UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES

SCHOOL OF LAW
J. HERNANDEZ AVENUE, NAGA CITY 4400

AIDS IN THE CONSTRUCTION

AND RULES IN CONFLICTING STATUTES

by
Gerald A. Espares

A TERM PAPER FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

prepared for Judge Rene Dela Cruz

November 14, 2019

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AIDS IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND RULES

IN CONFLICTING STATUTES

The law is blameless. It’s only a tool, nothing more, in the hands of a saint, it will bring

salvation, in the hands of a tyrant, it will reap the lives of the innocent. — It is an establish

criterion of a state particularly in democratic or republican context that the law regulates the

harmonious operation of the government, the people and the society — it attends as an

interference in solving every predicaments involving mild or coarse problematic situations by

delivering due process to the aggressed victims of oppression, unreasonableness and injustice,

as well, by providing necessary consequences to the persons who fostered evil acts and

intentions. On this purpose, settled is that, the law gives birth to its own spirit.

Be that as it may, but what happens when the resolved or the spirit of the law appears

to be uncertain?

It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience that circumstances when the

law is unclear, ambiguous, silent or susceptible from misperception or when there are

conflicting statutes, it is said that it is justice, truth and fairness that should always govern. In

fact, the same situation seemed to be much extensive in applying actual construction.

The task of interpretation however then arises when indeed the language is not only

plain but also admits of but one meaning, although their difficulty may sometimes vary it is

nevertheless a conceivable and effective measure in ascertaining the true intent of the framers

of our legislature to take it from the deeply rooted rules and well accepted aids of construction

to circumvent the misapplication of the law and widely deliver the earnestness of the same.
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I. INTRINSIC AIDS

These are the tools that one can used in interpreting the provision of the law. Generally,

they are found within the statute itself which includes the title, preamble, text and punctuations.

A. Title

The Constitution mandates that “every law passed by the congress shall have only one

subject matter which shall be embraced in the title thereof” [1]. The title of the statute not only

provides insight on the context of the law but also serves as aid or instrument to its construction

and in ascertaining the legislative intent on cases of which ambiguity and doubt arises.

In the case of Ebarle v. Sucaldito, [2] petitioner was then the provincial governor

of Zamboanga and a running candidate for re-election when the Anti-Graft League of

the Philippines filed complaint against him for violation of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft Law

and the Articles 171, 182, 183, 213 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The issue raised

at bar is whether or not EO 264 entitled “Outlining the procedure by which complaints

charging government officials and employees with commission of irregularities should

[3]
be guided” is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to criminal

complaints. The Supreme Court however held that the title of EO 264 is of

“Commission of Irregularities” speaks only of the commission of irregularities and not

criminal offenses. Therefore, the petition was then dismissed.

In this case, it serves as illustration to the rule that in case of ambiguity of the statute

one can resort in looking from the title of the law to understand its content. It should be clear

however, that if the statute is free from doubt it is improper to take it from its title just to make

it complicated or obscure.
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B. Preamble

It is in nature of prefatory statement that gives the preliminary explanation of the statue,

found in the opening paragraph which also summarizes the intention, reason, motive and

objective which are sought to be achieved by the legislators in enacting the law.

Although the preamble is not an integral part of the statute and it cannot confer or

enlarge powers since it only a mere recital of the intent and mischief of the framers, it may still

play as a key on cases whenever the statute is open to doubt where it can give restrictions to

the broad scope and meaning of the statute.

[4]
In the case of People v. Echavez, the petitioner filed with the lower court

against 16 persons charging them with squatting as penalized in Presidential Decree

772. The respondent Echavez then dismissed the case on the ground that the accused

access the land only by stealth and not by means of inflicting force, intimidation, threat

or taking advantage of the absence of the owner as described in the P.D. 772. The issue

was raised on whether or not P.D. 772 penalizes squatting also apply to agricultural

lands. The court answered in negative stating the preamble of the P.D. 772 shows that

it was intended only to apply to squatting in “urban communities” [5]

and does not

involve posture lands in “rural areas”.

In this case, it serves as illustrative example that when in doubt of the clear intent of the

law, it is an effective measure to resort in finding the purpose stated in its preamble to set out

the real intention of legislature. It is therefore, clearly permissible to it as an aid to construing

the enacting provisions. Provided, that is only when it conveys a clear and definite meaning in

comparison with obscure enacting words of the statute that the preamble may legitimately

prevail or be given application.

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C. Text

The intention of the legislature must primarily be determined from the language of the

statute itself available therein. Such language consists of words, phrases and sentences used in

the statute.

In the case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Manila v. Social Security

[6]
Commission, the petitioner thru counsel filed with Social Security Commission a

request that Catholic charities and all religious and charitable institutions operated by

the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila be exempted from the coverage of R.A.

11611 otherwise know as Social Security Law of 1954 arguing that the said act is a

Labor and does not covers religious and charitable institutions. The issue was raised on

whether or not Catholic charities and religious charitable institutions maybe exempted

from the coverage of Social Security System under R.A. 11611. The court nevertheless

ruled denying the petition stating that the “employer, employee and employment” [7]

have been clearly defined in R.A. 11611 sections c, d and j respectively and no part of

their definition nor in the limitations enumerated did the law give exemption to Catholic

charities and religious and charitable institutions.

In this case, the word of the statute may give different meaning from its usual or

ordinary sense, thus the meaning as prescribed or defined by the context of the statute must

always be taken into account in governing the actual intent of the law. Provided however, that

in construing the text of the statute as a guide on ascertaining its intent, every section, provision

or clause enumerated therein be taken also in general consideration of the act as a whole in

relation to one another and not from any single part.

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D. Punctuation Marks

These are symbols that are used to aid the clarity and comprehension of a written

language such as comma, a semi-colon and a period. It also gives the state a meaning which is

reasonable and in accord to the intention of the framer.

A comma indicates the division or independence of the preceding word from another,

in relation to their meaning or thought. A semi-colon indicate that the word has relation to the

same matter which precedes it. Generally, both are not indicative to introduce new idea. A

period however, used to indicate the end of a sentence.

This is clearly expressed in the case of People v. Subido [8] where the accused-

appellant was found guilty of libel therefore prescribing him the sentence of 3 months

of Arresto Mayor with accessory penalties and a fine of P500 and amount of P10,000

to indemnify the offended party and to pay the cost with subsidiary imprisonment in

case of insolvency. However, the Court of Appeals modified the judgement reducing

the indemnity amount and mention nothing of the subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency. Thus, accused-appellant filed with the trial court to recognize the decision

of Court of Appeals and to cancel his bond. The issue was raised on whether or not the

accused-appellant can serve the fine and indemnity prescribed in the judgement of

Court of Appeals in a form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The court

held affirming their decision and added that the use of comma (,) in the part of the

sentence is to make “the subsidiary imprisonment in case of solvency” refers not only

to non-payment of the indemnity but also to non-payment of the fine.

Note: In this case, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.

5465 already eliminated subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of civil

liability thus only applicable for fines.

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II. EXTRINSIC AIDS

These are the aids, extraneous facts and circumstances not found in the language of the

law. These includes history of the legislative enactments, dictionary, judicial decisions and

administrative regulations as well foreign jurisprudence. In determining the intention of the

legislature, the court should resort and exhaust first all the available intrinsic aids before taking

into consideration in resorting the extrinsic aids.

Extrinsic aids such as those mentioned above are entitled to respect and consideration

but subject to the discretion of the courts whether they are applicable or not to the case at bar.

A. History of the Legislative enactment

These are history which maybe found in the legislative committee reports taken during

hearing, legislative investigation or legislative debates. Although the individual statements by

members of Congress on the floor do not necessarily reflect legislative intent, however, if there

is a unanimous decision among them in respect to the objective sought by the enactment, their

opinions in debates may then be used as evidence of the purpose of the act.

The rule was illustrated in the case of US v. De Guzman [9] wherein the defendant

De Guzman along with Pedro and Serpio Macarling was convicted of murder and

sentenced to life imprisonment. De Guzman however, entered into an agreement with

the fiscal under terms which the promised to appear and testify as a witness for the

government at the trial of his co-accused and to tell the truth provided that information

was dismissed as to him and he will not be brought to trial, with the consent of the court

pursuant to the agreement he was then not arraigned. However, during the time he was

placed on the witness stand he argued that the statement he swore before justice of

peace was false it had been made through fear of a certain police officer where he also

denied all of his knowledge of the murder. The issue was raised on whether or not the
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defendant be discharged from prosecution even if did not comply to the sworn

agreement made prior from the trial which entitled him immunity as witness for the

States. The court then held that the defendant should not be discharged applying the

rule of statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of the original and

history of statutes, and looking at the legislative history of the statute under old system

of criminal procedure, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail

of the bar to criminal prosecution and failure of the defendant to carry out his

undertaking deprived him of the right to plead his dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.

B. Dictionary

Clearly, this is any reference or resource that list the words of language and provides

their natural, plain and ordinary meaning. Dictionary is however only for consultation in the

absence of any juridical guidance or authority and maybe called by the parties to supplement

their resources if they think it will fit especially where no strong reason actually exists why the

meaning of word in dictionary should not be adopted in interpreting the statute.

In the case of PNB v. Court of Appeals [10] in securing the payment of his loan

private-respondent mortgages two lots to petitioner bank. For failure to pay the

obligation, petitioner bank extra-juridically foreclosed the mortgage property and won

the highest bidder at the auction sale. A final deed of sale was registered in favor of the

petitioner bank and later sold to third party. The notices of sale of private respondent’s

foreclosed properties were published on a newspaper on March 28, April 11 and April

12 which falls on Friday, Friday and Saturday respectively. R.A. 3135 requires that the

notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive

weeks” [11]. The issue was raised on whether or not the petitioner bank complied with

the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extra-judicial foreclosure of

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mortgages. The court held in negative and conceded that Article 13 of the New Civil

Code is completely silent as to the definition of what is a week. The term week however

was interpreted to mean in ordinary sense as a period of time consisting of seven

consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins. The

petitioner bank failed to comply with the legal requirements of publication. Therefore,

the auction sale of petitioner bank is void and of no legal effect.

In this case, when the law does not define words in a statute and the legislature has not

intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words, the court in their sound discretion

may used or adopt the ordinary meaning of the word widely accepted by the majority.

C. Administrative Regulations

These are detailed directions developed or issued by administrative or executive

officers having the power to partake the nature of a statute to put such policy into practice.

However, administrative regulation is at best merely advisory, for it is still the court that finally

determine what the law means.

In the case of Victoria’s Milling Company Inc. v Social Security Commission

[12]
the petitioner counsel questioned the validity of the Circular No. 22 requiring all

employees in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and

overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration arguing that it is

contrary to previous Circular No. 7 which includes overtime pay and bonus in the

computation of the employer’s and the employees’ respective monthly premium

contributions. The issue was raised on whether or not Circular 22 is a rule or regulation

as contemplated in R.A. 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt,

amend and repeal the subject to the approval of the President as maybe necessary to
[13]
carry out the provisions and purposes of this act”. The court held affirming the
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employers and employees concerned with the interpretation of the law as amended

which was needed to be enforced. The commission simply stated their opinion as to

how the law should be construed and does not requires presidential approval nor

publication to Official Gazette. Whereas, it only renders an opinion or a statement of

policy and merely interprets a pre-existing law.

Administrative construction is not necessary binding upon the courts and maybe set

aside by them if there’s an error of law or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction which is not

in relation to the spirit of legislative enactment. In the present case at bar however, the

administrative construction was authorized, appears to be reasonable and promulgated in

accordance with the prescribed procedure.

D. Judicial Decisions or Precedents

Under this rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decision is

generally binding on the courts and should followed in similar case. It is not however

universally applicable, especially on cases if grievous wrong may result and the court should

not then follow or apply previous decisions which are already erroneous.

In the case of JM Tuason and Co. et. al v. Mariano et. al. [14] The court likewise

applied the juridical decisions in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735
[15] [16]
such as the case provided in Benin v. Tuason , Alcantara v. Tuason where the

court ruled that the OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared valid.

IV. CONFLICTING STATUTES

To the extent possible, statutes should be harmonized and not read as creating a conflict.

However, a conflict may still exist if one statute allows what another prohibits or prohibits
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what another allows.

A. BASIC GUIDELINES

It may happen that in a statute, conflicting clauses and provisions may arise. If such

situation may ensue, the statute must be interpreted as a whole. (Agpalo, 2003)

B. STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA & INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE

LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS

Statutes in Pari Materia are when statutes relate upon the same specific matter or

subject. If the statute is ambiguous, the court may apply this canon and look to the rest of the

statute on the surrounding statutes to determine the meaning of the ambiguous statute.

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus is an expressed rule

in statutory construction that every statute must be construed to reconcile them with other

statutes to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

In the case of Chin Ah Foo v. Concepcion, [17] it was held that Article 12 of the

Revised Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the

Administrative Court. Thus, Article 12 of the RPC and section 1048 of the

Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together. Therefore, the

Director of Health has no power to release without proper judicial authority on any

person confined by the order of the court in an asylum. Equally, the respondent Judge

cannot discharge the person in asylum until the views of the Director of Health have

been ascertained as to whether or not the person maybe released without danger.

In this case at bar, although the two laws are in apparent conflict, they are nevertheless

deemed enacted relating to the same subject and expressed purpose of national policy. The duty

of the court if possible, should harmonize them by reasonable construction and both be
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construed that their effect should be given to every provision of each because they are

nonetheless equally handiwork of the same legislature.

C. GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES

A general statute is one that embraces a subject which applies to all people of the state

affecting the entire community. Special statute on the other hand, is one which embraces only

a particular person or subject and must only be applicable therewith and does not extend to

another subject. Generally, a special and general law on the same subject are statutes in pari

materia and therefore should accordingly be read together and harmonize if possible, with a

view to giving effect to both.

It is an established rule however, that where there are two acts; one of general and

another is special and if both statutes are irreconcilable, the general statute must give way to

the special or particular provisions since it indicates and particularly vindicate the intent of the

legislature more clearly than that of a general provisions which presupposes that it gives more

attention to the specified subject. This principle does not change regardless that the special law

comes before or after the general act unless otherwise the legislature clearly intended the later

general enactment to cover the whole subject and repeal other laws inconsistent to it or when

the special law merely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a specific and

special rule.

In the case of City of Manila v. Teotico, [18] the petitioner filed a complaint for

damages against the City of Manila including its mayor, city engineer, health officer,

treasurers and chief of police. The issue was raised on whether or not the City of Manila

is liable for damages. The court is clear on this matter and held affirming that the City

of Manila should pay the petitioner for the damages inflicted to him asserting that

Article 2189 of the New Civil Code constitutes particular prescription making
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“provinces, cities and municipalities” x x x “liable for damages for the death of, or

injury suffered by any person by reason” x x x specifically “of the defective conditions

of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control

or supervision”. In other words, Article 2189 of NCC govern liability due to “defective

streets” in particular than of the Charter of Manila. Although, it is true that in case of

conflict, a special law prevails over a general law and that the Charter of Manila is a

special law while the New Civil Code is a general law, it was however mentioned in

particular provision of each law concerned that Charter of Manila establishes a general

rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila and there is no particular exemption

but merely a general exemption of the liabilities arising from negligence. On the other

hand, Article 2189 of NCC provides a particular presumption on liabilities due to

“defective streets”.

In this case at bar, it is clear that when there is a conflict between two statutory

provisions of a general statement and a specific statement, the court shall apply the more

specific statement serving as an exemption to the general statement.

D. WHEN HARMONIZATION NO LONGER POSSIBLE

If there’s a conflict between two or more laws relating on the subject and cannot be

possibly be reconciled or harmonized, the rule is that one must yield to the later one, it being

the later expression of legislative will. (Agpalo, 2003)

Take for example when a provision took effect on January 2018 and the other

one took effect in January 2019, the latter statute of 2019 that most recently took effect

controls.
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WORKS CITED

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2003

FOOTNOTES

1. Philippine Constitution Art. VI Sec. 26 (1) 1987

2. Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987

3. (Sgd.) Ferdinand Marcos, Executive Order No. 264, s. 1970

4. People v. Echaves, G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

5. Presidential Decree No. 772 August 20, 1975

6. In Re: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No.

L-15045 January 20, 1961

7. Republic Act No. 1161 June 18, 1954

8. People v. Subido, G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975

9. US v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-9144 March 27, 1915

10. PNB v. Court of Appeals, 222 Scra 134, May 17, 1993

11. Republic Act No. 3135, March 6, 1924

12. Victoria’s Milling Company Inc. v Social Security Commission, G.R. No. L-16704

March 17, 1962

13. Republic Act No. 1161 June 18, 1954

14. JM Tuason and Co. et. al v. Mariano et. al., G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978

15. Benin v. Tuason, G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

16. Alcantara v. Tuason, G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974

17. Chin Ah Foo v. Concepcion, G.R. No. L-33281 March 31, 1930

18. City of Manila v. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968