Page 1 of 41

The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded
the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose,
Republic of the Philippines Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No.
SUPREME COURT 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. 'B'). On May 12, 1975, said vessel
Manila arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of
the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana
SECOND DIVISION disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier.
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989 over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, '2') between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
vs. and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS.
ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its
CORPORATION, respondents. crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and
one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it
Herenio E. Martinez for petitioner. started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the
crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already
disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his
M.R. Villaluz Law Office for private respondent. cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it
was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place
where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him
between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter
brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter,
REGALADO, J.:
on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death
Certificate (Exh. "C") being "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review of the traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder"
decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal portion of which (See also Exh. "B"). For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other
reads: miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife, herein plaintiff, spent a total
of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E", "E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto Viana who was
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of only forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E')
October 27, 1982, is hereby affirmed with the modification that was in good health. His average annual income as a farmer or a farm
appellant Aboitiz Shipping is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellees supervisor was 400 cavans of palay annually. His parents, herein
the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; actual plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death had been
damages of P9,800.00; P150,000.00 for unearned income; P7,200.00 recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly.
as support for deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as moral damages; Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they
had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos. 2
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by respondent
court, are as follows: .
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint 3 for damages against petitioner corporation
(Aboitiz, for brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.

In its answer. 4 Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the
vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
(Pioneer, for short) as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the
unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane
operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-
servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint 5 against Pioneer
imputing liability thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the
negligence of the crane operator who was an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control
and supervision.
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, 6 raised the defenses that Aboitiz had no
cause of action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for
breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer is not a party; that Pioneer had observed the
diligence of a good father of a family both in the selection and supervision of its employees as
well as in the prevention of damage or injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana;
that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the direct and proximate cause of his death; and
that the filing of the third-party complaint was premature by reason of the pendency of the
criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence filed against the crane operator, Alejo
Figueroa.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to pay the
Vianas for damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse Aboitiz for whatever
amount the latter paid the Vianas. The dispositive portion of said decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:
(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs
the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as
actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; F
5,000.00, value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years
for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's
parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art.
2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and
costs; and
(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
to reimburse defendant and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping
Page 2 of 41
Corporation the said amounts that it is ordered to pay to herein
plaintiffs.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they similarly
raised the trial court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross negligence
despite the overwhelming evidence presented in support thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged,
in opposition to Pioneer's motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the liability of
Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and
arising from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure
of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane
operator which the court a quo ruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the
memorandum of agreement supposedly refers only to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or
damage to goods handled by it but not in the case of personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz
cannot properly invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because its liability stems from a breach
of contract of carriage. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party
defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation is concerned rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs-,:
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic)
as actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years
for deceased's parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia
Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for
deceased's parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years
pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral
damages, and costs; and
(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for
(sic) any liability for the death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V
Antonia owned by defendant third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation it appearing that the negligence of its crane operator has
not been established therein.
Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the same to
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the
amount of damages awarded to the Vianas.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court erred:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La
Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is
applicable to the case in the face of the undisputable fact that the
factual situation under the La Mallorca case is radically different from
the facts obtaining in this case;
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of
the court a quo and confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of
Appeals that the deceased, Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory
negligence, which, We respectfully submit contributory negligence was
the proximate cause of his death; specifically the honorable respondent
Court of Appeals failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil Code;
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable
respondent Court of Appears that petitioner may be legally condemned
to pay damages to the private respondents we respectfully submit that
it committed a reversible error when it dismissed petitioner's third party
complaint against private respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
instead of compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for whatever
damages it may be compelled to pay to the private respondents
Vianas. 9
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals
found the victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the
negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the
unloading of cargoes which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's
death.
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto
Viana disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to
unload his cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no
longer reasonable e and he consequently ceased to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that
the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching
his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time
after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or
Page 3 of 41
a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12 The
carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported
has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's
premises to claim his baggage.13
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca
was enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and
passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And,
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still
a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his
brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and
without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother,
he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues
to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad
company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his
baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus.
Racquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father.
However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus
waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus
started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the
moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near
the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be
claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a
'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to
transport safely its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be
considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection
under their contract of carriage. 14

It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is
the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That
reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the
place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per
se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited
case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave
the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed
before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a
reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel.
We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than
other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the
number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger
volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship
passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel
and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his
luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the
bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes,
that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to
apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that
the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident
occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do,
from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its
passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their
baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already
disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the
time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In
consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour
allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten
off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked
an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to
claim his baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was
admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances,
the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic
death.
Page 4 of 41
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case. 15 More particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This gives
rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to
prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is,
the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, 18which, in the instant
case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence
while such relation subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury
the operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence, and it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers of common carriers
which can be carried out only by imposing a stringent statutory obligation upon the latter.
Concomitantly, this Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by
exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in
mind the welfare of the passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and
profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid
that petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to prevent the
accident from happening.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of
drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact
that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not
indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the
victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in
question was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the
supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the guard's
admonitions against entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into
insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was
exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing
to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their
purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can
such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be
exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law of
common carriers with respect to their passengers.
 Page 5 of 41

While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could
definitely have prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at
bar, 19 petitioner has expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals
that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the
deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to
claim otherwise.

No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's

declaration that there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a
confirmation of the trial court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being
absolved of any liability.

As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross
negligence of the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was
due to the negligence of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel
and for lack of evidence on its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it
readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading
operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff
therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing
its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the suit against it.
Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required
of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz.
This, of course, does not detract from what we have said that no negligence can be imputed
to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence
for the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991


DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO
CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL
CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by
Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.
Francisco S. Reyes Law Office for petitioners.
Antonio C. de Guzman for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against petitioners for
the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March
25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said
date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to
petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic
rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito
Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said
driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other
passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the
Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the
supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the
safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness
and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint plus an award of damages in their favor by way of a counterclaim.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of petitioners, with
this decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat
was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Nonetheless,
defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Pedrito Cudiamat the sum of
P10,000.00 which approximates the amount defendants initially offered said heirs for the
amicable settlement of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Page 6 of 41
Not satisfied therewith, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in a
decision 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19504 promulgated on August 14, 1990, set aside the decision
of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents:
1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for death of
the victim Pedrito Cudiamat;
2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;
3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as actual
and compensatory damages;
4. The costs of this suit. 4
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated October 4, 1990, 5 hence this petition with the central issue herein being whether
respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners
negligent and liable for the damages claimed.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a rule are final
and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is subject to settled
exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of
the trial court, in which case a reexamination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeal have discordant positions as to who
between the petitioners an the victim is guilty of negligence. Perforce, we have had to
conduct an evaluation of the evidence in this case for the prope calibration of their conflicting
factual findings and legal conclusions.
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was negligent, made the following findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a moving
vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And, without having given the
driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to board the bus. But defendants can
also be found wanting of the necessary diligence. In this connection, it is safe to assume that
when the deceased Cudiamat attempted to board defendants' bus, the vehicle's door was
open instead of being closed. This should be so, for it is hard to believe that one would even
attempt to board a vehicle (i)n motion if the door of said vehicle is closed. Here lies the
defendant's lack of diligence. Under such circumstances, equity demands that there must be
something given to the heirs of the victim to assuage their feelings. This, also considering that
initially, defendant common carrier had made overtures to amicably settle the case. It did offer
a certain monetary consideration to the victim's heirs. 7

However, respondent court, in arriving at a different opinion, declares that:
From the testimony of appellees'own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is evident
that the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat boarded the same as it
was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja alighted from the bus. Moreover,
contrary to the assertion of the appellees, the victim did indicate his intention to board the bus
as can be seen from the testimony of the said witness when he declared that Pedrito
Cudiamat was no longer walking and made a sign to board the bus when the latter was still at
a distance from him. It was at the instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella
at the platform of the bus when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver
commenced to accelerate the bus.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver in
prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure
his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus was at the time
slippery and wet because of a drizzle. The defendants-appellees utterly failed to observe their
duty and obligation as common carrier to the end that they should observe extra-ordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them according to the circumstances of each case (Article 1733, New Civil Code). 8
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the above
holding of the Court of Appeals. Its aforesaid findings are supported by the testimony of
petitioners' own witnesses. One of them, Virginia Abalos, testified on cross-examination as
follows:
Q It is not a fact Madam witness, that at bunkhouse 54, that is before the place of the
incident, there is a crossing?
A The way going to the mines but it is not being pass(ed) by the bus.
Q And the incident happened before bunkhouse 56, is that not correct?
A It happened between 54 and 53 bunkhouses. 9
The bus conductor, Martin Anglog, also declared:
Q When you arrived at Lepanto on March 25, 1985, will you please inform this Honorable
Court if there was anv unusual incident that occurred?
A When we delivered a baggage at Marivic because a person alighted there between
Bunkhouse 53 and 54.
Q What happened when you delivered this passenger at this particular place in Lepanto?
Page 7 of 41
A When we reached the place, a passenger alighted and I signalled my driver. When we
stopped we went out because I saw an umbrella about a split second and I signalled again
the driver, so the driver stopped and we went down and we saw Pedrito Cudiamat asking for
help because he was lying down.
Q How far away was this certain person, Pedrito Cudiamat, when you saw him lying down —
from the bus how far was he?
A It is about two to three meters.
Q On what direction of the bus was he found about three meters from the bus, was it at the
front or at the back?
A At the back, sir. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the
passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct.
They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown
by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it
stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of
negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the
victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to
board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no
necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public
utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it
becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that
would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board
the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. 11
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to
afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered
by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
while they are doing so. 12
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same
cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the
testimony of the aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just started"
and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its
platform. 13

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar
which is moving slowly. 14 An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board
the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers
board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver
and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered
a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual
relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its
patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. 15
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordina diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to
all the circumstances of each case. 16 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 17
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court
need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to
hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the
carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely
and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any
injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be
stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus could
have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead opted to first
proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a refrigerator, despite the
serious condition of the victim. The vacuous reason given by petitioners that it was the wife of
the deceased who caused the delay was tersely and correctly confuted by respondent court:
... The pretension of the appellees that the delay was due to the fact that they had to wait for
about twenty minutes for Inocencia Cudiamat to get dressed deserves scant consideration. It
is rather scandalous and deplorable for a wife whose husband is at the verge of dying to have
the luxury of dressing herself up for about twenty minutes before attending to help her
distressed and helpless husband. 19
Page 8 of 41
Further, it cannot be said that the main intention of petitioner Lardizabal in going to Bunk 70
was to inform the victim's family of the mishap, since it was not said bus driver nor the
conductor but the companion of the victim who informed his family thereof. 20 In fact, it was
only after the refrigerator was unloaded that one of the passengers thought of sending
somebody to the house of the victim, as shown by the testimony of Virginia Abalos again, to
wit:
Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?
A I asked them to bring it down because that is the nearest place to our house and
when I went down and asked somebody to bring down the refrigerator, I also asked
somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat.
COURT:
Q Why did you ask somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A Because Mr. Cudiamat met an accident, so I ask somebody to call for the family of
Mr. Cudiamat.
Q But nobody ask(ed) you to call for the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A No sir. 21
With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by respondent
Court of Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross income of the victim.
The rule is that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a tort is not the loss of the
entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would
have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered,
that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and minus living and other incidental expenses. 22
We are of the opinion that the deductible living and other expense of the deceased may fairly
and reasonably be fixed at P500.00 a month or P6,000.00 a year. In adjudicating the actual or
compensatory damages, respondent court found that the deceased was 48 years old, in good
health with a remaining productive life expectancy of 12 years, and then earning P24,000.00
a year. Using the gross annual income as the basis, and multiplying the same by 12 years, it
accordingly awarded P288,000. Applying the aforestated rule on computation based on the
net earnings, said award must be, as it hereby is, rectified and reduced to P216,000.00.
However, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the death indemnity is hereby
increased to P50,000.00. 23
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
 Page 9 of 41

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents .

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo
Roman, et. al., which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and
finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account
of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks,
Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist
fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between
the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming
in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of
P50,000.00;
Page 10 of 41
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of
Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable
thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants
from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and
the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim
entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting
the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that
there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad
failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned
and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted
petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application
of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.

The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10
October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate
court; viz:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO
ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual
findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the
presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners
would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks,
was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would
add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified
being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract
of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station
and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under
a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable
for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a
common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. [4] The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
Page 11 of 41
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. [5] Such duty of a
common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course
of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to
be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. [6] The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts
of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury,
the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of
its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the
carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, [10] an exception from the
general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either
case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
 Page 12 of 41

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort
under the provisions of Article 2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,
[13]
of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on
the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made
liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one
hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.[15]In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. [16] Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that
there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the
case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of Republic of the Philippines
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the SUPREME COURT
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter Manila
and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or vs.
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. [18] It is an established rule that nominal G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.[19] Ahmed Garcia for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R,
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs. holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al.,
P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual
SO ORDERED.
damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their
minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2
years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953

Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for
Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages
containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-
brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full
fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe,
since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's
rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers
bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to
the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the
first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to
a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the
vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he
had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father.
While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to
hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its
trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal
to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano
Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled
about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the
running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the
road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise
time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the
ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the
defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral
damages and actual damages sustained as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on
the merits, the court below rendered the judgment in question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of
carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as
compensatory damages representing burial expenses and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of
contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a
passenger of the bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had
already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found
the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the
negligence of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of
Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the
plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it
liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of contract,
Page 13 of 41
and (2) in raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents
did not appeal from the decision of the lower court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding
petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out
that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including
the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or
unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle
(which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the
seats of the bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he
returned to the bus for his bayongwhich was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and
carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and
passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the
carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. 1 The issue to be
determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about
5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of
carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at
the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier
at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a
person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a
passenger.2 So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by
the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the
report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without
intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection
of the railroad and company and its agents.3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus
awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even
he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the
child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be
claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions
person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run
the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still
unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence
of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be
considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage.
 Page 14 of 41

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads —
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs'
daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport
plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the
operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while
incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section
2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the
alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in
controversy may be resolved and determined.4
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs'
daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also
proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the
proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of
the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence
of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And THIRD DIVISION
this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. [G.R. No. 118664. August 7, 1998]
Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child Raquel JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS ENRIQUE AGANA,
Beltran. MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA, ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, MIRANDA, respondents .
however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and DECISION
consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal ROMERO, J .:
from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL) seeking the
the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [1] which affirmed with modification the award
plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of of damages made by the trial court in favor of herein private respondents Enrique Agana,
the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose Miranda.
exception to the general rule.5Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San
Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently, Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents
meritorious.1äwphï1.ñët Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both
petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense,
death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as actual damages. No costs thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
in this instance. So ordered. Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel
Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey,
went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it
inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel
expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the
private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due to NAIAs
indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer
defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were
forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from
June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when
they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991,
commenced an action for damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104.[2] To support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live
up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay
for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In
other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they
were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that
airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to
force majeure.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents
holding JAL liable for damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan
Airlines to pay the plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and Maria Angela Nina Agana
the sum of One million Two Hundred forty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos
(P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred
sixteen and 31/100 (P320,616.31) as actual, moral and exemplary damages and pay
attorneys fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and to pay the
costs of suit.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which, however, with the
exception of lowering the damages awarded affirmed the trial courts finding,[3] thus:
Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each
of the plaintiffs, the exemplary damages to P300,000.00 and the attorneys fees
to P100,000.00 plus the costs.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. [4]
Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder
the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final
destination, even if the delay were caused by force majeure.
To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from
proceeding to Manila on schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such event
can be considered as force majeure since their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable to
JAL.[5]
Page 15 of 41
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the
delayed arrival in Manila, it was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their
unexpected stay in Narita since airlines have the obligation to ensure the comfort and
convenience of its passengers. While we sympathize with the private respondents plight, we
are unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a
contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public
interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care
and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its
passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for
all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise
would render the defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and
ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of
force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance.[6] Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to
the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is
undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected
overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating
experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety
during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or
negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the
absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by
reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
mode of travel.[7] In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are
some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must
assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks. [8]
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of force majeure, still ruled against
JAL relying in our decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting
standard required by law. Undisputably, PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather
was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its
passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country,
PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one
case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carriers premises. Hence,
PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the
comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final
destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between
 Page 16 of 41

government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private
respondent was a stranger to the place.
The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the
instant petition. In that case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the diversion of
the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened when private respondents
(passenger) was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with
PAL personnel,[10] not to mention the apparent apathy of the PAL station manager as to the
predicament of the stranded passengers.[11] In light of these circumstances, we held that if the
fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carriers employees, an
action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for private respondents,
none of these conditions are present in the instant petition.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must
be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their
final destination. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents living
expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to
make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available
connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort
and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from transit
passengers to new passengers as a result of which private respondents were obliged to Republic of the Philippines
make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private SUPREME COURT
respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves Manila
of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of EN BANC
June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that G.R. No. L-49188 January 30, 1990
they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to vs.
June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RICARDO D. GALANO, Court of First
it would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIAs closure, that JAL flight operations Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, Deputy Sheriff, Court of
would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its First Instance, Manila, and AMELIA TAN, respondents.
obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first
available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the
United States to Manila as their final destination. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated Behind the simple issue of validity of an alias writ of execution in this case is a more
in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may fundamental question. Should the Court allow a too literal interpretation of the Rules with an
be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. open invitation to knavery to prevail over a more discerning and just approach? Should we
[12]
The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source not apply the ancient rule of statutory construction that laws are to be interpreted by the spirit
enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.[13] which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth?
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
22, 1993 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby 07695 entitled "Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Hon. Judge Ricardo D. Galano, et al.", dismissing
DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered to pay each of the private respondents the petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila which
nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorneys fees of P50,000.00 issued an alias writ of execution against the petitioner.
plus costs. The petition involving the alias writ of execution had its beginnings on November 8, 1967,
SO ORDERED. when respondent Amelia Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing Press commenced a
complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 71307, entitled Amelia Tan, et al. v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 13, then presided over by the late
Judge Jesus P. Morfe rendered judgment on June 29, 1972, in favor of private respondent
Amelia Tan and against petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines:
1. On the first cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as actual
damages, with legal interest thereon from plaintiffs extra-judicial demand made by the letter
of July 20, 1967;
2. On the third cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P18,200.00, representing
the unrealized profit of 10% included in the contract price of P200,000.00 plus legal interest
thereon from July 20,1967;
3. On the fourth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as and for
moral damages, with legal interest thereon from July 20, 1 967;
4. On the sixth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 damages as
and for attorney's fee.
Plaintiffs second and fifth causes of action, and defendant's counterclaim, are dismissed.
With costs against the defendant. (CA Rollo, p. 18)
On July 28, 1972, the petitioner filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51079-R.
On February 3, 1977, the appellate court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that PAL is condemned to pay plaintiff the sum of
P25,000.00 as damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee, judgment is affirmed, with costs.
(CA Rollo, p. 29)
Notice of judgment was sent by the Court of Appeals to the trial court and on dates
subsequent thereto, a motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent Amelia Tan, duly
opposed by petitioner PAL.
On May 23,1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution denying the respondent's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the judgment became final and executory
and on May 31, 1977, judgment was correspondingly entered in the case.
The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and on September 2,1977,
respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. On October 11, 1977, the trial court, presided
over by Judge Galano, issued its order of execution with the corresponding writ in favor of the
respondent. The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes of Branch 13 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila for enforcement.
Four months later, on February 11, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of
an alias writ of execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed
with modification by the Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied.
On March 1, 1978, the petitioner filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to plaintiff through the
deputy sheriff of the respondent court, Emilio Z. Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers
properly signed and receipted by said Emilio Z. Reyes.
Page 17 of 41
On March 3,1978, the Court of Appeals denied the issuance of the alias writ for being
premature, ordering the executing sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes to appear with his return and
explain the reason for his failure to surrender the amounts paid to him by petitioner PAL.
However, the order could not be served upon Deputy Sheriff Reyes who had absconded or
disappeared.
On March 28, 1978, motion for the issuance of a partial alias writ of execution was filed by
respondent Amelia Tan.
On April 19, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion to withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias
Writ of Execution" with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution. On May 1, 1978, the
respondent Judge issued an order which reads:
As prayed for by counsel for the plaintiff, the Motion to Withdraw 'Motion for Partial Alias Writ
of Execution with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution is hereby granted, and the
motion for partial alias writ of execution is considered withdrawn.
Let an Alias Writ of Execution issue against the defendant for the fall satisfaction of the
judgment rendered. Deputy Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario is hereby appointed Special Sheriff
for the enforcement thereof. (CA Rollo, p. 34)
On May 18, 1978, the petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution issued on
the same day directing Special Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario to levy on execution in the sum of
P25,000.00 with legal interest thereon from July 20,1967 when respondent Amelia Tan made
an extra-judicial demand through a letter. Levy was also ordered for the further sum of
P5,000.00 awarded as attorney's fees.
On May 23, 1978, the petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution
stating that no return of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes and
that the judgment debt had already been fully satisfied by the petitioner as evidenced by the
cash vouchers signed and receipted by the server of the writ of execution, Deputy Sheriff
Emilio Z. Reyes.
On May 26,1978, the respondent Jaime K. del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the
depository bank of petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust Company, Rosario Branch, Binondo,
Manila, through its manager and garnished the petitioner's deposit in the said bank in the
total amount of P64,408.00 as of May 16, 1978. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., on the grounds that:
I
AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION CANNOT BE ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR RETURN OF
THE ORIGINAL WRIT BY THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER.
II
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER AS DIRECTED IN THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION CONSTITUTES SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.
III
INTEREST IS NOT PAYABLE WHEN THE DECISION IS SILENT AS TO THE PAYMENT
THEREOF.
IV
SECTION 5, RULE 39, PARTICULARLY REFERS TO LEVY OF PROPERTY OF
JUDGMENT DEBTOR AND DISPOSAL OR SALE THEREOF TO SATISFY JUDGMENT.

Can an alias writ of execution be issued without a prior return of the original writ by the
implementing officer?
We rule in the affirmative and we quote the respondent court's decision with approval:
The issuance of the questioned alias writ of execution under the circumstances here
obtaining is justified because even with the absence of a Sheriffs return on the original writ,
the unalterable fact remains that such a return is incapable of being obtained (sic) because
the officer who is to make the said return has absconded and cannot be brought to the Court
despite the earlier order of the court for him to appear for this purpose. (Order of Feb. 21,
1978, Annex C, Petition). Obviously, taking cognizance of this circumstance, the order of May
11, 1978 directing the issuance of an alias writ was therefore issued. (Annex D. Petition). The
need for such a return as a condition precedent for the issuance of an alias writ was justifiably
dispensed with by the court below and its action in this regard meets with our concurrence. A
contrary view will produce an abhorent situation whereby the mischief of an erring officer of
the court could be utilized to impede indefinitely the undisputed and awarded rights which a
prevailing party rightfully deserves to obtain and with dispatch. The final judgment in this case
should not indeed be permitted to become illusory or incapable of execution for an indefinite
and over extended period, as had already transpired. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere debet (A judgment ought not to be
illusory it ought to have its proper effect).
Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for
execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law (Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 8 SCRA 59 [1963]; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 697, 698 [1967]). A judgment cannot be rendered
nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested rights were
never intended to rest on the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform
the court and the parties, of any and all actions taken under the writ of execution. Where such
information can be established in some other manner, the absence of an executing officer's
return will not preclude a judgment from being treated as discharged or being executed
through an alias writ of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the case at bar. Where
the return cannot be expected to be forthcoming, to require the same would be to compel the
enforcement of rights under a judgment to rest on an impossibility, thereby allowing the total
avoidance of judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to
other writs of execution (Government of the Philippines v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil.
318). It is a well known legal maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect,
sues his case vainly.
More important in the determination of the propriety of the trial court's issuance of an alias
writ of execution is the issue of satisfaction of judgment.
Under the peculiar circumstances surrounding this case, did the payment made to the
absconding sheriff by check in his name operate to satisfy the judgment debt? The Court
rules that the plaintiff who has won her case should not be adjudged as having sued in vain.
To decide otherwise would not only give her an empty but a pyrrhic victory.
It should be emphasized that under the initial judgment, Amelia Tan was found to have been
wronged by PAL.
She filed her complaint in 1967.
Page 18 of 41
After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeals, Ms. Tan won her case.
It is now 1990.
Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a centavo of what the courts have
solemnly declared as rightfully hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has
been deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid from the start, before 1967,
without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all because PAL did not issue the
checks intended for her, in her name.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by
check in his name did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.
In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to
the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides:
Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or
his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express
or implied, to receive the particular payment (Ulen v. Knecttle 50 Wyo 94, 58 [2d] 446, 111
ALR 65). Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a
rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment
is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a discharge
(Hendry v. Benlisa 37 Fla. 609, 20 SO 800,34 LRA 283). The receipt of money due on
ajudgment by an officer authorized by law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt (See 40
Am Jm 729, 25; Hendry v. Benlisa supra; Seattle v. Stirrat 55 Wash. 104 p. 834,24 LRA [NS]
1275).
The theory is where payment is made to a person authorized and recognized by the creditor,
the payment to such a person so authorized is deemed payment to the creditor. Under
ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff
should be valid payment to extinguish the judgment debt.
There are circumstances in this case, however, which compel a different conclusion.
The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender
but in checks. The checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the
absconding sheriff.
Did such payments extinguish the judgment debt?
Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not
possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when
through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.
In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.
In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of
a debt or obligation in money (US v. Robertson, 5 Pet. [US] 641, 8 L. ed. 257) and unless the
parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in
lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt (Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md.. 312, 29 A 527, 25
LRA 200,47 Am. St. Rep. 402). Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by

consent of the obligee a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than money in
payment of an obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance
by the sheriff of the petitioner's checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a
discharge of the judgment debt.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of
such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment (See. 189, Act 2031 on Negs.
Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco v.
Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary cheek,
is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of
payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does
not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and
remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249,
Civil Code, par. 3).
If bouncing checks had been issued in the name of Amelia Tan and not the Sheriff's, there
would have been no payment. After dishonor of the checks, Ms. Tan could have run after
other properties of PAL. The theory is that she has received no value for what had been
awarded her. Because the checks were drawn in the name of Emilio Z. Reyes, neither has
she received anything. The same rule should apply.
It is argued that if PAL had paid in cash to Sheriff Reyes, there would have been payment in
full legal contemplation. The reasoning is logical but is it valid and proper? Logic has its limits
in decision making. We should not follow rulings to their logical extremes if in doing so we
arrive at unjust or absurd results.
In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in cheeks.
And second, payment in cash always carries with it certain cautions. Nobody hands over big
amounts of cash in a careless and inane manner. Mature thought is given to the possibility of
the cash being lost, of the bearer being waylaid or running off with what he is carrying for
another. Payment in checks is precisely intended to avoid the possibility of the money going
to the wrong party. The situation is entirely different where a Sheriff seizes a car, a tractor, or
a piece of land. Logic often has to give way to experience and to reality. Having paid with
checks, PAL should have done so properly.
Payment in money or cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of
the judgment debt but the Court has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors
should settle their obligations by turning over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to sheriffs
and other executing officers. Payment in cash would result in damage or interminable
litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash in his hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, therefore, the courts encourage the practice of payments by cheek
provided adequate controls are instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal
or disbursement of funds. If particularly big amounts are involved, escrow arrangements with
a bank and carefully supervised by the court would be the safer procedure. Actual transfer of
funds takes place within the safety of bank premises. These practices are perfectly legal. The
object is always the safe and incorrupt execution of the judgment.
It is, indeed, out of the ordinary that checks intended for a particular payee are made out in
the name of another. Making the checks payable to the judgment creditor would have
prevented the encashment or the taking of undue advantage by the sheriff, or any person into
Page 19 of 41
whose hands the checks may have fallen, whether wrongfully or in behalf of the creditor. The
issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made possible the misappropriation
of the funds that were withdrawn.
As explained and held by the respondent court:
... [K]nowing as it does that the intended payment was for the private party respondent Amelia
Tan, the petitioner corporation, utilizing the services of its personnel who are or should be
knowledgeable about the accepted procedures and resulting consequences of the checks
drawn, nevertheless, in this instance, without prudence, departed from what is generally
observed and done, and placed as payee in the checks the name of the errant Sheriff and not
the name of the rightful payee. Petitioner thereby created a situation which permitted the said
Sheriff to personally encash said checks and misappropriate the proceeds thereof to his
exclusive personal benefit. For the prejudice that resulted, the petitioner himself must bear
the fault. The judicial guideline which we take note of states as follows:
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of
trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. (Blondeau, et
al. v. Nano, et al., L-41377, July 26, 1935, 61 Phil. 625)
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself, the judgment debtor whose
act made possible the loss had but itself to blame.
The attention of this Court has been called to the bad practice of a number of executing
officers, of requiring checks in satisfaction of judgment debts to be made out in their own
names. If a sheriff directs a judgment debtor to issue the checks in the sheriff's name,
claiming he must get his commission or fees, the debtor must report the sheriff immediately to
the court which ordered the execution or to the Supreme Court for appropriate disciplinary
action. Fees, commissions, and salaries are paid through regular channels. This improper
procedure also allows such officers, who have sixty (60) days within which to make a return,
to treat the moneys as their personal finds and to deposit the same in their private accounts
to earn sixty (60) days interest, before said finds are turned over to the court or judgment
creditor (See Balgos v. Velasco, 108 SCRA 525 [1981]). Quite as easily, such officers could
put up the defense that said checks had been issued to them in their private or personal
capacity. Without a receipt evidencing payment of the judgment debt, the misappropriation of
finds by such officers becomes clean and complete. The practice is ingenious but evil as it
unjustly enriches court personnel at the expense of litigants and the proper administration of
justice. The temptation could be far greater, as proved to be in this case of the absconding
sheriff. The correct and prudent thing for the petitioner was to have issued the checks in the
intended payee's name.
The pernicious effects of issuing checks in the name of a person other than the intended
payee, without the latter's agreement or consent, are as many as the ways that an artful mind
could concoct to get around the safeguards provided by the law on negotiable instruments.
An angry litigant who loses a case, as a rule, would not want the winning party to get what he
won in the judgment. He would think of ways to delay the winning party's getting what has
been adjudged in his favor. We cannot condone that practice especially in cases where the
courts and their officers are involved.1âwphi1 We rule against the petitioner.
Anent the applicability of Section 15, Rule 39, as follows:

Section 15. Execution of money judgments. — The officer must enforce an execution of a
money judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and nature
whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from
execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if they be sufficient, and selling the
same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will
satisfy the judgment. ...
the respondent court held:
We are obliged to rule that the judgment debt cannot be considered satisfied and therefore
the orders of the respondent judge granting the alias writ of execution may not be
pronounced as a nullity.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear and manifest that after levy or garnishment, for a judgment to be executed there is
the requisite of payment by the officer to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and none such payment had been concededly made yet
by the absconding Sheriff to the private respondent Amelia Tan. The ultimate and essential
step to complete the execution of the judgment not having been performed by the City Sheriff,
the judgment debt legally and factually remains unsatisfied.
Strictly speaking execution cannot be equated with satisfaction of a judgment. Under unusual
circumstances as those obtaining in this petition, the distinction comes out clearly.
Execution is the process which carries into effect a decree or judgment (Painter v. Berglund,
31 Cal. App. 2d. 63, 87 P 2d 360, 363; Miller v. London, 294 Mass 300, 1 NE 2d 198, 200;
Black's Law Dictionary), whereas the satisfaction of a judgment is the payment of the amount
of the writ, or a lawful tender thereof, or the conversion by sale of the debtor's property into an
amount equal to that due, and, it may be done otherwise than upon an execution (Section 47,
Rule 39). Levy and delivery by an execution officer are not prerequisites to the satisfaction of
a judgment when the same has already been realized in fact (Section 47, Rule 39). Execution
is for the sheriff to accomplish while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve.
Section 15, Rule 39 merely provides the sheriff with his duties as executing officer including
delivery of the proceeds of his levy on the debtor's property to satisfy the judgment debt. It is
but to stress that the implementing officer's duty should not stop at his receipt of payments
but must continue until payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.
Finally, we find no error in the respondent court's pronouncement on the inclusion of interests
to be recovered under the alias writ of execution. This logically follows from our ruling that
PAL is liable for both the lost checks and interest. The respondent court's decision in CA-G.R.
No. 51079-R does not totally supersede the trial court's judgment in Civil Case No. 71307. It
merely modified the same as to the principal amount awarded as actual damages.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the trial court's issuance of
the alias writ of execution against the petitioner is upheld without prejudice to any action it
should take against the errant sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes. The Court Administrator is ordered to
follow up the actions taken against Emilio Z. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.
Page 20 of 41
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by her
husband, FRANKLIN G. GACAL, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C.
ANIMAS, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, BRANCH I, respondents.
Vicente A. Mirabueno for petitioners.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a, petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First Instance of South
Cotabato, Branch 1, *promulgated on August 26, 1980 dismissing three (3) consolidated
cases for damages: Civil Case No. 1701, Civil Case No. 1773 and Civil Case No. 1797
(Rollo, p. 35).
The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follows:
Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal, Bonifacio S. Anislag and his wife,
Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman, were then passengers boarding
defendant's BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that on the same
flight, Macalinog, Taurac Pendatum known as Commander Zapata, Nasser Omar, Liling
Pusuan Radia, Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all of Marawi City and members of
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their co-passengers, three (3) armed with
grenades, two (2) with .45 caliber pistols, and one with a .22 caliber pistol. Ten (10) minutes
after take off at about 2:30 in the afternoon, the hijackers brandishing their respective
firearms announced the hijacking of the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. With the
pilot explaining to them especially to its leader, Commander Zapata, of the inherent fuel
limitations of the plane and that they are not rated for international flights, the hijackers
directed the pilot to fly to Sabah. With the same explanation, they relented and directed the
aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport, Zamboanga City for refueling. The aircraft landed at
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 21, 1976 at Zamboanga Airport. When the plane began

to taxi at the runway, it was met by two armored cars of the military with machine guns
pointed at the plane, and it stopped there. The rebels thru its commander demanded that a
DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the President of the defendant company as hostage and
that they be given $375,000 and six (6) armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane if their
demands will not be met by the government and Philippine Air Lines. Meanwhile, the
passengers were not served any food nor water and it was only on May 23, a Sunday, at
about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon that they were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and 1/10
cup of PAL water. After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane but
immediately after they alighted therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. That
commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers which led ultimately to the
liberation of the surviving crew and the passengers, with the final score of ten (10)
passengers and three (3) hijackers dead on the spot and three (3) hijackers captured.
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal suffered injuries in the
course of her jumping out of the plane when it was peppered with bullets by the army and
after two (2) hand grenades exploded inside the plane. She was hospitalized at General
Santos Doctors Hospital, General Santos City, for two (2) days, spending P245.60 for hospital
and medical expenses, Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped unhurt but
Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her left elbow for which she was
hospitalized and operated on at the San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, and therefore, at Davao
Regional Hospital, Davao City, spending P4,500.00. Elma de Guzman died because of that
battle. Hence, the action of damages instituted by the plaintiffs demanding the following
damages, to wit:
Civil Case No. 1701 —
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal and Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal — actual damages: P245.60 for
hospital and medical expenses of Mrs Gacal; P8,995.00 for their personal belongings which
were lost and not recovered; P50,000.00 each for moral damages; and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, apart from the prayer for an award of exemplary damages (Record, pp. 4-6,
Civil Case No. 1701).
Civil Case No. 1773 —
xxx xxx xxx
Civil Case No. 1797 —
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages
sustained in the premises were attributed to force majeure.
On September 12, 1980 the spouses Franklin G. Gacal and Corazon M. Gacal, plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 1701, filed a notice of appeal with the lower court on pure questions of law
(Rollo, p. 55) and the petition for review on certiorari was filed with this Court on October 20,
1980 (Rollo, p. 30).
The Court gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 147) and both parties filed their
respective briefs but petitioner failed to file reply brief which was noted by the Court in the
resolution dated May 3, 1982 (Rollo, p. 183).
Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the unfortunate incident is the gross, wanton and
inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline personnel in their failure to frisk the passengers
adequately in order to discover hidden weapons in the bodies of the six (6) hijackers. They
Page 21 of 41
claimed that despite the prevalence of skyjacking, PAL did not use a metal detector which is
the most effective means of discovering potential skyjackers among the passengers (Rollo,
pp. 6-7).
Respondent Airline averred that in the performance of its obligation to safely transport
passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, it has exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person with due regard to all circumstances, but the security
checks and measures and surveillance precautions in all flights, including the inspection of
baggages and cargo and frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and
rendered solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines.
Similarly, the negotiations with the hijackers were a purely government matter and a military
operation, handled by and subject to the absolute and exclusive jurisdiction of the military
authorities. Hence, it concluded that the accident that befell RP-C1161 was caused by
fortuitous event, force majeure and other causes beyond the control of the respondent Airline.
The determinative issue in this case is whether or not hijacking or air piracy during martial law
and under the circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso fortuito or force majeure which would
exempt an aircraft from payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in
jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in
their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case (Article 1733). They are presumed at fault or
to have acted negligently whenever a passenger dies or is injured (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 124 SCRA 583 [1983]) or for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 463 [1987]).
The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into
said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence
according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person (Isaac v. Ammen Transportation Co., 101 Phil. 1046 [1957]; Juntilla v.
Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624 [1985]).
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence (Philippine
National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown that the
carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far as
human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event
(Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall
be responsible for those "events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were
inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v.
Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the same sense as " force majeure" (Words and
Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol. 17, p. 362).
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from liability
under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will
of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)

the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of
the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39
SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v. Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA
553 [1985]; Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 [1986]). Caso
fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore,
not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee
the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely
from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the
same plane, all members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any
connection with private respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its
passengers.
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident which could
have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of
baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred during
Martial Law where there was a military take-over of airport security including the frisking of
passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights. In fact military take-over was specifically announced on October 20, 1973
by General Jose L. Rancudo, Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force in a letter to
Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson, then Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ( Rollo, pp. 71-
72) later confirmed shortly before the hijacking incident of May 21, 1976 by Letter of
Instruction No. 399 issued on April 28, 1976 (Rollo, p. 72).
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a
nominal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty
taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied. Consequently the
existence of force majeure has been established exempting respondent PAL from the
payment of damages to its passengers who suffered death or injuries in their persons and for
loss of their baggages.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 22 of 41
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119756. March 18, 1999]
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U.
CAORONG, and minor children YASSER KING CAORONG, ROSE HEINNI and
PRINCE ALEXANDER, all surnamed CAORONG, and represented by their mother
PAULIE U. CAORONG, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J. :
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of
the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI,
Iligan City. The aforesaid decision of the trial court dismissed the complaint of private
respondents against petitioner for damages for breach of contract of carriage filed on the
ground that petitioner had not exercised the required degree of diligence in the operation of
one of its buses. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein, was a
passenger of the bus and was killed in the ambush involving said bus.
The facts of the instant case are as follows:
Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Caorong is the
widow of Atty. Caorong, while private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince
Alexander are their minor children.
On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney,
including two Maranaos.Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary
Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the
owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its
buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the
Philippine Constabulary Regional Hearquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of
Sgt. Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, at its main
office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure
the safety of lives and property would be taken.[1]
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be
passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan
City. Among the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos,
identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the
bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused
him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one of the companions of Mananggolo started
pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the passengers at bay with a
handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passengers to get off the bus. The passengers,

including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some
distance from the highway.[2]
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At
that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan,
who had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed
men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a
living. The armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they were
going to burn the bus along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and
the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the canal
on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz,
one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire.Some of
the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the
Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation.[3]
The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. In his decision, dated December 28, 1990, the trial court
dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:
The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was informed of the
rumors that the Moslems intended to take revenge by burning five buses of defendant is
established since the latter also utilized Crisanto Generalaos as a witness. Yet despite this
information, the plaintiffs charge, defendant did not take proper
precautions. . . . Consequently, plaintiffs now fault the defendant for ignoring the report. Their
position is that the defendant should have provided its buses with security guards. Does the
law require common carriers to install security guards in its buses for the protection and
safety of its passengers? Is the failure to post guards an omission of the duty to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family which could have prevented the killing of Atty.
Caorong? To our mind, the diligence demanded by law does not include the posting of
security guards in buses. It is an obligation that properly belongs to the State. Besides, will
the presence of one or two security guards suffice to deter a determined assault of the
lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe so, but again, perhaps not. In
other words, the presence of a security guard is not a guarantee that the killing of Atty.
Caorong would have been definitely avoided.
. company if such items were made available to its personnel to cope up with situations such
Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of Mr. Generalao
and the fact that it did not provide security to its buses cannot, in the light of the
circumstances, be characterized as negligence.
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assailants did not have the least intention of
harming any of the passengers. They ordered all the passengers to alight and set fire on the
bus only after all the passengers were out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an
unexpected and unforseen occurrence over which defendant had no control. Atty. Caorong
performed an act of charity and heroism in coming to the succor of the driver even in the face
of danger. He deserves the undying gratitude of the driver whose life he saved. No one
should blame him for an act of extraordinary charity and altruism which cost his life. But
neither should any blame be laid on the doorstep of defendant. His death was solely due to
the willful acts of the lawless which defendant could neither prevent nor stop.
Page 23 of 41
.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed. For lack of merit,
the counter-claim is likewise dismissed. No cost.[4]
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held:
In the case at bench, how did defendant-appellee react to the tip or information that certain
Maranao hotheads were planning to burn five of its buses out of revenge for the deaths of two
Maranaos in an earlier collision involving appellees bus? Except for the remarks of appellees
operations manager that we will have our action . . . . and Ill be the one to settle it personally,
nothing concrete whatsoever was taken by appellee or its employees to prevent the
execution of the threat. Defendant-appellee never adopted even a single safety measure for
the protection of its paying passengers. Were there available safeguards? Of course, there
were: one was frisking passengers particularly those en route to the area where the threats
were likely to be carried out such as where the earlier accident occurred or the place of
influence of the victims or their locality. If frisking was resorted to, even temporarily, . . . .
appellee might be legally excused from liability. Frisking of passengers picked up along the
route could have been implemented by the bus conductor; for those boarding at the bus
terminal, frisking could have been conducted by him and perhaps by additional personnel of
defendant-appellee. On hindsight, the handguns and especially the gallon of gasoline used
by the felons all of which were brought inside the bus would have been discovered, thus
preventing the burning of the bus and the fatal shooting of the victim.
Appellees argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its buses and that
the safety of citizens is the duty of the government, is not well taken. To be sure, appellee is
not expected to assign security guards on all of its buses; if at all, it has the duty to post
guards only on its buses plying predominantly Maranao areas. As discussed in the next
preceding paragraph, the least appellee could have done in response to the report was to
adopt a system of verification such as frisking of passengers boarding its buses. Nothing, and
to repeat, nothing at all, was done by defendant-appellee to protect its innocent passengers
from the danger arising from the Maranao threats. It must be observed that frisking is not a
novelty as a safety measure in our society. Sensitive places in fact, nearly all important
places have applied this method of security enhancement. Gadgets and devices are available
in the market for this purpose. It would not have weighed much against the budget of the bus
as the Maranao threats.
In view of the constitutional right to personal privacy, our pronouncement in this decision
should not be construed as an advocacy of mandatory frisking in all public
conveyances. What we are saying is that given the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because of a vehicular collision involving one of appellees
vehicles; (b) appellee received a written report from a member of the Regional Security Unit,
Constabulary Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the two deceased were planning
to burn five buses of appellee out of revenge; and (c) appellee did nothing absolutely nothing
for the safety of its passengers travelling in the area of influence of the victims, appellee has
failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of common carriers. Hence, appellee must
be adjudged liable.
.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another rendered
ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
1) P3,399,649.20 as death indemnity;
2) P50,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance as attorneys fees; and
Costs against defendant-appellee.[5]
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends:
(A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED DECEMBER 28, 1990 DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
AS WELL AS THE COUNTERCLAIM, AND FINDING FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BY
ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE GARGANTUAN SUM OF P3,449,649.20
PLUS P500.00 PER APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEYS FEES, AS WELL AS DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE SUPPLEMENT TO SAID
MOTION, WHILE HOLDING, AMONG OTHERS, THAT PETITIONER BREACHED THE
CONTRACT OF CARIAGE BY ITS FAILURE TO EXERCISE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF
DILIGENCE;
(B) THAT THE ACTS OF THE MARANAO OUTLAWS WERE SO GRAVE, IRRESISTIBLE,
VIOLENT, AND FORCEFUL, AS TO BE REGARDED AS CASO FORTUITO; AND
(C) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SECURITY IN
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS AS PART OF ITS DUTY TO OBSERVE EXTRA-
ORDINARY DILIGENCE AS A COMMON CARRIER.
The instant petition has no merit.
First. Petitioners Breach of the Contract of Carriage
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered
by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the
common carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioners
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were
planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of
petitioners operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be
taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passengers
constitutional rights. As this Court intimated in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,[6] a common
carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack on one
of petitioners buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Second. Seizure of Petitioners Bus not a Case of Force Majeure
Page 24 of 41
The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants was a fortuitous
event for which it could not be held liable.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals,[7] we held that
to be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable
or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned
above would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,[8] it was held that the common carrier was liable for its
failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was
warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was foreseeable,
and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by
analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties
of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore,
was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals[9] and De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals[10] in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes
force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals,[11] it was held that a common carrier is not liable
for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries caused by
rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals,[12] it was ruled that a common carrier is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a
robbery which is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art. 1755
of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious person,
with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the
respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to
the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of
third persons. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an
event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC
agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioners buses and the
assurance of petitioners operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary
precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of
passengers.
Third. Deceased not Guilty of Contributory Negligence
The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning
to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed
out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioner and its employees, not its
passengers. The assailants motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a
result of the collision between petitioners bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos
were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the
 Page 25 of 41

passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver.The armed men latter. The formula established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity is as
actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered follows:[19]
them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the Gross Necessary
role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act of negligence, let Net earning = Life x Annual - Living
alone recklessness. Capacity Expectancy Income Expenses
Fourth. Petitioner Liable to Private Respondents for Damages
Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and
We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong, private the age of the deceased.[20] Since Atty. Caorong was 37 years old at the time of his death,
respondents herein, are entitled to recover from the petitioner. [21]
he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3 more years.[22] His projected gross annual income,
Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides for computed based on his monthly salary of P11,385.00[23] as a lawyer in the Department of
the payment of indemnity for the death of passengers caused by the breached of contract of Agrarian Reform at the time of his death, was P148,005.00.[24] allowing for necessary living
carriage by a common carrier. Initially fixed in Art. 2206 at P3,000.00, the amount of the said expenses of fifty percent (50%)[25]of his projected gross annual income, his total earning
indemnity for death has through the years been gradually increased in view of the declining capacity amounts to P2,121,404.90.[26] Hence, the petitioner is liable to the private
value of the peso. It is presently fixed at P50,000.00.[13] Private respondents are entitled to respondents in the said amount as compensation for loss of earning capacity.
this amount. WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is hereby
Actual damages. Art. 2199 provides that Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. is ordered to pay
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has the following amounts to private respondents Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince
duly proved. The trial court found that the private respondents spent P30,000.00 for the wake Alexander Caorong:
and burial of Atty. Caorong.[14] Since petitioner does not question this finding of the trial court, 1. death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
it is liable to private respondents in the said amount as actual damages. 2. actual damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00);
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and 3. moral damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos(P100,000.00);
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of 4. exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
the death of the deceased. The trial court found that private respondent Paulie Caorong 5. attorneys fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
suffered pain from the death of her husband and worry on how to provide support for their 6. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of two million one hundred twenty-
minor children, private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander.[15] The one thousand four hundred four pesos and ninety centavos (P2,121,404.90); and
petitioner likewise does not question this finding of the trial court. Thus, in accordance with 7) costs of suits.
recent decisions of this Court,[16] we hold that the petitioner is liable to the private respondents SO ORDERED.
in the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. In the present case, the petitioner acted in a wanton and
reckless manner. Despite warning that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge against
the petitioner by burning some of its buses, and contrary to the assurance made by its
operations manager that the necessary precautions would be taken, the petitioner and its
employees did nothing to protect the safety of passengers. Under the circumstances, we
deem it reasonable to award private respondents exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00.[17]
Attorneys Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in the
instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[18] we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to be
reasonable. Hence, the private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees in that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art.
2206 thereof, provides that in addition to the indemnity for death arising from the breach of
contract of carriage by a common carrier, the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
 Page 26 of 41

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989
JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
Martin Badong, Jr. for petitioner.
Eufronio K. Maristela for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision* rendered by the Court of Appeals dated
19 October 1979 in CA-G.R. No. 57354-R entitled "Jose Pilapil, plaintiff-appellee versus
Alatco Transportation Co., Inc., defendant-appellant," which reversed and set aside the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7230 ordering
respondent transportation company to pay to petitioner damages in the total sum of sixteen
thousand three hundred pesos (P 16,300.00).
The record discloses the following facts:
Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus
bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While
said bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga
City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur,
on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled
a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye. Private respondent's
personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where
he was confined and treated.
Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr. Malabanan
of Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no improvement in his
left eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated by Dr.
Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his
left eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I
an action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident. After
trial, the court a quo rendered judgment with the following dispositive part:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered:
1. Ordering defendant transportation company to pay plaintiff Jose Pilapil the sum of P
10,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing actual and material damages for causing a
permanent scar on the face and injuring the eye-sight of the plaintiff;
2. Ordering further defendant transportation company to pay the sum of P 5,000.00,
Philippine Currency, to the plaintiff as moral and exemplary damages;

3. Ordering furthermore, defendant transportation company to reimburse plaintiff the sum of P
300.00 for his medical expenses and attorney's fees in the sum of P 1,000.00, Philippine
Currency; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED 1
From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals where the appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354R. On 19 October 1979, the Court of Appeals, in a
Special Division of Five, rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of the
court a quo.
Hence the present petition.
In seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that said
court has decided the issue not in accord with law. Specifically, petitioner argues that the
nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks,
and the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one such
risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
We do not agree.
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of
transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become
an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform
certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. The requirement of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is restated in Article 1755: "A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Further, in case of death
of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be at fault or to have
acted negligently. 2
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. 3
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and
foresight can provide. what constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard
to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of
the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time
being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same
is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by
the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event. 4
Page 27 of 41
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to
curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their
business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree
of diligence that the law requires. 5
Petitioner contends that respondent common carrier failed to rebut the presumption of
negligence against it by proof on its part that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety
of its passengers.
We do not agree.
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the
carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained
by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method
of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and
therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well
as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over
which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule
otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers
which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the safe transport of their passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard
by which its liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers is to be
determined directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage Article 1763 governs:
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that
when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case,
the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its
passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the ground that the injury
complained of could have been prevented by the common carrier if something like mesh-work
grills had covered the windows of its bus.
We do not agree.

Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of
ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to
take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The
carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely
prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved
type, in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree
of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with
negligence in this respect. 6
Finally, petitioner contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a carrier were made
liable for such stone-throwing incidents rather than have the bus riding public lose confidence
in the transportation system.
Sad to say, we are not in a position to so hold; such a policy would be better left to the
consideration of Congress which is empowered to enact laws to protect the public from the
increasing risks and dangers of lawlessness in society.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 28 of 41
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated
by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found
guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of
Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan,
Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover
damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the
deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from
behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the
carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages
against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this
ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more
damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and
on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co.,
97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon
the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are
very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and
the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection
with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila . The stipulation of facts is
clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-
San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty
was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under
no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased
was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty . The position of Devesa at
the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and

not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had
assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed
in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. .
. . (Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the
passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of
carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place
in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the
scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which,
unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the
safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees.
The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted
the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has
been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both
articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides
for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the
statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual
situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the
old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier
liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the
wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken from
Anglo-American Law.2There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers
committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the
principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within
the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. 5 The
carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule
based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained
in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central
Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish
its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of
care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and
other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the
Page 29 of 41
passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to
passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of
his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the
passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the
passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's
employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with
due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less
important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and
social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly
adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of
the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on
breach of contract of carriage 7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is
covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-
appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764
in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the
passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should
be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that
plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing, 8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and
1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the
passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having
been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. 9 Plaintiff demands
P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral
damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such
damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to
P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the
complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from
is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142305. December 10, 2003]
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner, vs. ANDION
FERNANDEZ, respondent .
Page 30 of 41
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164 in Civil
Case No. 60985 filed by the respondent for damages.
The Case for the Respondent
Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano here in the Philippines and
abroad. At the time of the incident, she was availing an educational grant from the Federal
Republic of Germany, pursuing a Masters Degree in Music majoring in Voice.[3]
She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on February 3 and 4,
1991. For this singing engagement, an airline passage ticket was purchased from petitioner
Singapore Airlines which would transport her to Manila from Frankfurt, Germany on January
28, 1991. From Manila, she would proceed to Malaysia on the next day.[4] It was necessary for
the respondent to pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe; and to rehearse and
coordinate with her pianist her repertoire for the aforesaid performance.
The petitioner issued the respondent a Singapore Airlines ticket for Flight No. SQ 27,
leaving Frankfurt, Germany on January 27, 1991 bound for Singapore with onward
connections from Singapore to Manila. Flight No. SQ 27 was scheduled to
leave Frankfurt at 1:45 in the afternoon of January 27, 1991, arriving at Singapore at 8:50 in
the morning of January 28, 1991.The connecting flight from Singapore to Manila, Flight No.
SQ 72, was leaving Singapore at 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991, arriving
in Manila at 2:20 in the afternoon of the same day.[5]
On January 27, 1991, Flight No. SQ 27 left Frankfurt but arrived in Singapore two hours late
or at about 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991. By then, the aircraft bound
for Manilahad left as scheduled, leaving the respondent and about 25 other passengers
stranded in the Changi Airport in Singapore.[6]
Upon disembarkation at Singapore, the respondent approached the transit counter who
referred her to the nightstop counter and told the lady employee thereat that it was important
for her to reach Manila on that day, January 28, 1991. The lady employee told her that there
were no more flights to Manila for that day and that respondent had no choice but to stay
in Singapore. Upon respondents persistence, she was told that she can actually fly to Hong
Kong going to Manila but since her ticket was non-transferable, she would have to pay for the
ticket. The respondent could not accept the offer because she had no money to pay for it.
[7]
Her pleas for the respondent to make arrangements to transport her to Manila were
unheeded.[8]
The respondent then requested the lady employee to use their phone to make a call
to Manila. Over the employees reluctance, the respondent telephoned her mother to inform
the latter that she missed the connecting flight. The respondent was able to contact a family
friend who picked her up from the airport for her overnight stay in Singapore.[9]
The next day, after being brought back to the airport, the respondent proceeded to petitioners
counter which says: Immediate Attention To Passengers with Immediate Booking. There were
four or five passengers in line. The respondent approached petitioners male employee at the
counter to make arrangements for immediate booking only to be told: Cant you see I am

doing something. She explained her predicament but the male employee uncaringly retorted:
Its your problem, not ours.[10]
The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight
from Singapore to Malaysia on January 29, 1991, through the efforts of her mother and travel
agency in Manila. Her mother also had to travel to Malaysia bringing with her respondents
wardrobe and personal things needed for the performance that caused them to incur an
expense of about P50,000.[11]
As a result of this incident, the respondents performance before the Royal Family of Malaysia
was below par. Because of the rude and unkind treatment she received from the petitioners
personnel in Singapore, the respondent was engulfed with fear, anxiety, humiliation and
embarrassment causing her to suffer mental fatigue and skin rashes. She was thereby
compelled to seek immediate medical attention upon her return to Manila for acute urticaria.
[12]
On June 15, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
ACCORDINGLY and as prayed for, defendant Singapore Airlines is ordered to pay herein
plaintiff Andion H. Fernandez the sum of:
1. FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as compensatory or actual damages;
2. TWO HUNDRED and FIFTY THOUSAND (P250,000.00) PESOS as moral damages
considering plaintiffs professional standing in the field of culture at home and abroad;
3. ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages;
4. SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
On June 10, 1998, the CA promulgated the assailed decision finding no reversible error in the
appealed decision of the trial court.[14]
Forthwith, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the following errors:
I prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.[21]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT AWARDED DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT FOR THE
ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
ACTED IN BAD FAITH.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS
COUNTERCLAIMS.[15]
The petitioner assails the award of damages contending that it exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law under the given circumstances. The delay of Flight No. SQ 27
from Frankfurt to Singapore on January 28, 1991 for more than two hours was due to a
fortuitous event and beyond petitioners control. Inclement weather prevented the petitioners
plane coming from Copenhagen, Denmark to arrive in Frankfurt on time on January 27,
1991. The plane could not take off from the airport as the place was shrouded with fog. This
delay caused a snowball effect whereby the other flights were consequently delayed. The
Page 31 of 41
plane carrying the respondent arrived in Singapore two (2) hours behind schedule.[16] The
delay was even compounded when the plane could not travel the normal route which was
through the Middle East due to the raging Gulf War at that time. It had to pass through the
restricted Russian airspace which was more congested.[17]
Under these circumstances, petitioner therefore alleged that it cannot be faulted for the delay
in arriving in Singapore on January 28, 1991 and causing the respondent to miss her
connecting flight to Manila.
The petitioner further contends that it could not also be held in bad faith because its
personnel did their best to look after the needs and interests of the passengers including the
respondent. Because the respondent and the other 25 passengers missed their connecting
flight to Manila, the petitioner automatically booked them to the flight the next day and gave
them free hotel accommodations for the night. It was respondent who did not take petitioners
offer and opted to stay with a family friend in Singapore.
The petitioner also alleges that the action of the respondent was baseless and it tarnished its
good name and image earned through the years for which, it was entitled to damages in the
amount of P1,000,000; exemplary damages of P500,000; and attorneys fees also in the
amount of P500,000.[18]
The petition is barren of merit.
When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to expect that he be
transported on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit
for a breach of contract of carriage. [19]
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, the law requires
common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances.[20] In an action for breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not
have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the respondent carried a confirmed ticket for the two-
legged trip from Frankfurt to Manila: 1) Frankfurt-Singapore; and 2) Singapore-Manila. In her
contract of carriage with the petitioner, the respondent certainly expected that she would fly
to Manila on Flight No. SQ 72 on January 28, 1991. Since the petitioner did not transport the
respondent as covenanted by it on said terms, the petitioner clearly breached its contract of
carriage with the respondent. The respondent had every right to sue the petitioner for this
breach. The defense that the delay was due to fortuitous events and beyond petitioners
control is unavailing. In PAL vs. CA,[22] we held that:
.... Undisputably, PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous
event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its
passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country,
PAL is deemed to be equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in
one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carriers
premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in

safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have
reached their final destination...
...
...If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the
sole and only cause (Art. 1755 C.C., Art. 1733 C.C.). Since part of the failure to comply with
the obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the
defendants failure to provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using
extraordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to
fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant airline could have prevented,
defendant becomes liable to plaintiff.
Indeed, in the instant case, petitioner was not without recourse to enable it to fulfill its
obligation to transport the respondent safely as scheduled as far as human care and foresight
can provide to her destination. Tagged as a premiere airline as it claims to be and with the
complexities of air travel, it was certainly well-equipped to be able to foresee and deal with
such situation. The petitioners indifference and negligence by its absence and insensitivity
was exposed by the trial court, thus:
(a) Under Section 9.1 of its Traffic Manual (Exhibit 4) flights can be delayed to await the uplift
of connecting cargo and passengers arriving on a late in-bound flight As adverted to by the
trial court,Flight SQ-27/28 maybe delayed for about half an hour to transfer plaintiff to her
connecting flight. As pointed out above, delay is normal in commercial air transportation (RTC
Decision, p. 22); or
(b) Petitioner airlines could have carried her on one of its flights bound for Hongkong and
arranged for a connecting flight from Hongkong to Manila all on the same date. But then the
airline personnel who informed her of such possibility told her that she has to pay for that
flight. Regrettably, respondent did not have sufficient funds to pay for it. (TSN, 30 March
1992, pp.8-9; RTC Decision, pp. 22-23) Knowing the predicament of the respondent,
petitioner did not offer to shoulder the cost of the ticket for that flight; or
(c) As noted by the trial court from the account of petitioners witness, Bob Khkimyong, that a
passenger such as the plaintiff could have been accommodated in another international
airline such as Lufthansa to bring the plaintiff to Singapore early enough from Frankfurt
provided that there was prior communication from that station to enable her to catch the
connecting flight to Manila because of the urgency of her business in Manila(RTC Decision,
p. 23)
The petitioners diligence in communicating to its passengers the consequences of the delay
in their flights was wanting. As elucidated by the trial court:
It maybe that delay in the take off and arrival of commercial aircraft could not be avoided and
may be caused by diverse factors such as those testified to by defendants pilot. However,
knowing fully well that even before the plaintiff boarded defendants Jumbo aircraft
in Frankfurt bound for Singapore, it has already incurred a delay of two hours. Nevertheless,
defendant did not take the trouble of informing plaintiff, among its other passengers of such a
delay and that in such a case, the usual practice of defendant airline will be that they have to
stay overnight at their connecting airport; and much less did it inquire from the plaintiff and
the other 25 passengers bound for Manila whether they are amenable to stay overnight in
Singapore and to take the connecting flight to Manila the next day. Such information should
Page 32 of 41
have been given and inquiries made in Frankfurt because even the defendant airlines manual
provides that in case of urgency to reach his or her destination on the same date, the head
office of defendant in Singapore must be informed by telephone or telefax so as the latter
may make certain arrangements with other airlines in Frankfurt to bring such a passenger
with urgent business to Singapore in such a manner that the latter can catch up with her
connecting flight such as S-27/28 without spending the night in Singapore[23]
The respondent was not remiss in conveying her apprehension about the delay of the flight
when she was still in Frankfurt. Upon the assurance of petitioners personnel in Frankfurt that
she will be transported to Manila on the same date, she had every right to expect that
obligation fulfilled. She testified, to wit:
Q: Now, since you were late, when the plane that arrived from Frankfurt was late, did you not
make arrangements so that your flight from Singapore to Manila would be adjusted?
A: I asked the lady at the ticket counter, the one who gave the boarding pass in Frankfurt and
I asked her, Since my flight going to Singapore would be late, what would happen to my
Singapore-Manila flight? and then she said, Dont worry, Singapore Airlines would be
responsible to bring you to Manila on the same date. And then they have informed the name
of the officer, or whatever, that our flight is going to be late.[24]
When a passenger contracts for a specific flight, he has a purpose in making that choice
which must be respected. This choice, once exercised, must not be impaired by a breach on
the part of the airline without the latter incurring any liability.[25] For petitioners failure to bring
the respondent to her destination, as scheduled, we find the petitioner clearly liable for the
breach of its contract of carriage with the respondent.
We are convinced that the petitioner acted in bad faith. Bad faith means a breach of known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will. Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not
personal ill will, may well have been the motive; but it is malice nevertheless.[26] Bad faith was
imputed by the trial court when it found that the petitioners employees at
the Singapore airport did not accord the respondent the attention and treatment allegedly
warranted under the circumstances. The lady employee at the counter was unkind and of no
help to her. The respondent further alleged that without her threats of suing the company, she
was not allowed to use the companys phone to make long distance calls to her mother
in Manila. The male employee at the counter where it says: Immediate Attention to
Passengers with Immediate Booking was rude to her when he curtly retorted that he was
busy attending to other passengers in line. The trial court concluded that this inattentiveness
and rudeness of petitioners personnel to respondents plight was gross enough amounting to
bad faith. This is a finding that is generally binding upon the Court which we find no reason to
disturb.
Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship,
exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. In this case, petitioners employees acted in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is, therefore,
warranted in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Page 33 of 41

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO BETER,

SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA RAUTRAUT, respondents.
Aquino W. Gambe for petitioners.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City dismissing the private
respondents' complaint for collection of "a sum of money" and finding the petitioners solidarily
liable for damages in the total amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P120,000.00). The petitioners also question the appellate court's resolution denying a motion
for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio
Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City
passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger;
that about fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC
soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers; that when the bus
stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road,
the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe
injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran
toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents
of Ornominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera] Rautraut are the parents
of Narcisa) filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged
owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their
respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped
off the bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and
conductor and the defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had exercised due
diligence in the choice of its employees to avoid as much as possible accidents; the incident
on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic accident or vehicular accident; it was an incident or event
very much beyond the control of the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident
Republic of the Philippines complained of as it was an act of a third party who is not in any way connected with the
SUPREME COURT defendants and of which the latter have no control and supervision; ..." (Rollo, pp. 112-
Manila 113).i•t•c-aüsl
THIRD DIVISION After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985 dismissing the complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside. The dispositive
G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990 portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA, petitioners, WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
vs. entered finding the appellees jointly and solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the
following amounts:

1) To the heirs of Ornominio Beter, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) in loss of earnings and support, moral damages, straight death indemnity and
attorney's fees; and,
2) To the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut, the amount of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00)
for straight death indemnity, moral damages and attorney's fees. Costs against appellees.
(Rollo, pp. 71-72)
The petitioners now pose the following questions
What was the proximate cause of the whole incident? Why were the passengers on board the
bus panicked (sic) and why were they shoving one another? Why did Narcisa Rautraut and
Ornominio Beter jump off from the running bus?
The petitioners opine that answers to these questions are material to arrive at "a fair, just and
equitable judgment." (Rollo, p. 5) They claim that the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts and its conclusion is grounded on speculation, surmises or
conjectures.
As regards the proximate cause of the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, the
petitioners maintain that it was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and stabbed another
passenger of the bus. They contend that the stabbing incident triggered off the commotion
and panic among the passengers who pushed one another and that presumably out of fear
and moved by that human instinct of self-preservation Beter and Rautraut jumped off the bus
while the bus was still running resulting in their untimely death." (Rollo, p. 6) Under these
circumstances, the petitioners asseverate that they were not negligent in the performance of
their duties and that the incident was completely and absolutely attributable to a third person,
the passenger who ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and Rautraut could not have
been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them to jump off the running bus. They
argue that they should not be made liable for damages arising from acts of third persons over
whom they have no control or supervision.
Furthermore, the petitioners maintain that the driver of the bus, before, during and after the
incident was driving cautiously giving due regard to traffic rules, laws and regulations. The
petitioners also argue that they are not insurers of their passengers as ruled by the trial court.
The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of
carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
Page 34 of 41
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the nature
of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus
belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered
injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code,
petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove
that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
New Civil Code.
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on its posture that
the death of the said passengers was caused by a third person who was beyond its control
and supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or
negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of
passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the
common carrier did not have any control.
Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states:
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or
when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable.
The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of the old Civil
Code which states"
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and
those in which the obligation itself imposes liability.
In the case of Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657 [1924]), we defined "events" which cannot be
foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable in the following manner:
... The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to define the term 'caso
fortuito' and hold that the two expressions are synonymous. (Manresa Comentarios al Codigo
Civil Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to Article 1105 is found in Law II, Title 33, Partida 7, which defines caso
fortuito as 'occasion que acaese por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos,
derrivamientos de casas e fuego que enciende a so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca
de ladrones' (An event that takes place by incident and could not have been foreseen.
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of
robbers ...)
Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other
occurrences of a similar nature.

In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Española says:
'In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent
of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor. (5) Enciclopedia Juridica Española, 309)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of
the will of the obligor or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. ...
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered
off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running
to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and
Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another
passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier
must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.
Thus, as early as 1912, we ruled:
From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not liable for the loss and damage
of the goods shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bien Sip, inasmuch as such
loss and damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no
negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents .
(Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 [1912]; Emphasis supplied).
This principle was reiterated in a more recent case, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court(167 SCRA 379 [1988]), wherein we ruled:
... [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to
natural causes and exclusively without human intervention. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether or not the petitioner's common
carrier observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.
In this regard the trial court and the appellate court arrived at conflicting factual findings.
The trial court found the following facts:
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how the two deceased Narcisa Rautruat and
Ornominio Beter met their deaths.
However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Court could not see why the two
deceased could have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses testified that when the
commotion ensued inside the bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each other towards
the door apparently in order to get off from the bus through the door. But the passengers also
could not pass through the door because according to the evidence the door was locked.
On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give credence to the evidence adduced by the
defendants that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the two deceased panicked and,
in state of shock and fear, they jumped off from the bus by passing through the window.
Page 35 of 41
It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that transportation companies are not
insurers of their passengers. The evidence on record does not show that defendants'
personnel were negligent in their duties. The defendants' personnel have every right to
accept passengers absent any manifestation of violence or drunkenness. If and when such
passengers harm other passengers without the knowledge of the transportation company's
personnel, the latter should not be faulted. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are material facts ignored
by the trial court which were discussed by the appellate court to arrive at a different
conclusion. These circumstances show that the petitioner common carrier was negligent in
the provision of safety precautions so that its passengers may be transported safely to their
destinations. The appellate court states:
A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's conclusions of fact in its tersely written ratio
decidendi. The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the
passengers, specifically the two deceased, jumped out of the window. The lower court
therefore concluded that the defendant common carrier is not liable for the death of the said
passengers which it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the unidentified passenger
who went amuck.
There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door of the bus was
locked as to prevent the passengers from passing through. Leonila Cullano, testifying for the
defense, clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the passengers were
shouting that the bus stop while they were in a state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically
stated that she actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the
force of the onrushing passengers.
Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door after the last passenger had
boarded the bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers
had panicked, he himself panicked and had gone to open the door. Portions of the testimony
of Leonila Cullano, quoted below, are illuminating:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the door at the front or rear portion of the
bus?
A Front door.
Q And these two persons whom you said alighted, where did they pass, the fron(t) door or
rear door?
A Front door.
xxx xxx xxx
(Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after there was a commotion at the rear portion of the bus?
A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I noticed that there was a passenger who
was sounded (sic). The conductor panicked because the passengers were shouting 'stop,
stop'. The conductor opened the bus.'
(Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the deceased passengers jumped from the
window when it was entirely possible for them to have alighted through the door. The lower

court's reliance on the testimony of Pedro Collango, as the conductor and employee of the
common carrier, is unjustified, in the light of the clear testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole
uninterested eyewitness of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro Collango's testimony to
be infused by bias and fraught with inconsistencies, if not notably unreliable for lack of
veracity. On direct examination, he testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So what happened to the passengers inside your bus?
A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.
COURT:
Q While the bus was in motion?
A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we have just picked up a passenger.
Atty. Gambe:
Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was running slow because you have just
picked up a passenger. Can you estimate what was your speed at that time?
Atty. Calo:
No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a conductor.
COURT:
Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor experienced.
Witness:
Not less than 30 to 40 miles.
COURT:
Kilometers or miles?
A Miles.
Atty. Gambe:
Q That is only your estimate by your experience?
A Yes, sir, estimate.
(Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983).
At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the
speed of the bus could scarcely be considered slow considering that according to Collango
himself, the bus had just come from a full stop after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and
that the bus was still on its second or third gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees,
consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising
vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated
stop and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an
appreciably fast speed. At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its
administrative officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take
on passengers and the public at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its
size and loading capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo, pp. 23-26)
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately
stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the
victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running;
the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and
Page 36 of 41
the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law
governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves
no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers
were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe
extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as
warranted by law. (See Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra).
The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to show to the court that they
are the parents of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut respectively and therefore have no
legal personality to sue the petitioners. This argument deserves scant consideration. We find
this argument a belated attempt on the part of the petitioners to avoid liability for the deaths of
Beter and Rautraut. The private respondents were Identified as the parents of the victims by
witnesses during the trial and the trial court recognized them as such. The trial court
dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that the petitioners were not negligent.
Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and Rautraut by the appellate
court is supported by the evidence. The appellate court stated:
Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his death, single, in good health and
rendering support and service to his mother. As far as Narcisa Rautraut is concerned, the
only evidence adduced is to the effect that at her death, she was 23 years of age, in good
health and without visible means of support.
In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, and established
jurisprudence, several factors may be considered in determining the award of damages,
namely: 1) life expectancy (considering the state of health of the deceased and the mortality
tables are deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of
support and service; and (3) moral and mental suffering (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et al., 93
Phil. 470).
In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 92, at page 104), the
High Tribunal, reiterating the rule in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511),
stated that the amount of loss of earring capacity is based mainly on two factors, namely, (1)
the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate
at which the losses sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v. Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497, at the age
of 30 one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on the American Expectancy Table
of Mortality (2/3 x 80-32).i•t•c-aüsl By taking into account the pace and nature of the life of a
carpenter, it is reasonable to make allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life
expectancy of the deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v. Daniel, supra). To fix the
rate of losses it must be noted that Art. 2206 refers to gross earnings less necessary living
expenses of the deceased, in other words, only net earnings are to be considered (People v.
Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio Beter, it is both just and reasonable,
considering his social standing and position, to fix the deductible, living and incidental
expenses at the sum of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) a month, or Four Thousand Eight

Hundred Pesos (P4,800.00) annually. As to his income, considering the irregular nature of the
work of a daily wage carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume that he shall have work
for twenty (20) days a month at Twenty Five Pesos (P150,000.00) for twenty five years.
Deducting therefrom his necessary expenses, his heirs would be entitled to Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) representing loss of support and service (P150,000.00 less
P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs are entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
straight death indemnity pursuant to Article 2206 (People v. Daniel, supra). For damages for
their moral and mental anguish, his heirs are entitled to the reasonable sum of P10,000.00 as
an exception to the general rule against moral damages in case of breach of contract rule Art.
2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75). As attorney's fees, Beter's heirs are entitled to
P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-appellants Ricardo and Sergia Beter as heirs of their son
Ornominio are entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).
In the case of Narcisa Rautraut, her heirs are entitled to a straight death indemnity of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), to moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees, or a total of Forty
Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) as total indemnity for her death in the absence of any
evidence that she had visible means of support. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision dated May 19,
1988 and the resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8034 November 18, 1955
CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
First Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico C. Alikpala and Attorney Higino R. Francisco for
appellant.
Restituto Luna for appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Manila Railroad Company has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna sentencing it to pay P4,000 damages to the appellees herein, the widow and children
of the late Tomas Gillaco, shot by an employee of the Company in April, 1946.
Page 37 of 41
The judgment was rendered upon the following stipulation of facts:
That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from
Calamba, Laguna to Manila;
That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the
Manila Railroad Company assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened to
be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where
he was going to report for duty;
That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same dating
back during the Japanese occupation;
That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him
by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the
train coach;
That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the would which he sustained from the shot fired by
Devesa.
It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted with homicide by final judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
Appellant's contention is that, on the foregoing facts, no liability attaches to it as employer of
the killer, Emilio Devesa; that it is not responsible subsidiary ex delicto, under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual
performance of his ordinary duties and service; nor is it responsible ex contractu, since the
complaint did not aver sufficient facts to establish such liability, and no negligence on
appellant's party was shown. The Court below held the Railroad company responsible on the
ground that a contract of transportation implies protection of the passengers against acts of
personal violence by the agents or employees of the carrier.
There can be no quarrel with the principle that a passenger is entitled to protection from
personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. But
under the law of the case, this responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of car and diligence required of it.
Discussing the basis of a carrier's liability under the old Civil Code of 1889 (which was in
force in 1946, when Gillaco was shot) this Court said in Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil., 657):
In our opinion, the conclusions of the court below are entirely correct. That upon the facts
stated the defendant's liability, if any, is contractual, is well settled by previous decisions of
the court, beginning with the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), and
the distinction between extra-contractual liability and contractual liability has been so ably and
exhaustively discussed in various other cases that nothing further need here be said upon
that subject. (See Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768; Manila
Railroad vs. Compañia Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875; De
Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706). It is sufficient to reiterate that the
source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract of carriage; that by entering into that
contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiff safely and securely to their destination; and
that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his
 Page 38 of 41

obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads as The only good reason for making the carrier responsible for the misconduct of the servant
follows: perpetrated in his own interest, and not in that of his employer, or otherwise within the scope
"No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, of his employment, is that the servant is clothed with the delegated authority, and charge with
were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise the duty by the carrier, to execute his undertaking with the passenger. And it cannot be said,
and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability." we think, that there is any such delegation to the employees at a station with reference to
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge passenger embarking at another or traveling on the train. Of course, we are speaking only of
nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by the the principle which holds a carrier responsible for wrong done to passenger by servants
Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would acting in their own interest, and not in that of the employer. That principle is not the ordinary
meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist between each rule,respondent superior, by which the employer is held responsible only for act or omissions
one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its of the employee in the scope of his employment; but the only reason in our opinion for a
trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of article 105 broader liability arises from the fact that the servant, in mistreating the passenger wholly for
of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; some private purpose of his own, in the very act, violates the contractual obligation of the
and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of appellant's contract of safe employer for the performance of which he has put the employee in his place. The reason
carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby. does not exist where the employee who committed the assault was never in a position in
No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care and diligence in the which it became his duty to his employer to represent him in discharging any duty of the latter
protection of its passengers; but, considering the vast and complex activities of modern rail toward the passenger. The proposition that the carrier clothes every employee engaged in the
transportation, to require of appellant that it should guard against all possible transportation business with the comprehensive duty of protecting every passenger with
misunderstanding between each and every one of its employees and every passenger that whom he may in any way come in contact, and hereby makes himself liable for every assault
might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as demanding diligence commited by such servant, without regard to the inquiry whether or not the passenger has
beyond what human care and foresight can provide. come within the sphere of duty of that servant as indicated by the employment, is regarded as
The lower Court and the appellees both relied on the American authorities that particularly not only not sustained by the authorities, but as being unsound and oppressive both to the
hold carriers to be insurers of the safety of their passengers against willful assault and employer and the employee. (Houston & T. C. R. Co. vs. Bush, 32 LRA (NS), p. 1205.)
intentional ill treatment on the part of their servants, it being immaterial that the act should be Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint ordered dismissed,
one of private retribution on the part of the servant, impelled by personal malice toward the without cost. So ordered.
passenger (10 Am. Jur. 108; Ed. Note to Gassenheimer vs. Wester R. Co. 40 LRA (NS), p.
999, et seq.) But as can be inferred from the previous jurisprudence of this Court , the Civil
Code of 1889 did not impose such absolute liability (Lasam vs. Smith, supra). The liability of a
carrier as an insurer was not recognized in this jurisdiction (Government vs. Inchausti & Co.,
40 Phil., 219; Oriental Comm. Co. vs. Naviera Filipina, 38 Off. Gaz., 1020).
Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is that, when the crime took
place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of
the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot
and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains,
and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train
that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two
hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and
the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that
of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an
employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its
contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach
of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. We agree with
the position taken by the Supreme Court of Texas in a similar case, where it held:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 60501. March 5, 1993.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS L.
ALCANTARA, respondents.
Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Tomacruz, Manguiat & Associates for petitioner.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenger & Corpus for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; BREACH THEREOF; PETITIONER BREACHED
ITS CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN IT FAILED TO
DELIVER HIS LUGGAGE AT THE DESIGNATED PLACE AND TIME. — Petitioner breached
its contract of carriage with private respondent when it failed to deliver his luggage at the
designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers
Page 39 of 41
and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their
transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
2. DAMAGES; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES PREDICATED UPON A BREACH OF
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; RECOVERABLE ONLY IN INSTANCES WHERE THE MISHAP
RESULTS IN DEATH OF A PASSENGER, OR WHERE THE CARRIER IS GUILTY OF
FRAUD OR BAD FAITH; THE CONDUCT OF PETITIONER'S REPRESENTATIVE
TOWARDS RESPONDENT JUSTIFIES THE GRANT OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES IN CASE AT BAR. — Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in death of a
passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. The language and conduct of
petitioner's representative towards respondent Alcantara was discourteous or arbitrary to
justify the grant of moral damages. The CATHAY representative was not only indifferent and
impatient; he was also rude and insulting. He simply advised Alcantara to buy anything he
wanted. But even that was not sincere because the representative knew that the passenger
was limited only to $20.00 which, certainly, was not enough to purchase comfortable clothings
appropriate for an executive conference. Considering that Alcantara was not only a revenue
passenger but even paid for a first class airline accommodation and accompanied at the time
by the Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy who was assisting him in his problem,
petitioner or its agents should have been more courteous and accommodating to private
respondent, instead of giving him a curt reply, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I
cannot do anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific."
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary
damages. Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
3. TEMPERATE DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE ONLY UPON PROOF THAT THE CLAIMANT
SUSTAINED SOME PECUNIARY LOSS. — However, respondent Alcantara is not entitled to
temperate damages, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo, in the absence of any showing
that he sustained some pecuniary loss. It cannot be gainsaid that respondent's luggage was
ultimately delivered to him without serious or appreciable damage.
4. WARSAW CONVENTION; DOES NOT OPERATE AS AN EXCLUSIVE ENUMERATION
OF THE INSTANCES FOR DECLARING A CARRIER LIABLE FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OR AS AN ABSOLUTE LIMIT OF THE EXTENT OF THAT
LIABILITY; DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE OPERATION OF THE CIVIL CODE AND OTHER
PERTINENT LAWS. — As We have repeatedly held, although the Warsaw Convention has
the force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the
Philippine government, said convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the
instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit
of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages
in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations. However, it must not be construed to
preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much
less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers

under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established, which is clearly the case before Us.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
with modification that of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of private
respondent Tomas L. Alcantara.
The facts are undisputed: On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a first
class passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY for brevity) on its Flight
No. CX-900 from Manila to Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta on Flight No.
CX-711. The purpose of his trip was to attend the following day, 20 October 1975, a
conference with the Director General of Trade of Indonesia, Alcantara being the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of Iligan Cement Corporation, Chairman of the Export
Committee of the Philippine Cement Corporation, and representative of the Cement Industry
Authority and the Philippine Cement Corporation. He checked in his luggage which contained
not only his clothing and articles for personal use but also papers and documents he needed
for the conference.
Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing. When he
inquired about his luggage from CATHAY's representative in Jakarta, private respondent was
told that his luggage was left behind in Hongkong. For this, respondent Alcantara was offered
$20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate personal needs until the luggage
could be delivered to him.
His luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four (24) hours after his arrival.
However, it was not delivered to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be picked
up by an official of the Philippine Embassy.
On 1 March 1976, respondent filed his complaint against petitioner with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Norte praying for temperate, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
On 18 April 1976, the trial court rendered its decision ordering CATHAY to pay Plaintiff
P20,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for temperate damages, P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 for attorney's fees, and the costs. 1
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. CATHAY assailed the conclusion of the trial
court that it was accountable for breach of contract and questioned the non-application by the
court of the Warsaw Convention as well as the excessive damages awarded on the basis of
its finding that respondent Alcantara was rudely treated by petitioner's employees during the
time that his luggage could not be found. For his part, respondent Alcantara assigned as error
the failure of the trial court to grant the full amount of damages sought in his complaint.
On 11 November 1981, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the
findings of fact of the trial court but modifying its award by increasing the moral damages to
P80,000.00, exemplary damages to P20,000.00 and temperate or moderate damages to
P10,000.00. The award of P25,000.00 for attorney's fees was maintained.
The same grounds raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals are reiterated before Us.
CATHAY contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to
respondent Alcantara for moral, exemplary and temperate damages as well as attorney's
Page 40 of 41
fees; and, (2) the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the Warsaw Convention on the
liability of a carrier to its passengers.
On its first assigned error, CATHAY argues that although it failed to transport respondent
Alcantara's luggage on time, the one-day delay was not made in bad faith so as to justify
moral, exemplary and temperate damages. It submits that the conclusion of respondent
appellate court that private respondent was treated rudely and arrogantly when he sought
assistance from CATHAY's employees has no factual basis, hence, the award of moral
damages has no leg to stand on.
Petitioner's first assigned error involves findings of fact which are not reviewable by this
Court. 2 At any rate, it is not impressed with merit. Petitioner breached its contract of carriage
with private respondent when it failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and time,
it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage safely to
their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their transportation, 3 and the evidence
shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in
instances where the mishap results in death of a passenger, 4 or where the carrier is guilty of
fraud or bad faith. 5
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that CATHAY was grossly
negligent and reckless when it failed to deliver the luggage of petitioner at the appointed
place and time. We agree. CATHAY alleges that as a result of mechanical trouble, all pieces
of luggage on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta were unloaded and transferred to the
second aircraft which departed an hour and a half later. Yet, as the Court of Appeals noted,
petitioner was not even aware that it left behind private respondent's luggage until its
attention was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. More, bad faith or otherwise
improper conduct may be attributed to the employees of petitioner. While the mere failure of
CATHAY to deliver respondent's luggage at the agreed place and time did not ipso facto
amount to willful misconduct since the luggage was eventually delivered to private
respondent, albeit belatedly, 6 We are persuaded that the employees of CATHAY acted in
bad faith. We refer to the deposition of Romulo Palma, Commercial Attache of the Philippine
Embassy at Jakarta, who was with respondent Alcantara when the latter sought assistance
from the employees of CATHAY. This deposition was the basis of the findings of the lower
courts when both awarded moral damages to private respondent. Hereunder is part of
Palma's testimony —
"Q: What did Mr. Alcantara say, if any?
A. Mr. Alcantara was of course . . . . I could understand his position. He was furious for the
experience because probably he was thinking he was going to meet the Director-General the
following day and, well, he was with no change of proper clothes and so, I would say, he was
not happy about the situation.
Q: What did Mr. Alcantara say?
A: He was trying to press the fellow to make the report and if possible make the delivery of
his baggage as soon as possible.
Q: And what did the agent or duty officer say, if any?

A: The duty officer, of course, answered back saying 'What can we do, the baggage is
missing. I cannot do anything.' something like it. 'Anyhow you can buy anything you need,
charged to Cathay Pacific.'
Q: What was the demeanor or comportment of the duty officer of Cathay Pacific when he said
to Mr. Alcantara 'You can buy anything chargeable to Cathay Pacific'?
A: If I had to look at it objectively, the duty officer would like to dismiss the affair as soon as
possible by saying indifferently 'Don't worry. It can be found.'" 7
Indeed, the aforequoted testimony shows that the language and conduct of petitioner's
representative towards respondent Alcantara was discourteous or arbitrary to justify the grant
of moral damages. The CATHAY representative was not only indifferent and impatient; he
was also rude and insulting. He simply advised Alcantara to buy anything he wanted. But
even that was not sincere because the representative knew that the passenger was limited
only to $20.00 which, certainly, was not enough to purchase comfortable clothings
appropriate for an executive conference. Considering that Alcantara was not only a revenue
passenger but even paid for a first class airline accommodation and accompanied at the time
by the Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy who was assisting him in his problem,
petitioner or its agents should have been more courteous and accommodating to private
respondent, instead of giving him a curt reply, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I
cannot do anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific."
CATHAY's employees should have been more solicitous to a passenger in distress and
assuaged his anxieties and apprehensions. To compound matters, CATHAY refused to have
the luggage of Alcantara delivered to him at his hotel; instead, he was required to pick it up
himself and an official of the Philippine Embassy. Under the circumstances, it is evident that
petitioner was remiss in its duty to provide proper and adequate assistance to a paying
passenger, more so one with first class accommodation.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary
damages. 8 Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
However, respondent Alcantara is not entitled to temperate damages, contrary to the ruling of
the court a quo, in the absence of any showing that he sustained some pecuniary loss. 9 It
cannot be gainsaid that respondent's luggage was ultimately delivered to him without serious
or appreciable damage.
As regards its second assigned error, petitioner airline contends that the extent of its liability
for breach of contract should be limited absolutely to that set forth in the Warsaw Convention.
We do not agree. As We have repeatedly held, although the Warsaw Convention has the
force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine
government, said convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances
for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the
extent of that liability. 10 The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in
the enumerated cases and under certain limitations. 11 However, it must not be construed to
preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much
Page 41 of 41
less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers
under the contract of carriage, 12 especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established, which is clearly the case before Us. For, the Warsaw
Convention itself provides in Art. 25 that —
"(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilfull misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to wilfull misconduct."
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the
damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the
scope of his employment."
When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed to deliver it to its
passenger at the appointed place and time, some special species of injury must have been
caused to him. For sure, the latter underwent profound distress and anxiety, and the fear of
losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In fact, for want of appropriate clothings
for the occasion brought about by the delay of the arrival of his luggage, to his
embarrassment and consternation respondent Alcantara had to seek postponement of his
pre-arranged conference with the Director General of Trade of the host country.
In one case, 13 this Court observed that a traveller would naturally suffer mental anguish,
anxiety and shock when he finds that his luggage did not travel with him and he finds himself
in a foreign land without any article of clothing other than what he has on.
Thus, respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. We however find the award by
the Court of Appeals of P80,000.00 for moral damages excessive, hence, We reduce the
amount to P30,000.00. The exemplary damages of P20,000.00 being reasonable is
maintained, as well as the attorney's fees of P25,000.00 considering that petitioner's act or
omission has compelled Alcantara to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest. 14
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
exception of the award of temperate damages of P10,000.00 which is deleted, while the
award of moral damages of P80,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The award of P20,000.00
for exemplary damages is maintained as reasonable together with the attorney's fees of
P25,000.00. The moral and exemplary damages shall earn interest at the legal rate from 1
March 1976 when the complaint was filed until full payment.
SO ORDERED.