CRIM LAW

CASE NO. 3
61 Phil., 225, March 19, 1935
Effects on repeal of criminal law

People vs. Tamayo

MAIN POINT: If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which was
penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated.

FACTS:

Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos
Sur, of a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932. Upon appeal to
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. While
this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question, which
repeal was duly approved by the provincial board, and the act complained of, instead of
being a violation of the municipal ordinances, is now legal in that municipality. Appellant
has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of that repeal.

ISSUE:

Is Mr.Tamayo still liable for violating an ordinance which is now repealed and deemes
legal what was previously illegal?

ANSWER: No, Mr. Tamayo is no longer held liable for his violations. In Wing vs. United
States (218 U.S., 272), the doctrine was clearly established that in the Philippines repeal
of a criminal Act by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy
criminal liability. But not a single sentence in the decision indicates that there was any
desire to hold that a person could be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no
longer criminal. Moreover, the repeal here was absolute the legislative intent as shown
by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced, is no
longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to sentence
appellant for an offense that no longer exists. Wherefore, the case of the appelant is
dismissed.
CASE No. 4
G.R. No. L-335

People vs. Sindiong and Pastor

MAIN POINT:

The defendants GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T. PASTOR

contested the effectivity of violations under the repealed act charged against them by the
Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Negros.

FACTS:

The defendants Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were, on June 4, 1941,
charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Negros with a violation of sections 1458 and
1459 of the Revised Administrative Code, for having deliberately evaded paying the
percentage tax while being owners of ‘Magazine Center’, an establishment devoted to
selling newspapers from 1936 to 1938. The defendants waived their right to a preliminary
investigation. The Court of First Instance however found the proper information lodged
against them. No further proceedings was undertaken not after the motion to quash by
the defendant on January 27, 1946. The motion was immediately upheld by the trial court
in its order dated February 12, 1946. The defendant Sindiong argued that the violations
under the laws were already repealed by Commonwealth Act Nos. 466 and 503, in which
took effect on 1939 and debared Sindiong’s Magazine business from the requirement of
paying taxes.

ISSUE:

Does the violations under the repealed acts be legally prosecuted.

RULING:

The judgment of the Supreme Court was held in favor to the defendant with the costs de
officio

CONCLUSION:
No. The Supreme Court held that upon the enactment of the National Internal Revenue
Code (CA 466 and 503), the defendants ceased to be bound in paying taxes. The prevailing
doctrine is that where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which
constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries with
it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons
charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.

CASE No. 5
GR No. L-4504 December 15, 1908

United States v. CUÑA

FACTS:

Cuna, on June 30, 1907, sold opium to Apolinanaria Gumpal, Filipina, who was not a
doctor or a registered user of the drug. He was charged in violation of Sec.5 of Act No.
1461 of the Philippine Commission.Cuna demurred on the ground that the said act was
repealed by Act no. 1761 on October 10, 1907 and because having repealed during the
pendency of the case with no exception regarding the pendency, there was no law in
force thus no jurisdiction of any courts.The trial court dismissed the case. The
Government appealed and argued that bothActs penalizes the same crime and should
not be construed as having the courts deprive Cuna of trial.

ISSUE:

Whether Cuna, who committed the crime before the repeal, should be convicted.

RULING:

Yes. The reliance on English and American common law doctrines cannot be given
credence since such is not accepted in this jurisdiction. Thus, the courts have
jurisdiction over the case to try, convict and sentence offenders. Moreover, even if Act
No. 1761 repealed Act No. 1461, no retroactive effect of the law shall take effect in that
the new law penalized the same act in the repealed law; hence, the new law cannot be
said to be more favorable to the accused.
CASE NO. 6
56 OG 5466
People vs Baesa CA.,

Facts:

The accused was charged with having failed to pay the salary of Cabasares whom he
employed as master fisherman in his motor launch from June 26 to October 12, 1952. He
was convicted under Com. Act No. 303, which was repealed by Rep. Act No. 602,
approved on April 16, 1951, and became effective 120 days thereafter. The subject-matter
of Com. Act No. 303 is entirely covered by Rep. Act No. 602 with which its provisions are
inconsistent. It was held that the fact that the offender was erroneously accused and
convicted under a statute which had already been repealed and therefore no longer
existed at the time the act complained of was committed does not prevent conviction
under the repealing statute which punishes the same act, provided the accused had an
opportunity to defend himself against the charge brought against him.

Issue: Whether the accused can be convicted of com. Act no 303 which was repealed by
rep. act no. 602 entirely.

Ruling: Yes, A person erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may
be punished under the repealing statute.
Case No. 7
69 SCRA 410 / G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976
Effects on repeal of criminal law

People vs. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410

FACTS:

Landlord, Margarita Fernando, accused before the CFI Nueva Ecija that on December
1963, the tenants Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto
Durion, have violated Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law for pre-threshing a
portion of their respective harvestswithout her consent.

The lower court held that the information is basically deficient because it does not
describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession
of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the
harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded
ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest. Thus, this appeal from the
prosecution citing the provision of Section 39 and 57 of the said Agricultural Tenancy
Law.

ISSUE:

 Is the failure of the original petitioner to enumerate specific circumstances with its
corresponding violations to the cited law justified in granting of appeal in favor of
the respondents?
 Whether the tenant's act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.

RULING:

 YES. Because failure of the petitioners to substantiate the violation of the

Agricultural Tenancy Law with facts proving the same gave respondents the
power to question the accusation. While it is basic that there is no crime when there
is no law punishing it, the mere existence of a law does not make a crime without
the elements that constitute a violation thereof.
 NO. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share
tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder
from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim,
 cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself
also ceases) applies to this case and the Order of Dismissal by the Lower Court is
AFFIRMED.

CONCLUSION: The Court cannot punish the people for crimes of violations under laws
which are already repealed. As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-
threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural
Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is
already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code
and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and
pre-threshing without notice to landholder.
Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-9726

THE UNITED STATES

Vs.
CARSON TAYLOR

Main Point:

According to Act No. 277 Section VI, “every author, editor or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words
contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he
were the author of the same.” But to be mentioned as “Manager” is not a sufficient proof
to be held accountable unless it is shown by the proof that he, as manager of the
newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing
of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article.

Facts:

A libel case was filed against Carson Taylor, who was the acting editor, proprietor,
manager, printer and publisher of a Manila Daily Bulletin. The complaint alleges that he,
on September 25, 1913, intended to impeach the honesty, virtue and reputation of Ramon
Sotelo, to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule by composing, printing,
editing, publishing, circulating and/ or procuring to compose an article, which they have
alleged to be false and to be a malicious defamation and libel of Ramon Sotelo. According
to the article entitled “Owners fired building to collect insurance, criminal charges
follows civil suit”, there was a conspiracy to defraud the insurance company. The house
in Calle O’Donnell was intentionally burnt and claims were made from the insurance
companies. In this conspiracy, the name of Ramon Sotello was implicated and was
therefore charged with conspiracy and fraud.

Issues:

1. Whether the defendant was responsible for and guilty of alleged libelous article

Ruling:
No. In this case, the Solicitor-General said that no one is represented to be the author,
editor and proprietor. There was no word of proof in the record showing that he was the
author, editor or proprietor. It only mentioned that the defendant was the manager. There
was no proof that he as the manager was directly responsible for writing, editing or
publishing the contents in the alleged libelous article. The prosecution only presented the
newspaper to show the relationship of the defendant to it.

CASE NO. 9
GR. NO. 151258
NULLEM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LAGE

VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE

MAIN POINT: THERE IS NO CRIME WHERE THERE IS NO LAW PUNISHING IT

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juries Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). The neophytes including the victim, Leonardo “Lenny” Villa are subjected
into the Aquila “Initiation Rites”. It will last for 3 days. They survived their first day
initiation rites.During the second day accused non-resident alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal demanded initiation rites be reopened. The
neophytes became the subject of paddling that caused physical pain. Leny received
several blows, one of which was too strong that send him sprawling on the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After an
hour of sleep the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he
was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some
of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through
a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed
him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members. The trial court found the 26
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and penalized with
reclusion temporal. However, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Nineteen of the accused were acquitted, four of the
accused were found guilty of slight physical injuries, and two of the accused (Villareal
and Dizon) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Accused Villareal petitioned for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the grounds that
the CA allegedly committed two reversible errors: first, denial of due process; and,
second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While petition was pending,
petitioner VILLAREAL died on March 13, 2011. Counsel for the petitioner filed a Notice
of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

ISSUE 1: Is the criminal liability of the accused be extinguished by death

ANSWER 1: Yes, the criminal liability of accused will be extinguished by death

RULING:
The Criminal Liability of the accused Villareal is extinguished by death. Based on Article
89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. Personal penalties
refer to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while pecuniary penalties
refers to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of. However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict
survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.

Therefore, the death of petitioner VILLAREAL extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the
delict complained of. Consequently, his petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against him deemed closed and terminated.

CONCLUSION:
Dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing is different
from other crimes. It cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act wrong.
Therefore, Possible amendment of anti-hazing law to include the fact of intoxication
and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the application penalties. The congress
created a special law on hazing not simply enact an amendment but it founded upon
the principle of mala prohibita. Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing
when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of
his death.

CASE No. 10

G.R. No. 176364

Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege

Rimando vs. Commission on Elections

Main Point: That the respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the resolutions, disregarding the doctrine “Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine
Lege”, there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.

Facts:
On July 13, 2001, herein private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC and
herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando of violating Section 2, paragraph (e) and Section 3,
paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in relation to Section 261, paragraph (s)
of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166. That
Juanito R. Rimando allow his security guards Jacinto Carag and Jonry Enaya to work
with firearms knowing that they do not have written COMELEC authority to do so.
Private respondent Magno appealed to the COMELEC citing Section 3(d) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328, she argued that prior written authority from the COMELEC was
necessary before firearms could legally be carried even in the place of assignment during
the election period.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration

I-1: Whether the petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability.

A-1: Yes, the petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with the
doctrine nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law
punishing it.

Under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is the bearing of
arms outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the election period.
Licensed firearms were carried and used by security guards within their place of work,
for which no exemption and/or permit was needed in accordance with Section 2,
paragraph (e) and Section 3, paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328.

Conclusion/Ratio: Interpreting the provisions in relation to this case, we arrive at the

following important points:
1. One does not need authority from the Commission when the firearm is carried
within the immediate vicinity of his place of work;

2. If his place of work cannot be determined but he has an assignment to carry out
in accordance with his duty, authority from the Commission is required.

In the instant case, the shooting incident happened within the premises guarded by the
security agency headed by the respondent. It is very clear therefore that the carrying of
firearm was done within the premises of the guards’ place of work. That being the case,
there was no need to secure a written authority from the COMELEC under Section 261(s)
of the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, there was no violation at all of that particular
provision
CASE No.11
Gr No. 180016

Corpuz v People
Swindling (Estafa)

Facts:

In 1990, a private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner Lito Corpuz had met at
Admiral Royale casino in Olongapo City. The private complainant engaged in the
lending of money to petitioner in exchange for the petitioner to sell pieces of jewellery
on a commission basis. All jewellery had an aggregated value of 98,000 pesos. The
agreement between the private complainant and petitioner was for the petitioner to
remit the proceeds of sales but if unsold to return items within a 60 day period.
Petitioner had failed and had refused to return the jewellery or the remittance of 98,000
pesos towards the damage and prejudice of private complainant.

The petitioner had entered the plea of not guilty. Both the prosecutor and the defendant
had presented the lone testimony of opposing parties. In summary, the petitioner and
the private complainant were collecting agencies of Antonio Balajadia whom extended
loans to Base employees. Every collection is equivalent to receiving a commission.
Petitioner had denied having any business endeavours with private complainant. The
Petitioner had admitted to receive a loan from Balajadia in 1989 which was signed as a
blank receipt. Petitioner claimed that the receipt was dated as March 2, 1981 and was
used against him to sell jewellery in which he didn’t see.

The RTC had found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the felony of
estrafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph b of the Revised Penal Code
which states the penalty of the deprivation of liberty alongside imprisonment with the
modification of imprisonment of four years and two months as a maximum and eight
years as the minimum sentence, with an additional one year with an additional of
10,000 pesos or seven years as a total.

The petitioner was denied by the CA for reconsideration but petitioned to the Supreme
Court. The grounds of the petition were:

A) The CA was erred by the confirmation of through appreciation and admission of

the lower court from the prosecution of evidence through machine copies of
evidence which violates the best evidence rule;
B) The CA erred in affirming through the lower courts of the criminal information
for estafa:
 1. There was no fix indication of a time period for the return of the unsold
jewellery and the remittance of sales if jewellery was sold
2. The alleged crime date of July 5, 1991 was differ to the one the private
complainant gave which was May 2, 1991
C) The CA erred in affirming the lower courts in the demand to return the unsold
jewellery or sales from the sold jewellery.
D) The CA erred in affirming the lower courts that the prosecution’s case was
proven beyond reasonable doubt:
1. The private complainant testified with two versions of the incident
2. The petitioner testified as straightforward, consistent and logical with human
experience
3. No equipoise rule in appreciation and application of the case
4. Penal statutes were interpreted against the state

The Solicitor General had counteract towards petitioner’s grounds through the failure
to object admissibility, the information was not defective through establishment of
offense and complained actions, the petitioner established the elements of the crime
charged.

Issue:

1. Whether the Petitioner was in the right to petition against the sentence of the
case as erred by the CA.

Ruling:

1. No. The Court ruled that the finding of the CA to be conclusive for it has more
weight, not inclusion of the unnecessary, and the awareness of errors that
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. For the CA to justifiably mention Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph b of the Revised Penal Code was considered as
constitutional. For the Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph b of the Revised
Penal Code mentioned that the unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through the
gathering of money, goods and personal property for the purpose to sell or
return but with incurrence of misappropriation or conversion of said items by
the offender with the denial of the receipt with a demand of the offended party
to the offender referred to as swindling (estafa).

Main Point:

The petitioner had been in the wrong to question the jurisdiction of the CA through
stating the potential wrong doings of the CA such as the affirmations made to the lower
courts and the violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner by default had been
ruled by the Court as a doer of swindling (estafa).

CASE No. 12
G.R. 166401
Topic: Construction of Penal Laws

People v. Alfredo Bon

Main Point: The penalty of death, as provided for in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code, will no longer be included in the graduation of criminal penalties.

Facts:

Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon
(appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older
brother. The RTC Appellant Alfredo Bon guilty of eight counts of rape. However, the
Court of Appeals upheld six, and downgraded two, of the rape convictions. For each of
these two counts, it imposed a reduced indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Issues:

1. Whether the Court should affirm that death penalty is the punishment for the
conviction of Bon for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape.

2. Whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape should be two degrees lower
computed from death penalty.

RULING:

1. No. On the first issue, the Court affirmed the conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
The High Court said that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
was guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in the
light of Republic Act 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines,” the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended. Section
2 of this law mandates that, in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court could no longer uphold the death
sentences imposed by lower courts. If the guilt of the accused is affirmed, it must instead
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,whenever appropriate.

2. No. Since RA 9346 prohibits the impostion of death penalty in the Philippines,
the two counts for attempted rape should be counted two degrees lower from the
Reclusion Perpetua.

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) provision reads:

Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by
one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall
be observed in graduating such penalty. The courts, in applying such lower or higher
penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1

1. Death 2. Reclusion perpetua 3. Reclusion temporal 4. Prision mayor 5. Prision

correctional 6. Arresto mayor 7. Destierro 8. Arresto menor 9. Public censure

10. Fine

Conclusion:

Alfredo J. Bon’s penalty for each of the six counts of rape was reduced by the Court to
reclusion perpetua. For each of the two counts of attempted rape, the penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals was downgraded by one degree to prision mayor, imposed in
its medium period, since there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Consequently, his penalty for each of the two counts of attempted rape was reduced to a
minimum two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, to a maximum of
eight years and one day of prision mayor. He was also ordered to pay the victims civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
CASE NO. 13
GR No. 185715
People vs. Capuno

Facts:

In its April 3, 2006, decision the RTC of San Mateo Rizal found appellant Erlinda
Capuno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under section 5, Art. II
of RA No. 9165 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002. The trial court’s
decision was affirmed by the CA but modified the penalty important.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The prosecution presented PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio who narrated that the
around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian
informant arrived and reported that a woman was openly selling drugs of Manggahan
Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban Rizal. Upon receiving the information, he, PO1
Joseph Fernandez, and PO1 Fortunato Jiro planned an entrapment operation where he
posed a buyer and his companions would act as back-up. They went to Manggahan Street
and when they were near, the informant pointed them to the appellant. PO1 Antonio
approached the appellant and her, “ paiskor ng halagang piso” ; he then handed a pre-
marked one hundred peso bill to the appellant who pulled out a plastic sachet and
handed it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held appellant’s arm, introduced
himself to her and stated her constitutional rights.

PO1 Jiro testified around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was in the police station
when the confidential asset called and informed the police that he saw one “alias erlinda”
selling illegal drugs. The police planed a buy bust operation. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1
Antonio and PO1 Fernandez, along with the confidential assed proceeded to Manggahan
Street were the buy-bust operation executed.
 The defense on their part, presented a different version of events. Appellant
Capuno testified that around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was sleeping at home with
her daughter, when two persons who introduced themselves as police officers, entered
her house. The two men who were wearing maong pants and sando, asked her if she was
Erlinda Capuno and when she said yes, they searched her house. When they found
nothing on her house, she, along her daughter, were invited at the Municipal hall of
Montalban.

Upon appeal, Capuno claimed that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the crime
charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
anchoring her claim that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro’s conflicting claim.

Issue: Whether appellant’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No. The SC, after due consideration resolved to acquit appellant for prosecution
failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In considering criminal case it is critical to start with the law’s own starting
perspective on the status of the accused-in all criminal prosecutors, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting
the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own
merits not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the
required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not event present evidence on its
behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.
CASE No. 14
G.R. Nos. 216007-09

People V Valdez

Facts: This case is a petition of the People of the Philippines against (i) motion to set aside
the no bail recommendation and fix the amount of bail, (ii) and the urgent supplemental
motion to the motion to set aside no bail recommendation and fix the amount of bail with
addition prayer to recall the warrant of arrest granted to Luzviminda S. Valdez. Auditors,
administered a post-audit of the disbursement voucher of Bacolod City Government
which the private respondent is the former mayor. Based on the verification conducted
by the auditor in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that
the cash slips were altered to enable Valdez to overclaim reimbursement from the
Government the total amount P274,306.75. Valdez was charged with eight cases four of
which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents under Articles
217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Since the
Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is
still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to
fix the amount of bail. She argued that the three cases are bailable as a matter of right
because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was alleged.

Petitioner countered in its comment that the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is
inapplicable as the attending circumstances are immaterial because the charges
constituting the complex crime have the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since
the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Luzviminda S. Valdez’s complex crime is punishable by

reclusion perpetua.

(2) Whether the crime is bailable.

Ruling: (1) No. The grave crime committed by Valdez is Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, amounted to
P274,306.75. It falls under the penalty of reclusion temporal with its maximum period to
reclusion pepetua, in which according to Art 217(4) The penalty of reclusion temporal, in
its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand
pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

(2) Yes, the case of Valdez is bailable because in accordance with Art 3 sec 13 of
constitution, All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

MAINPOINT: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

CASE NO.15
G.R. No. 150762TOPIC
Equipoise Doctrine

ABARQUEZ V PEOPLE

MAIN POINT:

The Court ruled the acquittal of the accused due to the effect of theEquipoise Doctrine,
which happened between Jose Umali and Coverdale Evangelista.

FACTS:

Theaccused, Coverdale “Abarquez” Evangelista, was charged with crimes of

homicideand attempted homicide for allegedly conspiring with Alberto Villanueva in the
killing ofRicardo Bello andthewoundingof JoseUmali.Bellowas stabbed twice with a
bladedweapon and was hit with a gun at the back, resulting in his immediate death
whileUmalisustained a 3cm wound on his left forearm.The Trial Court ruled Abarquez
guiltybeyond reasonable doubt as the accomplice ofVillanuevain the crime of
homicide.Hethenissued an appeal to the Court of Appeals, stating that he was only trying
to stop theinvolved parties from fighting, to which they rejected.Abarquez argues that:
(a) theprosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and isnot
sufficient tosupport his convictionas an accomplice and; (b)the credibility of the witnesses
againsthim is questionable.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented against Abarquezis sufficient enough to

provethat he was an accomplice in the killing of Bello.
RULING:

No, the Court ruled in the negative as Abarquez did not fulfil the two requisites that
define when a person becomes an accomplice according to Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code. First, by community of design, he was not aware of Villanueva’sintent and was not
directly involved. Second, he did not cooperate in the executionofVillanueva’s actions
and had no intention of doing so.The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly rendered,which cannot exist without the previouscognizance of the criminal
actintended to be executed. Abarquez must be in direct participation of the crime
committed by Villanueva in order to be considered an accomplice. In ruling the case
Abarquez, both Courts relied mainly on the testimony of Umali, which proved that
Abarquez did not agree with Villanueva’s criminal design. Umali’s perspective thought
that Abarquez was restraining him from helping Bello; however, Abarquez was simply
stopping him from joining the fight. Therefore, this case can be subjected to the Equipoise
Doctrine which holds that when the evidence isevenly balanced, the presumption of
innocence tilts the scales in favour of the accused.

CONCLUSION: The Court ruled thatAbarquez did not fulfil the two requisites that
define when aperson becomes an accomplice according to Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code

CASE NO. 17
GR NO. 160328

VERGARA v. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE:

To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check
knew at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. Because this
element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.

FACTS:

Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) granted Perpetual Garments Corporation

(PERPETUAL) a continuing credit line of Php 750,000. Both agreed that for every
availment of the line, PERPETUAL would execute a promissory note and issue post-
dated checks corresponding to the amount of the loan. Teresita Alcantara Vergara
(Vergara), as Vice President and General Manager of PERPETUAL, signed the credit line
agreement and all the post-dated checks. One of the checks signed and issued by Vergara
for Php 150,000 was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. LIVECOR verbally informed
Vergara of the dishonor of the check. The prosecution claims that petitioner failed to pay
the full amount of Check No. 019972 or to make arrangements for its full payment within
5 days from notice of dishonor thereof in December 1988. Although petitioner made cash
and check payments after the dishonor, the same were treated by LIVECOR as continuing
payments of the outstanding Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with violation
of BP 22 because she replaced Check No. 019972 on May 25, 1989, with 6 25, 1989, with 6
checks, each for P25,000.00 or for the total amount of P150,000.00. She claimed that from
the time of dishonor up to March 1992, PERPETUAL paid LIVECOR P542,000.00 thus
covering the full amount of the dishonored. The trial court rendered decision finding
petitioner guilty of violating BP 22. CA affirmed RTC decision, hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner violated BP 22.

RULING:

No. To hold petitioner liable for violation of BP 22, it is not enough that she issued the
check that was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must also be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that she knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check
was issued. The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also
provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the
check or makes arrangement for its payment within five banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. BP 22 gives the accused an
opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. Even
assuming that petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor, still, the prima facie pr
esumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds would not arise. The presumption that
the issuer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after
it is proved that the issuer had received notice of dishonour and that within 5 banking
days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for its payment. The prosecution is burdened to prove these acts that give
rise to the prima facie presumption.
CASE No. 19
G.R. No. 111343 August 22, 1996

ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LOURDES DU, respondents.

Facts:

Ernesto P. Dunlao,SR. is accused of violating the Decree No.1612,otherwise known as

“Anti-Fencing law of 1979. Committed as follows: That on or about a week prior to
October 25, 1986 In the City of Davao,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the CA,
that Ernesto accused, with intent to gain for himself, willfully,unlawfully and feloniously
purchased and received dismantle farrowing crates made of GI pipes, Valued at 20.000.00
pesos knowing the same to be the subject of thievery thereby committing an act of
“fencing”. To the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof Lourdes Farm, Inc.
represented by Lourdes.

Issue:
Whether or not Ernesto is guilty or violated the anti-fencing law of 1979

Ruling:

Yes. That Ernesto P. Dunlao.Sr, Guilty, beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the anti
fencing law of 1979.The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed 13 on
petitioner's shelves inside his compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing
crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did he display them? When a
storeowner displays articles, it is assumed that he is doing so with the intention of selling
them. Petitioner is ordered to pay Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Mrs. Lourdes Du,
the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value of the recovered pipes and farrowing crates,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
CASE No. 20
G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015
TOPIC: Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita

ABS-CBN vs. Gozon et. Al.

FACTS: On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against
GMA-7 for alleged act of copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the
Intellectual Property code(RA 8293), because of the respondent aired footage of the
arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo Dela Cruz without the petitioner’s consent.
ABS-CBN had a special embargo agreement with Reuters in exchange for new and video
material and Reuters will ensure that the footage obtained cannot be aired in the country.

GMA-7 is a subscriber of Reuter’s feed. After it received the live feed of Angelo Dela Cruz
from Reuters, GMA-7 on their program FLASH REPORT used the footage that was taken
by ABS-CBN that was only intended to be used by Reuters for outside the country airing.
The respondent stated that the news staff was not aware about the special embargo-
agreement between ABS-CBN and Reuters and stated as well that it was not aware of the
aired footage came from ABS-CBN.

The RTC of QC ruled possible cause to indict Dela Pena-Reyes and Manalastas.(3 Dec
2004)
Respondents appealed before the Department of Justice.(1 Aug 2005)
DOJ Sec.Gonzales ruled in favour of respondents on the grounds of good faith me be
used as a defence. Meanwhile DOJ Acting Sec.Agra issued a resolution to reverse
Sec.Gonzalez’s resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Pena-Reyes and
Manalastas as well as to indict Gozon et.al for violation of the Intellectual Property Code.
(29 June 2010)

The Court of Appeals granted the petition for Certiorari to reverse and set aside the DOJ.
Sec.Agra’s resolution and a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
Preliminary Injunction. (Nov 2010)

ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to charge respondents with infringement under
Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code.
RULING: he Supreme Court partially granted ABS-CBN’s petition and ordered RTC
Q.C. Branch to continue with the criminal proceedings against Dela Pena-Reyes and
Manalastas due to copyright infringement. The other respondents are not held liable to
for the committed criminal act because they did not take part in the said crime. Mere
membership does not mean they directly participated in the act. There was no
knowledge, approval or participation of the rest of the respondents to what has occurred.

The Supreme court also stated that GMA-7 did not do a diligent job in their function to
prevent that footage from being aired in television. It held that ABS-CBN’s video footage
is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual works and cinematography works and
works produced by a process” In its current form, the Intellectual Property Code is
malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict liability for copyright infringement. Good faith,
lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense against
copyright infringement. Copyright, however, is subject to the rules of fair. use and will
be judged on a case-to-case basis. Finding probable cause includes a determination of the
defendant's active participation, particularly when the corporate veil is pierced in cases
involving a corporation's criminal liability.

MAIN POINT:

The difference of an act mala in se and mala prohibita was stated in the present case.
Acts mala in se requires presence of criminal intent and the persons knowledge of
his/her act, while in acts of mala prohibita, presence if criminal intent and person’s
knowledge is not necessary. The court also stated that the Philippine laws on copyright
infringement does not require criminal intent(mens rea) and does not support good
faith as a defence. Thus the act of infringement and not the intent is the one that causes
the damage.
CASE 21
GR NO. 168111

Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita

Tan vs Ballena

Facts:

Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danila Domingo and Robert Lim were the
owner/president and administrative officers, respectively, of Footjoy Industrial
Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing footwears.
Respondent Amelito Ballena and 139 other employees of footjoy filed a joint complaint-
Affidavit against the petitioners for the latter’s violation of RA 1161, as amended by RA
8282; and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondents alleged that footjoy did
not regularly report the SSS membership of the employees and it likewise failed to remit
their SSS contributions and payment for their SSS loans. Petitioners blamed the economic
distress of their company. Thereafter the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor found probable
cause to charge footjoy with violations of the social security law. The charge for violation
of Art. 315 was dismissed as this was deemed absorbed by the violations of the social
security law. Provincial prosecutor approved this and affirmed the filing of informations
against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Motion for reconsideration but the provincial
prosecutor filed two informations for violating the social security law. Petitioners filed a
petition for review with the DOJ, while also filing a motion for the suspension of
scheduled arrangement with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. DOJ granted the
petition for review where they reversed the decision of the provincial prosecutor.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent filed with
Court of Appeals petition for certiorari but was dismissed and respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and the Court of Appeals granted and set aside the DOJ’s decision.
Petitioner issued Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
Whether the actions of petitioner for failure of reporting their employees for membership
at SSS and failure to remit SSS contributions and payment for SSS loans, are characterized
as mala prohibita
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were charged for the violation of the SSS law, which is a special law,
and such, it belongs to a class of offense known as mala prohibita. The difference between
mala in se and mala prohibita is that, mala in se are acts who are wrong in themselves
and mala prohibita as acts who would not be wrong but declared wrong for the fact that
positive law forbids them. The rule of the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent
governs, but in act mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?

CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 157171, 2006

Garcia vs. CA

FACTS:

In the 1995 election, the petitioners, Arsenia B. Garcia, et. al., of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, Alaminos, Pangasinan, were charged by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. for violating Section 27(b), R.A. No. 6646. He complained that petitioners
conspired, confederated, and mutually helped each other to wilfully and unlawfully
decreased his votes from 6,998 votes (actual disclosed total number of votes from 159
precincts) to 1,921 votes. RTC convicted Garcia and acquitted the other accused due to
insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. She
appealed the case in CA but it ruled to deny the motion of reconsideration and affirmed
the decision of RTC with modification to increase the minimum imprisonment for six
months to one year. The case was thereby filed in SC wherein the petitioner contested CA
ruling and attested her lack of motive to reduce the votes of the respondent. The
respondent argued that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law.

ISSUE:

Whether the violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is under mala in se.

RULING:

Yes. The provisions under Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 under mala in se. The intention
to increase or decrease the votes of the candidate is by nature immoral and punishable
by law. Even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be
punishable. The court ruled that the petitioner is liable even if the votes were not added
to any senatorial candidates.

CASE NO. 23
GR No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)
Characteristics of Criminal Law; Prospective

Co vs CA

Prospective Characteristic of Criminal Law:

Prospective– The law does not have any retroactive effect.
Exception to Prospective Application: When new statute is favorable to the
accused.

FACTS:
Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a postdated
check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank. The check was deposited on January
3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later for the reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (an act penalizing the
making or drawing and issuance of a check without sufficient funds or credit and for
other purposes) was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the RTC of
Pasay City. RTC ruled in favor of the salvage firm citing Ministry Circular No. 12 issued
August 8, 1984 — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check
to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12 appeared to have been
based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansaa misapplication
of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa” and conforms to the rule that an
administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administration
interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively.
Co appealed. He contends that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1,
1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on
September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense.

ISSUES:
1. Can Albino raise the defense that Ministry Circular No. 12 cannot be retroactively
applied?
2. Is Albino Co held liable under B.P. 22?

RULING:
1. Yes. At the time Co delivered the check, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check
as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense. Article 8 of the
Civil Code provides that "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our
decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." Albino may raise the defense of non-retroactivity effect of the Ministry
Circular No. 12.

2. No. It is echoed in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal.” The RPC also provides for the prospective effect of the law. This means that
the law cannot penalize an act that was not punishable at the time of its commission. The
reckoning point is the time of the commission of the act and not the time when the
complaint is raised. It is a well-known exception that when new statute is favorable to
the accused, the law may have retroactive effect. Hence, Co cannot be held liable under
BP 22 as he delivered the check before the implementation of Ministry Circular No. 12.

CASE NO. 24
1 Phil 463
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION
 TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA v VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ

MAIN POINT:
The penalty prescribed by article 458, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code should be applied
in its medium grade, and in view of all the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty
as four years of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day's
banishment for every 12 pesetas not paid, and the costs of both instances.

FACTS:

Valdez was the editor of "Miau," a periodical published and circulated in Manila, and
that an article containing the alleged injurious matter was published in the issue of that
periodical of September 1901. The article is couched throughout in grossly abusive
language, and in terms not capable of being misunderstood; charges the private
prosecutor, who had been then recently appointed a member of the United States
Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time of the murder of
his mother and sister and with having subsequently entered into intimate political
relations with the assassin. The article contains other statements and imputations of a
derogatory character.

Injurias graves are classified by article 457 of the Penal Code under four heads.
1. The imputation of a crime of the class not subject to prosecution de oficio.
2. That of a vice or moral shortcoming, the consequences of which might seriously
injure the reputation, credit, or interests of the person offended.
3. Injurias which by reason of their nature, occasion, or circumstances are commonly
regarded as insulting.
4. Those which may be reasonably classified as grave in view of the condition,
dignity, and personal circumstances of the injured party and the offender.

ISSUE: Whether the offense is injuries grave and punishable under Article 458 of the
RPC.

RULING:

It is urged by counsel that the official position of the private prosecutor should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance under Penal Code, article 10, No. 20.
Article 10: “Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are
or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
CONCLUSION: The private prosecutor and the defendant have appealed from the
judgment of the court, finding the defendant guilty of the offense of injurias graves under
article 457 and 458 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas,
with subsidiary imprisonment and costs.

CASE No. 25
Article II, Section 2: EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE
Commission of an Offence on a Philippine Ship or Airship

US v. Fowler, 1 Phil 614

FACTS: On August 12, 1901, the two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen
bottles of champagne of the value of $20 while on board the transport Lawton, then
navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of the
said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa,
and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and
without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and provided. The
counsel for defendant presented a demurrer asking to dismiss the case, alleging that the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila was without jurisdiction to try the crime
charged because such crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the City of
Manila, or within the territory in which the jurisdiction of the Court extends. The CFI
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecuting attorney appealed and
the case was brought before this court.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila has jurisdiction over the
criminal case of theft committed on board while navigating the high seas on a vessel not
registered in the Philippines.

RULING: No. Article 2(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the provisions of the
Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, but also outside of its
jurisdiction against those who should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship. It is the registration of the vessel or aircraft in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines which makes it a Philippine ship or airship. In the case at bar, the
transport Lawton is not a vessel registered in the Philippines, thus the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on
the high seas on board the vessel Lawton.

MAIN POINT: The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed
on the high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines.

Case number 26
183 SCRA309
Intentional Felonies
People vs. Gonzales

FACTS:

On February 21, 1981, Augusto Gonzales the son of the appellant Custodio Gonzales, Sr
informed the barangay captain that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd
Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still
holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with
blood the barangay captain then brought them to the police station. When arraigned on
September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada,
presented himself to the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify
for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, dated March 3,
1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant),
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. all the accused
pleaded not guilty to the crime. The RTC of Iloilo believed the testimony of Huntoria and
on October 31, 1984 found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder
of Mr. Lloyd Peñacerrada, the petitioner-appellant appealed to the court of appeals. The
Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's defense of alibi and affirmed the decision of the
lower court. The case was then brought to the supreme court.

Issue: whether appellant has intent to commit the crime.

Ruling:

No, the appellant has no intent in committing such crime he was accused of, The decision
of the court of appeals was reversed and set aside and the appellant was acquitted. The
supreme court found Honturio to be an unreliable witness and an interested witness to
ingratiate himself to the deceased family. At any rate, there is another reason why we
find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful
— it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and
culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any
possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused
who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow
the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone
adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the
appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we
seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three
robust male sons (Custodio, Jr., Nerio, and Augusto), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a
perceived enemy. Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate
circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not
beyond cavil, it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with
disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record.
CASE NO. 27
G.R. No. 31695, November 26, 1929

Intentional Crime: Intent

People v. Sia Teb Ban

Facts:

Defendant was found guilty of qualified theft and habitual delinquency was sentenced
by the Municipal Court of Manila to two years, four months, and one day presidio
correction with cost and additional penalty if twenty-one years imprisonment. The
decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance. He contended that he is not guilty
of the crime contending that animus lucrandi or intent to gain or profit is not present.

Issue: Whether the defendant is not guilty of theft on the grounds that animus lucrandi
is not shown.

Ruling:
No, the defendant is guilty of the crime of theft. It is a fundamental doctrine of law that
the act penalized by the law is presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary is shown
(art. 1, Penal Code). From the defendant's felonious acts, freely and deliberately executed,
the moral and legal presumption of a criminal and injurious intent arises conclusively
and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary (sec. 334, No. 2, Act No. 190).

Case No.28
Article 3 – Types of Felonies according to intent
Intentional Felonies – INTENT

PEOPLE vs RENEGADO, GR No. L-27031

Facts:

The City Fiscal of Calbayog City filed with the Local Court of First Instance an
Information against Loreto Renegado for "Murder with assault upon a person in
authority" on the basis that on August 29, 1966, about 9:30 A.M in Calbayog City,
Philippines and within the premises off the Tiburcio Tancinco Vocational School decided
intent to kill with assault upon a person in authority; the deceased Mamerto de Lira being
at the that time a public school teacher of the said school.
Respondent's counsel-de-oficio, Atty. Roberto C. Alip, pleads for an acquittal with
the argument that accused should be exempt from criminal liability because the
respondent is allegedly acted out of insanity -- acts without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. The next point raised by the defense is that the testimonial evidence
of the prosecution comes from "biased, partial, and highly questionable sources. Lastly,
he argued that the motive of the assault is important to determine whether or not the
assault falls under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code;[30] in the instant case it is clear
that the underlying motive for the assault was not that Renegado was asked to type the
test questions of the teacher Lira but that the latter made insulting and slanderous
remarks to the herein appellant.

Issue: Did the accused commit a crime with intent?

RULING: YES. The accused commit a crime with intent. Firstly, the killing of Mamerto
de Lira is qualified by evident premeditation. Evident premeditation exists when enough
time had elapsed for the actor to reflect and allow his conscience to overcome his
resolution to kill but he persisted in his plan and carried it into effect. Secondly, treachery
attended the killing of Lira because the latter, who was unarmed, was stabbed from
behind, was totally unaware of the coming attack, and was not able to defend himself
against it. There is treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a position
to defend himself or offer resistance, nor to present risk or danger to the accused when
assaulted. Thirdly, the killing of Lira is complexed with assault upon a person in
authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly recognized private school is a person
in authority under Art. 152 of the R.P.C. as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 578.

In as much as the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority
and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. On the part of the Court, for lack of ten votes for purposes of
imposing the death sentence, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, is to be
imposed.

Conclusion: Since there is the “INTENT” of the accused in killing the deceased therefore
is subject to a penalty.
CASE NO. 29
G.R.NO. 210192

ROSALINDA S. KHITRI AND FERNANDO S. KHITRI; Petitioners

Vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; Respondent

FACTS:

Rosalinda and Fernando( petitioners) filed for petition for review on certiorari for
convicting them for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The court of appeals (CA) rendered the decision on June 27, 2013 in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33961, which affirmed the Decision dated December 9, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, in Criminal Case No.00-1023.
Petitioners received the amount of 400,000.00 purposely for the construction of factory
building on half-portion of petitioner’s lot located at Monte Vista Park Subd., Sto. Niño,
Cainta, Rizal. Petitioner did not comply as were agreed and failed to return the said
amount . There was no legal contract entered between the petitioners and spouses
Hiroshi and Fukami; their business partners as the respondents.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the court will aquit the Petitioners on Estafa case.

2.) Whether or not the RTC grants the Petitioner’s prayer for REVIEW on the court’s
decision as QUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime ON Dec. 2,
2009.

RULINGS: 1.) YES, The petitioners cannot be made criminally liable on estafa because
there are some elements not present. Absence of the elements of misappropration, the
private complainants could not have been deprived of their money through
defraudation. The lost profit could have arisen from the ABORTED JOINT VENTURE.
 2.) Yes. Court of Appeals (CA) erred that RTC of Las Piñas, City has jurisdiction over
the case.Crime of Estafa is punishable under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
(RPC). But NOT all elements of the crime of estafa are present. On June 27,2013
,CA affirming by RTC in Las Piñas City, Branch 253, in Criminal Case No. 00-1023
is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioners were aquitted of the crime
Estafa. And directed to REIMBURSE the private complainants, Spouses Hiroshi
and Belen Fukami, the amount 400,000.00) subject to annual interest of six percent(
6%) from the finality of this decision until full satisfaction on June 27, 2013.

CASE NO. 30
G.R. NO. 171951
ARTICLE 3 - DEFINITIONS: TYPE OF FELONIED ACCORDING TO INTENT:
INTENTIONAL FELONIES: INTENT

Alvarado Garcia vs. People

Facts:

Alvarado Garcia, the petitioner, and Fidel Foz Jr., had a drinking spree in the morning of
September 1999 that lasted the until the evening of that day. Due to the blaring noise of
the “videoke” (a.k.a. karaoke) machine that the two were enjoying, Manuel Chy, told the
group to quiet down.Two days after, the met again on a wedding and again, Chy told the
two to stop singing. On the next day, the two, now with a friend, decided to have a
drinking session and later moved to Punta. On their way to Punta, they saw Chy. After
said event, the petitioner expressed to his companions “This Manny is really arrogant, I
will finish him off today” in his local dialect. Later in the day the when the petitioner
asked his friend to call for Chy, the petitioner suddenly assaulted Chy and struck him on
the lower part of his head with a bottle, to the shock of Chy. When Chy found a way to
escape, he rushed to his home and phoned his wife and told her to call the police. When
they arrived, they found Chy unconscious and later pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital. A later autopsy found out that the cause of death was myocardial infarction.

The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The petitioner
contended that he should only be charged with slight physical injuries as his assault on
Chy was not the cause of his death.

Issue: Whether Garcia should be held liable for the death of Chy.
Ruling:

Yes. It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain
from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The
inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended
to commit.

The essential requisites for the application of this Article 4 of the RPC are: (a) the intended
act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit
graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. Hence, the fact that Chy
was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his
death. a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the
what he intended.

Conclusion: A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from
what he intended.

CASE NO. 34
G.R. NO. 97471
ii. INTENT VS. MOTIVE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PUNO

 February 17, 1993

Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry

FACTS:

On January 13, 1988, around 5:00 pm in Quezon City, Isabelo Puno, the accused, personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta
Avenue, Quezon City. Fred, the personal driver had to go to Pampanga on an emergency,
Isabelo will temporarily take his place. She got into his husband’s Mercedes Benz, the
driver was Isobelo, and she had to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig. After the car turned
right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
boarded the car beside the driver. Enry pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as while Isabelo
told her to "get money". She handed P7, 000 but they wanted P100, 000 more. She drafted
three checks: two P30, 000 checks and one P40, 000 check. The car headed towards Metro
Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga.
According to her, she jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and injured when she jumped out of the
car.

Issue:

1. Whether the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

2. Whether it is classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Ruling: No. There is no intention of kidnapping or serious illegal detention. There is no

showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, other than the exploiting money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

No. The robbery was committed inside a car which was operating on a highway
does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case.

Main Point: For this crime to exist there must be substantial proof that the actual intent
of the offenders was to deprive the offended party of her liberty.
CASE NO. 33
G.R. 151314 June 3, 2004

PEOPL OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIAN BADANG, ADING SALAMAT and

RAKIMA ABUBAKAR
; Illegal Sales of Regulated Drugs, Alibi, Buy-bust Operation, Conspiracy, Frame Up,
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659.

FACTS:
On May 3, 2000 the Philippine National Police carried out a buy bust operation in Arlegui,
Quiapo, Manila based on a tip notified by an informant about the drug trafficking
activities of appellants Bandang and Abubakar in Quiapo, Manila. The Philippine
National Police organized a team composed of PO1 Carpentero, as the poseur-buyer, and
PSI Mendoza, as the team leader, to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operation.

The informant introduced PO1 Carpentero to appellants as a prospective buyer of 700

grams of shabu. Appellants told PO1 Carpentero that it costs ₱490,000.00. When they
asked her if she has the money, PO1 Carpentero replied that she will come back the
following day with the money.They prepared boodle money in two bundles consisting
of cut papers. They then placed two five hundred genuine bills on top of each bundle,
wrapped and placed them in a blue transparent plastic bag.

During the buy-bust operation, Abubakar asked PO1 Carpentero if she has the money.
When she said “yes,” appellant Bandang got the black shoulder bag from appellant
Ading Salamat and gave it to PO1 Carpentero. She then opened the black shoulder bag
and saw seven (7) transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.

Thereupon, she handed the bundles of boodle money to appellant Abubakar and
immediately pressed the button of the hazard lights of the car, indicating that the deal
was consummated.
PO1 Carpentero then introduced herself as a police officer and arrested the three
appellants.
The substance, with a total weight of 716.54 grams, was submitted to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for examination. It was positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Omero presented to the trial court the specimen and it was identified by PO1 Carpentero
as the same white crystalline substance contained in a black shoulder bag handed to her
by appellant Bandang. All the appellants raised the defenses of alibi and frame-up.
The trial court found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the Violation of
Section 15, Article III in relation to paragraphs (e), (f), (m), (o) of Section 2, Article I and
in relation to Sections 20 & 21, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659.

ISSUE: Whether the elements of the crime of illegal sale of Dangerous Drugs were
established and that the sale was consummated in the buy bust operation?

RULING: Yes. The requisites of the case according to RA 6425 are met: (1) transaction of
sale of illegal drugs took place, (2) the corpus delicti was presented as evidence, and (3)
the buyer and seller were identified. All the three requisites are present in the case of
Salamat, Badang and Abubakar.
Furthermore, the claim of Alibi did not prosper due to inconsistency of the testimonies
on direct admission and cross examination of the appellants. The appeal on frame up did
not hold up as well due to the fact that the appellants and police officers had no prior
relation or knowledge of each other not until the transaction as introduced by the
informant. Lastly, conspiracy was established among the three appellants as their
conduct were mutually and jointly carried out from the possession of the drugs,
presentation of the illicit item to the buyer and acceptance of the payment for the
supposed sale. No one during the consummation of sale had an objection thus
establishing knowledge, consent and willingness to be involved in the transaction.

CONCLUSION: The penalty prescribed under Section 15 of Article III, in relation to

Section 20 and 21 of Article IV of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 for unauthorized sale
of 200 grams or more is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine of Php 500,000.00 as
imposed.

MAIN POINT: The basic requisites in the Dangerous Drug Act are to be established and
prima facie evidence of the illicit item as consummated in the sale and even just with
possession would be penalized under RA 7659.

CASE NO. 34

People vs. Oquino

FACTS:

An information for robbery with homicide in the instant case was filed on November 11,
1971 charging three accused, namely: Antonio Oquiño Romulo Lagario alias "Rogelio
Lagario" and Arnido Calosor. The evidence for prosecution was the testimony of Marina
Uy that the accused Oquiño held (her) Marina's right hand and dragged her away.
Lagario and Calosor took Aniceto to the side of the small house and wanted to take his
wrist watch.Af ter Lagario and Calosor stabbed Aniceto, Marina ran away to ask for help.
She went to the Leyte Provincial Jail accompanied by a man. Somebody at the jail dalked
to the telephone. After about twenty (20) minutes, she returned and found Aniceto
wounded. His wrist watch was no longer with him
The trial court as aforesaid, refused to give credence to the evidence of the defendant
Lagario and convicted him of the crime of robbery with homicide. Accused-appellant
argued that the lower court erred in finding that the accused is guilty of robbery.
Appellant's contended that there was no unlawful taking of the wrist watch and that the
prosecution failed to prove the element of intent of gain.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused Lagario is liable for the crime of robbery with homicide.

RULING:

Yes. That the crime of robbery with homicide was committed by the accused has, thus,
been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. We disagree with appellant's contention that
there was no unlawful taking of the wrist watch and that the prosecution failed to prove
the element of intent of gain.

Proof as to motive for the crime, that is, the accused intended to rob or only to kill the
victim, is important or essential when the evidence on the commission of the robbery
is purely circumstantial or inclusive, as in this case. Similarly, the motive to rob was
duly proven in this case by the categorical statement of Marina Uy that while appellant
and Calosor were dragging Aniceto to the side of the hut, they "wanted to take his watch"
20 coupled with the disappearance of the wrist watch when she returned to the wounded
Aniceto after seeking help and its subsequent recovery from a certain Agripino Aguilos
whose name was supplied to the police by the appellant and his co-accused, Antonio
Oquiño after their arrest.

The intent to gain from the taking of the watch is clearly indicated in appellant's
testimony that he was asked by Oquiño to sell the watch.