1. Libi vs.
IAC ● T​he diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child
G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992
By: ZURITA
Topic:​ Children 15 years and below
Petitioners: ​CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI
Respondents: ​HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY
GOTIONG
Ponente: ​Regalado
FACTS:
● The Gotiongs are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann who died on January 14, 1979,
○ Julie Ann was an 18-y/o commerce student of the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City
● The Libis are the parents of Wendell, then a minor between 18-19 y/o who was
living at that time with his parents, and who also died in the same event on the
same date.
● For more than 2 yrs, Julie Ann & Wendell were sweethearts. Julie broke up with
Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
○ During the first 2 weeks of January, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but she refused, prompting Wendell to resort
to threats against her.
○ Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou, to avoid Wendell.
● Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi,
which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence the
Gotiongs.
● Theories of parents:
○ The Gotiongs: Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the firearm
and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
○ The Libis: rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown 3rd
party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of
his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to
eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification
● CFI: ​dismissed the petitioner’s complaint due to lack of evidence
LIBIS CONTENTION: Amelita testified that Cresencio owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. The spouses each have a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that
on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.
ISSUE: W/N the Libis are liable for Julie Ann’s death?
RULING: YES
● We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had
really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the
fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys
to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to
the bag of his mother where the other key was.
relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
child.
○ Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death
that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
○ Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents
were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and
knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be
engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, or even drug
users.
○ Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell,
with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding
upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in
possession of that firearm.
● THE IAC RULED: ​". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their
children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of
drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of
their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in
their company.’
● We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held
liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime
committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and
discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require
clarification.
● Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable,
but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in
nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on
the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our
readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor
children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil
liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the
parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid
and substantial defense.
● We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children,
as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In
fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of
joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the
minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary,
hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated
of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."
● We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by
their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for
acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
● Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor
children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of
fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family.
● That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such
damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the
minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only
in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi
delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed."
For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third
paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
● DOCTRINE: ​The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor
children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case
of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.:
Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24
Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26
Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability
of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years
of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over,
since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both
instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved
in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons
well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to
hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and
not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere
negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with
criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in
a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the liability of
the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children,
is primary or subsidiary.
○ It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the
compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28
employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29
and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of
their co-accused in the other classes.
● Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are
and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control,
or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary
liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with
respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard
to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or
15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
● Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against
the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon
the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under
the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors,
the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
○ In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises
relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives
herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to
duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
NOTE: IAC RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed.
 2. Salen v Balce
G.R. No. L-14414 April 27, 1960
By: ​Kate
Topic: ​Vicarious liability arising from delict
Petitioners: ​SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA
Respondents: ​JOSE BALCE
Ponente: ​J. Bautista
FACTS:
● Carlos Salen died from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of
respondent.
● At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also a minor below 18 years of age, and was
living with his parents.
● As a result of Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of
homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased
an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00.
● Upon petition of plaintiff (parents of Carlos), a writ of execution was issued for the
payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo
Balce was insolvent and had no property in his name.
● Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant, father of Gumersindo, the
payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus
causing plaintiffs to institute the present action.
● Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs
predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers
to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases.
ISSUE:​ Whether respondent can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00
which his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him.
RULING:
YES. ​The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which
provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if
the damage is caused with criminal intent. ​Verily, the void that apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code
It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for
the acts committed by his son ​only i​ f the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age,
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act without discernment, unless it appears that there
is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3,
Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the deliquent minor under his legal authority or
control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability,
for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgement is hereby rendered ordering
appellee to pay appellants the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the filing of
the complaint, and the costs.
3. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA
GR NO. ​82465
February 25, 1
By: Raymond Villafuerte
Topic:​ TORTS; Liability of Schools
Petitioners: ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND
ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE
ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ
Respondents: ​THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ
Ponente: ​J. Paras
FACTS:
● Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of St. Francis High School, wanted to join a
school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
o Because of short notice, Ferdinand’s parents (respondent spouses Castillo) did
not allow him to join, but merely allowed him to bring food to the teacher’s
for the picnic with a directive to go back home immediately after doing so.
o However, because of the persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went with
them to the beach.
● During the picnic, one of the teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue.
o In the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned.
● Ferdinand’s parents filed a complaint against St. Francis High School, its Principal
(Benjamin Illumin) and the teachers for damages.
 o They contended that the death of their son was due to the failure of the
petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in
preventing their son's drowning.
● Trial Court: Ruled in favor of the Castillo spouses. Ordered the teachers to jointly and
severally pay the Castillos P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees. The case was dismissed as against St. Francis High School,
Principal Benjamin Illumin, and Teacher Aurora Cadorna.
o "This Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a
school sanctioned one.
o Similarly, no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin
and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together
with the other defendant teachers.
o It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not
consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it.
o On the other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to
supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by
defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo
belongs."
● CA:​ Affirmed with the following modifications.
(1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs,
in addition to the [other damages mentioned above];
(2) St. Francis High School and Principal Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly and
severally liable with defendant teachers for the payment to Castillos of the
abovementioned damages.
● "Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school
principal must be found jointly and severally liable with the
defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of
the death of their son.
● It is the rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application,
the ​negligence of the employees ​in causing the injury or damage ​gives rise to
a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the
establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal);
and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by
clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision
of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers).
● The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the
aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal
from liability under the above-cited provisions.
(3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability, and the
case against them, together with their respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered
dismissed.
● These 2 defendants had satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to
the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance examination
being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof.
● Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in question, it
cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence attributable
to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in the
supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the
drowning of plaintiffs' son.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the
award of damages to the plaintiffs.​ – NO.
● At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
o The fact that Ferdinand’s father gave money to his son to buy food for
the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent
for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
● Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the
Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.
o ART 2180 (4): “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry."
o Under this paragraph, it is clear that ​before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee​, the ​act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice ​must have occurred while an employee was
in the performance of his assigned tasks.
● In the case at bar, ​the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of
their assigned tasks.
o The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a
purely private affair, a picnic.
o This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin
Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity.
● As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal
Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in
any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the
same.
o The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither
is it supported by any jurisprudence.
o If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers will forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed
to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even
if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the
performance of their duties.
2. W/N the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar.​ - NO
● Petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can
be assessed against them.
● While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join
the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their
duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the
safety of the children.
o But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the required diligence.
o Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are
concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there being no
merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
4. AQUINAS SCHOOL V SPS. INTON
G.R. No. 184202 : January 26, 2011
By: Nico Nunez
Topic: LIABILITY OF SCHOOLS
Petitioners: AQUINAS SCHOOL
Respondents: CARPIO, J., CHAIRPERSON, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, AND MENDOZA, JJ.
SPS. JOSE INTON AND MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, ON THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF
THEIR MINOR CHILD, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, AND SR. MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP
Ponente: ABAD, ​J..
FACTS:
● Respondent Jose Luis Inton (Joese Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas
School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose
Luis' grade three religion class.
● ​While Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and
went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this
and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went
over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the child's behavior,
Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also
pulled and shoved his head on the classmate's seat. Finally, she told the child to
stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the
blackboard while seated on the floor.
● As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an
action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas
before the RTC. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for
violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly.
● With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and
his mother Victoria suffered. RTC dismissed Victoria's personal claims but ruled in
Jose Luis' favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney's fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs
of suit.
● Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of
damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an
employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA
found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to increase the
award of damages. Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this was denied.
Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE(s): W/N Aquinas is solidarily liable with Yamyamin for damages.
HELD/RATIO: NO
● The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold test" to determine the existence
of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the
employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control
over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers
to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the
work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes
the same.
● In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students.
Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin's religious congregation
that chose her for the task of catechizing the school's grade three students, much
like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public
schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have
control over Yamyamin's teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school
directress' testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
● First, Yamyamin's transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion. Second, there is no question that Aquinas
ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters
and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she
would behave properly towards the students. Third, the school gave Yamyamin a
copy of the school's Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for
handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she
was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998. Fourth, the school pre-approved
the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was really
catechizing the students. Fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin
to classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start
of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her
methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as
 the school learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of
outright neglect.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas
School not liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton
5. Amadora v. CA
GR NO. L-47745
April 15, 1988
SPV
Topic: ​Liability of Schools
Petitioners: JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.
YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA
Respondents: ​HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR
LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru
his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO
Ponente: ​Cruz
FACTS
- Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his
high school diploma.
o These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972.
o On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. T
o he victim was only seventeen years old.
- Daffon was convicted thru reckless imprudence.
- The victim’s parents field a civil action for damages under Art 2180 against Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents
o The complaint against the students were later on dropped.
- CFI held the remaining defendants liable for death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages
and atty’s fees.
- CA reversed, stating that Art 2180 is not applicable as the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning.
o The students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the
incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the school, had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury
- The petitioners contend ​their son was in the school to show his physics experiment
as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the
private respondents.
- The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only
for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
- It is not disputed that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any further action .
o As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired
the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the
same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son
would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso.
ISSUE: ​W/N the respondents are liable for Alfredo’s death – NO
HELD:
- The Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under Article 2180 and it is an academic institution of learning.
- Article 2180 should apply to ​all s​ chools, academic as well as non-academic.
o GR: Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student
o In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
o Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable.
- There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the
non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned.
o The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under
his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he
is teaching.
- The distinction between school of arts and trades and academic schools no longer
obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contract of their heads with the students.
o Article 2180, however, remains unchanged.
o In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court
according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking
into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit
to enact the necessary amendment.
- As to the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades over the students: While the custody requirement does not mean
 that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that
the student should be within the control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury.
o This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with
the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as
the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the
period before the commencement exercises.
o The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
- DOCTRINE​: As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues.
o Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody
and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the
provisions of Article 2180.
o During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the
parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody.
o It is ​not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically
present and in a position to prevent it.
o Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but
refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence.
o The liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
school itself.
▪ But as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he
can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180
- IN THIS CASE: At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that
the fourth year classes had formally ended.
o It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important
is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.
o Even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of
the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in
the custody of the school authorities.
- The ​rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because ​none of them was the teacher-in-charge​ as previously defined.
o Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student
body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline.
o The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge
of the offending student was.
o The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics
teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's
killer.
- At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their
non-observance.
o His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that
day.
o And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of
the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the
tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his
laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student.
o On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
- In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should
be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same
later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher
authorities.
o While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting
of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned
pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
- Finally, the ​Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
o Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in
the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
- None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on
Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
6. LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild
G.R. Nos. L-12582 and L-12598. January 28, 1961.
By: Jam
Topic: ​ER-EE Relationship; Control Test
Petitioners: LVN PICTURES, INC petitioner-appellant; SAMPAGUITA PICTURES, INC.,
petitioner-appellant
Respondents: PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS GUILD (FFW) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents-appellees.
Ponente​: CONCEPCION, J
DOCTRINE​: ​Control Test - It is well settled that "an employer-employee relationship exists
where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only
the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end.”
FACTS:
● Premised upon the ff allegations, the Philippine Musicians Guild prayed that it be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for all musicians working in
the film companies LVN, Sampaguita, and Premiere Productions.
○ The Guild is a duly registered legitimate labor organization;
○ LVN Pictures, Sampaguita Pictures, and Premiere Productions are
engaged in the making of motion pictures and in the processing and
distribution thereof;
○ They employ musicians for the purpose of making music recordings for
title music, background music, musical numbers, finale music and other
incidental music
○ 95% of the musicians playing for all the musical recordings of the film
companies involved in these cases are members of the Guild.
● LVN Pictures, Sampaguita, and Premiere Production denied the allegations. The
musicians of the Guild are not their employees, but independent contractors.
● CIR: certified the Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agency of all musicians working with the film companies.
● The film companies filed a petition for review. They claim that a petition for
certification cannot be entertained when the existence of employer-employee
relationship between the parties is contested.
ISSUE: W/N the film companies reserve the right to control over the means to be used and
the end to be achieved thereby making the musicians of the Guild employees of the said
companies. – YES.
RULING:
● SC cited the lower court: ​"The work of the musical director and musicians is a
functional and integral part of the enterprise performed at the same studio
substantially under the direction and control of the company. To determine
whether a person who performs work for another is the latter's employee or an
independent contractor, the National Labor Relations Board relies on "the right of
control' test:
○ Under this test an employer-employee relationship exists where the
person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control
not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be
used in reaching the end.
○ "Notwithstanding that the employees are called independent
contractors, the Board will hold them to be employees under the Act
where the extent of the employer's control over them indicates that the
relationship is in reality one of employment.”
○ "The right of control of the film company over the musicians is shown
(1) by calling the musicians through 'call slips' in the name of the
company; (2) by arranging schedules in its studio for recording sessions;
(3) by furnishing transportation and meals to musicians; and (4) by
supervising and directing in detail, through the motion picture director,
the performance of the musicians before the camera, in order to suit the
music they are playing to the picture which is being flashed on the
screen”
○ The members of the Philippine Musicians Guild are employees of the 3
film companies and, therefore, entitled to right of collective bargaining
under RA 875.
○ "The Philippine Musicians Guild is hereby declared as the sole collective
bargaining representative for all the musicians employed by the film
companies.”
● SC: ​We are fully in agreement with the foregoing conclusion and the reasons given
in support thereof.
● The relation between the business of the film companies and the work of the
musicians is not casual. "The work of the musicians is an integral part of the entire
motion picture." Indeed, one can hardly find modern films without music therein.
Music is a necessary incident in the production of motion pictures.
● The film companies summon the musicians to work, through the musical directors.
The film companies, through the musical directors, fix the date, the time and the
place of work. The film companies, not the musical directors, provide the
transportation to and from the studio. The film companies furnish meal at dinner
time.
● "During the recording sessions, the motion picture director who is an employee of
the company" — not the musical director — "supervises the recording of the
musicians and tells them what to do in every detail." The motion picture director —
not the musical director — "solely directs the performance of the musicians before
the camera". The motion picture director "supervises the performance of all the
actors, including the musician who appear in the scenes, so that in the actual
performance to be shown on the screen, the musical director's intervention has
stopped."
● "The movie director tells the musical director what to do; tells the music to be cut
or tells additional music in this part or he eliminates the entire music he does not
(want) or he may want more drums or more violin or piano, as the case may be".
The movie director "directly controls the activities of the musicians". He "says he
wants more drums and the drummer plays more" or "if he wants more violin or he
does not like that".
● DOCTRINE: ​It is well settled that "an employer-employee relationship exists where
the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not
only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end.”
○ The decisive nature of said control over the "means to be used", is
illustrated in the case of Gilchrist Timber Co in which, by reason of said
control, the employer-employee relationship was held to exist between
the management and the workers, notwithstanding the intervention of
an alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercised, the power to
hire and fire said workers. The aforementioned control over "the means
to be used" in reaching the desired end is possessed and exercised by the
film companies over the musicians in the cases before us.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ​WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
NOTES:
 ● RA 875 “AN ACT TO PROMOTE INDUSTRIAL PEACE “ is patterned after the US
Wagner Act.
● Wagner Act: the purposes of the Act are to encourage collective bargaining and to
remedy the workers' inability to bargaining power, by protecting the exercise of full
freedom, of association and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment.
● By declaring a worker an employee of the person for whom he works and by
recognizing and protecting his rights as such, we eliminate the cause of industrial
unrest and consequently we promote industrial peace, because we enable him to
negotiate an agreement which will settle disputes regarding conditions of
employment, through the process of collective bargaining.
7. NPC v CA
G.R. No. 119121| August 14, 1998
By: Jon De Leon
Topic: Labor only contracting
Petitioners: National Power Corporation
Respondents: Court of Appeals, fifteenth division and Phesco incorporated
Ponente: Romero, ​J.
Doctrine: ​In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between the
principal employer and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly,
the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if
such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.
Facts:
· On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National
Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city.
· Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with plate no
RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision
with a Toyota Tamaraw.
· The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota
Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
· On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against National Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated
(PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi
City.
· When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it contended that
it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the Toyota
Tamaraw but NPC.
· Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main
duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects.
· On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of
the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO.
·​ ​RTC: NPC absolved. Phesco and Gavino Ilumba jointly and severally liable
·​ ​CA: Reversed RTC
o A "labor only" contractor is considered merely as an agent of the
employer. A finding that a contractor is a "labor only" contractor is
equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-employee
relationship between the owner of the project and the employees
of the "labor only" contractor.
o So, even if Phesco hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is
admittedly a "labor only" contractor of Napocor the statute itself
establishes an employer-employee relationship between the
employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor
only contractor.
o We hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba, as
there was no employment relationship between Phesco and driver
Gavino Ilumba.
o NPC Liable
Issue: W/N NPC may be held liable
Held: Yes
· NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was its employee. It alleges that
it did not have the power of selection and dismissal nor the power of control
over Ilumba.
· PHESCO, meanwhile, argues that it merely acted as a "recruiter" of the
necessary workers for and in behalf of NPC.
· Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions are met:
(a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the
contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to
his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the
work except to the result thereof​; and (​b) the contractor has substantial
capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business.
· Absent these requisites, what exists is a "labor only" contract under which the
person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary
of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to
the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
· We are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting.
· It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve
the "critical path network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by
PHESCO.
· Likewise, the manning schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO
were subject to confirmation by NPC.
· Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or
lease, again NPC's concurrence is needed. Another consideration is that even
in the procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO,
NPC's favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and
equipment can be purchased.
 · Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that will be used by
PHESCO to undertake the project.
· Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the project being undertaken by
PHESCO, ​i.​ ​e​., construction of power energy facilities, is related to NPC's
principal business of power generation. In sum, NPC's control over PHESCO in
matters concerning the performance of the latter's work is evident.
· It is enough that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as
the employer.
· There is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only" contracting
vis-à-vis ​NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter.
· In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between the
principal employer and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor is
created.
o Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees
of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had been directly
employed by the principal employer.
· Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC,
including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees
of NPC.
· NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract exists between
it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due
to the tortious acts of the employee of the "labor-only" contractor.
o NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code on labor only contracting
o NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to compliance
with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages and shall not extend to liabilities suffered by
third parties
· The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised on
the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and
PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the
applicable law in resolving this case.
· Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will determine the
liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for
any negligent act of the employees of the "labor only" contractor.
· In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and
the driver.
· NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the driver, could
still have disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of due diligence in
the selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba.
o NPC did not invoke said defense.
· By opting not to present any evidence that it exercised due diligence in the
supervision of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its
right to interpose the same on appeal in conformity with the rule that points
of law, theories, issues of facts and arguments not raised in the proceedings
below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 10, 1994 and its accompanying resolution dated February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED
without prejudice to the right of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement of
the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8. RCJ Bus Line, Inc. vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
GR No. ​193629 August 12, 2011
By: Kath
Topic:​ PRESUMPTION OF EMPLOYER’S NEGLIGENCE
Petitioners: ​RCJ BUS LINES, INCORPORATED
Respondents: ​STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED
Ponente: ​CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
● On June 19, 1994 along the National Highway at Brgy. Amlang, Rosario, La Union,
Flor B. Mangoba while driving an RCJ HINO BLUE RIBBON PASSENGER BUS in a
reckless and imprudent manner, bumped and hit a 1991 Mitsubishi Lancer GLX
o Mitsubishi Lancer which is owned by Rodelene Valentino was insured for
loss and damage with Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
o RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. is the registered owner of the Passenger Bus
o Upon seeing a pile of gravel and sand on the road, the Toyota Corolla
stopped on its tracks. The Mitsubishi Lancer followed suit and also halted.
At this point, the bus hit and bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi
Lancer causing it to move forward and hit the Toyota Corolla in front of it.
● the Mitsubishi Lancer was extensively damaged
● Standard paid Valentino the amount of P162,151.22 for the repair
o Valentino executed in Standard's favor a Release of Claim thereby
subrogating the latter to all his rights of recovery on all claims
● Despite demands, RCJ have failed to reimburse Standard
● Standard filed a complaint against Mangoba and RCJ before the MeTC
o RCJ: direct, immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the driver of the Mitsubishi Lancer when, for no reason at
all, it made a sudden stop along the National Highway, as if to initiate
and/or create an accident
o Mangoba: also pointed his finger at the driver of the Mitsubishi Lancer
● MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Standard
o ordering Mangoba and RCJ To pay P162,151.22
● RTC affirmed with modification MeTC’s decision
o deleted the award for exemplary damages
o RCJ failed to convince the RTC that it observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages sustained by the Mitsubishi Lancer.
o ruled that the testimony of Conrado Magno, RCJ's Operations Manager,
who declared that all applicants for employment in RCJ were required to
submit clearances from the barangay, the courts and the National Bureau
of Investigation, is insufficient to show that RCJ exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its drivers.
o allegation of the conduct of seminars and training for RCJ's drivers is not
proof that RCJ examined Mangoba's qualifications, experience and
driving history.
 o testimony of Noel Oalog, the bus conductor, confirmed that the bus was
travelling at a speed of 60 to 75 kilometers per hour, which was beyond
the maximum allowable speed of 50 kilometers per hour for a bus on an
open country road.
● CA found that the RTC committed no reversible error in affirming RCJ's liability as
registered owner of the bus and employer of Mangoba, as well as Mangoba's
negligence in driving the passenger bus.
o deleted the award for attorney's fees and modified the legal interest
ISSUE:
W/N RCJ is liable for the claim of supposed actual damages incurred by Standard – YES.
RULING
Standard may hold RCJ liable for two reasons. One, RCJ is the registered owner of the bus
driven by Mangoba. Two, RCJ is Mangoba's employer.
● The registered owner of a vehicle should be primarily responsible to the public for
injuries caused while the vehicle is in use.
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by
the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on
a definite individual, the registered owner
● RCJ, by presenting witnesses to testify on its exercise of diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus drivers, admitted that
Mangoba is its employee.
o Article 2180 19 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2176, 20 makes the
employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. When the
employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family.
o For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection
and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for
damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias
or on the employer's own negligence.
o Mangoba, as driver of the bus which collided with the Mitsubishi Lancer,
was negligent since he violated a traffic regulation at the time of the
mishap.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 105338 promulgated on 11 March 2010 as well as the Resolution
promulgated on 3 September 2010.
9. HEIRS OF REINOSO V. CA
GR NO. 116121 | JULY 18 2011
By: Claire
Topic:​ DEFENSE OF EMPLOYER
Petitioners: ​THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., represented by Ruben Reinoso, Jr.
Respondents: ​COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE GUBALLA, and FILWRITERS
GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORPORATION
Ponente: ​MENDOZA
FACTS:
● The complaint for damages arose from a collision of a jeepney & a truck at 7pm
along E. Rod QC
○ As a result, the passenger of the jeep, Ruben Reinoso Sr., was killed
○ The jeep was owned by Ponciano Tapales, driven by Alejandro Santos
○ The truck was owned by Jose Guballa, driven by Mariano Geronimo
● The heirs of Reinoso filed a complaint against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa
filed a 3​rd party complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corp (FGAC) under
Policy Number OV-09527
● RTC: in favor of heirs, against Guballa; under the third party complaint – in favor of
said 3​rd​ party by way of 3​rd​ party liability
● CA reversed RTC and dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-payment of
docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Manchester v. CA; also ruled that
since prescription had set in, heirs could no longer pay the docket fees
○ Heirs assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint, they were not
certain of the amount of damages that they were entitled to, bec the
amount of lost income would still be finally determined in the course of
trial
● Heirs filed an MR of the CA decision but was denied. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: ​WON the Guballa as employer of Geronimo is liable to the heirs – YES
RULING:
▪ It was established that the primary cause of the injury was the negligence of the
truck driver who was driving at a very fast pace.
o Based on the sketch, spot report of the police, and narration of the jeep
driver and passengers, the collision was brought about because the truck
driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side portion of
the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the jeep as a
consequence.
o The police sketch having been made right after the incident is a piece of
evidence worthy to be relied upon showing the true facts of the
bumping-occurrence. The bumping indeed occurred at lane 4 and
showing how the truck is positioned in relation to the jeepney.
▪ The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136), reads as follows:
"Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. — Unless a different course of action is required in
the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of
unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance therewith, every person
operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on highway shall pass to the
right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when
overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the
 left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the
right of the center of the intersection of the highway."
▪ The Court is convinced of the veracity of the version of the jeep driver Santos that
while running on lane 4 westward bound towards Ortigas Ave at 30-40kph, the
“sand & gravel” truck from the opposite direction driven by Geronimo, the
headlights of which the former had seen while still at distance from the wooden
barricade, upon reaching the wood block, suddenly swerved to the left into lanes 3
and 4 at high speed “​napakabilis po ng dating ng truck” ​in the process of hitting
them at the left side up to where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner
“​pahilis”​
▪ The jeep after it was bumped by the truck due to the strong impact was thrown
resting on its right side while the left was on top of the side walk. The passengers
and driver were injured + 2 passengers who died. The left side of the jeep suffered
considerable damage
▪ While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile
collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police
officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit the jeepney.
o The front portion of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the
passenger jeepney, causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to the
driver and passengers of the jeepney. The truck driver should have been
more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was
under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
▪ The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner, Guballa,
failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and supervision of his
employee (Art 2176 & 2180).
▪ Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his employee. Thus, in
the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualification, experience and service record. With respect to the
supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence. Thus, the RTC committed no error in finding that the
evidence presented by respondent Guballa was wanting.
o As expected, Guballa attempted to overthrow this presumption by
showing that he had exercised the due diligence required of him by
seeing to it that the driver must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is
assigned to before he leaves the compound like the oil, water, brakes,
gasoline, horn; and that Geronimo had been driving for him sometime in
1976 until the collision in litigation came about; that whenever his trucks
gets out of the compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied
with 2 helpers.
o This was all which he considered as selection and supervision in
compliance with the law to free himself from any responsibility. This
Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to an exercise of
all the care of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his driver Mariano Geronimo.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The May 20, 1994 Decision and June 30, 1994
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 22, 1988
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is REINSTATED , with the
MODIFICATION that the private respondents should, as they are hereby ordered to, pay
interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, or his duly authorized deputy, is
hereby ordered to compute the correct docket fees and to enforce the judgment lien by
collecting the additional fees from the petitioners. SO ORDERED .
NOTES:
On the issue of payment of docket fees
▪ The payment in full of docket fees within the period is mandatory. The strict
application in Manchester v. CA was relaxed after 2 years in the case of Sun
Insurance Office v. Asuncion wherein the court declared that the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
o This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
required.
o Thus, the Court explained that were the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional fees, the liberal
doctrine in Sun Insurance will apply, and not the Manchester.
▪ While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on
the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for
it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather
than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
▪ In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said
trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of
non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu
proprio dismissed the case for said reason.
▪ Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than 30
years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case
to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of
substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will
resolve the case on the merits.

10 EREZO ET AL v. JEPTE
GR No. L-9605 | September 30, 1957
TS
Topic:​ Liability of the registered owner of vehicle
Petitioners: ​GAUDIOSO EREZO, ET AL.
Respondents​: AGUEDO JEPTE
Ponente: ​LABRADOR
FACTS:
● Jepte is the registered owner of a 6x6 truck. On August 9, 1949, while the same was
being driven by Rodolfo Espino, it collided with a taxicab at the intersection of San
Andres and Dakota Streets, Manila.
● As the truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo and another, and the former
suffered injuries, as a result of which he died.
● The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence by the CFI
Manila. The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and
to pay the heirs of Ernesto Erezo the sum of P3,000.
● As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against Espino, Erezo
brought this action against the registered owner of the truck, Jepte.
● Jepte does not deny that at the time of the fatal accident the cargo truck driven by
Espino was registered in his name. However, he claims that the vehicle belonged to
the Port Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the time of the accident.
○ His explanation was corroborated by Policarpio Franco, the manager of
the corp, that the trucks of the corp were registered in his name as a
convenient arrangement so as to enable the corp to pay the registration
fee with his backpay as a pre-war government employee.
● Franco, however, admitted that the arrangement was not known to the Motor
Vehicles Office (MVO).
● The trial court held that as Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the truck,
the MVO relied on his representation and registered the vehicles in his name, and
thus the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right
to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration.
● Trial court held that Jepte is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his
own declaration.
● Jepte appealed, claiming that at the time of the accident the relation of employer
and employee between the driver and him was not established, it having been
proved at the trial that the owner of the truck was the Port Brokerage, of which
Jepte was merely a broker.
ISSUE: ​W/N Jepte is liable. – ​YES
RULING:
● In previous decisions, We already have held that the registered owner of a
certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages
suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle,
even though the same had been transferred to a third person.
● In dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the
right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof,
for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may have for
injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public
should be required to prove who the actual owner is.
● Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a
public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or
streets.
● Jepte should be held liable to Erezo for the injuries occasioned to the latter
because of the negligence of the driver even if Jepte was no longer the owner of
the vehicle at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to another.
● The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that no
vehicle may be used or operated upon any public highway unless the same is
properly registered.
● It has been stated that the system of licensing and the requirement that each
machine must carry a registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of the
precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury to pedestrians and other travelers
from the careless management of automobiles, and to furnish a means of
ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances, regulating
the speed and operation of machines upon the highways.
● Not only are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or
operated without being properly registered for the current year, but that dealers in
motor vehicles shall furnish the MVO a report showing the name and address of
each purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer's
serial number and motor number.
● Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which
ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the
administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to
the contract of sale between the parties, but to permit the use and operation of
the vehicle upon any public highway.
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by
the vehicles on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed
on a definite individual, the registered owner.
o Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways
caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means
of identification. It is to forestall those circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily
ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.
● One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identification of the
vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge
that means of detection are always available may act as a deterrent from lax
observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe operation.
● Whatever purpose there may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to
the primary purpose of rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the
rules of safety shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him. The
purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a "snare
and delusion," if courts will entertain such defenses as that put forward by appellee
in this case.
● No responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the most outrageous
acts of negligence, if they should be allowed to place a "middleman" between them
 and the public, and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense their
servants.
ISSUE: ​W/N the registered owner should be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and
real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility and lay the
same on the person actually owning the vehicle. – ​NO
RULING:
● The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the
responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence
of registration.
● Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the
supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others
or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite
person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for
the damage or injury done.
● A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no
means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to
determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him
would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape
liability by disproving his ownership.
● If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner
should be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured that
is, to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may
thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured person.
● The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would
seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner
who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party
complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or
injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.
● The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability; said
inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the registration that
the law demands and requires.
● In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, Jepte, is primarily responsible for
the damage caused to the vehicle of Erezo, but Jepte has a right to be
indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required
to pay as damage for the injury caused to Erezo.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
defendant-appellant.
11. Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024; February 7, 1996
By: Hans
Topic:​ Liability of the registered owner of vehicle
Petitioners: ​MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA
Respondents: ​COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC
Ponente: ​ Kapunan
DOCTRINE:
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car
to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary
to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.
Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of
liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus
pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
FACTS:
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela - plaintiff; victim (amputated); driving a blue Mitsubishi Lancer (Plate
No. FFU 542)
Richard Li - Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc.; driving a 1987 Mitsubishi
Lancer
Alexander Commercial, Inc. - employer of Li, registered owner of the 1987 Lancer
Rogelio Rodriguez - eyewitness
● At around 2am of 24 June 1990, Valenzuela was driving from her restaurant at
Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Ave
○ She was traveling with Cecila Ramon, who was heading towards the
direction of Manila
● Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires
● She stopped at a lighted place where there were people to verify if she had a flat
tire and to ask for help, if needed
● Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she
cannot reach her home in the car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk
○ About 1 - ½ feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car
and went to the rear to open the trunk
● She was standing on the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a
man (Rodriguez) who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
the Lancer driven by Li
● Valenzuela was thrown against the windshield of the car of Li, which was
destroyed, and then fell to the ground
○ She was pulled out from under Li’s car
● Valenzuela’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin
and sucle connected to the rest of the body
● She was brought to UERM where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation,
leg, left up to the distal thigh (above knee)”
○ She was confined for 20 days
○ Fitted with and artificial leg
○ Expenses: P120k for hospital confinement, P27k for the artificial leg were
paid by the defendants from the car insurance
 ● In her complaint, Valenzuela prays for moral damages (P1m), exemplary damages
(P100k), and other medical related expenses (P180k), including loss of expected
earnings
● Li denied he was negligent and alleges that:
○ He was driving home, travelling 55kph
○ It was raining and visibility was affected, and the road was wet
○ Traffic was light
○ When in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, he was temporarily blinded by a car
coming from the opposite direction which he instinctively swerved to the
right to avoid colliding and bumped with plaintiff Valenzuela’s car,
■ which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color
■ No parking lights
■ Area was poorly lighted
○ The left rear portion of Valenzuela’s car was protruding
○ Plaintiff Valenzuela was reckless/negligent, as she was not a licensed
driver
● According to Police Investigator, Pfc. Ramos:
○ Plaintiff Valenzuela’s car was near the sidewalk
○ This witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of the plaintiff’s
car were on
○ Did not notice if there was an early warning device
○ Mostly dark aka “things can be seen”
● According to Rogelio Rodriguez, a witness for the plaintiff:
○ Li’s car came approaching very fast 10 meters from the scene
○ The car was zigzagging
○ Stated that Li was under the influence of liquor as he could “smell it very
well”
● Trial Court: Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Art. 2176.
Likewise held that Alexander Commercial, Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable
for damages pursuant to Art. 2180
● CA: Li was liable for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela but absolved Alexander
Commercial from any liability towards Valenzuela and reduced moral damages to
P500k (originally P1M by the RTC)
ISSUE:
Whether Alexander Commercial, Inc., as Li’s employer, was liable being it the registered
owner of the Lancer driven by Li during the incident? (Yes, Alexander Commercial is solidary
liable with Li)
RULING:
Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, we are
of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for
the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990
● First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals ​upon which
respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and
its teacher's supervision of students during an extracurricular activity. These cases
now fall under the provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the
Family Code which generally encompasses all authorized school activities, whether
inside or outside school premises
● Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias
embodied by ​Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is ​quasi-delictual
or tortious in character​. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees​. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden is
overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of
its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee's
private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or
unrelated to the employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of
managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with
courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the
company itself or are subject to various plans through which employees eventually acquire
their vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many
companies provide liberal ​"car plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank
to purchase cars, which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be
able to purchase on their own.
● Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to
the point of turnover of ownership to the employee;
● in the second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the employee
himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved of
responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued car occurs during
private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan,
require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father
of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee
to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company or private
purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a
company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect
guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of
using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited in the example of
the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either related to
the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or
- for practical and utilitarian reasons ​- to enable its managerial and other employees of rank
or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car
serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all
hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited
use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company
and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for
business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it
entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue
capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an ​Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his
testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not
require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to
perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its
clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. ​The service
car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the
corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill
before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the
former with a convenient mode of travel.
Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
● No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
● Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, ​said company, based on
the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with
the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the
distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, ​Valenzuela will forever be deprived of
the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity​, even with the use of state of the art
prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li),
she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of
the stump from the process of healing.
We are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury - physical and psychological - suffered
by Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early
morning hours of the accident.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with
the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
12. Sps. Bernabe Africa vs. Caltex Phils, et al.
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
By: ZURITA
Topic:​ Liability of the registered owner of vehicle
Petitioners: ​THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA and the HEIRS OF
DOMINGA ONG
Respondents: ​CALTEX (PHIL.) INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: ​Makalintal
FACTS: ​copied facts from Tara!
● One afternoon, as fire broke out at the Caltex service station at Antipolo St. cor.
Rizal Ave., Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted.
● The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal
properties and effects inside them.
● The owners (herein petitioners) sued Caltex Inc. as owner of the station, & Mateo
Boquiren as its agent in charge of operation.
● The negligence of both was attributed as the cause of the fire.
● Both TC and CA found that Spouses Africa and Heirs of Ong failed to prove
negligence and that Caltex & Boquiren had exercised due care in the premises and
with respect to the supervision of their employees.
ISSUE: W/N Caltex is liable
RULING: yes
● This question, in the light of the facts not controverted, is one of law and hence
may be passed upon by this Court. These facts are:
(1) Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex;
(2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the
equipment therein;
(3) Caltex exercised control over Boquiren in the management of the
station;
(4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the
name CALTEX painted on it; and
(5) the license to store gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex,
which paid the license fees.
● In Boquiren’s amended answer to the second amended complaint, he denied that
he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the truck into the tank and
alleged that the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his employ, the driver
being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline
station." It is true that Boquiren later on amended his answer, and that among the
changes was one to the effect that he was not acting as agent of Caltex. But then
again, in his motion to dismiss appellants’ second amended complaint the ground
alleged was that it stated no cause of action since under the allegations thereof he
was merely acting as agent of Caltex, such that he could not have incurred personal
liability. A motion to dismiss on this ground is deemed to be an admission of the
facts alleged in the complaint.
●
● Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein,
but claims that the business conducted at the service station in question was
owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with
 Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire.
There must have been one in existence at that time.
○ Instead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored
for purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly before the
expiration of the one- year period it was intended to operate. This
so-called license agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on
November 29, 1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to
cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity
provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion that it was
designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with respect to
the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for any
injury to person or property while in the property herein licensed, it
being understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an
employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
● But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be
considered an independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would pay
Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the
equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex products. Maintenance of the station
and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of Caltex.
Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of
Caltex.
○ The license agreement was supposed to be from January 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two
days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel and terminate
the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not
conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex
but not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of
the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter
was virtually an employee of the former.
● "Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position to the
company and the latter could remove him or terminate his services at will; that the
service station belonged to the company and bore its tradename and the operator
sold only the products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator
belonged to the company and were just loaned to the operator and the company
took charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the company
supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company’s
gasoline and service station; that the price of the products sold by the operator
was fixed by the company and not by the operator; and that the receipts signed by
the operator indicated that he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the operator was an agent of the company and not an independent
contractor should not be disturbed.
● "To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to rely
upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties, should there be a
controversy as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the
contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed
upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict with
the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over
the latter." Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. v. Firemen’s Insurance Company
of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
● the accident and that there was at said intersection no bars, semaphores, and
● "The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of creating the
apparent relationship of employer and independent contractor, and of avoiding
liability for the negligence of the employees about the station; but the company
was not satisfied to allow such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it
immediately assumed control, and proceeded to direct the method by which the
work contracted for should be performed. By reserving the right to terminate the
contract at will, it retained the means of compelling submission to its orders.
Having elected to assume control and to direct the means and methods by which
the work has to be performed, it must be held liable for the negligence of those
performing service under its direction. We think the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the verdict of the jury."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-
appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay them the aforesaid sums
of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the complaint, and
costs.
13. PNR VS. IAC
G.R. No. 70547 ; January 22, 1993
By: Nico Nunez
Topic: STATE LIABILITY; GOCC
Petitioners:​ ​PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and HONORIO CABARDO
Respondents: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC.
Ponente: Melo, ​J..
DOCTRINE:​The power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact private
business.
FACTS:
● ​Baliwag Transit is a duly constituted corporation registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission engaged in the business of transportation and operating
public utility buses for the public with lines. Philippine National Railways is a purely
government owned and controlled corporation duly registered and existing virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 741, with capacity to sue and be sued, and is likewise
engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by trains and buses.
● ​The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant
Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and
bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way
to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila. But upon reaching the railroad crossing at
Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express
train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom
died and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical injuries.
● ​At the time of the collision there was a slight rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of
 signal lights that would warn the public of the approaching train that was about to
pass through the intersection and likewise there was no warning devices to passing
trains showing that they were about to pass an intersection in going to Manila from
San Fernando, La Union and back.
● ​There was no railroad crossing bar; there was only one sign of railroad crossing
"Stop, Look and Listen" placed on a concrete slab and attached to a concrete post
existing at the approach of the railroad track from the highway.
● ​Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores,
signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against
defendants.
ISSUE 1: W/N PNR, not Baliwag, was guilty of negligence.
HELD/RATIO: YES
● ​There is no admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take
necessary precaution in traversing the track. Contributory negligence may not be
ascribed to the bus driver for he had taken necessary precautions before passing
over the railway track. The failure of PNR, on the other hand, to put a crossbar, or
signal light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence of negligence on
their part
● ​Moreover, upon impact, the bus loaded with passengers was dragged and thrown
into a ditch several meters away; the train had stopped only after the engine
portion was about 190 meters away from the fallen bus; several passengers were
injured and at least 20 died; such facts conclusively indicate that the train was
speeding, because if it were moving at moderate speed, it would not run some 190
meters after impact and throw the bus at quite a distance especially so when it is
claimed that the train's emergency brakes were applied.
● ​The train was also running too fast. It may be argued that a railroad is not subject
to the same restrictions to the speed of its train as a motorists (Mckelvey v.
Delaware ); but it does not follow that a train will be permitted to run fast under all
conditions at any rate of speed it may choose. It must regulate its speed with
proper regard for the safety of human life and property (Johnson v. Southern
Pacific Company), considering the surrounding circumstances particularly the
nature of the locality (Atchinson, T. and SFR Co. v. Nicks (Arts) 165 p. 2d 167).
● ​Moreover, there was an intermittent rain at the time of the; the condition of the
weather was such that even if for this reason alone, the train engineer should have
foreseen that danger of collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery road;
he should have taken extra precaution by considerably slackening its speed. This he
failed to do even if the nature of his job required him to observe care exercised by
a prudent man.
ISSUE 2 (MAIN ISSUE): W/N PNR, as a GOCC, may be liable.
HELD: YES
● ​Firstly, an exculpation of this nature that was raised for the first time on appeal
may no longer be entertained in view of the proscription under Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Revised Rules of Court, apart from the fact that the lawyer of petitioner agreed
to stipulate inter alia that the railroad company had capacity to sue and be sued.
This being so, respondent court continued, PNR was perforce estopped from
disavowing the prejudicial repercussion of an admission ​in judicio.
● ​Secondly, Even as the laws governing the creation and rehabilitation of the PNR
were entirely mute on its power to sue and be sued, respondent court nonetheless
opined that such prerogative was implied from the general power to transact
business pertinent or indispensable to the attainment of the goals of the railroad
company under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as amended by Republic Act No.
6366:
○ ​Sec. 4 General Powers — The Philippine National Railways shall have the
following general powers:
o ​(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
purpose of the corporation; and
o ​(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the
Corporation law.
● In conjunction with Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 741:
o ​(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines, trucklines, subways,
and other kinds of land transportation, vessels, and pipelines, for the
purpose of transporting for consideration, passengers, mail and
property between any points in the Philippines
● The Court utilized the Doctrine of Implied powers in ​National Airports Corporation
vs. Teodoro, Sr. The power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to
transact private business. At any rate, respondent court characterized the railroad
company as a private entity created not to discharge a governmental function but,
among other things, to operate a transport service which is essentially a business
concern, and thus barred from invoking immunity from suit.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
respondent court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 14. Guilatco v City of Dagupan
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
By: Kate
Topic: State Liability
Petitioners: ​FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO
Respondents: ​CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: J. Sarmiento
FACTS:
● Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI-Dagupan City, while she
was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a
National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan)
accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right
leg to be fractured.
● As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, and confined in 2
hospitals. All her doctors have confirmed the extent of the fracture and injuries
sustained by Guilatco as a result of the mishap.
● Since the mishap she has been deprived of her income as she has already
consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several
pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she
has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she
used to do prior to the incident.
● On the other hand, Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo testified and confirmed
the existence of the manhole on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the
incident which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping
hole about 2 ft. long by 1 1/2 feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150
cms. Deep.
● Defendant government official Alfredo Tangco was City Engineer of Dagupan City
(LOCAL govt capacity). As City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the
maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are
properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago
de Vera (Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance
Engineer. Tangco was also the Ex-officio Highway Engineer of Bureau of Public
Works (NATIONAL govt capacity) who exercises supervision and control over
National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.
● Tangco admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., a
National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole is
owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found
along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government.
● City of Dagupan contends that that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole
is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City
of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually
the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the
Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same
person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE: ​WON the City of Dagupan exercises control or supervision over a national road and in
effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189.
RULING:
YES. The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of,
or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong or be owned by the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties:
​Sec. 22. The City Engineer x x x He shall have the following duties:
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all
sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all
private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and
their connection with the public sewer system.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and
improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof,
may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city
indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is
located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries
sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the
provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar. The
charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city.
On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective
streets, public buildings and other public works." Alfredo G. Tangco in his official capacity as
City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex-Officio Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the
Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City,
receives the following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from
the Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by
virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively." This function of supervision over streets, public buildings,
and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance
Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the
National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive
instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over
the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article
2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
​WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED
with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount
of P 15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost
income for one (1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P
10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
15. QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT v DACARA
GR NO. ​150304
June 15, 2005
By: Raymond Villafuerte
Topic:​ TORTS; Liability of Municipal Corporations (ART 2189)
Petitioners:​ QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON
Respondents: ​FULGENCIO DACARA
Ponente: ​J. Panganiban
FACTS:
● Fulgencio Dacara Jr., while driving his ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door sedan, rammed into a
pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being
repaired by the Quezon City government.
o As a result, Dacara sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage since it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
● Dacara sought indemnification from the City Government, but yielding negative results,
his father (Fulgencio Sr.) filed a complaint for damages, for and in behalf of his ​minor
son, against the QC Government and Engineer Ramir Tiamzon.
o Defendants (QC and Tiamzon) alleged that the subject diggings was provided
with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks
placed before or after it which was visible during the incident.
o In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the
area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident.
o Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely
because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care.
● RTC: Ruled in favor of Dacara. Held that the evidence proffered was found to be
sufficient proof of the negligence of the defendants. They were held to be liable under
ART 2189.
o Ordered the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of P20K as
actual/compensatory damages, P10K as moral damages, P5K as exemplary
damages, P10K as attorney's fees and other costs of suit."
● CA:​ Affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE/HELD: ​W/N the petitioners’ (QC and Tiamzon) negligence is the proximate cause of the
damages suffered by Dacara’s car. – YES
● Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not
have occurred otherwise.
o Proximate cause is ​determined from the facts of each case​, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
● That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly
discussed in the lower court's finding, which we quote:
o "Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident which caused
almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was
the ​existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure
at Matahimik Street ​nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign
perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist
especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive​.
o If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that
according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted
again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
o [DOCTRINE] "The provisions of ​Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes
the ​responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of
roads and bridges since ​it exercises the control and supervision over the
same​. ​Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found
in the subject-article is ​tantamount to negligence per se which renders the
City government liable​. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof
but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the
roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would
deem just and equitable."
● [Procedural matter, but in case tanungin] P ​ etitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio
Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kph when he met the accident. This speed was
allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light
traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that
Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent
pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code.
o These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the
trial.
o It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue.
o It is well-settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in
the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.
o To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings
would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
● Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated
by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners' negligence as the proximate
cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given
to overturn this factual conclusion.
As to the award for Moral Damages: NOT ENTITLED
● To award ​moral damages​, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following
requisites:
(1) An injury — whether physical, mental, or psychological — clearly sustained by the
claimant;
(2) A culpable act or omission factually established;
 (3) A wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury o It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be
sustained by the claimant; and responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the
(4) The award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. safety of the public.
● Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, o Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary
provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. measures.
o There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in ● Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is
physical injury. justified only by public service.
● [MAIN POINT] It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, o Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the
however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical interests of the public foremost in their agenda.
expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s bare assertion of physical injury. o For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are
o Thus, there was ​no credible proof that would justify an award of moral the very parties responsible for endangering the public through such a rash
damages​ based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. and reckless act.
o Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of
respondent that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of DISPOSITIVE PORTION​:
petitioners. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
o The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the testimony of AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED. No costs.
respondent's four witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding
moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, social humiliation and the like.
● Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate
in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
inflicted on a person.
o Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo
ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury
suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
● Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded whether in
a civil or a criminal case— in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or similar injury.
o The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing
that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing
proof.
As to the award for Exemplary Damages: ENTITLED!
● Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, ​exemplary
damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
o Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that
the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences
of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent
(or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others.
o The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons
or property.
o Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
● Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good.
o The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious
actions.
o Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender.