Definition of Statutory Construction

(1) CONSIDERATION, PRIZE, AND CHANCE

Caltex v Palomar
GR No. L-19560 September 29, 1966

Doctrine: Statutory construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided
for in the law.

Facts: This is a petition by Caltex for declaratory relief against respondent Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public".

In 1960, Caltex conducted a promotional scheme dubbed as “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, calling for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. With the exception of its employees, its dealers, its advertising
agency and their immediate families, participation is open to all “motor vehicle owners and/or licensed
drivers”. The participants need not to pay nor purchase any Caltex product. Entry forms are to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but
also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with
the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, in view of sections 1954(a),
1982 and 1983 of Revised Administrative Code, which (1) relates to the absolute prohibition of written
or printed matter in any form that convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme, (2) permits the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or
employee of the Bureau to return such materials with a “fraudulent” stamp, and (3) deprive the
company or person any postal money order or telegraphic transfer.

On October 31, 1960, Caltex enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position
that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. However, then Acting
Postmaster General found that the scheme is within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and
declined to grant the requested clearance.

Caltex sought for reconsideration and stood on its ground that the contest is not considered as a lottery.
However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that simply applying the clear provisions of the
law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules, the contest is considered as a "gift enterprise",
which is banned under the Postal Law.

Issue: Did the 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' violate the Postal Law?

Ruling: No, the 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' did not violate the Postal Law.

Statutory construction is defined as "the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided
for in the law."

Even if the Postmaster simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied
in the rules of the contest, statutory construction refers to the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case.

The Supreme Court held that under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element
of consideration. Whereas, lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such
as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: consideration, prize, and chance.

Focusing on the last element of consideration, Court has laid down that the law does not condemn the
distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance. The rules of the 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' is clear that the participants need
not to pay nor purchase any Caltex product, and that entry forms are to be made available upon request
at each Caltex station. The contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as
a lottery.

As such, the 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' did not violate the Postal Law.

Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet

(2) A VERY SPECIAL AGENT
People v Jabinal
GR No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

Doctrine: "Legis Interpretatio Legis Vim Obtinet", means that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. However, when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is
overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Facts: On September 5, 1964, Jose Jabinal y Carmen was alleged for the illegal possession of firearms,
having possessed a revolver and ammunition without the requisite license or permit. Carmen however
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although bearing no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander and the said appointments expressly carried with
them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Carmen further contended that he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of previous Supreme Court
decisions in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero that has justified the possession of firearms without
permit or license by special agents. However, the court held that Carmen is criminally liable as such
decisions were reversed and abandoned in the ruling of the case of Mapa in 1967. The court only
considered the appointments of the accused as secret agent and confidential agent as mitigating
circumstances.
Thus, this appeal to reverse the judgment of the lower court finding the accused guilty of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on
a retroactive application of the Court's ruling in the Mapa case.

Issue: Should Jabinal be criminally liable for illegal possession of firearms, retroactively applying the
ruling in the case of Mapa?

Ruling: No, Jabinal should not be held criminally liable for illegal possession of firearms, and that the
ruling in the case of Mapa should not be retroactively applied.

"Legis Interpretatio Legis Vim Obtinet", means that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. However, when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and
a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of
the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court in 1964. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it
is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

Therefore, Jabinal is not criminally liable for illegal possession of firearms, and that the ruling in the case
of Mapa should not be retroactively applied.

(3) EMOTIONAL IMMATURITY AND IRRESPONSIBILITY DIFFER FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Pesca v Pesca
GR No. 136921 April 17, 2001

Doctrine: The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule
follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Facts: This petition is filed to review the Court of Appeal's decision in declaring the marriage of the
petitioner and respondent. Petitioner Lorna Pesca and respondent Zosimo Pesca were married in 1975.
The marriage bore four children. Petitioner alleges that it was in 1988 that the respondent showed signs
of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations, the respondent being emotionally
immature and irresponsible. The petitioner paints the respondent as cruel and violent, also a habitual
drinker. The petitioner mentioned that at one time, she was chased by the respondent with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of
her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner
decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. However, things
became worse, and on March 22, 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and filed a case
against respondent for slight physical injuries. Respondent was convicted and was sentenced to 11 days
of imprisonment.

Petitioner, living together with her children in a separate apartment from respondent, filed for
declaration of nullity of marriage invoking psychological incapacity. She likewise sought the custody of
her minor children and prayed for support during litigation (pendente lite). The respondent answered
some time later, and vehemently denied the allegation of psychological incapacity.

The regional trial court rendered its decision on November 15, 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent then appealed to the CA, contending that that there was no legal basis to declare the
marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and
subsisting.

CA held that it has not been established the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family
Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to
meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of
the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

Petitioner invoked that the doctrine enunciated in enunciated in Santos vs. CA, promulgated on January
14, 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on
13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling
could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory
and not mandatory in nature.

Issue: Can the petitioner invoke nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity?

Ruling: No, the petitioner cannot invoke nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows
the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. It is in Santos
when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally
provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

The petitioner has failed to make out a case as emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity. For these reasons, the petitioner cannot invoke nullity of
marriage due to psychological incapacity.
When is there room for interpretation or construction?
(4) COMMISSION x SEPARATION
Songco v NLRC
GR No. L-50999 March 23, 1990

Doctrine: “…where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation
or construction; there is only room for application.”

Facts: This is a petition for review to modify the decision of the case by Songco, et, al. (“petitioner”)
versus the National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”) with regard to their separation pay with their
former employer, F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc. (“Zuelig”).

Zuelig has terminated the services of the petitioners on grounds of financial losses. However, the
petitioners alleged that Zuelig is not suffering from any losses, and that they are being dismissed
because of their membership in the union. In the last hearing, the petitioners are no longer contesting
their dismissal. The issue to be resolved is the basis of separation pay that is due to the petitioners.

Petitioners, who were in the sales force of Zuellig received monthly salaries of at least P400.00. In
addition, they received commissions for every sale they made. Petitioners contend that their basic
salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together.

They cited Article 97(f) of the Labor Code which includes commission as part of one's salary, to wit:

"(f) ‘Wage’ paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated,
capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task,
piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done
or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable
value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily
furnished by the employer to the employee. ‘Fair and reasonable value’ shall not include any
profit to the employer or to any person affiliated with the employer."

Issue: Should the earned sales commissions and allowances be included in the monthly salary of
petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay?

Ruling: Yes, earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of
petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.

We ruled that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of
the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living allowances."

We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or not earned sales commissions should be
included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
(5) CARDEMA 2010 version char
Amores v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Villanueva
GR No. 189600 June 29, 2010

Doctrine: When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction
or interpretation. There is only room for application.

Facts:

Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva was a representative of the Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
party-list. Petitioner Amores questioned the legality of his assumption on the office on the following
grounds:

1. Villanueva was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (Party-List System Act); and
2. his change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to
be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of the Party-List System Act.

This was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The Electoral Tribunal contended
that the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of the Party-List System Act only
applies to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector. CIBAC, however, is considered as a multi-sectoral organization.

In addition, with regard to the shift of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector, the Electoral Tribunal held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not
apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.

The petitioner, thus, filed this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Is the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva as representative of the Citizens' Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) party-list legal?

Ruling: No, Villanueva's assumption of office as a representative of CIBAC partylist is not legal.

Well settled is the rule that, when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.

Section 9 of the Party-List System Act explicitly provides that, "In case of a nominee of the youth sector,
he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term". There is no textual support for the Electoral Tribunal's
interpretation that this particular section applied only to those nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. In addition, Section 15 clearly covers
that changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation should be effected at least six months before
the elections for the nominee to be considered eligible.

Consequently, Villanueva's assumption of office as a representative of CIBAC partylist is not legal.

When can courts construe or interpret the law?
(6) DELAYED shz
RCBC v IAC
GR No. 74851 December 9, 1999

When courts need to resort to interpretation or construction.

(7) TELL GO TO STOP PRODUCING RICE AND/OR CORN
Go Ka Tac Sons v Rice and Corn Board
GR No. L-23607 May 23, 1967

Doctrine:

Facts: This is a petition filed by Rice and Corn Board (RICOB) to review the court’s ruling on the case filed
against the plaintiff Go Ka Toe Sons & Co., for its operations without proper registration upon effectivity
of Republic Act 3018.

On January 1, 1961, Republic Act 3018 took effect which provides the prohibition of, among others,
partnerships whose capital was not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging, directly
or indirectly, in the rice and/or corn industry. However, Section 3(a) allowed such partnerships, upon
registration with the municipal treasurer, to continue business until two years from and after its
effectivity.

On November 21, 1960, the newly created Rice and Corn Board issued Resolution No. 10, pursuant to
Section 6 of the law, defining the term "by-product" used in the law, which shall mean “the secondary
products resulting from the process of husking, grinding, milling, and cleaning of palay and corn, such as,
but not limited to 'binlid', 'darak', 'tahop', 'tiktik’, 'corn husk', 'corn drips’ and 'corn meals'."

Further, on July 10, 1961, the RICOB issued Gen. Circular No. 1, as amended, which defined the term
"capital investment" used in Section 3 of Republic Act 3018 which limits the maximum amount of capital
investments of alien persons and entities engaged in the rice and/or corn industry to the amount stated
in their statement made pursuant to Section 2 of the law.

The plaintiff filed action in the Court of First Instance, whereas the lower court rendered judgment (a)
declaring Republic Act 3018 not applicable to plaintiff's business; (b) declaring null and void RICOB's
Resolution No. 10, dated November 21, 1960 and General Circular No. 1, as amended, dated July 10,
1961 in so far as they were and are being made applicable to plaintiff's business and (c) making and
declaring permanent and perpetual the preliminary writ of injunction issued in the case.

Plaintiff contends that it has stopped from engaging in the purchase and sale of rice and/or corn since
the lapse of the two year period from the effectivity of the law. It has limited its activities to the trade,
processing and manufacture of corn and rice oil from raw materials consisting of corn germ proper or
embryo ("sungo") and "tahup", as well as from rice husk which it secures from others who mill rice and
corn. In the processing and manufacture of corn oil, plaintiff also produces a residue called "corn meal"
or "corn meal germ" which it sells and trades.

Issue: Is Go Ka Toe Sons & Co.’s remaining activities relating to corn and rice covered by prohibitions in
Republic Act 3018?
Ruling: Yes, Go Ka Toe Sons & Co.’s remaining activities relating to corn and rice are still covered by
prohibitions in Republic Act 3018.

RICOB’s IRR was the “specification” of the law---

Lower court invalidated it as the statute itseld did not include “by-product”, however The power and
authority of appellant RICOB to issue such rules and regulations implementing the law, proceeds from
the law itself.

(8) SHOULD A SPECIAL AGENT BE EXEMPT?

People v Mapa
GR No. L-23301 August 30, 1967

Doctrine: Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them.

Facts:

Issue: whether or not the appointment to and the holding of the position of a secret agent to the
provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.

Ruling: No,

(9) CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP x CONJUGAL LIABILITY

Luzon Surety v DE Garcia
GRNo. L-25659 October 31, 1969

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue: Whether or not a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could
be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in
favor of a surety company.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals held that it could not.

Punctuation and Grammar: An Aid to Construction

(10) WHAT DO SEMI-COLONS MEAN
US v Hart
GR No. L-8848 November 21, 1913

Doctrine: If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord
with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not
conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act
the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and
inserting others where necessary.
Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

Extrinsic or external aids in Statutory Construction

(11) Floresca v Philex Mining
GR No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

Doctrine: External Aids + When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation?

Facts:

Mining accident which resulted to five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were
rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number … were left mercilessly to their fate

Issue:

Ruling:

(12) INCOMPATIBILITY IS NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Republic v CA and Molina
GR No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Doctrine: External aids + How must legislative intent be ascertained?

Issue:

Facts:

Ruling:

How must legislative intent be ascertained?

(13) TWO PARAGRAPHS ONE PROVISION
Aisporna v CA
GR No. L-39419 April 12, 1982

Doctrine: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.

Facts:

Issue: Is the petitioner guilty for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act?

Ruling: No, the petitioner is not guilty for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.