G.R. No.

208146, June 08, 2016

VIRGINIA DIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by amendment, courts
must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated January 8,
2013 and Resolution3 dated July 10, 2013. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial
Court Order that quashed the Informations charging petitioner Virginia Dio (Dio) with libel because these
Informations failed to allege publication.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay
Marine Exploratorium, of which Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of
Directors.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel.6 Two (2) separate Informations,
both dated February 26, 2003, were filed and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109. 7 The
Information in Criminal Case No. 9108 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy
Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the offended party and to other persons
namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson which read as follows:

'NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD SURVIVED, (sic) YOU SHOULD STOP
YOUR NONSENSE THREAT BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE PAY YOUR
EXHORBITANT (sic) SALARY, HOUSE YOU ADN (sic) SUPPORT ALL YOUR PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU SHOULD
BE ASHAMED IN DOING THIS. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING EXCEPT A PERSON WHO
IS TRYING TO SURVIVED (sic) AT THE PRETEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR [sic]. YOU
ARE PADI (sic) TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL YOUR WORK IN THE WORK (sic). AT THE SAME TIME, YOU
BLOATED THE PRICE OF EACH ANIMAL YOU BROUGHT TO THE PHILIPPINES from US$500,000.00 to
US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned (sic) more shares that you should. Please look into this
deeply.

IF YOU INSISTS (sic) TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR IN OUR COUNTRY,
THEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE SHOULD STOP BLEEDING THE COMPANY WITH YOUR MONTHLY PAYROLL OF
ALMOST P1 MILLION A MONTH.'

The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to cause
dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8cralawred
The Information in Criminal Case No. 9109 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy
Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the [sic] Atty. Winston Ginez and Fatima
Paglicawan, to the offended party, Timothy Desmond and to other persons namely: Hon. Felicito Payumo,
SBMA Chariman [sic], Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and Gail Laule which read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'Dear Winston and Fatima:

UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SBME, AS
OF THIS DATE THE COMPANY HAD INCURRED A LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLION. A BALANCE
SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY THEIR ACCOUNTANT JULIET REFLECT AND (sic) ASSETS OF MORE THAN
THREE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS, 50% OF WHICH IS OVERVALUED AND NON-EXISTENT. TIM DESMOND
AND FAMILY HAD ACCUMULATED A (sic) SHARES OF MORE THAN 70% OF THE RECORDED PAID UP
CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF THE ASSETS CONTRIBUTION, PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN COMPANY IN THE
USA, ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED THE COMPANY FROM DATE OF
INCORPORATION TO PRESENT FOR AN AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION PER MONTH FOR THEIR PERSONAL
GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ET, [sic] ETC.'cralawred
The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to cause
dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9cralawred
On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal proceedings,10 but it was denied in the Order
dated February 6, 2004.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Dio moved for reconsideration of the February 6, 2004 Order.12 She also moved to quash the Informations,
arguing that the "facts charged do not constitute an offense."13 In its Order14 dated July 13, 2004, the trial
court denied both Motions. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Premises considered, the Motion For Reconsideration of the Order dated February 6, 2004 and the Motion
To Quash, both filed for accused, as well as the Motion For Issuance of a Hold Departure Order filed by
the Prosecution, are hereby DENIED.

Arraignment will proceed as previously set on July 20, 2005 at 9:00 a.m.

SO ORDERED.15cralawred
Dio moved for partial reconsideration of the July 13, 2004 Order, but the Motion was denied in the trial
court's Order dated September 13, 2005.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On October 11, 2005, Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration.17She
also filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege publication and lack of
jurisdiction, and for second reconsideration with leave of court.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court's Order dated February 7, 2006 denied both Motions and scheduled Dio's arraignment on
March 9, 2006.19 Dio moved for partial reconsideration.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court granted Dio's Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its February 12, 2009 Order,21 the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Motion For Partial Reconsideration filed by the accused in Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 9108
and 9109, on the ground that the Informations in the said cases fail (sic) to allege publication, is GRANTED
and, accordingly, the Informations filed against the accused are thereby QUASHED and DISMISSED.

No finding as to costs.

SO ORDERED.22cralawred
After filing a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2009,23 Desmond raised before the Court of Appeals the
following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ACCUSED'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
PRESENT CHARGES SHOULD BE QUASHED FOR FAILURE OF THE INFORMATIONS TO ALLEGE PUBLICATION.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND QUASHING THE
INFORMATIONS WITHOUT GIVING THE PROSECUTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE
INFORMATIONS.24cralawred
In its January 8, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that the Informations did not substantially
constitute the offense charged.25 It found that the Informations did not contain any allegation that the
emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had been accessed.26 However, it found that the trial court erred
in quashing the Informations without giving the prosecution a chance to amend them pursuant to Rule
117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although we agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the Informations do not substantially
constitute the offense charged, the most prudent thing to do for the trial court is to give the prosecution
the opportunity to amend it and make the necessary corrections. Indeed, an Information may be defective
because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, however, the dismissal of the case will not
necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct
the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution's failure to do so. The trial court's
failure to provide the prosecution with this opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
power.27cralawred
The dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The order of the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga City, Branch 3 dated February 12, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109 is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Balanga City is hereby
DIRECTED to amend the Informations.

SO ORDERED.28cralawred
Dio moved for reconsideration,29 but the Court of Appeals denied the Motion in its July 10, 2013
Resolution.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Desmond and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their Comments,31 to which Dio filed her Reply.32On
April 2, 2014, this Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Office of the Solicitor General filed on June 11, 2014 a Manifestation and Motion34 adopting its
Comment. Desmond and Dio filed their memoranda on June 19, 201435 and July 10, 2014,36respectively.

Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases."37 Considering that libel is limited as to the
venue of the case, failure to allege "where the libelous article was printed and first published"38 or "where
the offended party actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense"39 is a jurisdictional
defect. She argues that jurisdictional defects in an Information are not curable by amendment, even
before arraignment. To support this position, she cites Agustin v. Pamintuan:40
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed,
the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio
City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the
amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.41 (Citations
omitted)cralawred
Dio also cites Leviste v. Hon. Alameda,42 where this Court has stated that not all defects in an Information
are curable by amendment prior to arraignment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry
of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An
amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.43 (Citations
omitted)cralawred
Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of Morong, Bataan had no authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the offenses charged.44 The complaint filed before the prosecutor
did not allege that the emails were printed and first published in Morong Bataan, or that Desmond resided
in Morong, Bataan at the time of the offense.45 In the absence of these allegations, the prosecutor did not
have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation or to file the
information.46ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel, was not present in the case. She asserts
that emailing does not constitute publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. As there was
no allegation in the Informations that the emails were received, accessed, and read by third persons other
than Desmond, there could be no publication.47 Further, emails are not covered under Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the time the allegedly libelous emails were sent, there was no law punishing
this act.48ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Finally, Dio argues that she sent the emails as private communication to the officers of the corporation,
who were in the position to act on her grievances.49 The emails were sent in good faith, with justifiable
ends, and in the performance of a legal duty.50ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The primordial issue for resolution is whether an information's failure to establish venue is a defect that
can be cured by amendment before arraignment.

The Petition is denied.

I

If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment
be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment.cralawred
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary
exercise of power.51 In People v. Sandiganbayan:52
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an
amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts
constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are
mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the
opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue
delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical
grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As
explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where
such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme
Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.53cralawred
In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court applies. If the information is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it
before it may be quashed.

Petitioner claims that Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies only to informations that can be
cured by amendment. She argues that before a court orders that an amendment be made, or otherwise
gives the prosecution an opportunity to amend an information, it must first establish that the defective
information can be cured by amendment.
Petitioner relies on Agustin to argue the proscription of an amendment of an information in order to vest
jurisdiction in the court. This is misplaced.

In Agustin, the accused in the criminal case was already arraigned under a defective information that
failed to establish venue.54 The Court of Appeals held that the defect in the information was merely formal
and, consequently, could be amended even after plea, with leave of court. Thus, this Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed,
the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio
City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the
amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.55cralawred
In turn, Agustin cited Agbayani v. Sayo.56 However, Agbayani does not involve the amendment of a
defective information before or after arraignment. Subsequent cases have cited Agustin as basis that
amendment of an information to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is impermissible. Thus, in Leviste, this
Court cited Agustin and stated that certain amendments are impermissible even before
arraignment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry
of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An
amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.57cralawred
It may appear that Leviste supports petitioner's contention that an amendment operating to vest
jurisdiction in the trial court is impermissible. However, the statement in Leviste was obiter dictum. It cites
only Agustin, which did not involve the amendment of an information before arraignment.

Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no legal basis to reverse the Court of
Appeals' determination that the defective informations may be amended before arraignment. Although
the cases petitioner cited involved defective informations that failed to establish the jurisdiction of the
court over the libel charges, none involved the amendment of an information before arraignment. Thus,
these cannot be controlling over the facts of this case.
II

A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information. In Sasot v.
People:58
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the
alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;

c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
 d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses;

f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of
the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the
fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.59cralawred
On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper ground. In Cudia v. Court of
Appeals:60
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles
City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality
of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

"Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

. . . .

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena
for the purpose.

. . . .cralawred
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when
required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing
the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to
it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in
the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution.
If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of
the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach
where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating
panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that
the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To rule
otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give
rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.

Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have
been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of
Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite
plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to
give way to the filing of a new information.61 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)cralawred
However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect of the information must be evident on
its face. In Santos v. People:62
First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face. The
same cannot be said herein. The Information against petitioner appears valid on its face; and that it was
filed in violation of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws is not evident
on the face thereof. As pointed out by the CTA First Division in its 11 May 2006 Resolution, the more
appropriate recourse petitioner should have taken, given the dismissal of similar charges against
Velasquez, was to appeal the Resolution dated 21 October 2005 of the Office of the State Prosecutor
recommending the filing of an information against her with the DOJ Secretary.63cralawred
For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of authority to file it, the lack of the
authority must be evident on the face of the information.

The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus,
it is not apparent on the face of the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file
them.

The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend the Informations. If the proper
venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan after the Informations have been amended, then the trial court
may dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the
information.
III

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or
any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.cralawred
Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not covered under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner claims this is bolstered by the enactment of Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cybercrime Law, which widened the scope of libel to include libel committed through
email, among others.64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons named in the Informations—who
appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is
found—is sufficiently "public," as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by the
Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial.

Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of a degree
of protected freedom of expression.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust,66 some leeway should be
given to the public to express disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in
abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises barren
abstractions that may wander into situations only imagined, not real.
IV

Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court. It is not apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot be
the basis for quashing them. In Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals:67
We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information. Specifically, paragraph (g) of said provision states
that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information where it contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. Hence, for the alleged privilege to be a ground for
quashing the information, the same should have been averred in the information itself and secondly, the
privilege should be absolute, not only qualified. Where, however, these circumstances are not alleged in
the information, quashal is not proper as they should be raised and proved as defenses. With more reason
is it true in the case of merely qualifiedly privileged communications because such cases remain actionable
since the defamatory communication is simply presumed to be not malicious, thereby relieving the
defendant of the burden of proving good intention and justifiable motive. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove malice. Thus, even if the qualifiedly privileged nature of the communication is
alleged in the information, it cannot be quashed especially where prosecution opposes the same so as not
to deprive the latter of its day in court, but prosecution can only prove its case after trial on the merits.
In People v. Gomez we held, inter alia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"The claim of the accused . . . that the letter is privileged communication is not a ground for a motion to
quash. It is a matter of defense which must be proved after trial of the case on the merits."68 (Citations
omitted)cralawred
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding petitioner's purported good faith. This should be a
matter of defense properly raised during trial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29, 2013 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated January 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Brion, J., on official leave.
Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 3-22. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
Id. at 24-32. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32514, was penned by Associate Justice Amelita
G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth
Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3
Id. at 34-35. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by
Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4
Id. at 31.

5
Id. at 24.

6
Id.

7
Id.

8
Id. at 28.

9
Id. at 28-29.

10
Id. at 25.

11
Id.

12
Id.
13
Id.

14
Id.

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Id.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Id. at 26.

22
Id.

23
Id.

24
Id. at 26-27.chanrobleslaw

25
Id. at 27-28.

26
Id. at 29.

27
Id. at 30-31.

28
Id. at 31.

29
Id. at 36-44.

30
Id. at 34-35.

31
Id. at 57-70, Desmond's Comment, and 76-87, Office of the Solicitor General's Comment.

32
Id. at 90-97.

33
Id. at 99.

34
Id. at 100.
33
Id. at 104-116.

36
Id. at 130-151.

37
Id. at 139.

38
Id. at 140.

39
Id.

40
505 Phil. 103 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

41
Id. at 113.

42
640 Phil. 620 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].

43
Id. at 640.

44
Rollo , pp. 15-16, Petition.

45
Id.

46
Id.

47
Id. at 147.

48
Id. at 145.

49
Id. at 147.

50
Id.

51
Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 619 Phil. 306, 321 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

52
G.R. No. 160619, September 9, 2015
<http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/160619.pdf
> [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].

53
Id. at 10, citing People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/november2014/187000.pdf
> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

54
Id. at 112.
55
Id. at 113.

56
178 Phil. 574 (1979) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

57
Id. at 640.

58
500 Phil. 527 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].

59
Id. at 536.

60
348 Phil. 190 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

61
Id. at 199-202.

62
585 Phil. 337 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

63
Id. at 361, citing Gozos v. Hon. Tac-An, 360 Phil. 453,464 (1998) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

64
Rollo, p. 145, Memorandum.

65
See J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 237, 602-621 [Per J. Abad, En Bane], which proffered the view that continued
criminalization of libel, especially in platforms using the internet unqualifiedly produces a "chilling effect"
that stifles freedom of expression:

"The crime of libel in its 1930 version in the Revised Penal Code was again reenacted through the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. It simply added the use of the internet as one of the means to commit
the criminal acts. The reenactment of these archaic provisions is unconstitutional for many reasons. At
minimum, it failed to take into consideration refinements in the interpretation of the old law through
decades of jurisprudence. It now stands starkly in contrast with the required constitutional protection of
freedom of expression.

. . . .

With the definite evolution of jurisprudence to accommodate free speech values, it is clear that the
reenactment of the old text of libel is now unconstitutional. Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Revised
Penal Code — and by reference, Section 4(c)4 of the law in question — are now overbroad as it prescribes
a definition and presumption that have been repeatedly struck down by this court for several decades.

. . . .

The effect on speech of the dangerously broad provisions of the current law on libel is even more palpable
in the internet.
. . . .

The broad and simplistic formulation now in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code essential for the
punishment of cyber libel can only cope with these variations produced by the technologies in the Internet
by giving law enforcers wide latitude to determine which acts are defamatory. There are no judicially
determinable standards. The approach will allow subjective case-by-case ad hoc determination. There will
be no real notice to the speaker or writer. The speaker or writer will calibrate speech not on the basis of
what the law provides but on who enforces it.

This is quintessentially the chilling effect of this law.

The threat of being prosecuted for libel stifles the dynamism of the conversations that take place in
cyberspace. These conversations can be loose yet full of emotion. These can be analytical and the product
of painstaking deliberation. Other conversations can just be exponential combinations of these forms that
provide canisters to evolving ideas as people from different communities with varied identities and
cultures come together to test their messages.

Certainly, there will be a mix of the public and the private; the serious and the not so serious. But, this
might be the kind of democratic spaces needed by our society: a mishmash of emotion and logic that may
creatively spring solutions to grave public issues in better and more entertaining ways than a symposium
of scholars. Libel with its broad bright lines, thus, is an anachronistic tool that may have had its uses in
older societies: a monkey wrench that will steal inspiration from the democratic mob" (Id. at 50-62).

VIRGINIA DIO v. PEOPLE & TIMOTHY DESMOND, GR No. 208146, 2016-06-08

Facts:
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109.[7] The Information in Criminal Case No.
9108 reads:
That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines,
Issues:
whether an information's failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by amendment before
arraignment.
Ruling:
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment
be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or... information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment.
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary
exercise of power.
Principles:
When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by amendment, courts
must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information.
Although we agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the Informations do not substantially
constitute the offense charged, the most prudent thing to do for the trial court is to give the prosecution
the opportunity to amend it and make the necessary... corrections. Indeed, an Information may be
defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, however, the dismissal of the case will
not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to
correct the defect; the... court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution's failure to do so. The
trial court's failure to provide the prosecution with this opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
power.
Generally, a defect pertaining to the... failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is
one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically
quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect
through... an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect
to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to
prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a... defective indictment that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution.

G.R. No. 203370, April 11, 2016

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. AND HELEN Y. DEE, Petitioners, v. PHILIP PICCIO, MIA
GATMAYTAN, MA. ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE
DIZON, ROLANDO PAREJA, WONINA M. BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE
ORTUOSTE, VICTOMA GOMEZ JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR., RICARDO LORAYES, PETER C.
SUCHIANCO, AND TRENNIE MONSOD, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 215106

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIP PICCIO, MIA GATMAYTAN, MA.
ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE DIZON, ROLANDO
PAREJA, WONINA M. BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA
GOMEZ JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR., RICARDO LORAYES, PETER C. SUCHIANCO, AND TRENNIE
MONSOD, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before this Court are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.1 The first petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 203370, filed by petitioners Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan Insurance) and Helen
Y. Dee (petitioners) assails the Decision2 dated February 24, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated September
5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31467, which denied their appeal from the
Order4 dated February 20, 2007 and the Resolution5 dated September 3, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City (Makati-RTC), Branch 137 (Makati-RTC, Br. 137) in Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882
on the ground that the same was not authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). On the other
hand, the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 215106, filed by petitioner Malayan Insurance assails the
Decision6 dated March 31, 2014 and the Resolution7 dated October 17, 2014 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR. No.
32148, which denied its appeal from the Orders8 dated December 28, 2007 and August 29, 2008 of the
Makati-RTC, Branch 62 (Makati-RTC, Br. 62) in Criminal Case No. 06-884 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts

On October 18, 2005, Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez), President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising
Agency - the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of Companies (Yuchengco Group), to which Malayan
Insurance is a corporate member - filed a Complaint-Affidavit9 for thirteen (13) counts of Libel, defined
and penalized under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the City
Prosecutor of Makati City, docketed as I.S. No. 05-1-11895, against herein respondents Philip Piccio, Mia
Gatmaytan, Ma. Annabella Relova Santos, John Joseph Gutierrez, Jocelyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolando
Pareja, Wonina M. Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortuoste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto,
Juvencio Pereche, Jr., Ricardo Lorayes, Peter C. Suchianco, and Trennie Monsod (respondents) for
purportedly posting defamatory articles/statements on the website www.pepcoalition.com that
besmirched the reputation of the Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group, including herein
petitioners.10

Upon the prosecutor's finding of probable cause,11 thirteen (13) Informations were filed before the
Makati-RTC. Among those filed were Criminal Case Nos. 06-87712 and 06-88213 (raffled to Makati-RTC, Br.
137) and Criminal Case No. 06-88414 (raffled to Makati-RTC, Br. 62), from which arose the present
petitions.

In Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882, respondents filed a Motion to Quash15 dated June 7, 2006,
asserting, among others, lack of jurisdiction, since the residences of petitioners were not alleged in the
Informations. Besides, even if so stated, the residence or principal office address of petitioners was
admittedly at Quintin Paredes Street, Binondo, Manila, and not in Makati City. Hence, the venue was
mislaid, and the Makati-RTC, Br. 137 did not have jurisdiction over the said cases.16

In an Order17 dated February 20, 2007, the Makati-RTC, Br. 137 granted the said motion and
dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.18 It found that the
Informations filed in these cases failed to state that any one of the offended parties resides in Makati City,
or that the subject articles were printed or first published in Makati City.19 Hence, the failure to state the
aforementioned details was a fatal defect which negated its jurisdiction over the criminal
cases.20 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,21 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution22dated September 3, 2007. Hence, petitioners filed an appeal23 before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 31467.

Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 06-884, respondents filed a Motion to Quash24 dated June 5, 2006, based
on the following grounds: (a) that the Information failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati-RTC; (b) that
the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law; and (c) that the Information is fatally
defective for failing to designate the offense charged and to allege the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense of Libel.25cralawred

In an Order26 dated December 28, 2007, the Makati-RTC, Br, 62 dismissed Criminal Case No. 06-884 for
lack of probable cause. Among others, it ruled that the element of malice was lacking since respondents
did not appear to have been motivated by personal ill will to speak or spite Malayan Insurance.27 The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,28 which was,, however, denied in an Order29 dated August
29, 2008. Thus, Malayan Insurance filed an appeaL30 before the CA. docketed as CA-GR. CR. No. 32148.
The Proceedings Before the CA

In CA-GR. CR No. 31467, the CA noted that while petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, the Appellants' Brief
was filed only by the private prosecutor, and not by the OSG as required by law.31 It likewise observed
from the records that the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion32 dated September 16, 2008 asking that
"it be excused from filing any documents or pleadings relative to the aforementioned case[,] considering
that it had not received any endorsement coming from the Department of Justice to appeal the
same."33 Moreover, the CA held that "the Chief City Prosecutor-of Makati City was required to comment,
and he categorically stated in his Explanation and Compliance that he did not authorize the filing, nor
conform to the filing of an appeal from the quashal of the two (2) Informations in [Criminal Case Nos. 06-
877 and 06-882]."34

Thus, in the assailed Decision35 dated February 24, 2012, the CA denied the appeal outright on the ground
that the same was not filed by the authorized official, i.e., the OSG. It remarked that although the private
prosecutor may, at certain times, be permitted to participate in criminal proceedings on appeal in the CA,
his participation is always subject to prior approval of the OSG; and the former cannot be permitted to
adopt a position that is not consistent with that of the OSG.36 Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration37 was denied in the assailed Resolution38 dated September 5, 2012, prompting them to
file the petition in G.R. No. 203370.

The same was reached when the CA, in the assailed Decision39 dated March 31, 2014 in CA-GR. CR. No.
32148, denied Malayan Insurance's appeal, but this time, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The ruling
was premised on its finding that the case of Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, Branch 149 (Bonifacio),40 which
involved one of the thirteen (13) Libel cases, particularly Criminal Case No. 06-876, participated in by the
same parties albeit concerning a different defamatory article, is already controlling.41 Hence, since this
Court directed the quashal of Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and dismissed the same, the CA did
not delve on the propriety of the Makati-RTC, Br. 62's finding of probable cause, and instead, adopted,
the same course of action in Bonifacio. In its view, all other issues are rendered moot and academic in
light of this Court's declaration that the Makati-RTC is without jurisdiction to try and hear cases for Libel
filed by Malayan Insurance against respondents. 42 Malayan Insurance's motion for reconsideration43 was
denied in the assailed Resolution44 dated October 17, 2014, prompting it to file the petition in G.R. No.
215106.
The Issues Before the Court

In G.R. No. 203370, petitioners contend that the CA erred in denying the appeal in CA-GR. CR No.
31467 due to lack of the OSG's authorization. While in G.R. No. 215106, Malayan Insurance argued that
the CA likewise erred in denying its appeal, in CA-GR. CR. No. 32148, but this time, on jurisdictional
grounds.
The Court's Ruling

I. Resolution of G.R. No. 203370

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested
solely in the OSG45 which is "the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions
include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the Philippines] before any court in any
action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require."46 Section 35 (1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code47 provides that:

PEREZ, J.:
Before us for review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 dated
19 November 2012 which dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Fabian Urzais y Lanurias and affirmed
with modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 13155 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping with homicide through the use of unlicensed firearm.

Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was charged with Violation
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, with homicide through the use of an unlicensed firearm. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or prior thereto, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating with and abetting one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a Isuzu
Highlander car, colored Forest Green, with Plate No. UUT-838 of one MARIO MAGDATO, valued at FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) Philippine Currency, owned by and belonging to said MARIO
MAGDATO, against his will and consent and to his damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of
P500,000.00, and on the occasion of the carnapping, did assault and use personal violence upon the
person of one MARIO MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm, a Norinco cal.
9mm Pistol with Serial No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the head which caused
his death.[3]
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against him. His two co-
accused remain at large.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley), Senior Police Officer 2 Fernando
Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and Dr. Jun Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion).
Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband's disappearance and discovery of
his death. She narrated that her husband used to drive for hire their Isuzu Highlander with plate number
UUT-838 from Pulilan, Bulacan to the LRT Terminal in Metro Manila. On 12 November 2002, around four
o'clock in the morning, her husband left their house in Pulilan and headed for the terminal at the Pulilan
Public Market to ply his usual route. When her husband did not return home that day, Shirley inquired of
his whereabouts from his friends to no avail. Shirley went to the terminal the following day and the barker
there told her that a person had hired their vehicle to go to Manila. Shirley then asked her neighbors to
call her husband's mobile phone but no one answered. At around 10 o'clock in the morning of 13
November 2002, her husband's co-members in the drivers' association arrived at their house and
thereafter accompanied Shirley to her husband's supposed location. At the Sta.Rosa police station in
Nueva Ecija, Shirley was informed that her husband had passed away. She then took her husband's body
home.[4] Shirley retrieved their vehicle on 21 November 2002 from the Cabanatuan City Police Station.
She then had it cleaned as it had blood stains and reeked of a foul odor.[5]

SPO2 Figueroa of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Cabanatuan City, testified concerning the
circumstances surrounding accused-appellant's arrest. He stated that in November 2002, their office
received a "flash alarm" from the Bulacan PNP about an alleged carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest
green color. Thereafter, their office was informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the AGL
Subdivision, Cabanatuan City. Thus, a team conducted surveillance there and a checkpoint had been set
up outside its gate. Around three o'clock in the afternoon of 20 November 2002, a vehicle that fit the
description of the carnapped vehicle appeared. The officers apprehended the vehicle and asked the driver,
accused-appellant, who had been alone, to alight therefrom. When the officers noticed the accused-
appellant's waist to be bulging of something, he was ordered to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered
tucked there. The officers confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco, with magazine and twelve (12) live
ammunitions. The officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle matched that of the victim's. Found
inside the vehicle were two (2) plates with the marking "UUT-838" and a passport. Said vehicle contained
traces of blood on the car seats at the back and on its flooring. The officers detained accused-appellant
and filed a case for illegal possession of firearm against him. The subject firearm was identified in open
court.[6]

Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the cause of his death. He stated that
the victim sustained one (1) gunshot wound in the head, the entrance of which is at the right temporal
area exiting at the opposite side. The victim also had several abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip
of the nose and around the right eye. He also had blisters on his cheek area which could have been caused
by a lighted cigarette.[7]

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed the defense of denial.

Accused-appellant testified that he had ordered in October 2002 from brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista,
an owner-type jeepney worth P60,000.00 for use in his business. The brothers, however, allegedly
delivered instead a green Isuzu Highlander around half past three o'clock in the afternoon of 13 November
2002. The brothers told accused-appellant that his P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment with the
remaining undetermined amount to be paid a week after. Accused-appellant agreed to this, amazed that
he had been given a new vehicle at such low price. Accused-appellant then borrowed money from
someone to pay the balance but the brothers never replied to his text messages. On 16 November 2002,
his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to surrender the vehicle as it could be a "hot car." Accused-appellant
was initially hesitant to this idea as he wanted to recover the amount he had paid but he eventually
decided to sell the vehicle. He removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back. On 18
November 2002, he allegedly decided to surrender the vehicle upon advice by a certain Angie. But when
he arrived home in the afternoon of that day, he alleged that he was arrested by Alex Villareal, a member
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.[8] Accused-appellant
also testified that he found out in jail the owner of the vehicle and his unfortunate demise.[9] On cross-
examination, accused-appellant admitted that his real name is "Michael Tapayan y Baguio" and that he
used the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second passport in 2001 to be able to return to Taiwan.[10]

The other defense witness, Oscar Angeles (Angeles), testified that he had known the accused-appellant
as Michael Tapayan when they became neighbors in the AGL subdivision. Accused-appellant also served
as his computer technician. Angeles testified that accused-appellant previously did not own any vehicle
until the latter purchased the Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00 from the latter's friends in Bulacan. Angeles
advised accused-appellant that the vehicle might have been carnapped due to its very low selling price.
Angeles corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he did not want to surrender the car at first as
he wanted to recover his payment for it.[11]

On 18 October 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
The RTC anchored its ruling on the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.[12] It held that the
elements of carnapping were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through the recovery
of the purportedly carnapped vehicle from the accused-appellant's possession and by his continued
possession thereof even after the lapse of one week from the commission of the crime.[13] The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Fabian Urzais alias Michael Tapayan y
Lanurias GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping as defined and penalized by
Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) as amended by R.A. 7659 with homicide thru the use of
unlicensed firearm. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years
of reclusion perpetua.

In the service of the sentence, accused shall be credited with the full time of his preventive detention if
he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners
pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Mario Magdato the sum of Php50,000.00 as death
indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and Php672,000.00 as loss of earning capacity.[14]
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2010.[15]

On 19 November 2012, the CA rendered the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial court's
decision. The CA noted the absence of eyewitnesses to the crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial
evidence was presented to prove accused-appellant's guilt, solely, accused-appellant's possession of the
allegedly carnapped vehicle.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution[16] dated 12 August 2013,
accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desired. Accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief[17] while the OSG
manifested[18] that it adopts its Brief[19] filed before the CA for the purpose of the instant appeal.

Before the Court, accused-appellant vehemently maintains that there is no direct evidence that he robbed
and murdered the victim; and that the lower courts erred in convicting him based on circumstantial
evidence consisting only of the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle. Accused-
appellant decries the appellate court's error in relying on the disputable presumption created by law
under Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the
vehicle, he is considered the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing of its owner.
Accused-appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold in the case at bar.

The Court agrees.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the
presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the
accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects,
thus, it is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things.[20] By the amendment in
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or
force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty
of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of
the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof." This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide
or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit
was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven)
would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[21]

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution
to prove all its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence
indicating the guilt of accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct
evidence.[22] Both lower courts solely based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime
on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance,
the discovery of his death and the details surrounding accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the
vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres is absolutely noevidence supporting the prosecution's
theory that the victim's vehicle had been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the author
of the same.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Decided cases expound
that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rationale except that of guilt.[24]

In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial evidence
of possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally,
prosecution did not offer any iota of evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-
appellant's participation. In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was
discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated evidence says accused-
appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear
any license plates, while the latter testified he was arrested at home. The following testimony of
prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa on cross-examination raises even more questions:

Q: You mentioned the car napping incident, when was that, Mr. witness?

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, I noticed that every time the witness gave his answer, he is looking at a piece of paper
and he is not testifying on his personal knowledge.
x x x
x

COURT:

The witness is looking at the record for about 5 min. now. Fiscal, here is another witness who has
lapses on the mind.

FISCAL MACARAIG:

I am speechless, Your Honor.

WITNESS:

It was not stated in my affidavit, sir the time of the carnapping incident.

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, if he can no longer remember even the simple matter when this car napping incident
happened then he is an incompetent witness and we are deprive (sic) of the right to cross examine
him. I move that his testimony would be stricken off from the record.

x x x
x

Q: Mr. Witness, what is the date when you arrested the accused Fabian Urzais?
A: It was November 20, 2002 at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: You said earlier that on November 3, 2002 that you met the accused is that correct, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why did you see the accused on November 3, 2002, Mr. Witness?
A: During that time, we conducted a check point at AGL were (sic) the Highlander was often seen, sir.

So, since on November 3, 2002, you were conducting this check point at AGL, it is safe to assume
Q:
that the carnapping incident happened earlier than November 3, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you present when this vehicle was car napped, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.

Since you were not present, you have no personal knowledge about this car napping incident, right,
Q:
Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: No further question, Your Honor.[25]
Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing" since the non-
return of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the check-point had begun before then,
as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the prosecution witness raises doubts about the prosecution's
version of the case. Perhaps, the check-point had been set up for another vehicle which had gone missing
earlier. In any event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing vehicle whose
owner had been found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of the vehicle priced so suspiciously
below standard. But how this alone should lead to a conviction for the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed by the appellate court is downright disturbing.

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of
the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to
cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.[26] In the instant case, accused-
appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story
that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is
not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the
unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution
to produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the
prosecution was unable to discharge. In contrast to prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa's confused,
apprehensive and uncorroborated testimony accused-appellant unflinchingly testified as follows:

Will you please tell us how you came into possession of this Isuzu Highlander with plate number UTT
Q:
838?
A: That vehicle was brought by Ricky Bautista and Alex Bautista, sir.

x x x
x

Q: Do you know why Alex and Ricky Bautista gave you that Isuzu Highlander?
Actually that was not the vehicle I ordered form (sic) them, I ordered an owner type jeep worth
A:
Php60,000 but on November 13, 2002 they brought that Isuzu Highlander, sir.

Q: Why did you order an owner type jeep from them?

A: Because I planned to install a trolley, cause I have a videoke for rent business, sir.

x x x
x

Q: What happened upon the arrival of this Alex and Ricky Bautista on that date and time?
A: I was a little bit surprise (sic) because Alex alighted from an Isuzu Highlander colored green, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I told them that it was not I ordered from you and my money is only Php60,000, sir.

Q: What did he told (sic) you?

He told me to give them the Php60,000 and they will leave the vehicle and when I have the money
A:
next week I will send text message to them, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was amazed because the vehicle is brand new and the price is low, sir.

x x x
x

Q: Did you find out anything about the Isuzu highlander that they left to you?
When I could not contact them I went to my friend Oscar Angeles and told him about the vehicle
then he told me that you better surrender the vehicle because maybe it is a hot car, sir. "Nung hindi
A:
ko na po sila makontak ay nagpunta ako sa kaibigan kong si Oscar Angeles at sinabi ko po yung
problema tungkol sa sasakyan at sinabi nya sa akin na isurrender na lang at baka hot car yan"[27]

x x x
x

Mr. Witness, granting for the sake that what you are saying is true, immediately on the 16th,
Q: according to your testimony, and upon confirming it to your friend, you then decided to surrender
the vehicle, why did you not do it on the 16th, why did you still have to wait until you get arrested?
Because I was thinking of my Sixty Thousand Pesos (Php60,000.00) at that time, and on how I can
A: take it back, sir. ("Kasi nanghinayang po ako sa Sixty Thousand (Php60,000.00) ko nung oras na un ...
pano ko po yun mabawi sabi ko".)

x x x
x

So Mr. Witness, let us simplify this, you have purchased a carnapped vehicle, your intention is to
surrender it but you never did that until you get caught in possession of the same, so in other words,
Q:
that is all that have actually xxx vehicle was found dead, the body was dumped somewhere within
the vicinity of Sta. Rosa, those are the facts in this case?
A: I only came to know that there was a dead person when I was already in jail, sir.

Q: What about the other facts that I have mentioned, are they correct or not?
When I gave the downpayment, I do not know yet that it was a hot car and I came to know it only
A:
on the 16th, sir.[28]
Significantly, accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by defense witness Angeles who had
known accused-appellant by his real name "Michael Tapayan y Baguio," to wit:
Q: Do you know if this Michael Tapayan owns any vehicle sometime in 2002?
A: At first none, sir, he has no vehicle.

Q: What do you mean when you say at first he has no vehicle?

A: Later, sir, I saw him riding in a vehicle.

x x x
x

Q: Did Michael Tapayan tell you how much he bought that vehicle?
A: I remember he told me that he bought that vehicle for Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos, sir.

What was your reaction when you were told that the vehicle was purchased for only Thirty Thousand
Q:
Pesos (Php30,000.00)?
A: I told him that it's very cheap and also told him that it might be a carnap (sic) vehicle.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan when you told him that?
He thought about it and he is of the belief that the person who sold the vehicle to him will come
A:
back and will get the additional payment, sir.

Aside from this conversation about that vehicle, did you have any other conversation with Michael
Q:
Tapayan concerning that vehicle?
After a few days, sir, I told him to surrender the said vehicle to the authorities because the persons
A:
who sold it to him did not come back for additional payment.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan to this suggestion?

He told me that he will think about it because he was thinking about the money that he already gave
A:
to them.[29]
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's explanation for his
possession of the missing vehicle. The possession having been explained, the legal presumption is
disputed and thus, cannot find application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage
of justice as criminal convictions necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt and in the absence of such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an incident of
carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal
Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both courts relied only on
the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of the missing vehicle for the latter's
conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November
2002. Dr. Concepcion gave testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had
sustained. Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot wound which
caused his death and the firearm found in the person of accused-appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's
testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-appellant was found to have been in possession of the
missing vehicle of the victim. But even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does not link accused-
appellant to the carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not preclude
the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from the Bautista
brothers who have themselves since gone missing.

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.[30]

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution
was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to
exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in
mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters
by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.[31]

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal
becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has
imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[32] The constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[33]

In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral
certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 November 2012 in
C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael
Tapayan y Baguio is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide, without
prejudice to investigation for the crime of fencing penalized under Presidential Decree 1612. His
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for some other lawful
cause.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin,** and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., on official leave.

April 26, 2016

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 13, 2016 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on April 26, 2016 at 2:25
p.m.

G.R. Nos. 212593-94, March 15, 2016

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, Respondent.

G.R.Nos. 213163-78

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213540-41

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213542-43

JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES AND JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES, Petitioners, v. CONCHITA CARPIO

MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 215880-94

JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES AND JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213475-76

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"In dealing with probable cause[,] as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be
proved."1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Before this Court are consolidated2 petitions3 which commonly assail the Joint Resolution4 dated March
28, 2014 and the Joint Order5 dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-
C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396 finding probable cause for the crimes of Plunder6 and/or violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 30197 against petitioners Jessica Lucila "Gigi" G. Reyes (Reyes), Janet
Lim Napoles (Janet Napoles), Jo Christine L. Napoles (Jo Christine Napoles) and James Christopher L.
Napoles (James Napoles; collectively, the Napoles siblings), and John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), together
with several others. Further assailed are: by Reyes,8 the Resolution9 dated July 3, 2014 of the
Sandiganbayan, which directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against her, and several others, as well
as the Resolution10 dated July 4, 2014 issued by the same tribunal, which denied her Urgent Motion to
Suspend the Proceedings;11 and by the Napoles siblings,12 the Resolution13 dated September 29, 2014 and
the Resolution14 dated November 14, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan, which found the existence of probable
cause against them, and several others, and consequently, set their arraignment.
The Facts

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported15 by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy),
Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced
from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total
amount of P172,834,500.00.16 The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a
Complaint17 for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013,
docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318 (NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint18 for Plunder and violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013,
docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0396 (FIO Complaint). Tersely put, petitioners were charged for the following
acts:

(a) Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, for fraudulently
processing the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project identification
and cost projection;19 (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters,20 project reports,21 and
pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Implementing Agencies (IAs);22 and (3) endorsement of the preferred JLN23-controlled Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs)24 to undertake the PDAF-funded project - and for personally25 receiving significant
portions of the diverted PDAF funds representing Senator Enrile's "share," "commissions," or "kickbacks"
therefrom,26 as well as her own;27cralawred

(b) Janet Napoles, as the alleged mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Senator Enrile's PDAF - through: (1) the commencement via "business
propositions"28 with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF;29 (2) the creation and operation of the
JLN-controlled NGOs purposely to serve as "conduits" of government funds, in this case, Senator Enrile's
PDAF;30 (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear that the projects
were implemented by her NGOs;31 (4) the falsification and machinations used in securing the funds from
the IAs and liquidating disbursements;32 and (5) the remittance of the PDAF funds to Janet Napoles from
her JLN controlled-NGOs to the JLN Corporation33 to be misappropriated by her and Senator Enrile;34
(c) the Napoles siblings,35 as high ranking officers of the JLN Corporation,36 for continuously diverting the
sums sourced from Senator Enrile's PDAF to Janet Napoles's control37 - through: (1) falsification and
forgery of the signatures of the supposed recipients on the Certificates of Acceptance and Delivery
Reports, as well as the documents submitted in the liquidation of PDAF funds;38 and (2) handling of the
PDAF proceeds after being deposited in the accounts of the JLN-controlled NGOs; and39

(d) De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger,40 for assisting in the fraudulent releases
of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs and eventually remitting the funds to Janet Napoles's
control - through: (1) preparation and use of spurious documents to obtain checks from the IAs; 41 (2)
picking up and receiving42 the checks representing the PDAF "commissions" or "kickbacks," and depositing
them to bank accounts in the name of the JLN-controlled NGOs concerned;43 and (3) withdrawing and
delivering the same to their respective recipients44 - also, for having been appointed as
member/incorporator45 and President46 of certain JLN-controlled NGOs.

As alleged, the systemic pillaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF commences with Janet Napoles meeting with a
legislator - in this case, Senator Enrile himself or through his Chief of Staff, Reyes, or Ruby Tuason
(Tuason)47 - with the former rendering an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "rebate,"
"commission," or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.48 Upon their agreement on
the conditions of the "PDAF acquisition," including the "project" for which the PDAF will be utilized, the
corresponding IA tasked to "implement" the same, and the legislator's "rebate," "commission," or
"kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the "project" cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO),49 the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the
immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the
SARO.50 By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Janet Napoles
to the legislator.51 Upon release of the SARO, Janet Napoles would then direct her staff - including
whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas - to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred
JLN-controlled NGO that will be used for the implementation of the "project," the project proposals of the
identified NGO, and the indorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the
approval of the legislator;52 and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the
legislator,53 which is usually delivered by her staff, De Asis and Ronald John Lim.54Once the documents are
approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which will handle the preparation of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen
NGO.55 Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to the IA concerned, the
head of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check
representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project
cost.56 Among those tasked by Janet Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts
of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings.57 Once the funds are in the
account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Janet Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal
thereof.58 Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Janet Napoles's staff, the latter will bring the proceeds to
the office of the JLN Corporation where it will be accounted. Janet Napoles will then decide how much
will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City.59 De Asis, Luy, and
Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Janet Napoles's residence.60Finally, to liquidate
the disbursements, Janet Napoles and her staff, i.e., the Napoles siblings and De Asis, would manufacture
fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar
documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-related project was implemented.61 Under
this modus operandi, Senator Enrile, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly tunneled his
PDAF amounting to around P345,000,000.0062 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received
"rebates," "commissions," or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P172,834,500.00.63

In her defense, Reyes filed her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit64 on January 3, 2014, contending that the
letters and documents which she purportedly signed in connection with the allocation of the PDAF of
Senator Enrile were all forged, and that none of the three (3) witnesses - Luy, Suñas, and Nova Kay B.
Macalintal - who mentioned her name in their respective affidavits, directly and positively declared that
she received money from the PDAF in question.65

For their part, the Napoles siblings filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit66 on February 24, 2014, opposing
their inclusion as respondents in the FIO Complaint. They claimed that the said Complaint: (a) is
insufficient in form and substance as it failed to state in unequivocal terms the specific acts of their
involvement in the commission of the offenses charged, as required in Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure;67 and (b) failed to allege and substantiate the elements of the crime of
Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.68 They likewise argued that the affidavits and statements
of the whistleblowers contain nothing more than mere hearsay and self-serving declarations, which are,
therefore, inadmissible evidence unworthy of credence.69

On the other hand, while De Asis admitted70 that he was an employee of the JLN Corporation from 2006-
2010 in various capacities as driver, bodyguard or messenger, and that he received a salary of P10,000.00
a month for serving as the personal driver and "errand boy" of Janet Napoles, he denied the allegations
against him, and maintained that he was merely following instructions from Janet Napoles when he
picked-up checks for the JLN-controlled NGOs; that he had no knowledge in setting up or managing the
corporations which he supposedly helped incorporate (namely, Kaupdanan Para sa
Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. [KPMFI], as President,71 and Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic
Development Foundation, Inc. [CARED], as Member/Incorporator)72; and that he did not personally
benefit from the alleged misuse of the PDAF.73

Meanwhile, despite due notice, Janet Napoles failed to file her counter-affidavits to the foregoing
Complaints. Thus, the Ombudsman considered her to have waived her right to file the same. 74

While preliminary investigation proceedings were ongoing before the Ombudsman, Tuason, who was
likewise charged under OMB-C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396, surfaced as an additional witness and
offered her affidavit75 implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam. This prompted Reyes to file before the
Ombudsman an Omnibus Motion76 dated March 27, 2014, requesting that: (a) she be furnished copies of:
(1) Tuason's affidavit, which supposedly contained vital information that was described by Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima as "slam dunk evidence";77 (2) the transcript of the alleged 12-hour
clarificatory hearing on February 11, 201478 where Tuason was said to have substantiated the allegations
in her affidavit; and (3) the additional documents the latter submitted thereat; and (b) she be given a
period of time to comment on Tuason's affidavit or to file a supplemental counter-affidavit, if deemed
necessary.79 On even date, the Ombudsman denied80 Reyes's Omnibus Motion on the ground that "there
is no provision under [the said office's Rules of Procedure] which entitles [Reyes] to be furnished filings
by the other parties, including the other respondents."81

The following day, the Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution82 dated March 28, 2014
finding probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder,
and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen (15) counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly, separate motions for reconsideration were timely filed by
Reyes,83 Janet Napoles,84 the Napoles siblings,85 and De Asis.86

Pending the resolution of the aforesaid motions, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order87 dated May 7,
2014 granting Reyes's request for copies of the respective Counter-Affidavits of Tuason and Dennis
Cunanan (Cunanan), and directing her to file a comment thereon. Among the documents allegedly
attached to the said Joint Order were copies of the Supplemental Sworn Statement88 of Tuason dated
February 21, 2014 and the Sworn Statement89 of Cunanan dated February 20, 2014,90 to which Reyes
submitted separate Comments91 on May 13, 2014. However, Tuason's earlier Sworn Statement dated
February 4, 201492 and the transcripts of the clarificatory hearing93 - both of which were requested by
Reyes - were not included. Hence, Reyes filed another Motion94 on May 9, 2014 requesting copies of said
documents. Subsequently, on May 13, 2014, she filed a Reiterative Motion95 for the same purpose. The
Ombudsman denied the aforesaid motions on the ground that "the Affidavit dated 4 February 2014 does
not form part of the records of the preliminary investigation and neither was [it] mentioned/referred to
in the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014."96 It was further stated that the Special Panel of Investigators
"did not conduct clarificatory hearings at any stage during the preliminary investigation."97

Due to reports98 that Tuason was officially declared a state witness and granted immunity99 from criminal
prosecution for the PDAF scam-related cases, Reyes wrote a letter100 dated May 7, 2014 to the
Ombudsman, requesting a copy of the immunity agreement that it entered into with Tuason. Again, the
Ombudsman denied Reyes's request for the reason that the immunity agreement is a "privileged
communication which is considered confidential under Section 3, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing [RA] 6713,"101 otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."102

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order103 denying, among others, the motions for
reconsideration filed by herein petitioners. This led to the filing of the petitions before this Court,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 212593-94,104G.R. Nos. 213540-41,105G.R. Nos. 213542-43,106 and G.R. Nos.
213475-76,107 commonly assailing the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution108 and the June 4, 2014 Joint
Order109 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396.

Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations110 were filed by the the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan, charging, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238;111 and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and
De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
SB-14-CRM-0241 to 0255,112 which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third Division.113

To forestall the service of a warrant of arrest against her, on June 13, 2014, Reyes filed an Urgent Motion
to Suspend Proceedings114 before the Sandiganbayan until after this Court shall have resolved her
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in G.R.
Nos. 212593-94. On July 1, 2014, she filed a Manifestation and Reiterative Motion to Suspend Proceedings
Against Accused Reyes.115 Similarly, the Napoles siblings filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with Urgent Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Suspend
Proceedings116 dated June 13, 2014 before the Sandiganbayan.

On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, "along with several other related cases,"
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution117 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against "all the accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause was a mere superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of
the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.118 In view, however, of the Separate Opinion119 issued by
Justice Samuel R. Martires, dissenting to the issuance of warrants of arrest against the Napoles siblings,
aiong with several others, upon the premise that the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) still needs to
present additional evidence with respect to the aforementioned persons, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 112
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,120 a Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, composed of
five (5) members, was created.

A day later, or on July 4, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution121 dated July 4, 2014 in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0238 and SB-CRM-0241 to 0255, denying Reyes's Motion to Suspend
Proceedings for lack of merit. In view of the foregoing developments, Reyes voluntarily surrendered to
the Sandiganbayan on even date, and accordingly, underwent the required booking procedure for her
arrest and detention.122 This prompted Reyes to file the petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 213163-
78,123assailing the July 3, 2014124 and July 4, 2014125 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution126 in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of probable cause against them, and several
others, and consequently, setting their arraignment. The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the
reconsideration127 of the judicial finding of probable cause against them and requested that their
arraignment be held in abeyance pending the resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles siblings
alleged128 that the Sandiganbayan acted on their motion for reconsideration through the latter's
Resolution129 dated November 14, 2014, declaring that the presence of probable cause against them had
already been settled in its previous resolutions.130 Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the
petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94,131 assailing the September 29, 2014132 and November 14,
2014133 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against
petitioners for the charges against them.
The Court's Ruling
I. The Petitions Assailing the Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman.
In G.R. Nos. 212593-94, Reyes imputes grave abuse of discretion against the Ombudsman in finding
probable cause against her for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 on the basis of: (a)
Tuason's Sworn Statement dated February 4, 2014, which was not furnished to Reyes despite her
repeated requests therefor, thereby violating her right to due process;134 (b) Tuason's Supplemental
Sworn Statement dated February 21, 2014 that did not mention Reyes's name at all;135 (c) documentary
evidence that were forged, falsified, and fictitious;136 and (d) hearsay declarations of the whistleblowers
who merely mentioned Reyes's name in general terms but did not positively declare that they saw or
talked with her at any time or had seen her receive money from Janet Napoles or the latter's employees.137

In G.R. Nos. 213540-41, Janet Napoles claims that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
in finding probable cause to indict her for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
notwithstanding the failure of the NBI and the FIO to allege and establish the elements of Plunder; 138and
the insufficiency, in form and in substance, of both the NBI and FIO Complaints as they lacked certain
particularities such as the time, place, and manner of the commission of the crimes charged.139Janet
Napoles further contends that as a private individual, she cannot be held liable for Plunder, considering
that the said crime may only be committed by public officers; and that conspiracy was not established.140

In G.R. Nos. 213542-43, the Napoles siblings assert that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
finding probable cause against them for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, mainly arguing that there
is no evidence to show that they conspired with any public officer to commit the aforesaid
crime.141 Likewise, the Napoles siblings asseverate that the whistleblowers' testimonies were bereft of
probative value and are, in fact, inadmissible against them.142

Finally, in G.R. Nos. 213475-76, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of gravely abusing its discretion in finding
probable cause against him for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, contending that he was
a mere driver and messenger of Janet Napoles, and not the "cohort" that the Ombudsman found him to
be;143 that he did not benefit from the illegal transactions of Janet Napoles, nor was he ever in full control
and possession of the funds involved therein; and that the whistleblowers admitted to being the "real
cohorts" of Janet Napoles, and as such, should have been the ones charged for the crimes which were
ascribed to him instead.144

The petitions are bereft of merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not
an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.145 In Ciron v. Gutierrez,146 it was held that:
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[T]his Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well.Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the flscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.147(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be drawn to the
context of its ruling - that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it.148 Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction."149 In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,150 "[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
'actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does riot require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged."151

Thus, in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable
cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not
absolute certainty."152 In this case, petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2153 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements:
(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts described in Section 1 (d)154 thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).155

On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)156 of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must
be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting
in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge
of his functions.157

Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements need not
be definitively established for it is en6ugh that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is
because probable cause - the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation implies mere probability
of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction would suffice.158

Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits.159 Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level."160

Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the "technical rules of evidence
should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings,161 keeping in mind that "the determination of
probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the
admissibilitv or veracity of testimonies presented."162 Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman163 (Estrada), the
Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations
of parties, "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay."164

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion
in finding probable cause to indict Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and
Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis of fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, as will be explained hereunder.

First, records reveal that there is substantial basis to believe that Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile,
dealt with the parties involved; signed documents necessary for the immediate and timely
implementation of the Senator's PDAF-funded projects that, however, turned out to be "ghost projects";
and repeatedly received "rebates," "commissions," or "kickbacks" for herself and for Senator Enrile
representing portions of the latter's PDAF. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, such participation
on the part of Reyes was outlined by whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas as follows:
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[O]nce a PDAF allocation becomes available to Senator Enrile, his staff, in the person of either
respondent Reyes or Evangelista, would inform Tuason of this development. Tuason, in turn, would relay
the information to either Napoles or Luy. Napoles or Luy would then prepare a listing of the projects
available where Luy would specifically indicate the implementing agencies. This listing would be sent
to Reyes who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile.
After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give Tuason
a down payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes. After the SARO and/or NCA is released,
Napoles would give Tuason the full payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi
Reyes.165ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This was corroborated in all respects by Tuason's verified statement, the pertinent portions of which read:
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11. x x x It starts with a call or advise from Atty. Gigi Reyes or Mr. Jose Antonio Evangelista (also from the
Office of Senator Enrile) informing me that a budget from Senator Enrile's PDAF is available. I would then
relay this information to Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy.

12. Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy would then prepare a listing of the projects available indicating the
implementing agencies. This listing would be sent to Atty. Gigi Reyes who will endorse the same to the
DBM under her authority as Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile.

13. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give me a
down payment for delivery for the share of Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles would give me the full payment for delivery to
Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

15. Sometimes Janet Napoles would have the money for Senator Enrile delivered to my house by her
employees. At other times, I would get it from her condominium in Pacific Plaza or from Benhur Luy in
Discovery Suites. When Benhur Luy gives me the money, he would make me scribble on some of their
vouchers [or] even sign under the name "Andrea Reyes," [Napoles's] codename for me. This is the money
that I would deliver to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

16. I don't count the money I receive for delivery to Senator Enrile. I just receive whatever was given to
me. The money was all wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles or Benhur Luy.
For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely on the accounting records of Benhur Luy for the PDAF
of Senator Enrile, which indicates the date, description and amount of money I received for delivery to
Senator Enrile.

x x x x

18. As I have mentioned above, I personally received the share of Senator Enrile from Janet Napoles and
Benhur Luy and I personally delivered it to Senator Enrile's Chief-of-Staff, Atty. Gigi Reyes. Sometimes she
would come to my house to pick up the money herself. There were also instances when I would personally
deliver it to her when we would meet over lunch. There were occasions when Senator [Enrile] would join
us for a cup of coffee when he would pick her up. For me, his presence was a sign that whatever Atty. Gigi
Reyes was doing was with Senator Enrile's blessing.

x x x x

25. Initially, I was in-charge of delivering the share of Senator Enrile to Atty. Gigi Reyes, but later on, I
found out that Janet Napoles dealt directly with her. Janet Napoles was able to directly transact business
with Atty. Gigi Reyes after I introduced them to each other. This was during the Senate hearing of Jocjoc
Bolante in connection with the fertilizer fund scam. Janet Napoles was scared of being investigated on her
involvement, so she requested me to introduce her to Atty. Gigi Reyes who was the Chief of Staff of the
[sic] Senate President Enrile.166 (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, these pieces of evidence are already sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes
charged were committed and Reyes is probably guilty thereof as it remains apparent that: (a) Reyes, a
public officer, connived with Senator Enrile and several other persons (including the other petitioners in
these consolidated cases as will be explained later) in the perpetuation of the afore-described PDAF scam,
among others, in entering into transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds; (b) Senator
Enrile and Reyes acted with manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-
controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF without the benefit of public bidding and/or negotiated
procurement in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; 167 (c) the
PDAF-funded projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue injury to the government,
and at the same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to the beneficiaries of the
scam; and (e) Senator Enrile, through Reyes, was able to accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P172,834,500.00.

In an attempt to exculpate herself from the charges, Reyes contends that the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion when it: (a) relied upon hearsay and unsubstantiated declarations of the whistleblowers who
merely mentioned her name in general terms but did not positively declare that they saw or talked with
her at any time or that they had seen her receive money from Janet Napoles or anyone else connected
with the latter;168 (b) granted immunity to the whistleblowers and Tuason;169 (c) denied her of due process
When she was deprived of the opportunity to rebut and disprove the statements of Tuason as she was
never furnished a copy of the latter's Sworn Statement170 dated February 4, 2014 despite repeated
requests therefor;171 and (d) disregarded the fact that her signatures found on the documentary evidence
presented were forged, falsified, and fictitious.172

Such contentions deserve scant consideration.

Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely hearsay, it must be reiterated that - as
held in the Estrada case - probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, so long as there, is
substantial basis for crediting the same.173 As aforestated, the modus operandi used in advancing the
PDAF scam as described by the whistleblowers was confirmed by Tuason herself, who admitted to having
acted as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the office of Senator Enrile.174 The Ombudsman further
pointed out that the collective statements of Luy, Sula, Suñas, and Tuason find support in the following
documentary evidence: (a) the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received
by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his "commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (b) the
2007-2009 Commission on Audit (COA) Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken
on PDAF disbursements - that there were serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-
funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and (c) the reports on the independent field
verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn statements of local
government officials and purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be
inexistent.175 Clearly, these testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably
conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand trial
therefor.

In this relation, the Court rejects Reyes's theory that the whistleblowers and Tuason are the "most guilty"
in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs her claim that the Ombudsman violated Section
17, Rule 119176 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting immunity to them. To begin with,
"[t]he authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such
power in the Ombudsman[,] as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an
accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to
obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The latter do not, as a rule[,]
have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution's evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently,
courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an
accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section
17, Rule 119 [of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure]."177 As explained in Quarto v. Marcelo:178
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It
is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher
objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty
of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the
conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the
law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the
timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power
to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide
whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the
jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial
tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now
and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.179 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As earlier mentioned, Tuason admitted to having acted merely as a liaison between Janet Napoles and
the Office of Senator Enrile. It is in this capacity that she made "direct arrangements" with Janet Napoles
concerning the PDAF "commissions," and "directly received" money from Janet Napoles for distribution
to the participants of the scam. In the same manner, Luy and Suñas, being mere employees of Janet
Napoles, only acted upon the latter's orders. Thus, the Ombudsman simply saw the higher value of
utilizing them as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in order to fully establish and strengthen her case
against those mainly responsible for the scam.180 The Court has previously stressed that the discharge of
an accused to be a state witness is geared towards the realization of the deep-lying intent of the State not
to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished by allowing an accused who appears not to be the
most guilty to testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more guilty co-accused. It is aimed
at achieving the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number
among the accused for an offense committed.181 In fact, whistleblower testimonies - especially in
corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but rather, be welcomed as these
whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the perpetrators and bring them to
justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio
Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.),182 the Court gave recognition and
appreciation to whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that corruption is often done in secrecy
and it is almost inevitable to resort to their testimonies in order to pin down the crooked public officers.183

For another, Reyes erroneously posits that under Section 4,184 Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, she is entitled to copies of Tuason's affidavit, as well as the transcripts of the
clarificatory hearings conducted by the Ombudsman with Tuason, and that the Ombudsman's denial of
such copies constitutes a violation of due process on her part. In Estrada, the Court had already resolved
in detail that under both Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 4, Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, a respondent to a preliminary investigation
proceeding (such as Reyes in this case) is only entitled to the evidence submitted by the complainants,
and not to those submitted by a co-respondent185 (such as Tuason in this case, prior to her grant of
immunity as a state witness). It must also be noted that by virtue of the Ombudsman's Joint Order186dated
May 7, 2014, Reyes was even provided with copies of Tuason and Cunanan's respective Counter-
Affidavits,187 and directed to file a comment thereon. In fact, Reyes even submitted separate
Comments188 on May 13, 2014. Thus, there is more reason to decline Reyes's assertion that the
Ombudsman deprived her of due process. Time and again, it has been said that the touchstone of due
process is the opportunity to be heard,189 which was undeniably afforded to Reyes in this case.

Finally, anent Reyes's claim that her signatures in the documentary evidence presented were false,
falsified, and fictitious, it must be emphasized that "[a]s a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon
to have been forged."190 Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to present clear and convincing
evidence to prove her claim of forgery, especially in light of the following considerations pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos. 212593-94:191 (a) in a letter
dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the COA, Senator Enrile himself admitted that his signatures, as well
as those of Reyes, found on the documents covered by the COA's Special Audit Report are
authentic;192 and (b) Rogelio Azores, the supposed document examiner who now works as a freelance
consultant, aside from only analyzing photocopies of the aforesaid documents and not the originals
thereof, did not categorically state that Reyes's signatures on the endorsement letters were forged.193 As
there is no clear showing of forgery, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot subscribe
to Reyes's contrary submission. Notably, however, she retains the right to raise and substantiate the same
defense during trial proper.

In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Reyes of
one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Anent Janet Napoles's complicity in the abovementioned crimes, records similarly show that she, in all
reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile's PDAF. As
exhibited in the modus operandi discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of the availability of
a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the "lead employee"194 of the JLN Corporation, would prepare a
listing of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by the Office of
Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery
to Senator Enrile through Reyes, with the remainder of the amount given to the Senator after the SARO
and/or NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet Napoles's NGOs to undertake the PDAF-
funded projects,195 which were "ghost projects" that allowed Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the
PDAF allocation.196

Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against
Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has prima facie been established that: (a) she, in conspiracy
with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-
described modus operandi to obtain Senator Enrile's PDAF, who supposedly abused his authority as a
public officer in order to do so; (b) through this modus operandi, it appears that Senator Enrile repeatedly
received ill-gotten wealth in the form of "kickbacks" in the years 2004-2010; and (c) the total value of
"kickbacks'' given to Senator Enrile amounted to at least P172,834,500.00.

In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, as it is ostensible that: (a) she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his chief of
staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they would enter into transactions involving illegal
disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest partiality and evident
bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF-funded projects -
even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or negotiated procurement, in direct violation of existing
laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement;197 and (c) the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects
caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of P345,000,000.00.

At this juncture, the Court must disabuse Janet Napoles of her mistaken notion that as a private individual,
she cannot be held answerable for the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because
the offenders in those crimes are public officers. While the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired
with said officers in committing the same.198 This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases
of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.199 In this case, given that the evidence gathered perceptibly
shows Janet Napoles's engagement in the illegal hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF, the Ombudsman
rightfully charged her, with Enrile and Reyes, as a co-conspirator for the aforestated crimes.

Furthermore, there is no merit in Janet Napoles's assertion that the complaints are insufficient in form
and in substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and manner
of the commission of the crimes charged. "According to Section 6, Rule 110200 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a
complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypotheticallv admitted,
constitute the elements of the offense."201 In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints stated that: (a)
Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are the ones responsible for the PDAF scam; (b)
Janet Napoles, et al. are being accused of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; (c) they used
a certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of which were stated therein; (d) because of
the PDAF scam, the Philippine government was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount of
P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened sometime between the years 2004 and 2010,
specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and Pasay City.202The aforesaid allegations were
essentially reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations - one (1) for Plunder203 and fifteen (15) for violation
of RA 3019204 - filed before the Sandiganbayan. Evidently, these factual assertions already square with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-cited. Upon such
averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet Napoles has been completely informed of the accusations
against her to enable her to prepare for an intelligent defense.205The NBI and the FIO Complaints are,
therefore, sufficient in form and in substance.

In view of the foregoing, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to
indict Janet Napoles of the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings and De Asis, it must be first
highlighted that they are placed in the same situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged with
crime/s principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or multiple violations of
Section 3 [e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as private individuals on account of their alleged
conspiracy with public officers, Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that "[w]hen
there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all."206 Thus, the reasonable likelihood that conspiracy
exists between them denotes the probable existence of the elements of the crimes above-discussed
equally as to them.

"Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests."207

With respect to the Napoles siblings, it must be clarified that while it appears from the evidence on record
that: (a) they did not serve as officers or incorporators of the JLN-controlled NGOs designated as "project
partners" in the implementation of Senator Enrile's PDAF projects;208 (b) their names did not appear in
the table of signatories to the MOAs;209 and (c) they did not acknowledge receipt of the checks issued by
the I As in payment of Senator Enrile's "ghost" PDAF-funded projects, they were nonetheless involved in
various phases of the PDAF scam. Their respective participations, from which a unity of purpose and
design with the acts of their mother, Janet Napoles, resonates, were uncovered in the sworn
statement210 of whistleblower Luy, as will be shown hereunder.

For its proper context, it should be first pointed out that Luy specifically mentioned that Janet Napoles
transacted with Senator Enrile regarding his PDAF, among other legislators:
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50. T: Nabanggit mo na may mga pulitiko na madalas nakikipag-transact kayJANET LIM
NAPOLES, maaari mo bang sabihin kung sinu-sino ang mga pulitiko na nagpapagamit sa mga
PDAF nila?
S: Opo. Sa mga Senador po ang madalas pong makuha ni Madame Janet na PDAF nila ay sina
Senador JINGGOY ESTRADA, Senador JUAN PONCE ENRILE, at si Senador BONG
REVILLA. Sa Congressman naman ay sina, Congresswoman RIZALINA LANETE ng 3rd District ng
Benguet, Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA ng lone District ng Agusan Del Sur, Congressman
CONSTANTINO JARAULA ng lone District ng Cagayan De Oro, at siCongressman EDGAR
VALDEZ ng APEC Party List. Meron pa rin mga iba pero nasa records ko po iyon. Itong mga
nabanggit ko po ay familiar na sa akin kasi regular silang nakaka-transact ng JLN
Corporation.211 (Emphasis supplied)
He then explained that the share of the involved legislators in the PDAF were termed as "rebates," and
their disbursement from JLN Corporation were reflected in "vouchers," which were, after his initial
preparation, checked by, among others, Jo Christine Napoles:
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51. T: Papaano mo naman nalaman na madalas na nagagamit o nakukuha niJANET LIM
NAPOLES ang PDAF ng mga nabanggit mong pulitiko?
S: Kasi po bukod sa nakikita ko sila sa opisina ng JLN Corporation o sa mga parties ni Madame
JANET LIM NAPOLES o madalas na kausap sa telepono, ay sila rin lagi ang nasa records ko na
pinagbibigyan ng pera ni MadamJANET LIM NAPOLES. Gaya po ng sinabi ko, ako po
ang inuutusan ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na gumawa ng mga dokumento at maghanda
ng pera para sa rebates ng mga Senador o Congressman na mga ito. MayVOUCHER po kasi ang
mga pera na lumalabas sa JLN Corporation. Doon savoucher ay nakalagay ang pangalan ng
taong pagbibigyan gaya ng Senador, o Chief-of-Staff nila, o Congressman, o sinumang public
official na kumukuha ng REBATES sa mga government projects na ipinatutupad
ngNGOs o foundations ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES.

52. T: Sino naman ang gumagawa ng sinasabi mong voucher?

S: Ako po.

53. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung papaano itong paghahanda mo ng voucher at ang proseso nito?
S: Noong ako ay nasa JLN Corporation pa, ang una po ay sasabihan ako niMadame JANET LIM
NAPOLES na may pupuntang tao sa opisina ng JLN Corporation na kukuha nang pera.
Maghahanda ako ng VOUCHER kung saan naka-indicate ang pangalan ng politiko, iyong petsa,
iyong control number ng voucher at iyong amount na ibibigay. Pipirmahan ko ito at ipapa-
check ko ito sa anak ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na si JO CHRISTINE o di kaya ay
kay REYNALD "JOJO" LIM. Kapag nasuri na nila na tama [ang] ginawa ko ay pipirmahan na nila
ito at ibibigay kayMadame JANET LIM NAPOLES at siya ang rcag-a-approve nito. Babalik sa akin
ang voucher para maihanda ko iyong pera. Kukuha ako ng pera sa vault na nasa opisina ng JLN
Corporation. Kapag nandoon si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES sa opisina ay siya mismo ang
nag-aabot ngpera sa tao. Kung wala naman siya kami na ang nag-aabot ng pera. Bago pa man
iabot ang pera ay bibilangin pa muna sa harap noong taong tatanggap ng pera at
papapirmahin siya sa voucher para katunayan na natanggap ng ganoon halaga ng
pera.212 (Emhpases supplied)
Luy further revealed that these "vouchers" do not actually contain the names of the legislators to whom
the PDAP shares were disbursed as they were identified by the use of "codenames." These "codenames,"
which were obviously devised to hide the identities of the legislators involved in the scheme, were known
by a select few in the JLN Corporation, among others, the Napoles siblings:
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57. T: Sinabi mo na inilalagay mo sa voucher iyong pangalan ng kung sino man ang kulaiha ng per a,
may mga pagkakataon ba na iyong sinabi sa iyo niJANET LIM NAPOLES na kukuha ng pera ay
iba sa tatanggap?
 S: Meron po. Kunwari po sa mga Senador, sasabihin ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na kinukuha
na ni ganitong Senador ang kanyang kickback pew ang pera ay kukunin ng kanyang Chief-of
Staff o representative niya. Ilalagay ko iyong pangalan o codename ng Senador tapos i-
indicate ko na"care of" tapos iyon pangalan o codename ng kung sinuman ang tumanggap.

58. T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"?

S: Ang pangalan po ng taong tumanggap ngpera ang nilalagay ko sa "voucher" pero minsan po
ay codename ang nilalagay ko.

59. T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"?

S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi daw po ay sa gobyerno
kami nagta-transact.

60. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang mga "codenames" ng mga ka-transact ni JANET
LIM NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang Chief-of-Staff?
S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA" kaySenator Jinggoy Estrada,
"POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla, "GUERERA" kayCongressman Rizalina Seachon-Lanete,
"BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA, "BULAKLAK" kay Congressman SAMUEL
DANGWA, "SUHA" kay Congressman ARTHUR PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kayCongressman
EDGAR VALDEZ. Mayroon pa po ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa ngayonpo ay sila langpo
ang aking naalala.

61. T: Bukod sa iyo, may ibans tao ba na nakakaalam ng mga sinasabi mong codenames?

S: Opo.

62. T: Sinu-sino itong mga nakakaalam ng codenames na nabanggit mo?

S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES, ang anak niyang sina JO CHRISTINE at JAMES
CHRISTOPHER, at mga seniors ko sa JLN Corporation na sinaMERLINA SUÑAS [sic], MARINA
SULA, EVELYN DE LEON, RONALD JOHN LIM at ako.213 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As mentioned by Luy, the Napoles siblings' standing in the JLN Corporation were as follows:
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13. T: Bago ang sinasabi mong iligal na pagkakakulong mo noong December 2012, sinu-sino ang
mga ibans emyleyado ni JANET LIM NAPOLES?
 S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang President/CEO, JAIME G. NAPOLES po
ang Consultant, JO CHRISTINE L. NAPOLES ang Vice-President for Admin and Finance, JAMES
CHRISTOPHER L. NAPOLES Vice-President for Operations, x x x.214

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Subsequently, Luy shed light on the process through which the "rebates" were received by the legislators,
again identifying the Office of Senator Enrile, through Tuason, as one of the recipients:
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66. T: Papaano naman ibinigay ni JANET LIM NAPOLES ang "rebates" ng Senador oCongressman?
S: Sa mga ibang transaction ay pumupunta sa opisina ng JLN Corporation angChief of Staff o
pinagkakatiwalaan na tao ng Congressman o Senador. Ikalawa po, mayroon din po na
pagkakataon na bank transfer na mula saaccount ng foundation o JLN Corporation o JO CHRIS
Trading patungo saaccount ng legislator o pinagkakatiwalang tao ng Congressman o
Senador. Ikatlong sistema po ay si Madame NAPOLES o kaming mga empleyado na po ang
nagdadala ng cash sa mga kausap niya.

67. T: Mayroon bang pagkakataon na ikaw mismo ay nakapagbigay ng pera

na"rebates" ng transaction sa Senador o Congressman o sa kung sino mangrepresentative ng
pulitiko?
S: Opo. Sa mga Chief-of-Staff ng mga Senador at sa mga Congressman mismo ay nakapag-abot
na po ako ng personal. Pero sa mga senador po ay wala pong pagkakataon na ako mismo ang
nag-abot. Naririnig ko lang kayMadame JANET LIM NAPOLES na nagbibigay daw sa mga
Senador.

68. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung sinu-sino itong mga tinutukoy mong Chief-of-Staff ng Senador na
tumanggap ng pera na "rebates" sa transaction kayJANET LIM NAPOLES?

S: Opo, sina Atty. RICHARD CAMBE sa opisina ni Senador BONG REVILLA, Ms. PAULINE
LABAYEN, sa opisina ni Senador JINGGOY ESTRADA, Ms. RUBY TUASON sa opisina nina
Senador JUAN PONCE ENRILE at SenadorJINGGOY ESTRADA.

69. T: Sinu-sino naman sa mga Congressman ang pinagbigyan mo ng pera

na"rebates" ng transaction nila ni JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Sina Congressman EDGAR VALDEZ, Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA, Congressman
CONSTANTINO JARAULA po. Nakapag-abot din po ako kay Mr. JOSE SUMALPONG na Chief of
Staff ni Congresswoman RIZALINA LANETE.215 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When asked if Luy was the only one involved in the disbursement of "rebates," he clarified that the
children of Janet Napoles, among others, were also into the act:
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70. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung bakit ikaw ang nag-abot ng pera
na "rebates" sa transaction ni JANET LIM NAPOLES sa mga pinangalanan mong Chief-of-
Staff o representative ng Senador at mga Congressman?
S: Ganoon naman ang kalakaran sa opisina kung wala si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES. Kapag
may pumupuntang tao sa opisina para kumuha ng pera ay sinasabihan na kami ni Madame
JANET LIM NAPOLES para maghanda ng pera at kami na mismo ang nag-aabot ngpera.
Binibilang namin ito sa harap ng tatanggap bago namin iabot at pinapapirma namin sila para
ipakila kayMadame JANET LIM NAPOLES kapag pinag-report niya kami.

71. T: Sinasabi mo na "kami", ibig mo bang sabihin ay bukod sa iyo ay mayroon pang iba na nakapag-
abot ng pera sa mga pinangalanan mong tumanggap ng pera
na "rebates" sa transaction ni JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Opo, iyong mga ibang seniors ko sa opisina na trusted na tauhan ni Madame JANET LIM
NAPOLES na sina MERLINA SUÑAS [sic], EVELYN DE LEON, at JOHN LIM. Pati iyong
mga ANAK at kapatid ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES ay nag-aabot din ng personal sa mga
kumukuha ng pera sa opisina ng JLN Corporation.216 (Emphases supplied)
Meanwhile, Suñas testified that the Napoles siblings were previously involved in the forging of documents
and signatures which were, however, related, to illegal disbursements involving funds allotted to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). She also stated that the Napoles siblings were employees of the
JLN Corporation who always held office thereat, and, similar to Luy, knew their positions in the office:
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91. T: Maaalala mo pa ba kung sinu-sino ang mga kasama mo sa sinabi mong pagpupulong kung
saan nabanggit ni Madame JENNY na may nakuha siyang pondo mula sa DAR?
S: Opo, andun po iyong mga empleyado ng JLN Corporation na sinaBENHUR LUY, EVELYN DE
LEON, LAARNI UY, ARTHUR LUY, JR., JOHN LIM, MARINA SULA at mga anak ni Madam JENNY
LIM na sina JO CHRISTINE a.k.a "NENENG" at JAMES CHRISTOPHER a.k.a "BUTSOY." Tapos
noong bandang October 2009 ay pinulong ulit kami ni Madame JENNY at dito niya sinabi na
ang pondo ay nagkakahalaga ng Php 900 million mula sa DAR.217

xx
xx

111. T: Nabanggit mo na kasama ang mga anak ni Madame JENNY na sinaJO CHRISTINE at JAMES
CHRISTOPHER sa paggawa ng mga pekeng dokumento at pamemeke ng mga pirma, sila
ba ay nasa opisina ng JLN Corporation lagi?
 S: Opo. Dahil empleyado din sila at doon nag-oopisina sa JLN Corporation.

xx
xx

149. T: Bilang dating empleyado ng JLN Corporation mula taong 2000 hanggang2013, natatandaan
mo pa ba kung sino-sino ang mga nakatrabaho mo sa JLN Corporation?
S: Opo. Sila ay [sina] JANET LIM NAPOLES na president and CEO, asawa niyang si JAIME G.
NAPOLES bilang consultant, mga anak niyang sinaJO-CHRISTINE L. NAPOLES ang VP for
admin and finance at JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES na VP for operations x x
x.218 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Notably, the JLN Corporation, as per whistleblower Sula's account, had no income from business
transactions aside from the PDAF coming from the legislators involved that go through Janet Napoles's
conduit NGOs:
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12) T: Nabanggit mo sa iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013 na ikaw ay
nagtrabaho kay JANET LIM NAPOLES mula pa noong taong1997, ano ba ang uri ng negosyo
ng JLN Corporation?
S: Ayon po sa SEC paper ng JLN Corporation ay trading ng mga marine supplies and
equipment at construction materials ang line of business subalit sa papel lamang po iyon
dahil pakikipag-transact po sa mgalawmakers, government agency heads at LGU
officials para saimplementation ng mga government funded projects ang naging
negosyo ng JLN Corporation gamit ang mga NGOs o foundations na itinatag ni Madam
JANET NAPOLES.

13) T: Paano naman kumikita ang JLN Corporation sa mga PDAF ng lawmakers?

S: Sa katotohanan po ay hindi naman po kumikita ang JLN Corporation dahil wala naman po
hong anumang business transactions. Ang mga pondo po na nagmumula sa PDAF ng mga
lawmakers ay pumapasok sa mga NGOs niMadam JANET NAPOLES. Mula po sa mga bank
accounts ng NGOs ay winiwidraw po ang pera at inire-remit po kay Madam JANET
NAPOLES. Kay Madam JANET NAPOLES po napupunta ang pera at hindi sa JLN Corporation.

14) T: Sa paragraph No. 21 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013 ay may
mga listahan ng miyembro ng pamilya NAPOLES at mga tao na may kaugnayan sa kanyang
mga negosyo, makikita dito na coded at mga alyas lamang ang ID names, maari mo bang
ibigay ang mga kumpletong pangalan nila?
 S: Opo, ang mga katumbas po ng mga codes/alyas na nakasaad sa akingnotebook ay ang mga
sumusunod:
xx
xx

3) N1 JO CHRISTINE L. NAPOLES
4) N2 JAMES CHRISTOPHER L. NAPOLES

x x x x219 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it may be gathered that the Napoles siblings: (a) worked at the JLN Corporation,
which was apparently shown to be at the forefront of the PDAF scam, as it was even revealed that it
received no other income outside of the PDAF transactions; (b) do not work as mere regular employees
but as high-ranking officers, being the Vice-President for Administration and Finance and Vice-President
for Operations, respectively of JLN Corporation; and (c) as high-ranking officers of the JLN Corporation,
were ostensibly privy to and/or participated in the planning and execution of the company's endeavors,
which, as claimed, include illegal activities concerning the misappropriation of various government funds,
which, as specifically pointed out by Luy, included, among others, Senator Enrile's PDAF. To recount, Luy
stated that Jo Christine Napoles, as part of the scheme, checked the "vouchers" he had prepared; that the
Napoles siblings knew of the "codenames" of the legislators in the illicit "vouchers"; and that they were
also included in the actual disbursement of "rebates" to the legislators, among others. Senator Enrile.
More so, although Suñas's testimony that the Napoles siblings forged documents and signatures
pertaining to the disbursement of the DAR funds which does not directly prove that they had committed
the same with respect to Senator Enrile's PDAF, such evidence, when juxtaposed with Luy's testimony,
gains relevance in ascertaining the illegal plan, system or scheme to which they were alleged to be
involved. It also tends to directly prove the fact that they had knowledge of JLN Corporation's illegal
activities.220 The Court notes that these accounts gain more credibility not only in view of the
whistleblowers' allegations that they worked closely with the Napoles siblings in JLN Corporation for a
considerable length of time.221 but also that Sula, Suñas, and particularly Luy as "lead employee," were
among the most trusted workers of Janet Napoles in the furtherance of the PDAF scam.222 Also, there
appears to be no motive for any of these whistleblowers, particularly, Luy, to incredulously implicate the
Napoles siblings in this case. With all these factors together, there is, at least, some substantial basis to
conclude, that the Napoles siblings were, in all reasonable likelihood, involved in the entire con.

Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their invocation
of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission
is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule.223 To be sure, the foregoing rule
constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay
evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the
preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."224 This is because
"such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties."225 Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for
crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings
under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical
rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation,"226 as in this case.

Therefore, on account of the above-mentioned acts which seemingly evince the Napoles siblings'
participation in the conspiracy involving Senator Enrile's PDAF, no grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed against the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against them for fifteen (15) counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.

In the same vein, the evidence on record exhibits probable cause for De Asis's involvement as a co-
conspirator for the crime of Plunder, as well as violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. A perusal thereof
readily reveals that De Asis is the President227 of KPMFI and a member/incorporator228 of CARED - two (2)
among the many JLN-controlled NGOs that were used in the perpetuation of the scam particularly
involved in the illegal disbursement of Senator Enrile's PDAF.229 Moreover, in the Pinagsamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay230 of whistleblowers Luy and Suñas, as well as their respective Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay231 they tagged De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the
lawmaker;232 that he, among others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the
same in the bank;233 and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, De Asis was also one of those
tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles's house.234 With these, the Court finds that there are equally
well-grounded bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation as President of KPMFI
and member/incorporator of CARED, as well as his acts of receiving checks in the name of said NGOs,
depositing them in the NGOs' bank accounts, delivering money to Janet Napoles, and assisting in the
delivery of "kickbacks" and "commissions" of the legislators, conspired with the other petitioners to
commit the crimes charged against them.

Certainly, De Asis's defenses, which are anchored on the want of criminal intent, as well as the absence
of all the elements of the crime of Plunder on his part, are better ventilated during trial and not during
preliminary investigation. At the risk of belaboring the point, a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of
the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.235

Hence, for De Asis's apparent participation in the PDAF scam, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding probable cause against him for one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.

In totality, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, and G.R. Nos. 213475-
76 questioning the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman
finding probable cause against Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis should all be
dismissed for lack of merit.
II. Petitions Assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

In G.R. Nos. 213163-78, Reyes ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan for
allegedly failing to perform its duty of personally evaluating the evidence on record and, instead, merely
adopting the findings of the Ombudsman in the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014.236 She argues that,
had the Sandiganbayan conducted a judicious and independent evaluation of the evidence on record, it
would have determined that there is no probable cause against her for plunder and violations of Section
3 (e) of RA3019.237

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 215880-94, the Napoles siblings impute grave abuse of discretion against
the Sandiganbayan in issuing its Resolutions dated September 29, 2014238 and November 14,
2014239 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.240 They claim that the
challenged Resolutions which were concluded without any additional evidence presented by the OSP
were hastily issued and decided; that the documents submitted by the prosecution, which were used as
bases in resolving the challenged Resolutions, were mere bare allegations of witnesses that did not relate
to the crime charged and most of them even made no mention of them; that the NBI Complaint submitted
by the prosecution creates serious doubt on their participation; that not even one of the essential
elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is present in the case in so far as they are concerned; and that there
is no proof to show that they conspired with any of the accused public officers.241

Their arguments fail to persuade.

Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case
to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to
determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. The Court,
in People v. Castillo,242 delineated the functions and purposes of a determination of probable cause made
by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and the trial court, on the other:
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There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.243 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As above-articulated, the executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there
is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.244

This notwithstanding, the Court in Mendoza v. People245 (Mendoza) clarified that the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it,
namely to: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.246 The Court went on to elaborate that
"the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory" and reiterated that
"the court's first option x x x is for it to 'immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause.'"247

Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion
of the accused, is entitled to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether
there is probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in the absence
thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case.248 This is in line with the fundamental
doctrine that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to
its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court."249 Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of
this nature:
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Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before
it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable
cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she
must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be
served.250ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A careful study of the records yields the conclusion that the requirement to personally evaluate the report
of the Ombudsman, and its supporting documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it
explicitly declared in its Resolution251 dated July 3, 2014 that it had "personally [read] and [evaluated] the
Information, the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the
[Ombudsman], together with the above-enumerated documents, including their annexes and
attachments, which are all part of the records of the preliminary investigation x x x."252 A similar
pronouncement was made by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution253 dated September 29, 2014, wherein
it was said that "[a]fter further considering the records of these cases and due deliberations, the Court
finds the existence of probable cause against the said accused x x x."254 Later on, in a Resolution255 dated
November 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier findings when it held that the presence of
probable cause against all the accused "was already unequivocally settled x x x in its [Resolution] dated
July 3, 2014 x x x."256 Besides, the Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the presumption of regularity
in the performance of its official duties.257 This presumption was not convincingly overcome by either
Reyes or the Napoles siblings through clear and convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail.258 As such,
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes and the Napoles siblings was
judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and
issued warrants of arrest against them.259

Also, the Court cannot lend any credence to Reyes's protestations of haste on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed Resolutions, absent any clear showing that the presumed regularity
of the proceedings has been breached. Reyes would do well to be reminded of the Court's ruling in Leviste
v. Alameda260 wherein it was instructed that "[s]peed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one's
prompt dispatch may be another's undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the
paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each
case."261

Finally, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying Reyes's
motion to suspend proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorariquestioning the
Ombudsman's issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94. Under Section 7, Rule 65262 of the
Rules of Court, a mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari in relation to a case pending before
the court a quo does not ipso facto stay the proceedings therein, unless the higher court issues a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the conduct of such proceedings.
Otherwise stated, a petition for certiorari does not divest the lower courts of jurisdiction validly acquired
over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an original action; it is not
a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction,
including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 7 of
Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule
65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an
injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the
existence of an, urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented. 263 In
this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94, then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the
proceedings before it.

Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially determining the
existence of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes's Urgent Motion
to Suspend Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R. Nos. 215880-94 is in
order.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions and
Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 183529

OFELIA C. CAUNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated April 29, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28068, finding
Ofelia Caunan (Caunan) guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." The case involves the government's purchase and payment
of equipment not delivered; a transaction dubbed as "ghost delivery."
Facts of the Case
On August 15, 2000, Dra. Magnolia Punzalan (Punzalan), as the then Chairman of Barangay Marcelo Green,
requested for the purchase of Compost Garbage and Recycling Equipment (compost equipment) from the
City Government of Parañaque (City Government), intended to be used in their barangay. However, her
request was not acted upon even after she finished her term in 2002. On July 20, 2002, Dante Pacheco
(Pacheco) succeeded Punzalan and assumed his post as the Chairman of Barangay Marcelo Green. Like
his predecessor Punzalan, Pacheco requested for the purchase of compost equipment for their barangay.2
In September 2002, the Office of the City Auditor of Parañaque (Office of the City Auditor) conducted an
investigation on the City Government’s reported purchase of 14 sets of compost equipment worth
₱6,287,500.00 in the year 2000. As part of the investigation, state auditors sent letters of inquiry3 to
barangay captains to confirm the
delivery of compost equipment to their respective barangays in the year 2000.4
Punzalan was alerted of the ongoing investigation when Pacheco furnished her with a copy of his reply5 to
the state auditor. In the letter, Pacheco stated that Punzalan did not turn over to him any compost
equipment she received during her tenure. Punzalan also received a similar letter of inquiry from the
Office of the City Auditor.6 In a letter7dated October 21, 2002, Punzalan repudiated that she received the
delivery of compost equipment in Barangay Marcelo Green; she likewise disclaimed the signature
purporting to be hers on the documents attached to the letter of inquiry.
The foregoing events led Punzalan to visit the Office of the City Auditor where she discovered the
existence of documents relative to the purchase and delivery of compost equipment to Barangay Marcelo
Green during her term of office.8 The following documents were uncovered: (1) Purchase Order (P.O.) No.
0005031 was issued naming Julia Enterprises and General Merchandise (Julia Enterprises) as the
supplier/dealer; (2) Disbursement Voucher No. 101-00-12-8580, for a total amount of ₱900,000.00 for the
delivery of compost equipment, with Julia Enterprises indicated as the claimant; (3) Check No. 123787
dated December 12, 2000, with Julia Enterprises as the payee, for the amount of ₱861,600.00; and (4)
Memorandum Receipt, allegedly signed by Punzalan and Caunan on December 13, 2000.9
Incidentally, Pacheco’s purchase request was granted. In 2003, one set of compost equipment was
delivered by another supplier, Lacto South Metro Enterprises (Lacto South) to Barangay Marcelo Green
under P.O. No. 001100,10which was received by Pacheco.11
Meanwhile, the Office of the City Auditor continued with the investigation. In a Memorandum 12 dated
November 5, 2002, State Auditor Arturo F. Garcia disclosed that 10 sets of compost equipment worth
₱4,493,750.00 were purchased and paid in full by the City Government in 2000 and 2001 for different
barangays, but were not delivered by the suppliers. One of the barangays that did not receive such
compost equipment is Barangay Marcelo Green.13
To clear her name,14 Punzalan lodged a complaint before the Ombudsman. After preliminary
investigation, an Information15 was filed before the Sandiganbayan against the following: Silvestre De
Leon (De Leon), City Treasurer; Antonio Abad III (Abad), City Administrator; Caunan, the Officer-in Charge
of the General Services Offices; and Ricardo Adriano (Adriano), the proprietor of Julia Enterprises for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information reads:
That on or before 12 December 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Parañaque,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused [De Leon], a public official being then the City
Treasurer of Parañaque City, [Abad], likewise a public officer, being then the City Administrator, and
[Caunan], a public official, being the OIC, General Services Offices, all from the [City Government], while
in the performance of their duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring and
confederating with a private individual [Adriano], Proprietor of [Julia Enterprises], with evident bad faith
or manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause damage or undue injury
to the government in the amount of Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00) by causing it to appear
that a [compost equipment] was delivered by [Julia Enterprises] to a certain [Punzalan], then Barangay
Chairman, Barangay Marcelo Green, Parañaque City, when in truth and in fact no such delivery was made,
and thereafter, did then and there cause the payment thereof in the amount of Nine Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P900,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
On April 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision finding Caunan guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 while her co-accused Abad was exonerated of the charge against him, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, accused [Caunan] is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated [R.A. No.]
3019, Section 3 (e) and is sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 6 years [and] 1 month to 10 years.
She also has to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office. Accused [Caunan] is
directed to reimburse the City of Parañaque the amount of eight hundred sixty[-]one thousand six
hundred [pesos] (P861,600.00) representing the cost of the undelivered compost equipment.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused [Abad], beyond reasonable doubt, he is
ACQUITTED.
Costs against accused [Caunan].
SO ORDERED.17
Accused De Leon was freed from criminal liability in view of his death during the pendency of the case,
whereas Adriano was at large.18
During trial, the defense primarily argued that an ocular inspection would prove that the compost
equipment was actually delivered to Barangay Marcelo Green. Yet, the Sandiganbayan found that the
existing compost equipment in Barangay Marcelo Green was not delivered by Julia Enterprises, but by
Lacto South under another fully paid transaction.19 The Sandiganbayan took note of the uncontested fact
that the City Government entered into two separate transactions for the purchase of compost equipment
for Barangay Marcelo Green. The first transaction was initiated by Punzalan’s request on August 15, 2000
while the second transaction was a result of Pacheco’s request on September 5, 2002. It is the non-
delivery under the first transaction which is the subject of the case.20
Caunan moved to reconsider the decision but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution21 dated
July 11, 2008.
Thus, Caunan filed a petition for certiorari22 assailing the decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
The issue primarily raised in the petition is whether Caunan’s conviction for the crime of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was proper.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
At the outset, it is emphasized that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only
questions of law. "It is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive
upon the Supreme Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; [and] (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
None of the above exceptions obtains in this case."23
The charge against Caunan is violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. x x x.
xxxx
To be found guilty under the said provision, the following elements must concur:
1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.24
First, it is undisputed that Caunan is a public officer, as she is the Officer in Charge of the Department of
General Services of the City Government.25 Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the general
services officer performs all functions pertaining to supply and property management in the local
government unit concerned.26 The duties and functions of a general services officer were further
expounded by the Sandiganbayan:
The functions of accused Caunan as the General Services Officer of the City of Parañaque are:
1) As the General Services Officer of the City of Parañaque, she is mandated under the Local Government
Code to "(t)ake custody of and be accountable for all properties, real or personal, owned by the local
government unit".
2) As the General Services Officer, her purchasing function is specified under the Rules and Regulations
On Supply and Property Management, Section 29 [of] which provides that:
In every province and city, the office of the general services officer shall exercise the function of acquiring
for the province or city all its supply or property requirements. The municipal treasurer and barangay
treasurer shall exercise said function for the municipal and barangay government, respectively.
For the transaction/purchase in this case, it was accused Caunan as the General Services Officer who acted
as the purchasing officer for the City of Parañaque.
3) On the point bearing on the delivery and inspection of purchased items, Section 114 of the Rules and
Regulations on Supply and Property Management specifically provides that "(a)ll items to be
inspected shall be accepted first by the general services officer, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the
case may be." x x x Thus, the equipment (supposedly delivered) to be inspected should have first been
accepted by her, as the purchasing officer.27 (Citations omitted and emphasis and italics in the original)
Second, on the element of bad faith and manifest partiality, Caunan made it appear that the compost
equipment subject of P.O. No. 0005031 was in the official custody of the government by signing the
disbursement voucher and issuing a memorandum receipt for compost equipment which was not in fact
delivered.28
The Court explained that "‘partiality’ is synonymous with ‘bias’ which ‘excites a disposition to see and
report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.’ ‘Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.’"29
Caunan’s bad faith was made even more evident in the irregularities committed in the delivery and
acceptance of the compost equipment.1âwphi1 Caunan claimed that her office merely prepared the
Memorandum Receipt based on the documents indicating that the compost equipment was received by
Punzalan in Barangay Marcelo Green.30 These documents were supposedly brought to her office by a
courier from the barangay.31 However, the details surrounding the delivery are not as straightforward;
upon further questioning, Caunan revealed that the compost equipment was initially delivered in the
premises of the city hall because of the lack of space to hold the equipment in Barangay Marcelo Green.
It was the inspector from the Office of the City Treasurer who accepted and inspected the delivery in the
city hall, after which Caunan issued the Memorandum Receipt.32 According to Caunan, the compost
equipment was deposited later on with the manufacturer because of the confined space in the city hall.33
In Caunan’s version of the events, there was no account on how the delivery eventually reached Barangay
Marcelo Green after the compost equipment was allegedly "returned" to the manufacturer. She claimed
that she cannot remember when the compost equipment was actually delivered in Barangay Marcelo
Green34 but she sent members of her staff to check on the equipment.35 Notably, none of these staff
members were presented to testify for the defense; there was no record as regards these staff members
who could vouch for the inspection of the delivery in Barangay Marcelo Green under P.O. No. 0005031.
In fact, Caunan declared that she personally inspected the compost equipment in Barangay Marcelo Green
only in 2006.36 This was long after the supplier was paid in the year 2000.
On the last element, Caunan raised in her petition that P.O. No. 0005031 was duly served and that no
damage or prejudice was caused to the government; that Pacheco certified that two sets of compost
equipment are currently operating in Barangay Marcelo Green; and that the delivery was not made by
Julia Enterprises itself as the supplier, but by Lacto South as the manufacturer of the equipment. These
circumstances would indicate that there was full performance of the obligation to deliver under P.O. No.
0005031.37
But the delivery made by Lacto South is not an issue in this case as that delivery referred to a different
transaction, duly paid and supported by another set of documents.38 In his testimony, Pacheco clarified
that his certification, affirming that two sets of compost equipment are operating in Barangay Marcelo
Green, was issued sometime in 2004.39 This was after the compost equipment under P.O. No. 001100
from Lacto South was delivered, while the second set of compost equipment was subsequently adopted
from Barangay Baclaran.40 This was also verified by a Technical Audit Specialist from the Commission on
Audit in an Inspection Report41 when another ocular inspection was conducted in 2006. It was found that
"there was a delivery of two (2) sets of [compost equipment] but not under the subject [P.O.] No. 0005031
and not supplied by [Julia Enterprises]."42 Furthermore, a perusal of the testimony43of Ronaldo Samala,
managing partner of Lacto South, would show that he never claimed that Lacto South delivered any
compost equipment under P.O. No. 0005031 on behalf of Julia Enterprises.
Thus, no delivery under P.O. No. 0005031 was made, resulting to a loss of P861,600.00 on the part of the
government for which Caunan must be held liable. As the general services officer concerned, she
participated in the issuance of documents which facilitated the payment of undelivered compost
equipment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2008 and Resolution dated July 11,
2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28068 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193176, February 24, 2016

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL M. REINOSO, GENEROSO TANSECO, MANUEL MORALES, RUBEN B.
ANCHETA, GERONIMO Z. VELASCO, TROADIO T. QUIAZON, JR., FERNANDO MARAMAG, EDGARDO
TORDESILLAS, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., GERARDO SICAT, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, POTENCIANO ILUSORIO,
MANUEL B. SYQUIO, RAFAEL M. ATAYDE, HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., GEORGE T. SCHOLEY,1 TIRSO
ANTIPORDA, JR., CARLOS L. INDUCTIVO, AND TEODORO VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari2 are the Resolution3 dated July 28, 2006 and Order4 dated June 9,
2010 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-05-0110-C, which dismissed
the complaint for violation of Sections 3 (e)5 and (g)6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, also known as the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," for failure to establish probable cause against respondents.
The Facts

On October 8, 1992, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 7 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to investigate
alleged behest loans granted by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), among others, during the Marcos
years.8 The Committee was composed of the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) as Chairman, the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman, and representatives from the
Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice (DOJ), the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), PNB, the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation, and the Government Corporate Counsel, as members.9

Subsequently, through the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 61,10 the Committee's functions were
broadened in scope. To aid in its investigation of behest loans, the following criteria were established as
a frame of reference:
a. It is undercollateralized.
b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized.
c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes.
d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies.
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended.
f. Use of corporate layering.
g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought.
h. Extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release was made.11
Assisted by a Technical Working Group (TWG),12 the Committee investigated the loans granted by PNB to
Hercules Minerals and Oils, Inc. (HMOI), a domestic corporation engaged in mining copper ores to produce
copper concentrates. It was incorporated on May 9, 1969 with an initial authorized capital stock of
P20,000,000.00, of which P4,000,000.00 was subscribed and P1,000,000.00 was paid-up. On November
17, 1978, it increased its authorized capital stock to P50,000,000.00, and then to P200,000,000.00 on May
15, 1981.13

The Committee's investigation revealed that on June 27, 1978, the HMOI, through its Chairman of the
Board, respondent Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), filed with the PNB an application for a guarantee loan in
the amount of US$17,000,000.00 (US$17M), which the latter approved via PNB Resolution No. 548 dated
July 16, 1979 where it stated that the proceeds of the loan will finance HMOI in developing, extracting,
and milling its copper reserves in Ilocos Norte, dubbed as "The Bully Bueno Copper Project." Thus, HMOI
and PNB executed a Loan Agreement on February 1, 1980 for the US$17M loan, then equivalent to
P125,290,000.00.14

The US$17M loan was purportedly secured by several collaterals amounting to PI38,783,000.00, which
exceeded the maximum amount of loan in proportion to the value of the mortgaged assets fixed by
Section 78 of RA 337,15 otherwise known as the "General Banking Act,"16 which provides:
SEC. 78. Loans against real estate security shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the appraised value
of the respective real estate security, plus seventy percent (70%) of the appraised value of insured
improvements, and such loans shall not be made unless title to the real estate, free from all
encumbrances, shall be in the mortgagor. x x x.

Similarly, loans on the security of chattels shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the appraised value of
the security, and such loans shall not be made unless title to the chattels, free from all encumbrances,
shall be in the mortgagor.

xxxx
However, the collaterals were apparently over-valued, as the true amount thereof, i.e., P94,656,000.00,
was discovered when HMOI subsequently applied for additional loans, which PNB likewise,
approved.17Moreover, the assets used as collateral were inexistent, as these were yet "to be acquired,"
"to be constructed," and "to be produced," in violation of the said Section 78 of RA 337.18

Thereafter, PNB extended additional loans to'HMOI, amounting to US$2,500,000.00 and P11,325,000,00.
However, the Central Bank reduced the US$2,500,000.00 loan to US$1,970,000.00. At this time, the Total
PNB Exposure was already P149,000,000.00 but the total value of the collateral was only P94,656,000.00.
Moreover, the additional loans were secured by the same collaterals used in the initial US$17M loan,
whose value was now ascertained to be only P94,656,000.00 instead of P138,783,000.00. Apparently, the
value of the collaterals was exaggerated when HMOI applied for the US$17M loan.19

Subsequently, in a letter20 dated March 10, 1981, respondent Rafael M. Atayde (Atayde), in his capacity
as President of Hercules' Solid State Systems (HSSS), a new division of HMOI, wrote to then. President
Ferdinand Marcos (President Marcos) to seek the latter's intervention in the approval of HMOI's additional
US$5,000,000.00 loan with PNB. President Marcos then endorsed21 the letter to then PNB President,
respondent Panfilo Domingo (Domingo), by personally noting thereon, "Let us help Ilocos Norte by setting
up this factory." As a result of the President's endorsement, HMOI was able to obtain an additional
unsecured loan of P4,400,000.00. Likewise, PNB granted a P20,000,000.00 Export Advance against the
US$3,800,000,00 letter of credit that was opened in favor of HMOI by Dai-ichi Kangyo Finance (HK) Ltd.
Subsequently, PNB approved the refinancing of interest on HMOI loans in the aggregate amount of
US$4,200,284.41 and the conversion of the P20,000,000.00 Export Advance to an Export Advance Line
against existing collaterals. At this time, the Total PNB Exposure was P167,770,000.00 but the total value
of collaterals was only P119,193,000.00.22

Sometime in 1982, HMOI ceased operations. Consequently, it was unable to meet its overdue and
maturing obligations with PNB. Nonetheless, despite stoppage of its operations, PNB granted another
loan to HMOI amounting to P650,000.00. By this time, the Total PNB Exposure had already ballooned to
P203,610,000.00, while its collateral was only P94,656,000.00.23

Upon PNB's foreclosure of HMOI's chattel and real estate mortgages, a deficiency claim amounting to
P252,388,000.00 was left, as a substantial portion of the loans obtained by HMOI from PNB was utilized
in assets with no collateral value.24

With the foregoing findings, petitioner PCGG, through its Legal Consultant, Atty. Liezel G. Chico (Atty.
Chico), filed on December 15, 2004 an affidavit-complaint25 before the Ombudsman accusing respondents
of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 for their participation in the alleged behest loans extended
by PNB to HMOI.26 At the time of the application and approval of said loans, respondents Domingo, Renato
D. Tayag (Tayag), Ismael M. Reinoso (Reinoso), Generoso Tanseco (Tanseco), Manuel Morales (Morales),
Ruben B. Ancheta (Ancheta), Geronimo Z. Velasco (Velasco), Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. (Quiazon), Fernando
Maramag (Maramag), Edgardo Tordesillas (Tordesillas), Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. (Tanco), and Gerardo Sicat
(Sicat)27 were members of the PNB Board of Directors, while respondents Ilusorio, Atayde, Manuel B.
Syquio (Syquio), Honorio Poblador, Jr. (Poblador), George T. Scholey (Scholey), Tirso Antiporda, Jr.
(Antiporda), and Carlos L. Inductivo (Inductivo) were members of the HMOI Board of
Directors.28 Respondent Teodoro Valencia (Valencia) was likewise impleaded as part of HMOI,29 although
in what capacity, the affidavit-complaint does not clearly state.

PCGG contended that the loans extended by PNB to HMOI were in the nature of behest loans, being
characterized by the following: (a) the loans were undercollateralized; (b) the borrower corporation was
undercapitalized; (c) the stockholders, officers, or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as
cronies; and (d) the extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release was made.30 It asseverated that
because PNB unduly accommodated HMOI, as evidenced by said loans which were grossly
disadvantageous to the government, as well as the public, respondents must be prosecuted under
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.31

Only respondent Domingo submitted his counter-affidavit,32 raising as defenses lack of personality of Atty.
Chico, prescription, and insufficiency of evidence. He claimed that Atty. Chico had no personal knowledge
of the questioned loan transactions between PNB and HMOI and was without any legal authority to
prosecute or initiate the cases falling under RA 3019, as amended.33 He also claimed that the action under
RA 3019 had already prescribed, applying the original 10-year prescriptive period fixed by Section 11
thereof before it was amended on March 16, 1982 to 15 years. He maintained that the reckoning point to
count the prescriptive period was from the time of commission of the act complained of, which should
have been on February 1, 1980, the date of the execution of the first Loan Agreement. Even if the
reckoning point was to be counted from the discovery of the offense, he contended that the date thereof
would have been February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. Thus, the complaint filed on December 15,
2004 was already barred by prescription.34

Likewise, he claimed that the collaterals used in obtaining the loans were valid and acceptable in the
banking industry, and that other properties posted as security were overlooked by the PCGG. He also
maintained that the PCGG made no independent appraisal of the said properties and, thus, had no
credible knowledge on the true value of the collaterals.35 Finally, he denied that he was an identified
"crony" of President Marcos.36
The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Resolution37 dated July 28, 2006, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint.38 On the issue of
prescription, it found that the complaint has not yet prescribed, having been filed within the 15-year
prescriptive period reckoned from the date of the discovery of the commission of the offense, which is
February 1, 1994, the date of the PCGG's Terminal Report from which it ascertained that the loan accounts
of HMOI with PNB were behest.39

With respect, however, to the existence of probable cause to hold respondents liable as charged, the
Ombudsman ruled in the negative. It held that the PCGG's argument that the loans were
undercollateralized was specious, as the Committee did not make any independent valuation of the said
collaterals. Neither did it secure any documentation which could show that HMOI exaggerated the value
thereof. It also had no inventory of the properties acquired for the copper project and from the loan
proceeds to show that HMOI merely used the same assets for the subsequent loans and exaggerated its
value. Moreover, it held that future assets or after-acquired properties are acceptable securities and thus,
not inimical to sound banking practice.40

Likewise, the Ombudsman found that there was nothing on the loan agreements to indicate that HMOI
unduly influenced PNB into granting it loans or that unwarranted favors had been extended to it. Thus,
the presumption that regular duty was observed and exercised stands.41 As regards the marginal note
endorsement by President Marcos that purportedly paved the way for the approval of an additional loan,
the Ombudsman held that there were no indications that the loan rested solely on said endorsement for
its approval.42

Dissatisfied, PCGG moved for reconsideration,43 which was, however, denied in an Order44 dated June 9,
2010; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion when it found no probable cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Sections 3 (e) and
(g) of RA 3019 and consequently, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
determination as to the existence or non-existence of probable cause. The rule, however, does not apply
if there is grave abuse of discretion.45

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.46

After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds that such judicial intervention is justified and
proper in this case.

Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers.47 Its elements are: (1) that
the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private
party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.48

On the other hand, Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits,
advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers, its core element being the
engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.49 The elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.50

Taking into consideration the foregoing elements, the Court finds that there may be liability arising from
violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.

The fact that PNB appeared to be unduly exposing its finances by extending iniquitous loans to HMOI,
despite the latter being undercapitalized and, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the collaterals being
offered to secure the loans, should have been sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to find probable cause.
The HMOI loans appear to bear the badges of a behest loan, as indicated by the following circumstances:
HMOI was undercapitalized, the loans extended to it by PNB were undercollateralized, its officers were
identified as "cronies," President Marcos had a marginal note/endorsement on Atayde's March 10, 1981
letter which facilitated the approval of another loan in favor of HMOI, and the loans were approved with
extraordinary speed.

It bears stressing that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to
establish whether there exists probable cause to file an information in court against the accused. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused
committed the crime.51 Taking into account, the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, the Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

That the PCGG failed to make or submit an independent valuation of the properties in order to support
its stance that the loans were undercollateralized is of no moment. Included in the records of this case is
the Executive Summary52 of the TWO, citing as evidence numerous documents from PNB53 showing, on
its face, that the loans granted to HMOI by PNB were undercollateralized. Hence, the lack of independent
valuation alone is not sufficient to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence to establish mere probable
cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and
merits of a party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during the trial proper.54

It is incumbent upon the Ombudsman, while it asks the Court to respect its findings, to also accord a
proper modicum of respect towards the expertise of the Committee, which was formed precisely to
determine the existence of behest loans.55 On account of their special knowledge and expertise, they are
in a better position to determine whether standard banking practices are followed in the approval of a
loan or what would generally constitute as adequate security for a given loan. Absent a substantial
showing that their findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive and, in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.56

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds probable cause to hold respondents for trial on the offenses
charged, except for Domingo, whose criminal liability is extinguished in accordance with Article 89 (1)57of
the Revised Penal Code on account of his death on June 26, 2008.58 With respect to respondents Tanseco,
Morales,59 and Syquio,60 the facts of their deaths must be confirmed with sufficient evidence before the
same provision may apply to them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to:
1. DISMISS the complaint against deceased respondent Panfilo O. Domingo;
2. REQUIRE the counsels of respondents Generoso Tanseco, Manuel Morales, and Manuel B. Syquio
to submit proofs of their deaths; and
3. FILE with the Sandiganbayan the necessary information against respondents Renato D. Tayag,
Ismael M. Reinoso, Ruben B. Ancheta, Geronimo Z. Velasco, Troadio Quiazon, Jr., Fernando
Maramag, Edgardo Tordesillas, Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., Gerardo Sicat, Potenciano Ilusorio, Rafael M.
Atayde, Honorio Poblador, Jr., George T. Sholey, Tirso Antiporda, Jr., Carlos L. Inductivo, and
Teodoro Valencia.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209387

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated September 28, 2012 and
the Resolution3 dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City.4 The Court of Appeals
affirmed5 the trial court’s Judgment6 finding petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on Elections Resolution No.
77647 in relation to Section 2618 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 8819 during the 2007 election period.10
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel.11 He frequently traveled, "coming back and
forth taking a vessel."12 At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu
Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo.13 While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a
porter.14 It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.15
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
machine for inspection.16 The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.17
Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007.18 She saw the
impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.19 Upon seeing the suspected
firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector
then.20
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag.21 Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative
and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag.22
"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu
Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was called by . . . Igot."23 Igot told Officer Abregana that
there were firearms in a bag owned by a certain person.24 Igot then pointed to the person.25 That person
was later identified as Dela Cruz.26
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag.27 The bag was then inspected and the following items
were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items; and four (4)
live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder.28 When asked whether he had the proper documents for the
firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.29
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. 30 He was also
informed of his constitutional rights.31
In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No.
8294 for illegal possession of firearms:32
Criminal Case No. CBU -80084
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with the deliberate intent and without being
authorized by law, did then and there possess and carry outside his residence one (1) Cal. 38 Simith [sic]
& Wesson revolver without serial number; one (1) .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial
number; one (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial number and four rounds
of live ammunitions for cal. 38 without first securing the necessary license to possess and permit to carry
from the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.33
Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with the violation of Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881:34
Criminal Case No. CBU 80085
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 in the afternoon, which is within the election
period for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there possess
and carry outside his residence the following:
One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number;
One (1) cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial number;
One (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial number and four (4) rounds of live
ammunitions for cal. 38.
CONTRARY TO LAW.35
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.36
After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section
261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU 80085.37 Dela Cruz was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year with disqualification from holding public office and the right to suffrage.38
According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dela Cruz
committed illegal possession of firearms.39 It proved the following elements: "(a) the existence of the
subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or
permit to possess the same."40 The prosecution presented the firearms and live ammunitions found in
Dela Cruz’s possession.41 It also presented three (3) prosecution witnesses who testified that the firearms
were found inside Dela Cruz’s bag.42 The prosecution also presented a Certification that Dela Cruz did not
file any application for license to possess a firearm, and he was not given authority to carry a firearm
outside his residence.43
The trial court also held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus,
valid:44
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of
the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught
in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against [the] accused.45
The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz’s claim that the firearms were "planted" inside his bag
by the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag while he was buying a ticket.46 According to the
trial court, Dela Cruz’s argument was "easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove."47 Dela Cruz also
did not show improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to discredit their testimonies.48
The trial court dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No. 8294.49 It held that "Republic Act No.
8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed ‘no
other crime.’"50Dela Cruz, who had been charged with illegal possession of firearms, was also charged
with violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764.51
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Consolidated Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU-80085, and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, and to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage.
While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of RA 8294 is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the cash
bond posted by accused therein for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and released to said
accused.
The subject firearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the live ammunitions (Exhs. "K to K-2"") shall, however,
remain in custodia legis for proper disposition of the appropriate government agency.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Judgment.53 It held that the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit.54The acts of government authorities were found to be regular.55
The Court of Appeals did not find Dela Cruz’s defense of denial meritorious.56 "Denial as a defense has
been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted." 57 Dela
Cruz did not present any evidence "to show that he had authority to carry outside of residence firearms
and ammunition during the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during] election time."58 The prosecution
was able to prove Dela Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed January 27, 2010
Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case CBU-
59434 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs on accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.59 (Emphasis in the original)
Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,60 which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated August 23, 2013.61
Dela Cruz filed this Petition on November 4, 2013.62 In the Resolution63 dated December 9, 2013, this court
required respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to submit its Comment on the Petition.
Respondent submitted its Comment64 on March 6, 2014, which this court noted in the Resolution65 dated
March 19, 2014.
Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for an inter-island vessel.66 He was "well[-]acquainted
with [the] inspection scheme [at the] ports."67 He would not have risked placing prohibited items such as
unlicensed firearms inside his luggage knowing fully the consequences of such an action.68
According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007, he left his luggage with a porter to
buy a ticket.69 "A considerable time of fifteen minutes went by before he could secure the ticket while his
luggage was left sitting on the floor with only the porter standing beside it."70 He claims that someone
must have placed the unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he was away from it.71 He was
surprised when his attention was called by the x-ray machine operator after the firearms were detected.72
Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless
search:73
In petitioner’s case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the search of his luggage,
he had no actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief
that when his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his luggage. . . . [H]e
believed that no incriminating evidence w[ould] be found. He knew he did not place those items. But
what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a considerable time interval lapsed, creating an
opportunity for someone else to place inside his luggage those incriminating items.74 (Emphasis in the
original)
Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure,
thus warranting his conviction.75 Dela Cruz was "caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers
and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went through the x-ray machine in the Cebu Domestic Port
on May 11, 2007, well within the election period."76 The firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-
ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.77
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted by
airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures.78
Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and
seizure.79 The trial court found that Dela Cruz voluntarily gave his consent to the search.80
Dela Cruz’s claim that his bag was switched is also baseless.81 The witnesses categorically testified that
Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it went through the x-ray machine, and he was also in
possession of the same bag that contained the firearms when he was apprehended."82
Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding [him] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt[.]"83
The issues for resolution in this case are:
First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal firearms within the
meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881;
Second, whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and
Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
We deny the Petition.
I
The present criminal case was brought to this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The penalty
imposed on petitioner by the trial court is material in determining the mode of appeal to this court. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be differentiated from appeals under Rule 124,
Section 1384 involving cases where the lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or, previously, death.85
In Mercado v. People:86
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is
at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty, refrain from
entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court for review. This
will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this Court
and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very
inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its
jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review
of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or
questions of law may be raised.87 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law are reviewed by this court.88 The
rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 is based on sound and
practical policy considerations stemming from the differing natures of a question of law and a question of
fact:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.89
Concomitantly, factual findings of the lower courts as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on this
court.90
In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the whole case open for review[.]"91 The underlying
principle is that errors in an appealed judgment, even if not specifically assigned, may be corrected motu
propio by the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the
case.92 Nevertheless, "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being
merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law[.]"93
II
Petitioner argues that the firearms found in his bag were not his. Thus, he could not be liable for
possessing the contraband. Key to the resolution of this case is whether petitioner possessed firearms
without the necessary authorization from the Commission on Elections. Petitioner was charged under
special laws: Republic Act No. 8294 and Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. During the election period from January 14, 2007 it shall be unlawful for:
a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of residence or place of
business, to bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places including any
building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose firearm includes airgun, while
deadly weapons include hand grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics[.]
Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
....
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although possessing a
permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election
period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft
shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof. (Par. (l), Id.)
This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of their duties
or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually carry
large sums of money or valuables.
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, we will examine three (3) points
of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray
scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the
Port Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and seize the
firearms and ammunition.
III
The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port personnel—
the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine station.94 With regard to
searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state
agents or authorized government authorities.
In People v. Marti,95 the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating
procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and
detected a peculiar odor from the packages.96 The representative from the company found dried
marijuana leaves in the packages.97 He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation and
brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examination.98 Agents from the
National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs.99 Andre Marti was
charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.100
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure.101 The evidence obtained against the
accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized government
agencies.102 The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals:103
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.104
Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons are
not covered by the exclusionary rule.105
To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case was committed by private or public
persons, we revisit the history and organizational structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.
Port security measures are consistent with the country’s aim to develop transportation and trade in
conjunction with national and economic growth. In 1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created for
the reorganization of port administration and operation functions.106 The Philippine Ports Authority’s
Charter was later revised through Presidential Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter provided that the
Authority may:
after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or regulations for the planning,
development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision and management of any Port or Port
District and the services to be provided therein, and for the maintenance of good order therein, and
generally for carrying out the process of this Decree.107
The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through Executive Order No.
513,108 which provides:
Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:
Section 6-c. Police Authority – The Authority shall have such police authority within the ports administered
by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives,
without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement
bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
a) To provide security to cargoes, port equipment, structure, facilities, personnel and documents:
Provided, however, That in ports of entry, physical security to import and export cargoes shall be exercised
jointly with the Bureau of Customs;
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as
movement within the port of watercraft;
c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police authorities;
d) To supervise private security agencies operating within the port area; and
e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law. (Emphasis supplied)
In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to specifically administer all ports located in the Province of
Cebu.109The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-benefit corporation . . . under the supervision of the
Department of Transportation and Communications for purposes of policy coordination."110 Control of
the ports was transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January 1, 1996, when its operations officially
began.111
In 2004, the Office for Transportation Security was designated as the "single authority responsible for the
security of the transportation systems [in] the country[.]"112 Its powers and functions included providing
security measures for all transportation systems in the country:
b. Exercise operational control and supervision over all units of law enforcement agencies and agency
personnel providing security services in the transportation systems, except for motor vehicles in land
transportation, jointly with the heads of the bureaus or agencies to which the units or personnel
organically belong or are assigned;
c. Exercise responsibility for transportation security operations including, but not limited to, security
screening of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring, retention, training and testing of security
screening personnel;
d. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government, formulate,
develop, promulgate and implement comprehensive security plans, policies, measures, strategies and
programs to ably and decisively deal with any threat to the security of transportation systems, and
continually review, assess and upgrade such security plans, policies, measures, strategies and programs,
to improve and enhance transportation security and ensure the adequacy of these security measures;
e. Examine and audit the performance of transportation security personnel, equipment and facilities, and,
thereafter, establish, on a continuing basis, performance standards for such personnel, equipment and
facilities, including for the training of personnel;
f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme which shall prescribe the rules and regulations
for the efficient and safe operation of all transportation systems, including standards for security
screening procedures, prior screening or profiling of individuals for the issuance of security access passes,
and determination of levels of security clearances for personnel of the OTS, the DOTC and its attached
agencies, and other agencies of the government;
g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in accordance with existing laws,
rules, regulations and international conventions;
h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue Transportation Security Regulations/Rules
and amend, rescind or revise such regulations or rules as may be necessary for the security of the
transportation systems of the country[.]113 (Emphasis supplied)
The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by the Office for Transportation Security,
including the National Security Programme for Sea Transport and Maritime Infrastructure.114
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in
this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered
agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine
security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.
In People v. Malngan,115 barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law enforcement
officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution.116 In People v. Lauga,117 this court held that
a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial investigation under Article III, Section
12118 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement
of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"119
Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port
security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in
domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
In People v. Suzuki,120 the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal."121 He
was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag
and a box marked ‘Bongbong’s piaya.’"122 The accused "proceeded to the ‘walk-through metal detector,’
a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or
object."123 "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of
metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying."124 When the accused was asked to
open the content of the box, he answered "open, open."125 Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops
were then found inside the box.126 Suzuki argued that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a
certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the night before.127 He did not know the contents of the
box.128
This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security procedure:129
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted
by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. Hence, when
the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been
caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against appellant.130(Citations omitted)
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-
on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.131 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People.132 This court in Sales upheld the validity of
the search conducted as part of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic Airport—now
Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.133
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for
inspection of passengers’ bags.134 When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in
the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner’s bag. Notably,
petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.
IV
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion—when the baggage inspector
opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port police officer?
We rule in the negative.
The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and
vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of
whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or
inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is
being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers
passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence
of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.135
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel if weighed
against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.
As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an individual’s liberty may be confined within
the harm that the individual may cause others. John Stuart Mill’s "harm principle" provides:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter
him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself,
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.136
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port security
measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm to society caused
by lawless persons.
V
A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy occurred during petitioner’s submission to port
security measures. This court should determine whether the requirements for a valid waiver against
unreasonable searches and seizures were met.
After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect petitioner’s bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.137 A warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable.138 However, this court lays down the exceptions where
warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2)
seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.139
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:140
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.141
Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by the
port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against a
warrantless search.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be
weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show that petitioner presented his bag for scanning in
the x-ray machine.142When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were detected, he
voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities:
Prosecutor Narido:
Q. What did he tell you?
A. I asked him if I can check his bag?
Q. What was his response?
A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag.143
It was after the port personnel’s inspection that Officer Abregana’s attention was called and the bag was
inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.144
"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of witnesses’ credibility by the trial court,
because the latter was in a better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness
stand."145 We do not find anything erroneous as to the findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals.
There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of his personal
effects. As the trial court found:
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of
the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught
in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against [the] accused.146
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui147 and People v. Omaweng148 who permitted
authorities to search their persons and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from
claiming an invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In
addition, petitioner’s consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances.149
This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,150 which involved the
search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint.151 In that case, there was no implied acquiescence to the
search since the checkpoint set up by the police authorities was conducted without proper consultation,
and it left motorists without any choice except to subject themselves to the checkpoint:
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver
of petitioner’s right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines
shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation
of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in
consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution
No. 2323." The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o’clock in the afternoon of 13
January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that news
of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the same have
been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon
carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place
did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. With the authorities in
control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the
PNP’s scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide
probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any,
could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty.152 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
We also cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that there was no valid consent to the search because
his consent was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited items in his bag. The defendant’s
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not automatically negate valid consent to the
search when incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured against the totality of the
circumstances.153 Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port security measures and, as he
claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since he had been traveling back and forth
through the sea port.
Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that the present petition falls under a valid consented
search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner’s bag
is valid.
VI
The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs search.
Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when "persons
exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of
customs laws."154The Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search, as this
court ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al.:155
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.156 (Citation omitted)
The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People,157 in that the state’s policy to combat smuggling must
not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on whether the state has the duty to accord constitutional
protection to dutiable articles on which duty has not been paid, as with a person’s papers and/or
effects.158
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search
was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of
customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the
search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized
under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other
customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the
search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.
VII
In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a firearm . . . outside of his residence
within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority[.]"159
In Abenes v. Court of Appeals,160 this court enumerated the elements for a violation of the Gun Ban: "1)
the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession
occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place."161 This court also ruled
that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a written authority to
possess a firearm is on the accused.162
We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to carry the
firearms outside his residence during the period designated by the Commission on Elections. He was
carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.
However, petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense: (1) that he was a frequent traveler
and was, thus, knowledgeable about the security measures at the terminal; (2) that he left his bag with a
porter for a certain amount of time; and (3) that he voluntarily put his bag on the x-ray machine for
voluntary inspection. All these circumstances were left uncontested by the prosecution.
This court is now asked to determine whether these circumstances are sufficient to raise reasonable doubt
on petitioner’s guilt.
When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the burden of evidence to
prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal
of the presumption of innocence. In People v. Villanueva,163 this court discussed the difference between
burden of proof and burden of evidence, and when the burden of evidence shifts to the accused:
Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the
commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the
person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in
the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the
burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in
the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to
the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to
overthrow, that prima facie case.164 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the intent to
possess the illegal firearms. In People v. De Gracia,165 this court elucidated on the concept of animus
possidendi and the importance of the intent to commit an act prohibited by law as differentiated from
criminal intent.166 The accused was charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting from the coup d’etat staged in 1989
by the Reform Armed Forces Movement - Soldiers of the Filipino People.167 This court held that the actions
of the accused established his intent to possess the illegal firearms:
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in
the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm,
it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.
Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the
accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a
person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of
the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty
of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite
license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the
first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De
Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4.
At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his
act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession
thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was merely employed as
an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not
and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What
exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant
De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from
the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and
conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various
kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former soldier, it
would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A
fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of
explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military
camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal
or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of
this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all,
directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.168 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction between criminal intent and intent to possess, which is
relevant to convictions for illegal possession of firearms, was reiterated in Del Rosario v. People.169 This
court ruled that "[i]n the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal
liability."170
In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal firearms seized from his bag was
"temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession[.]"171 As put by the trial court, petitioner’s claim
that anyone could have planted the firearms in his bag while it was unattended is flimsy.172 There are dire
consequences in accepting this claim at face value, particularly that no one will be caught and convicted
of illegal possession of firearms.
Courts must also weigh the accused’s claim against the totality of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. This includes determination of: (1) the motive of whoever allegedly planted the illegal
firearm(s); (2) whether there was opportunity to plant the illegal firearm(s); and (3) reasonableness of the
situation creating the opportunity.
Petitioner merely claims that someone must have planted the firearms when he left his bag with the
porter. He did not identify who this person could have been and he did not state any motive for this person
to plant the firearms in his possession, even if there was indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms.
However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work, petitioner was a frequent traveler
who is well-versed with port security measures. We cannot accept that an average reasonable person
aware of travel security measures would leave his belongings with a stranger for a relatively long period
of time. Also, records show that petitioner had only one (1) bag. There was no evidence to show that a
robust young man like petitioner would have need of the porter’s services. The defense did not identify
nor present this porter with whom petitioner left his bag.
VIII
The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for violation of Republic Act
No. 8294, otherwise known as illegal possession of firearms. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 provides:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo173 already settled the question of whether there can be a "separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another crime committed[.]"174 In that case, the
petitioner was charged with both illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Gun Ban under
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 2826.175 This court acquitted petitioner in the case for illegal
possession of firearms since he simultaneously violated the Gun Ban.176 This court also held that the
unlicensed firearm need not be actually used in the course of committing the other crime for the
application of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294.177
Similarly, Madrigal v. People178 applied the ruling in Agote and held that Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be convicted for illegal possession of firearms if another
crime was committed.179
IX
We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a period of one (1) year and to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Under Section 264 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found guilty of an election offense "shall be punished with imprisonment of
not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation."180 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the Revised Penal Code and special
laws.181
The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The trial court should have provided
minimum and maximum terms for petitioner’s penalty of imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.182Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court. Based on the facts, we
deem it reasonable that petitioner be penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two
(2) years as maximum.183
X
The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently detained by the state or is out on bail. Petitioner’s
detention is relevant in determining whether he has already served more than the penalty imposed upon
him by the trial court as modified by this court, or whether he is qualified to the credit of his preventive
imprisonment with his service of sentence.
Article 29184 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused
who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting
of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if
the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with
the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except
in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of
his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment.1âwphi1
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or
the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good
conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any
stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That
recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from
the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is lestierro
[sic], he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due, petitioner must first signify his agreement to the
conditions set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.185 If petitioner has already served more than
the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court, then his immediate release from custody is in order
unless detained for some other lawful cause.186
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz is sentenced to imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2)
years as maximum in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The period of his preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in his favor if he has given his written conformity to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and if he is not out on bail.
SO ORDERED.

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

Dela Cruz, an OJT of an interim-vessel, was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While
buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. When his bag was placed in the x-ray
machine, the operator saw firearms inside his bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, the operator
called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then. Dela Cruz
claimed ownership for the bag and consented to manual inspection. Dela Cruz was charged with violation
of RA. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms. The trial court held that the search conducted by the port
authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid. The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881.
Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and whether the search
was valid

HELD:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of constitutionality. However, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government. Hence, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by
private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.

However, Court held this doctrine is not applicable in this case since port security personnel's functions
having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of government. Nevertheless, searches
pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning
and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted
by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.

The search rendered was not unreasonable when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and
called the attention of the police. The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to
ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted
himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's right to travel if weighed
against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be
weighed in its entirety. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were detected,
he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities. It was after the port personnel's
inspection that Officer Abregana's attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's
consent. Also, there was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of
his personal effects.
With the foregoing reasons, the search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016

VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated August 12, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated January 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424, which affirmed with modification the Judgment4 promulgated on May 31, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 210,
finding Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron (Jabalde) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act (R.A) No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation, Discrimination Act."
The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryJabalde pleaded "not guilty" in a criminal information dated October 14,

2002, for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, before the RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch
31,5 which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on December 13, 2000 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, in Barangay Cawitan, Santa
Catalina, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, [Jabalde], with cruelty
and with intent to abuse, maltreat and injure one LIN J. BITOON, 8 years of age, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously slap and strike said Lin J. Bitoon, hitting said Lin J. Bitoon on the
latter's nape; and immediately thereafter[,] [c]hoke the said offended party, causing the latter to
sustain the following injuries: Abrasions: Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the base of the right
mandibular area; One (1), linear 1 inch at the right lateral neck; Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the
anterior neck; and Four (4), minute circular at the left lateral neck, which acts of sa[i]d accused caused
the said offended part[y] not only physical but also emotional harm prejudicial to his development.

CONTRARY to the aforesaid.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were: Lin J. Bito-on (Lin), the minor victim; Dr. Rosita Muñoz
(Dr. Muñoz), the physician who examined Lin; Ray Ann Samson (Ray Ann), the classmate of Lin who
witnessed the incident; and Aileen Bito-on (Aileen), the mother of Lin.7chanrobleslaw

Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School. At around 9:00
a.m. of December 13, 2000, he was playing "langit lupa" during recess with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova and
another classmate. During the course of their game, he touched the shoulder of Nova, Jabalde's daughter,
causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then helped Nova to stand while one of his
classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building, which was
near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck and choked
him. Lin was able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck. He immediately ran
towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. He told his mother Aileen about the incident.
Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for treatment and a medical certificate was then
issued to him.8chanrobleslaw

Dr. Muñoz testified that she was the physician who issued the medical certificate to Lin on December 13,
2000 for the physical examination conducted upon the latter. Dr. Muñoz stated that Lin sustained
abrasions: two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the base of the right mandibular area; one (1) linear
abrasion 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck; two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the back of the
neck; and four (4) minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck. According to her, the abrasions could
have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted and that these linear abrasions were signs of
fingernail marks. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color signifying that they were still fresh. She
did not notice other injuries on the body of Lin except those on his neck.9chanrobleslaw

Ray Ann, the classmate and playmate of Lin, testified that she knows Jabalde because she was a teacher
at Cawitan Elementary School. At about 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she was playing "langit lupa"
with Lin, Nova, Ryan and Rhea. Nova, who was standing on top of an unstable stone fell on the ground
and thereafter hit her head on the stone. Then, somebody called Jabalde, Nova's mother. When Jabalde
came to see her daughter, she struck Lin on his neck then squeezed it. Lin cried and was able to free
himself and ran towards their house. Jabalde then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself
because if not I should have killed you."10 Ray Ann saw Lin again after their class dismissal at 11:00 a.m.
when she went to their house. Lin did not return to school again because he was afraid of Jabalde. During
cross examination, Ray Ann testified that Lin did not run into the dilapidated building after the incident
and that she was near them when Jabalde struck Lin.11chanrobleslaw

Aileen testified that Lin is her son who was born on September 4, 1993, and at the time of the incident,
he was still 7 years old. That at about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, Lin came home crying and
trembling. Lin told her that he was strangled by Jabalde, who happens to be Aileen's aunt and Lin's
grandmother. Lin was running back and forth crying but Aileen noticed his neck with scratches. Thereafter,
she went to see his teacher-in-charge whom she asked for details of the incident. While in the school
campus, she did not see Jabalde. She also testified that they went to Dr. Muñoz for the examination of
her son's injuries. Afterwards, they went home. Her son no longer returned to the school because of fear
but they let him pass on that school year. During cross-examination, she testified that Jabalde's house is
just adjacent to their house in Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. Aileen also filed two cases against her for stealing
and physical injuries in the year 2002 in Sta. Catalina. After she filed two cases, she then filed the instant
complaint in the Provincial Prosecution's Office in Dumaguete City. She said it took her until 2002 to file
the present charges against Jabalde because she was still pregnant during the time of the incident and
that her husband was still assigned in Surigao. She admitted that when she was still a child, she already
feared Jabalde. She also initiated the filing of the present case because she heard that if she will not file a
case against Jabalde, the latter instead will file a case against them.12chanrobleslaw

The defense, on the other hand, presented Jabalde herself She testified that she is a school teacher at
Cawitan Elementary School for 18 years. Lin is her grandson and that his mother Aileen is her niece. She
remembered that it was about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she was teaching Mathematics when
some children went to her classroom and shouted "Mam Jabalde, Ma'm Jabalde, Nova's head was
punctured (nabuslot)".13 Thinking that her daughter was dead, her vision got blurred and she fainted.
When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about 5 to 10 minutes.
The children then came again and shouted that her daughter's head got punctured. She ran towards her
daughter's classroom while at the same time, looking for a gathering of people in the hope of finding her
daughter. But, before reaching the place of the incident, she saw her grandson Lin crying. She asked him
the whereabouts of Nova but he just kept on jumping and so she held him still. Lin said, "Lola[,] forgive
me, forgive me"14 and immediately ran. Jabalde proceeded to her daughter's room and saw the latter
seated on the desk. Thereafter, she brought Nova to her own classroom and applied first aid. Then she
resumed teaching. She believed that there was a motive in filing the instant complaint which has
something to do with a family grudge because of inheritance.15chanrobleslaw

Another defense witness Rhealuz Pedrona, playmate of Nova and Lin, testified that Nova got injured while
they were playing "langit lupa" during their recess on December 13, 2000. She went to Jabalde to inform
her that Nova's head was punctured. Jabalde immediately ran to the place of incident. She, however, did
not see Jabalde slap or choke Lin.16chanrobleslaw

In its Judgment17 promulgated on May 31, 2006, the RTC found Jabalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of [Jabalde] beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of paragraph (a), Section 10, Article VI of R.A. 7610, as amended, [Jabalde] is Convicted. Appreciating in
her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obluscation, and applying the provisions of the
indeterminate sentence law, [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum

The bond posted for her temporary liberty is hereby ordered release.

SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Naturally dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Jabalde appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA

On August 12, 2010, the CA dismissed Jabalde's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
modification.19 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2006 Decision, of the [RTC], Branch 63, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jabalde filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on January 4, 2011.21
The Issues
1. Whether or not acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or R.A. No. 7610.
2. Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in appreciating the acts of
Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is punishable under
the RPC particularly Article 266(1)22 which defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be punished
under the RPC and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.23chanrobleslaw
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out in its Comment24 filed on May 24, 2011 that since
the issue was just raised for the first time on appeal by Jabalde, this is already barred by estoppel citing
the cases of People v. Francisco25cralawred and People v. Lazaro, Jr.26chanrobleslaw

The cases cited by the OSG do not apply in this case. In Francisco, the appellant assailed the order of the
trial court for failing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt for the records show neither proof
nor a transcript of the proceedings that the appellant indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he
fully understood its import. The appellant also maintained that he was not given the opportunity to
present evidence and that the case was submitted for decision immediately after the prosecution filed its
offer of evidence. In Lazaro, the appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In both cases, this Court held that issues raised for the first time on appeal
are barred by estoppel.

However, the reliance on the foregoing cases is misplaced due to different factual antecedents. Here,
Jabalde postulates that the acts complained of do not fall within the definition of R.A. No. 7610 and
therefore, she should not be convicted on the basis of the said law, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Jabalde] postulates that other acts of child abuse falling under Section 10 (a), Art. II, R.A. 7610 is limited
to acts not punishable under the [RPC]. As the law is being defined in this section:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary"Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the [RPC], as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period[."]

Needless to say, acts which are covered under the [RPC] will be dealt with under the provisions of the
[RPC] and definitely, out of the context of R.A. 7610, particularly Section 10 (a). In the case of [Jabalde],
the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is punishable under the [RPC] particularly Article
266 (1) which defines slight physical injuries. The act of [Jabalde] in slapping, striking and choking [Lin],
causing abrasions on the different parts of his neck is absolutely covered within the realm of Article 266
(1). When the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period, shall be punished with
arresto menor.27 (Citations omitted)
Here, Jabalde questions the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case and is
correct in claiming that the instant petition raises pure question of law28 and not question of fact29 as
being argued by the OSG. In Cucueco v. CA,30 the Court discussed the distinction between questions of law
and questions of fact, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. There is a "question
of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On
the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
complicated. In a case involving a "question of law," the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to
each other, the issue in that query is factual.

x x x The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
"The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or the alleged falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them."32chanrobleslaw

In the case on hand, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood of the alleged facts nor the
sufficiency of the evidence, but the appreciation of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case.
Jabalde is simply correct in raising the question of law in the instant petition.

Now, on the substantive issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the case at bar, the Court agrees with
the contention of Jabalde in her Reply to OSG's Comment33 that the acts complained of do not fall within
the definition of the said law, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The [OSG] in his comment is correct in saying that the issues that could be raised in a petition for review
are purely questions of law. Guided by this principle, [Jabalde] comes to this Court to raise a question of
law. [Jabalde] has been arguing when she availed of his right to appeal that the acts of the [OSG] does not
fall within the definition of R.A. 7610 and should not be convicted on the basis of the said law. This is not
a new matter that [Jabalde] raised.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10(a), Article VI,
of R.A. No. 7610, which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis ours)
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. -

x x x x

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,35 the Court expounded the definition of "child abuse" being
referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case, therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by
the lower courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Court held that only when
the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding
that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase
the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done
at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern
for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and
Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse.36 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his nape, and immediately thereafter,
choking the said offended party causing the latter to sustain injuries.37 However, the records of the case
do not show that Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as
a human being.

Black's Law Dictionary defined debasement as "the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of
something."38 Degradation, on the other hand, is "a lessening of a person's or thing's character or
quality."39 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defined demean as "to lower in status, condition,
reputation, or character."40chanrobleslaw

The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being informed that
her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got
blurred and she fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board
for about five to ten minutes.41 Moreover, the testimony of the examining physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied
the accusation that Jabalde, with cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted. She also testified that the
linear abrasions were signs of fingernail marks. She did not notice other injuries on the body of the victim
except those on his neck. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color, signifying that they were still
fresh.42 (Emphasis ours)
It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself testified
that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse,
maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows.

As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the most
excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just
a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as
manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on
inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the prescribed
degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

What crime, then, did Jabalde commit?

Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical
injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical
assistance.

xxxx
As found out by Dr. Muñoz, Lin only sustained abrasions namely: two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at
the base of the right mandibular area; one linear abrasion of 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck; two
linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the back of the neck; and four minute circular abrasions at the left
lateral neck.43 When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended parly for labor or of the
required medical attendance; or when there is no proof as to the period of the offended party's incapacity
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.44chanrobleslaw

Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde lacked the intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being as required under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, her acts of laying hands against Lin showed the essential element of intent
which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.
The case of Villareal v. People45 is instructing. In that case, the Court discussed that the RPC belongs to the
classical school of thought. The criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the
actor. The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent -
is the predominant consideration. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of "dolo" or "malice".46chanrobleslaw

The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of
freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying
an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent
in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act.47
In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the [RPC], the employment
of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex
affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as
to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in
itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde slapped him on his neck
and choked him,49 and that of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck, squeezed it and then
shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I should have killed you,"50 deserve more
credit than Jabalde's own statement that she merely held Lin still because the latter kept on
jumping.51 The laying of the hands and the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin established the
fact that Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause or inflict physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one (1) day to thirty (30) days
of imprisonment.52 In imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6). of the RPC,53 because Jabalde lost his reason
and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.54 There is passional obfuscation when
the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.55 For passion and obfuscation to
be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce
passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a
reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the
accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit
of lawlessness or revenge.56 With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her daughter,
Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten [10] days) when only mitigating
circumstance is present in the case.57 Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,58 Jabalde shall suffer a penalty of one
(1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 12, 2010 and Resolution dated January 4, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424 are SET ASIDE; and a new judgment is ENTERED (a) finding petitioner
Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES under paragraph 2, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015

JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y
JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Jackson Padieraos y Quejada
(Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German (Roxas) and Rolando Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The petitioners seek
the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision1 dated May 10, 2007 and resolution2 dated December
20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Baler, Aurora in Criminal Case No. 3122.

The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. According to the
Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as evidence
and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows:
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in their
possession and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at
P133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago
Castillo y Cruz without any permit, license or documents from the proper authority and that at about 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon on the following day, November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously
and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it
could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool
or instrument of the crime, [emphasis and italics supplied]

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera) remain
at large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula) pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime; while petitioners
Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.
Prosecution's evidence

The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded
with lumber, which was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan)3 The truck bore the
name "JEROME" with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck
helper, Mostera, the lumber's supporting documents but they failed to produce any.

Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident. Some of the DENROs represented that the
transportation of the seized lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any
supporting document.

The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) - and
the policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit, guarded the truck loaded with lumber.4

The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They
transferred the lumber first from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national
highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers.5

On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived
at the place where the truck was being held in custody.6

Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring
the truck to the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck;
while Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were.8

Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of
the truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza (Mendoza)
and his companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.

Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that Mesina
would maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina
increased the truck's speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their two
policemen escorts9 who chased the truck and fired three warning shots.10

As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2
Mendoza corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear
what they were saying.

When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck anymore
and simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.
The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy.
Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.11

As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had
no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber.12

Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza13 immediately proceeded to
Brgy. Bagting where they found the DENRO group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen
proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police station compound.

Evidence for the defense

Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when
his former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He
refused Santiago's request because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities;
particularly, the truck had been previously loaded with lumber that were confiscated.14

Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really no
problem with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to fetch
Roxas to accompany them.15

Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he could drive
his truck to Cabanatuan City.16 Roxas refused because he had already heard of the truck's
apprehension,17 but he finally relented after Santiago assured him that there was no problem with the
truck. They proceeded to Caragsacan, Dingalan where the truck was parked.18 On cross-examination,
Roxas testified that he knew very well that the vehicle was a "hot" truck but he relied on Santiago's claim
that the problem already been settled.19

On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki,
Dingalan.20 According to Padiernos, he had been waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30
p.m. but only Santiago's group came by.21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that they
would bring Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City.22

Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached Caragsacan.23

On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked towards the
back of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street. Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and several
other persons for about 25 to 30 minutes.24

Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina.25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of the
truck with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took the driver's seat.26 Mesina drove the car towards
Cabanatuan City upon Santiago's instruction.27

The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to
stop them.28 They also did not notice any motorcycle following them as the truck's side mirrors were
broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged them down.29

After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while Roxas and Mesina
boarded a jeepney bound for Dingalan.30
The RTC's ruling

The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D.
705.31

The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used
in violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code.32

The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical, straightforward, and
consistent; they had no improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC
disregarded the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck.34

The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their prior knowledge
that the truck had been previously confiscated for illegal transport of forest products. This explains the
reluctance of Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago in getting the truck.35

The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's testimony that Padiernos
gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they had no right to apprehend the truck and its
cargo.36 Padiernos' knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity
with the townsfolk of Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products. The RTC
concluded that the incident and the personalities involved could not have escaped Padiernos' notice, yet
he still went with them to get the truck.37

Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the policemen's warning shots
and the DENROs' shouts because of the noisy engine and the defective windows of the truck. The RTC had
observed during its ocular inspection of the truck that both windows were in order and sounds outside
could be clearly heard even with a running engine.38
The CA's ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty imposed on
the petitioners.39

The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the
meaning of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already been
unloaded and placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of the
loaded undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in proving the
commission of the offense of violation of P.D. 705, as amended.40

The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive, or
knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their defense of denial must fail in view of the evidence on
record and their own admissions that they were aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity at
the time that they drove it towards Nueva Ecija.41

The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with Santiago, Roxas, and
Mesina. Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's application for mayor's permit as a lumber dealer;
Roxas is a family friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and Padiernos' are
long-time acquaintances.42
The Parties' Arguments

The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because
the DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the
truck when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija.43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories
who prevent the discovery of the crime.44

On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the
discovery of the crime. The respondent alleges that without the truck, the accused in the present case
could easily produce the necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the
confiscated lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who
tried to make it appear that the seized lumber had the proper transportation permit for 8,254 board feet
and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, with the actual volume of
the confiscated lumber of 10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46
The Court's Ruling

We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open
for review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even obligates, the appellate court to correct errors as
may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is likewise settled
that when an accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new trial.47

The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the appealing
accused, and from imposing the corresponding punishment in accordance with the charges in the
Information and the crime proved during trial.

Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case contained a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting both the crimes of illegal
possession of firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple murder may be validly taken into
account49 in the resolution of the appeal before the Court, although the appellants have been acquitted
of illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled that the appellants in that case were fairly apprised of
the nature of the crime of multiple murder and granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves.

Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in the
Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories
for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime

The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense,
and not the technical name that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From
a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should
be directed and his interest should be on the facts alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a
crime given in the law with some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the actsalleged in
the body of the information in the manner therein set forth."50

In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck
with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor
of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.
Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were
accessories to the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical name
of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual charges against them.
In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.

These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and carry away
the subject truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in
favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been sufficiently
apprised of these factual allegations, against which they should defend themselves.

Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of
"accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused
as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.

Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the
crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent
to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order
to prevent its discovery.

Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the
discovery of the crime.52

In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already
been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the
truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November 16,
2002, after its confiscation.

In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the
legal definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations in the
Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.

The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section
1(b) of P.D. 1829

The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not
constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute
instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829
entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."

P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or
frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the following
acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to
impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of
or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in
criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners' acts
actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above.

First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under
Section 1(b).

The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck
so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
government as a tool or instrument of the crime.

In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is
indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck
is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the seized
lumber as the permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber.
According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered with
supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter.

Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term
"suppress" means to subdue or end by force.54
Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its
availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of
P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.

It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport
of the seized lumber. Santiago had every reason and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without
the truck, Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for
violation of P.D. 705 would be frustrated.

The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the status of
the truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.

Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the
petitioners' admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew that the truck had been involved in the illegal
transportation/possession of the seized lumber.

Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had beenpreviously
loaded with lumber that was confiscated.

According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news of
the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being
assured that there was no problem with the truck.

Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's
involvement with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs, saying they had no
right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close association with the
other petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial.

The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners deliberately
drove the truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the policemen's warning shots, tapping, and
the DENROs shouting for help from the back of the truck.

Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate the
petitioners' defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and their knowledge of the truck's
involvement in an illegal activity.

The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close association with each
other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent to take away the truck, and the totality of their acts
showing their common design to take the truck - lead us to conclude that the petitioners had indeed
mutually conspired with one another to take away the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence
in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.

Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the petitioners'
violation of P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings and find the petitioners guilty of Section 1(b) of P.D.
1829.

Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision correccionalin
its maximum period, or a fine ranging from P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or
both.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 10, 2007,
and its resolution dated December 20, 2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiernos y Quejada, Jackie
Roxas y German, and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days to 5
years, 4 months, and 20 days.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary