Human Security:

Threats, Risks,
and Crises The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention:
International Human
Security Conference Series
Cases of Libya and Syria
18-19 October 2012 By Fulya Akgül & Asiye Gün Güneş
2nd İstanbul Conference

Introduction

The post-Cold War era has witnessed some tremendous changes in the concepts of war and
security. The traditional subjects of the discipline of International Relations as being war and
peace, and military interventions have started to be replaced mostly by interventions to civilian
conflicts for humanitarian purposes in the post-Cold War era. As opposed to the previous era’s
inter-state conflicts, increase in the number of peace operations and humanitarian interven-
tions by the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and some group
of states is a distinctive characteristic of this period.

The changing security concept and the practice of humanitarian intervention is shaped, con-
strained and influenced by the recent academic and political discussions and the attitudes and
policy choices of states. To stop human rights violations, protect civilians, maintain peace and
stability and end conflicts are some reflections of moral discourses and purposes of the actors
that intervene in various conflicts since the last decade of the 20th century. The fact that con-
siderable numbers of states unilaterally or in coalitions and international organizations such as
the UN have been involved in several conflicts with the discourse of moral justifications for
interventions brings about the argument that the Realist paradigm which primarily concerns
for national interest is inadequate to understand and explain the post-Cold War era’s so called
“New World Order” and the moral aspects of world politics. However, the fact that there are
some cases in which states or international organizations which are composed of states have
acted with the lack of will to intervene in massive human rights violations and massacres rais-
es a question about the power of humanitarian justifications as emerging norms since the end
of the Cold War.

This study aims to discuss the share of national interest and moral causes in shaping the deci-
sions of states to take part in humanitarian interventions in order to understand why states
respond to some grave violations of human rights and not others. In this context, the first part
of this study focuses on the concept and practice of humanitarian intervention with some illus-
trative case studies with reference to the interplay of the basic concepts of Realist, Idealist
and Constructivist approaches embedded in the subject. The second part of the study presents
the cases of Libya and Syria as examples of humanitarian intervention and non-intervention
with the aim of demonstrating that each case of humanitarian intervention or non-intervention
is unique and this uniqueness with regard to the leading international actors’ significant incon-
sistencies in humanitarian action presents the dilemma of interventions in the international
relations.

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The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention: Norms and Interests

The last two decades has seen an increasing share of study of humanitarian intervention in
literature and the emergence of a focus on the norms and morality on state behavior. The last
two decades has also witnessed an increasing number of sovereign states and significance of
sovereignty as one of the basic principals of state behavior. These two developments intersect
with each other on the grounds of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the
internal and external affairs of states and the emergence of a norm suggesting that extreme
humanitarian abuses can constitute a threat to peace so that the aim of ending it legitimizes
intervention. Therefore, humanitarian interventions bring about a challenge of how to balance
state sovereignty and human rights against each other.

The difficulty of differentiating between a humanitarian military action and one motivated by
self-interest, self-defense, cultural imperialism or ideology is fortified by the fact that all the
interventions are supported by some states and opposed by some other which are uncon-
vinced by the moral justifications of the intervener. By taking into consideration this difficulty,
humanitarian interventions in general aim to stop human right violations, protect civilians,
maintain stability, deliver necessary health and food aids to civilians in need and interfere into
the conflicting groups when necessary. They are interventions into armed conflicts for humani-
tarian purposes with several means including use of armed force. In a broad sense, humani-
tarian interventions are a state’s, a group of states’ or an international organization’s use of
armed forces against another state with the purpose of ending massive human rights viola-
tions. When the principles of the concept of humanitarian intervention are analyzed, it is seen
that the first-order principle is humanity or the sanctity of life. Despite the moral absolute of
the first-order principle, the second-order principles which include neutrality and impartiality
are not moral absolutes and they are rather operational.1

Increasing number of interventions which have been motivated by the abuse of another state’s
citizens and resorting to use of armed force with the aim of giving ethical responses to large-
scales violations of human rights –beyond the motivation- are multilateral and based on coop-
eration. This aspect of humanitarian interventions is an area of Idealism. However, the fact
that multilateral humanitarian operations are carried out by the governments of states which
take some short and long term interests into consideration while deciding when, where and
why to use force comes into the inquiry of Realism and this raises questions about the pure
humanitarian –Idealist- aspect of humanitarian interventions.2

By focusing on the questions of when, where and why humanitarian action is taken, it is in-
ferred that states do not intervene to prevent human rights violations just because they can or
are allowed to. This notion brings a normative aspect of humanitarian interventions into ques-
tion. It is argued that ideas and beliefs shared by some members of international society –
particularly a liberal world society- not only permits but also prescribes intervention in certain
circumstances. In this context, the occurrence of intervention is explained by a prescriptive
norm which increases felt obligations and reconstitutes interests. 3 When the Constructivist un-

1. Thomas G. Weiss, “Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons”, Journal of Peace Research,
Vol. 38, No 4, 2001, p. 422.
2. Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War”, Mershon International Studies
Review, Vol. 42, No 2, 1998, p. 283-284.
3. Luke Glanville, “Norms, interests and humanitarian intervention”, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol.
18, No 3, 2006, p. 154.

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derstanding is applied to humanitarian norm, Constructivists in common describes norms as

“collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity”. 4 However,
given the fact that states intervene selectively as a response to grave violations of human
rights, it is hard to speak of an humanitarian norm which a state considers as a possible policy
choice that may or may not coincide with its national interest. It can be rather argued that
humanitarian ideas as prescriptive norms can help states to redefine state interests so that
norm compliant behavior is seen as being in the state’s interest. 5

The emergence of a prescriptive norm in the conduct of world politics can be inferred from UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s speech addressing the prospects for human security and inter-
vention in the 21st century to the General Assembly in 1999 that referred to a “developing in-
ternational norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter”, “a con-
sistency in commitment to humanitarian action” and redefinition of state interests as “the col-
lective interest is the national interest”. 6 However, the inconsistency in the practice of humani-
tarian intervention undermines its normative roots and highlights the roles of interests that
intervening states could possibly be pursuing in humanitarian military interventions.

When humanitarian military interventions of the past decades are examined very briefly, it is
seen that a very humanitarian intervention can be an illustration of a changing international
normative context, an example of geo-strategic or geo-economic advantages to be gained or
an interaction of norms with material self-interests. In this regard, it is believed to be of great
significance to refer to some notable humanitarian interventions in the last decade of the 20 th
century in order to better understand the main case studies of this study.

When the response of the United States (US) as one of the most influential global actor and
the UN to various humanitarian crises since the end of the Cold War, it is observed that in
some cases For instance, when the casualties of civil war between the Barre regime and its
opponents became inevitable by 1990 in Somalia, the US and the UN did not interfere into the
initial phases of the conflict by diplomatic or any other means in order to prevent the escala-
tion of the crises. The fact that the US and the UN were involved in Iraq and Kuwait at that
that time and the UN’s lack of will to intervene due to security concerns until the end of 1991
brings questioning of the motivations behind the intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994.7 From
the standpoint of normative approach, it is argued that the US had no geo-strategic or geo-
economic gain in Somalia so that the intervention can only be explained by reference to
norms.8 However, it can be argued that in the absence of self-interest, a key factor in the de-
cision to intervene is affected by the belief about the little risk of casualties and when casual-
ties began to increase, the reality that the US had no material interests at stake were given
priority than any commitment to moral norms and the result was the withdrawal of the US
troops.9

4. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security”, Peter J. Katzenstein

(ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press,
1996, p. 5.
5. Glanville, p. 155.
6. Kofi Annan, “The Secretary-General Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, 20 September
1999, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/1999/sg2381.html (Accessed 10 August 2012).
7. John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994, RPG Refugee Policy Group,
Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues, 1994, p. 7-9.
8. Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, 1996, p.
154.
9. Glanville, p. 167.

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The protection, fulfillment and promotion of human rights, and the responsibility for protecting
the fundamental rights of citizens of other states are emphasized by the proponents of hu-
manitarian intervention as strong requirements on the international community. 10 As it was the
case in Somalia, the lack of response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 confirmed the idea-
tional retreat and the weakness of the norm in the absence of material or strategic self-
interests. Some measure of self-interest, however, appeared to be necessary to justify going
to war as it was the case in NATO’s 1999 action in Kosovo as it served to protect the stability
of Europe and maintain the European order.11 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo also illustrates
the fact that the UN as an international organization is effective as long as there is consensus
among the powerful states that are behind the organization. The case of intervention in Koso-
vo is of great importance since it is an example of the humanitarian action by the US, the Unit-
ed Kingdom (UK) and France in alliance with NATO without the authorization of the UN. From
the standpoint of the Realist paradigm, it shows that the rules and norms of international law
are the products of the powerful states and they are in effect as long as they are supported by
powerful states12, and from the normative standpoint, it is an example of convergence of hu-
manitarian concern with material self-interests which led to an intervention that advanced the
prescriptive humanitarian norm.13

Cases of Libya and Syria as Intervention and Non-intervention

The starting point of the events that led to an eventual intervention in Libya was initiated by
the violent respond to the protests upon the arrest of a regime opponent -Fethi Terbil- on 15
February 2011. Due to the increase in the number of injured in the protests, the events spread
rapidly beyond Benghazi, throughout the country. Muammar Gaddafi’s use of mercenaries and
war planes against the protestors and the growing number of deaths drew reaction from the
dissidents in the country and the international community. The first reaction came from the UN
Security Council (UNSC) on February 22, 2011 calling upon the Libyan Government for an im-
mediate end of the human rights violations, to act with restraint, to respect human rights and
international humanitarian law, and to allow immediate access for international human rights
monitors and humanitarian agencies.

This reaction was followed by the UNSC’s adoption of Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011.
According to that Gaddafi, his parents and some security members’ travel rights were prevent-
ed and their assets were frozen. The UNSC also decided to prevent the direct or indirect sup-
ply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types. On February 28, 2011 the Coun-
cil of European Union (EU) prohibited trade with Libya in equipment which might be used for
internal repression. On March 17, 2011 with Resolution 1973, the UNSC approved ‘no-fly zone’
over Libya, authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians, by vote of ten in favor and
five abstentions. Under the leadership of France, the US, the UK, Italy and Canada, the coali-
tion initiated the intervention in Libya on March 19, 2011, approximately only one month after
the beginning of the conflicts. This decision of intervention was followed by the NATO’s en-
gagement with ‘Unified Protector’ operation.

10. Ian Atack, “Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 33, No 3, 2002, p.
280-281.
11. Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security, Routledge, 2004, p. 119-120.
12. John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 3.
13. Glanville, p. 170.

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In the case of Syria, the beginning of the events was initiated by a protestor’s burning himself
and followed by the protests upon the murder of two Kurdish origin soldiers in January 2011.
The spread of events and the mass protests took place in the mid-May. Particularly a violent
response by the military forces against the protestors in Dara, an increasing number of
deaths, and conflicts at the funerals worsened the crisis in the country. The first reaction for
the situation in Syria came from the Council of European Union on March 27, 2011 and the
Council called upon the Syrian authorities to refrain from resorting to violence, to take into
consideration the legitimate aspirations of the people and address them through inclusive po-
litical dialogue and genuine reforms, not through repression. On May 9 2011, the Council of
EU has adopted a regulation and a decision providing for an embargo on exports to Syria or
arms and equipment that could be used for internal repression as well as a visa ban and an
assets freeze. The ongoing decisions have included visa ban, freezing of assets for more peo-
ple and entities and prohibition of export of Syrian oil to the EU.

The states that participated in the intervention in Libya in the shortest possible time and found
the common denominator swiftly seem reluctant regarding the casualties in Syria that contin-
ues for 18 months and they have been waiting for Bashar al-Assad to engage in a political re-
form. In fact both Libyan and Syrian regimes were involved in killing and torturing of their own
citizens. Due to the ongoing uncertainty, the question of “What lies behind the different re-
sponses of states and international organizations to these two states which have experienced
similar situations such as governments being in conflict with their own citizens and use of in-
creased violence and growing number of deaths” is becoming increasingly controversial. In
this context, it is argued that NATO, which has failed to take humanitarian action despite the
occurrence of more severe events in Syria than it was in the case of Libya, took action in an
immediate time in Libya not only out of humanitarian concerns but because of the material
reasons that included Libya’s being an oil-rich country and Gaddafi’s economy politics. 14 This
argument lies on the fact that intervention in Libya has occurred when casualties were about
1000 and, however, in Syria an intervention has not been brought up seriously even though
the mentioned casualties have been 5000 and missing protestors have been counted between
15000 and 4000015, and an expectation of political reforms from Assad has been constantly
repeated. According to this argument, the objections to Gaddafi’s economic policy are the
main cause of the intervention. Under a stringent new system known as EPSA-IV, the regime
judged companies' bids on how large a share of future production they would let Libya have.
Winners routinely promised more than 90% of their oil output to the National Oil Corporation
(NOC).16 It is claimed that behind the support of the Arab League to the intervention, there is
also the impact of Gaddafi’s economic policy due to the fact that he has spent a considerable
amount of oil revenues for the development of Africa with the aim of uniting Black Africa and
Arab Africa.17 The leading states of the intervention -France, the US, the UK, Italy and Canada
- have had close relations to the Libyan oil which seems to support the mentioned claims.

14. Nikolas Gvosdev, “The Realist Prism: Gratitude vs. Neutrality in Post-Gadhafi Libya”, 9 September 2011,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9952/the-realist-prism-gratitude-vs-neutrality-in-post-
gadhafi-libya (Accessed 30.05.2012)
15. Rachel Donadio, “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000”, 23 Fabruary 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/europe/24italy.html?_r=2, Uprising Timeline, 9 September 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html, More than
100,000 Syrians sought asylum in August – UN refugee agency, 4 September 2012,http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp/story.asp?NewsID=42799&Cr=Syria&Cr1=#.UE3zha5HB9t (Accessed 30.05.2012)
16. Guy Chazan, “For West's Oil Firms, No Love Lost in Libya”, 15 April 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703730104576260902489238740.html (Accessd 30.05.2012)
17. Jehron Muhammad, “NATO Intervention in Libya Rooted in Access to Oil”.17 May 2012, http://
www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/World_News_3/article_8850.shtml (Accessed 30.05.2012)
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When the list of countries that buy oil from Libya is examined, Italy is placed at the first rank
by a percentage of 27% and France is placed at the second by 16%.18 Although it may seem
that the UK is seventh by %4, Libya is among the first three countries from which the UK buys
oil. Although the U.S. has a small percentage -3%- and Canada almost has no percentage of
oil bought from Libya, these two states have some considerable investments in the oil sector
of Libya.

In the case of Syria, it is argued that the reasons for the failure to intervene in Syria have in-
cluded sectarian differences in Syria, the potential of worsening of the conflicts among them,
and the situation’s being far more different and complicated than Libya’s, the potential impact
of sectarian conflicts in the region, Syria’s strong and large army and the concern for a possi-
ble intervention’s being much more bloody and difficult than it was in the case of Libya. 19 It is
also argued that the US’ response to the conflicts with non-intervention is based on the US’
strategic interests concerning Israel’s preference of a weak neighbor and not having the stra-
tegic priority of the fall of the Baas regime.20

Within the legal framework, the greatest obstacle to intervention in Syria is the veto of Russia
and China. According to these states’ official stances, China's opposition to a possible interven-
tion in Syria is based on the norm of “respect for sovereignty”. It has been stated that interna-
tional community must respect a state’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integ-
rity and they stand against the regime changes by external forces. The main reason for Rus-
sia’s stance against an intervention and a regime change is related to its own geo-strategic
and geo-economic interests in the region. Russia who suffered serious economic losses from
the intervention in Libya, with a possible regime change in Syria, is likely to lose one of its five
biggest buyers of arms, which is also its only Arab ally providing it with a naval support base
that allows it to project naval power in the Mediterranean.

In addition to the veto of Russia and China which is shown as a barrier to a possible interven-
tion, it is claimed that the UK and France are too not that interested in an intervention in Syria
as they used to be. UN Deputy Secretary-General Jon Elliasson and British Foreign Secretary
stated that the proposal may create serious problems and they oppose the proposal which is
to set up refugee camps in Syria proposed by Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in
the UNSC which gathered on August 30, 2012. Besides, it is asserted that neither the US
providing 75% of reconnaissance data, surveillance, intelligence and refueling planes during
the operation in Libya nor the NATO or the states which volunteered the intervention in Libya
would act the same for Syria.21 The current American government’s negative stance on inter-
vention in Syria has been related by a defense official and a former top Pentagon official
Michele A. Flournay to the US’ concerns about the potential for starting a proxy war with Iran
or Russia which are two crucial allies of Syria. Flournay said “If we jump in with purely military
instruments as the US, absent a broader strategy, we could very quickly hasten reactions from
others, namely Iran and Russia, to bolster the regime and start us down a road towards great-

18. Nick Squires, “Libya: Italian oil giant suspends supply from Libya”, 22 February 2011, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8341220/Libya -Italian-oil-giant-
suspends-supply-from-Libya.html, (Accessed 30.05.2012)
19. Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria, 11 April 2008, http://www.gevans.org/
speeches/speech300.html (30.05.2012)
20. Ali Younes, “Obama is not committed to military intervention in Syria, yet”, 27 March 2012, http://
english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/03/27/203484.html (30.05.2012)
21. Ed Husain, “West Must Not Intervene Militarily in Syria”, 9 February 2012, http://www.cfr.org/syria/west-
must-not-intervene-militarily-syria/p27338 (Accessed 30.05.2012)

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er confrontation”.22 The US is also concerned about the risks in attacking Syria’s plentiful and
sophisticated Russian-made air defenses which are located close to major population centers,
arming deeply splintered Syrian opposition and the lack of an international coalition willing to
take action against the Assad regime. US’ major concern is Iran because it opposes foreign
intervention in Syria and believes that the Syrian people must solve the problem which is their
own "internal matter". Iran does not want to lose its nuclear, economic and military partner
since 1979 and which is also its only strategic partner in the Middle East and serving as Teh-
ran’s link to terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which threaten Israel’s
security and regional stability.23

Conclusion

With the end of the bipolar international system of the Cold War, there have been new threats
and instabilities in the system. Increasing numbers of civil wars, ethnic conflicts and severe
violations of human rights are in contradiction with the infamous speech of former US Presi-
dent George Bush during the Gulf War announcing the beginning of the ‘New World Order’.
The US as the hegemonic power of the post-Cold War era has emphasized more liberal dis-
courses and the importance of international cooperation, roles of international organizations,
international law and human rights. In addition to this liberal emphasis, the concept and prac-
tice of humanitarian intervention has become a common security aspect of the New World
Order.

The humanitarian aspect of interventions is seen as both a representative of the Idealist para-
digm and as an emerging norm in International Relations, both of which seems to present a
challenge to the Realist paradigm. However, when the cases of humanitarian intervention and
non-intervention are examined, it can never be argued that the motivations behind the inter-
ventions are purely humanitarian and there emerges humanitarian interventions in certain cir-
cumstances. As the case of Libya and Syria suggest, even with the acceptance of the exist-
ence of a prescriptive humanitarian norm which obligates states to intervene in order to pre-
vent other states’ abuse of human rights, this norm is applied selectively. Since the humanitar-
ian aspect of the Syrian crisis has been worsening than ever it was the case in Libya does not
necessarily bring causality for humanitarian intervention, the reasons for decisions to take or
not to take part in interventions can be found at material interests of the leading actors.

As the recent historical cases of humanitarian interventions and non-interventions –Somalia,

Rwanda and Kosovo- illustrates, when, where and why to use of armed forces is still at the
expense of states which decides to take humanitarian action. This aspect of the practice of
humanitarian intervention brings about the validity of the Realist paradigm’s main argument
about states’ being the main actors in International Relations and effectiveness of rules and
norms of international law and organizations as long as they are supported by powerful states.
In this context, with taking into consideration the Idealist and normative aspects of the con-
cept of humanitarian intervention, it is not possible to comprehend the state behavior without
the basic concepts of the Realist paradigm. Within the theoretical framework of the concept
and practice of humanitarian intervention, it can be concluded that it is difficult to differentiate

22. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Military Points to Risks of a Syrian Intervention”, 11 March 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/us-syria-intervention-would-be-risky-pentagon-officials-
say.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www (Accessed 30.05.2012)
23. Henry A. Ensher, “Iran-Syria Relations and The Arab Spring”, 12 July 2011, http://www.irantracker.org/
foreign-relations/iran-syria-relations-and-arab-spring (Accessed 30.05.2012)
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between a humanitarian military action and one motivated by self-interest. It is also difficult to
predict a common state behavior in case of humanitarian intervention since it is fortified by the
fact that all interventions supported by some states and opposed by some others reflects the
uniqueness of each case.

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editors@cesran.org
 Author’s name, title and full address with a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet.
 Authors are encouraged to submit their manuscripts by electronic means as Word format attachments in Times
New Roman and 1,5 space. 12 font should be used within text while 10 font should be preferred for footnotes.
 The minimum length for Articles is 1000 words.
 Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks (“……”). Quotations larger than four lines should be
indented at left margin and single-spaced. Use footnotes (not endnotes). Dates should be in the form 3
November 1996; 1995-1998; and 1990s.
 Foreign language text should always be italicized, even when lengthy. American spelling is accepted but
spelling practice should be consistent throughout the article.
 If a submitted article is selected for publication, its copyright will be transferred to Centre for Strategic
Research and Analysis (CESRAN). Published papers can be cited by giving the necessary bibliographical
information. For re-publication of any article in full-text permission must be sought from the editors.
 Authors bear responsibility for their contributions. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Political
Reflection Magazine are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the Magazine or
the CESRAN.
 Submissions whether they are published or not are not returned.