SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-23779-80. April 29, 1977.]

FEDERICO QUIZON and PROFITISA QUIZON, Petitioners, v. HON. JOSE L. BALTAZAR, Municipal
Judge of San Fernando, Pampanga; ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga; and CECILIA SANGALANG, Respondents.

Lorenzo P. Navarro, for Petitioners.

Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Cecilia Sangalang.

Eliodoro B. Guinto for and in his own behalf.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare null and void the orders of the Municipal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 4203, People v. Federico Quizon and 4204, People v.
Profitisa Quizon, dated July 11 and August 17, 1964, respectively, denying petitioners’ motion to quash the
criminal complaints against them based on the ground of prescription of the offense of serious oral
defamation of which they were charged, and to prohibit said court from proceeding further with the said
criminal cases, except to dismiss the same.

On May 11, 1964, private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, with the assistance of Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, filed with respondent court two
separate criminal complaints both for serious oral defamation, the one against petitioner Federico Quizon in
Criminal Case No. 4203 and the other petitioner Profitisa Quizon in Criminal Case No. 4204, committed,
according to the said complaints on the same day, November 11, 1963. Upon being called for arraignment,
petitioners presented a written motion to quash contending principally that the offense charged had already
prescribed as of May 9, 1964.

In support of their motion, petitioners argued that by express provision of Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offense of oral defamation prescribes in six months and under the authority of People v. Del
Rosario, 97 Phil. 67, the correct computation of said six months for the purposes of their particular case is
as follows:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"From Nov. 12 to 30, 1963 there were 19 days

December, 1963 had 31 days

January, 1964 had 31 days

February, 1964 had 29 days

March, 1964 had 31 days

April, 1964 had 30 days

From May 1 to 9, 1964 was a matter of 9 days

———

From Nov. 12, 1963 to May 9, 1964 were 180 days"

(Page 26, Record.).

Overruling their motion, respondent court reasoned out thus: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss by making a computation of time as follows: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

"From Nov. 12 to 30, 1964, there are 19 days

December 30 days

January 30 days

February 30 days

March 30 days

April 30 days

From May 1 to 11, 1964, there are 11 days

———

From Nov. 12, 1963 to May 11, 1964 are 180 days

(Opposition to the Motion to Quash, p. 2).

"A study of the provisions of the laws pertinent to the issue at bar leads one to agree with the mode of
computation submitted by the public prosecutor because Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, in providing
for the prescriptive period for oral defamation, speaks of month, not of day, as the basic unit in reckoning
the duration of the prescription, when it says that ‘offenses of oral defamation . . . shall prescribe in six
months.’ Article 13 of the new Civil Code says that ‘when the laws speak of . . ., months, . . . it shall be
understood that . . . month . . . of thirty days each . . . . It says further that ‘If months are designated by
their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. Conformably to
these legal provisions and applying the same to the case at bar, the computation given by the public
prosecutor appears to be correct. The month of November was designated in the complaint so it will be
given the number of days it has in the calendar which is 30 days. But the succeeding months of December,
January, February, March and April, which are the months comprised within the prescriptive period of six (6)
months are nowhere specifically designated by their name, consequently they should be given the 30-day
period of duration in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 13 aforesaid. It is believed, and the Court
so holds, that this formula or mode of computation is more squarely in accordance with the one adopted in
the case of People v. Del Rosario (G.R. No. L-7234) quoted in the motion to quash. The month of May,
having been designated in the complaint, was given the number of 31 days it has in the calendar, the
succeeding month of June comprised within the prescriptive period was given 30-day duration, so it resulted
to be thus:.

May 28 to 31 3 days (the 28th was excluded)

June 30 days

July 27 27 days (the 27th was included)

———

60 days

"In pursuance thereto, the Supreme Court in the Del Rosario Case finally held that the filing of the action on
July 27 was on the 60th day.

"If the formula for computation of the defense is to be followed, Article 13 in so far as a month is to be
understood to be of 30 days, unless the month is designated by its name, will be rendered nugatory, for the
simple reason that there are months that have 31 days in the calendar to be reckoned with as they will be
within the prescriptive period. The basic unit of computation used by the defense is by the day and not by
the month of 30-day duration as provided for in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the counting of which
is to be made in relation to Article 13 of the Civil Code (new).
"The contention of the private prosecutor no longer needs discussion in view of the conclusion arrived at
above." (Pp. 37-40, Record.).

Surely, such ratiocination is plainly erroneous. In the case of People v. del Rosario, supra, which was
properly brought to the attention of the court in petitioners’ motion to quash, this Court held very clearly
that:jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

‘Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. — . . .

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.’

‘Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. —

The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents, . . .’

"The court a quo held that in accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code the ‘month’ mentioned in
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the period of prescription
commences to run from the day ‘on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,’ i.e., in this case
on May 28, 1958 when it was committed, the two months period provided for the prescription of the offense
already expired when the information was filed, because the filing was on the 61st day. The Solicitor General
in this appeal argues that in the same manner that Article 13 of the new Civil Code is applied to determine
the length of the two months period required for the prescription of the offense, its provision (of the said
Article 13) contained in paragraph 3 which reads ‘In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
the last day included’ should also be applied, so that the information should be considered as filed on the
60th day and not on the 61st day after the offense has been committed. The resolution of the appeal
involves the determination of two legal issues, first, whether the prescriptive period should commence from
the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was committed,
in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Penal Code should
be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil or calendar month.

"As to the first question, we note that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period shall
commence to run from the day on which the offense is committed or discovered. The title indicates that the
provision merely purports to prescribe the manner of computing the period of prescription. In the
computation of a period of time within which an act is to be done, the law in this jurisdiction has always
directed the first day be excluded and the last included (See section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court; section
13, Rev. Adm. Code and Art. 13, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in the case of Surbano v. Gloria, 51
Phil., 415, where the question involved was whether an offense had prescribed, we held that from February
18 to March 15, 1927 only a period of 25 days elapsed, because we excluded the first day (February 18) and
included the last day (March 15). The above method of computation was in force in this jurisdiction even
before the advent of the American regime (Article 7, Spanish Civil Code). It is logical to presume, therefore,
that the Legislature in enacting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code meant or intended to mean that in the
computation of the period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and the last one included, in
accord with existing laws.

"We find much sense in the argument of the Solicitor General that if the Civil Code of the Philippines is to be
resorted to in the interpretation of the length of the month, so should it be resorted to in the computation of
the period of prescription. Besides, Article 18 of the Civil Code (Article 16 of the old Civil Code) expressly
directs that any deficiency in any special law (such as the Revised Penal Code) must be supplied by its
provisions. As the Revised Penal Code is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be
computed, resort must be had to its Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of computating a period.
We find, therefore that the trial court committed error in not excluding the first day in the computation of
the period of prescription of the offense.

"The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month
and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length
of the Month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be understood as containing 30
days; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that
month means the civil or calendar month and not the regular 30-day month (Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil.,
334). With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have reverted to
the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular
30-day month (Article 13). This provision of the new Civil Code has been intended for general application in
the interpretation of the laws. As the offense charge in the information in the case at bar took place on May
28, 1953, after the new Civil Code had come into effect, this new provisions should apply, and in accordance
therewith the month in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the regular 30-
day month.

"In our conclusion that the term ‘month’ used in the Revised penal Code should be interpreted in the sense
that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find persuasive authority in a decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain. In a case decided by it in the year 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval
of the Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the law spoke of months, it meant the natural month or
the solar month, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil
Code of Spain, which provided in its Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of the laws, and with
particular respect to months, that a month shall be understood as a 30-day month, said court held that the
two months period for the prescription of a light offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a month
being a 30-day month. (S. de 6 de Abril de 1895, 3 Viada, p. 45). Similarly we hold that in view of the
express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code the term ‘month’ used in Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day month and not the solar or civil month.

"We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, said period to be
counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that when the information was
filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29."
(97 Phil. 68-72.).

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements of this Court, the insistence of respondents that the factual
situation in this case is substantially different from the one in del Rosario is too tenuous to merit
consideration. Respondents have not shown any ponderous reason why We have to depart from the above
rulings.

Indeed, it being obvious that respondent court disregarded the construction of the pertinent legal provisions
by this Court, the charge of petitioners that it has committed grave abuse of discretion must be sustained.

As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari or
prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when
the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been
indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust, for which reason, procedurally, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the criminal complaint in the aforementioned cases are hereby
ordered dismissed. No costs. 1

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., did not take part.

Martin J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Endnotes:

1. In the interest of speedy administration of justice, We are overlooking the omission to join in the petition
the People of the Philippines.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äw phï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
 However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the
oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to
submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing
of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this
Court resolved to deny the motion.

2 San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3 Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his
share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered
to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company
against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty
(60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on
the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of
the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as
follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg.
22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the

payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia
 Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A.
Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria
Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984
(Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check
to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that
Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an
obligation," as follows:4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having

interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but
that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs.
Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim
that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to
the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP
22, enacted on April 3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court
dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court
required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on
appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment,
Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and
contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code.
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares
Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases.
These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576
which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of
loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on
June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect
that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no
retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before
publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying
retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the
soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a
tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by
RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding
that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to
wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a
circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590
of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an
employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason
whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People
v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis
vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of
the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old
 doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No
97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was
mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest
bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on
September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as
amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners
Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for
pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But
while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4
of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is
easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the
oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The
Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a
statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity.

Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared
"that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no
force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in
reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
 Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of
"Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued
by the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v.
Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit:11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional
act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering
from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify
any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially
declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount.
Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not
however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in
all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a

statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This
 language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil.
1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]).
An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the
Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No
34, 12 — declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against
civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court,
in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle,
be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final
when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final
sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the
convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on
the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be
released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did
not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision
in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the
limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a
municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished. 13

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
— should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128,
applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is
inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go
Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official
issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law
violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest
misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the
present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a
private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government,
the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a
constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature
and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos
vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that
in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary
construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must
be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason
why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are
reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED,
with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing
Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific
Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU
Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively contributed
P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.

2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".

3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration,

promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21,
1987, written for the division by Paras,J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez,
Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of
approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now
settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."

4 Emphasis supplied.

5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired
Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1,
pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after
not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power : e.g.,
tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v.
Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first
time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v.
Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal
possession of firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial
Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential
agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.

7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.

8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported
in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et
al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].

9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.

10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the
decision.

11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987)
(Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose
as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order creating a municipality
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA
686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino
Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,
212 SCRA 425.

12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991;
and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].

14 SEE footnote 3, supra.

15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall
expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner,
emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .

16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.

17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968
of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the judgment of
conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.

On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael
Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the
municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of
imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.

In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of
firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded
to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two
offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a
patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the
requisite license or permit therefor.

On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing
him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of
the Government.

Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving
only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as
secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as
secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang,1 was exempt
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the
court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa2which held that section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by
provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the
case at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.

The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961"
includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have
the right to bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the
rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang,3 the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s]
him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police"
whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to
firearm licenses.

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.4

At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965,
the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
- formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked
the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the
new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the
old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area,
more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society.5

Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret
agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at
the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle,
notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses. 1äwphï1.ñët

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713.

2 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

3 Vide People vs. Lucero, L-10845, April 28,1958, 103 Phil. 500.

4 People vs. Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607. Vide Senarillos vs.
Hermosisima, L-10662, December 14, 1956, 100 Phil. 501.

5 People vs. Jabinal, ibid.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for
plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved
therein.

On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No.
20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:

(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25,
1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;

(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this
decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to
plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would
pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson
has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.

Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and
judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701
thereof, against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No.
20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and
plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
 Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than
P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court,
the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the
decision of this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on
December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days
(Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present
case was filed it was filed two days too late.

The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët

The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on
March 20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein
raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred
by the statute of limitations.

Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same
Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn,
took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was
received by the defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken
therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955
expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise,
because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap
years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an
aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court
accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar
year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being
computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation.
There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following
year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day,
then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore,
that the 366 days constitute one year." 2

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit
provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as
the term is used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain,
the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it
meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such
provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the
same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are
referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or
"solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the
Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del
Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we
have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity
that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto
the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days."

Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for
failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot
be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the
Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act
of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so
ordered.

Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Sec. 1, Rule 39, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 31, Rules of Court.

2 Emphasis ours.

3 Decision of April 6, 1895.

4 Guzman v. Lichauco, 42 Phil. 292; Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336.

5 97 Phil. 70-71.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander
Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987
granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987
which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.

The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.

The following are the antecedents of this petition:

In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information3 which was filed on 24 October
1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal
Code allegedly committed as follows:

That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until
the present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party
of the Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the
National Democratic Front with its other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under
the direction and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the aforenamed
accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the
 country against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government, the seat of which is in the City of Manila, or of
removing from the allegiance to that government and its laws, the country's territory or part of
it;

That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of
the aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the
organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit
of their unlawful purpose, such as . . .

(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).

At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave.,
Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his
capture.4

A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas
corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court5 which, as shall hereafter
be discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the
agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will
face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person.

On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished,6 to which petitioner filed an
Opposition7 citing, among other grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:

xxx xxx xxx

Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody over his person.

In his Order of March 6, 1987,8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.

Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a
petition for bail,9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 198710 on the
ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is
no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.

On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83,
No. 24) which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.

In his Order of 7 July 198711 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon
private respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2)
months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent
Judge stated:

. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the offense
of rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable
pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses
before final judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114,
aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the present
circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter of right
inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.

As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private
respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is
to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release
would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before
whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:

True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-
capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows the right, the paramount interest
of the state." Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a
"declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed
by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action.
Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of
certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, which the government is prohibited
from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77).
To this Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the same should
be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of
his rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is that
powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and the wherewithals to fight those
"who oppose, threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and
political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the accused
may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and
anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a reason to
deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an accused
is entitled as a matter of light to bail. Dura est lex sed lex.

In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice
Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable
for the offense and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent
"had in the past escaped from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the well-
organized plan to overthrow the government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology is attained."

On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration13 indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his
bail –– to appear in court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts
which are widely known by the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have
judicial notice of:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested;

2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;

4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;

5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest,

which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court
for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers,
are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens the
existence of this very Court from which he now seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original
penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State
conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of the State of self-
preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United States of America holding "that
there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings,14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he
presents a risk of flight;15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious
felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to
the community which no condition of release can dispel.16

On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order17 adverted to in the introductory portion
of this decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
"supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds
the first motion for reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of bail is
concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of
bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the
additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every two (2)
 months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-
31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).

In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the
"sudden turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the
petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the
cases involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a
proviso on the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against
excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of
Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108,
October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.

Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following
issues:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE
GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED
BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to
bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant
of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-
capital offenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present
evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the
time that the petition for bail was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to
adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing
the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy
record of private respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the
likelihood of flight.18

In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.

In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:

I
 RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER
WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.

II

RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE

PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.

III

RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION

PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.

IV

THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS
NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.

THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES

NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent.21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987.22

In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
file simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.

In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November24 and 23 November

198725 petitioner and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that
the petition and reply be considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November
198726 and 1 December 1987,27 respectively.

In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on
the issues raised in this petitions,28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May
199029 wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private
respondent had waived the light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail
to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the
primary consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against him
which would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of whatever
amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor
General likewise maintains that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of private
respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent Judge.

And now on the issues presented in this case.

I.

Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the
application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which
the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the
application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the
penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored.
The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for
bail.

We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is
charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore,
a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:

Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the
right is absolute.32

And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact
that the accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment,
We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such
conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the
security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates
that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:

. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican
state, like ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of
public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of
section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4),
(5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the
protection of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the
Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof
will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.33 But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, supra., We held:

The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:

The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many states provide
that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses,
where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such
provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all
cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right
even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great!34

Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail
in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail
is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail.35

We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the
fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are
not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et
al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight
of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused
is under bond in other case. . . .

In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant
of an opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for
the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to
deny bail.
 II.

It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable byprision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968
approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two
newspapers of general circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:

Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. ––– Any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion

or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

xxx xxx xxx

This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed
prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.36

III.

We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in
G.R. No. 76009.

On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent,
and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia
Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel
Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying,
among others, that the petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpusbe issued
requiring respondents to produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-
accused before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested and detained them.
The following proceedings took place thereafter in said case:

1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required

respondents to make a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October
and set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Return To The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina
Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were
apprehended by the military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine General
Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders or members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic Front, organizations
dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent means, and having actually
committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After
their arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for
their arrest were issued and respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of
arrest and the pendency of the criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that,
contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was not a member of the
NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe conduct pass issued by competent
authorities.

3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements
reached between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:

When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong,
Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon
Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for
the petitioners. Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the
respondents, with Solicitor General Ordoñez arguing for the respondents.

Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in

conformity with the agreement reached with the government, the petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released
immediately.

Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing
statement made by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition
for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed to the immediate
release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will
be required of them, but they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo
Salas; further, that they will not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by
the trial court provided that they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when their presence
is required.

In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel today

relative to the compromise agreement that they have previously undertaken to
submit.

Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath
as member of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have
agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered
their immediate release.

Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and
required both parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00
o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.

4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint
Manifestation and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
 COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel,
and to this Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:

1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and

Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were
conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and human
considerations may be called into play.

2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of agreement:

a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and

Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but
shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo
Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them under their
personal recognizance.

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his person.

c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation before
the Supreme Court that they will submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.

3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the
Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic)
and their counsel of record.

4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on
October 14 and the present manifestation in compliance with the resolution
announced in court this morning.

WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.

5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:

G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas,
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño and Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14,
1986 filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and
Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states that they have entered
into an agreement whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately
released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs.
Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on their personal
recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for the
 person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in
view of the formal manifestation before this Court that they will submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition
for habeas corpusbut subject to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty.
Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to
ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.

It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even
during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to
bail."37 Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and
legal basis, for in their petition for habeas corpusthey precisely questioned the legality of the arrest
and the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was
not resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent
after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the
petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional
rights to be granted not only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent
maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means
that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.

Interestingly, private respondent admits that:

"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as
the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing
or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59
Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)

He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty."38

When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.

they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of
the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his
co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them;
they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons."
Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had
the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they
should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the
parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation
that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and
that only they shall be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall remain
in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.

In defining bail as:

. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .

Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for
the term "in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.39 It
presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of liberty.40

Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.

But, is such waiver valid?

Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."41

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:

. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the
word "waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive
any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the
owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest
in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and
further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection
of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . .

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
 While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute
and guaranteed by constitutionmay be waived, it has also been said that constitutional
provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional
rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.42

In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in
which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the
accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be
waived; those of the second may be.

It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will."44

This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;45 the right to counsel and to remain silent;46 and the right to be
heard.47

Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights. Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and
1âwphi1

independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:

. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly
suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver
will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.

We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry,
Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1
Entitled People of the Philippines versus Rodolfo C. Salas, alias Commander Bilog,
Josefina Cruz, aliasMrs. Mercado, and Jose Concepcion, alias Eugene Zamora.

2
Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 25-27.

3
Annex "C" of Petition; Id., 28-31.

4
Petition, 7; Rollo, 7; p. 4 of Order of 6 March 1987 of respondent Judge, Annex "F" of
Petition; Rollo, 47.

5
G.R. No. 76009 entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas,
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, petitioners, versus Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,
respondents.

6
Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 32-36.

7
Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 37-45.

8
Annex "F" of Petition; Id., 44-50.

9
Annex "G" of Petition; Id., 51-53.

10
Annex "H" of Petition; Rollo, 54-56.

11
Annex "J" of Petition; Id., 64-70.

12
Annex "K" of Petition; Rollo, 71-74.

13
Annex "L" of Petition; Id., 75-79.

14
Carlson vs. Landon, 342 U.S. 524; 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing vs. U.S., 163 U.S. 228
(1986).

15
Bell vs. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 534.

U.S. vs. Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro, No. 86-87, May 26, 1987, decided by the
16

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court.

17
Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo, 18-24.

18
Petition, 11-15.

19
Rollo, 84.

20
Id., 89-119.

21
Resolution of 3 September 1987; Rollo, 122.

22
Id., 126-135.
23
Id., 136.

24
Rollo, 137.

25
Id., 139-141.

26
Id., 138-A.

27
Id., 142.

28
Id., 163.

29
Id., 196-206.

30
Article 135, Revised Penal Code.

31
See Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210, 213; People vs. Alano, 81 Phil. 19, 21.

32
Montano vs. Ocampo, L-6352, Resolution of 29 January 1953, 49 O.G. 1855, cited in the
dissenting opinion of then Justice Teehankee in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA
472 (1953).

33
Herras-Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 770.

34
Citing 6 C.J., sec. 168, pp. 953, 954; Italics supplied for emphasis.

35
People vs. Sandiego, 26 SCRA 522.

36
Article 22, Revised Penal Code.

37
Petition, 8.

38
Comment, 6-8; Rollo, 94-96.

39
Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38.

40
Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., 51 SCRA 369.

41
67 C.J. 291.

42
92 C.J.S., 1066-1068; Italics supplied for emphasis.

43
16 A. 2d 50, 57, 340 Pa. 33, cited in note 71 C.J.S., 1068.

TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., pp. 31-32, citing Waxman vs.
44

United States, 12 Fed. 2nd, 775

45
People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221; de Garcia vs. Locsin, et al., 65 Phil. 689.
 People vs. Royo, 114 SCRA 304; Morales vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538; People vs. Colana,
46

126 SCRA 23; People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465; People vs. Sanchez, 132 SCRA 103 and
People vs. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362.

47
Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525; People vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
 1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
 and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither
the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering
the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag
be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.

2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345;
Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA
924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil.
486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming
Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil.
179.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et
al., 110 Phil. 150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S.
Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request
regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential
issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the
publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection

Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand
Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice
Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide
publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published."
See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution
of Indiana, U.S.A.