DESTACAMENTO

JOSE BURGOS v. SPOUSES ELADIO SJ. NAVAL & ARLINA B. NAVAL

GR No. 219468, 2016-06-08

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a letter-complaint dated April 26, 2012 filed by Burgos, before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Taytay, Rizal, charging respondents spouses Eladio and Arlina Naval (Sps. Naval) and
their daughter, Amalia Naval (Amalia; collectively respondents), of the crime of Estafa through Falsification
of Public Documents.

Burgos alleged that he and his wife, Rubie S. Garcia-Burgos, were the registered owners of a lot with an area
of 1,389 square meters, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, On November 19, 1996, the subject lot
was purportedly mortgaged to a certain Antonio Assad, and subsequently, Burgos decided to obtain a loan
from Sps. Naval in order to avoid foreclosure. Respondents agreed and asked spouses Burgos to sign some
blank documents in return -to which they faithfully complied.

Sometime in February 2011, Burgos allegedly discovered that TCT No. 550579 was cancelled, and a new one
was issued, i.e., TCT No. 644582, in favor of Sps. Naval on April 1, 1998. He claimed that the blank
documents which he and his wife... previously signed turned out to be a receipt and a Deed of Absolute
Sale[11] over the subject lot through the ploy and conspiracy of respondents.

Before arraignment, respondents filed a motion to quash based on the following grounds: (a) that their
criminal liability has been extinguished due to prescription; (b) that the information failed to charge Amalia...
with an offense; and (c) that they were not afforded the opportunity of a preliminary investigation.
Respondents averred that since the information was filed on February 11, 2013, beyond the reglementary
period often (10) years from the registration of the title on April 1, 1998, the crime had already prescribed.
They also claimed that the information did not contain any specific charge against Amalia. Finally, they
maintained that they were deprived of their right to dispute the allegations of the complaint during the
preliminary investigation.

The RTC granted respondents' motion and, consequently, dismissed the case on the ground of prescription
since more than ten (10) years had elapsed when the information was filed on February 11, 2013, the
subject crime had prescribed.

ISSUES:

whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the certiorari petition on the ground that the People, as
represented by the OSG, was not impleaded as a party.

HELD:
 DESTACAMENTO

The Court finds for respondents.

Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in
an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case.

The OSG is "the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the People before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require."

In People v. Piccio (Piccio), this Court held that "if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the
dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.
For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.

He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the
end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case."

It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of Burgos's certiorari petition is without prejudice to his
filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are
complied with.

It is noteworthy to point out that "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action where[:] (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil
action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

In this case, the RTC did not render any ruling that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby, dismissed the criminal case on the
sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for the People, thru
the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue. As earlier intimated, Burgos's remedy is to institute a civil case under
the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 DESTACAMENTO

Laude v. Judge Ginez-Jabalde, et al.

G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015.

FACTS:

This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon
Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton
before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.

On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the
same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media
Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they were only
able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have
also “furnished a copy of the Motion personally at the hearing of the Motion. On 23 December 2014, the
Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Are the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally applied due to
the timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable?

HELD:

NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be
given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural
due process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap
of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so
will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party
must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given
sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.

Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the
hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served a
 DESTACAMENTO

copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They also attempt to underscore the urgency
of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of legal holidays” where courts
would be closed. To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22,
2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule. These
circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel
was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another
incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the
issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on
noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an
accused.

ROLEX RODRIGUEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 192799. October 24, 2012

FACTS:
RTC convicted Rolex Rodriguez of Unfair Competition. After promulgation of sentence, he filed for a motion
for reconsideration before the RTC on last day of the reglementary period to appeal. Fourteen days after
receipt of the RTC denying his motion for reconsideration, he filed his Notice of Appeal. Thus, the denial of
his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (29 days after promulgation).
Rodriguez asserted that the fresh period rule should be applied after the motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
ISSUE:

Whether the fresh period rule should apply.

HELD:
The SC held that the fresh period rule should also apply to criminal cases.
As was the decision in Yu v. Tatad, the fresh period rule should also apply to Rule 122, Sec. 6 of the Rules of
Court. The SC said that the privilege should also accord those in criminal cases and not just in civil cases.
 DESTACAMENTO

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION v. PEOPLE

GR No. 161106, 2014-01-13

FACTS:

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the
Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search
the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza
Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, applications alleged that petitioners were conducting
illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 the trial
court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera
(Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as
witnesses.

ISSUES:

PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question the quashal of the
search warrants

HELD:

The conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done
by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an
appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal
case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the
search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of
determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the
quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."
 DESTACAMENTO

ROMEO S. CHUA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON

G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993

FACTS:

1. Judge Lauro V. Francisco RTC Cebu branch 8, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other
witnesses, issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction
located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number
GAP-175. At twelve noon of the same date, respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody
thereof.

2. RTC cebu branch 13: ACTION FOR Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same
Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe"

3. petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle
on the strength of the aforesaid search warrant.

4. Writ of REPLEVIN – ISSUED

5. Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin –
DENIED. MR- DENIED: CA: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for the nullification of the orders

6. Carnapping case was provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo Chua with the following reservation:
"without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved"

7. CA reversed RTC decision - directed that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy

8. SC – certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON RTC erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to petitioner when the
latter filed the action for replevin

HELD:

1. It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in
custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive
officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for this principle is that if it was
otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been
performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or
 DESTACAMENTO

attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the
levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie.

2. Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where personal property
is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed
by the filing of a criminal and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the
filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not
necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that
the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for
carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is
resolved in favor of complainant" (emphasis supplied), or the criminal information has actually been
commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the
proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in
any other branch of the said court.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION AND ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED VS. SAMIR FARAJALLAH, VIRGILIO D.C.
HERCE, et a.,

G.R. No. 205800 , G.R. No. 205800

FACTS:

Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Sy stems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of the United States. Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including
copyright relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software and the corresponding user’s manuals,
and the registered owner of the “Microsoft” “MS DOS” trademarks in the Philippines.

Adobe Systems Incorporated is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions
of Adobe Software. Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Her ce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma.
Geraldine S. Garcia are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation
with principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City.

Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing
and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc. (OSI) was engaged by petitioners to
 DESTACAMENTO

assist in the verification of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and
Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were
trained to detect unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software. On 17 March 2010, counsel for
petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group.

The case was assigned to Police Senior Inspector Ernesto V. Padilla (Padilla). On 26 March 2010, Padilla,
Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of respondents. Using a legitimate business pretext, they were able
to use two computers owned by New Fields and obtained the following information regarding the installed
Microsoft and Adobe software: First computer Installed Software Product I.D./Serial Number Microsoft
Windows XP Pro V2002 SP2 55274-640-1582543-23775 Microsoft Office Word 2007 Enterprise Edition 2007
89388-707-0358973-65509 Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro (1) 1118-1061-0904-4874-2027 Second computer Installed
Software Product I.D./Serial Number Microsoft Windows XP Pro V2002 SP2 55274-640-1582543-23442
Microsoft Office Word 2007 Enterprise Edition 2007 89388-707-0358973-65709 Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro (1)
1118-1061-0904-4874-2027 Padilla was trained to distinguish original from counterfeit software, and he saw
the screens of the computers used by the OSI staff, including the product I.D. Nos. of the installed software.
In their Joint Affidavit, Serrano and Moradoz stated that: There are at least two (2) computers using common
product identification and/or serial numbers of MICROSOFT and ADOBE software. This is one indication that
the software being used is unlicensed or was illegally reproduced or copied. Based on the training we
attended, all ADOBE and MICROSOFT software should only be installed in one computer, unless they avail of
an Open License Agreement from the software developer, which is not the case in NEW FIELDS. In this case,
the first three sets of numbers of the Product I.D. Nos. of the MICROSOFT Windows XP Pro operating System
software program installed in the two (2) computer units we used, i.e., “55274-640- 1582543-xxxxx”, were
the same. We also observed that the first three sets of numbers of the Product I.D Nos. of the MICROSOFT
Office 2007(Word) software in the two (2) computers we used, i.e., “89388-707-0358973- xxxxx”, were also
the same. Ostensibly, this means that NEW FIELDS only used one (1) installer of the MICROSOFT Windows XP
operating system software and one (1) installer of the MICROSOFT Office software program on two (2)
computers. They also observed that New Fields had 90 computers in their office with Microsoft software,
none of which had the Certificate of Authenticity issued by Microsoft.

After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then issued certifications that they have
not authorized New Fields to “copy, print, reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and
Adobe software products.” An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before
Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC. Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and
10-15913 were issued on the same date. The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New
 DESTACAMENTO

Fields employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized, including 17
CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software.

On 6 June 2010, New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two warrants served (Search Warrant
No. 10-15912). On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that “all the
items seized from the respondents be returned. According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified
which specific computer had the pirated software. The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet,
despite the fact that the seized items have been in petitioners’ possession for several weeks since the
warrants wer eissued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the petitioners’ contention that the three-day notice rule
was not complied with because petitioners were already notified of the motion personally.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Quash
despite: (1) respondents’ failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2) the existence of
probable cause, and personal knowledge of the warrant applicant.

The CA denied the petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Amor Reyes of Branch 21, Regional Trial Court of
Manila did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
Orders dated 29 June 2010 and 27 August 2010, quashing Search Warrant Nos. 10-[1]5912 and 10-[1]5913
and directing the immediate release of the items seized pursuant to the said warrants, despite the pendency
of appellate proceedings.

HELD:

We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case.

However, we sustain petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and
the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both warrants. Compliance with the three-day notice rule.
In Anama v. Court of Appeals we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the rule
is to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable
opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be
dispensed with. As correctly pointed out by the CA: In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered
petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in
court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when
respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study
 DESTACAMENTO

and oppose the arguments stated in the motion. Existence of probable cause Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari “shall raise only questions of law.” A question of fact
exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only be resolved through a
reexamination of the body of evidence. In this case, we find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA,
since there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.The CA sustained the quashal of the
warrant because the witnesses had “no personal knowledge of the facts upon which the issuance of the
warrants may be justified,” and the applicants and the witnesses merely relied on the screen shots acquired
from the confidential informant.

We disagree with the conclusions of the CA. Looking at the records, it is clear that Padilla and his
companions were able to personally 3 verify the tip of their informant. In his Affidavit submitted to Judge
Amor Reyes prior to the issuance of the warrant, Padilla stated that: “At the time that I was inside the office
premises of the NEW FIELDS, I saw the Product Keys or Product Identification Numbers of the ADOBE and
MICROSOFT computer software programs installed in some of the computer units. Ms. Serrano and Mr.
Moradoz were able to pull up these data since they were allowed to use some of the computers of the
target companies in line with the pretext that we used to gain entry into NEW FIELDS. I actively read and
attentively observed the information reflected from the monitor display unit of the computers that Ms.
Serrano and Mr. Moradoz were able to use. x x x. As mentioned earlier, Padilla has been trained to
distinguish illegally reproduced Adobe and Microsoft software The evidence on record clearly shows that the
applicant and witnesses were able to verify the information obtained from their confidential source. The
evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Thus, the
requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant and witnesses was clearly satisfied in this case.

Oebanda vs People

FACTS:

1. United States Office of Inspector General, through Special Agent Daniel Altman, sought the assistance of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate alleged financial fraud committed by Visayan Forum
Foundation, Inc., a nonstock, non-profit corporation, against the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). Visayan Forum was then receiving funding from USAID which suspected that Visayan
 DESTACAMENTO

Forum was fabricating documents and official receipts for purchase of goods and services to justify expenses
and advances covered by USAID funding.

2. On 29 August 2012, two NBI Agents, Atty. Dennis R. Villasfer and Atty. Erickson Donn R. Mercado, entered
the premises of Visayan Forum representing themselves to be part of the audit team of B.F. Medina and
Company, an independent external audit firm accredited by USAID and engaged by Visayan Forum to
conduct an audit of its USAID funds. After gaining entry, the NBI Agents went through boxes, sifted through
documents and photocopied some documents and receipts.

3. Thereafter, the NBI Agents, under the authorization of the NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation
Service, jointly applied for a search warrant with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 citing violation of Article
172(2) of the Revised Penal Code and alleged that petitioners Maria Cecilia Oebanda, the Executive Director
of Visayan Forum, and/or the occupants and employees of Visayan Forum are in possession or have in their
control falsified private documents which were used and are being used to defraud the donors of USAID, to
its damage and prejudice.

4. On the same date, Judge Cabochan, the Presiding Judge of RTC-Quezon City, Branch 98, conducted a
hearing on the application for search warrant. Plaintiff People of the Philippines presented the as witnesses:
the said NBI agents, Maria Analie L. Villacorte (Villacorte), a former bookkeeper of Visayan Forum; and
Celestina M. Aguilar (Aguilar), an auditor from B.F. Medina and Company. After Judge Cabochan personally
examined the applicants and their witnesses, and was satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application was based, she issued the search warrant in question against Visayan Forum.

5. On 24 September 2012, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant on the ground of
lack of probable cause to issue the search warrant but it was later denied by Presiding Judge Ma. Lourdes A.
Giron of the RTC- Quezon City, Branch 102, denied the motion. Judge Cabochan of RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98, who originally issued the search warrant, inhibited herself from the case.

6. On 26 December 2012, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied in an Order dated
3 June 2013.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC committed reversible error in finding that probable cause exists to issue the search
warrant in question - NO

HELD:

The petition lacks merit. At the outset, this petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which is
limited to questions of law. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
 DESTACAMENTO

probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Because this Court is not a trier of
facts, a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the RTC. Further, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions laid down in the Rules.
However, in order to put finis to this case, we will discuss and go through the issues submitted by petitioners.
On whether the judge asked probing and exhaustive questions Petitioners submit that the judge who issued
the search warrant did not sufficiently ask probing, exhaustive, and extensive questions. Petitioners insist
that the judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but must make her own extensive
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. In an application for search warrant, the mandate of
the judge is for him to conduct a full and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must depend on a
large extent upon the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not
merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory.

In the present case, the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, comprised of 72 pages which was taken during the
hearing, shows that Judge Cabochan extensively interrogated the two NBI Agents who applied for the search
warrant. By representing themselves to be part of the audit team of B.F. Medina and Company, the two NBI
Agents were able to freely enter and move around Visayan Forum's premises. There, the NBI Agents were
able to sufficiently observe the layout of the office buildings, the location of relevant documents and
equipment, and the movement of the employees. Most importantly, the NBI Agents were able to distinctly
describe the alleged wrongful acts that Visayan Forum committed and was committing at that time. Clearly,
the records show that Judge Cabochan personally examined NBI Agents Villasfer and Mercado, the
applicants for the search warrant, as well as their witnesses, Villacorte and Aguilar. The interrogations
conducted by the trial judge showed that the applicants and their witnesses had personal knowledge of the
offense petitioners committed or were then committing. Absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed
that a judicial function has been regularly performed.

The judge has the prerogative to give his own judgment on the application of the search warrant by his own
evaluation of the evidence presented before him. We cannot substitute our own judgment to that of the
judge. On whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrant In the issuance of a search warrant,
probable cause requires such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In People v. Punzalan, we held that there is no exact test for
the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on
the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. Here, the records show that the
 DESTACAMENTO

applicants for the search warrant and their witnesses were able to sufficiently convince the judge of the
existence of probable cause based on their own personal knowledge, or what they have actually seen and
observed, in Visayan Forum's premises. When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by the reviewing courts. Here, in issuing the
search warrant, Judge Cabochan sufficiently complied with the requirements set by the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.

JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a)
petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma,
showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d)
his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner,
as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.
 DESTACAMENTO

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is
premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in
Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties
have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these
so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They
are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations
in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a)
A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a
 DESTACAMENTO

suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding
of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.”

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for violation of Section 681 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,2 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines
(Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, on August 12, 2008.4 The Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CR No. 01162, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution5 dated April 15, 2011 for failure to serve a copy
 DESTACAMENTO

of the Appellant’s Brief to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The CA, in its Resolution6 dated
November 19, 2012, also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

The Facts

Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house
of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon,
Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to
the petitioner’s house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they
saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner and at the shoreline about two meters away
from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who
was the owner of the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel
entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without a search warrant.7

Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered.
When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter
showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the
said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and
the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt showed that
the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on
March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber in the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces
of magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece
2x10x12.8

Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber,
asked for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber
to the DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement Showing the
Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated,9 which showed the value of the lumber to be
9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s
testimony.10

SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio
Crescencio went to the house of the petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later loaded on a
cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon,
Bohol.11
 DESTACAMENTO

On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber were
owned by the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol
and from Java Marketing in Ubay, Bohol.12 However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053
issued by Pengavitor Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the forest products confiscated.

On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information13 alleged:

That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to possess and to gain for her
own benefit, without any legal document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and
without any lawful authority under existing rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector,
willfully, unlawfully and illegally possess and have under her custody and control forest products consisting
of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a volume of 452 board feet and a total value of Nine
Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the
Philippines.14

During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.Thereafter,
trial ensued.15

On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment16 convicting the petitioner of the offense charged and
sentenced her to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11)
years and six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber owned by the petitioner.17

As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its Resolution18 dated April 15,
2011, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the
Appellant’s Brief in violation of the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied by the CA,in its Resolution19 dated November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the appeal due to the petitioner’s
failureto serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant factual
circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice.

Ruling of the Court

In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure and submits that the
CA erred in dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.
 DESTACAMENTO

Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest
opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities
whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.20

The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid,technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not override – substantial justice. For this
reason, courts must proceed with caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must
ensure thatall litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their
causes, free from the constraint of technicalities."21

It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner’s cause, the appellate
court opted not to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the appeal was the decision of the RTC
convicting the petitioner of violation of the Forestry Code and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of
no less than six (6) years to eleven (11) years.

In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to
subvert and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that her appeal was
dismissed by the CA for failure to serve a copy of her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately
confronted her previous counsel who denied having filed such brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried
of being incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw from the case. Thus, the petitioner
submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence and ignorance of her former
counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an Appellant’s Brief.

As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the
appellate court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty
or property; or (c) where the interests of justice so require.22

Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief
tothe OSG is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton
recklessness or gross negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in
the outright deprivation of her liberty.

In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the
meritsof the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioner’s liberty.

Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.
 DESTACAMENTO

In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents to show
that she bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in
evidence against her.

The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain
view.1âwphi1 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right
to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.24

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the
house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying
under the latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It
isclear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside
the petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. Section
8025 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the
Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing
in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense orthe forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly,
in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the lumber which
evidently incriminated the petitioner.

The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well as her subsequent
failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute
criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two
distinctand separate offenses punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.26

In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents consummates
the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is
 DESTACAMENTO

a special law which considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.27

In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but unfortunately no
permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly
charged the petitioner with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents. The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that the
lumber was confiscated from the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume
of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the house of the petitioner,
and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR
personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the
petitioner’s liability.

As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayoras maximum.

The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as
appearing in the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is
₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that
this amount is the estimate based on prevailing local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they issued,
the prosecution did not present any proof as tothe value of the lumber.

Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the
property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the prosecution must present more than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum
penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.28 Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of the confiscated lumber is ₱9,040.00 for no
evidence of such value was established during the trial.

Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)29 of the RPC,
whichis arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation of Section 68
of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 31030 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC,
the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that is, to prision correccionalin its medium and
maximum periods or within the range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4)
 DESTACAMENTO

years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that there are no attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the offense.

In accordance with current jurisprudence31 and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court finds it proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of
frmr (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Charlie Te vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva

G.R. No. 164974, August 5, 2015

FACTS:

Respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the petitioner upon the application of
respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting of the Saranggani District Office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI SARDO) on the basis of his finding of probable cause for a violation of Section 2(b) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 33. Petitioner presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence
and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising therein the lack of probable cause, failure to specify the single
offense committed, illegality of the nighttime search, improper application of the plain view doctrine, and
inclusion of other offenses.

The motion was denied by the presiding judge observing that he had issued the search warrant for one
specific offense; that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. The petitioner assailed the order
in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari mainly positing that respondent Presiding Judge had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. However, the CA promulgated
 DESTACAMENTO

the first assailed order dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that a copy of the petition had been served on the
OSG. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that impleading the People of the Philippines as
respondents was premature because no criminal case had yet been filed against him with only the
application for the issuance of the search warrant having been made; and that serving the copy of the
petition on the OSG pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court was not indispensable.

Not satisfied, the petitioner has come to the Court on appeal to reverse and set aside the aforesaid
resolutions by insisting that the failure to implead the People of the Philippines was not a fatal defect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as respondents in the petition for
certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) to annul and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
denying the petitioner's motion to quash the search warrant issued against him.

HELD:

YES. Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not depend on whether or not
an actual criminal action had already been commenced in court against the petitioner. The impleading is
expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 461 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the omission of the People of
the Philippines from the petition was fatal. The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines is also imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

We may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant was not a criminal action; and
that the application for the search warrant was not of the same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the
search warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is rather a legal process that may be likened to a writ of
discovery employed by no less than the State to procure relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an
instrument or tool, issued under the State’s police power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the
name of the People of the Philippines. Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant and
the search warrant itself were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines.
 DESTACAMENTO

People vs Castillo

FACTS:

Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued a search warrant against the premises of Rabino for
violation of RA 9165. A search was conducted wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1 sachet of shabu inside the
house of Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The case
was raffled to RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.
Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally
Acquired Evidence, citing lack of probable cause among other grounds. Judge Castillo granted the motion to
quash, holding that because the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of 6
years, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to issue the search warrant.
As such, the search warrant is null and void and all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and
void.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

ISSUE:
May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction?

HELD:

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on
grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those
specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the
accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites
set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:
 DESTACAMENTO

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where
the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan
has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant
was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was
found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court was duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant
must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has
jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has
yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.