Case Digests Compilation - Torts and Damages PDF

TORTS AND DAMAGES
CASE DIGESTS | S.Y. 2019 – 2020
CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 2
Concept: Culpa Aquiliana, Quasi-Delict, Torts ................................................................................................. 2
Padilla vs. CA, 129 SCRA 558 .............................................................................................................................. 2
Syquia vs. CA, GR 98695....................................................................................................................................... 5
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, GR 97336 ..................................................................................................... 7
LRTA vs. Natividad, GR 145804....................................................................................................................... 10
Distinctions (Culpa Aquiliana, Culpa Contractual, Culpa Criminal) ....................................................... 12
Calalas vs. CA, GR 122039................................................................................................................................. 12
Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil 607........................................................................................................................ 15
Cangco vs. MRR, 38 Phil 769 ........................................................................................................................... 21
Quasi-Delict ................................................................................................................................. 25
Elements (Art. 2176, CC) ........................................................................................................................................ 25
Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809 ............................................................................................................................. 25
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP Agustino Recoletos............................................................................... 26
Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 ...................................................................................................... 30
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542 ....................................................................................................................... 33
Damnum Absque Injuria ....................................................................................................................................... 36
Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, GR 18805 .................................................................................................. 36
Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corp., GR 83589 ....................................................................................... 41
No Double Recovery Rule (Article 2177, CC) ................................................................................................. 42
Joseph vs. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540 ................................................................................................................ 42
Bermudez, Sr. vs. Herrera, 158 SCRA 168 ................................................................................................... 44
Singson vs. Bank of P.I., 23 SCRA 1117 ........................................................................................................ 46
Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 ...................................................................................................... 47
Rafael Reyes Trucking vs. People, GR 129029........................................................................................... 47
Gambito | Miquiabas | Rosette | Sarangani | Sarip

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INTRODUCTION RTC Ruling: Finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia
CONCEPT: CULPA AQUILIANA, QUASI - guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
DELICT, TORTS grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to
suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One
PADILLA VS. CA, 129 SCRA 558 (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual
and compensatory damages in the amount of
FACTS P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
On or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
in the morning, in the municipality of Jose damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
Philippines, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, proportionate costs of this proceedings.
Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, Accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David
David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their
and mutually helping one another, and acting criminal participation in the crime charged.
without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of The extinction of the civil action by reason of
threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil
and his family to close their stall located at the Public liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability
Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the
door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a
and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein crime.
by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying
CA Ruling: According to the petitioners, the town
away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
mayor had the power to order the clearance of
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara
market premises and the removal of the
and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in
complainants' stall because the municipality had
concept of actual or compensatory and moral
enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which
damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as
the market stall was a nuisance per se.
exemplary damages.
Appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable
That in committing the offense, the accused took
doubt, but they are ordered to pay jointly and
advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,
severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00,
being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
as actual damages.
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, ISSUE
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error
evident premeditation.
in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to

Page 2 of 49
the complainants after acquitting them from the that the crime of grave coercion has not been
criminal charge. proved in accordance with law.
RULING While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they

nevertheless are liable for the actual damages
No, respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
suffered by the complainants by reason of the
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil properties. The extinction of the penal action does
liability which is included in the criminal action is that not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist
case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court). In the
no civil liability arising from the criminal charge instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise,
could be imposed upon him. namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
properties contained therein; exists, and this is not
In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted denied by the accused. And since there is no
not because they did not commit the acts stated in showing that the complainants have reserved or
the charge against them. There is no dispute over the waived their right to institute a separate civil action,
forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
with axes and other instruments, and the carting criminal action (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were
acquitted because these acts were denominated Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the
coercion when they properly constituted some other fundamental proposition that when a criminal action
offense such as threat or malicious mischief. is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing instituted with it. There is no implied institution when
provision, the violence must be employed against the offended party expressly waives the civil action
the person, not against property as what happened or reserves his right to institute it separately.
in the case at bar.
There is the civil liability arising from the act as a
May the accused be convicted of an offense other crime and the liability arising from the same act as a
than coercion? quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil
They should have been prosecuted either for liability may be enforced against the accused,
threats or malicious mischief. But the law However, the offended party cannot recover
does not allow us (SC) to render judgment of damages under both types of liability.
conviction for either of these offenses Section 3 (c) of Rule 111
because they were not indicted for, these
offenses. The information under which they (c) Extinction of the penal action does not
were prosecuted does not allege the carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
elements of either threats or malicious extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
mischief. Although the information mentions final judgment that the fact from which the
that the act was by means of threats', it does civil might arise did not exist. In other cases,
not allege the particular threat made. We rule the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the
Page 3 of 49
manner provided by law against the person To require a separate civil action simply because the
who may be liable for restitution of the thing accused was acquitted would mean needless
and reparation or indemnity for the damage clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
suffered. duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability
of the accused for damages only when it includes a Up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the
declaration that the facts from which the civil might goods taken out from the store nor the materials of
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not the demolished stall have not been made known.
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
evaluated them were:
of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance,
in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief Value of furniture and equipment
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur judgment destroyed 300.00
only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does
Value of goods and equipment taken
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act
8,000.00
of which the accused was acquitted.
P9,600.00
Article 29, Civil Code
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact
When the accused in a criminal prosecution
that they caused the destruction of the
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
complainant's market stall and had its contents
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
carted away.
a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action The only supposed obstacle is the provision of
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when
Upon motion of the defendant, the court the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to the ground that his guilt has not been proved
answer for damages in case the complaint beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
should be found to be malicious. for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal
substantive law calls for a separate civil action and
is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in
shall so declare. In the absence of any
the interests of economy and simplicity and
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
following the dictates of logic and common sense.
from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground. We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code
in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a
Acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case
judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a
a civil case based on the same acts which led to
remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has
the criminal prosecution (Republic v. Bello, 120
been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the
SCRA 203).
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ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond The complaint alleged:
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil
• that pursuant to a Deed of Sale and
action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal
Interment Order No. 7106 executed between
for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code
plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and
provision does not state that the remedy can be
defendant-appellee, the former, father of
availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate
deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized
civil case may be filed but there is no statement that
and instructed defendant-appellee to inter
such separate filing is the only and exclusive
the remains of deceased in the Manila
permissible mode of recovering damages.
Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision July 25, 1978;
in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a • that on September 4, 1978, preparatory to
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal transferring the said remains to a newly
action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment purchased family plot, the concrete vault
of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal encasing the coffin of the deceased was
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil removed from its niche;
liability unless there is clear showing that the act • that plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the
from which civil liability might arise did not exist. concrete vault had a hole approximately
three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom
A separate civil action may be warranted where
of one of the walls closing out the width of
additional facts have to be established or more
the vault on one end and that for a certain
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
length of time (one hour, more or less), water
case has been fully terminated and a separate
drained out of the hole;
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
• that plaintiffs-appellants became agitated
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
and upset with concern that the water which
where the criminal action was decided for further
had collected inside the vault might have
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
risen as it in fact did rise;
offended party may, of course, choose to file a
• that pursuant to an authority granted by the
separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Municipal Court of Parañaque, plaintiffs-
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the
appellants with the assistance of licensed
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
morticians and certain personnel of
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
defendant-appellant caused the opening of
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
the concrete vault;
• that upon opening the vault, the following
SYQUIA VS. CA, GR 98695 became apparent: a) the interior walls of the
concrete vault showed evidence of total
FACTS
flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and by water, filth and silt causing the wooden
Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-appellants parts to warp and separate and to crack the
herein, filed a complaint for damages against viewing glass panel located directly above
defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the
Cemetery, Inc. entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the
deceased, and the exposed parts of the
Page 5 of 49
deceased's remains were damaged and ISSUES
soiled by the action of the water and silt and
1. Whether the Manila Memorial Park
were also coated with filth.
Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach petitioners
by the defendant-appellee of its obligation to 2. Whether private respondent was guilty of a
deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to tort.
protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin
RULING
against the elements which resulted in the
desecration of deceased's grave and in the Both NO. There is not enough ground, both in fact
alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the
New Civil Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, petitioners. Although a pre-existing contractual
the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered relation between the parties does not preclude the
ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs- existence of a culpa aquiliana, SC finds no reason to
appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, disregard the CA’s finding that there was no
P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages negligence.
in the amount determined by the court, 20% of
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees,
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
and expenses of litigation and costs of suit.
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
Ruling of RTC negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict .
RTC dismissmed the complaint. The trial court held
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
that the contract between the parties did not
guarantee that the cement vault would be Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict Inc., entered into a contract entitled
because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or
"Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care"
negligence, and because there was a pre-existing
on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the
contractual relation between the Syquias and
relations of the parties and defined their respective
defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The
rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual
trial court also accepted the explanation given by
negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-
the vault: "The hole had to be bored through the
delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual
concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will
as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to
float and the grave would be filled with water and
wit:
the digging would caved in the earth, the earth
would caved in the fill up the grave." Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
Ruling of CA
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
CA affirmed RTC’s judgement of dismissal. liable for damages.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private
respondent provides that:
Page 6 of 49
Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or of the persons, of the time and of the place."
concrete, the actual installment of which shall be
The circumstances surrounding the commission of
made by the employees of the Association.
the assailed act — boring of the hole — negate the
Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private allegation of negligence.
respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof.
As explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman:
Consequently, water seeped through the cement
enclosure and damaged everything inside it. “The day before Vicente Syquia was buried our
However, there was no stipulation in the Deed of personnel dug a grave. After digging the next
Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave
Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole
Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. was placed on the vault so that water could come
into the vault because it was raining heavily then
Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel,
because the vault has no hole the vault will float and
explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed."
the grave would be filled with water and the digging
The meaning that has been given by private
would caved in and the earth, the earth would caved
respondent to the word conforms with the cited
in and fill up the grave.”
dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear
that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the
As ruled by the CA:
accumulation of water inside the vault which would
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his have resulted in the caving in of earth around the
signature to the Deed of Sale and the attached Rules grave filling the same with earth.
and Regulations, it can be assumed that he has
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part
accepted defendant-appellee's undertaking to
of private respondent, SC finds no reason to award
merely provide a concrete vault. He cannot now
damages in favor of petitioners. SC AFFIRMS in toto
claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.
be waterproofed. It is basic that the parties are
bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law
between them. Where there is nothing in the GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. CA, GR 97336
contract which is contrary to law, morals, good
FACTS
customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of
the contract must be sustained. Private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged
Therefore, private respondent did not breach the violation of their agreement to get married. She
tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. alleges that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and has a good moral character and
Can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana
reputation duly respected in her community.
for boring the hole on the vault?
Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that and an exchange student taking a medical course at
diligence which is required by the nature of the the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
Allegedly, petitioner proposed to the private

Page 7 of 49
respondent to which the latter accepted. Petitioner temerity and courage to come to court and expose
then visited the private respondent's parents to her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
secure their approval to the marriage. Petitioner ridicule if her claim was false.
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments;
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
promulgated the challenged decision affirming in
attitude towards her started to change; he
toto the trial court's ruling. Petitioner argue that
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any
confrontation with the Barangay, petitioner
good custom or public policy; he has not professed
repudiated their marriage agreement because he
love or proposed marriage to the private
was already married to someone living in Bacolod
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He
City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
other relief and remedies as may be just and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made
equitable. Petitioner admitted only the personal
a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill
circumstances of the parties as averred in the
the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations.
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
The RTC decided in favor of the private respondent Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four
applying Article 21 of the Civil Code. The decision is (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the
anchored on the trial court's findings and trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess
conclusions that (a) petitioner and private good moral character.
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not
a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who ISSUE
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, Whether or not damages may be recovered for a
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that RULING
deceitful promise, private respondent and her The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
traditions — made some preparations for the deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New
wedding, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
a foreigner and who has abused Philippine provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
because, inter alia, she would not have had the impossible for human foresight to specifically
Page 8 of 49
enumerate and punish in the statute books. device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
quasi-delict thus: award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
It is essential, however, that such injury should have
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
good customs or public policy.
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
protestations of love for and promise to marry
delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
includes not only negligence, but international
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short,
the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between
be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
Code because the private respondent was above
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
seduction.
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending, if
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo- not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on
American law on torts. account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then,
21, Supreme Court held that where a man's promise
from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
woman so circumstances could not have even
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
love and promise to marry were empty words
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed,
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
Page 9 of 49
he loved her and would want her to be his life's LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease selection and supervision of its security guards. The
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while
concept of morality and brazenly defied the Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad
can even be said that the petitioner committed such had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of assigned task.
the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
RTC: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to
performance of his obligations. No foreigner must
pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs
Actual damages, compensatory damages, indemnity
and traditions.
for the death of nicanor natividad, moral damages,
attorney’s fees, cost of suit.
LRTA VS. NATIVIDAD, GR 145804
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo
FACTS
Roman are dismissed for lack of merit. The
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are
station after purchasing a "token" (representing likewise dismissed. PRUDENT APPEALED.
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
CA: Exonerated Prudent from any liability for the
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin,
death of Nicanor Navidad and, Instead, appellees
the security guard assigned to the area approached
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby
fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-
indicate how the fight started or who, between the appellees, the following: actual damages; nominal
two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell damages; moral damages; indemnity for the death
on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad of the deceased; and attorney’s fees.
fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased
Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the might not have then as yet boarded the train, a
moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. contract of carriage theretofore had already existed
when the victim entered the place where passengers
Widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie
were supposed to be after paying the fare and
Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint
getting the corresponding token therefor. In
for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her that there was nothing to link the security agency to
husband. the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to
show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim
and the evidence merely established the fact of

Page 10 of 49
death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by petitioners, according to the appellate court, have
the train owned and managed by the LRTA and failed to show, the presumption would be that it has
operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court been at fault, an exception from the general rule that
faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert negligence must be proved.
evidence to establish the fact that the application of
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
ISSUE arises from the breach of that contract by reason of
its failure to exercise the high diligence required of
WON petitioners (LRTA and Roman) are liable for the
the common carrier. In the discharge of its
death of Nicanor Navidad.
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a
RULING carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate
firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities
that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED
under the contract of carriage.
and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from
liability. No costs. (LAWS CITED: ARTICLE Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that
1755,1756,1759,1763) liability could only be for tort under the provisions of
Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction
The law requires common carriers to carry
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise,
passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or
cautious persons with due regard for all
fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
established, the employer can then be made liable
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not
on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the
only during the course of the trip but for so long as
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
the passengers are within its premises and where
families in the selection and supervision of its
they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
employees. The liability is primary and can only be
carriage. The statutory provisions render a common
negated by showing due diligence in the selection
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
through the negligence or wilful acts of its
that has not been shown. Absent such a showing,
employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
one might ask further, how then must the liability of
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of
independent contractor, on the other hand, be
due diligence could have prevented or stopped the
described? It would be solidary. A contractual
act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a
obligation can be breached by tort and when the
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting
negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana,
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine,
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees
a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
where tort is that which breaches the contract.
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation
breach of contract would have itself constituted the
by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
Page 11 of 49
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract DISTINCTIONS (CULPA AQUILIANA, CULPA
existed between the parties, the contract can be said CONTRACTUAL, CULPA CRIMINAL)
to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply.
CALALAS VS. CA, GR 122039
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving
FACTS
spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this
Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court At 10 o'clock in the morning, private respondent
of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
court is not without substantial justification in our jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
own review of the records of the case. passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner door at the rear end of the vehicle.
Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental,
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she
and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way
the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so,
liable only for his own fault or negligence. an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned
by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying
which has been violated or invaded by the skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not circular casting, and case wedging were done under
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending
nominal damages cannot co-exist with physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic
compensatory damages. surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate period of three months and would have to ambulate
court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in in crutches during said period.
that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for
and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
liability. No costs. contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
Isuzu truck.

Page 12 of 49
RTC: Rendered judgment against Salva as third- The second issue: quasi-delict, also known as culpa
party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who the negligence of the tortfeasor. In quasi-delict, the
was responsible for the accident. negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action.
The trial court took cognizance of another case (Civil
Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which the same court held of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
for the damage to his jeepney. negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
CA: The ruling of the lower court was reversed on
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based
the common carrier the burden of proof. Thus, there
on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
is no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena
required under the Civil Code. The appellate court
liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should
dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva
be binding on Sunga.
and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
ISSUES collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
1. This case. Whether petitioner is liable on his negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
contract of carriage. YES. proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
2. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether quasi- delict, not in actions involving breach of
Salva and his driver Verena were liable for contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
quasi-delict for the damage caused to liability to a person where there is no relation
petitioner's jeepney. [Not to be answered in between him and another party. In such a case, the
this case; for illustration purposes] obligation is created by law itself.
3. Whether or not the moral damages (P50,000)
However, where there is a pre-existing contractual
was excessive and without legal basis. YES.
relation between the parties, it is the parties
RULING themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
There is a need to distinguish the two case (This case
thus created.
and Civil Case No. 3490).
NCC relavant provisions:
The first issue: breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
performance of a contractual obligation. In breach of business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
proving the existence of the contract and the fact over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, transported by them, according to all the
failed to transport his passenger safely to his circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary
destination diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6,
and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety
Page 13 of 49
of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 A. Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to
and 1756. an implied assumption of risk.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the • This is untenable. The Supreme Court held
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight that, it is akin to arguing that the injuries to
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
cautious persons, with due regard for all the should not be compensated merely because
circumstances. those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have B. The jeepney being bumped while it was
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
they prove that they observed extraordinary
• This is not untenable. A caso fortuito is an
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
event which could not be foreseen, or which,
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the though foreseen, was inevitable.
accident, the presumption of negligence at once • This requires that the following requirements
arose, and it became the duty of petitioner Calalas be present:
to prove that he had to observe extraordinary
a. the cause of the breach is independent of
diligence in the care of his passengers.
the debtor's will;
Petitioner was found to be negligent. Several factors
b. the event is unforeseeable or
militate against petitioner's contention:
unavoidable;
1. The jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
c. the event is such as to render it
portion being exposed about two meters from
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing
obligation in a normal manner, and
the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle.
This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as d. the debtor did not take part in causing
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic the injury to the creditor.
Code.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
2. It is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
more passengers than the allowed seating meters into the highway.
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of
the same law. THIRD ISSUE: GR: moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" breach of contract for it is not one of the items
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption XPN: such damages are recoverable:
of negligence imposed on him for the injury
1. in cases in which the mishap results in the death
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he
of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
According to the petitioner:
Page 14 of 49
2. in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud Ruling of CFI Manila: awarded damages in favor of
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the
date of the complaint.
There is no legal basis for awarding moral damages
since there was no factual finding that the petitioner CA Ruling: modified by reducing the damages to
acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action
of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
admission in open court that the driver of the negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was
jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad speed.
faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of
who took her to the hospital does not imply that
Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal
petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his
Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as
injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
there has been no civil action against Pedro
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo
for the accident.
cannot be held responsible in the case. The
contention is untenable. The liability sought to be
BARREDO VS. GARCIA, 73 PHIL 607
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil
FACTS obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor
(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,
imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason
on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
of his negligence in the selection or supervision of
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision
his servant or employee.
between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro ISSUE
Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil
its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
suffered injuries from which he died two days later.
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted
and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one RULING
year and one day to two years of prision
Yes, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
defendant-petitioner.
action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab independent from delict or crime. Upon this
and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903
of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Page 15 of 49
Civil Code Provisions: Articles 1089, 1092, 1093, institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
1902, 1903, 1904 ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law.
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from Some of the differences between crimes under the
contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito
and omissions which are unlawful or in which under the Civil Code are:
any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while
xxx xxx xxx
cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes
felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
by the provisions of the Penal Code. Code, by means of indemnification, merely
repairs the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts,
caused by his employees may recover from
because the former are punished only if there
the latter what he may have paid.
is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
Revised Penal Code: Articles 100, 101, 102, 103, 365 latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which
"any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of However, it should be noted that not all
felony. — Every person criminally liable for a violations of the penal law produce civil
felony is also civilly liable. responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles
game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
when nobody is hurt.
cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme
or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld that a quasi-
as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
only reckless but even simple imprudence or distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
negligence, the fault or negligence under article responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that
1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
worse confounded." However, a closer study shows acts of his employee.
that such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy the distinction Compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion Case
between the civil liability arising from a crime and (Supreme Court of Spain)
the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-
One of the most important of those Spanish
contractual. The same negligent act causing
decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
damages may produce civil liability arising from a
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or
run over by a streetcar owned by the "compañia
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was
contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
prosecuted in a criminal case, but he was acquitted.
Code. The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the
contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
streetcar company, paying for damages in the
Page 16 of 49
amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded had just been released, and besides, he was
damages; so, the company appealed to the Supreme probably without property which might be
Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 seized in enforcing any judgment against
of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non- him for damages.
existence of fault or negligence had been declared.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above
It will be noted, as to the case just cited: sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer
was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the
First. That the conductor was not sued in a
acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in
civil case, either separately or with the street
a previous criminal case, with greater reason
car company. This is precisely what happens
should Barredo, the employer in the case at
in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has
bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit
not been sued in a civil action, either alone or
filed against him because his taxi driver had
with his employer.
been convicted. The degree of negligence of
Second. That the conductor had been the conductor in the Spanish case cited was
acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla,
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this because the former was acquitted in the
did not exclude the co-existence of fault or previous criminal case while the latter was
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part found guilty of criminal negligence and was
of the conductor, under article 1902 of the sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver one year and one day to two years of prision
was found guilty of criminal negligence, so correccional.
that if he had even sued for his civil
Sentence of February 19, 1902 (Supreme Court of
responsibility arising from the crime, he
Spain): the same act may come under both the
would have been held primarily liable for civil
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
damages, and Barredo would have been held
action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the
and therefore could have been the subject of a
plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
primary responsibility because of his own
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of
presumed negligence — which he did not
the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there
employer and not the employee who was being
were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
sued.
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.: the trial
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of
primary liability as an employer under article the defendant, because the latter had negligently
1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which
which course to take, and they preferred the the rails slid off while iron was being transported,
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken.
within their rights. It might be observed in
Manzanares vs. Moreta: the mother of the 9-year-
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more
old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against
expeditious and effective method of relief,
Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death
because Fontanilla was either in prison, or
Page 17 of 49
of the child, who had been run over by an by the automobile that she turned to run, but
automobile driven and managed by the defendant. unfortunately, she fell into the street gutter where
The trial court rendered judgment requiring the hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as child died that same night from the burns. The trial
indemnity. courts dismissed the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this
It will be noticed that the defendant in the
Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory
above case could have been prosecuted in a
negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in
criminal case because his negligence causing
damages from J. V. House who at the time of the
the death of the child was punishable by the
tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance
the electric plant.
of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action It is most significant that in the case just
with its consequent civil liability arising from cited, this Court specifically applied article
a crime or of an entirely separate and 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although
independent civil action for fault or J. V. House could have been criminally
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate and not only punished but also made civilly
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa liable because of his criminal negligence,
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a an independent civil action for fault or
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
have been prosecuted and convicted in a Code.
criminal case and for which, after such a
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes: the action was for
conviction, he could have been sued for this
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter
civil liability arising from his crime.
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of
Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban the servant in driving an automobile over the child.
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.: the parents of the five- It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a
year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes
action to recover damages for the child's death as a had rented the automobile from the International
result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying
the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court
Bernal had come from another municipality to reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground
attend the same. After the procession the mother that he had shown that he exercised the care of a
and the daughter with two others were passing good father of a family, thus overcoming the
along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of presumption of negligence under article 1903.
the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only
defendants J. V. House, when an automobile
establishes liability in cases of negligence,
appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl,
but also provides when the liability shall
who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened
cease. It says:
Page 18 of 49
"The liability referred to in this article shall damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor
cease when the persons mentioned therein of the plaintiff.
prove that they employed all the diligence of
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is
a good father of a family to avoid the
no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the
damage."
Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily
From this article two things are apparent: understandable language authorizes the
determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
1. That when an injury is caused by the
negatives its application by providing that civil
negligence of a servant or employee there
obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors
instantly arises a presumption of law that
shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
there was negligence on the part of the
Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
matter or employer either in the selection of
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
the servant or employee, or in supervision
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful
over him after the selection, or both; and
or negligent act or omission not punishable by law.
2. that presumption is juris tantum and not juris
Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with
et de jure, and consequently, may be
the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil
rebutted.
Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
the satisfaction of the court that in selection and jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out
supervision, he has exercised the care and diligence of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil
of a good father of a family, the presumption is negligence.
overcome and he is relieve from liability.
It is not clear how the above case could
Cases relied by defendant support the defendant's proposition,
because the Court of Appeals based its
A. City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under
A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and
article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his
a streetcar of the Manila Electric Co. took place on
subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's
June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount
criminal negligence. In other words, the case
of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra,
prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
is predicated on an entirely different theory,
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
which is the subsidiary liability of an
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to
employer arising from a criminal act of his
indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
employee, whereas the foundation of the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
decision of the Court of Appeals in the
Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the
present case is the employer's primary
City of Manila filed an action against the Manila
liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that
We have already seen that this is a proper
the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main
and independent remedy.
defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the

Page 19 of 49
B. Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.
A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric
Company had been convicted o homicide by simple The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the
negligence and sentenced, among other things, to separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary that there is a distinction between civil liability
liability of the defendant as employer under the arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
family in selecting the motorman, and therefore Code, and that the same negligent act may produce
claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
held: Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
In view of the foregoing considerations, we
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
exemption from civil liability established in
employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner —
article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have
is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
acted with the diligence of a good father of
the Civil Code.
a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary
civil liability provided in article 20 of the Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365
Penal Code. punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
the defendant in the instant case, because the action
negligence not punished by law, according to the
there had for its purpose the enforcement of the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code,
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action
little scope and application in actual life. Death or
is based on the defendant's primary and direct
injury to persons and damage to property through
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
any degree of negligence — even the slightest —
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's
would have to be indemnified only through the
contention because that decision illustrates the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
principle that the employer's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal
character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
Code. required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
Overall rationale of the Supreme Court
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, negligence which can not be shown beyond
counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
which is governed by the Penal Code, and the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil

Page 20 of 49
Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of practically useless and nugatory the more
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first,
to the harm done by such practice and to restore the
would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
follow a devious and cumbersome method of
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
which is based on the primary and direct
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will,
the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
private rights because it re-establishes an ancient
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful
and additional remedy, and for the further reason
and productive of delay, it being a matter of
that an independent civil action, not depending on
common knowledge that professional drivers of
the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary adequate and efficacious redress.
and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to CANGCO VS. MRR, 38 PHIL 769
protect society. Workmen and employees should be
FACTS
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid
injury to the public. It is the masters or employers Plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was employed as clerk of
who principally reap the profits resulting from the Manila Railroad Company. He lived in the pueblo of
services of these servants and employees. It is but San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located
right that they should guarantee the latter's careful upon the line of the defendant railroad company;
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of and in coming daily by train to the company's office
others. in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a
pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. On
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in
on this subject, which has given rise to the
the second class-car where he was riding and,
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
making, his exit through the door. When the train
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
Cangco stepped off, but one or both of his feet came
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
in contact with a sack of watermelons with the
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility result that his feet slipped from under him and he
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of from the platform and was drawn under the moving
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
Page 21 of 49
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted due caution in alighting from the coach and was
from the train the car moved forward possibly six therefore precluded form recovering.
meters before it came to a full stop.
ISSUES
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a
1. Whether or not defendant Manila Railroad
dark night. The sacks of melons were present at the
Co. was liable for breach of contract.
platform since it was the customary season for
harvesting these melons and a large lot had been 2. Whether or not plaintiff Jose Cangco was
brought to the station for the shipment to the liable for contributory negligence.
market. They were contained in numerous sacks
which has been piled on the platform in a row one RULING
upon another. It is clear that the fall of the plaintiff 1. YES
was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one 2. NO
of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the
railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
The plaintiff’s injuries were very serious. He was these sacks on the platform. It necessarily follows
brought at once to a certain hospital where an that the defendant company is liable for the damage
examination was made and his arm was amputated. thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital
where a second operation was performed and the The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant
member was again amputated higher up near the is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation
shoulder. Plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in to respond for the damages arises from the breach
the form of medical and surgical fees and for other of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant
expenses in connection with the process of his to exercise due care in its performance. Differing
curation. essentially from that presumptive responsibility for
the negligence of its servants, imposed by article
Plaintiff instituted this proceeding in the Court of 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
First Instance of the city of Manila to recover proof of the exercise of due care in their selection
damages of the defendant company, founding his and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code relates
action upon the negligence of the servants and only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of contractual. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
melons upon the platform and leaving them so applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the
placed as to be a menace to the security of breach of a contract.
passenger alighting from the company's trains.
A master who exercises all possible care in the
Ruling of RTC (CFI) selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to
defendant company. Although negligence was
them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact
performs his duty to third persons to whom he is
that the sacks of melons were so placed as to
bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no
obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use
Page 22 of 49
his servants, even within the scope of their the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when
employment, such third person suffer damage. entering into the contractual relation.
This distinction was again made patent by this Court In terms of burden of proof, the general rule is that
in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor
Leynes. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of should assume the burden of proof of its existence,
Article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: From this article as the only fact upon which his action is based; while
two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is on the contrary, in a case of negligence which
caused by the negligence of a servant or presupposes the existence of a contractual
employee there instantly arises a presumption of obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and
law that there was negligence on the part of the that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to
master or employer either in selection of the prove negligence.
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for
the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption
the breach of a contract to show that the breach was
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his
consequently, may be rebutted.
servants, even though such be in fact the actual
On the other hand, the liability of masters and cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the
employers for the negligent acts or omissions of part of defendant that the negligence or omission of
their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions his servants or agents caused the breach of the
cause damages which amount to the breach of a contract would not constitute a defense to the
contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of action. If the negligence of servants or agents could
the master's negligence in their selection or control, be invoked as a means of discharging the liability
and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and arising from contract, the anomalous result would be
care in this regard does not relieve the master of that person acting through the medium of agents or
his liability for the breach of his contract. servants in the performance of their contracts, would
be in a better position than those acting in person.
Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the
breach or omission of those mutual duties which A brief review of the earlier decision of this court
civilized society imposes upon it members, or which involving the liability of employers for damage done
arise from these relations, other than contractual, of by the negligent acts of their servants will show that
certain members of society to others, generally in no case has the court ever decided that the
embraced in the concept of status. The breach of negligence of the defendant's servants has been
these general duties whether due to willful intent or held to constitute a defense to an action for
to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise damages for breach of contract.
to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The
The field of non- contractual obligation is much
fundamental distinction between obligations of this
more broader than that of contractual obligations,
character and those which arise from contract, rests
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
human relations. The mere fact that a person is
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
bound to another by contract does not relieve him
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
from extra-contractual liability to such person. When
whereas in contractual relations
such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
the vinculum exists independently of the breach of
break the contract under such conditions that the

Page 23 of 49
same act which constitutes the source of an extra- The correct doctrine relating to this subject is that
contractual obligation had no contract existed expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol.
between the parties. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff The test by which to determine whether the
carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him passenger has been guilty of negligence in
in safety and to provide safe means of entering and attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is
leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of
non-performance could not be excused by proof the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would
that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's have acted as the passenger acted under the
servants. circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care
has been defined to be, not the care which may or
The railroad company's defense involves the
should be used by the prudent man generally, but
assumption that even granting that the negligent
the care which a man of ordinary prudence would
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction
use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching In considering the situation thus presented the
and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that the obstruction
of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on
contributory negligence in failing to wait until the the platform existed; and as the defendant was
train had come to a complete stop before alighting. bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from
announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is absence of some circumstance to warn him to the
imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted,
damages should be apportioned. and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it
In this particular instance, that the train was barely
to the plaintiff.
moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively
by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from In determining the question of contributory
the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of negligence in performing such act, the age, sex, and
person alight from trains under these conditions physical condition of the passenger are
every day of the year, and sustain no injury where circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
the company has kept its platform free from passenger, and should be considered. It may be
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the
believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off
whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for the train at this station. There could be no
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the
provide a safe alighting place. length of the step which he was required to take or
the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
Page 24 of 49
under way was not characterized by imprudence and other side. As the automobile approached, Smith
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory guided it toward his left, that being the proper side
negligence. of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would move
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was earning P25
to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering
has suffered have permanently disabled him from
to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
continuing that employment. We are of the opinion
down, continued to approach directly toward the
that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by
horse without diminution of speed. When he had
him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500,
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant
the horse getting across to the other side, the
the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures
right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
connected with the treatment of his injuries.
automobile passed in such close proximity to the
The decision of lower court is reversed, and animal that it became frightened and turned its body
judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was
P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the
QUASI-DELICT horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required
ELEMENTS (ART. 2176, CC) medical attention for several days. From a judgment
of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability
PICART VS. SMITH, 37 PHIL 809 Picart has appealed.
FACTS ISSUE
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such
on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
halfway across, Smith approached from the opposite done.
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared
the bridge, he saw a horseman on it and blew his RULING
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued The test by which to determine the existence of
his course and after he had taken the bridge, he gave negligence in a particular case may be stated as
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
that the man on horseback before him was not negligent act use that person would have used in the
observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
automobile coming and heard the warning signals. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
the pony closely up against the railing on the right existence of negligence in a given case is not
side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He determined by reference to the personal judgment
says that the reason he did this was that he thought of the actor in the situation before him. The law
he did not have sufficient time to get over to the considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or

Page 25 of 49
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and the road. But as we have already stated, the
prudence and determines liability by that. defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is
The question as to what would constitute the
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
of course be always determined in the light of
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
human experience and in view of the facts involved
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot
by an appreciable interval. Under these
here be of much value but this much can be
circumstances the law is that the person who has the
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
conduct by the circumstances which are before them
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
or known to them. They are not, and are not
without reference to the prior negligence of the
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
other party.
can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of From what has been said it results that the judgment
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course is her rendered that the plaintiff recovers of the
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200),
to take precautions to guard against that harm. with costs of other instances.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring
of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always DAYWALT VS. CORPORACION DE PP
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. AGUSTINO RECOLETOS
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given FACTS
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W.
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as
conduct or guarding against its consequences. Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the court
of Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in
name. When the torrens title was issued, Endencia
the present case we think that negligence is clearly
found out that the property measured 1248 hectares
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed.
the defendant, would in our opinion, have
Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the
recognized that the course which he was pursuing
whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never
was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
intended to sell so large an amount and that she had
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
action for specific performance. The SC ordered
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the
Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt.
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was
Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corp., w/c
not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
owned an estate immediately adjacent to the
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
Page 26 of 49
property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire
happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the sympathy on the part of the defendant corporation
Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to defeat the
over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that its officials
easily subject to the influence of other people. Fr. may have advised her not to carry the contract into
Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with effect would not constitute actionable interference
Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the with such contract. It may be added that when one
entire tract. considers the hardship that the ultimate
performance of that contract entailed on the vendor,
Daywalt filed an action for damages against the
and the doubt in which the issue was involved — to
Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced
the extent that the decision of the Court of the First
Endencia to refrain from the performance of her
Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the
contract for the sale of the land in question and to
Supreme Court itself was divided — the attitude of
withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalt’s claim
the defendant corporation, as exhibited in the
for damages against the Recoletos was for the huge
conduct of its procurador, Juan Labarga, and other
sum of P500, 000, since he claims that because of the
members of the order of the Recollect Fathers, is not
interference of the Recoletos, he failed to
difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion
consummate a contract with another person for the
on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga
sale of the property and its conversion into a sugar
and his associates believed in good faith that the
mill.
contract cold not be enforced and that Teodorica
would be wronged if it should be carried into effect.
ISSUES
Any advice or assistance which they may have given
1. Whether a person who is not a party to a was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper
contract for the sale of land makes himself motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that
liable for damages to the vendee, beyond the Teodorica would have surrendered the documents
value of the use and occupation, by colluding of title and given possession of the land but for the
with the vendor and maintaining him in the influence and promptings of members of the
effort to resist an action for specific defendants corporation. But we do not credit the
performance. idea that they were in any degree influenced to the
2. Whether the damages which the plaintiff giving of such advice by the desire to secure to
seeks to recover under this head are too themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle
remote and speculative to be the subject of upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just
recovery. rights of the plaintiff.
RULING Whatever may be the character of the liability which

1st Issue a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or
assisting one of the parties to evade performance,
We deem it well it dispose of the contention that the there is one proposition upon which all must agree.
members of the defendants corporation, in advising This is, that the stranger cannot become more
and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply extensively liable in damages for the
with the contract of sale, were actuated by improper nonperformance of the contract than the party in
and malicious motives. The trial court found that this whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger
contention was not sustained, observing that while it liable for damages in excess of those that could be
Page 27 of 49
recovered against the immediate party to the prevented during a period of several years from
contract would lead to results at once grotesque and exerting that control over the property which he was
unjust. In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable to
the party directly bound by the contract, it is obvious dispose of the property advantageously.
that the liability of the defendant corporation, even
2nd Issue
admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the
breach of the contract, can in no even exceed hers. The damages ordinarily and normally recoverable
This leads us to consider at this point the extent of against a vendor for failure to deliver land which he
the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by has contracted to deliver is the value of the use and
reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of occupation of the land for the time during which it is
title and to place the plaintiff in possession. wrongfully withheld. And of course where the
purchaser has not paid the purchaser money, a
It should in the first place be noted that the liability
deduction may be made in respect to the interest on
of Teodorica Endencia for damages resulting from
the money which constitutes the purchase price.
the breach of her contract with Daywalt was a proper
Substantially the same rule holds with respect to the
subject for adjudication in the action for specific
liability of a landlord who fails to put his tenant in
performance which Daywalt instituted against her in
possession pursuant to contract of lease. The
1909 and which was litigated by him to a successful
measure of damages is the value of the leasehold
conclusion in this court, but without obtaining any
interest, or use and occupation, less the stipulated
special adjudication with reference to damages.
rent, where this has not been paid. The rule that the
Indemnification for damages resulting from the
measure of damages for the wrongful detention of
breach of a contract is a right inseparably annexed
land is normally to be found in the value of use and
to every action for the fulfillment of the obligation
occupation is, we believe, one of the things that may
(art. 1124, Civil Code); and its is clear that if damages
be considered certain in the law - almost as well
are not sought or recovered in the action to enforce
settled, indeed, as the rule that the measure of
performance they cannot be recovered in an
damages for the wrongful detention of money is to
independent action. As to Teodorica Endencia,
be found in the interest.
therefore, it should be considered that the right of
action to recover damages for the breach of the The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract
contract in question was exhausted in the prior suit. must be determined in the light of the situation in
However, her attorneys have not seen fit to interpose existence at the time the contract is made; and the
the defense of res judicata in her behalf; and as the damages ordinarily recoverable are in all events
defendant corporation was not a party to that action, limited to such as might be reasonable are in all
and such defense could not in any event be of any events limited to such as might be reasonably
avail to it, we proceed to consider the question of foreseen in the light of the facts then known to the
the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages contracting parties. Where the purchaser desires to
without refernce to this point. protect himself, in the contingency of the failure of
the vendor promptly to give possession, from the
The most that can be said with refernce to the
possibility of incurring other damages than such as
conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to
the incident to the normal value of the use and
carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and
occupation, he should cause to be inserted in the
resisted to the last an action for specific performance
contract a clause providing for stipulated amount to
in court. The result was that the plaintiff was
the paid upon failure of the vendor to give
Page 28 of 49
possession; and not case has been called to our by the delay in delivering the broken shaft. It was
attention where, in the absence of such a stipulation, held that the plaintiff could not recover.
damages have been held to be recoverable by the
The discussion contained in the opinion of the court
purchaser in excess of the normal value of use and
in that case leads to the conclusion that the damages
occupation. On the contrary, the most fundamental
recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are
conceptions of the law relative to the assessment of
two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a
damages are inconsistent with such idea.
sense necessary damage; and (2) special damages.
The principles governing this branch of the law were
Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of
profoundly considered in the case Hadley vs.
contract where the are no special circumstances to
Baxendale (9 Exch., 341), decided in the English Court
distinguish the case specially from other contracts.
of Exchequer in 1854; and a few words relative to the
The consideration paid for an unperformed promise
principles governing will here be found instructive.
is an instance of this sort of damage. In all such cases
The decision in that case is considered a leading
the damages recoverable are such as naturally and
authority in the jurisprudence of the common law.
generally would result from such a breach,
The plaintiffs in that case were proprietors of a mill
"according to the usual course of things." In case
in Gloucester, which was propelled by steam, and
involving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever
which was engaged in grinding and supplying meal
indulged as to whether that damage was
and flour to customers. The shaft of the engine got
contemplated or not. This is conclusively presumed
broken, and it became necessarily that the broken
from the immediateness and inevitableness of the
shaft be sent to an engineer or foundry man at
damage, and the recovery of such damage follows
Greenwich, to serve as a model for casting or
as a necessary legal consequence of the breach.
manufacturing another that would fit into the
Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to
machinery. The broken shaft could be delivered at
be within the contemplation of the parties.
Greenwich on the second day after its receipts by the
carrier it. It was delivered to the defendants, who Special damage, on the other hand, is such as
were common carriers engaged in that business follows less directly from the breach than ordinary
between these points, and who had told plaintiffs it damage. It is only found in case where some external
would be delivered at Greenwich on the second day condition, apart from the actual terms to the
after its delivery to them, if delivered at a given hour. contract exists or intervenes, as it were, to give a turn
The carriers were informed that the mill was stopped, to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the
but were not informed of the special purpose for promisor, without actual notice of that external
which the broken shaft was desired to forwarded, condition, could not reasonably be expected to
They were not told the mill would remain idle until foresee. Concerning this sort of damage, Hadley vs.
the new shaft would be returned, or that the new Baxendale (1854) [supra] lays down the definite and
shaft could not be manufactured at Greenwich until just rule that before such damage can be recovered
the broken one arrived to serve as a model. There the plaintiff must show that the particular condition
was delay beyond the two days in delivering the which made the damage a possible and likely
broken shaft at Greenwich, and a corresponding consequence of the breach was known to the
delay in starting the mill. No explanation of the delay defendant at the time the contract was made.
was offered by the carriers. The suit was brought to
recover damages for the lost profits of the mill, cause The statement that special damages may be
recovered where the likelihood of such damages

Page 29 of 49
flowing from the breach of the contract is AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
contemplated and foreseen by the parties needs to
be supplemented by a proposition which, though FACTS
not enunciated in Hadley vs. Baxendale, is yet clearly Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group
to be drawn from subsequent cases. This is that of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
where the damage which a plaintiff seeks to recover March 30, 1958.
as special damage is so far speculative as to be in
contemplation of law remote, notification of the On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
special conditions which make that damage possible through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
cannot render the defendant liable therefor. To bring Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
damages which would ordinarily be treated as airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
remote within the category of recoverable special Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at
damages, it is necessary that the condition should be Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
made the subject of contract in such sense as to forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
become an express or implied term of the was occupying because, in the words of the witness
engagement. Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
In the preceding discussion we have considered the When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff's right chiefly against Teodorica Endencia; plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
and what has been said suffices in our opinion to defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken
demonstrate that the damages laid under the over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
second cause of action in the complaint could not be according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
recovered from her, first, because the damages laid Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
under the second cause of action in the complaint when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having
could not be recovered from her, first, because the a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
damages in question are special damages which came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
were not within contemplation of the parties when Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and
the contract was made, and secondly, because said plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
damages are too remote to be the subject of plane.
recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to
the right of the plaintiff to recover such damages ISSUES
from the defendant corporation, for, as already
1. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class
suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the
seat he claims? YES.
contract, said corporation could in no event render
2. Whether or not the award of moral
itself more extensively liable than the principle in the
damages was proper. YES.
contract.
3. Whether or not exemplary damages are well
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court awarded. YES.
should be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs
RULING
against the appellant.
FIRST ISSUE: It is conceded that on March 28, 1958
he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and
Page 30 of 49
agreement of the parties; that, the issuance of a first C. Petitioner failed to provide First Class
class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a passage, but instead furnished Carrascoso
first class ride, but that such would depend upon the only Tourist Class accommodations from
availability of first class seats. Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca,
Carrascoso has been compelled by
The petitioner argues that the issuance of a first-
petitioner’s employees to leave the First Class
class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he
would be accommodated in the first-class
was already seated.
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had
yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every The Supreme Court substantially aver:
station for the necessary first-class reservation. This
1. That there was a contract to furnish
argument is untenable . The petitioner received the
Carrascoso a first class passage covering,
corresponding amount in payment of first-class
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg;
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the
2. That said contract was breached when
mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
petitioner failed to furnish first class
ordinary course of business that the company should
transportation at Bangkok; and
know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be
3. That there was bad faith when petitioner's
honored or not.
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his
SECOND ISSUE: Petitioner claims that Carrascoso's first class accommodation berth "after he
action is based upon breach of contract and that to was already, seated.
authorize an award for moral damages there must
It is true that there is no specific mention of the term
be an averment of fraud or bad faith.
bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and
this issue are: circumstances set forth therein. The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties.
A. That Carrascoso entered into a contract of air
But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
carriage with the PAL for a valuable
expulsion.
consideration, the latter acting as general
agents for and in behalf of the petitioner. On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
Which the Carrascoso was entitled to First declared:
Class passage on petitioner’s plane during
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first
the entire duration of Carrascoso’s tour of
class compartment of the plane belonging to the
Europe.
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
B. That, during the first two legs of the trip from transferred to the tourist class not only without his
Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
Bangkok, petitioner furnished to Carrascoso established by plaintiff in his testimony before
First Class accommodation but only after the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry
protestations, arguments and/or insistence made by the purser of the plane in his notebook
were made by the plaintiff with defendant's which notation reads as follows: "First-class
employees. passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene", and by the testimony of an eye-witness,
Page 31 of 49
Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even could give ground for an action for damages.
refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on Passengers do not contract merely for
behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
evidence for the plaintiff. carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
The Court of appeals further stated:
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior language, indignities and abuses from such
reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first- conduct on the part of employees towards a
class ticket to him when all the seats had already passenger gives the latter an action for damages
been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been against the carrier.
picked out as the one to suffer the consequences
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended
and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action is
of being ejected from his seat in the presence of
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
others. Instead of explaining to the white man the
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier —
improvidence committed by defendant's employees,
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
the manager adopted the more drastic step of
ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced THIRD ISSUE: Exemplary damages are well awarded.
in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief
The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
that this probably was what happened there, by the
exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi-
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga
contracts. The only condition is that defendant
who, when asked to explain the meaning of the
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of
said "that the space is confirmed for first class.
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
of its employees need not be essayed. It is well addition to moral damages.
settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of
The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: Any person
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
equitable that attorneys' fees be given. The Supreme
public policy shall compensate the latter for the
Court do not intend to break faith with the tradition
damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the
that discretion well exercised — as it was here —
foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
should not be disturbed.
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeal for moral
A contract to transport passengers is quite different
damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys' fees.
in kind and degree from any other contractual
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the
relation. The contract of air carriage generates a
trial court. The Court of Appeals did not interfere
Page 32 of 49
with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest granted without objection as to Cuddy and denied
that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the as to the appellants in order to give them an
facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness opportunity to prove that the injunction was
thereof. wrongfully issued, and the amount of damages
suffered by reason thereof.
GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY, 29 PHIL 542
CFI Ruling: Dismissed the cross-complaint upon the
FACTS merits for damages by the defendants against the
plaintiff for the alleged wrongful issuance of a
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and that
mandatory and a preliminary injunction.
on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for
a week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the ISSUES
26th of May, the week beginning that day. A few
Whether or not the CFI of Iloilo erred in the issuance
days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to
of a mandatory and preliminary injunction against
Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in Manila,
defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga and whether or
saying that he had made other arrangements with
not they are liable for damages to Gilchrist.
his film. The other arrangements were the rental to
these defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for RULING
the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist
Omission of the defendants to bring up the
against these parties from showing it for the week
missing portion of the evidence.
beginning the 26th of May. There is in evidence in
this case on the trial today as well as on the 26th of There is lacking from the record before us (SC) the
May, letters showing that the Pathe Brothers in deposition of the defendant Cuddy, which
Manila advised this man on two different occasions apparently throws light upon a contract entered into
not to contend for this film Zigomar because the between him and the plaintiff Gilchrist. By a series of
rental price was prohibitive and assured him also decisions, we have construed section 143 and 497 (2)
that he could not get the film for about six weeks. of the Code of Civil Procedure to require the
production of all the evidence in this court. This is
Upon the application of the appellee an ex parte
the duty of the appellant and, upon his failure to
mandatory injunction was issued on the 22d of May,
perform it, we decline to proceed with a review of
1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddy, to send
the evidence. In such cases we rely entirely upon the
to the appellee a certain cinematograph film called
pleadings and the findings of fact of the trial court
"Zigomar" in compliance with an alleged contract
and examine only such assigned errors as raise
which had been entered into between these two
questions of law. It is true that some of the more
parties, and at the time an ex parte preliminary
recent of these cases make exceptions to the general
injunction was issued restraining the appellants from
rule. Thus, in Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord &
receiving and exhibiting in their theater the Zigomar
Belser Co., (19 Phil. Rep., 102), that portion of the
until further orders of the court. On the 26th of that
evidence before us tended to show that grave
month the appellants appeared and moved the
injustice might result from a strict reliance upon the
court to dissolve the preliminary injunction. When
findings of fact contained in the judgment appealed
the case was called for trial on August 6, the appellee
from. We, therefore, gave the appellant an
moved for the dismissal of the complaint "for the
opportunity to explain the omission. But we required
reason that there is no further necessity for the
that such explanation must show a satisfactory
maintenance of the injunction." The motion was
Page 33 of 49
reason for the omission, and that the missing portion they had a right to compete with Gilchrist for the
of the evidence must be submitted within sixty days lease of the film, the right to compete being a
or cause shown for failing to do so. justification for their acts. If there had been no
contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist this defense
But from that portion of the record before us, we are
would be tenable, but the mere right to compete
not inclined to believe that the missing deposition
could not justify the appellants in intentionally
would be sufficient to justify us in reversing the
inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's
findings of fact of the trial court that the contract in
contractual rights.
question had been made. There is in the record not
only the positive and detailed testimony of Gilchrist Issue on Damages and Injunction
to this effect, but there is also a letter of apology
Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass.,
from Cuddy to Gilchrist in which the former enters
555), said: "Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits
into a lengthy explanation of his reasons for leasing
and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill
the film to another party.
and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious
Appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance.
to violate his contract with a third party when If disturbance or loss come as a result of
they induced him to accept the P350. competition, or the exercise of like rights by others,
it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior
Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the
right by contract or otherwise is interfered with."
owner of the film. He received a letter from his
agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he In the case at bar the only motive for the interference
could not get the film for about six weeks. The with the Gilchrist — Cuddy contract on the part of the
appellants must necessarily have known at the time appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting
they made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond
booked or contracted the film for six weeks from this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the
April 26. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that legal liability for interfering with that contract and
the appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the
his contract with another person. But there is no above authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist
specific finding that the appellants knew the identity for the damages caused by their acts, unless they
of the other party. are relieved from such liability by reason of the
fact that they did not know at the time the
Defendants had no right to interfere/induce
identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the
Cuddy.
film.
The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a
The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful
contract with Cuddy for the lease of the film must be
acts and not from contractual obligations, as they
fully recognized and admitted by all. That Cuddy was
were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to
liable in an action for damages for the breach of that
violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action
contract, there can be no doubt.
of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be
The ground upon which the appellants base the governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil
contention that they have the right to interfere is, Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a
that there was no valid and binding contract person who, by act or omission, causes damages to
between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
Page 34 of 49
obliged to repair the damage do done. There is "By `irreparable injury' is not meant such injury as
nothing in this article which requires as a condition is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond
precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily
must know the identity of a person to whom he great injury or great damage, but that species of
causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be
article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the
is required in order that the injured party may other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or
recover for the damage suffered. so small on the other, is of such constant and
frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable
But the fact that the appellants' interference with the
redress can be had therefor in a court of law."
Gilchrist contract was actionable did not of itself
entitle Gilchrist to sue out an injunction against The case at bar is somewhat novel, as the only
them. The allowance of this remedy must be justified contract which was broken was that between Cuddy
under section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Gilchrist, and the profits of the appellee
which specifies the circumstance under which an depended upon the patronage of the public, for
injunction may issue. Upon the general doctrine of which it is conceded the appellants were at liberty to
injunction, we said in Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., complete by all fair does not deter the application of
273): remarked in the case of the "ticket scalpers", the
novelty of the facts does not deter the application of
An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that
equitable principles. This court takes judicial notice
code (Act No. 190) from American practice, and
of the general character of a cinematograph or
originally borrowed from English legal procedure,
motion-picture theater. The attendance, and,
which was there issued by the authority and under
consequently, the receipts, at one of these
the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order
cinematograph or motion-picture theaters depends
cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where
in no small degree upon the excellence of the
there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy
photographs, and it is quite common for the
at law," which "will not be granted while the rights
proprietor of the theater to secure an especially
between the parties are undetermined, except in
attractive exhibit as his "feature film" and advertise it
extraordinary cases where material and irreparable
as such in order to attract the public. This feature film
injury will be done," which cannot be compensated
is depended upon to secure a larger attendance that
in damages, and where there will be no adequate
if its place on the program were filled by other films
remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to
of mediocre quality. It is evident that the failure to
take property out of the possession of one party and
exhibit the feature film will reduce the receipts of the
put it into that of another whose title has not been
theater.
established by law.
Hence, Gilchrist was facing the immediate
As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have
prospect of diminished profits by reason of the
an adequate remedy at law. Where the choice is
fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent
between the ordinary and the extraordinary
to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his
processes of law, and the former are sufficient, the
feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with
rule will not permit the use of the latter. If the injury
any degree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist
is irreparable, the ordinary process is inadequate.
would likely suffer from such an event would be
quite difficult if not impossible. If he allowed the

Page 35 of 49
appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be Nims on Unfair Business Competition, pp. 351- 371.
useless for him to exhibit it again, as the desire of the
"Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent a
public to witness the production would have been
wrongful interference with contract by strangers to
already satisfied. In this extremity, the appellee
such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient,
applied for and was granted, as we have indicated, a
and the resulting injury is irreparable. And where
mandatory injunction against Cuddy requiring him
there is a malicious interference with lawful and valid
to deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary
contracts a permanent injunction will ordinarily issue
injunction against the appellants restraining them
without proof of express malice. So, an injunction
from exhibiting that film in their theater during the
may be issued where the complainant to break their
weeks he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These
contracts with him by agreeing to indemnify who
injunctions saved the plaintiff harmless from
breaks his contracts of employment may be adjoined
damages due to the unwarranted interference of the
from including other employees to break their
defendants, as well as the difficult task which would
contracts and enter into new contracts with a new
have been set for the court of estimating them in
employer of the servant who first broke his contract.
case the appellants had been allowed to carry out
But the remedy by injunction cannot be used to
their illegal plans. As to whether or not the
restrain a legitimate competition, though such
mandatory injunction should have been issued, we
competition would involve the violation of a
are not, as we have said, called upon to determine.
contract. Nor will equity ordinarily enjoin employees
So far as the preliminary injunction issued against
who have quit the service of their employer from
the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them
attempting by proper argument to persuade others
from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which
from taking their places so long as they do not resort
Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion
to force or intimidations on obstruct the public
that the circumstances justified the issuance of that
thoroughfares."
injunction in the discretion of the court.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed,
Courts in the United States have usually granted
with costs, against the appellants.
such relief where the profits of the injured person are
derived from his contractual relations with a large
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
and indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing
him to the necessity of proving in an action against
the tort-feasor that the latter was responsible in each BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS. KALAW, GR
case for the broken contract, or else obliging him to 18805
institute individual suits against each contracting
FACTS
party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits.
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) was
In the case of the Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell chartered as a non-profit governmental organization
(82 Fed., 65), the court, among other things, said: on May 7, 1940 by Commonwealth Act 518 avowedly
"One who wrongfully interferes in a contract for the protection, preservation and development of
between others, and, for the purpose of gain to the coconut industry in the Philippines. On August 1,
himself induces one of the parties to break it, is liable 1946, NACOCO's charter was amended by Republic
to the party injured thereby; and his continued Act 5.
interference may be ground for an injunction where
the injuries resulting will be irreparable." General manager and board chairman was Maximo
M. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro
Page 36 of 49
Garcia were members of the Board; defendant here; and (2) failure to deliver was due to force
Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, majeure, the typhoons.
1947.
All the settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52.
NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5,
In a suit, NACOCO seeks to recover the above sum
embarked on copra trading activities. Amongst the
of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board
scores of contracts executed by general manager
chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan
Kalaw are the nine disputed contracts. An unhappy
Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges
chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from
Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old
fulfilling these contracts. Nature supervened. Four
Civil Code (now Article 2176, new Civil Code); and
devastating typhoons visited the Philippines.
defendant board members, including Kalaw, with
Coconut trees throughout the country suffered
bad faith and/or breach of trust for having
extensive damage. Copra production decreased.
approved the contracts.
Prices spiralled. Warehouses were destroyed. Cash
requirements doubled. Deprivation of export Ruling of RTC
facilities increased the time necessary to accumulate
shiploads of copra. Quick turnovers became The lower court dismissed the complaint without
impossible, financing a problem. costs as well as defendants' counterclaims, except
that plaintiff was ordered to pay the heirs of Maximo
When it became clear that the contracts would be Kalaw the sum of P2,601.94 for unpaid salaries and
unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the board for cash deposit due the deceased Kalaw from
approval. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the NACOCO.
situation, apprised the board of the impending
heavy losses. No action was taken on the contracts. Plaintiff appealed directly to SC.
Neither did the board vote thereon at the meeting
ISSUES
of January 7, 1948 following. Then, on January 11,
1948, President Roxas made a statement that the 1. Whether plaintiff Board of Liquidators has
NACOCO head did his best to avert the losses, that lost its legal personality to continue with this
NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw suit.
was to remain in his post. Not long thereafter, that
2. Whether the action is unenforceable against
is, on January 30, 1948, the board met again with
the heirs of Kalaw.
Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in attendance. They
unanimously approved the contracts. As was to be 3. Whether the case at bar is to be taken out of
expected, NACOCO but partially performed the the general concept of the powers of a
contracts. The buyers threatened damage suits. general manager, given the cited provision of
Some of the claims were settled. the NACOCO by-laws requiring prior
directorate approval of NACOCO contracts.
But one buyer, Louis Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd.,
did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. With particular reference to the Dreyfus
claims, NACOCO put up the defenses that: (1) the
contracts were void because Louis Dreyfus & Co.
(Overseas) Ltd. did not have license to do business

Page 37 of 49
RULING Citing Mr. Justice Fisher, defendants proceed to
argue that even where it may be found impossible
1st Issue: NO
within the 3 year period to reduce disputed claims to
SC rules that the Board of Liquidators has judgment, nonetheless, "suits by or against a
personality to proceed as: party-plaintiff in this corporation abate when it ceases to be an entity
case. capable of suing or being sued". So it is that
abatement of pending actions follows as a matter of
Accepted in this jurisdiction are three methods by course upon the expiration of the legal period for
which a corporation may wind up its affairs: (1) liquidation, unless the statute merely requires a
under Section 3, Rule 104, of the Rules of Court commencement of suit within the added time. For,
whereby, upon voluntary dissolution of a the court cannot extend the time alloted by statute.
corporation, the court may direct "such disposition However, the SC express the view that the executive
of its assets as justice requires, and may appoint a order abolishing NACOCO and creating the Board of
receiver to collect such assets and pay the debts of Liquidators should be examined in context (proviso
the corporation;" (2) under Section 77 of the in Section 1 of Executive Order 372). So reading, it
Corporation Law, whereby a corporation whose will be readily observed that no time limit has been
corporate existence is terminated, "shall tacked to the existence of the Board of Liquidators
nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for and its function of closing the affairs of the various
three years after the time when it would have been government owned corporations, including
so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and NACOCO. By Section 2 of the executive order,
defending suits by or against it and of enabling it while the boards of directors of the various
gradually to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of corporations were abolished, their powers and
and convey its property and to divide its capital functions and duties under existing laws were to be
stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the assumed and exercised by the Board of Liquidators.
business for which it was established;" and (3) under
Section 78 of the Corporation Law, by virtue of Nowhere in the executive order was there any
which the corporation, within the three year period mention of the lifespan of the Board of Liquidators.
just mentioned, "is authorized and empowered to Thus, liquidation by the Board of Liquidators may,
convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit under section 1, proceed in accordance with law, the
of members, stockholders, creditors, and others provisions of the executive order, "and/or in such
interested." manner as the President of the Philippines may
direct."
It is defendants' pose that their case comes within
the coverage of the second method. They reason out Defendants' position is vulnerable to attack from
that suit was commenced in February, 1949; that by another direction. By Executive Order 372, the
Executive Order 372, dated November 24, 1950, government, the sole stockholder, abolished
NACOCO, together with other government-owned NACOCO, and placed its assets in the hands of the
corporations, was abolished, and the Board of Board of Liquidators. The Board of Liquidators thus
Liquidators was entrusted with the function of became the trustee on behalf of the government. It
settling and closing its affairs; and that, since the was an express trust.
three year period has elapsed, the Board of
Liquidators may not now continue with, and
prosecute, the present case to its conclusion.

Page 38 of 49
2nd Issue: NO copra sales for future delivery. The movement of the
market requires that sales agreements be entered
The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent
into, even though the goods are not yet in the hands
acts of Kalaw for having entered into the questioned
of the seller. Known in business parlance as forward
contracts without prior approval of the board of
sales, it is concededly the practice of the trade.
directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff;
NACOCO was much more conservative than the
and is against Kalaw and the other directors for
exporters with big capital. To NACOCO, forward
having subsequently approved the said contracts in
sales were a necessity. Copra could not stay long in
bad faith and/or breach of trust. Clearly then, the
its hands; it would lose weight, its value decrease.
present case is not a mere action for the recovery of
Above all, NACOCO's limited funds necessitated a
money nor a claim for money arising from contract.
quick turnover. Copra contracts then had to be
The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the
executed on short notice — at times within twenty-
action is embraced in suits filed "to recover damages
four hours. To be appreciated then is the difficulty of
for an injury to person or property, real or personal",
calling a formal meeting of the board.
which survive.
Such were the environmental circumstances when
This Court, thru Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, declared
Kalaw went into copra trading.
(in the case of Aguas vs. Llemos, L-18107, August 30,
1962): Long before the disputed contracts came into being,
Kalaw contracted — by himself alone as general
Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that
manager — for forward sales of copra. These
contrasting the correlated provisions of the Rules of
previous contract were signed by Kalaw without
Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not
prior authority from the board. Said contracts
filed in the estate settlement proceedings (Rule 87,
were known all along to the board members.
sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and
Nothing was said by them. The aforesaid contracts
may be prosecuted against the executor or
stand to prove one thing: Obviously, NACOCO
administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that
board met the difficulties attendant to forward
actions for damages caused by tortious conduct
sales by leaving the adoption of means to end, to
of a defendant (as in the case at bar) survive the
the sound discretion of NACOCO's general
death of the latter.
manager Maximo M. Kalaw.
The ruling in the preceding case was hammered out
Liberally spread on the record are instances of
of facts comparable to those of the present. No
contracts executed by NACOCO's general manager
cogent reason exists why we should break away from
and submitted to the board after their
the views just expressed. And, the conclusion
consummation, not before. These agreements were
remains: Action against the Kalaw heirs and, for
not Kalaw's alone.
the matter, against the Estate of Casimiro Garcia
survives. Knowledge by the board is also discernible from
other recorded instances. When the board met on
3rd Issue: NO
May 10, 1947, the directors discussed the copra
The Kalaw contracts are valid corporate acts. situation. In view thereof, Kalaw informed the board
that "he intends to wait until he has signed contracts
The peculiar nature of copra trading deserves to sell before starting to buy copra." In the board
express articulation. Ordinary in this enterprise are meeting of July 29, 1947, Kalaw reported on the

Page 39 of 49
copra price conditions then current. Kalaw continued Thus, the directors are not liable.
to say that "the Corporation has been closing
Indeed, were it not for the typhoons, NACOCO
contracts for the sale of copra generally with a
could have, with ease, met its contractual
margin of P5.00 to P7.00 per hundred kilos."
obligations. Despite the typhoons, NACOCO was still
Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts able to deliver a little short of 50% of the tonnage
have been approved by the directors as a matter of required under the contracts. As the trial court
general practice, custom, and policy, the general correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque
manager may bind the company without formal injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here
authorization of the board of directors. absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if
either one or the other is wanting.
In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has
been to allow its general manager to negotiate and On top of all these, is that no assertion is made and
execute contracts in its copra trading activities for no proof is presented which would link Kalaw's acts
and in NACOCO's behalf without prior board — ratified by the board — to a matrix for defraudation
approval. If the by-laws were to be literally followed, of the government. Kalaw is clear of the stigma of
the board should give its stamp of prior approval on bad faith. Of course, Kalaw could not have been an
all corporate contracts. But that board itself, by its insurer of profits. He could not be expected to
acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And
the by-law requirement of prior approval. even as typhoons supervened Kalaw was not
remissed in his duty. He exerted efforts to stave off
Kalaw had authority to execute the contracts without
losses.
need of prior approval. Everybody, including Kalaw
himself, thought so, and for a long time. Doubts That Kalaw cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia
were first thrown on the way only when the contracts or as much as simple negligence, would seem to be
turned out to be unprofitable for NACOCO. supported by the fact that even as the contracts were
being questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO
Obviously, the board thought that to jettison Kalaw's
board itself, President Roxas defended the
contracts would contravene basic dictates of
actuations of Kalaw. The latter expressed his desire
fairness. They did not think of raising their voice in
"that the Board of Directors should reelect Hon.
protest against past contracts which brought in
Maximo M. Kalaw as General Manager of the
enormous profits to the corporation. By the same
National Coconut Corporation." And at a time when
token, fair dealing disagrees with the idea that
the contracts had already been openly disputed, the
similar contracts, when unprofitable, should not
board, at its regular meeting, appointed Maximo M.
merit the same treatment. Profit or loss resulting
Kalaw as acting general manager of the corporation.
from business ventures is no justification for turning
one's back on contracts entered into. The truth, then, Kalaw's good faith, and that of the other directors,
of the matter is that — in the words of the trial court clinch the case for defendants.
— the ratification of the contracts was "an act of
Viewed in the light of the entire record, the
simple justice and fairness to the general manager
judgment under review must be, as it is hereby,
and the best interest of the corporation whose
affirmed.
prestige would have been seriously impaired by a
rejection by the board of those contracts which
proved disadvantageous."

Page 40 of 49
FAROLAN VS. SOLMAC MARKETING CORP., disposition of importations of Oriented
GR 83589 Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) then
being held at the Bureau of Customs. Respondent
FACTS Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction
Solmac Marketing Corporation was the assignee, with the RTC. It prayed for the unconditional release
transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus of the subject importation.
Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of
RTC rendered ordering defendants to release the
what is technically known as polypropylene film,
subject importation immediately without drilling of
valued at US$69,250.05. Respondent SOLMAC
holes, subject only to the normal requirements of the
presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for
customs processing for such release to be done with
polypropylene film scrap. However, upon
utmost dispatch as time is of the essence. Solmac
examination of the shipment by the National
appealed to the Court of Appeals only insofar as to
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned
the denial of the award of damages is concerned.
out that the fibers of the importation were oriented
in such a way that the materials were stronger than Court of Appeals rendered that the appealed
OPP film scrap. In other words, the Clojus shipment judgment is modified by ordering the defendants
was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee Ramon Farolan and Guillermo Parayno solidarity, in
respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and their personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff temperate
BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented damages in the sum of P100,000, exemplary
polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, damages in the sum of P100,000 and P50,000 as
if not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
No. 658-B. Considering that the shipment was
different from what had been authorized by the BOI ISSUE
and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld Whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in
the release of the subject importation. Petitioner not immediately releasing the questioned
Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in
on whether or not the subject importation may be their personal and private capacities, for damages to
released. the BOI agreed that the subject imports the private respondent.
may be released but that holes may be drilled on
them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. RULING
The counsel of private respondent wrote to The respondent court committed a reversible error
petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking in overruling the trial court's finding. We hold that
for the release of the importation. The importation this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith
was not released, however, on the ground that holes is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges
had to be drilled on them first. BOI Governor H. the contrary that the burden of proof lies. In Abando
Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau of Customs v. Lozada, we defined GOOD FAITH as "refer[ring] to
stating that the subject goods may be released a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
without drilling of holes inasmuch as the goods of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest
arrived prior to the endorsement to the drilling of intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
holes on all importations of waste/scrap films. and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the
petitioner Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI opposite of fraud, and its absence should be
requesting for definite guidelines regarding the established by convincing evidence."

Page 41 of 49
The record is replete with evidence bolstering the But even granting that the petitioners committed a
petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the mistake in withholding the release of the subject
report of the National Institute of Science and importation because indeed it was composed of OPP
Technology (NIST) that, contrary to what the film scraps, contrary to the evidence submitted by
respondent claimed, the subject importation was not the National Institute of Science and Technology
OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless,
product of stronger material, whose importation to it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public
the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited. It officers are not hampered in the performance of
was on the strength of this finding that the their duties or in making decisions for fear of
petitioners withheld the release of the subject personal liability for damages due to honest
importation for being contrary to law. Second, the mistake.1âwphi1 Whatever damage they may have
petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the caused as a result of such an erroneous
Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a
whether the subject importation might be released. damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly
Third, petitioner Parayno also testified during the committed by public officers are not actionable
trial that up to that time there was no clear-cut absent any clear showing that they were motivated
policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP). faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers,
the acts of the petitioners are protected by the
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he
presumption of good faith.
binds himself to perform the duties of his office
faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, In the same vein, the presumption, disputable
and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. though it may be, that an official duty has been
Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that regularly performed applies in favor of the
prudence, caution, and attention which careful men petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter
use in the management of their affairs. In the case at esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly
bar, prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain and solemnly done.) It was private respondent's
from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption.
regarding the disposition of the various importations We are not persuaded that it has been able to do so.
of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
(PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs.
These cellophane/film products were competing
NO DOUBLE RECOVERY RULE (ARTICLE 2177,
with locally manufactured polypropylene and
CC)
oriented polypropylene as raw materials which were
then already sufficient to meet local demands,
hence, their importation was restricted, if not JOSEPH VS. BAUTISTA, 170 SCRA 540
prohibited. Consequently, the petitioners can not be
FACTS
said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately
releasing the import goods without first obtaining Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo
the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
As public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. The said
to it that the law they were tasked to implement, was cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was
faithfully complied with. on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.

Page 42 of 49
Luis Joseph, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P
cargo truck at Dagupan City to Valenzuela Bulacan. 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez,
While said cargo truck was negotiating the National and alleging further that respondents Cardeno,
Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to
Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
proceeding in the same direction. At about the same
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition
time, a pickup truck, supposedly owned by
to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and
respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan,
Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter
then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to
motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the
overtake the cargo truck which was then in the
release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the
process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing
other respondents inured to the benefit of
the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the
respondent Perez, considering that all the
road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, Joseph
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
sustained a bonafide bone fracture in one of his legs.
RTC: respondent judge issued the questioned order
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
dismissing the case, and a motion for the
respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo
reconsideration thereof was denied.
truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Petitioner contending that respondent judge erred
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the in declaring that the release of claim executed by
pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva
and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro
Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case.
Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
ISSUE
respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to
her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61. WON the judgment on the compromise agreement
under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract
Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and of carriage.
Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's RULING
claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P The argument that there are two causes of action
1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the
release of claim releasing from liability the following judgment on the compromise agreement under the
parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to
Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage,
and Jacinto Pagarigan. is untenable.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, A cause of action is understood to be the delict or

Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate wrongful act or omission committed by the
and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can
Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that be violative of various rights at the same time, as
Page 43 of 49
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of The respondents having been found to be solidarity
several separate and distinct legal obligations. liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some
However where there is only one delict or wrong, of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release
there is but a single cause of action regardless of the from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably
number of rights that may have been violated resulted in the extinguishment and release from
belonging to one person. liability of the other solidary debtors, including
herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the
singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights The claim that there was an agreement entered into
of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury between the parties during the pre-trial conference
resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause that, after such payment made by the other
of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no respondents, the case shall proceed as against
question that the petitioner sustained a single injury respondent Perez is both incredible and
on his person. That vested in him a single cause of unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to
action, albeit with the correlative rights of action show, either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a
against the different respondents through the transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-trial
appropriate remedies allowed by law. hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the
there was only one cause of action involved although respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against
the defendants therein were not necessarily Identical BERMUDEZ, SR. VS. HERRERA, 158 SCRA 168
since the respondents were not identically
circumstanced. However, a recovery by the FACTS
petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and
recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on
rationale for the proscription in our law against which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-
double recovery for the same act or omission which, appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against which caused his death. A criminal case for Homicide
unjust enrichment. Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Domingo Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed in the
There is no question that the respondents herein are
criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil
solidarily liable to petitioner. On the evidence
Action." Thereafter, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
presented in the court below, the trial court found
civil case for damages against Pontino and Kwan
them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner,
with the Court of First Instance.
in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court
hold respondents jointly and severally liable. RTC: Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action
Furthermore, the allegations in the amended "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary negligence in the accident constituted a quasi-
debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had
of petitioner that said allegations are intended to already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by
apply only in the event that execution be issued in reserving in the criminal case their right to file a
his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence separate civil action. That being so, the trial court
which would countenance such a procedure. decided to order the dismissal of the complaint
Page 44 of 49
against defendant Kwan and to suspend the hearing Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
of the case against Pontino until after the criminal which provide:
case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is
Section 1. — Institution of criminal and civil action. —
finally terminated.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
The plaintiffs appealed. for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
ISSUE action, unless the offended party expressly waives
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs- the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. — separately.
BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.
Section 2. — Independent civil action.- In the cases
RULING provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
The trial court treated the case as an action based on
action entirely separate and distinct from the
a crime in view of the reservation made by the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
offended party in the criminal case, also pending
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
before the court, to file a separate civil action. The
the right is reserved as required in the preceding
trial court cited Joaquin vs. Aniceto: If, in a criminal
section. Such civil action shall proceed
case, the right to file a separate civil action for
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based
require only a preponderance of evidence.
on crime and not on tort.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of
However, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
Rule 111, provides that —
in the case cited is inapplicable to the instant case.
The cited case talks about the respective liabilities of Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
the employer and employee arising from negligence. under the preceding article is entirely separate and
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
has the choice between an action to enforce the civil under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the recover damages twice for the same act or omission
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict of the defendant.
under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party
chooses the latter, he may hold the employer The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an
solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, independent civil action in accordance with the
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court.
In fact, even without such a reservation, we have
diligence of a good father of the family.
allowed the injured party in the criminal case which
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the action filed by appellant resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover
was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. damages based on quasi-delict.
The fact that appellants reserved their right in the
In People vs. Ligon: However, it does not follow that
criminal case to file an independent civil action did
a person who is not criminally liable is also free from
not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict. civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a
criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence
Page 45 of 49
is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then
the civil liability of the accused only when it includes wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by
a declaration that the facts from which the civil BPI because his account therein had already been
liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of garnished and that they are now constrained to close
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). his credit account with them.
Julian C. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter,

SINGSON VS. BANK OF P.I., 23 SCRA 1117
claiming that his name was not included in the Writ
FACTS of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was
served upon the bank. The defendant President
Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case in
Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to verify
the Court of First Instance, Manila, in which
this information and after having confirmed the
judgment had been rendered sentencing him and
same, apologized to the plaintiff Julian C. Singson
his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat
and wrote him a letter, requesting him to disregard
and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of
their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of
P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine
garnishment from his account had already been
Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably
removed.
appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille &
Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the
became final and executory. In due course, a writ of mistake that had been inadvertently committed,
garnishment was subsequently served upon the resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of
Bank of the Philippine Islands — in which the the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-
Singson commenced the present action against the
Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned.
Bank and its president, Santiago Freixas, for
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of
of the bank in charge of all matters of execution and plaintiffs' account.
garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff
herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a Ruling of CFI Manila: rendered judgment
party defendants, without further reading the body dismissing the complaint upon the ground that
of the said garnishment and informing himself that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon
said garnishment was merely intended for the the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation
deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin between the parties is contractual in nature; because
this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil
Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona,
Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because
prepared a letter for the signature of the President
plaintiffs have not established the amount of
of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson
damages allegedly sustained by them.
of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in
that case. Another letter was also prepared and
ISSUE
signed by the said President of the Bank for the
Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963. Whether or not plaintiffs cannot recover from the
defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict because
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff of the existence of a contract between the parties.
Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service

Page 46 of 49
RULING resulting in double homicide and damage to
property.
No. The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for
damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi- The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is
delict, their relation with the defendants being a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, transporting beer products for the San Miguel
however, that the existence of a contract between Corporation (SMC for Short) from the latter's San
the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales
the one against the order and the consequent outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire
recovery of damages therefor. is the white truck trailer described above driven by
Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside
Air France vs. Carrascoso: involving an airplane
from the Corporation's memorandum to all its
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had
drivers and helpers to physically inspect their
been illegally ousted from his first-class
vehicles before each trip the SMC's Traffic
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the
Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness
tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
of this White Truck trailer. In addition to a
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of
professional driver's license, it also conducts a rigid
tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation
examination of all driver applicants before they are
between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual
hired. At around 4:00 o'clock in the morning while
both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the
the White truck driven by Dunca was descending at
contract may also be a tort".
a slight downgrade along the national road at
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged
at bar, and considering, particularly, the portion of the road covering the full width of the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff truck's right lane going south and about six meters
was remedied as soon as the President of the bank in length. These made the surface of the road uneven
realized the mistake he and his subordinate because the potholes were about five to six inches
employee had committed, the Court finds that an deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion
award of nominal damages — the amount of which is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo,
need not be proven4 — in the sum of P1,000, in before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw
addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the
suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights. opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lance but at that
AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155 particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle,
they had to run over it. This caused the truck to
- - - - REFER TO PAGE 30 - - - -
bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and
the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING VS. PEOPLE, GR
Nissan. As a result, Dunca's vehicle rammed the
129029
incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of
the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder
FACTS
where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely
Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela damaged, and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano
filed with the RTC an amended information charging Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly from
Romeo Dunca y Tumol with reckless imprudence external and internal hemorrhage and multiple
Page 47 of 49
fractures. For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured
Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00. party can not avail himself of any other remedy
because he may not recover damages twice for the
The RTC finds the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
same negligent act or omission of the accused. This
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
is the rule against double recovery.1âwphi1.nêt
Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. The trial court In other words, "the same act or omission can create
also rendered a supplemental decision ordering the two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that
defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the
Francisco Dy, Jr., culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party can not
The Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision
recover damages under both types of liability."
affirming that of the trial court.
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to
ISSUE file a separate civil action for damages against
1. May petitioner as owner of the truck involved petitioner as employer of the accused, based on
in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of
the damages awarded to the offended the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner
parties in the criminal action against the Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer
truck driver despite the filing of a separate of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault
civil action by the offended parties against or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this
the employer of the truck driver? vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at
2. May the Court award damages to the least two specific provisions of law.
offended parties in the criminal case despite
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to
the filing of a civil action against the
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an
employer of the truck driver; and in amounts
action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by
exceeding that alleged in the information for
the injured party against the employer for an act or
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
omission of the employee and would necessitate
and damage to property?
only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here,
RULING the liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary,
We grant the petition, resolving under the
subject to the defense of due diligence in the
circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to
selection and supervision of the employee. The
the trial court for determination of the civil liability
enforcement of the judgment against the employer
of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the
in an action based on Article 2176 does not require
civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the
the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the
purpose.
liability of the employer with that of the employee,
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the the two being statutorily considered joint
choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that
Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the a felony committed by his employee in the discharge
Page 48 of 49
of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the
is convicted of a crime done in the performance of civil action ex delicto.
his work and is found to be insolvent that renders
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court
him unable to properly respond to the civil liability
erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case
adjudged.
and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the satisfied with such award, private respondent did not
negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However,
employer of the accused who has been adjudged petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be
guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, remanded to the trial court so that it may render
cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the decision in the civil case awarding damages as
filing of the separate civil action based on quasi may be warranted by the evidence.
delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and
With regard to the second issue, the award of
the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery
damages in the criminal case was improper
of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the
because the civil action for the recovery of civil
criminal action. Such separate civil action was for
liability was waived in the criminal action by the
recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
filing of a separate civil action against the
Code, arising from the same act or omission of the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil
accused.
indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, committed." The only issue brought before the trial
paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, court in the criminal action is whether accused
when private respondents, as complainants in the Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless
criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
civil action, they waived other available civil actions property. The action for recovery of civil liability is
predicated on the same act or omission of the not included therein, but is covered by the separate
accused-driver. Such civil action includes the civil action filed against the petitioner as employer
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, of the accused truck-driver.
and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment
act or omission of the accused.
convicting the accused became final and executory,
The intention of private respondents to proceed but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action
primarily and directly against petitioner as employer is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal
of accused truck driver became clearer when they action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The
did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against pronouncement was void because the action for
the latter based on quasi delict. recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime
has been waived in said criminal action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial
court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and
petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily
liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in
the criminal action as the offended parties in fact
filed a separate civil action against the employer

Page 49 of 49

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TORTS AND DAMAGES

CASE DIGESTS | S.Y. 2019 – 2020

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RULING While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they

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RULING Whatever may be the character of the liability which

Gambito | Miquiabas | Rosette | Sarangani | Sarip

Gambito | Miquiabas | Rosette | Sarangani | Sarip

Gambito | Miquiabas | Rosette | Sarangani | Sarip

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Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, A cause of action is understood to be the delict or

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