G.R. No.
L-32624 February 12, 1980 convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA,
FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and VICENTE
ROJAS, accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused
whose death sentence is under automatic review.
Jose W. Diokno for appellant Nierra.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for accused Misa.
Alberto Cacnio for appellants Doblen and Rojas.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
Solicitor Octavio R Ramirez and Trial Attorney Lolita
C. Dumlao for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses
Pagano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from
the decision dated March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro
Samson C. Animas of the Court of First Instance of
South Cotabato, General Santos City Branch II,
to death and ordering them to pay solidarity an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of
the victim Juliana Nierra (Criminal Case No. 2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder
charge, was also sentenced to death and ordered to
pay a similar indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969,
pp. 36-8, Record). His death sentence is under
automatic review.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana
Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Pagano Nierra, 39, her
brother-inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of
launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in
Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-
cola while Pagano sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the
owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II, while
Paciano was the owner of two launches, Sylvania I
and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto Nierra,
Paciano's elder brother. To mollify Pagano, by
diminishing the competition between their launches,
Aniceto sold Elsa II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and
Paciano were not on speaking terms.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the
locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of
liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose,
Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano,
accompanied to Paciano's house in the afternoon of
July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer
who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal
Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of
Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in June, 1969.
He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja
vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in
the presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife
of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of
three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the
morning after the killing he would pay Misa four
hundred pesos near the municipal hall of Tupi, South
Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away from
General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the
same place on August 12, 1969.
That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia.
When Misa scheduled the assassination on July 8,
1969, Pagano said that it was up to Misa since he was
the one who would kill Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of
Pagano Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a
package containing a caliber .38 pistol with five
bullets. Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and
apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired to kill
Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on the
night of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be
perpetrated.
On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette
store near the creek or canal about twenty-seven
steps from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia was
stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio about
eighteen steps from the scene of the crime. Pagano
was near the house of Juanito Desinorio about
twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The
houses of the two Desinorios were separated from
the house of Juliana Nierra by an alley.
Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five
steps from the scene of the crime in close proximity
to the back of Juliana's house where. as he had
previously observed some nights before, she used to
answer the call of nature. The house was at the back
of the Esso Gas Station near the beach of Sarangani
Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.
Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the
unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was
accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa
unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair,
thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he
inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and
fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the
beach, witnessed the actual killing.
The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana
sustained a gunshot wound in the tongue. The bullet
passed through the buccal cavity down to the spinal
column where the slug was extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the
ensuing commotion, went down from the house and
saw his prostrate wife with blood oozing from her
mouth and nose. Her panty was pulled down, her
dress was raised up to her waist, and her genital
organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor
pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach
in front of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the
alley between the houses of Tony Desinorio and
Francisco Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso
Gas Station crossed the creek or canal on the west,
reached the Lagao road, threw the gun into the
dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded
to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his
mind and returned to the beach near the victim's
house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by
passing through the alley between the house of the
victim and the Desinorio houses, which alley
separated the building of the Northern Lines and the
Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas Station, and
emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which intersects
Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia
resided. Their residence was about two hundred
meters away from the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who
happened to be at the Villa Bus Terminal at around
eight-thirty in the evening of July 8, 1969, when the
killing was perpetrated, testified that she saw Pagano
Nierra wearing an underwear and striped T-short
running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago. About
five minutes later, she saw Pagano the boulevard and
running towards Saguing Street. He was wearing long
pants. The witness made a statement to the police
about what she had seen.
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus
bound for Tupi and alighted near the municipal
building. Paciano Nierra arrived in that place and
gave him four hundred pesos. Misa returned to
General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and
proceeded to the victim's house where he mingled
with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept
vigil there, staying there for four nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for
the , buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a
commission of one peso per passenger. Policemen
arrested him and Rojas as for questioning but they
were later released. He left the city and brought his
family to Barrio Luan, Maitum South Cotabato. There,
he was arrested again, this time by Constabulary
soldiers.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by
Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police
department. He signed a confession admitting the
killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other
accused therein. The statement was sworn to before
the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the killing.
Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A
sketch of the scene of the crime was prepared.
On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary
in-vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted again
the killing and confirmed his confession implicating
Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and
Rojas. He executed another confession on August 12,
1969 which was sworn to before the city judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14,
1969, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as
co-conspirators, were charged with murder
aggravated by reward, treachery, evident
premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of
superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had
been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder
of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of
his co accused, his confessions and testimony were
offered by the prosecution and were the main bases
of the judgment of conviction and the imposition of
the death penalty.
As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their
individual cases will be separately reviewed.
Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that
Misa made an improvident plea because the trial
court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him
the gravity of the offense and the consequences of
his plea of guilty.
That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an
escaped prisoner, had acquired some experience in
criminal procedure. Not only that. He executed two
extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime as
the triggerman He testified at the preliminary
investigation, and, after he was sentenced to death,
he was the prosecution star witness during the trial
of his co-accused. His testimony against his co-
accused, delineating their roles in the commission of
the killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his
plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to
his culpability and as to his understanding of the
consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs.
Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de
oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction be set
aside and that the case be remanded to the lower
court for new trial To hold a new trial. wherein Misa
himself would again be the star prosecution witness,
would be a repetitious and preposterous ceremony.
The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any
complicity in the killing of Juliana Nierra. Their
version is that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at about
eight o'clock in the evening, Paciano Nierra was
inside a room of his house. Gaudencia Nierras was in
her room, writing something. Eduardo Nierra, the
couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion
Sabihon a housemaid, was somewhere in the house
premises.
Paciano heard somebody coming up the house.
When he came out of the room, he met Nolasco
Docallos who said that Juliana Nierra was shot.
Paciano Nierra asked who shot her. Docallos
answered that he did not know.
Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the
latter's motorcycle in going to the hospital. Paciano
instructed his son Eduardo to render assistance.
Paciano could not go out because two years before
he had undergone a surgical operation in Cebu City.
Gaudencia could not leave the children alone in the
house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor that
Juliana was already dead.
At about five-thirty in the morning of the following
day, Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She talked
with Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her
brother-in-law and husband of the victim, did not
answer when she tried to talk with him.
Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and
his wife and their Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and
Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus
and went to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the
outrigger of a vinta, a trip which the Nierra spouses
had previously agreed upon with Saguil. They arrived
in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not able to buy
bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez
Restaurant.
The group returned to General Santos City, arriving
there at two o'clock in the afternoon. They went to
the funeral parlor. They were not able to talk with
Aniceto Nierra. In the evening of that day, Gaudencia
led the prayers for the repose of the soul of Juliana
and she performed that task on the second, third and
fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the
succeeding nights because she was advised that it
was bad for her to do so. Their child attended
the novena Paciano could not attend
the novena because he had kidney trouble. They gave
one hundred pesos to Juliana's family as contribution
to the funeral expenses.
The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the
burial, Aniceto lost consciousness and collapsed
Paciano revived him by pressing his abdomen. After
the coffin was placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the
niche. The Nierra spouses gave to Aniceto an
additional two hundred pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp.
6-11, Appellants' Brief).
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a
credible witness because he was a recidivist and his
testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. That
contention is devoid of merit.
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The
basic point in his confessions and testimony was that
he was hired by the Nierra spouses, through Doblen
to kill Juliana for the price of three thousand pesos.
That is sufficient for the conviction of the Nierra
spouses as the inducers of the assassination of
Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony refer to
minor details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply
with their contractual commitment to pay Misa the
balance of two thousand six hundred pesos must
have impelled him to unmask them and to reveal the
truth even if such a revelation speeled his own
destruction.
The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy
among the accused is belied by the facts shown in
the record. Misa had no personal motive for killing
Juliana Nierra. He was induced to do so because of
the monetary consideration promised by the Nierra
spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to Paciano's cousin,
introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Before
Juliana's assassination, Gaudencia had contracted
Misa to kill Nene Amador, her former housemaid,
who was allegedly Paciano's mistress. That projected
killing did not materialize.
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as
to the alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view of
the rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be
admitted as evidence against appellants Nierra, the
alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence
other than such testimony and that there is no such
independent evidence. This argument is wrong. It is
not supported by action 27 of Rule 130
Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or
declarations but not to testimony given on the stand
at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant" (People vs. Serrano,
105 Phil. 531, 541).
Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in
finding that the motive for the killing was to stifle
business competition. This argument is refuted by
the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio
which show that Paciano Nierra was antagonistic to
his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager or "brains" of
Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola distribution
businesses.
In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's
launch, Elsa II, while it was under construction.
Aniceto had to sell that launch because of Paciano's
threat that somebody would be hurt if its operation
was continued. Pagano told Rodelio that the latter's
mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked was bad and
dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions,
Paciano even challenged his brother to a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial
court convicted them on the basis of the hearsay
testimonies of Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya.
This argument is misleading. The judgment of
conviction was anchored principally on the
confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool used by
the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death.
Misa's evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.
The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely
proved that Misa, Rojas and Doblen were implicated
in the killing of Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of
Sanchez, linking Misa to the killing, that gave the
police a breakthrough in the solution of the case.
After the connection of Misa with the crime was
established, the police arrested him and obtained his
confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the
investigators.
The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend
that the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the
affidavit of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was
obtained through an alleged promise of immunity.
The record is not clear as to that promise of
immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on August 1,
1969. On August 12, he testified at the pre
investigation. The record of his testimony before the
fiscal was signed by him. He was assisted by counsel
at that pre investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise
of immunity was shown to have been made by the
fiscal to Rojas.
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence
and is cumulative in character. As already stated, the
crucial and decisive evidence consists of Misa's
testimony and confessions.
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio
Falgui acted acted the preliminary investigation as
counsel of appellant Doblen, having been allegedly
hired by the offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then
at the trial, he acted as counsel de oficio of Misa who
pleaded guilty. He also appeared for Doblen (6 and
19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded
as having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who,
as already noted, were convicted on the basis of
Misa's confessions and testimony. The appellants
have not successfully overthrown or rebutted Misa's
evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a
tool of Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed
as a friend on Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he
had no hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra
was proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night
of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra
did not go to the funeral parlor to view the remains Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano
of Juliana. when they were confined in the city jail (translation):

After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with
murder, there was a confrontation between the said
spouses and Aniceto Nierra in the house of their
brother, Alonso, in the presence of their other
brother, Gerundio. The following dialogue took place
between Paciano and Aniceto:
Paciano: Noy, why did you
suspect us to be the killers
of your wife?
My companion Pacing (Paciano):
I am directly telling you and you could be
sure that I will do my best that you will
be free. Before the trial of (in) court, I
would like that you give me the sum of
P600 even if you give the cash advance
of P 500 before Sunday. OK and you give
the same thru the hole.

Aniceto: Will you still deny

when Gaspar Misa pointed
to you that you were
standing by the post and
Paciano (Gaudencia) was
also standing in a another
post when he (Misa) killed
my wife. From now on I
have no brother by the
name of Pacing.

Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.


Believe me that I will free you and burn
this immediately. (Exit 1)
The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano
were co- conspirators. The Nierras were co-principals
by inducement. By acting as lookouts during the
perpetration of the killing, they became co-principals
by cooperation as well.
Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. (— Doblen's alibi was
that on the night of the killing,
S he was stranded at
Margos, Glan, South Cotabato. g He returned to
General Santos City at ten o'clock
d in the morning of
the following day. He denied. that he accompanied
Misa to the house of Paciano) Nierra on July 4, 1969
and that he delivered to MisaGthe package containing
the murder weapon. a
s
Rojas' alibi was that on the night
p of the killing he
slept in his pumpboat at Lion'sa Beach, General Santos
City. However, that could notr have precluded him
from having acted as lookoutMon that same beach.
i
These appellants, like the Nierra
s spouses, contend
that Misa's confessions and testimony
a have no
probative value because there was no other evidence
proving the alleged conspiracy. As already stated,
that rule does not apply to testimony given on the
witness stand where the defendants have the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People
vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).
It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator
because he was not present when Misa and the
Nierra spouses discussed the liquidation of Juliana
Nierra and that when Doblen delivered the package
to Misa, he (Doblen) did not know that it contained
the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is contended that
he was not present at the said conference between
Misa and the Nierra spouses.
These contentions are not well-taken. The activities
of Doblen and Rojas indubitably show that they had
community of design with the Nierra spouses and
Misa in the assassination of Juliana Nierra.
Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio
contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained
under an alleged promise of immunity.
It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not
contain anything connecting him to the murder. In
that affidavit, he denied that he had any participation
in the commission of the crime and that he conspired
with Misa. So, the admission in evidence of that
affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
The killing was correctly characterized by the trial
court as murder qualified by treachery and
aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As
to the Nierras, relationship is an additional
aggravating circumstance.
Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of
superiority. The manner in which Misa liquidated
Juliana Nierra added shame, disgrace or obloquy to
the material injury caused by the crime. Hence,
ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar 2 Phil. 417).
In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance offset his plea of guilty. That did not
preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon
him.
Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death
penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in
accordance- with law. However, for lack of the
requisite ten votes, the death penalty imposed on
Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to
the Nierra spouses and delivering the murder
weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of
the crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout
and received fifty pesos for his work.
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of
Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion
that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is
true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they
should be punished as co-principals. However, since
their participation was not absolutely indispensable
to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the
court should favor the milder form of liability may be
applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and
other cases).
In some exceptional situations, having community of
design with the principal does not prevent a
malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if
his role in the perpetration of the homicide or
murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character
(See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming
1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598;
People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is
affirmed with respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano
Nierra.
(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra
is communited to reclusion perpetua. The civil liability
imposed upon her by the trial court is affirmed.
(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas
are convicted as accomplices. They are each
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years
of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen
years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and
to pay solidarily with the principals an indemnity of
six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the heirs of
Juliana Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the
extent of six thousand pesos for the principals' civil
liability. Costs against the accused.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO
DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO
ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in
band, with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated
homicide and assault upon agents of persons in
authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only
five of ten accused were brought to trial, the other
five named only as "John Does" in the information
having remained at large. Two of the five accused
who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were
acquitted, while the trial court, the Court of first
Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on the
appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble
and Antonio Romaquin The decision of the trial court
is now before Us for review for having imposed the
death penalty.
Both the de •ficio counsel for appellants and the then
Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, a retired
Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the
appealed decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief,
the relevant and material facts accurately reflect the
evidence presented, except only as to the fact that
there were eight malefactors, with respect to which
appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2, Appellants'
Brief).
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was
committed as follows:
Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten
(10) men, almost all of them heavily
armed with pistols, carbines and
Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in
a motor banca and proceeded to
Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the
Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank
and Trust Company. Once in Navotas
and taking advantage of the darkness of
the night, eight (8) men disembarked
from the banca and proceeded to the
beach in the direction of the branch
bank. Within a few minutes, shots were
heard throwing the people around in
panic. As confusion reigned, the people
ran in different directions scampering for
safety. As time went on, the shots grew
in intensity. As the commotion died
down, the eight men returned to their
banca, still fully armed and some of
them carrying what looked like
"bayongs". "They boarded the waiting
motor banca and sped away. As a result
of the shooting, many people got killed
and some injured. Among those who
were killed were agents of the law, like
Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine
Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and
Cpl. Teofilo Evangelista of the Navotas
Police Department. Dominador Estrella,
a market collector, was also killed.
'Those who were injured were Pat.
Armando Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus
Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro
de la Cruz.
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company
branch office located at the North hay
Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of
the bloody mission, has an unusual
banking hours. It opens at midnight and
closes at 8:00 in the morning. The bank
has ten employees, more or less,
including a security guard. It has two
cages or compartments for tellers. One
cage was under the care of Melvin
Domingo and the other one under the
care of Alejandro San Juan. At around
12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar
Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was
near the cage of Domingo when two
men entered the bank asking that their
money be changed. Domingo refused,
saying that they had no small
denominations. Suddenly, three men
armed with long guns barged in and
fired at the ceiling and the wall of the
bank. They ordered the employees to lie
down, face downward and then
demanded the key to the vault. When
Reyes answered that they do not have
the key, the armed men aimed their
guns at the vault and fired upon it until
its doors were opened. They entered the
vault and found that they could not get
anything as the compartments inside the
said vault were locked. Not being able to
get anything from the vault, the armed
men went to the two teller cages and
took whatever they could lay their hands
on. Not long afterwards, the men left,
carrying with them the sum of
P10,439.95.
Just beside the bank was a police
outpost. On the night in question, Pat.
Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost,
together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan,
Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl.
Evangelists. were on duty watching the
fish landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at
around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst
which he believed came from a
Thompson. He said he saw a man
pointing a Thompson upwards while he
was in front of the banca Afterwards,
Antonio said, he heard another burst
coming from the same direction.
Antonio and his companions then went
to the middle of the road and again they
heard shots, and this time they were
successive, coming from their left.
Antonio could not see who was firing the
shots. Suddenly, he said, he saw one of
this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple
down. He saw also Dominador Estrella
sitting down folding his stomach. They
were both felled by the shots coming
from the left side of the bank. Antonio
told Ocampo to go beside the outpost
and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm. Sgt.
Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell
down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said,
he went to the outpost and told Pat.
Ocampo to go too. He said that from the
outpost he heard some more shots.
Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh.
After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his
wounded companions placed in a
vehicle, together with Evangelista and
Aguilos who were already dead. Later
on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member
of the PC, lying prostrate in the ground
already dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to
how the robbery and the killing that followed in its
wake were actually committed, the three appellants
had no participation. It is not surprising that the
Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of
one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this
recommendation, it might be well to take up the case
of this appellant ahead of the other two, appellants
Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the
Solicitor General made the following observation:
As to appellant Simeon, the evidence
shows only that the malefactors met in
his house to discuss the plan to rob the
Prudential Bank This circumstance,
standing alone, does not conclude his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts
do not show that he performed any act
tending to the perpetration of the
robbery, nor that he took a direct part
therein or induced other persons to
commit, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act without
which it would not have been
committed. It could be that Simeon was
present at the meeting held in his house
and entered no opposition to the
nefarious scheme but, aside from this,
he did not cooperate in the commission
of the robbery perpetrated by the
others. At most, his act amounted to
joining in a conspiracy which is not
punishable. Mere knowledge,
acquiescence, or approval of the act,
without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy, but that
there must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and
purpose (15 CJS 1062).
We are, therefore, unable to agree with
the finding of the lower court that
Simeon was a principal both by
agreement and encouragement, despite
his non-participation in the commission
of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved
that Simeon received a part of the
looted money as to make him an
accessory. Romaquin's testimony that
the day after the robbery he gave P2.00
to Simeon who had asked for cigarettes
(p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly
be considered as the latter's share of the
loot. It is significant that in his statement
he claimed he had not yet received his
share. (pp. 10-11, Appellee's Brief; p.
146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the
foregoing observation of the Solicitor General to be
with convincing rationality it is only that portion in
which is cited Simeon's statement made before the
Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29, Folder
of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his share"
that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor
General's recommendation, for it gives the
impression that Simeon had given material or moral
support or encouragement to the malefactors
(referring to those still at large as the principal
culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot.
However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial
statement would erase that impression, and reveals
the true import of that statement as intended only to
show that Simeon had nothing to do with
commission of the crime and therefore did not
receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote
pertinent portions Of his statement. on custodial
investigation:
3. T — Ano ang dahilan at
ikaw ay naririto?
S — Dahil po sa aking
pagkakasangkot sa
holdapan dito sa isang
Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal at
ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan
ng M. P. D.
4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?
S — Noon pong Miyerkules
ng madaling araw, hindi ko
alam ang petsa pero nito
pong buwan na ito.
5. T — Mayroon ka bang
nalalaman tungkol sa
pagkakaholdap ng isang
bangko dito sa Navotas?
S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay
doon nagpulong sa aming
bahay ang mga taong
nangholdap dito sa Navotas.
6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao
ang mga nagpulong sa
inyong bahay?
S — Pirmero po ay walo (8),
pagkatapos ay may
dumating na dalawa pa at
ang mga kilala ko lamang po
ay sina Tony na may an ng
bangka, si Joe Rondina
Cresencio Doble at narinig
kong may tinawag pang
Erning. lyon pong iba ay
hindi ko alam ang pangalan
pero makikilala ko Pag aking
nakitang muli.
7. T — Gaano katagal na
nagpulong sa inyong bahay
ang mga taong ito?
S — Mahigit pong mga isang
(1) oras pero hatinggabi na
nong Lunes ng gabi (June
13, 1966).
8. T — Ano ang mga bagay
na pinagpulongan sa inyong
bahay?
S — Tungkol sa kanilang
lakad na pagpunta sa isang
bangko sa Navotas,
9. T — Sino ang nangunguna
sa pulong na iyon?
S — Iyan po (witness
pointing to the picture of
Rodolfo Dizon, after being
shown five (5) other
pictures).
10. T — Ano-ano ang mga
narinig mong
pinagpulongan?
S — Tungkol po doon sa
gagawing pagnanakaw sa
isang Bangko sa Navotas,
Rizal.
11. T — Samantalang sila ay
nagpupulong, ano ang iyong
ginagawa?
S — Wala po, hindi ko sila
sinasaway at hindi ako
kumikibo bastat ako ay
nakikinig lamang.
12. T — Bukod sa narinig
mong magnanakaw sa
bangko na usapan, ano pa
ang iba mong mga narinig?
S — Sinabi nito (witness
pointing to the picture of
Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose
Rondina na "MALAKING
KUARTA TO, PERO
MASYADONG
MAPANGANIB, AT
KAILANGAN AY HANDA
TAYO."
13. T — Ano pa ang
sumunod?
S — Nagbubulong-bulongan
ang iba tungkol doon sa
gagawing paglaban.
14. T — Ano pa ang
nangyari?
S — Maya-maya po ay
lumakad na sila, hindi ako
sumama.
15. T — Pagkatapos?
S — Makaraan po ang
mahigit na isang (1) oras ay
nagbalik silang lahat.
16. T — Ano ang nangyari
ng magbalik na sila?
S — Matapos po silang
bumaba doon sa malapit sa
aming bahay ay
nagmamadali na silang
umalis dahil sa may tama
ang isa sa kanila. At noon
pong umaga ng araw na
iyon ay nagpunta ako kay
Tony (Antonio Romaquin at
kumuha ng dalawang piso
(P2.00) dahil iyong aking
parte ay hindi pa naibibigay
sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay
umuwi na ako sa amin.
17. T — Ano pa ang iyong
masasabi kaugnay ng
pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba ay
mayroong nais na alisin o
dili kaya ay baguhin sa
salaysay mong ito?
S — Mayroon pa po akong
ibig na sabihin.
18. T — Ano pa ang ibig
mong sabihin?
S — Bago po tuluyang
umalis sila sa aking bahay ay
nag-usap-usap silang lahat
at ako ay sumama sa
kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng
mungkahi na ako na lamang
ang maghihintay sa kanila
dahil sa ako ay may pinsala
sa paa at maaaring hindi
ako makatakbo at
qqqmahuh lamang.
19. T — Iyan bang pinsala
mo sa kaliwang paa ay
matagal na?
S — Opo, may limang (5)
taon na.
20. T — Samantalang nag-
uusap sa loob ng bahay mo,
nasaan ka?
S — Kasama po sa loob ng
aking bahay.
21. T — Ano pa ang
masasabi mo?
S — Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his
house having been used as the meeting place of the
malefactors for their final conference before
proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank
branch thereat. He did not join them because of a
qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him only
a liability, not one who can help in the devilish
venture. To the malefactors he was most unwanted
to join them. If they met at his house it was only
because it was near the landing place of the banca,
and so he invited them to his house while waiting for
the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his house
where the conspirators met, and for merely telling
them that he could not join them because of his foot
injury, and will just wait for them; evidently as a mere
gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in
their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any
help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid
being suspected that he was against their vicious plan
for which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means
a co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in
the talks among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no
culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the
commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical
condition alone, he could not in any way be of help to
the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal
design, nor could he have been desired by the latter
to be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio
Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their main
contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon
which their conviction was principally made to rest,
are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained
by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-
incrimination. In support of this contention,
appellants have only their own self-serving testimony
to rely upon.
Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the
Navotas police department someone he could not
name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson
hit him on the left side with the butt of a gun causing
him to lose consciousness; that he was made to lie on
a narrow table and peppery liquid was poured over
his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it was
then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which
he could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and
maltreatment in order to force him to admit culpable
participation in the heist. The inquiry must,
accordingly, be whether the claim of violence and
involuntariness of their statements is true as to
render said statements inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the
execution of the custodial statements (Exhibits E, F,
F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the
same is negated by how the details as given by both
appellants in their respective statements fit into each
other, at least as to the part played by each from the
time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure
the latter's banca up to their get-away from the
scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in
his statement that although he wanted to escape
from the scene after his passengers have
disembarked for their evil mission, he could not do so
because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to
prevent his escape, as was the order given Cresencio
by the rest of the gang. The latter denied this
allegation when he testified that he returned the gun
given him because he did not know how to use or
manipulate it, although in his extra- judicial
statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he
stated that he accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an
attempt to exculpate himself which is generally taken
as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on
one while giving his statement on custodial
interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the
claim of violent maltreatment to which appellant's
were subjected to, that neither one of the appellants
presented medical certificate to attest to the injuries
allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which
disproves the claim (People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249;
People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to
the fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M,
p. 35, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the
accused, made no admission of his participation in
the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court,
he admitted that no violence was applied to him
when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12,
1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough
that the appellants could not have been dealt with
differently as their co-accused Aquino who was
allowed to give his statement freely without the
employment of force or intimidation upon him. The
evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio
addressed to Romaquin asking the latter not to
reveal the names of their companions. This means
that the names of the members of the band led by
Joe Intsik must have been known to both appellants.
That the Identity of five of those charged in this case
has remained only as "John Does" indicate the non-
employment of any coercive means with which to
force them into revealing the names of their
companions in the robbery, again negating the claim
of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin
and Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-judicial
statements when they testified in court. By all the
proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show the
voluntariness of their custodial statements plus the
positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named
among the alleged torturers, that any violence was
practiced by the investigators, specifically, the
alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6,
7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged
involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is
fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon
while allegedly attempting to escape could have
instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which
affected their freedom of will in giving their own
statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is a far-
fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the
giving of the statements, the killing having taken
place after their interrogation. In his supplemental
statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20,
Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person
of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place
long after appellants have given their main
statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio
had only bothered to check the dates of the main
statements of both appellants which were given not
later than just past the middle of June, 1966, and that
of the supplementary statement of Romaquin which
is July 5, 1966, he would not have probably come
forth with this argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American
case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps
on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial
statements, for their having been unaided by
counsel, nor informed of their right thereto during
the interrogation. 'There might be merit in this
contention were the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation one of constitutional grant as is
provided in our 1973 Constitution, before which the
right was given only to an accused, not to a mere
suspect during in-custody police interrogation
(Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4; People vs.
Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the
time of their custodial interrogation in 1966,
however, the requisite of assistance of counsel was
not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it
has been granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by
appellants, can neither be appreciated to impair the
admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is
the voluntariness of an admission or confession that
determines its admissibility, for no principle of law or
constitutional precept should stand on the way of
allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only
requisite justly demanded being that ample
safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions.
Once the element of voluntariness is convincingly
established, which, incidentally, is even presumed,
the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession,
admission or statement becomes unquestionable. 1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however,
when evaluated with the testimony they gave in
court, would convince Us that their liability is less
than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual
participation, as as was the holding of the trial court.
The most damaging admission made in the extra-
judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was asked
by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca
for his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by
Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be
used for robbery. Cresencio gave an affirmative
answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind Tony
Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied
Joe Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In
Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin,
p. 15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked
him to bring his friends in his banca, to board a
launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy
between the statements of Cresencio and Romaquin
as to the intended use of the banca is at once
apparent, for while according to the former, it was
for the commission of robbery, according to the
latter, it was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a
launch for a trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated
thereby is the full freedom with which both
appellants were allowed to give their respective
statements while in custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however,
did not necessarily make him a co-conspirator.
Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to
draft Cresencio into his band of malefactors that
would commit the robbery more than just asking his
help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men
all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime,
the commission of which needed planning and men
to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of
each other, which is not shown with respect to
appellants by the way they were asked to look and
provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual
robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to
the principal malefactors still at large, to be asked to
join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received
by Romaquin who alone was given money by the
malefactors in the sum of P441.00, indicate that the
latter did not consider appellant as their confederate
in the same character as those constituting the band
of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very
well represent only the rental of his banca, and for
the cooperation he extended to the malefactors,
which, by no means, is an indispensable one.
Cresencio, on the other hand, was not given any part
of the loot. It was only Romaquin who gave him P4
1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he
were a full-fledged ally or confederate.
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon
realizing the full impact of their vicious misdeeds,
Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear
of being implicated, as shown by the measure they
had taken to prevent his escape, is further proof that
Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator, who
is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust.
For his part, Cresencio testified that while he was
given a gun with which to cover Romaquin who might
escape, he returned the gun because he did not know
how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left
near the beach to prevent appellants fleeing from the
scene of the crime with banca. In his statement,
however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he
refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just the
same, and he received it.
The circumstances pointed out would not make
appellants liable as co-principals in the crime
charged. At the most their liability would be that of
mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal design
when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and
Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader
Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the
scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil
purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was
the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank
to be robbed and carried them away from the scene
after the robbery to prevent their apprehension.
Appellants thus cooperated but not in an
indispensable manner. Even without appellants
providing the banca, the robbery could have been
committed, specially with the boldness and
determination shown by the robbers in committing
the crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further
shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26, Record of
Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to
reveal to the police the names of their companions.
He went to Romaquin and asked for money which
the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show
that he had helped in some material way to deserve a
share in the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the
malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with which the
latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away
from the scene, evidently to show that he never
joined in the criminal purpose, and that all his acts
were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not
voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to
prevent his escape, could have been just an extra
precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the
course of the commission of the crime specially if
attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true
that he never voluntarily made the trip with
knowledge of the planned robbery, and with
Cresencio saying that he returned the gun given him
with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding
away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as
should have been his natural impulse had he not
joined in the criminal design. His act of hiding the
money he received from the malefactors, and
repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience
arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly
extended to the principal culprit to achieve their
criminal purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as
defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,
cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal
Code). There must be a Community of unlawful
purpose between the principal and accomplice and
assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs.
Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid
in the consummation of the offense and in as
efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In
this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a
driver of a car used for abduction which makes the
driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs.
Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs.
Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in
the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the
malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry
out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may
be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob,
which makes them accomplices. Their complicity
must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with
the killing. Having been left in the banca, they could
not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of
one seeking relief from liability for assaults
committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised
Penal Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere
accomplices may appear too lenient considering the
gravity and viciousness of the offense with which
they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to
establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy
with the real malefactors who actually robbed the
bank and killed and injured several persons, including
peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real
and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not
bring the wrath of the victims nor of the outraged
public, upon the heads of appellants whose
participation has not been shown to be as
abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The
desire to bring extreme punishment to the real
culprits should not blind Us in meting out a penalty to
appellants more than what they justly deserve, and
as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and
Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in
band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble
is entitled to acquittal as so recommended by the
Solicitor General who finds no sufficient evidence, to
which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio
Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as accomplices for the
crime of robbery in band is prision mayor minimum
which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as
provided ill Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same code.
The commission of the crime was aggravated by
nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There
being no mitigating circumstance, both appellants
should each be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months,
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional to eight
(8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the
sum of 1112,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble
who is hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he should
be continued in confinement for some other legal
cause. Proportionate costs against Cresencio Doble
and Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera,
Vasquez, and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the
benefit of a lenient attitude, I can agree that they
were not principals but merely accomplices as stated
in the main opinion. However, I cannot persuade
myself that their complicity must be limited to the
robbery only and should not include the killing. For it
must be remembered that the principal malefactors
were each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols,
carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns, This fact
was known to the appellants. In fact the principal
malefactors has so many guns that one was given to
Cresencio with which to cover Antonio in case he
tried to escape. This shows that the principal
malefactors were prepared to kill even an accomplice
so that they could accomplish their criminal
objective. How then can it be said that there was no
criminal design to kill but only to rob among the
principal malefactors as suggested in the main
opinion. And I cannot believe that under the
circumstances the appellants were unaware of the
criminal design to kill and that they gave their
cooperation — albeit not indispensable — only — to
the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants
should be held guilty as accomplices in the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the
main opinion.
Relova, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad
Santos.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the
benefit of a lenient attitude, I can agree that they
were not principals but merely accomplices as stated
in the main opinion. However, I cannot persuade
myself that their complicity must be limited to the
robbery only and should not include the killing. For it
must be remembered that the principal malefactors
were each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols,
carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns, This fact
was known to the appellants. In fact the principal
malefactors has so many guns that one was given to
Cresencio with which to cover Antonio in case he
tried to escape. This shows that the principal
malefactors were prepared to kill even an accomplice
so that they could accomplish their criminal
objective. How then can it be said that there was no
criminal design to kill but only to rob among the
principal malefactors as suggested in the main
opinion. And I cannot believe that under the
circumstances the appellants were unaware of the
criminal design to kill and that they gave their
cooperation — albeit not indispensable — only — to
the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants
should be held guilty as accomplices in the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the
main opinion.
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO
C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C.
DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his
brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged
with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance,
Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple
murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed
from the decision of the court a quo the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero
guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as
accomplices, in committing the crime of
Murder, which caused the death of Epifania
Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo
Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on
the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly,
in the absence of other circumstances to
mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico
Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA
PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio,
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo
Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4
Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto
mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to
(sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The
accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio
Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day
of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania
Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day
of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months
of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1
Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months
of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo
Doctolero; and the additional penalty of 2
Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto
mayor for the slight physical injury suffered by
the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed
Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of
P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and
the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero,
in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay three-
fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio
Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth
(1/4) cost de oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that
the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November,
1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with
bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and
once thereat, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, with
abuse of superior strength and with extreme
cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and
strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania
Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately
thereafter, the same accused while already on
the road, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
 assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero,
thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal
wounds which caused his death.2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not
guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial
court made the following findings and a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of
November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita
de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial
Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they
were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old
child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same
occasion, slightly injured while being fed on
the breast of his mother. On the road, a few
meters from the house of Marcial Sagun,
Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally
injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital but he died on the way. . . .
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show
that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were
responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio
and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting physical
injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And
immediately thereafter, with their father and
co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked
Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which
caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution
are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial
Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on
November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria
Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
(sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on
their way home to Barrio Binday. They came
from the field where they bundled their
harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road
in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico
Doctolero who, without warning and without
cause or reason, held the left shoulder of
Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck
Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded
that blow and wrestled with Ludovico
Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the
latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became
frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and
Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the
possession of the bolo of the former, so she
ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio
Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial
Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning
palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased
Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused,
Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed
Doctolero) throw stones at the house of
Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones,
Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the
house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy
went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and
saw the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio, coming down from the house going
towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be
patient and forget?" But she was asked not to
interfere. At about that time, Marcelo
Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero,
and uncle of the three accused was going
towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he
met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they
can't be patient and forget, but the three
accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will
also kill you." Then they struck Marcelo
Doctolero several times with their bolos. And
when their father Antonio Doctolero arrived,
he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo
on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then
all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is
sought to be corroborated by the testimony of
Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun)
who declared that while she was in the house
of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported
the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and
Marcial Sagun, she saw the three accused
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones
at their house and called to all the men in the
house to come out. She was about to go to
their house to get her children but she saw the
three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio
going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a
few meters away from their house. While
there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted
mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your
children." Then she saw the three accused
coming down from the house, going towards
the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero
whom they also boloed several times until he
fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also
 struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then
they all left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following
version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the
crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San
Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was
with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo
and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman.
Antonio Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial
Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo.
(tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera).
Marcial Sagun and company were on their way
home. (p. 8, Ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have
you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed,
however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on
his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun
why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with
a downward swing. He parried the bolo with
his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the
process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his
bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed
his bolo. They watched each other's step (p.
10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de
Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of
Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored
them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun
and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p.
11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both
Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico
tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo,
whom he hit at the back. He retreated and
then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and
Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p.
12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father,
Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his
meal, together with his small children upstairs,
while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero
was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his
meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4,
hearing June 8, 1971-Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and
asked him to look after his children as he might
meet something bad that night. He did not
enter the house anymore: he was only until the
door. Then he ran away. His father asked him
what happened, but he did not answer
anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by
passing through the house of his cousins,
Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came
near his house, he saw the house of Marcial
Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor.
His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house
calling him to get down. When Marcial did not
get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial
Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to
ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial
Sagun went towards the South. He was about
to leave when the old woman hit him at the
back of his neck, causing him to see darkness
and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19,
tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial
Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the
buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed.
Here, he did not notice anyone coming from
the south or the east. So he tried to move, but
as he did so, he noticed someone approaching
him coming from the yard of Marcelo
Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize
the man and thinking that it was Marcial
Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that
the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he
returned the bolo he was holding in its
scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero where
Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero
answered him, "because of your foolishness"
and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process
of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was
hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to
hit him for a second time he took a side step
and took hold of the stick and pulled it away,
causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees.
He was able to get the club, but Marcelo
Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the
latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo,
Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many times.
(pp. 19-26, ibid).4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders
as well as the injury caused to the child. A doctor and
a photographer went to the scene of the crime and
pictures were then taken.5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer
of San Fabian, the court below established that ––
. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body
of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper
border of the left ear to the side of the
forehead. There is fracture of the underlying
skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2
inches above the 1st wound with fracture of
the underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch
above the 2nd wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the
upper border of the left eyebrow to the right
eyebrow. There is also fracture of the
underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1
1/2 from the angle of the month towards the
lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of
the ear is detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is
almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the
left hand. There is a severance from the level
of the middle finger.
(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the
median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm,
left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the
8th wound.
xxx xxx xxx
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita
de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3
cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd
intercostal space just at the left border of the
sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds
were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
 xxx xxx xxx
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and
around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal
bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin
deep at the level of the right clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin
deep one inch below the second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference
with fracture of the underlying skull at the
right frontal portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at
the left frontal portion of the head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level
of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony
portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below
the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below
the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at
the base and lateral portion of the hand right.
There was fracture of some of the underlying
bones.6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan
Oviedo, the resident physician at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained
the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru,
about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the
dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another
about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right
forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2
inch, temporal right." He further testified that the
child was admitted to the hospital on November 8,
1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen
(15) days later.7
During the pendency of the present petition and on
motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May 17,
1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of
his appeal8
and entry of judgment with regard to said accused
was made on the same day.9
In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted
the manifestation of counsel for accused-appellants,
dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero
died on October 22, 1983 as per death certificate
attached thereto as Annex "A".10 Hence, this review is
only with respect to the liability of appellant Conrado
Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado
Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the
commission of the crimes charged. In his defense,
appellant denies having participated in the
commission thereof and raises the effete defense of
alibi, contending that he was not at the place where
the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension,
however, was not corroborated by any evidence
other than the testimony of the other erstwhile
appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator
or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes
from a polluted source and must be scrutinized with
great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion.11
This uncorroborated denial of his participation
cannot overthrow the positive and categorical
testimony of the principal witnesses of the
prosecution, and between the positive declarations
of the prosecution Witness and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserves more
credence.12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any
motive to testify falsely against appellants. The only
imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may
have had against appellants occurred years ago and
she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with
appellants as shown by the following testimony of
Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy
testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic)
your relationship with her was harmonious and
rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to
San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail
to see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a
quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial
Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the
persons who went up her house that night of
November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a
grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by
reason of that previous incident at the crossing yet,
no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun
should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero
in the commission of the crime."14
When there is nothing in the records which would
show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses
to falsely implicate the accused, identification should
be given full credit.15
And when there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was moved by improper motives, the presumption is
that he was not so moved, and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial
court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that
allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however,
are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility.
As correctly explained by the People, the seeming
contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out
by the appellants in their brief are mere
inconsequential variations on the part of each
observer in relating his own observation of the same
incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of
witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far
from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of
good faith. Not all persons who witness an incident
are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but
natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on
minor details.17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer
to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.18 And where the prosecution
witnesses were able to positively identify the
appellants as the authors of the crime and the
testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil
material points, the contradictions become
insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of
Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the investigation
himself and personally examined the scenes of the
multiple killings. Credence is accorded to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law
enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of convincing
proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown
that this prosecution witness was motivated by an
improper motive other than that of accomplishing his
mission.20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which
were received at the police department of San
Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were
committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros
were involved. He further testified that when he
immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and
investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him
that the accused Doctoleros came with bolos from
the house of Marcial Sagun.21
In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on
the results of his investigation and the weight to be
accorded to his findings was properly addressed to
the trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his
brother, Virgilio, participated as accomplices in the
slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on
the child. We agree with its findings and the
ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its
evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three
appellants were still stoning and hurling
challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they
must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and
shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn.
Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971),
after which all the three appellants went up
the house. Under these facts, it is impossible
that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and
Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not
aware when their brother Ludovico was
brutally killing the two women Lolita de
Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and
wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the
room of said house. Furthermore, from the
nature, number, and locations of the many
wounds sustained by the two women and child
(Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not have been
possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio
and Conrado (assuming that they did not go
inside the house) not to hear either the
screams of pain of their brother's victims or
the contact between the blade of his bolo and
their bodies when their brother Ludovico was
ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . .
Under these circumstances, it is obvious that
appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio
themselves knew what was going on inside the
room of the house at the time, but they just
 stood by and did nothing to stop their brother
Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his
women victims to death. It is, therefore,
reasonable to believe that the two appellants,
Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their
brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the
two deceased women, ready to lend
assistance. Indeed, there is no question that
the presence of these two appellants upstairs
in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their
brother Ludovico Doctolero the
encouragement and reliance to proceed as he
did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes
against two defenseless women and a child.22
We have held that where one goes with the
principals, and in staying outside of the house while
the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the
former effectively supplied the criminals with
material and moral aid, making him guilty as an
accomplice.23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a
consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus
negating a common criminal design in their minds.
This pretension must be rejected since one can be an
accomplice even if he did not know of the actual
crime intended by the principal provided he was
aware that it was an illicit act.24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S.
vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices therein
consented to help in the commission of forcible
abduction, they were responsible for the resulting
homicide even if the purpose of the principal to
commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the
criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not
they were liable but only with regard to the extent of
their participation. There being ample evidence of
their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the
nature of their liability, the courts should favor the
milder form of liability or responsibility which is that
of being mere accomplices,26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants
having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty
imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on
Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical
attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of
appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries
punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying
circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days
of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense
on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the
pendency of this appeal terminated only his criminal
liability but not his civil liability.27
Also, while the death indemnity has been increased
to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same
should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having
heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment
rendered by the trial court having long since become
final and executory with respect to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3)
indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of prision
mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania
Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo
Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20) days
of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries
inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado
Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are
ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00 for
each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of
Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and
Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS,
AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA
DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder
and the sentence of life imprisonment, with
indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the
deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of
P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused
the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma,
the last being the supposed wife of the deceased,
who, because no certificate nor any other proof of
their marriage could be presented by the
prosecution, could not be charged with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on
the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa
Domogma and their children, arrived together in
their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100
meters distant from the municipal building of the
place. For sometime, however, their relationship had
been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had
deserted their family home a couple of times and
each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On
two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis
Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits
Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
daughter living with them, go down the house and
leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind
that illicit relationship was going on between
Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between
him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that
should she get pregnant, the child would not be his.
About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house and did not come
back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and
Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan
were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra
during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2)
days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and
Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped
Teresa several times; the latter went down the house
and sought the help of the police, and shortly
thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of
Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a
policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter
left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that
someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00
o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's
daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash
clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with
Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned
by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the
latter's house; as she approached them, she heard
one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when
accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of
her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell
your father that we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old
daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in
the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go
down the house through the stairs and go to the yard
where she again met with the other appellants. As
they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where
the child was in the "batalan", she heard them
conversing in subdued tones, although she could not
discern what they were saying. She was able to
recognize all of them through the light coming from
the lamp in the kitchen through the open "batalan"
and she knows them well for they are all residents of
Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime.
She noted that the appellants had long guns at the
time. Their meeting did not last long, after about two
(2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants
went under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was
then ready, the child caged her parents to eat,
Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen
did not heed his daughter's call to supper but
continued working on a plow, while Teresa also
excused herself by saying she would first put her
small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone,
and as soon as she was through she again called her
parents to eat. This time, she informed her father
about the presence of persons downstairs, but
Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He
proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor
near the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him.
At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from
below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused
then climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their
long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and
Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her,
saying "You call for help and I will kill you", so she
kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene,
going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was
Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa
came out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside
and questioned her, and when Corazon informed her
that she recognized the killers of her father to be her
co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal
the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she
ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and
helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim,
Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his
own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the
place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours after death;
burial took place on the same day. The victim's
brother who came from Manila arrived one day after
the burial followed by their mother who came from
La Paz, Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had
not earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her
father because she was afraid of her own mother,
was somehow able to reveal the circumstances
surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of
hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter
executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the
filing of the information for murder against the
herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the
defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo,
was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has
a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America
who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of hers
had been continuously and regularly sending her
monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time
she was still single up to the time of her husband's
violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After
their marriage, they moved to and resided in her
husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with
them three (3) carabaos and two (2) horses, which
Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in
said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of
land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their
other children. She and Bernardo lived in their own
house which was about 4-5 meters away from the
house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo
dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never
maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk
to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own mother
who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to
her, (the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at
those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You
leave me alone". Her in-laws also hated her because
her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of
Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in
his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her
because she did not give him any of the carpentry
tools which her brothers in America were sending
over to her. She never left their conjugal home for
any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-
law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to
other places they were only during those times when
she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks
with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips,
she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if
she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the
morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with
merchants going to Bangued in the morning and
always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the
afternoon of the same day because the weapons
carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who
waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only
when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan,
as whenever any of the carabaos and horses they
brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and
Bernardo would go and report the matter to the
Mayor who would then refer the matter to his
policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they
may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew
Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the
latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away
from theirs. But illicit relationship had never existed
between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in
the kitchen of their house cooking their food for
supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were
with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the
adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the
plow at that time of the night because at daytime he
worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the
food was ready, she and the children moved over to
the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him
for supper, and he then proceeded to the kitchen to
eat. Teresa and the two children were about to
follow him to the kitchen when suddenly they heard
more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots
coming from near their "batalan". They were all so
terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit
she did not know yet at that precise time that her
husband was shot, as she and the children were still
in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about
three (3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon
Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as soon
as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms.
She did not see the killers of her husband, as the
night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo
was in her arms when the first group of people who
responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them
were the chief of police, some members of the
municipal council and appellant Tobias who even
advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of
Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6)
months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted
an investigation of the surroundings and he found
some empty shells and foot prints on the ground
some meters away from the "batalan". He also found
some bullet holes on the southern walls of said
"batalan" and on the nothern wallings of the kitchen.
Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the
information about the death of her husband to her
relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on
the news to Bernardo's mother and her family in La
Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they
have left their house in Sallapadan about two (2)
months previous after they lost the land they used to
till there in a case with the natives called Tingians.
Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June
26, 1967, and after Bernardo's remains was
autopsied and he was buried under their house, they
conducted an investigation, but she did not give
them any information relative to the Identity of the
persons who shot her husband because she did not
really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-
law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from
the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila,
and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over,
they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children under
their custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-
in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind
against her and they have her daughter, Corazon,
under their custody, they had forced the said child to
testify against her. She further declared that her late
husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his lifetime,
as he had quarrels with some people over the land
they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the
effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the
time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967;
being a policeman of the place at the time, he was
one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted
as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended
the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving
Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4)
days later on June 26, hence, he could not have
anything to do with the said killing. On the other
hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs.
Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of said killing,
but he was one of the persons who was called upon
by the chief of police of the place to accompany him
in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim.
The other two appellants Bides and Berras also
alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs.
Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of
said Mrs. Bayongan and had been staying in her
house for a long time. They were sleeping when the
chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias,
who was then municipal secretary, to accompany him
to the place of the shooting. They did not join them,
but continued sleeping. They never left the said
house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300
meters away from the place of the killing, that
evening of June 24, 1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting
evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have
no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of
June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all
armed with long firearms and acting inconspiracy
with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter
was sitting by the supper table in their house at
Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen
committing the offense by the witness Corazon. She
was the one who prepared the food and was
watching her father nearby. They were all known to
her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she
used to see them often before that night. Although
only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her
father after they had climbed the stairs of the
"batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he
would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not fire
any shot then. But even before the four appellants
went up the "batalan", they already fired shots from
downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two
nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the
deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a
violent quarrel during which he slapped her several
times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it
was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town,
who went to the vicinity of their house and
challenged her father to come down, but the latter
refused because the former was a policeman and was
armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting to her
father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration
regarding the amorous relationship between her
mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related
earlier above. So also her testimony that in the
morning following the quarrel between her father
and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to
the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she
saw all the herein four male accused-appellants
meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or
400 meters away from their house, near where she
was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion
she overheard one of them ask "Could (sic) he elude
a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to
whether or not her mother did say to her in shoving
her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your
father we will kill him." If it were true that there was
really such a message, it is to be wondered why she
never relayed the same to her father, specially when
she again saw the said appellants on the very night in
question shortly before the shooting talking together
in subdued tones with her mother and holding long
arms. Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a
warning could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence
related above and which We have carefully reviewed
that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder
qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they
committed the said offense in conspiracy with each
other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling
of the offended party. In other words, two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission
of the offense, namely, evident premeditation and
that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim.
No mitigating circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony
of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and
inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of
patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We
do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well
pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-
examination the exact time of some of the
occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it
was before or after Bernardo had began eating when
he was shot; (2) whether it was before or after seeing
her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the
morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to
wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused
were already upstairs or still downstairs when they
first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her
having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and
cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was
nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances
related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal
of the Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their
attack against the credibility of Corazon
Bagabag by pointing out five supposed
unnatural declarations in her testimony;
First, she said that her father, appeared
unconcerned when she informed him of
the presence of people downstairs. But
as correctly observed by the prosecuting
fiscal the witness does not know then
"the mentality of her father" (p. 62,
t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968).
Second, Corazon also declared that the
accused conversed that Saturday night
preceding the day the crime charged
was committed in a lighted place
although there was a place which was
unlighted in the same premises. But this
only proves that the accused were too
engrossed in their conversation,
unmindful of whether the place where
they were talking was lighted or not, and
unmindful even of the risk of
recognition. Third, witness declared that
Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not
fire their guns. Even if these accused did
withhold their fire, however, since they
were privies to the same criminal design,
would this alter their culpability? Should
the witness Corazon Bagabag be
discredited for merely stating an
observation on her part which is not
inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon
also declared that only three bullets
from the guns of the four male accused
found their mark on the body of her
father. But would this not merely prove
that not all the accused were good
shots? And fifth, the witness declared
that her father was still able to talk after
he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared
that his death was instantaneous It is
respectfully submitted, however, that
the doctor's opinion could yield to the
positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag
in this regard without in the least
affecting the findings of said doctor as
regards the cause of the death of the
deceased. As thus viewed, there are no
evident badges of falsehood in the
whole breadth and length of Corazon
Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's
Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her
version of the killing of her father, if it were not
basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she
was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she testified,
an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a
rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of others"
because "he has already got some principles, lying is
distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is
no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he
never loses an opportunity of being right in what he
affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No
cogent explanation has been offered why she would
attribute the assault on her father to three other
men, aside from Talingdan whom she knew had
relations with her mother, were she merely making-
up her account of how he was shot, no motive for her
to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such
testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor
pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and
cross, would show that she was constant, firm and
steady in her answers to questions directed to her."
We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are
convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the
witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants'
apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error
that the grave imputation of a mother's infidelity and
her suggested participation in the killing of her
husband, would if consistently impressed in the mind
of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to
make the child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in
any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We
feel Corazon was too young to he affected by the
infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense
suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her
whole testimony that it could not have been a
fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a
child of thirteen years to be able to substantially
maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand
without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long
cross-interrogations, if she had not actually
witnessed the event she had described. We reject the
possibility of her having been "brainwashed or
coached" to testify as she did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the
appeal brief do not merit serious consideration.
Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the
following refutations of the Solicitor General are well
taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court
allegedly failed to consider the
testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the
distance between the assailants and the
deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters
when the shots were fired. But the
appellants overlook the testimony of
Corazon Bagabag that when the first
shot was fired, the gunman was about 3-
½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 29, 1968), which
disproves the theory of the defense that
the killers fired from a stonepile under
an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters
away from the deceased's house.
Appellants also insist that the Court a
quo ignored the testimonies of defense
witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of
Police Rafael Berras on their having
found bullet marks on the southern
walling of the house of the deceased, as
well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells
under the aforementioned avocado tree.
The trial court, however, made the
following apt observations on the
testimony of defense witness Cpl.
Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the
house of the deceased to investigate the
crime after the deceased had already
been buried; that he investigated the
widow as well as the surroundings of the
house where the deceased was shot. He
found empty shells of carbine under the
avocado tree. He stated that the
'batalan' of the house of the deceased
has a siding of about 1-½ meters high
and that he saw bullet holes on the top
portion of the wall directly pointing to
the open door of the 'batalan' of the
house of the deceased. When the court
asked the witness what could have been
the position of the assailant in shooting
the deceased, he stated that the
assailant might have been standing. The
assailant could not have made a bullet
hole on the top portion of the sidings of
the 'batalan' because the 'batalan' is
only 1-½ meters high, and further, when
asked as to the level of the ground in
relation to the top sidings of the
'batalan,' he answered that it is in the
same level with the ground. If this is
true, it is impossible for the assailant to
make a bullet hole at the top portion
sidings of the 'batalan,' hence, the
testimony of this witness who is a PC
corporal is of no consequence and
without merit. The court is puzzled to
find a PC corporal testifying for the
defense in this case, which case was filed
by another PC sergeant belonging to the
same unit and assigned in the same
province of Abra (pp. 324- 325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in
the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to
state that no testimony has been
presented, expert or otherwise, linking
said shells to the bullets that were fired
 during the shooting incident. Surmises in
this respect surely would not overcome
the positive testimony of Corazon
Bagabag that the accused shot her
father as they came up the 'batalan' of
their house. (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove
that they were not at the scene of the crime when it
happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered
by the trial court, but it was properly brushed aside
as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is
made, which goes to show that in the mind of the
defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained
and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless,
it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm
the apt pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in
reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in
the opinion of the court, can not stand
firmly in the face of a positive and
unwavering testimony of the
prosecution witness who pointed out to
the accused as the authors of the crime.
This is so because, first, according to the
three accused — Bides, Tobias and
Berras — they were sleeping at 8:00
o'clock that night in the house of Mrs.
Bayongan which is only 250 meters away
from the scene of the crime. Granting,
for the sake of argument, but without
admitting, that they were already
sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of
Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly
stated that her father was gunned down
at sunset which is approximately
between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening,
hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and
Bides could have committed the crime
and went home to sleep in the house of
Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of
the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the
house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250
meters away from the house of the
victim. Second, the three accused have
failed miserably to present the
testimony of Mrs. Bayongan, the owner
of the house where they slept that night
to corroborate or bolster their defense
of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of
Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last
of the accused, also in his defense of
alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he
accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of
Sallapadan to Bangued, together with
policeman Cresencio Martinez for the
purpose of attending a cursillo in
Bangued They started in Sallapadan in
the early morning of June 22, 1967 and
arrived in Bangued the same day.
According to him, he went to accompany
the mayor to the cursillo house near the
Bangued Cathedral and after conducting
the mayor to the cursillo house, he went
to board in the house of the cousin of
Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at
Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never
saw the mayor until after they went
home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much
weight because he could have returned
anytime on the evening of June 22 or
anytime before the commission of the
offense to Sallapadan and commit the
crime on the 24th at sunset, then
returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the
mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan
on the 26th.
The irony of this defense of alibi is that
the mayor who was alleged to have been
accompanied by witness-accused is still
living and very much alive. As a matter of
fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the
mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also
policeman Cresencio Martinez, another
policeman who accompanied the mayor
to Bangued, is also still living and still a
policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not
the mayor and the policeman presented
to corroborate or deny the testimony of
Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of
Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the
Cursillo Movement, was presented as
rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On
the witness stand, he stated that he
belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was
held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the
St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan
Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As
 a matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of
Sallapadan also attended the cursillo
held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could
be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the
signature of Gregorio Banawa appears
because they both attended Cursillo No.
3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal
witness belies partly, if not in full, the
testimony of accused Nemesio
Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of
Appellants' Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant
Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General
has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We
find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as she
appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended
that there is no evidence proving that she actually
joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because
there is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her
part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that
led to his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is
claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or
approval" thereof on her part, which it is argued is
less than what is required for her conviction as a
conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We
do not see it exactly that way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in
the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for
which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as
her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in
the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear
that she helped directly in the planning and
preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that
she knew it was going to be done and did not object.
(U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not
definitely shown that she masterminded it either by
herself alone or together with her co-appellant
Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain
surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really
includible. After all, she had been having her own
unworthy ways with him for quite a long time,
seemingly without any need of his complete
elimination. Why go to so much trouble for
something she was already enjoying, and not even
very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark
Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time
was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb
is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her
faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from
criminal liability. There is in the record morally
convincing proof that she is at the very least an
accessory to the offense committed by her co-
accused. She was inside the room when her husband
was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she
inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize
the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified
appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the
culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not
to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the
extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will
kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the
peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them
with the information given to her by Corazon, she
claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words,
whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband,
she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding
her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do
away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"
which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed
by appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It
being obvious that appellants deliberately chose
nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault
their victim, taking advantage of their number and
arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to
insure success in attaining their malevolent objective.
In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted
with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the
threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he met
with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy
Friday and again on Saturday evening just before the
actual shooting. In other words, they had motive
Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his paramour,
Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if
they were not resolved to proceed with their
objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the
dwelling of the offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male
appellants being murder, qualified by treachery, and
attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and that the offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the
Court has no alternative under the law but to impose
upon them the capital penalty. However, as to
appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as
an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two
aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance
with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa
Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of
the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Barredo, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa
Domogma who should be convicted, not merely as an
accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the
death penalty, is concerned. A marriage certificate is
not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage;
because the presumption that the deceased and the
accused Teresa were married subsists by reason of
the fact that they had been living together for about
thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the
child-witness Corazon, who was 12 years old at the
time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the
accused-appellants, and who was 13 years of age
when she testified. They have other children aside
from Corazon.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely
an accessory after the fact has been clearly
demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter,
Corazon, who declared categorically that she plotted
with her co-appellants the assassination of her own
husband whom she betrayed time and time again by
her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused
Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their
neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that
Teresa, without a feeling for shame and unnaturally
lacking any concern for her minor children of tender
age, deserted several times their family home to live
with and continue with her immoral relations with
appellant Talingdan with whom at one time she
cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient
husband had to look for her and to beg her to return
each time she left the family abode for the embrace
of her lover.
We should believe Corazon's statement that between
10 and 11 o'clock Friday morning, she saw her
mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-
appellants in a small hut owned by her father some
300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house near
the creek where she was then washing clothes; that
she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he
elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her
presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You
tell your father that we will kill him"; that in the
evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24,
1967, while she was cooking supper in their house,
she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the
other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to
recognize all of them by the light coming from the
kitchen lamp through the open "batalan"; that she
knows all of them very well as they are all residents
of their barrio and she used to see them almost
everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed
with long guns; that their meeting did not last long;
that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant
Teresa, came up the house and proceed to her room
while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree
nearby; that when supper was ready she called her
parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call
but continued working on a plow while her mother
excused herself by saying she would first put her
small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone
after which she again called her parents to eat; that
about this time she informed her father about the
presence of persons downstairs but her father paid
no heed to what she said; that her father proceeded
to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door
while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at
the that moment her father was shot from below the
stairs of the "batalan"; that the four accused then
went up the stairs of the "batalan" with their long
guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive,
appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again;
that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help,
appellant Bides warned her saying "You call for help
and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants
fled towards the east.
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon
should be accorded belief in the same way that
credence was given to her statement that, upon her
mother's inquiry immediately after the shooting as to
whether she recognized the assailants of her father,
she (Corazon) readily told her mother that she
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits; for which reason her mother
warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if
you tell this to somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot,
he and Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo
slapped Teresa several times by reason of which
Teresa left the house and sought the help of the
police. Shortly thereafter appellant Talingdan came
and called Bernardo to come down. When Bernardo
ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman and
was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after
warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active
cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the
life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that
Teresa was a paramour of appellant Talingdan;
hence, she wanted freedom from her husband, the
victim, so that she could enjoy the company of her
lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had
no moral compunction in deserting her family and
her children for the company of her lover. As
heretofore stated, she did this several times and
continued to do so until the violent death of her
husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her
husband denied.
CASTRO, CJ., concurring:
Concurs, with the observations, however, that the
evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma as
a co-principal and that she should therefore also be
held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice
Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the accused
Teresa Domogma is concerned.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa
Domogma who should be convicted, not merely as an
accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the
death penalty, is concerned. A marriage certificate is
not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage;
because the presumption that the deceased and the
accused Teresa were married subsists by reason of
the fact that they had been living together for about
thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the
child-witness Corazon, who was 12 years old at the
time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the
accused-appellants, and who was 13 years of age
when she testified. They have other children aside
from Corazon.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely
an accessory after the fact has been clearly
demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter,
Corazon, who declared categorically that she plotted
with her co-appellants the assassination of her own
husband whom she betrayed time and time again by
her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused
Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their
neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that
Teresa, without a feeling for shame and unnaturally
lacking any concern for her minor children of tender
age, deserted several times their family home to live
with and continue with her immoral relations with
appellant Talingdan with whom at one time she
cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient
husband had to look for her and to beg her to return
each time she left the family abode for the embrace
of her lover.
We should believe Corazon's statement that between
10 and 11 o'clock Friday morning, she saw her
mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-
appellants in a small hut owned by her father some
300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house near
the creek where she was then washing clothes; that
she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he
elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her
presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You
tell your father that we will kill him"; that in the
evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24,
1967, while she was cooking supper in their house,
she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the
other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to
recognize all of them by the light coming from the
kitchen lamp through the open "batalan"; that she
knows all of them very well as they are all residents
of their barrio and she used to see them almost
everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed
with long guns; that their meeting did not last long;
that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant
Teresa, came up the house and proceed to her room
while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree
nearby; that when supper was ready she called her
parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call
but continued working on a plow while her mother
excused herself by saying she would first put her
small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone
after which she again called her parents to eat; that
about this time she informed her father about the
presence of persons downstairs but her father paid
no heed to what she said; that her father proceeded
to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door
while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at
the that moment her father was shot from below the
stairs of the "batalan"; that the four accused then
went up the stairs of the "batalan" with their long
guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive,
appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again;
that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help,
appellant Bides warned her saying "You call for help
and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants
fled towards the east.
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon
should be accorded belief in the same way that
credence was given to her statement that, upon her
mother's inquiry immediately after the shooting as to
whether she recognized the assailants of her father,
she (Corazon) readily told her mother that she
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits; for which reason her mother
warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if
you tell this to somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot,
he and Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo
slapped Teresa several times by reason of which
Teresa left the house and sought the help of the
police. Shortly thereafter appellant Talingdan came
and called Bernardo to come down. When Bernardo
ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman and
was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after
warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active
cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the
life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that
Teresa was a paramour of appellant Talingdan;
hence, she wanted freedom from her husband, the
victim, so that she could enjoy the company of her
lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had
no moral compunction in deserting her family and
her children for the company of her lover. As
heretofore stated, she did this several times and
continued to do so until the violent death of her
husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her
husband denied.
CASTRO, CJ., concurring:
Concurs, with the observations, however, that the
evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma as
a co-principal and that she should therefore also be
held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice
Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the accused
Teresa Domogma is concerned.
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court
dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is
whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to
murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
alleged principal in a separate proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21,
1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos
Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the
house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around
11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was
resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard
Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had
been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so
he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from
Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius
were also in the house. They went down to meet
Roberto who was crying and they called for help from
the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on
their lights and the street lights and coming down
from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto
and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a
bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one
driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an
armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they
stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his
armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter,
the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of
Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-
mortem statement. In the said statement which the
victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was
Identified as his assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with
murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N.
Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the
municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the
Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as
he was a member of the military, while the case
against Vino was given due course by the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was
indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an
information charging Vino of the crime of murder in
the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea
of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead
of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused
filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence
to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January
21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court
finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of
murder and imposing on him the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and
to pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused
having been denied, he interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was
rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the
following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE
CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED
IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF
SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED
SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS
PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON
THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE
PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN
ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19,
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY
AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE
STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST
BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY
PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL
VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of
Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was
remanded to the civil court as he was discharged
from the military service. He was later charged with
murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales,
Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a
supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was
acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was
rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the
petition. The comment was submitted by the Solicitor
General in behalf of respondents. On January 18,
1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition for
failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that
respondent court had committed any reversible error
in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present
motion for reconsideration to which the respondents
were again required to comment. The required
comment having been submitted, the motion is now
due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the
petitioner was charged in the information as a
principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter
be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the
affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the
commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16
of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories
of the persons responsible for the commission of the
same offense are the accomplice and the accessory.
There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been
committed and that the evidence tended to show
that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the
petitioner was present during its commission or must
have known its commission is the only logical
conclusion considering that immediately thereafter,
he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an
armalite, and they were together when they left
shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto
and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus
clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his
escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense
charged and the offense proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, in which
case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the
offense charged included in that which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after
trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake in
charging the proper offense, and the defendant
cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any
other offense necessarily included therein, in which
case the defendant must not be discharged if there
appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody,
so that he can be charged and made to answer for
the proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was
charged in the information. The commission of the
said crime was established by the evidence. There is
no variance as to the offense committed. The
variance is in the participation or complicity of the
petitioner. While the petitioner was being held
responsible as a principal in the information, the
evidence adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser.
An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice
or accessory under an information charging him as a
principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged
the petitioner as an accessory right then and there.
The degree of responsibility of petitioner was
apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse
did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or
not the trial of an accessory can proceed without
awaiting the result of the separate charge against the
principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each
other. As long as the commission of the offense can
be duly established in evidence the determination of
the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged
principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction
of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case
involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to
the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity
(Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may
nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact
established.
Corollary to this is United States vs.
Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case
that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result
in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown
that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire
was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no
basis for the conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of
murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an
accessory was established. By the same token there
is no doubt that the commission of the same offense
had been proven in the separate case against Salazar
who was charged as principal. However, he was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the
same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The
trial court held that the identity of the assailant was
not clearly established. It observed that only Julius
Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding
on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is
uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses,
Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed
in the information, who can corroborate the
testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the
prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the
dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as
his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the
victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father
and brother who came to his aid immediately after
the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the
failure of the prosecution and law enforcement
agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the
bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and
the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered
at the crime scene and to compare it with samples
taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial
court made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of
justice in this case due to the ineptitude
of the law enforcement agencies to
gather material and important evidence
and the seeming lack of concern of the
public prosecutor to direct the
production of such evidence for the
successful prosecution of the case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused
Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution
to adduce the quantum of evidence required to
generate a conviction as he was not positively
identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle
escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was
seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as
passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of
the crime immediately after the commission of the
crime of murder. The commission of the crime and
the participation of the principal or assailant,
although not identified, was established. In such
case, the Court holds that the accessory can be
prosecuted and held liable independently of the
assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
principal died or escaped before he could be tried denied and this denial is FINAL.
and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted
thereby even if the commission of the offense and SO ORDERED.
the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was
duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
criminally liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence

tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two
witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle
driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of
Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the Separate Opinions
trial court was not persuaded that he was positively
identified to be the man with the gun riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against
Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his CRUZ, J., dissenting:
defense, his liability as such an accessory was
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a
established beyond reasonable doubt in that he
person may be held liable as an accessory for helping
assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene
in the escape of the principal even if the latter is
of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no
himself found not guilty. The examples given are
material significance for the purpose of the
quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply
prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant
in the case at bar, which is sui generis and not
can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an
covered by the general principle.
accessory is indubitable.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of
having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as the
principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same
Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the
escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically,
of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been
exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held
liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a
crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be
reversed.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's
opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are
those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting
the offenders to profit by the effects of
the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body
of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent
its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting
in the escape of the principal of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be
convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as where
the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz
and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended
party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly
concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the
effects or instruments may be convicted if the
commission of the crime has been proven, even if the
principal has not been apprehended and convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly
harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his
escape, may not be convicted unless the principal,
whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted
in escaping, has been identified and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an
accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev.
Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the
escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of
Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced
trial separately and subsequently) was acquitted,
ironically by the same court that convicted Vino
earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in
the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged
killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was killed.
Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that
the prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer
of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle
did not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of
a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377
and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in
the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the
charge against accused as an accessory to theft was
brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the effects
of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen
watch. Although the principal, a young housegirl, was
acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of
discernment, the accessory was nevertheless
convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who
was charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for
not reporting the fire to the authorities, was
acquitted because the crime of arson was not
proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph
3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable
from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the
crime (murder) was proven but the identity of the
murderer was not (for the principal accused was
acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-
driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to
escape from the scene of the crime, may not be
convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it
turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be
the murderer. The accessory may not be convicted
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this
instance, the principle that "the accessory follows the
principal" appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a
person may be held liable as an accessory for helping
in the escape of the principal even if the latter is
himself found not guilty. The examples given are
quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply
in the case at bar, which is sui generis and not
covered by the general principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of
having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as the
principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same
Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the
escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically,
of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been
exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held
liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a
crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be
reversed.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's
opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are
those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting
the offenders to profit by the effects of
the crime.
 2. By concealing or destroying the body
of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent
its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting
in the escape of the principal of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be
convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as where
the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz
and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended
party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly
concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the
effects or instruments may be convicted if the
commission of the crime has been proven, even if the
principal has not been apprehended and convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly
harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his
escape, may not be convicted unless the principal,
whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted
in escaping, has been identified and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an
accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev.
Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the
escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of
Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced
trial separately and subsequently) was acquitted,
ironically by the same court that convicted Vino
earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in
the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged
killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was killed.
Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that
the prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer
of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle
did not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of
a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377
and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in
the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the
charge against accused as an accessory to theft was
brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the effects
of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen
watch. Although the principal, a young housegirl, was
acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of
discernment, the accessory was nevertheless
convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who
was charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for
not reporting the fire to the authorities, was
acquitted because the crime of arson was not
proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph
3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable
from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the
crime (murder) was proven but the Identity of the
murderer was not (for the principal accused was
acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-
driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to
escape from the scene of the crime, may not be
convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it
turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be
the murderer. The accessory may not be convicted
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this
instance, the principle that "the accessory follows the
principal" appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies
reveal that there is rampant robbery and thievery of
government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become
profitable on the part of the lawless elements
because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly
known as fence, of stolen properties;lawphil.net
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be
prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact and
punished lightly;
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties
on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of
robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order
and decree as part of the law of the land the
following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the
Anti-Fencing Law.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms
shall mean as follows:
(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft.
(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm,
association corporation or partnership or other
organization who/which commits the act of
fencing.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing
shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of
the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the
value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty
shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided
in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the property robbed or stolen is more than
6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property involved is more than 200 pesos
but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum
 period, if the value of the property involved is
over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period if such value is over five (5) pesos but
not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If
the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or
association, the president or the manager or any
officer thereof who knows or should have known the
commission of the offense shall be liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession
of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second
Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores,
establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell
of any good, article item, object of anything of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the
public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from
the station commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located. The Chief of
Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National
Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions of this section. Any person
who fails to secure the clearance or permit required
by this section or who violates any of the provisions
of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall upon conviction be punished as a
fence. lawphi1.net
Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect
upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in
the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
nine.
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1612, KNOWN AS THE ANTI-FENCING
LAW.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1612, known as the Anti-Fencing Law, the following
rules and regulations are hereby promulgated to
govern the issuance of clearances/permits to sell
used secondhand articles obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof:
I. Definition of Terms
1. "Used secondhand article" shall refer to any
goods, article, item, object or anything of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier, regardless of whether the same has
actually or in fact been used.
2. "Unlicensed dealer/supplier" shall refer to
any persons, partnership, firm, corporation,
association or any other entity or
establishment not licensed by the government
to engage in the business of dealing in or of
supplying the articles defined in the preceding
paragraph.
3. "Store", "establishment" or "entity" shall be
construed to include any individual dealing in
the buying and selling used secondhand
articles, as defined in paragraph hereof.
4. "Buy and Sell" refer to the transaction
whereby one purchases used secondhand
articles for the purpose of resale to third
persons.
5. "Station Commander" shall refer to the
Station Commander of the Integrated National
Police within the territorial limits of the town
or city district where the store, establishment
or entity dealing in the buying and selling of
used secondhand articles is located.
II. Duty to Procure Clearance or Permit
1. No person shall sell or offer to sell to the
public any used secondhand article as defined
herein without first securing a clearance or
permit for the purpose from the proper Station
Commander of the Integrated National Police.
2. If the person seeking the clearance or permit
is a partnership, firm, corporation, or
association or group of individuals, the
clearance or permit shall be obtained by or in
the name of the president, manager or other
responsible officer-in-charge thereof.
 3. If a store, firm, corporation, partnership,
association or other establishment or entity
has a branch or subsidiary and the used
secondhand article is acquired by such branch
or subsidiary for sale to the public, the said
branch or subsidiary shall secure the required
clearance or permit.
4. Any goods, article, item, or object or
anything of value acquired from any source for
which no receipt or equivalent document
evidencing the legality of its acquisition could
be presented by the present possessor or
holder thereof, or the covering receipt, or
equivalent document, of which is fake, falsified
or irregularly obtained, shall be presumed as
having been acquired from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier and the possessor or holder
thereof must secure the required clearance or
permit before the same can be sold or offered
for sale to the public.
III. Procedure for Procurement of Clearances or
Permits
1. The Station Commanders concerned shall
require the owner of a store or the president,
manager or responsible officer-in-charge of a
firm, establishment or other entity located
within their respective jurisdictions and in
possession of or having in stock used
secondhand articles as defined herein, to
submit an initial affidavit within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice for the purpose thereof
and subsequent affidavits once every fifteen
(15) days within five (5) days after the period
covered, which shall contain:
(a) A complete inventory of such articles
acquired daily from whatever source and
the names and addresses of the persons
from whom such articles were acquired.
(b) A full list of articles to be sold or
offered for sale as well as the place
where the date when the sale or offer
for sale shall commence.
(c) The place where the articles are
presently deposited or kept in stock.
The Station Commander may, at his discretion
when the circumstances of each case warrant,
require that the affidavit submitted be
accompanied by other documents showing
proof of legitimacy of the acquisition of the
articles.
2. A party required to secure a clearance or
permit under these rules and regulations shall
file an application therefor with the Station
Commander concerned. The application shall
state:
(a) The name, address and other
pertinent circumstances of the persons,
in case of an individual or, in the case of
a firm, corporation, association,
partnership or other entity, the name,
address and other pertinent
circumstances of the president, manager
or officer-in-charge.
(b) The article to be sold or offered for
sale to the public and the name and
address of the unlicensed dealer or
supplier from whom such article was
acquired.
In support of the application, there shall be
attached to it the corresponding receipt or
other equivalent document to show proof of
the legitimacy of acquisition of the article.
3. The Station Commander shall examine the
documents attached to the application and
may require the presentation of other
additional documents, if necessary, to show
satisfactory proof of the legitimacy of
acquisition of the article, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) If the legitimacy of acquisition of any
article from an unlicensed source cannot
be satisfactorily established by the
documents presented, the Station
Commander shall, upon approval of the
INP Superintendent in the district and at
the expense of the party seeking the
clearance/permit, cause the publication
of a notice in a newspaper of general
circulation for two (2) successive days
enumerating therein the articles
acquired from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier, the names and addresses of the
persons from whom they were acquired
and shall state that such articles are to
be sold or offered for sale to the public
at the address of the store,
establishment or other entity seeking
the clearance/permit. In places where
no newspapers are in general
circulation, the party seeking the
clearance or permit shall, instead, post a
notice daily for one week on the bulletin
board of the municipal building of the
town where the store, firm,
establishment or entity concerned is
located or, in the case of an individual,
where the articles in his possession are
to be sold or offered for sale.
(b) If after 15 days, upon expiration of
the period of publication or of the notice
referred to in the preceding paragraph,
no claim is made with respect to any of
the articles enumerated in the notice,
the Station Commander shall issue the
clearance or permit sought.
(c) If, before expiration of the same
period for publication of the notice or its
posting, it shall appear that any of the
articles in question is stolen property,
the Station Commander shall hold the
article in restraint as evidence in any
appropriate case to be filed. Articles held
in restraint shall be kept and disposed of
as the circumstances of each case
permit, taking into account all
considerations of right and justice in the
case. In any case where any article is
held in restraint, it shall be the duty of
the Station Commander concerned to
advise/notify the Commission on Audit
of the case and comply with such
procedure as may be proper under
applicable existing laws, rules and
regulations.
4. The Station Commander concerned shall,
within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the application, act thereon by either issuing
the clearance/permit requested or denying the
same. Denial of an application shall be in
writing and shall state in brief the reason/s
therefor.
5. The application, clearance/permit or the
denial thereof, including such other documents
as may be pertinent in the implementation of
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 shall be in the forms
prescribed in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", and
"E" hereof, which are made integral parts of
these rules and regulations.
 6. For the issuance of clearances/permit
required under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612, no
fee shall be charged.
IV. Appeals
Any party aggrieved by the action taken by the
Station Commander may elevate the decision taken
in the case to the proper INP District Superintendent
and, if he is still dissatisfied therewith may take the
same on appeal to the INP Director. The decision of
the INP Director may also be appealed to the INP
Director-General whose decision may likewise be
appealed to the Minister of National Defense. The
decision of the Minister of National Defense on the
case shall be final. The appeal against the decision
taken by a Commander lower than the INP Director-
General should be filed to the next higher
Commander within ten (10) days from receipt of
notice of the decision. The decision of the INP
Director-General should be appealed within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of the decision.
V. Penalties
1. Any person who fails to secure the clearance
or permit required by Section 6 of P.D. 1612 or
who violates any of the provisions of these
rules and regulations shall upon conviction be
punished as a fence.
2. The INP Director-General shall recommend
to the proper authority the cancellation of the
business license of the erring individual, store,
establishment or the entity concerned.
3. Articles obtained from unlicensed sources
for sale or offered for sale without prior
compliance with the provisions of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1612 and with these rules and
regulations shall be held in restraint until
satisfactory evidence or legitimacy of
acquisition has been established.
4. Articles for which no satisfactory evidence of
legitimacy of acquisition is established and
which are found to be stolen property shall
likewise be held under restraint and shall,
furthermore, be subject to confiscation as
evidence in the appropriate case to be filed. If,
upon termination of the case, the same is not
claimed by their legitimate owners, the
article/s shall be forfeited in favor of the
government and made subject to disposition as
the circumstances warrant in accordance with
 applicable existing laws, rules and regulations.
The Commission on Audit shall, in all cases, be
notified.
5. Any personnel of the Integrated National
Police found violating the provisions of Section
6 of P.D. No. 1612 or any of its implementing
rules and regulations or who, in any manner
whatsoever, connives with or through his
negligence or inaction makes possible the
commission of such violations by any party
required to comply with the law and its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be
prosecuted criminally without prejudice to the
imposition of administrative penalties.
VI. Visitorial Power
It shall be the duty of the owner of the store or of the
president, manager or responsible officer-in-charge
of any firm, establishment or other entity or of an
individual having in his premises articles to be sold or
offered for sale to the public to allow the Station
Commander or his authorized representative to
exercise visitorial powers. For this purpose, however,
the power to conduct visitations shall be exercise
only during office or business hours and upon
authority in writing from and by the INP
Superintendent in the district and for the sole
purpose of determining whether articles are kept in
possession or stock contrary to the intents of Section
6 of P.D. No. 1612 and of these rules and regulations.
VII. Other Duties Imposed Upon Station Commanders
and INP District Superintendent and Directors
Following Action on Applications for Clearances or
Permits
1. At the end of each month, it shall be the
duty of the Station Commander concerned to:
(a) Make and maintain a file in his office
of all clearances/permit issued by him.
(b) Submit a full report to the INP District
Superintendent on the number of
applications for clearances or permits
processed by his office, indicating
therein the number of
clearances/permits issued and the
number of applications denied. The
report shall state the reasons for denial
of an application and the corresponding
follow-up actions taken and shall be
accompanied by an inventory of the
 articles to be sold or offered for sale in
his jurisdiction.
2. The INP District Superintendent shall, on the
basis of the reports submitted by the Station
Commander, in turn submit quarterly reports
to the appropriate INP Director containing a
consolidation of the information stated in the
reports of Station Commanders in his
jurisdiction.
3. Reports from INP District Superintendent
shall serve as basis for a consolidated report to
be submitted semi-annually by INP Directors to
the Director-General, Integrated National
Police.
4. In all cases, reports emanating from the
different levels of the Integrated National
Police shall be accompanied with full and
accurate inventories of the articles acquired
from unlicensed dealers or suppliers and
proposed to be sold or offered for sale in the
jurisdictions covered by the report.
These implementing rules and regulations, having
been published in a newspaper of national
circulation, shall take effect on June 15, 1979.
FOR THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY DIRECTOR-
GENERAL, INP:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate
despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the
government to effectively contain them;
WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or
apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts
which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or
frustrate the successful apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the
following:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any
criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of
any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force
or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or
concealing any paper, record, document, or
object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or
admissibility as evidence in any investigation of
or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to
be used in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the
escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any offense under existing penal
laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution
and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the
purpose of concealing a crime, evading
prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or
concealing his true name and other personal
circumstances for the same purpose or
purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases
by obstructing the service of process or court
orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's
offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record,
document, paper or object with knowledge of
its falsity and with intent to affect the course
or outcome of the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept
any benefit in consideration of abstaining
from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution
of a criminal offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another
with the infliction of any wrong upon his
person, honor or property or that of any
immediate member or members of his family
in order to prevent such person from
 appearing in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order
to prevent a person from appearing in the
investigation of or in official proceedings in,
criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to
mislead or prevent the law enforcement
agencies from apprehending the offender or
from protecting the life or property of the
victim; or fabricating information from the
data gathered in confidence by investigating
authorities for purposes of background
information and not for publication and
publishing or disseminating the same to
mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by
any other law with a higher penalty, the higher
penalty shall be imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed
by a public official or employee, he shall in addition
to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer
perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-
one.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the
twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9346 June 24, 2006
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH
PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippine Congress
Assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is
hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A.
No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-
Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and
decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following
shall be imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the
law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the
law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause
the publication at least one a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation of the names of persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being
considered or recommend for commutation or
pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein shall
limit the power of the President to grant executive
clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its
publication in two national newspapers of general
circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON
CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED,
OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III,
Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof, states "Excessive
fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. . .";
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this
Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society;
WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such
crimes which has resulted not only in the loss of
human lives and wanton destruction of property but
also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable
economic development and prosperity while at the
same time has undermined the people's faith in the
Government and the latter's ability to maintain peace
and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the justice, public order
and the rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes;
Now, therefore,
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to foster and ensure
not only obedience to its authority, but also to adopt
such measures as would effectively promote the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare which are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy in a just and humane society;
Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who
levies war against the Philippines or adheres to
her enemies giving them aid or comfort within
the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a
fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
No person shall be convicted of treason unless
on the testimony of two witnesses at least to
the same overt act or on confession of the
accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines,
who commits acts of treason as defined in
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by
reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a
fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of
Book Two of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high
seas or in the Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the
high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon
any person who, on the high seas, or in
Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel
or, not being a member of its complement nor
a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of
the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or
passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of
mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon those who commit any of the crimes
referred to in the preceding article, under any
of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel
by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have
abandoned their victims without means
of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied
by murder, homicide, physical injuries or
rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article
211 of the same Code a new article to read as
follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public
officer is entrusted with law enforcement and
he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an
offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present, he shall suffer the penalty for the
offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands
such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty
of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under
Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so
that it shall read as follows:
 "Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill
his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or
promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and
ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities
enumerated in the preceding paragraph,
or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic
or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided
for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in
Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person
who shall kill any child less than three days of
age.
 If any crime penalized in this Article be
committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
medium and maximum periods, and if said
crime be committed for the same purpose by
the maternal grandparents or either of them,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall
have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed
simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall
have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained
shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed."
Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua,
when or if by reason or on occasion of
such robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision I of Article 263
shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal,
when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its medium period, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the
commission of the robbery shall have
been carried to a degree clearly
unnecessary for the commission of the
crime, or when in the course of its
execution, the offender shall have
inflicted upon any person not
responsible for its commission any of the
physical injuries covered by subdivisions
3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices,
consequent to one single act of burning,
or as a result of simultaneous burnings,
committed on several or different
occasions.
2. Any building of public or private
ownership, devoted to the public in
general or where people usually gather
or congregate for a definite purpose
such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or
merely incidental to a definite purpose
such as but not limited to hotels, motels,
transient dwellings, public conveyances
or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge
that there are persons in said building or
edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is
actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or
vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse
installation and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is
for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation
of law, or for the purpose of concealing
bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to
collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above
enumerated qualifying circumstances, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more
persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
whether their purpose is merely to burn or
destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall also be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or
military powder or fireworks factory,
ordnance, storehouse, archives or
general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse
or factory of inflammable or explosive
materials.
 If as a consequence of the commission of
any of the acts penalized under this
Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed."
Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. -
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and
a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law-spouse of the parent
of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody
of the police or military authorities.
 3. when the rape is committed in full
view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a
child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation."
Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder;
Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself
or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of
overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit
or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State."
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
import or bring into the Philippines any
prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20
of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed.
"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort
for Prohibited Drug Users. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person or group of persons who shall maintain
a den, dive or resort where any prohibited
drug is used in any form or where such
prohibited drugs in quantities specified in
Section 20, Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20
of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the
penalty shall be imposed in every case where a
prohibited drug is administered, delivered or
sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same
in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate
cause of the death of a person using the same
in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on
the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary.
"Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
engage in the manufacture of any prohibited
drug.
"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources
of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
plant, cultivate or culture any medium Indian
hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or
any other plant which is or may hereafter be
classified as dangerous drug or from which any
dangerous drug may be manufactured or
derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or
greenhouses on which any of said plants is
cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated to the State, unless the owner
thereof can prove that he did not know such
cultivation or culture despite the exercise of
due diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public
domain, the maximum of the penalties herein
provided shall be imposed upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
import or bring any regulated drug in the
Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
 pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall engage in the manufacture of any
regulated drug.
"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20
of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug
involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section
15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new
section to read as follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or
resort for regulated drug users. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person or group of persons who shall maintain
a den, dive or resort where any regulated
drugs is used in any form, or where such
regulated drugs in quantities specified in
Section 20, paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20
of this Act to the contrary, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed in
every case where a regulated drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who
is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate
cause of the death of a person using the same
in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on
the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary."
Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof."
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation
and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments
of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under
Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities :
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin
or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs,
the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the
Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultations/hearings conducted for
the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than
the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful
importation, sale, administration, delivery,
transportation or manufacture of dangerous
drugs, the cultivation of plants which are
sources of dangerous drugs and the possession
of any opium pipe and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs shall carry with it the
confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the
Government, of all the proceeds of the crime
including but not limited to money and other
obtained thereby and the instruments or tools
with which it was committed, unless they are
the property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those which are not of lawful
commerce shall be ordered destroyed without
delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of
such drugs as well as the proceeds or
instruments of the crime so confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government shall be
turned over to the Board for proper disposal
without delay.
Any apprehending or arresting officer who
misappropriates or misapplies or fails to
account for seized or confiscated dangerous
drugs or plant-sources of dangerous drugs or
proceeds or instruments of the crime as are
herein defined shall after conviction be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos."
Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section
20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to
read as follows:
"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any
person charged under any provision of this Act
where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail
of the provision on plea bargaining."
Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and
Employees and Officers and Members of Police
Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of
Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided
for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and
19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those found
guilty of any of the said offenses are
 government officials, employees or officers,
including members of police agencies and the
armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee
or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any
dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8,
9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or
in the immediate vicinity of another as
evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided."
Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person
who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term
is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four
months, when the carnapping is committed
without violence or intimidation of persons, or
force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months
and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof."
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years
and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be from twelve years and one
day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. -
The duration of the penalties of prision mayor
and temporary disqualification shall be from
six years and one day to twelve years, except
when the penalty of disqualification is imposed
 as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall
be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro.
- The duration of the penalties of prision
correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be
from six months and one day to six years,
except when the suspension is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, its duration
shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of
arresto mayor shall be from one month and
one day to six months.
Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of
arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty
days.
Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep
the peace shall be required to cover such
period of time as the court may determine."
Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall
not be imposed; Automatic review of the
Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty shall
be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws, except when the
guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the crime
or is more than seventy years of age or when
upon appeal or automatic review of the case
by the Supreme Court, the required majority
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the
death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed
by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and judgment by the Court en banc,
within twenty (20) days but not earlier than
fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of any motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript
shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days
from the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter."
Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended,
is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating
or aggravating circumstances and of habitual
delinquency. - Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall
be taken into account for the purpose of
diminishing or increasing the penalty in
conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in
themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the
law in defining a crime and prescribing the
penalty therefor shall not be taken into
account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty.
1(a). When in the commission of the crime,
advantage was taken by the offender of his
public position, the penalty to be imposed shall
be in its maximum regardless of mitigating
circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any group who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a
group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any
aggravating circumstances inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must of necessity
accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which arise from the moral attributes of the
offender, or from his private relations with the
offended party, or from any other personal
cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate
the liability of the principals, accomplices and
accessories as to whom such circumstances are
attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the
material execution of the act, or in the means
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of those
persons only who had knowledge of them at
the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the
following effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit
shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit
shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he
be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction,
the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this
article, the total of the two penalties to
be imposed upon the offender, in
conformity herewith, shall in no case
exceed 30 years.
For purposes of this article, a person
shall be deemed to be a habitual
delinquent, if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or
less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found
guilty of any of said crimes a third time
or oftener.
Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended,
is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to
be executed. - The death sentence shall be
executed with preference to any other and
shall consist in putting the person under
sentence to death by electrocution. The death
sentence shall be executed under the authority
of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far
as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution.
 If the person under sentence so desires, he
shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the
execution.
As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau
of Prisons, the method of carrying out the
sentence shall be changed to gas poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not
later than one (1) year after the judgment has
become final."
Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the
death sentence. - The death sentence shall not
be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery,
nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
In this last case, the death sentence shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has
become final, the records of the case shall be
forwarded immediately by the Supreme Court
to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power."
Section 26.<="" p="">
Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of
the provision of this Act shall be held to be
unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue
to be in full force and effect.
Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation. The publication shall not be later
than seven (7) days after the approval hereof.
G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:p
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the
reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a
deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes
is concerned and while the attendant details
pertaining to the execution of a death sentence
remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked
with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or
not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit
his place in human society for the infliction of the
primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own
blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of
conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the crime of
Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused LEO
ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
as charged in the complaint, aggravated
by the fact that the same was commited
by the accused who is the
father/stepfather of the complainant, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH, as provided for under RA. No.
7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa
Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the
accessory penalties provided by law,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.1
We note, however, that the charge had been
formulated in this manner:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned accuses LEO
ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE,
committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April
1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant, his daughter,
a minor, 10 years of age, all against her
will and without her consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the
accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as
summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his
ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a
ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born
on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the
eldest of five siblings. She has three
brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively,
and a 3-month old baby sister. Her
parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray,
the latter being the accused-appellant
himself. The victim lives with her family
in a small house located at No. 199
Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio,
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City
(pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994,
while Rodessa was looking after her
three brothers in their house as her
mother attended a gambling session in
another place, she heard her father, the
accused-appellant in this case, order her
brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-
11, ibid). As soon as her brothers left,
accused-appellant Leo Echegaray
approached Rodessa and suddenly
dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid).
Before she could question the appellant,
the latter immediately, removed her
panty and made her lie on the floor (p.
13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise
removed his underwear and
immediately placed himself on top of
Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant
forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer
intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While
appellant was pumping on her, he even
uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and
to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na
Papa, masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's
plea proved futile as appellant continued
with his act. After satisfying his bestial
instinct, appellant threatened to kill her
mother if she would divulge what had
happened. Scared that her mother
would be killed by appellant, Rodessa
kept to herself the ordeal she suffered.
She was very afraid of appellant because
the latter, most of the time, was high on
drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual
assault happened up to the fifth time
and this usually took place when her
mother was out of the house (p.
19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time,
Rodessa decided to inform her
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in
turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother.
Rodessa and her mother proceeded to
the Barangay Captain where Rodessa
confided the sexual assaults she
suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was
brought to the precinct where she
executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From
there, she was accompanied to the
Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for medical examination (p.
22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual
assaults happened only during the time
when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa
added that at first, her mother was on
her side. However, when appellant was
detained, her mother kept on telling her.
"Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo,
nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the
medico-legal officer in the person of Dra.
Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,3 the complainant
was described as physically on a non-
virgin state, as evidenced by the
presence of laceration of the hymen of
said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995,
pp. 8-9).4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief
presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first
witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted
that the RAPE charge against the
accused was only the figment of her
mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's
complaint was forced upon her by her
grandma and the answers in the sworn
statement of Rodessa were coached.
That the accusation of RAPE was
motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's
greed over the lot situated at the
Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay
San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, which her grandmother's
paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the
accused in order to persuade the latter
to admit that Rodessa executed an
affidavit of desistance after it turned out
that her complaint of attempted
homicide was substituted with the crime
of RAPE at the instance of her mother.
That when her mother came to know
about the affidavit of desistance, she
placed her granddaughter under the
custody of the Barangay Captain. That
her mother was never a real mother to
her.
She stated that her complaint against
accused was for attempted homicide as
her husband poured alcohol on her body
and attempted to burn her. She
identified the certification issued by the
NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That
the Certification based on the Masterlist
(Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-
owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso.
That Rodessa is her daughter sired by
Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the
paramour of her mother. That Conrado
Alfonso waived his right and
participation over the lot in favor of the
accused in consideration of the latter's
accepting the fact that he is the father of
Rodessa to simulate the love triangle
and to conceal the nauseating sex orgies
from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated
that the grandmother of the
complainant has a very strong motive in
implicating him to the crime of RAPE
since she was interested to become the
sole owner of a property awarded to her
live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-
NHA Project. That he could not have
committed the imputed crime because
he considers Rodessa as his own
daughter. That he is a painter-contractor
and on the date of the alleged
commission of the crime, he was
painting the house of one Divina Ang of
Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro
Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between
his work place to his residence is three
(3) hours considering the condition of
traffic. That the painting contract is
evidenced by a document denominated
"Contract of Services" duly accomplished
(see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted
that he has a big sexual organ which
when used to a girl 11 years old like
Rodessa, the said female organ will be
"mawawarak." That it is abnormal to
report the imputed commission of the
crime to the grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her (sic)
mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of
drug pushing earlier and he pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs.
The decretal portion of the judgment of
conviction ordering the accused to be
confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation
Center irked the grandmother of
Rodessa because it was her wish that
accused should be meted the death
penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his
testimony perorating the strong motive
of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating
him in this heinous crime because of her
greed to become the sole owner of that
piece of property at the National
Housing Authority-Madrigal Project,
situated at San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid cross-
examination. He asserted that the
imputed offense is far from his mind
considering that he treated Rodessa as
his own daughter. He categorically
testified that he was in his painting job
site on the date and time of the alleged
commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third
defense witness. She said that she is the
laundry woman and part time baby sitter
of the family of accused. That at one
time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books
and the Bulgar newspaper. That while
hanging washed clothes on the vacant
lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating by
tinkering her private parts. The
masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were
corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the
 fourth and last witness for the defense. 1. THE LOWER COURT
She stated that she tried hard to correct FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that SINISTER MOTIVE OF
she scolded her when she saw Rodessa PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa GRANDMOTHER? THAT
according to her was fond of going with PRECIPITATED THE FILING
friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE,
corroborated the testimony of Mrs. HENCE IT ERRED IN
Punzalan by stating that she herself saw HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY
Rodessa masturbating inside the room AS CHARGED.
of her house.5
2. THE COURT BELOW
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond OVERLOOKED THE FACT
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower THAT THE HEALED
court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7
credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten- O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE
year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely BEEN DUE TO THE
against accused-appellant can be attributed. The PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF
lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA
defense of the accused-appellant that the OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
extraordinary size of his penis could not have HENCE IT ERRED IN
insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the HOLDING THAT ACCUSED
accused is not the real father of the said victim. COMMITTED THE CRIME
CHARGED,
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in NOTWITHSTANDING
his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's VEHEMENT DENIAL.
verdict through the following assignment of errors:
 3. THE COURT A
QUO WHIMSICALLY
IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS
IN PARAÑAQUE ON THE
DATE AND TIME OF THE
IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE
IN THE CASE AT BAR.6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the
reimposition of the death penalty, requires a
thorough and judicious examination of the
circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains
guided by the following principles in evaluating
evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the accused though innocent to
disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the
prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of
persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales of
justice in favor of the accused-appellant
notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the
rape charge was merely concocted and strongly
motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the
NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San
Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The
accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness
Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the
victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that,
in the event that the accused-appellant shall be
meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be
consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question
is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado
Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera,
according to the records of the National Housing
Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would
want us to believe that the rape charge was
fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate
the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the
live-in partners would have the property for their
own.8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no
grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her
10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against
her own father simply on account of her alleged
interest over the disputed lot.9
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the
testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has
no motive to testify against the accused. 10
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the
testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the trial
court found convincing enough and unrebutted by
the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted
that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's
monstrous acts had made her cry.11 Once again, we
rule that:
. . . The testimony of the victim who was
only 12 years old at the time of the rape
as to the circumstances of the rape must
be given weight, for testimony of young
and immature rape victims are credible
(People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]).
No woman especially one of tender age,
practically only a girl, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and
thereafter expose herself to a public
trial, if she were not motivated solely by
the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People v.
Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the
rape accusation against him is malicious and
baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the
accused-appellant was already naked when he
dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her
subsequent testimony that the said accused-
appellant was still wearing short pants when she was
dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn
statement before the police investigator which
indicated that, while the accused was executing
pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?",
differ from her testimony in court wherein she
related that, when the accused took out his penis
from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos
na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion
Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was
the accused who went to see her to apprise her of
the rape committed on her granddaughter. However,
in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed
that she was the one who invited the accused-
appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a
secret.13 These alleged discrepancies merely pertain
to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt
as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Whether or not the accused was naked when he
dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually
assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's
testimony that she was actually raped by the
accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of
whatever words were uttered by the accused-
appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot
impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A
determination of which version earmarks the truth as
to how the victim's grandmother learned about the
rape is inconsequential to the judgment of
conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People
v. Jaymalin: 14
This Court has stated time and again that
minor inconsistencies in the narration of
the witness do not detract from its
essential credibility as long as it is on the
whole coherent and intrinsically
believable. Inaccuracies may in fact
suggest that the witness is telling the
truth and has not been rehearsed as it is
not to he expected that he will be able
to remember every single detail of an
incident with perfect or total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial
judge's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect
in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the
records of the instant case are bereft of clear and
concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to
the size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it
could not have merely caused shallow healed
lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his
testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he
could not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her
vagina had he actually done so. 16 This Court gives no
probative value on the accused-appellant's self-
serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case
of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal
membrane are elastic organs capable of
varying degrees of distensibility. The
 degree of distensibility of the female
reproductive organ is normally limited
only by the character and size of the
pelvic inlet, other factors being minor.
The female reprodructive canal being
capable of allowing passage of a regular
fetus, there ought to be no difficulty
allowing the entry of objects of much
lesser size, including the male
reproductive organ, which even in its
largest dimensions, would still be
considerably smaller than the full-term
fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of
healed lacerations in various parts of he
vaginal wall, though not as extensive as
appellant might have expected them to
be, indicate traumatic injury to the area
within the period when the incidents
were supposed to have occurred. (At pp.
13-14, emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential
element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at the doors of
the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis
suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry
into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a
conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal
examiner, categorically testified that the healed
lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent
with the date of the commission of the rape as
narrated by the victim to have taken place in April,
1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant
consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously
argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4)
offered as evidence in support of the accused-
appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated
because there is no law expressly requiring so. 21 In
view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses
have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-
appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case,
uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be
completely disregarded. 22 More importantly, the
defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes
even weaker in the face of positive identification of
the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of
rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-
appellant obligated himself to do some painting job
at the house of one Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro
Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not
proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with
Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint, dated
July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as
stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa positively
identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit
of Statutory Rape. Her account of how the accused-
appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous
and odious sexual assault on her is free from any
substantial self-contradiction. It is highly
inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated
upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal
grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the
accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two
decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating,
thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this
Court that where the offended parties
are young and immature girls like the
victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted)
there is marked receptivity on its, part to
tend credence to their version of what
transpired. It is not to be wondered at.
The state, as parens patria, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those, who, because of their minority,
are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its utmost protection.
Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is
not inflicted on the unfortunate victim
alone. The consternation it causes her
family must also be taken into account It
may reflect a failure to abide by the
announced concern in the fundamental
law for such institution There is all the
more reason then for the rigorous
application of the penal law with its
severe penalty for this offense,
whenever warranted. It has been aptly
remarked that with the advance in
civilization, the disruption in public
peace and order it represents defies
 explanation, much more so in view of
what currently appears to be a tendency
for sexual permissiveness. Where the
prospects of relationship based on
consent are hardly minimal, self-
restraint should even be more
marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often
referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed
if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eigthteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-
appellant questions the penalty imposed by the trial
court by declaring that he is neither a father,
stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he
was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother. 26 On
direct examination, he admitted that before the
charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated
Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for
her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The
Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the
accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden
name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in
partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during
the cross-examination that she, the accused-
appellant, and her five children, including Rodessa,
had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate,
even if he were not the father, stepfather or
grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save
him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous
crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering
that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within the
aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under
the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the
accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to
conclude that accused-appellant is either the father
or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual
assault perpetrated by the accused on his young
victim has become all the more repulsive and
perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-
appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her
are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the
accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has
made it inevitable under the circumstances of this
case that the accused-appellant face the supreme
penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 124736 January 22, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO GALLO y IGLOSO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM.:
It is disturbing enough to see that there has been a
noticeable increase in the incidents of rape but one is
left completely appalled that this still growing
number includes cases of the bestial act being
perpetrated on the young and innocent and, no
longer too infrequently it seems, compounded by the
close kinship of the offender and the victim.
In People vs. Malagar, 1 the Court has had occasion to
state that a —
. . . (F)ather is looked up to as the
protector and as the guardian of his
family, remaining ever wary of even the
slightest harm that might befall it. It is
difficult to thus imagine that any such
man could instead stand as the predator
of his own flesh and blood. Yet, we
occasionally wound find ourselves so
regrettably contending with it as a fact. 2
In the instant case, the accused, Romeo Gallo y
Igloso, was charged, docketed Criminal Case No.
2282, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of
Binangonan, Rizal, with the crime of rape in an
information that read:
That on or sometime the period of May,
1994 in the Municipality of Cardona,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd
designs and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with a 13-year old girl,
Marites Gallo y Segovia.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accused pleaded not guilty; trial ensued in due
time.
In a decision, dated 17 April 1986, Romeo Gallo y
Igloso was ultimately convicted of rape committed
against his own daughter, Marites Gallo y Segovia,
only then thirteen years of age. The death penalty
having been imposed by the trial court, the records
of the case were transmitted to this Court by way of
an automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659.
The Solicitor General recommends an affirmance of
the decision. He makes the following statement of
facts:
For three years, since age ten,
complainant Marites Gallo y Segovia
suffered repeated sexual abuses from
her father, herein appellant Romeo Gallo
y Igloso, the last of which was in their
house at Sitio Alacos, Lambac, Cardona,
Rizal at around 7:00 in the evening (Exh.
"A") in May 1994 (TSN, Feb. 8, 1995, pp.
4-5; March 13, 1995, p. 2).
That evening, appellant, taking
advantage of the situation that Marites
was only with her younger brother who
was already asleep, again imposed his
bestial desire on his own daughter.
Subjecting his daughter to the usual
threat that she would be killed if
anybody would know his bestiality,
appellant (with his pants off) undressed
Marites, removed her underpants,
kissed her and inserted his penis into her
vagina (Annex "A," TSN, Feb. 8, 1995, pp.
25-27).
 After appellant's last sexual onslaught,
Marites, now thirteen, finally mustered
enough courage and narrated her
harrowing experience to her aunt
Dolores del [Prado]. Accompanied by the
latter, Marites reported the incident to
the Barangay Captain of Lambac,
Cardona, Rizal (TSN, Feb. 8, 1995, pp. 6-
7). The incident led to the investigation
by the Cardona Police. Marites executed
her complainant-affidavit (Exh. "A," "A-
1;" Id., pp. 8-10).
Marites was, thereafter, brought to
Camp Crame, Quezon City and was
examined by Dr. Cristina B. Freyra who
found Marites to be in a non-virgin state.
The result of the examination was
reduced in writing and covered by
Medico-Legal Report No. M-0963-94
(Exh. "B," "B-1;" Id., p. 12; TSN, Sept. 5,
1995, pp. 6-7).4
The defense pictured the accused as any other
ordinary man in the family who had tried hard to
provide and care for his wife and children. At certain
times, the accused conceded, he would meet and
drink with friends. The appellant's brief summed up
the testimony of Gallo given before the court
below; viz:
Accused Romeo Gallo testified that be is
a native of Masbate and he got married
to his wife Elvie Sigovia in 1975. They
were married in the Island of Lambac,
Cardona, Rizal. Marites, the complaining
witness in this case is his eldest child
who was born in 1977. Marites was born
inn Bicol where Elvie, his wife, formerly
resided. His daughter Marites stayed
with his mother-in-law in Bicol for three
(3) years. After three years, Marites
already stayed with his family. In 1989,
his family, together with Marites, stayed
[in] Mindoro up to 1994. During their
stay in Mindoro they engaged
themselves [in] farming, planting palay,
cassava and "kamoteng bagin." When
asked about the incident that Marites
related during her testimony, that she
was first molested by the accused, he
said that he [did] not know about their
accusations. He has no knowledge of any
charge against him, for what Marites has
said are not true. He treated Marites as
a family and he performs his obligation
over his family. As far as he
remember[s], he spanked his children
whenever they commit mistakes as a
part of discipline. He and his family alone
were in Mindoro, his mother-in-law was
not with them.
In 1994, they moved to Lambac,
Cardona, Rizal and there, they engaged
in charcoal making somewhere in the
mountainous part of Lambac. With him
was his whole family of six (6) children
and his wife, and they occupy a nipa hut.
When asked of the incident that
happened in the mountainous part of
Lambac where he was accused of
molestng [his] child Marites, he
answered that he knows nothing about
it. The truth is that one time he beat
Marites and may be she was hurt and
related the matter to her mother-in-law.
His mother-in-laws was making "sulsol"
to his daughter to file this case against
him so that he and his wife will be
separated. His mother-in-law wanted
them to be separated because of his
poverty. He tried to convince his child
Marites to discontinue filing this case
but she did not listen. He [has] never
molested her daughter Marites Gallo
even once.
On cross examination, he testified that
when he married his wife Elvie Gallo, he
was then a charcoal maker and before
their marriage he [did] not know her
mother in law. It was only because of the
prodding of his mother-in-law that this
case was filed by her daughter. Even in
1975 when he got married to his wife
Elvie he was still poor and this may be
the reason why his mother-in-law
wanted him to be separated from his
family. At one time he inflicted
punishment [on] Marites and this is
probably the reason why Marites agreed
to file this case against him. On that
occasion, he spanked Marites on the
buttocks. He admit[ted] to be drinking
liquor for a long time during the intervals
of weeks . . . with companions in
Lambac, Cardona, Rizal. They have
 stayed in Mindoro from 1984 to 1993, victim, and because, except for a bare denial, there
then they moved to Lambac, Cardona, hardly is any direct rebutting evidence, the Court
Rizal. After the testimony of this finds it fitting to hear, here again, Marites, in her own
accused, the defense rested its case. words, on the unfortunate saga. Thus —
(TSN, pp. 3-17, November 27, 1995)5
Marites Gallo y Segovia,
Contending that the prosecution has failed to Testifying:
overcome the Constitutional presumption of
innocence by an exacting standard of proof beyond Q Now, you said that you
reasonable doubt, appellant downgrades the are almost 14 years of age
testimony of the complainant as being nothing but today?
incredulous.
A Yes, sir.
The Court has taken meticulous care in reviewing the
evidence submitted by both the prosecution and the Q When is your birthday.?
defense. All possible angles have been considered in
A October 6, sir.
the process, for, as it has so recently been said
in People vs. Galera, 6 "the Court exercises the Q October 6, 1995?
greatest circumspection" in its review of death
penalty cases since "there can be no stake higher and A Yes, sir.
no penalty more severe . . . than the termination of a
human life." Regrettably in this instance, the Court Q Now, the accused in this
must agree with the trial court in the judgment of case . . .
conviction.
What relation, if any, do
Cognizant of the fact that the focal, as well as crucial, you have with the accused
point in this review is the testimony of the young in this case?
 A He is my father, sir.
Q And sometime on May,
1994 you were already 13
years old, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ASST. PROS. SOYANGCO
Q You said that he is your
father, if he is inside the
Court room can you identify
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him.
INTERPRETER
Witness is pointing to a man
wearing fuchsia t-shirt, who
when his name was asked
answered to the name of
Romeo Gallo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You are the complainant
in this case, Maritess?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, can you inform us
why you are accusing your
father of rape?
A "Pinagsamantalahan niya
po ako," he raped me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said
"pinagsamantalahan" what
exactly do you mean?
A "PINAGSAMANTALAHAN
PO NIYA AKO NUON."
xxx xxx xxx
ASST. PROS. SOYANGCO
And the answer was "Ako
po ay pinagsamantalahan
niya." Now to reform that I
will adopt the suggestion of
the Court that the question
should be — "What exactly
did your father do to your?"
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
He removed my clothes and
he took advantage of me
while he was drank, sir.
ASST. PROS SOYANGCO
Q Now, exactly what do you
mean by "he took
advantage of you while he
was drank," I mean the
accused took advantage of
you while he was drank?
A "INASAWA NIYA PO AKO."
ASST. PROS SOYANGCO
"Inasawa," Your Honor,
means sexual intercourse.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Are you a tagalog
speaking person?
A Yes, sir.
Q In tagalog, what exactly
do you mean by the word
"Inasawa ako?"
A He is making me as if I am
his wife, sir.
Q How did he make you as if
you were this wife?
A He placed his body on top
of my body, sir.
Q When he placed his body
on top of you, were you
naked?
A Yes, sir.
Q Completely naked?
A Only my panty, sir.
Q And your father, when he
undressed you and placed
himself on top of you, was
he dressed-up or naked?
A He was dressed but his
shortpants was off, sir.
Q So he was without
shortpants.
Now, when he was on top
of you what happened?
A He inserted his penis to
my vagina, sir.
Q When he undressed you,
did you do anything?
A I was not able to do
anything because he told
me that he will kill me, sir.
Q And when he inserted his
penis into your genital or
vagina, what did you do?
A I was crying, sir.
Q After having inserted his
penis into your vagina, what
happened next?
A "KINAYOG KAYOG NIYA
PO AKO."
xxx xxx xxx
Q After that what
happened?
A After that he dressed-up
and he told me to dress-up
also, sir.
Q What happened next?
A And he left the house, sir.
Q And what about you?
A And I also left the house,
sir.
Q By the way when you said
house, what house are you
referring to?
A Our house, sir.
Q And where is this house
situated?
A Our house in Mindoro
where he did that things,
sir.7
Q You are testifying in this
case for rape against your
father, the accused, Romeo
Gallo y Igloso which per
information happened on
May 1994 in the
Municipality of Cardona,
Province of Rizal?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, in the last session
when you were testifying in
this case you made mention
of the fact that when asked
where is your house
located, you said in
Mindoro?
A The first time I was raped
was in Mindoro and the last
time he raped me was in
our house in Cardona, sir.
Q So you were raped by
your own father earlier than
you were raped in Cardona
in Mindoro?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you remember
when was that when you
were raped by your father
in Mindoro?
A Yes, sir.
Q When?
A 1993, sir.
Q And how old were you
when you were raped in
1993 by your father?
A I was raped when I was
ten (10) years old up to the
age of thirteen (13), sir.
Q How many times were
you raped by your father
from the time you were ten
(10) years old up to the time
that you were 13 years old
in Mindoro?
A Many times, sir.
Q And the last of which is
that you were raped is the
subject of the instant
information that happened
in Lambak, Cardona, Rizal, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when you were
raped in Barrio Lambak,
Cardona, Rizal by your
father what did you do after
that, if any?
A I did not do anything, sir.
Q You did not do anything?
Did it not occur to you to
report it to your mother?
A I was afraid, sir because
he threatened me that he
will kill us, sir.
Q And why was this case
filed by you against your
father?
A Because he raped me, sir.
Q Yes. Who told you to file
this complaint of rape?
A No other person except
me, sir.
Q When did you report this
matter?
A To my auntie, sir.
Q What is the name of your
auntie?
A Dolores del Prado, sir.
Q After having told your
auntie Dolores del Prado
about this incident, what
did your auntie or you do?
A They also told the incident
to their other sisters, sir.
Q And what is the name of
that sister?
A Elvie Gallo, sir.
Q Who else?
A No more, sir.
Q Now, what did your
auntie or you again [do]
after that?
A She told us to go back to
Lambak, sir.
Q For what purpose?
A We will talk together, sir.
Q Together with whom?
A We will talk with the
Barangay Captain, sir.
Q Did you in fact go to the
Barangay Captain in
Lambak?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when
you reached there?
A We talked together in the
Barangay Hall and
afterwards he was brought
in Cardona, sir.
Q When you said he you are
referring to your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular in
Cardona were he taken?
A In the Municipal Hall, sir.
Q And were you with him
when he was taken in the
Municipal Hall of Cardona?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what office in
particular in the Municipal
Hall of Cardona did you go?
A In the office near the jail,
sir.
Q Could it be the Police of
Cardona?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened there,
what did you do there?
A I told them what really
happened to me, sir.
Q And what did the Police
do as you narrated what
happened to you?
A They were listening and
writing what I was
narrating, sir.
Q In other words what you
narrated was reduced into
writing by the Police?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, I am showing to you
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay
ni Marites Gallo," what
relation if any has this
document to that document
which you said the Police
was writing down as you
narrated then?
 A Yes this is the document,
sir.
Q Was it read and explained
to you by the Investigator?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you understood the
contents thereof?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ASST. PROSECUTOR
SOYANGCO:
Now, there appears a
signature below the
document marked already
as Exhibit "A" a signature on
top of the typewritten
name Marites Gallo, whose
signature is this?
A That is my signature, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ASST. PROSECUTOR
SOYANGCO:
Q So, you went to the Police
of Cardona and your father
and who else are your
companions?
A My mother and also my
grandmother, sir.
Q What is the name of your
mother?
A Elvie Gallo, sir.
Q And your grandmother?
A Conching, sir.
Q Conching what?
A Conching Segovia, sir.
Q Who else.
A No more, sir.
Q What about a certain Q Did you not report the
Rogelio del Prado, was he matter to any other office?
not with you?
A None, sir.
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did this Rogelio del
Prado do in the Police Q Were you treated or
Station? given medical assistance by
anyone?
A We went to the Police and
told them that he is one of A Yes, sir.
the witnesses, sir.
Q Where?
Q And I supposed that he
was made to sign a sworn A Camp Crame, sir.
statement?
Q In other words you were
A Yes, sir. examined by someone in
Camp Crame?
Q Now, after that I mean
after reporting the incident A Yes, sir.
to the Police what legal step
Q And who were with you
did you do next?
when you were examined in
A None, sir. Camp Crame?

A My aunt, Dolores del

Prado, sir.
 Q What happened when
you were examined?
A The result of the
examination is that I was
not a virgin, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ASST. PROSECUTOR
SOYANGCO:
Back to your father . . . you
mentioned in your
testimony earlier that your
father was drank when he
committed rape against
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is your father a habitual
drunkard?
A Yes, sir.
Q When he is in the
influence of liquor he is
violent, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you a victim of acts
of violence of your father
other than the rape?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of cruelty did
he inflict upon you?
A He pulled our hair, kicked
us and mauled us, sir.
Q When you said "kami"
you are not only referring to
yourself but also to others?
A Yes, sir also my mother.
Q Who else?
A Only the two (2) of us, sir.
Q Can you describe to the
Honorable Court the sort of
cruelty that the accused
inflicted towards your
mother?
A He was also doing the
same thing to my mother
what he has done to me, sir.
Q And that you mean your
mother was also mauled?
A Yes, sir because he was
jealous.
xxx
Q Jealous of whom?
A To the men [s]he was
talking, sir.
Q Of your own knowledge
do you know of a fact that
your father despite the fact
that he is in jail is making
threats to you and your
mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q What sort of threat if you
know?
A He told us that he will kill
us, sir.
Q And when did he tell you
that he will kill you?
A He said the moment I get
out of jail I will kill all of you,
sir.
xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY
ATTY. JUAN B. SUCO, JR. ON
WITNESS MARITES GALLO:
Q You were first raped at
Mindoro?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were ten (10)
years old, is that correct?
Q When was that?
A The year 1993, sir.
Q Do we understand that
during that time you and
your family were still
residing in Mindoro?
A Yes, sir.
Q Including your mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your brothers and sisters?
A I am the only girl, sir.
Q Are you the only daughter
of your parents?
A Yes, sir and I have five (5)
brothers.
Q Are you the youngest o[r]
the eldest?
A I am the eldest, sir.
Q In what particular place in
Mindoro were your
residing?
A Gutad, Mindoro, sir.
Q Is that a barrio?
A No, sir we lived in a
mountainous part of
Mindoro, sir.
Q What month when you
were first raped in 1993?
A May, sir.
Q But you did not file any
complaint against you
father?
A No, sir because I was
afraid.
Q Neither you report what
your father did to you to
your mother?
A Because if I will tell the Q By the way, what time
matters to my mother we was that when the incident
will be killed, sir. happened?

Q You only presumed it to A About 4:00 o'clock, sir.

yourself when you report
the matter to your mother? COURT

A Yes, sir. Q 4:00 o'clock what?

Q When you were raped for A 4:00 o'clock in the

the first time did you offer afternoon, sir.
resistance?
ATTY. SUCO:
A Yes, sir.
Q Did that happen inside
Q In what manner? your house?

A I pinched him and pushed A Yes, sir.

him, sir.
Q Your mother was also
Q You did not attempt to there?
run away?
A She was not there, sir.
A He was able to hold me,
sir. Q What about your other
brothers?

A They were not there, sir.

Q The four (4) of them were
not in your house when that
incident happened?
A There are five (5), sir.
Q Not even one (1) of them
was inside your house?
A One (1) was there, sir the
youngest.
Q How old is your youngest
then?
A Two (2) years old, sir.
Q Can he talk already?
A He can talk only for few
words, sir.
Q But he can understand?
A No, sir.
Q Where was your mother
then?
A She went to the barrio to
get out rice, sir.
Q How far?
A Near, sir.
Q How near?
A It will not took her one (1)
hour by walk, sir.
Q But you have neighbors?
A We have neighbors, sir
but we only have two (2)
neighbors, sir.
Q In other words there are
three (3) families residing in
the area?
A Yes, sir. Our house was
the third house.
Q And your two (2)
neighbors were near to your
house?
A A little bit far, sir.
Q How far?
A A little bit far, sir.
Q Alright. From the place
where you are now sitting,
can you demonstrate the
distance in relation to your
house and to the two (2)
neighbors?
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to the
place where she is sitting up
to the municipal hall of
Binangonan, Rizal.
ATTY. SUCO:
Can we stipulate?
WITNESS:
A The same distance, sir.
ATTY. SUCO:
Q About a distance of thirty
(30) meters?
A Yes, sir.
ASST. PROSECUTOR
SOYANGCO:
We can stipulate on that.
ATTY. SUCO:
Q And you are referring that
distance, you refer to the
distance to one of your
neighbors?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know the name of
that neighbor of yours?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name?
A Arias, sir.
Q How many were they
living in the house?
A Three (3), sir, his wife and
a child.
Q Only one (1) child?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, your other
neighbor, can you also
demonstrate the distance?
A The same distance, sir.
Q And again do you know
the name?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name?
A Bernard, sir.
Q Is he a man or a woman?
A He is a man, sir.
Q Is he married?
A He is married, sir.
Q How many were they
living inside the house?
A His wife and his four (4)
children were residing
there, sir.
Q So, all in all you have nine
(9) neighbors in that two (2)
houses?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when the incident
happened did you not
attempt to shout for help?
A They were not there at
that time, sir.
Q Why did you say that they
were not there? Did you
visit the two (2) houses
before you were raped by
your father in your house?
A They went to the barrio,
sir.
Q The nine (9) of them went
to the barrio?
A Yes, sir because they
always go to that place and
nobody was left, sir.
Q How do you know that?
A They went to the barrio
and the house was closed,
sir.
Q Did all of them inform you
that they will go to the
barrio?
A Yes, sir.
Q They informed you before
they left for the barrio?
A They talked to me and
told me to watch their
house while they were away
in the barrio, sir.
Q When that incident was in
progress did you not shout
or tell your youngest
brother to report the
matter to your mother who
was in the barrio?
A He cannot talk yet at that
time, sir.
Q But you did not tell him?
A Even if I told him he
cannot understand, sir.
Q In other words you did
not tell anything to your
brother?
A No, sir because even if I
told him he cannot
understand, sir.
Q You just allowed your
father to do what he
wanted to do?
A I also reported what
happened, sir, after we had
transferred residence, sir.
Q While the incident was
still in progress you did not
tell any word to your
younger brother or shout
hoping that somebody will
rescue you?
A That time my brother was
sleeping, sir.
Q Now, will you explain
what exactly did your father
[do] to you at that
particular incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he [do] to you?
A He first undress me, sir
and he raped me.
Q You did not offer
resistance when he
removed your dress?
A I tried to resist, sir but he
is a man that is why I cannot
resist him, sir.
Q Is that the only thing
happened, did he just
removed your dress?
A He removed my panty or
underwear, sir.
Q Is that the only one?
A Yes, sir.
Q Other than that nothing
happened?
A After he removed my
panty he raped me, sir.
Q What do you mean by he
raped me?
A He took advantage of me,
sir.
Q By what means?
A He kissed me, sir and . . .
ATTY. SUCO:
We request that that
statement in vernacular be
recorded.
COURT:
The vernacular testimony of
the witness put it down as
requested by the counsel . .
"INANO NIY AKO AT
INANO."
ATTY. SUCO:
Q What did you mean by
"INANO AKO."
A He inserted his penis to
my vagina, sir, that is what I
mean.
Q How?
A He held his penis and
inserted it to my vagina, sir.
Q Was there an actual
penetration of his penis to
your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q He was able to penetrate
his penis to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you telling this Court
that after he held his penis
he was able to insert it
immediately to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, if that is the case it
could be that you assisted
 him or you positioned A For less half hour, sir.
yourself in such a manner
that he can insert his penis Q So, for 59 minutes?
immediately inside your
vagina? xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx ATTY. SUCO:

Q What did you feel when Twenty nine (29) minutes I

the penis of your father was mean.
already inside your vagina?
WITNESS:
A I felt pain, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did the penis of
xxx xxx xxx
your father was inside your
vagina? ATTY. SUCO:
A For quite a long time, sir. Q Was your vagina bleeding
when your father finished?
Q Up to the next morning
his penis was inside your A Yes, sir.
vagina?
Q By the way, was that the
A No, sir. first time that you were
sexually abused by any
Q How long in terms of
person?
hours?
A Yes, sir.
Q After that did you try to
consult a doctor for the
purpose of treating your
vagina when you said it was
bleeding?
A There was no doctor
around, sir and the doctor
was far in our house and
the doctor was in Tanyag,
sir.
Q You did not consult to any
albularyo?
A The place of the albularyo
was also far, sir.
Q You did not apply any
medicine to your vagina
which was bleeding?
A I placed some medicine,
sir.
Q What medicine?
A Oil, sir.
Q And did it heal when you
applied oil?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you also testified
that you were abused many
times starting in Mindoro.
Now, please tell this Court
how many times?
A For a month, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A About five (5) times, sir.
ATTY. SUCO:
Q In all that incidents your
father was able to insert his
penis to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
 Q Do you have a A He was still abusing me,
menstruation already? sir.

A Yes, sir. Q When?

Q When did you experience xxx xxx xxx

having for the first a
menstruation? WITNESS:

A March, sir. A Last year, sir.

Q March of what year? xxx xxx xxx

A 1994, sir. Q Did you say earlier in

Q So, only last year?
A Yes, sir only now, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SUCO:
Q Since March when you
experienced menstruation
you were not abused
anymore by your father up
to now?
reply to the question of the
counsel for the accused that
your menstruation was in
March 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q Atty. Suco asked next . .
since that time were you
abused by your father?
A Yes, sir.
 Q The next question of Atty.
Suco . . when were you
abused?
A In the year 1994, sir he
keep on abusing me.
ATTY. SUCO:
Q What do you mean by he
keep on abusing you?
A That was the time he
wanted to rape me, sir. 8
Marites spoke of not one but of several sexual
transgressions committed, as if so casually, on her by
her own father, the first of which occurred when she
was only ten years of age and the last when she was
thirteen. For some undisclosed reasons, appellant
was not charged with the prior offenses.
Almost invariably, the Court uses three guiding
principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) An
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense. 9 It is
within these parameters that this Court, not much
unlike that of the trial court, has made its evaluation
of the case.
Since the participants are usually the only witnesses
in crimes of this nature, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused would virtually depend on the credibility
of the complainant's testimony. 10 If found credible,
the lone declaration of facts given by the offended
party would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. 11 A
victim of sexual assault would not ordinarily be
willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial,
let alone testify on the details of her ordeal, if her
reasons were other than her natural passion to
avenge her honor 12 and to condemn a grave
injustice done to her. 13 Even more improbable than
any other case perhaps, is for a young girl to accuse
her own father for her defilement, 14 and so expose
not only herself but the family as well to shame and
scandal, if the charges were untrue and merely
made up. 15
Understandably in the case at bar, appellant could
only resort to, and content himself by, having a
recourse to mere generalities, such as those
hereinafter discussed, so normally employed as
defense strategy when the evidence for the
prosecution appears to be formidable.
In giving full credence to the testimony of the
victim, the trial court has found no cogent reason to
deny her credibility and to discard what it described
to be her "coherent and straightforward" narration
of the incident. That court has had all the
opportunity to observe closely the demeanor of the
young victim at the witness stand. Well settled is
the rule that an assessment made by a trial court on
the testimony of witnesses deserves great respect
absent any valid justification that can warrant its
outright rejection by an appellate court. 16 Nothing
significant has been shown to convince the Court
that the trial court has at any time acted with undue
bias or that it has overlooked or ignored something
of substance that could have, in any degree,
warranted a turnabout by it of its findings and
judgment. Occasional flaws or unguarded
exaggerations in the testimony of witnesses, verily,
could lend and add up to the credence of
testimony. 17 A completely accurate description of
the incident certainly cannot be expected from a
witness in recounting the details of a harrowing
experience. 18 An errorless declaration could, in fact,
be suspect for a rehearsed testimony.
Appellant bewails the supposed failure of the
offended party to promptly report the crime to the
authorities. The delay and initial reluctance of a
rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue
is neither unknown nor uncommon. 19 It is not an
unexpected reaction of a woman to keep secret, at
least momentarily, the dishonor brought to bear on
her and to suffer alone in her misfortune rather
than to be the subject of embarrassment, public
scrutiny, pity or ridicule. Fear, brought about by
threat or when, such as in the case at bar, the rapist
is living under the same roof with his victim, 20 is a
circumstance that can easily muffle the latter into
silence stated while that fear lasts. Age is
another. 21 Thus we have stated.
Vacillation in the filing of complaints by
rape victims is not an uncommon
phenomenon. This crime is normally
accompanied by the rapist's threat on
the victim's life, and the fear can last for
quite a while. There is also the natural
 reluctance of a woman to admit her
sullied chastity, accepting thereby all
the stigma it leaves, and to then expose
herself to the morbid curiosity of the
public whom she may likely perceive,
rightly or wrongly, to be more
interested in the prurient details of the
ravishment than in her vindication and
the punishment of the rapist. In People
vs. Coloma [222 SCRA 255] we have
even considered an 8-year delay in
reporting the long history of rape by the
victim's father as understandable and
so not enough to render incredible the
complaint of a 13-year old daughter.22
Marites, to stress once again, was only between ten
and thirteen years old when she was subjected to
repeated bestial abuse. The unbelievable depravity
was committed by her own father, described by the
victim's younger brother Christopher Gallo to be a
cruel and violent man particularly when drunk. It
was to her credit that she ultimately found the right
composure and determination, belated such as it
might have been, to finally have her father brought
to justice.
Everything considered, the Court is convinced that
accused-appellant did commit the crime of rape on
his own 13-year old daughter. This offense is
defined and made punishable by Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. The law, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 23 reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is
committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following
circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or
frustrated and a homicide is committed
by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed
if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody
of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full
view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a
child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the Philippine National Police or any
law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.
The crime of rape, having been committed by
appellant on his own daughter of thirteen years of
age, is consequently covered by the above
mandatory death penalty provision. Thus, following
its deliberations, the Court by a majority vote, with
two members voting to only impose the penalty
of reclusion perpetua on constitutional grounds,
sustains the trial court in the imposition of the
death penalty on appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED except for the award of civil indemnity
which is INCREASED to P50,000.00 Costs against
accused-appellant.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records
of the case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE
JOSEPH, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course
of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the
property of a third person are subject to be returned
to the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful
act. But the trial court may not release such objects
pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged
RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph)
with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section
26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal
Case No. 09-208,the accusatory portion of the
information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in
the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding each other,
they not being authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver
and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-
colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in
six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with
recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of METHAMPHETAMINE,
a dangerous drug.2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed
another information charging only Brodett with a
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information
alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in
the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control the
following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos
and ten (10) transparent capsules containing
white powdery substance contained in one
self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a
net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA),
commonly known as "Ecstasy", a dangerous
drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic
sachets containing white powdery substance
with total recorded net weight of 1.2235
grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic
sachets containing white powdery substance,
placed in a light-yellow folded paper, with total
 recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination
yielded positive results for presence of
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic
sachets containing dried leaves with total
recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination
yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July
30, 2009, Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug
Evidence. He averred that during his arrest,
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had
seized several personal non-drug effects from
him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license
plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their
return. He prayed that his personal effects be
tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon
verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor
submitted its Comment and
Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the
RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to
be held there throughout the duration of the trial,
would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense
to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office
of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the
car because it appeared to be the instrument in the
commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the
transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of
the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its
authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to:
(1) photograph the abovementioned Honda Accord,
before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra
S. Brodett and the return should be fully
documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as
listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S.
Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for
safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but
its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack
of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The Order of the Court dated November 4, 2009 is
upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the
Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari,
claiming that the orders of the RTC were issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its
Decision,8 dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord
subject of this petition is owned by and registered in
the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard
Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of
the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged
of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases
of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying
Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We
therefore see no cogent reason why the subject
Honda Accord may not be exempted from
confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that
the subject car, being an instrument of the offense,
may not be released to Ms. Brodett and should
remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are
plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room
for a contrary construction, especially so that the
only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not
obtaining here. More so that the required literal
interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and
consequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
 Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the
CAwas not in accord with applicable laws and the
primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165.10 It
contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that
the Honda Accord car, registered under the name of
Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from
accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal
operation and should not be released from the
custody of the law;that the Motion to Return Non-
Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car
had belonged to a third person; and that even if the
car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release,
because she was under the obligation to prove to the
RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner
failed to present any question of law that warranted
a review by the Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No.
9165 clearly and unequivocally states that
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of
the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such
proceeds or instruments are the property of a third
person not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is
gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person
must still prove in the trial court that he has no
knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that
PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the
petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the orderfor the release of the car to
Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal
proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the
offense has the power to order upon conviction of an
accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit
the crime, including documents, papers, and other
effects that are the necessary means to commit the
crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal.
As justification for the first, the accused must not
profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or
the right to possession of property through his
unlawful act.12 As justification for thesecond, to
return to the convict from whom thecontraband was
taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or
proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation
of the law for possessing the contraband
again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the
offense has theright to dispose of property used in
the commission of the crime, such disposition being
an accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused,
unless the property belongs to a third person not
liable for the offense that it was used as the
instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and
ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and
shall pass to the Government.15 But it is required that
the property to be forfeited must be before the court
in such manner that it can be said to be within its
jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property
may be seized in connection with a criminal offense
either by authority of a search warrant or as the
product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the
search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal
property that may be seized may be that which is the
subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen
or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; orthat which has been used or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense.17 If
the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure
may be made of dangerous weapons or anything that
may have been used or may constitute proof in the
commission of an offense.18 Should there be no
ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal
property seized is used as evidence, its return to the
person from whom it was taken, or to the person
who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A
proper court may order the return of property held
solely as evidence should the Government be
unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such
property can be made only when the case is finally
terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable
legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property
claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion extends
even to the manner of proceeding in the event the
accused claims the property was wrongfully taken
from him.23 In particular, the trial court has the
power to return property held as evidence to its
rightful owners, whether the property was legally or
illegally seized by the Government.24 Property used
as evidence must be returned once the criminal
proceedings to which it relates have terminated,
unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other
proceedings.25
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated
car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged
either in connection with the illegal possession and
sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that
were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the
RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that
confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases
pertains to "all the proceeds and properties derived
from the unlawful act, including but not limited to,
money and other assets obtained thereby, and the
instruments or tools with which the particular
unlawful act was committed unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful
act." Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of
confiscation and forfeiture any property that is
owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord
subject of this petition is owned by and registered in
the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard
Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of
the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged
of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases
of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying
Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We
therefore see no cogent reason why the subject
Honda Accord may not be exempted from
confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when
the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no
alternative but to apply the same according to its
clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that the first and
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law
according to its express terms, interpretation being
called only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision
of law peremptorily calls for application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that
the subject car, being an instrument of the offense,
may not be released to Ms. Brodett and should
remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are
plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room
for a contrary construction, especially so that the
only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not
obtaining here. More so that the required literal
interpretation is not consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
unlawful act, including the properties or proceeds
derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs
and precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20
of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas
follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act,
Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from
the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty
imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources
of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the
confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the
government, of all the proceeds derived from
unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and
other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments
or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
committed, unless they are the property of a third
person not liable for the unlawful act, but those
which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions
of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the
appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall
immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation
and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and
all the assets and properties of the accused either
owned or held by him or in the name of some other
persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly
out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided,
however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle,
the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5)
days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial
Court, no property, or income derived therefrom,
which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be
disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall
be in custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for
the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any
property confiscated or forfeited under this Section
shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in
the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture,
custody and maintenance of the property pending
disposition, as well as expenses for publication and
court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its
campaign against illegal drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed
out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No.
9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar
to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instruments of theCrime. – Every penalty imposed
for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government,
unless they be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those articles which are not
subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of
the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose,28 concerning
the confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the
four accused when they committed theforcible
abduction with rape, although the car did not belong
to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the
confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool
used in the commission of the crime if such "be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense,"
it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court
below for the confiscation of the car in question
should be set aside and that the said car should be
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as
decreed in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section
20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and
instruments belonging to a third person,therefore,
there must be an indictment charging such third
person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice.
Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of
the tools and instruments to the third person, for a
mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not
sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture
of the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed
throughits Comment and Objection submitted on
August 27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the delivery to the
RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to
be held there throughout the duration of the trial,
would be to enable the Prosecution and the
Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value.
The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to
the return of the car because it appeared to bethe
vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of
dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in
the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be
not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial
intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165,32 and
contends that the car should not be released from
the custody of the law because it had been seized
from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal
operation. It argues that the Motion to Return Non-
Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car
had belonged to a third person; and that even if the
car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release,
because she was under the obligation to prove to the
RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime. It insists that the car is a property in
custodialegis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted
accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-Drug
Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal
proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet
to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at
that pointof the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20,
supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or
transfer of any property, or income derived
therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the
pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such
property or income derived therefrom should remain
in custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall
be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20
of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be
prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the
car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be
made only when the judgment was to be rendered in
the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated
in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the
trial in the RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily
intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its
availability as such. To release it before the judgment
is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the
parties access to it as evidence. Consequently, that
photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was
not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in
fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As
such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the
express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed
orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA.
It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC
promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal
Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209,
acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further
ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug
evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine
money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish
all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case
at bar. The Court cannot merely rely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official function in view of the glaring blunder in the
handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The
presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the
two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged
for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and
JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-
209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered
transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the non-
drug evidence except the buy bust money and the
genuine money are ordered returned to the accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as
well as the genuine money confiscated from both
accused are ordered escheated in favor of the
government and accordingly transmitted to the
National Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis
supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence
hasovertaken the petition for review as to render
further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court
seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to
formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation
and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those
belonging to third persons not liable for the offense,
in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial
court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.34 This the
Court must now do in view of the question about the
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being
susceptible of repetition in the future.35 1âwphi1
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts
shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20
of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles,
whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the
trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if
owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review
isDENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to
disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 170281 January 18, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner,
vs.
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC.
and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the order2 dated
October 27, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 47, dismissing the complaint for
forfeiture3 filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) against respondents Glasgow Credit and
Collection Services, Inc. (Glasgow) and Citystate
Savings Bank, Inc. (CSBI).
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the
RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent
plea for issuance of temporary restraining order
[TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against
the bank deposits in account number CA-005-10-
000121-5 maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. The case,
filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed
as Civil Case No. 03-107319.
Acting on the Republic’s urgent plea for the issuance
of a TRO, the executive judge4 of RTC Manila issued a
72-hour TRO dated July 21, 2003. The case was
thereafter raffled to Branch 47 and the hearing on
the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was set on August 4, 2003.
After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding
Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August
8, 2003.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned
"unserved" as it could no longer be found at its last
known address.
On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified
omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons
and (b) leave of court to serve summons by
publication. In an order dated October 15, 2003, the
trial court directed the issuance of alias summons.
However, no mention was made of the motion for
leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court
archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic
to serve the alias summons. The Republic filed an ex
parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and
(b) resolve its pending motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court
ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed
the Republic to serve the alias summons on Glasgow
and CSBI within 15 days. However, it did not resolve
the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication declaring:
Until and unless a return is made on the alias
summons, any action on [the Republic’s]
motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication would be untenable if not
premature.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of
the Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the
sheriff’s return dated June 30, 2004 stating that
the alias summons was returned "unserved" as
Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given
address since July 2002 and left no forwarding
address.
Meanwhile, the Republic’s motion for leave of court
to serve summons by publication remained
unresolved. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the Republic
filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve
its motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of
Glasgow’s "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special
Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It alleged that
(1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as
summons had not yet been served on it; (2) the
complaint was premature and stated no cause of
action as there was still no conviction for estafa or
other criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3)
there was failure to prosecute on the part of the
Republic.
The Republic opposed Glasgow’s motion to dismiss. It
contended that its suit was an action quasi in
rem where jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that prior
conviction for unlawful activity was not a
precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and
that its complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to
establish a cause of action. It denied that it failed to
prosecute the case.
On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the
assailed order. It dismissed the case on the following
grounds: (1) improper venue as it should have been
filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI, the depository
bank of the account sought to be forfeited, was
located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in form and
substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to
release to Glasgow or its authorized representative
the funds in CA-005-10-000121-5.
Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this
petition.
On November 23, 2005, this Court issued a TRO
restraining Glasgow and CSBI, their agents,
representatives and/or persons acting upon their
orders from implementing the assailed October 27,
2005 order. It restrained Glasgow from removing,
dissipating or disposing of the funds in account no.
CA-005-10-000121-5 and CSBI from allowing any
transaction on the said account.
The petition essentially presents the following issue:
whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was
correctly dismissed on grounds of improper venue,
insufficiency in form and substance and failure to
prosecute.
The Court agrees with the Republic.
The Complaint Was Filed
In The Proper Venue
In its assailed order, the trial court cited the grounds
raised by Glasgow in support of its motion to dismiss:
1. That this [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the
person of Glasgow considering that no
[s]ummons has been served upon it, and it has
not entered its appearance voluntarily;
2. That the [c]omplaint for forfeiture is
premature because of the absence of a prior
finding by any tribunal that Glasgow was
engaged in unlawful activity: [i]n connection
therewith[,] Glasgow argues that the
[c]omplaint states no cause of action; and
 3. That there is failure to prosecute, in that, up
to now, summons has yet to be served upon
Glasgow.5
But inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the
venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture
against it, how could the trial court have dismissed
the complaint for improper venue? In Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court6 (reiterated in Rudolf
Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque
City),7 this Court ruled:
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint by [the] trial court on the ground of
improper venue is plain error…. (emphasis
supplied)
At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue.
On November 15, 2005, this Court issued A.M. No.
05-11-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of
Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds
Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful
Activity or Money Laundering Offense under RA
9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republic’s
complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in
CSBI has not yet attained finality on account of the
pendency of this appeal. Thus, the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the Republic’s
complaint.8 Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially
admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case."9
Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial
Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the
regional trial court. – A petition for civil
forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial
court of the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds
representing, involving, or relating to an
unlawful activity or to a money laundering
offense are located; provided, however, that
where all or any portion of the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds is located
outside the Philippines, the petition may be
filed in the regional trial court in Manila or of
the judicial region where any portion of the
monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is
located, at the option of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in
Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil
forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region
where the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an
unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense
are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to
be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the
National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the
complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be
filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is
one of the RTCs of the NCJR,10 it was a proper venue
of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of
Glasgow’s account.
The Complaint Was Sufficient In Form And
Substance
In the assailed order, the trial court evaluated the
Republic’s complaint to determine its sufficiency in
form and substance:
At the outset, this [c]ourt, before it proceeds,
takes the opportunity to examine the
[c]omplaint and determine whether it is
sufficient in form and substance.
Before this [c]ourt is a [c]omplaint for Civil
Forfeiture of Assets filed by the [AMLC],
represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General[,] against Glasgow and [CSBI] as
necessary party. The [c]omplaint principally
alleges the following:
(a) Glasgow is a corporation existing under the
laws of the Philippines, with principal office
address at Unit 703, 7th Floor, Citystate Center
[Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,] Pasig
City;
(b) [CSBI] is a corporation existing under the
laws of the Philippines, with principal office at
Citystate Center Building, No. 709 Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig City;
(c) Glasgow has funds in the amount
of P21,301,430.28 deposited with [CSBI], under
CA 005-10-000121-5;
(d) As events have proved, aforestated bank
account is related to the unlawful activities of
Estafa and violation of Securities Regulation
Code;
(e) The deposit has been subject of Suspicious
Transaction Reports;
(f) After appropriate investigation, the AMLC
issued Resolutions No. 094 (dated July 10,
2002), 096 (dated July 12, 2002), 101 (dated
July 23, 2002), and 108 (dated August 2, 2002),
directing the issuance of freeze orders against
the bank accounts of Glasgow;
(g) Pursuant to said AMLC Resolutions, Freeze
Orders Nos. 008-010, 011 and 013 were issued
on different dates, addressed to the concerned
banks;
(h) The facts and circumstances plainly
showing that defendant Glasgow’s bank
account and deposit are related to the
unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code, as well as to a
money laundering offense [which] [has] been
summarized by the AMLC in its Resolution No.
094; and
(i) Because defendant Glasgow’s bank account
and deposits are related to the unlawful
activities of Estafa and violation of Securities
Regulation Code, as well as [to] money
laundering offense as aforestated, and being
the subject of covered transaction reports and
eventual freeze orders, the same should
properly be forfeited in favor of the
government in accordance with Section 12,
R.A. 9160, as amended.11
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the
veracity, of the material allegations.12 The
determination is confined to the four corners of the
complaint and nowhere else.13
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on
lack of cause of action, the question submitted
to the court for determination is the sufficiency
of the allegations made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether
those allegations of fact are true, for said
motion must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint.
The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in the complaint is whether or not, admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance
 with the prayer of the complaint.14 (emphasis
ours)
In this connection, Section 4, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 4. Contents of the petition for civil
forfeiture. - The petition for civil forfeiture shall
be verified and contain the following
allegations:
(a) The name and address of the
respondent;
(b) A description with reasonable
particularity of the monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds, and
their location; and
(c) The acts or omissions prohibited by
and the specific provisions of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act, as amended,
which are alleged to be the grounds
relied upon for the forfeiture of the
monetary instrument, property, or
proceeds; and
[(d)] The reliefs prayed for.
Here, the verified complaint of the Republic
contained the following allegations:
(a) the name and address of the primary
defendant therein, Glasgow;15
(b) a description of the proceeds of Glasgow’s
unlawful activities with particularity, as well as
the location thereof, account no. CA-005-10-
000121-5 in the amount of P21,301,430.28
maintained with CSBI;
(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific
provisions of RA 9160, as amended,
constituting the grounds for the forfeiture of
the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious
transaction reports showed that Glasgow
engaged in unlawful activities of estafa and
violation of the Securities Regulation Code
(under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA 9160, as
amended); the proceeds of the unlawful
activities were transacted and deposited with
CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5
thereby making them appear to have
originated from legitimate sources; as such,
Glasgow engaged in money laundering (under
Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the
 AMLC subjected the account to freeze order
and
(d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance
of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction and
the forfeiture of the account in favor of the
government as well as other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.
The form and substance of the Republic’s complaint
substantially conformed with Section 4, Title II of the
Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture.
Moreover, Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions. –
(a) Civil Forfeiture. – When there is a covered
transaction report made, and the court has, in
a petition filed for the purpose ordered seizure
of any monetary instrument or property, in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related
to said report, the Revised Rules of Court on
civil forfeiture shall apply.
In relation thereto, Rule 12.2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as
amended, states:
RULE 12
Forfeiture Provisions
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be
Applied. – When there is a SUSPICIOUS
TRANSACTION REPORT OR A COVERED
TRANSACTION REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS
AFTER INVESTIGATION BY THE AMLC, and the
court has, in a petition filed for the purpose,
ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, related to said report, the
Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall
apply.
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations lay down two conditions when applying
for civil forfeiture:
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction
report or a covered transaction report deemed
suspicious after investigation by the AMLC and
 (2) the court has, in a petition filed for the
purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, related to said report.
It is the preliminary seizure of the property in
question which brings it within the reach of the
judicial process.16 It is actually within the court’s
possession when it is submitted to the process of the
court.17 The injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003
removed account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 from the
effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their
representatives or agents and subjected it to the
process of the court.
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in
CSBI was (1) covered by several suspicious
transaction reports and (2) placed under the control
of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in
Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were satisfied.
Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC,
properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.
Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the
proceeds of unlawful activities is an evidentiary
matter that may be proven during trial. The
complaint, however, did not even have to show or
allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a
conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful
activities of estafa and violation of the Securities
Regulation Code.
A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a
prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture
proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an
unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil
forfeiture.
Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering. –
(a) Any person may be charged with and
convicted of both the offense of money
laundering and the unlawful activity as herein
defined.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful
activity shall be given precedence over the
prosecution of any offense or violation under
this Act without prejudice to the freezing
and other remedies provided. (emphasis
supplied)
Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:
Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering –
(a) Any person may be charged with and
convicted of both the offense of money
laundering and the unlawful activity as defined
under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful
activity shall be given precedence over the
prosecution of any offense or violation under
the AMLA without prejudice to
the application ex-parte by the AMLC to the
Court of Appeals for a freeze order with
respect to the monetary instrument or
property involved therein and resort to other
remedies provided under the AMLA, the Rules
of Court and other pertinent laws and rules.
(emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases
of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or
conviction necessary. – No prior criminal
charge, pendency of or conviction for an
unlawful activity or money laundering
offense is necessary for the
commencement or the resolution of a petition
for civil forfeiture. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or
outcome of a criminal prosecution for the unlawful
activity or for money laundering, an action for civil
forfeiture may be separately and independently
prosecuted and resolved.
There Was No Failure
To Prosecute
The trial court faulted the Republic for its alleged
failure to prosecute the case. Nothing could be more
erroneous.
Immediately after the complaint was filed, the trial
court ordered its deputy sheriff/process server to
serve summons and notice of the hearing on the
application for issuance of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The subpoena to Glasgow
was, however, returned unserved as Glasgow "could
no longer be found at its given address" and had
moved out of the building since August 1, 2002.
Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Glasgow from
removing, dissipating or disposing of the subject bank
deposits and CSBI from allowing any transaction on,
withdrawal, transfer, removal, dissipation or
disposition thereof.
As the summons on Glasgow was returned
"unserved," and considering that its whereabouts
could not be ascertained despite diligent inquiry, the
Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a)
issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court to
serve summons by publication on October 8, 2003.
While the trial court issued an alias summons in its
order dated October 15, 2003, it kept quiet on the
prayer for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004,
the trial court archived the case for failure of the
Republic to cause the service of alias summons. The
Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a)
reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court
ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed
the Republic to cause the service of
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15
days. However, it deferred its action on the
Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication until a return was made on
the alias summons.
Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts
to obtain information from other government
agencies on the whereabouts or current status of
respondent Glasgow if only to save on expenses of
publication of summons. Its efforts, however, proved
futile. The records on file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission provided no information.
Other inquiries yielded negative results.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic received a copy of the
sheriff’s return dated June 30, 2004 stating that
the alias summons had been returned "unserved" as
Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given
address since July 2002 and left no forwarding
address. Still, no action was taken by the trial court
on the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication. Thus, on August 11, 2005,
the Republic filed a manifestation and ex
parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court
to serve summons by publication.
It was at that point that Glasgow filed a motion to
dismiss by way of special appearance which the
Republic vigorously opposed. Strangely, to say the
least, the trial court issued the assailed order
granting Glasgow’s motion.
Given these circumstances, how could the Republic
be faulted for failure to prosecute the complaint for
civil forfeiture? While there was admittedly a delay in
the proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily
ascribed to the Republic. That Glasgow’s
whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only
beyond the Republic’s control, it was also
attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office
address without informing the Securities and
Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body
(like the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Department of Trade and Industry) of its new
address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the
Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve
summons by publication.
In Marahay v. Melicor,18 this Court ruled:
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground
of non prosequitur, the real test for the
exercise of such power is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of
the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the
part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
courts should decide to dispense with rather
than wield their authority to dismiss.
(emphasis supplied)
We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the
Republic to delay the disposition of the case or a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules. The trial court should not
have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republic’s complaint.
Service Of Summons
May Be By Publication
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,19 this Court declared
that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are
actions in rem. While that case involved forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle
applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as
amended, since both cases do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of
the properties either acquired illegally or related to
unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the
thing itself instead of against the person.20 In
actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over
the res.21 Nonetheless, summons must be served
upon the defendant in order to satisfy the
requirements of due process.22 For this purpose,
service may be made by publication as such mode of
service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in
rem.23
In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service. - (a) The
respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the
same manner as service of summons under Rule 14
of the Rules of Court and the following rules:
1. The notice shall be served on respondent
personally, or by any other means prescribed
in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the
case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of
action; and (iv) the relief prayed for; and
3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso
that, if no comment or opposition is filed
within the reglementary period, the court shall
hear the case ex parte and render such
judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the petition and its supporting
evidence.
(b) Where the respondent is designated
as an unknown owner or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be
effected upon him by publication of the
notice of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and
for such time as the court may order. In
the event that the cost of publication
exceeds the value or amount of the
property to be forfeited by ten percent,
publication shall not be required.
(emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
October 27, 2005 order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 03-107319 is SET
ASIDE. The August 11, 2005 motion to dismiss of
Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
is DENIED. And the complaint for forfeiture of the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-
Money Laundering Council, is REINSTATED.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 47 which shall forthwith
proceed with the case pursuant to the provisions of
A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC. Pending final determination of
the case, the November 23, 2005 temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG.
GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the
Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER
THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E.
PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO
C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR.,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our
criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once
more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not
the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a
number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the
ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it
would Beem, where season and circumstance had
more effectively conspired to attract wide public
attention and excite impassioned debate, even
among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite
the kind and range of arguments that are now
brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of
February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case
No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile
was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given
over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula
Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator
Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental
petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or
having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense
which does not exist in the statute
books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation
was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
 (c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the
strength of a warrant issued without the
judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of
probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable
March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General
filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of
Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said
return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is
putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common
crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information
against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but
not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the
Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing
another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of
the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph,
with which Hernandez was not concerned and to
which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as
scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting
Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours
from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
without prejudice to a more extended resolution on
the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon
the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members
of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator
Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the
Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they
are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition,
G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the
Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the
minority view expressed in the main
dissent of Justice Montemayor in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes, and that under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with common
offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral
argument although it is not offered in his
written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to
offenses committed in furtherance, or as
a necessary means for the commission,
of rebellion, but not to acts committed
in the course of a rebellion which also
constitute "common" crimes of grave or
less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to
make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court
voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-
examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to
warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced
by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent
President, exercising her powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among
others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former
regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect
that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of
the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of
Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are
imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the
most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it
the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted
to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be,
limited in its application to offenses committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion and
that the ruling should not be interpreted as
prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other
common crimes committed on the occasion, but not
in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the
Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not
entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they
were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be
the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed in its course under either of the
aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by
the following excerpt from the majority opinion in
that case:
There is one other reason-and a
fundamental one at that-why Article 48
of our Penal Code cannot be applied in
the case at bar. If murder were not
complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the
crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present,
but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending
upon the modifying circumstances
present. in other words, in the absence
of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of
a single aggravating circumstance. Thus,
said provision, if construed in conformity
with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was
enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which
would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished
separately. In the words of Rodriguez
Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en
los casos de concurso de
delitos a que hace
referencia este articulo (75
del Codigo de 1932), esta
basado francamente en el
principio pro reo.' (II
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this
observation refers to Article 71 (later 75)
of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932,
reading:
Las disposiciones del
articulo anterior no son
aplicables en el caso de que
un solo hecho constituya
dos o mas delitos, o cuando
el uno de ellos sea medio
necesario para cometer el
otro.
En estos casos solo se
impondra la pena
correspondiente al delito
mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que
represents la suma de las
que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente
los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi
computada exceda de este
limite, se sancionaran los
delitos por separado.
(Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain
the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition
of the penalty for the graver offense in
its maximum period to the case when it
does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence
of said limitation in our Penal Code does
not, to our mind, affect substantially the
spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there
can be no reason to inflict a punishment
graver than that prescribed for each one
of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver
offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have
had no other purpose than to prescribe
a penalty lower than the aggregate of
the penalties for each offense, if
imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes
are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than
when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must
suffer the maximum of the penalty for
the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the
sum total of the separate penalties for
each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines
the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating
to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case.
Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to
do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of
the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the
information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable
phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to
be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus,
in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the
allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein
are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for
the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information
is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH;
and that, in conformity with the policy of
this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged
with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled
that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint
having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation
was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular
or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by
the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued
the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personally determining the existence of probable
cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III,
sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of
the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of
arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes
after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said
respondent had what some might consider only a
relatively brief period within which to comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not,
or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right
to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and
of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose,
was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was
the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right
to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing
a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by
the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
Court have been invoked, and even then, not without
first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by
the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-
existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same
basis that it charges more than one offense, would
not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies.
Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the
grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
dealing with the charges against him, were originally
justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of
directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the
resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-
indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to
hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except this
Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would
justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the
hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the
reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court
against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that
the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted
of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if
it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to
correct its error. It makes no difference that the
respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest
fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply
following the prosecutor's recommendation
regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the
better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail
hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in
any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no
bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the
right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the
strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition
has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a
similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from
it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined.
The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed
to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to
avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on
the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on
jurisdictional grounds would only compound the
delay that it has already gone through, the Court now
decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said
petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started
with the trial court and reached this Court only if the
relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in
a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will
no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to,
pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the
judicial process and burden it with the resolution of
issues properly within the original competence of the
lower courts. What has thus far been stated is
equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of
the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is
virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in
factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the
same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest
issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile
in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they
appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the
afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into
custody and detained without bail on the strength of
said warrants in violation-they claim-of their
constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events,
the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency
with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of
country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not
even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in
the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores
this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless
killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem
so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated
against innocent civilians as against the military, but
by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-
called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no
exception-that not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence
that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is
an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion,
either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly
define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of
illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has
no power to effect such change, for it can only
interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and
what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing
the initiative in this matter, which is properly within
its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the
doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan
Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail,
before final conviction, as a matter of right. The
Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being
merely provisional in character, the proceedings in
both cases are ordered REMANDED to the
respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall
become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no
part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972
NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Victor Arichea for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar,
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
finds the accused Bonifacio Malana,
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set
Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre
forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
which We quote:
crime of robbery in band and sentences
Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after
the fact to suffer imprisonment of from
six (6) months, arresto mayor, as
minimum to six (6) years, prision
correccional, as maximum and to
indemnify the offended party, Ignacio
Peñaflor in the sum of P80.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency but not to exceed one-third
(1/3)of the principal penalty and the
accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario
Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from
ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1)
day, reclusion temporal, as maximum,
both to indemnify the spouses Ignacio
Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the
sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and all three to pay the
proportionate part of the costs.
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early
morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs.
Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , 47-year old
wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the owner of a
store located at the new highway,
Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a
minor call of nature, heard the barkings
of the dog nearby indicating the
presence of strangers around the
vicinity. Acting on instinct, she woke up
husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after
getting his flashlight and .38 caliber
revolver, went down the store to take a
look. As he approached the door of the
store, it suddenly gave way having been
forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men,
one of them holding and pointing a
machinegun. Confronted by this peril,
Ignacio Peñaflor fired his revolver but
missed. Upon receiving from someone a
stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell
down but he pretended to be dead. He
was hogtied by the men. The fact,
however, was that he did not lose
consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then
went up the house. One of the robbers
asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor for
money saying that they are people from
the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor ,
realizing the danger, took from under
the mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in
cash and two rings worth P350.00 and
delivered them to the robber.
Thereupon, that robber opened and
ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied
the hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor
and those of her two sons. After telling
them to lie down, the robbers covered
them with blankets and left. The
revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00,
was taken by the robbers. The spouses
thereafter called for help and Councilor
Almario, a neighbor, came and untied
Ignacio Peñaflor . The robbery was
reported to the Chief of Police of
Hermosa and to the Philippine
Constabulary.
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that
he went to the premises upon receiving
the report of Councilor Almario and
found owner Ignacio Peñaflor with a
wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The
wardrobe was ransacked and things
scattered around. It appears that the
robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of
the ground floor of the store and passed
through it to gain entrance. According to
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid, "they
removed the adobe stone and that is the
place where they passed through" (tsn.
24, I). In that same morning, policeman
 Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing
suspicious characters passing through a
nearby field and when the field was
inspected, the authorities were able to
locate a greasegun with 5 bullets and a
pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony
of Chief of Police)...
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a
criminal complaint for robbery in band was filed with
the Justice of the Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan.
Named as defendants in the complaint, as
subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis,
Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila,
alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia,
alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro,
Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana,
Anila and Casimiro having waived their right to a
preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as they
are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding
information was filed. As subsequently amended, by
the inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio
Bededia alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben
de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe, Apolinario
Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged in
said information: .
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early
morning of October 1, 1956, in the
Municipality of Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused Bonifacio Malana,
Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz,
Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel,
Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias
Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy Casimiro,
Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso,
Domingo Flores, Alias Eko and Paul Doe,
by conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, with the intent to gain and
armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3)
caliber .45 pistols and two (2) revolvers,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, entered the dwelling of
the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR and
CASIMIRA L. PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole
under the sidewall of the ground floor of
the house and once inside, attack,
assault and hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the
handle of the Grease Gun causing him to
fall on the ground and rendering him
unconscious, tied his hands and feet and
then leave him; that the same accused
 approached Casimira L. Peñaflor ,
threatened her at gun point and
demanded money; that the same
accused while inside the said house
searched and ransacked the place and
take and carry away the following cash
money and articles belonging to said
spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira L.
Peñaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash,
Philippine Currency, One (1) ring
(Brillante) valued at P350.00, One (1)
licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial
No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight,
valued at P7.00, to the damage and
prejudice of said spouses in the total
sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS, (P2,557.00)
Philippine Currency.".
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz,
Anila, Casimiro and
Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of
the testimony of the offended parties, Ignacio
Peñaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman Peñaflor ,
Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court
Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina,
Delfin Lapid, the Chief of Police of Hermosa, Bataan,
and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the Constabulary and the
affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis,
Satimbre and Malana, respectively, admitting their
participation in the commission of the crime charged.
Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery
involved in the charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon
narrated the circumstances under which the affidavit
Exhibit A was subscribed and sworn to before him by
appellant Napolis; Police Chief Lapid and Lt.
Sacramento dwelt on the investigations conducted by
them and the circumstances under which said
defendants made their aforementioned affidavits;
and Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of
Court Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and C
were subscribed and sworn to before them by
defendants Satimbre and Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an
alibi. Testifying in his own defense, he would have Us
believe that on October 1, 1956, he was in his house
in Olongapo, Zambales, because of a tooth extracted
from him by one Dr. Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own
testimony and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza.
Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the crime
charged and said that, although reluctant to sign
Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the
advice of his wife Engracia Mendoza — who sought
to corroborate him — and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas
of Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated
in a robbery that took place in Balanga, Bataan, and
that he could be sent back to his hometown,
Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first
instance of Bataan dismissed the case as against
defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis,
Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above
indicated. Said defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal,
and affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are
concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said
decision of the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis
alleges that said court has erred — .
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of
petitioner herein, of the crime charged
based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of
petitioner based upon an extra-judicial
confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court
a quo based upon the evidence on
record adduced during the trial.
IV. In deciding the case not in
accordance with the provision of law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that
appellant has not been sufficiently identified as one
of those who perpetrated the crime charged. In
support of this contention, it is argued that the
identification made by Mrs. Peñaflor was due to a
picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from the
files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then
shown to her, before he (appellant) was
apprehended and then brought to her presence for
identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peñaflor
identified him in consequence of the suggestion
resulting from the picture she had seen before he
was taken to her for said purpose. The defense
further alleges that she could not have recognized
appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence,
because the same was dark, and the flashlight used
by the malefactors was then focused downward.
Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual
basis. The record shows that the authorities were
notified immediately after the occurrence; that, soon
after, peace officers — Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt.
Sacramento — repaired to the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Peñaflor and investigated them; that based upon the
description given by Mrs. Peñaflor , one individual
was apprehended and then presented to Mrs.
Peñaflor , who said that he was not one of the
thieves; that another person subsequently arrested
and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was, similarly, exonerated
by her; that in the course of the investigation
conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt.
Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peñaflor to the offices
of the police force in Olongapo and showed her the
pictures of police characters on file therein; that
among those pictures, she noticed that of appellant
herein, who, she believed, was one of the culprits;
and that appellant was, therefore, arrested and
brought to Mrs. Peñaflor , who positively identified
him as one of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to
Mrs. Peñaflor , through the aforementioned picture
of appellant, that he was one of the thieves. It was
she who told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was
that of one of the thieves. Besides, the fact that Mrs.
Peñaflor readily exonerated the first two suspects,
arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant
herein would not have been identified by her if she
were not reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize
appellant herein because it was he who demanded
money from her and to whom she delivered P2,000
in cash and two (2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he
who opened and ransacked her wardrobe; and it was
he who tied her hands and those of her two sons.
These series of acts, performed in her presence,
consumed sufficient time — from 10 to 20 minutes
— to allow her eyesight to be adjusted to existing
conditions, and, hence, to recognize some of the
robbers. The night was dark; but, there were two
flashlights switched on, namely, that of her husband,
and the one used by the thieves. Although the latter
was, at times, focused downward, it had to be aimed,
sometimes, in another direction, particularly when
the money and rings were delivered to appellant
herein, and when he opened and ransacked the
wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor . Lastly, her testimony was
confirmed by other circumstances presently to be
mentioned, in connection with the consideration of
the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant
herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a
wrong premise — that appellant's conviction was
based upon his extra-judicial confession and that the
same had been made under duress.
Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the
factors considered by His Honor, the trial Judge, and
the Court of Appeals in concluding that the evidence
for the defense cannot be relied upon and that the
witnesses for the prosecution had told the truth.
Besides, appellant's confession was not tainted with
duress. In this connection, the Court of Appeals had
the following to say: .
Apart from the reliability of Mrs.
Casimira Lagman Peñaflor 's
identification, we have the extra-judicial
confession of appellant Nicanor Napolis,
marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to
by said accused on October 26, 1956, 25
days after the occurrence, before
Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the
64-year old prosecutor who, since July
18, 1946, was the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan up to the present. His testimony
shows that he read the confession, Exh.
A, to said accused in the Tagalog dialect;
asked him whether he understood it to
which appellant Napolis answered "yes";
inquired whether he was coerced to
which he replied "No"; and then,
required him to raise his hand in
affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the
confession in his (Fiscal's) presence.
Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon further
testified that he saw no signs of physical
violence on the person of the appellant
who appeared normal in his appearance
(tsn. 15, I). In this confession, Exh. A,
appellant Napolis related that it was co-
accused Antonio Bededia (still-at-large)
who pointed the greasegun to husband
Ignacio Peñaflor and who hit him
(Peñaflor ) on the head and that it was
co-accused Ben de la Cruz (whose case
was dismissed) who wrested Peñaflor 's
revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis
admitted that it was he who talked to
Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he
 who got the money bag. The loot,
according to him, was split from which
he received a share of P237.00 (Answer
to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he
mentioned appellant Bonifacio Malana
as the owner of the greasegun and the
one who got Peñaflor 's revolver from
the hands of co-accused Ben de la Cruz.
... .
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on
appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the
findings of fact made in said decision are final, except
—.
(1) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee. 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of
the foregoing exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the
theory that the evidence for the prosecution is
contradictory and, hence, unworthy of credence.
Counsel for the defense alleges that, whereas Ignacio
Peñaflor said that the thieves had entered his house
by forcing its door open, Mrs. Peñaflor testified that
their entry was effected through an excavation by the
side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed
that the malefactors had removed a piece of wood
and an adobe stone to get into said house. No such
contradictions, however, exist. The house of Mr. and
Mrs. Peñaflor consisted of two (2) parts, one of which
was a store and the other the dwelling proper,
adjoining the store, which had a door leading thereto
(to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor testified that
the culprits had entered the store by removing an
adobe stone from a wall thereof, and this was
corroborated by the chief of police, although he
added that the malefactors had, also, removed a
piece of wood from said wall. Upon the other hand,
the testimony of Mr. Peñaflor referred to a door,
inside the store, leading to the dwelling proper, as
distinguished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are
supported by those of His Honor, the trial Judge, who
had observed the behaviour of the witnesses during
the trial, it is clear to Us that the first three (3)
assignments of error are untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the
characterization of the crime committed and the
proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the
crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an
inhabited house, entry therein having been made by
breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing
Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, which is in accordance with said legal
provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the
malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio
Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby
infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under
conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said
article, which prescribes the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, which is lighter than that
prescribed in said Article 299, although, factually, the
crime committed is more serious than that covered
by the latter provision. This Court had previously
ruled — .
... that where robbery, though
committed in an inhabited house, is
characterized by intimidation, this factor
"supplies the controlling qualification,"
so that the law to apply is article 294 and
not article 299 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is on the theory that "robbery
which is characterized by violence or
intimidation against the person is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery
committed by force upon things,
because where violence or intimidation
against the person is present there is
greater disturbance of the order of
 society and the security of the
individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346;
People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this
view is followed even where, as in the
present case, the penalty to be applied
under article 294 is lighter than that
which would result from the application
of article 299. ... . 3
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable
to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by
breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an
inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable
effects, without violence against or intimidation upon
persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised
Penal Code with reclusion temporal.4 Pursuant to the
above view, adhered to in previous decision,5 if, aside
from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon
any person, without committing any of the crimes or
inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in
subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same
Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5)
thereof -- shall be much lighter.6 To our mind, this
result and the process of reasoning that has brought
it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against
or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling
qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said
result. We agree with the proposition that robbery
with "violence or intimidation against the person is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by
force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We
cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in
the cases above cited — reduction of the penalty for
the latter offense owing to the concurrence of
violence or intimidation which made it a more
serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to
believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with
violence against or intimidation of person takes
place without entering an inhabited house, under the
conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal
Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as
We do, when the elements of both provisions are
present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for
the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code --
of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period, which, in the case at bar,
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This
penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum
period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month
and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal — owing to the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime. In short, the doctrine
adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos7 and applied in U.S. v.
Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People v.
Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People v.
Sebastian, 12 is hereby abandoned and appellant
herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day
of prision mayor to nineteen (19) years, one (1)
month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other
respects, with costs against herein appellant, Nicanor
Napolis. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took part.
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y
ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and
Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-
appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and
attempted murder, sentencing them to death and
ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1)
Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo
S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R.
Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista
in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the
sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The
judgment of conviction was based on the following
facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married,
are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen
(or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern
Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own
lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966.
Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins,
they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a
distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila
as a laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's
three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in
Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a
letter from Leonora telling him that she would give
him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio
killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty
pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to
see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five
pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their
pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took
a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to
Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to
Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from
Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in
the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to
the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which
brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter which
Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them,
they were able to locate an employment agency
where they learned the address of the Eng Heng
Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that
store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the
agency, they proceeded to her employer's
establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos.
Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty
pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right
pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the
city. The twins returned to the agency where they ate
their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan
took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that
same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night
Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the
afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third
from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one
row of two-passenger seats and another row of
three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite
seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers
were seated side by side on the fourth three-
passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door.
Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the
window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy
was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near
the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There
were more than one hundred twenty passengers in
the coach. Some passengers were standing on the
aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were
two men and an old woman who was sleeping with
her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on
the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with
the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were
seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and
one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the
opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter
and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby.
They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train
stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought
some chicos which they put aside. The vendors
alighted when the train started moving. It was
around eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular
speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors
(Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of
him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his
seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the
sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him.
She was not able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa,
with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but
before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her
on her right hand with which she was supporting her
child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side
and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child
was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried
away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck,
stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the
coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort
who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was
taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He
was going to the dining car to drink coffee when
someone informed him that there was a stabbing
inside the coach where he had come from. He
immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9.
Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled
on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of around
nine meters, he saw a man on the platform
separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife
between the thumb and index finger of his right
hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to
the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and
a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay
down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he
would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the
knife by clutching it between his palm and little finger
(with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal
impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly
sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the
platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man
holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the
steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed
with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting
opposite her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the
train. He was in the dining car when he received the
information that there were killings in the third
coach. He immediately went there and, while at the
rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was
wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors
two women and a small girl and a woman who was
later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3).
Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were
prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter
made a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio
was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a
seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with
the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then
jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and
wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered
resistance despite the blows administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four
Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the
train and turned them over to the custody of the
Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their
names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were
turned over to the Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach
while others were picked up along the railroad tracks
between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still
alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid
treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were
brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila,
where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11).
A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of
the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose
bodies were found in the train, died from stab
wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer,
Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale,
Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper,
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa
employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper,
Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo
Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L
to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2
and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad
tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving
train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter,
Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez,
Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez,
Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper,
657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-
10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs.
X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-
Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-
Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly
died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound
inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was
first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital.
Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the
Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where
she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As
a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in
her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby
losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty
pesos. When she ran for safety with her child, she
lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos
aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag
which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary
Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,
Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary
investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal,
Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that
date, the statements of the Toling brothers were
taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel
also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the
train he was stabbed by a person "from the station"
who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by
stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed
somebody "who might have died and others that
might not". He clarified that in the train four persons
were asking money from him. He stabbed one of
them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who
wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons
because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die",
he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn
Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was
wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from
Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated
by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said
that he stabbed two persons who were demanding
money from him and who were armed with knives
and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons
died due to the stabbing, he commented that
everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the
scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back
with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly
pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to
him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed
against the Toling brothers in the municipal court of
Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through
counsel, the accused waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to
the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the
Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the
Toling brothers an information for multiple murder
(nine victims), multiple frustrated murder (six
victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who
died after jumping from the running train to avoid
being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their
counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge
Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction
already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that
the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in
the alternative, that their criminal liability was only
for two homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as
distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1
and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban
Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965,
Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for
himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out
his money from the right pocket of his pants and
later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The
two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them,
whispering among themselves and making signs. The
twins suspected that the four men harbored evil
intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men
followed them. They were facing the twins. They
were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two
passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the
window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being
to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were
suspecting of having evil intentions towards them,
sat on the seat facing them, while the other two
seated themselves behind them. Some old women
were near them. When the train was already running,
the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up,
approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at
his throat while the other man who was sitting near
the window and who was holding also
a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right
pocket, threatening him with death if he would not
hand over the money. Antonio answered that he
would give only one-half of his money provided the
man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's)
place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he
suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo
(eight inches long including the handle) from the
back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it,
causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He
also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket.
Antonio identified the two men whom he had
stabbed as those shown in the photographs of
Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A
and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second
man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed
him on the forehead, causing him to lose
consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has
two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and
left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness
when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His
money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose
stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded
his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose
was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed
also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen,
inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two
men whom he had stabbed because he was already
weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He
identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and
Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used.
He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary
soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario,
a physician of the North General Hospital who
treated them during the early hours of January 9,
1965 and who testified that he found the following
injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured),
frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-
frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial
to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS
right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest
wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on
the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left,
penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound
was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or
"about one inch from the midline to the left" (113
tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on
January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the
motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which
resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent
persons, made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that
actuated the accused to run amuck? It
appears that the accused travelled long
over land and sea spending their hard
earned money and suffering privations,
even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense
with respect to Antonio the meager sum
of P50 from his daughter and P30 from
his grandson and with respect to Jose to
receive nothing at all from any of his
three children whom he could not locate
in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are
twins, are queerly alike, a fact which
could easily invite some people to stare
or gaze at them and wonder at their very
close resemblance. Like some persons
who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by
the persons in front of them,
immediately suspected them as having
evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is
despondency on the part of the accused
coupled with their unfounded suspicion
of evil intention on the part of those
who happened to stare at them that
 broke the limit of their self-control and
actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach
No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins,
whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-
passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at,
was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-
sensory perception the twins must have sensed that
their co-passengers were talking about them in
whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes
about their humble persons. In their parochial minds,
they might have entertained the notion or suspicion
that their male companions, taking advantage of
their ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by
stealing their little money. Hence, they became
hostile to their co-passengers. Their pent-up hostility
erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to
the conclusion that the trial court and the
prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the
other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because the
twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are
"very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS
Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong
after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of
identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They
confessed that they might be mistaken in making
such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3,
1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who
is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn
statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the
killing, their own testimonies and the medical
certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the
evidence reveal that the one who was armed with
the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed
with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses
and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed
with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with
the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared
that he was armed with a knife, while Jose declared
that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio
had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he
boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because
the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was
already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom
Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to
commit suicide on the platform of the train by
stabbing himself on the chest would be Antonio (not
Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical
certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that
Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person
whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had
stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not
with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is
contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9,
Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking
Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from
their credibility. The controlling fact is that those
witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that
they stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the
summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's
decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants
Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not
particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel
each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony is
that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the
chest and apparently trying to commit suicide.
Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other
twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea
took the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by
Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was
near Jose on the platform of the train. Those
discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea
unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel
did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not
compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid
succession in the coach of the train and it was
nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea
would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140;
People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54
SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel
witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did
not observe the same events and their powers of
perception and recollection are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs.
Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her
testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a
sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat
occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's
testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports
and by the twins themselves who admitted that they
stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that
persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted
the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus
delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins,
from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their
testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel,
Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the
authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the
twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante
delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the
statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It
is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the
twins from beginning to end because everyone in
Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his
life. The ensuing commotion and confusion
prevented the passengers from having a full personal
knowledge of how the twins consummated all the
killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense
is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9,
which was lighted, it was improbable that two or
more persons could have held up the twins without
being readily perceived by the other passengers. The
twins would have made an outcry had there really
been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which
they sustained, could be attributed to the blows
which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop
their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable
only for two homicides, because they admittedly
killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and
for physical injuries because they did not deny that
Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject
that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task
of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two
yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached
manhood without coming into contact with the
mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we
exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the
evidence. We are convinced that the record
conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for
the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be
indemnified, according to the trial court, because
they died due to stab wounds, should be added the
name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2).
The omission of her name in judgment was probably
due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy
reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano,
Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo
U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries
consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and
fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to
J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving
tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they met
their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did
not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be
indemnified. As to three of them, the information
charges that the accused committed homicide. The
trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from
the train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced
by testimony showing that the proximate cause of
their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct
of the twins, then the latter would be criminally
responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended".
The presumption is that "a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec.
5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's
mind an immediate sense of danger which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he
injures himself, the person who creates such a state
of mind is responsible for the injuries which result"
(Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S.
vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person
against whom a criminal assault is directed
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death
or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps
into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation, the assailant is responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning"
(Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs.
Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the
jumping from the train of the four victims already
named precludes the imputation of criminal
responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths
of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered
by the other victims. The charge of multiple
frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by
Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and
Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed
by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs.
Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify
on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be
treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted
murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise
assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-
passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins
would act like juramentados and who were unable to
defend themselves (even if some of them might have
had weapons on their persons) was a mode of
execution that insured the consummation of the
twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-
passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they
cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or
more grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called
"concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos
formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o
mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b)
cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1
Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos",
the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de las
penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son
varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con
la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno
de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511,
January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one
attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil.
1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed
sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted
of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder
and two attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108
Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six
defendants were convicted of fourteen separate
murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where
a person who fired successively at six victims was
convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham,
15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs.
Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders;
U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil.
260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-
103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975;
People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali,
96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236;
People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49
Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by means of
separate acts were held to be complex on the theory
that they were the product of a single criminal
impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating
circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty
for murder should be imposed in its medium period
or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised
Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial
court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be
imposed on the appellants. No modifying
circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted
murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified
by setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-
appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found
guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders
and one attempted murder. Each one of them is
sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the
eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of
one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum for the attempted murder and to pay
solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs
of the seven victims named in the dispositive part of
the trial court's decision and of the eight victim,
Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of
P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa.
In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit
fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs
against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz
Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES,
RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES,
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo
City, * dated 29 August 1988, in Criminal Case No.
20092, finding him and his co-accused Reynaldo,
Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed Canasares, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery
with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal
Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:
The undersigned City Fiscal accuses
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO
CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose maternal
surnames, dated and places of birth cannot be
ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION (Art, 294, paragraph 3, in
conjunction with Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in
the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
conspiring and confederating among
themselves, working together and helping one
another, armed with guns and handgrenade
and with the use of violence or intimidation
employed on the person of Severino Choco,
Mary Choco, Mimie Choco and Rodita Hablero
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally take and carry away, with intent of
gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2)
Men's wrist watches, one (1) Lady's Seiko
quartz wrist watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen
wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued
at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by
reason of said robbery, Mary Choco suffered
serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of
Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise
suffered serious physical injuries and Reynaldo
Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that
the said accused also illegally detained, at the
compound of the New Iloilo Lumber Company,
Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco,
owner/proprietor of said Lumber Company,
Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who is a minor,
being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who
is a salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on
the occasion of the robbery, the accused also
asked and were given a ransom money of
P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended
by aggravating circumstances of band, and
illegal possession of firearms and explosives;
that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom
money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist
watches, two (2) lady's wrist watches, one (1)
.38 caliber revolver and one (1) live grenade
were recovered from the accused; to the
damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo
Lumber Company in the amount of
P120,000.00.
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as
follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four
accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon
time. The plan was hatched about two days before.
The accused were armed with homemade guns and a
hand grenade. When they entered the establishment,
they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who
was on her way out for her meal break and
announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was
made to go back to the office and there Appellant
Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco,
and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter
being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former
that all they needed was money. Hearing this,
Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag
wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00,
according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant.
Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused
to leave the premises as they already had the money
but they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino
after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita,
were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages
were allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns
eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant
told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the
other hostages could be released. Severino answered
that he could not do so because it was a Saturday
and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had
surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major
Melquiades B. Sequio Station Commander of the INP
of Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused using a
loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender with
the assurance that no harm would befall them as he
would accompany them personally to the police
station. The accused refused to surrender or to
release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City
arrived and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue
with the accused, which lasted for about four hours,
Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and
some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00
instead, explaining the difficulty of raising more as it
was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive
the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by
Mary Choco in going out of the office. When they
were out of the door, one of the accused whose face
was covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor
Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the
padlocked door and handed to Rodita the
P50,000.00, which the latter, in turn, gave to one of
the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was
herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio and even volunteer
radio newscasters continued to appeal to the
accused to surrender peacefully but they
refused.1âwphi1 UItimatums were given but the
accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and
assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls,
Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused
Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a
"macerated right lower extremity just below the
knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The
medical certificate described her condition as "in a
state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in
to the hospital and had to undergo several major
operations during the course of her confinement
from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at
about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-
accused entered the lumber yard and demanded
money from the owner Severino Choco He
demanded P100,000.00 but was given only
P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the
office of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and
his co-accused kept Severino, his daughters, and
Rodita inside the office. He maintained, however,
that he stopped his co-accused from getting the
wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the
P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were
never touched by them. He claimed further that they
had never fired on the military because they
intended to surrender. Appellant's version also was
that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood up
and went outside; he wanted to stop her but he
himself was hit by a bullet and could not prevent her.
Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them
to surrender but that they gave themselves up only
much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of
conviction and sentenced each of the accused "to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the
costs."
Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on
the following Assignments of Error:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the
crime charged was consummated and in not
holding that the same was merely attempted.
2. The lower court erred in not appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender."
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that "The complete crime of
larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an
attempt requires asportation or carrying away, in
addition to the taking, In other words, the crime of
robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the
giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or
asportation And without asportation the crime
committed is only attempted" (Memorandum for
Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required
that there be a taking of personal property belonging
to another. This is known as the element of
asportation the essence of which is the taking of a
thing out of the possession of the owner without his
privity and consent and without the animus
revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p.
97, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no actual
taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of
personal property of another is an essential part of
the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been
proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because
neither he nor his three co-accused touched the
P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or
watch during the entire incident; proof of which is
that none of those items were recovered from their
persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the
evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified
that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put
P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently
handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor
Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the
amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the
padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the
amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was,
therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp.
12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and the
wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and
control of the Appellant and his co-accused and
completed the taking.
The State established a "taking" sufficient to
support a conviction of robbery even though
the perpetrators were interrupted by police
and so did not pick up the money offered by the
victim, where the defendant and an
accomplice, armed with a knife and a club
respectively, had demanded the money from
the female clerk of a convenience store, and
the clerk had complied with their instructions
and placed money from the register in a paper
bag and then placed the bag on the counter in
front of the two men; these actions brought
the money within the dominion and control of
 defendant and completed the taking. (Johnson
vs. State, 432 So 2d 758).
"Severance of the goods from the possession
of the owner and absolute control of the
property by the taker, even for an
instant, constitutes asportation (Adams vs.
Commonwealth, 154 SW 381; State vs. Murray,
280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs. Commonwealth,
105 SE 2d 149) [Emphasis supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-
accused had no opportunity to dispose of the
personalities taken. That fact does not affect the
nature of the crime, From the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had
no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful
taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code
Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
The crime is consummated when the robber
acquires possession of the property, even if for
a short time, and it is not necessary that the
property be taken into the hands of the
robber, or that he should have actually carried
the property away, out of the physical
presence of the lawful possessor, or that he
should have made his escape with it" (People
vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220
SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504;
People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a
conviction for consummated and not merely
attempted Robbery is in order.
It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not
have seen the taking because the place was dark
since the doors were closed and there were no
windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita
was one of the hostages herself and could observe
the unfolding of events. Her failure to mention the
taking in her sworn statement would not militate
against her credibility, it being settled that an
affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate
and does not disclose the complete facts for want of
inquiries or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No.
L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan,
et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of
Severino would not lessen her credibility. The
defense has not proven that she was actuated by any
improper motive in testifying against the accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers
around the credibility of witnesses in respect of
which the findings of the Trial Court are entitled to
great weight as it was in a superior position to assess
the same in the course of the trial (see People vs.
Ornoza G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA
495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June
1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the
"surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused
cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate their
liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the
following requisites: (a) that the offender had not
been actually arrested; (b) that the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his
agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary
(People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-62043, 13 August
1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused
hardly meets these requirements. They were, indeed,
asked to surrender by the police and military
authorities but they refused until only much later
when they could no longer do otherwise by force of
circumstances when they knew they were completely
surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The
surrender of the accused was held not to be
mitigating as when he gave up only after he was
surrounded by the constabulary and police forces
(People vs. Sigayan et al., G.R. Nos. L-18523-26, 30
April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg G.R. No.
L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their
surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated
more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it
is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is
that they did not despite several opportunities to do
so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of
(People vs. Dimdiman 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated
and we find the guilt of the accused-appellant,
Bienvenido Salvilla, established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it
necessary to turn now to the nature of the linked
offenses involved and the penalty imposed by the
Trial Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the
Information with "Robbery with Serious Physical
Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par.
3, in conjunction with Art. 267, RPC )and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court
that a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code has been committed such that the
penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal
Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or
"reclusion perpetua to death," is to be imposed
instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with
Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which
is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the
other." The term "necessary means" does not
connote indispensable means for if it did then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another
would be an indispensable element of the latter and
would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase
"necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of
the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987
ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of
Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary
means" as it was selected by Appellant and his co-
accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively
their evil design to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs.
Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149
SCRA 325) where the accused were convicted of
Robbery but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal
Detention and where it was held that "the detention
is absorbed in the crime of robbery." For one,
in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations
filed, one for Robbery and another for Serious Illegal
Detention. In the present case, only one Information
was filed charging the complex offense. For another,
in Astor, the robbery had already been consummated
and the detention was merely to forestall the capture
of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case,
where the detention was availed of as a means of
insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further,
in Astor, the detention was only incidental to the
main crime of robbery so that it was held therein:
. . . were appellants themselves not trapped by
the early arrival of the police at the scene of
the crime, they would have not anymore
detained the people inside since they have
already completed their job. Obviously,
appellants were left with no choice but to
resort to detention of these people as security,
until arrangements for their safe passage were
made. This is not the crime of illegal detention
 punishable under the penal laws but an act of
restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the
criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9
Phil. 265; People v. Uday 55 Phil. 167, cited in
the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976
ed., p. 1337). Where the victims in a robbery
case were detained in the course of robbery,
the detention is absorbed by the crime of
robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In the
case at bar, the detention was only incidental
to the main crime of robbery, and although in
the course thereof women and children were
also held, that threats to kill were made, the
act should not be considered as a separate
offense. Appellants should only be held guilty
of robbery.
In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not
only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary
means to commit the same.1âwphi1 After the
amount of P20,000.00 was handed to Appellant, the
latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The
victims were then taken as hostages and the demand
to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a
prerequisite for their release. The detention was not
because the accused were trapped by the police nor
were the victims held as security against the latter.
The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to
enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a
means of extortion for an additional amount. The
police and other authorities arrived only much later
after several hours of detention had already passed.
And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused
to surrender, they adamantly refused until the
amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be
turned over to them. They even considered
P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as
inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from
those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the
restraint was for no other purpose than to prevent
the victims from reporting the crime to the
authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085
[1953] where the victims were taken to a place one
kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the
witnesses to the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92
Phil. 1008 [1953]; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167
[1922], all of which cases were cited in Astor and
where the victims were only incidentally detained so
that the detention was deemed absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the
elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention
are present in this case. The victims were illegally
deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and
Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified
circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those
detained. The continuing detention was also for the
purpose of extorting ransom, another listed
circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.) not only from
the detained persons themselves but even from the
authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was
not merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary
means employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed
by the Trial Court is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-75390 March 25, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DANILO VALDEZ and SINIPLICIO ORODIO alias
"Kamlon", appellants.
FELICIANO, J.:
This case is before us on automatic review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union,
convicting the accused-appellants Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio of the crime of murder and
sentencing each of them to death.
The accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio were
charged in an information which read as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of June,
1977, in the Municipality of Santol,
Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually
aiding one another, armed with a fire
arm, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with deliberate intent
to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shoot Eleno
Maquiling inflicting upon him a gunshot
wound which caused the victim's
instantaneous death.
 That the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime was present in the
commission of the crime. Contrary to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
After arraignment and trial, the trial court rendered
in due course, on 27 June 1986, a decision finding
both of the accused guilty of murder. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
this Court finds the accused Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias
'Kamlon' guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and judgment is
hereby rendered imposing upon each of
them the Capital penalty of death; to
indemnify the heirs of Eleno Maquiling
the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the
expenses in the sum of P3,000.00 to said
heirs, and to pay the costs.
The bail bonds posted by the accused for
their provisional liberty are hereby
cancelled and their immediate arrest
ordered.
The accused-appellants argue that the trial court
erred in the following respects:
1) That the evidence of the prosecution
does not establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt; and
2) That the evidence of the prosecution
is based simply on suspicion.
We will address these arguments together.
From the record, the facts of the case may be
collated as follows:
The house of the Maquiling family stands on the
slope of a mountain in Barangay Ambagat, Santol, La
Union. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 7 June
1977, the victim Eleno Maquiling, his sisters Leticia
and Thelma, his mother Esmenia, and his father
Juanito were an in the yard of their house. Esmenia
and Juanito were under the awning of their house
facing north, engaged in stringing together tobacco
leaves. The victim's brother Dionisio was eating his
dinner in the wall-less kitchen located on the ground
floor of the house. The victim Eleno was seated with
his back toward the north and plucking a guitar. The
place and its surroundings were lighted by a 300
candle power petromax lamp hanging under the
northern end of the awning of the house. 1
While the Maquilings were thus seated in their yard,
a relative of the family, one Carolina, arrived and
asked Esmenia to accompany her to a prayer
meeting. Esmenia demurred and instead asked Eleno
to accompany Carolina. The victim was then just
about two (2) meters away from his parents and
about to stand up when suddenly a very loud gun
shot rang out from the northern side of the yard and
Eleno fell to the ground, crying out to his father for
help. Juanita rushed to his fallen son and carried him
into their house; Eleno, however, died immediately
thereafter.
The victim's mother Esmenia was about to succour
Eleno when she instinctively looked toward the
direction from whence the gunshot came and saw
the two (2) accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio, running down the hill away from the bamboo
groves on the northern side of the house. According
to Esmenia, the accused Danilo was wearing a blue
shirt and dark pants and carrying a long firearm,
while the other accused Simplicio was running along
side the former. Dionisio Maquiling, brother of the
victim, also testified that he too had seen Danilo with
a gun and Simplicio both running away in a westernly
direction. Danilo stated that he was then about seven
(7) meters away from the accused-
appellants. 2 Danilo Valdez was a neighbor and a
relative of the Maquilings, while Simplicio Orodio was
their old accquaintance residing in Sitio Village,
Barangay Corooy of the same town; thus, both were
well-known to Esmenia and Dionisio Maquiling.
On 8 June 1977, the Municipal Health Officer of
Balaoan, Dr. Monico O. Morales, conducted an
autopsy which showed that the victim Eleno had
sustained eight (8) gunshot (pellet) wounds on his
back:
1. Wound, gunshot, ½; inch longest dia.,
1 cm. below base of neck, medial, pellet
plowed slightly upward and found its
exist at the lower 3rd of neck, left,
measuring 3/4 inch longest diameter.
(Thru and thru).
2. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia
medial, 1 inch lateral to vertebral
column, right, pellet plowed upward and
found its exit at the base of neck, left,
measuring ¾ longest diameter. (Thru
and thru).
3. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia
level of 4th intercostal space, back, right,
penetrating the chest cavity, pellet was
recovered at the upper lobe of right
lung.
4. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 1
inch above armpit, back, right, pellet
plowed slightly upwards and to left.
Pellet was not recovered.
5. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia
8th intercostal space, back, right, 1 inch
lateral to the vertebral column, pellet
penetrated check cavity hitting lower
lobe of lungs, right. Pellet was not
recovered.
6. Wound, gunshot ½ inch longest dia
medial, back, left, level of 8th intercostal
space, hitting the lower lobe, lung, left.
Pellet was not recovered.
7. Wound, gunshot. ½ inch longest dia
chest, back medial, left, (Level of 9th
interspace), penetrating chest cavity
hitting lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet was
not recovered.
8. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia
postero-lateral, back, I inch below lowest
rib of chest, right. Pellet was recovered
at the abdominal wall, hypochondic
region, front, right. Two (2) pellets were
given to Chief of Police, Segundo
Tuvera. 3
The morning after the shooting, on 8 June 1977, Sgt.
Segundo Tuvera of the Integrated National Police,
Santol, La Union, went to the house of the Maquilings
to investigate the death of Eleno. 4 He saw a
petromax lamp hanging from the awning of the
northern end of the house, as well as footprints near
the bamboo groves near the northern side of the
house. During his investigation, neither Esmenia nor
Dionisio informed Sgt. Tuvera of what they had seen.
On 10 June 1977, Juanito Maquiling, the victim's
father, executed a sworn statement before the police
in the Santol Police Substation. Juanita admitted in
his statement that he had not seen the accused-
appellants on the night of the shooting. He did relate,
however, that three (3) days prior to the shooting of Q. When you heard that
Eleno, Eleno had informed him that in case gunshot, what did you do?
something untoward happened to him (Eleno), the
accused-appellants Danio Valdez and Simplicio A. We immediately rushed
Orodio should be held responsible, since he (Eleno) to his side and we found
had quarrelled with them concerning their stealing him on the ground, sir.
and robbing. 5 Juanita further, stated that the
accused Danilo has had a personal grudge against Q. From what direction did
Eleno; Danilo had mortgaged to Eleno's brother a you hear the gunshot?
stolen spading fork, a circumstance that Eleno
A. North of our yard, sir.
discovered when the real owner of the spading fork
came to talk to him. Esmenia, Eleno's mother, gave Q. When you went to the
no sworn statement on that day. Ten (10) days later, succour of your son, what
on 20 June 1977, however, she made a sworn else did you do?
statement to the Philippine Constabulary in San
Fernando, La Union. Shortly thereafter, on 23 June A. When I went, to give
1977, Dionisio Maquiling, Eleno's brother, gave his succour to my son, I turned
own separate sworn statement also to the Philippine and I saw these two, sir,
Constabulary. Both Esmenia and Dionisio Identified
Danilo Orodio as Eleno's killers. 6 Q. Where did you see the
two accused?
At the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and
categorical in Identifying the appellants as the men A. North of our yard, sir.
she saw running from the bamboo groves
immediately after the shooting — Q. How far were they from
you when you saw them?
A. Witness indicating a
distance of more or less five
meters.
Q. When you saw the two
accused, did you see
anything in their
possession?
A. They have, sir, (Witness
indicating a length of about
a foot), and it was Danilo
Valdez who was holding
that object.
Q. Were you able to
recognize that object which
Danilo Valdez was then
holding?
A. It was a gun, sir.
Q. When you saw Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
north of your yard, what
were they doing?
A. I saw Danilo Valdez
holding the gun while
Simplicio Orodio ran
downhill and then Danilo
Valdez followed, sir.
Q. You Id that you saw
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio north of your yard.
In relation to the place
where you heard the
gunshot, where were they?
A. Near the bamboo grove
which is located north of
our house, sir?
Q. In relation to that
bamboo grove where you
heard the gunshot, where
were Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio at the time
you saw them?
A. They were east of the
bamboo grove, sir.
Q. How far were they from
that bamboo grove?
A. Witness referring to a
distance of about 6 to 6-½
meters away.
COURT:
Q. How far were you from
the accused when you
recognized them?
A. Less than a meter away
when I recognized them, sir.
FISCAL:
Q. You Id that the distance
between you and the two
accused at the time you saw
them was five meters more
or less. Upon questioning of
the court, you Id that the
distance is less than a
meter. Which is true?
A. Witness pointing to a
distance of more or less five
meters.
Q. How were you able to
recognize the two accused
at that distance of five
meters from you
considering that it was
nighttime?
A. There was a light from
the petromax lamp which
was hanging [from] the
awning of our house, sir.
Q. That part of the house
where this awning is
located, is there a wall
surrounding the awning?
A. None, sir.
Q. That petromax lamp
which you said was hanging
under the awning of your
house, how high is the
petromax light from the
ground level?
A. The height is 12 feet, sir.
Q. How big was the
petromax light?
7
A. About two feet, sir.
Esmenia's testimony was
corroborated by the equally
definite testimony of
Dionisio Maquiling, who
declared that:
Q. Where were you at the
time your brother was shot
to death?
A. I was in our kitchen
eating.
Q. Where was your brother
then at the time he was
shot in relation to your
house?
A. He was west of our
kitchen.
Q. In what particular part of
your house, inside or
outside?
A. Outside of our house.
Q. What time was your
brother shot to death?
A. More or less 8 o'clock in
the evening.
Q. You said you were in the
kitchen of your house
eating and you Pointed to
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio alias "Kamlon" as
the persons who shot your
brother. How were you able
to see Simplicio Orodio and
Danilo Valdez shoot your
brother?
A. I saw them.
Q. Will you relate how were
you able to see Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
alias Kamlon shoot your
brother Eleno Maquiling?
A. When I was eating facing
westward I heard a gunshot
and when I looked through
the north I saw Danilo
Valdez running being
followed by Simplicio
Orodio.
Q. When you looked
northward and you saw
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio running, did you see
anything in their
possession?
A. A gun. (Witness showing
a length of about half a
meter).
Q. Who of the two, Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
was hiding the gun?
A. Danilo Valdez. 8
The trial court found the testimony of witnesses
Esmenia and Dionisio as positive, credible and
reliable. We find no reason to disagree with the
finding of the trial court. It is commonplace that "the
findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the
witnesses are to be given great weight and a high
degree of respect by the appellate court". 9 There is
nothing in the record to show that the prosecution
witnesses were moved by any improper motive to
accuse falsely the accused-appellant — one a relative
and the other an old acquaintance — of so grave a
crime as murder.
The circumstance that Esmenia waited for thirteen
(13) days after her son's assassination before
reporting the Identities of the accused to the
authorities, was not unnatural in itself. She explained
the delay by saying that she was afraid to talk about
the killing and that she had seen the accused loitering
frequently around the Maquilings' house, carrying a
gun, after the burial of her son.10 The trial court
observed that Esmenia's fear —
was not imaginary because the night
that she reported the Identities of the
 accused their house was stoned by
unidentified persons. The delay was
satisfactorily explained. In People vs.
Martinez, 127 SCRA 260, it was held that
delay of witness for several months,
because of fear, in reporting the incident
to the police does not affect credibility.
"Fear of likely retaliation by the several
accused who were still at large has been
considered as a justified reason for the
witnesses' delay in coming forward with
their testimony' (People vs. Sampang, 16
SCRA 531; People vs. Equal, 14 SCRA
89). 11
This explanation does not appear incredible in itself
and certainly such a delay of thirteen(13)days, under
the circumstances of this case, does not warrant a
conclusion that her testimony as to the Identities of
the killers of her son was false. In People v.
Martinez, 12 the Court held that the failure of a
witness to reveal immediately the Identities of the
accused does not militate against his credibility.
Both Esmenia Maquiling and Dionisio Maquiling did
not testify that they had actually seen either Danilo
Valdez or Simplicio Orodio shooting at the deceased
victim. The principal evidence against the accused is,
therefore, circumstantial in character. The trial court
recognized this and was careful to analyze the chain
of circumstantial evidence on the basis of which the
trial court concluded that the two (2) accused had
killed Eleno Maquiling:
While the prosecution failed to present
an eye witness to the actual shooting by
the accused of deceased Eleno, the chain
of circumstances, prior and subsequent
to the killing, leaves no room for doubt
that accused are the guilty persons. The
rule is that before conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused as the authors of the
crime. (People vs. Pamintuan, 127 SCRA
820). In this case, this requisite has been
fully met.
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE, WHEN
SUFFICIENT. —
Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one
circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all
the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tested by the rule stated above, and
considering that Eleno was killed by a
shot in the back and suffered eight (8)
pellet wounds from one gunshot only;
that the accused were immediately seen
running down-hill away from the scene
In his brief, the Solicitor General took the position
after the gunshot report with
that accused-appellant Simplicio Orodio should be
accused Danilo v. Valdez carrying a long
acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain
firearm; that three (3) days before the
incident there was already bad blood
between the victim and accused Danilo
Valdez as the victim confided to his
father Juanito Maquiling that if ever he
would be shot accused Danilo Valdez is
the one to be blamed; 13 that when the
place where the clime was committed is
an isolated place and it is highly
probable that some other malefactors
could have been present; and that
footprints were seen by the police
investigators behind the bamboo grove
where the accused were seen to come
from immediately after the shooting that
Esmenia Maquiling even described the
clothing of accused Danilo Valdez; that
the two accused are well known to the
victim's family thereby precluding the
possibility of mistaken Identity; all these
proven facts afford sufficient or a
reasonable inference that the two
accused were indeed the killers of the
victim. 14
this conviction either as a principal or an accomplice.
The Solicitor General said:
In the case at bar, the information
charged Orodio as having allegedly
conspired with Valdez in killing Eleno.
The prosecution did not however adduce
any evidence establishing the aforesaid
alleged conspiracy between Valdez and
Orodio to commit the crime charged.
The only fact that the prosecution was
able to successfully prove was the
presence of Orodio at the crime scene
when he was seen running together with
Valdez by Dionisio and Esmenia after
Eleno was gunned down and that he was
a barkada of Eleno. It is submitted that
in the light of the aforecited ruling in the
Madera case, there exist no factual and
legal basis to sustain the conviction of
Orodio either as a principal or
accomplice in this case. 15
We are unable to agree with the Solicitor General,
whose view appears to be too drastic a simplification
of the evidence that was in fact before the trial court.
Orodio was present with Valdez at the time Eleno
Maquiling was killed by a shotgun blast at his back.
He was in the company of a man running with a
shotgun, at approximately 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, immediately after the fatal shooting, just
outside the Maquilings house where he had no
business being if he were not acting in concert with
Danilo Valdez, the accused-appellant who carried the
shotgun. He was a close friend (barkada) of the
accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the deceased
victim had Identified as probably responsible should
any untoward event befall the victim. Simplicio
Orodio completely failed to explain what he was
doing with Danilo Valdez the night of the killing, on
the one hand. Upon the other, both Danilo Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Valdez
and Orodio both testified that they were in
Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, when Eleno was shot to death.
Their common alibi remained uncorroborated for
both failed to present either the mother of accused
Danilo Valdez who was supposed to have come to
Cervantes Ilocos Sur, to inform them that Eleno
Maquiling had been shot to death, or any other
witness for that matter. The trial court found the
accused common defense of alibi as non-credible "as
it was not impossible for the accused to be present at
the scene of the crime. 16
We hold that the prosecution's evidence was more
than adequate to sustain the finding of the trial court
of a conspiracy between Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio. Conspiracy being present, it does not matter
that the prosecution had failed to show who as
between the two actually pulled the trigger of the
shotgun that killed Eleno Maquiling. 17 Both Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-
conspirators since any act of a co- conspirator
becomes the act of the other regardless of the
precise degree of participation in the act. 18
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of
treachery and evident premeditation. The accused
had purposely sought nocturnity and hid themselves
behind the bamboo groves located close by the
victim's house and had fired at Eleno Maquiling
suddenly, without any warning, from behind
obviously to ensure the success of their deadly
purpose without any risk to themselves and without
any possibility of retaliation. Three (3) days before his
assassination, Eleno was already apprehensive for his
life when he disclosed to his father, Juanito
Maquiling, his quarrel with Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio over the latter's thievery and
robbery. Clearly, the accused had planned to kill
Eleno some days before the fateful night of 7 June
1977; the shotgun blast at the back of Eleno was not
the result of a spur of the moment decision.
Since both treachery and evident premeditation were
present, and only one (1) qualifying circumstance is
necessary to constitute homicide into murder,
evident premeditation may be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance. 19 The
circumstance of nighttime is, however, absorbed by
treachery. 20 A second aggravating circumstance —
that the victim who had given no provocation was
slain in his dwelling — was also found by the trial
court. 21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the trial court finding Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the
abolition of capital punishment under the 1987
Constitution, and in view of the presence of two (2)
aggravating circumstances not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the applicable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.
Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente
de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente Magat's
house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and
without violence or intimidation against persons nor
force upon things, took, with intent to gain, two
game roosters which were in the yard, one with
colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego
Magat, and the other with white plumage and black
spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the
municipal court for two crimes of theft, on the theft
of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'.
Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty
and was sentenced by the municipal court in each to
suffer the penalty of three years, six months and one
day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters
to their respective owners and to pay the costs in
both cases. The accused appealed from this judgment
to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being
arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not
guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly by
agreement of the parties approved by the court.
In view of the evidence, the trial court found the
accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the
theft of the two roosters constituted but one crime,
and taking into consideration the circumstance that
the accused is an habitual delinquent sentenced him
in said two cases to the penalty of three years, six
moths and one day presidio correccional and to pay
the costs in case R. G. No. 25375, declaring the costs
in case No. 25376, de oficio without the obligation to
indemnify, as the roosters were returned to their
respective owners. The accused appealed to this
court and his counsel alleges that the trial court
erred: (a) In holding that the guilt of the accused was
proven by his own admission; (b) in not giving him
the benefit of reasonable doubt, and (c) in sentencing
instead of acquitting the accused, with the costs de
oficio.
We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds
to support the contention of the appellant. We are of
the opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the accused
in the present case is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The case falls under the provisions of
paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Penal Code,
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3244, in connection
with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code. The
penalty provided in the law is that of presidio
correcional in its full extent, and there having been
present the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity,
the penalty must be imposed upon the accused in its
maximum degree, or four years, two moths and one
day presidio correcional. The accused being an
habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an
additional penalty must be imposed upon him
consisting of half the penalty provided or the crime
committed, or 2 years and 1 month presidio
correcional. (People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728;
People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753 1).
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General
raises a question in his brief which we believe it is
necessary for us to resolve now, due to the fact that
it is not only important to our jurisprudence, but also
to the due prosecution of violators of the law. The
Attorney-General urges that the penalty for two
crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for
each of the stolen roosters. The question, then, to
determine is whether or not the fact that the
accused, with intent to gain, on the same occasion
and in the same place, took the two roosters, one
belonging to Vicente Magat and the other to Ignacio
Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.
It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal
Code contains three paragraphs enumerating the
acts which constitute the crime of theft. The first
defines theft in general; the second declares a
particular act to be theft which is not included in the
description in the first paragraph, and the third also
considers theft a series of acts with similar
characteristics to the general type, with the
exceptions therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 517. The following are guilty of
theft: 1awph!l.net
1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but
without the use of violence or intimidation
 against any person or the use of force upon
anything, shall take anything which is the
personal property of another without the
latter's consent.
2. Any person who, having found anything
which has been lost, shall with knowledge of
its ownership appropriate the same with of
gain.
3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who
shall remove or make use of the things
damaged, subject to the exceptions
established by paragraphs one two, and three
of article five hundred and ninety-two
paragraph one of article five hundred and
ninety-three; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-five, and articles five
hundred and ninety-six, five hundred and
ninety-eight, and six hundred and three.
As may be seen, the act taking another's property
without violence or intimidation against persons, not
force upon things, with intent to gain and without
the consent of its owner, is what constitutes the
crime of theft, as described in the first paragraph of
article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal
property and what is punished is the alarm caused in
the community by the perpetration of the act which
is violative of the individual rights guaranteed by the
law, as well as the damage that said act may occasion
to the members of the community. Under sound
principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal
purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being
modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons.
There is no series of acts here for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only one
of which was consummated, and which determines
the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the
roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent
existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13,
1894, said:
The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two
cows and two calves on one night, belonging to
four owners, which livestock was found in
 various adjacent and open meadows,
constitutes only one crime of theft, because
the fact that the persons injured by the taking
of the cattle by the accused were several, said
accused knowing that the meadows in which
this livestock was found were open and
adjacent, it being easy to pass from one to the
other, does not authorize the legal conception
that the said accused committed four thefts on
said night, but only one as found by the lower
court, which did not commit an error of law by
holding that the acts were committed on a
single occasion.
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the
culprit know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime
being consummated provided that being stolen
belongs to another and the same is taken with intent
to gain. (Decision of the supreme Court of Spain of
November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for the
existence of the crime of theft that it should appear
in a specific manner who the owner is of the thing
stolen, because the law does not require it nor does
it affect the criminal liability, but only the restitution
or indemnification of damages, which are merely of a
civil nature. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain,
October 4, 1905.) What constitutes the crime of theft
is the taking of another's property with intent to gain,
without the consent of the owner, so that after the
unlawful act of taking another's property is proven, it
is evident that all the elements mentioned in the first
paragraph of article 517 of the Penal Code exist.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the
intention to take a thing belonging to another on one
occasion and in the same place, constitutes the
commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that
the things taken belong to different persons does not
produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be
punished separately.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of
the doctrine laid down in United States vs. Balaba (37
Phil., 260), according to which, where the accused
made no objection to the information on the ground
that it charged more than one offense, the
prosecution properly submitted evidence as to the
commission of each and all of the offenses charged;
and the trial court also properly entered judgment of
conviction of each and all of these offenses which
were established by the introduction of competent
evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have
imposed the prescribed penalties for each and all of
the offenses of which the accused was convicted in
accordance with the provisions of article 87 of the
Penal Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable
to the present case as two separate complaints have
been filed herein against the accused, but the trial
court convicted the accused in the two cases,
considering the facts alleged in the said complaints as
constituting but one crime.
In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as
in Spanish decisions in regard to the question which
is here debated:
In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard
to the taking of articles belonging to two different
owners at the same time and place: "In a few
jurisdictions the rule obtains that if two or more
articles belonging to different are stolen at the same
time and place, the theft of the property of each
owner is a separate crime and may be prosecuted as
such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5
Cranch C. C., 412; State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382;
Morton vs. State, 1 Lea [Tenn.], 498.) In other
jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be
prosecuted, at the pleasure of the State, either as
one offense or as several distinct offenses.
(Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass., 507; Com. vs. Sullivan,
104 Mass., 552; State vs. Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65
Pac., 802; 99 Am. St., 688; State vs. Lambert, 9 Nev.,
321.) But the prevailing rule is that if several articles,
stored in the same place, are taken by a single
larcenous act, the mere fact that some of them
belonged to one person and some to another does
not dissolve the act into separate crimes. (Ala.-
Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; Am. St.,
17; D. C.-Chanock vs. U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed.,
612; Holies vs. U. S., 10 D. C., 370; 36 Am. Rep., 106;
Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171; Dean vs. State, 9 Ga.
A., 571; 71 South East, 932; III.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 III.,
284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.-Furnace vs. State, 153
Ind.-93; 54 North East, 441; Bell vs. State 42 Ins., 335;
Iowa-State vs. Sampson, 157 Iowa, 257; 138 North
West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N. S.], 967;
State vs. Congrove, 109 Iowa., 66; 80 North West,
227; State vs. Larson, 85 Iowa, 659; 52 North West,
539; Ky.-Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-
State vs. Warren, 77 Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39
Am. St., 401; Mich.-Peo. vs. Johnson, 81 Mich., 573;
45 North West, 1119; Miss.-State vs. Quintini, 51 So.,
276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44 So., 802; 124
Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90 Miss., 249; 43 So.,
466; Mo.-State vs. Morphin, 37 Mo., 373;
Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37 Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-
State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont., 490; 75 Pac., 87; N. H.-
State vs. Merril, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner,
19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac., 679; Ann. Cas. 1917-D, 824;
N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh-
State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh. St., 339, 13 Am. Rep.,
253; State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23
Cinc- LBul., 85; Or.-State vs. Clark, 46 Or., 140; 80
Pac., 101; Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503;
Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa. Dist., 884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer,
17 S. D., 67; 95 North West, 289; Tex.-
Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602;
Hudson vs. State, 9 Tex. A., 151, 35 Am. Rep., 732;
Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23
Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs. Blay, 77 Vt., 56;
58 Atl. Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl.
Rep., 432; 54 Am. St., 878; State vs. Newton, 42 Vt.,
537; Va.-Alexander vs. Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South
East, 782; Wash.-State vs. Laws, 61 Wash., 533; 112
Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac., 33;
Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189; Wyo.-
Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.-
Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K., 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must
be, as is hereby, modified and the accused Vicente de
Leon y Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
years and three months presidio mayor, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez
and Villa-Real., JJ., concur.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.
REPUBLIC ACT No 4103
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE HUNDRED NINETY
OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE.
Section 1. Section one hundred and ninety of
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and
sixty-six, as amended, is further amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 190. Compensating tax. On the commodities
goods, wares or merchandise purchased or received
by persons residing or doing business in the
Philippine, there shall be paid a compensating tax on
the total value thereof, including freight, postage,
insurance, commission and similar charges,
equivalent to the percentage taxes imposed under
this Title on original transactions effected by
merchants, importers, or manufacturers, such tax to
be paid before the withdrawal or removal of said
commodities, goods, wares or merchandise from the
customhouse or the post office, except as follows:
(a) Articles subject to specific taxes under Title
IV of this Code and articles to be used by the
importer himself in the manufacture or
preparation of articles subject to specific taxes;
"(b) Commodities, goods, wares or
merchandise purchased or received by
merchants, importers and manufacturers who
are subject to tax under Section one hundred
eighty-four, one hundred eighty-five, one
hundred eighty-six or one hundred eighty-nine
of this Title, where such importations are to be
sold, resold, bartered or exchanged or are to
be used in the manufacture or preparation of
articles for sale, barter, or exchange and are to
form part thereof;
"(c) Articles to be used by the importer himself
in the manufacture or preparation of articles
for consignment abroad;
"(d) Articles to be used by the importer himself
as a passenger and/or cargo vessel whether
coastwise or ocean-going, including engines
and spare parts of said vessel;
"(e) Wearing apparel and articles for personal
use purchased in foreign countries by residents
of the Philippines which have been used
abroad and accompanying them upon their
return to the Philippines the export value of
which does not exceed the amount of:
"P250 when the sojourn is not less than one
week;
"P500 when the sojourn is not less than two
weeks; or
"P1,000 when the sojourn is not less than one
month.
"Personal and household effects purchased in
foreign countries and brought into the
Philippines by returning residents which effects
have been used abroad, neither imported for
the account of any other person nor intended
for barter, sale or hire and accompanying them
upon their return to the Philippines or arriving
within ninety days before or after their return,
the export value of which does not exceed the
amount of:
"P1,500 when the sojourn is not less than
three months;
"P2,500 when the sojourn is not less than six
months; or
"P3,000 when the sojourn is not less than one
year.
"Additional exemption shall be granted for
books, professional instruments and
implements belonging to Filipino professionals,
students and grantees of fellowships and
scholarships returning to the Philippines from
training, studies and/or employment abroad,
the export value of which does not exceed the
amount of one thousand pesos: Provided, That
an additional exemption shall be granted to
returning Filipino Doctors of Medicine and
Dentistry and other scientists for professional
instruments and implements related to their
particular field of specialization as attested to
by the respective institutions of training,
studies and/or employment, the export value
of which does not exceed three thousand
pesos: Provided, further, That returning
Filipino professionals, students and grantees of
fellowships and scholarship, shall present to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a
certificate issued by the schools they have
attended: Provided, finally, That such returning
residents shall not have previously received
the benefits herein granted within one
hundred and eighty days immediately
preceding their arrival.
"(f) Professional instruments and implements,
tools of trade, occupation or employment,
wearing apparel, domestic animals, and
personal and household effects belonging to
persons coming to settle for the first time in
the Philippines, including citizens of the
Philippines who have resided abroad for not
less than ten years, for their own use and not
for barter, sale or exchange, accompanying
such persons, or arriving within ninety days
before or after the arrival of their owners,
upon the production of evidence satisfactory
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
such persons are actually coming to settle in
the Philippines, that the articles were brought
from their former place of abode, that change
of residence is bona fide: Provided, That no
merchandise of any kind, machinery or other
articles for use in manufacture, shall be
classified under this subsection.
"(g) Articles used by officials and employees of
the Philippine Government assigned abroad
and brought on their return to the Philippines
by reason of transfer, resignation, or
retirement, upon specific instructions of the
Secretary of Finance and upon the request of
the returning official or employee concerned:
Provided, That the total acquisition cost of
such articles does not exceed twenty per
centum of the total basic salary received from
the Philippine Government during such tour of
duty, of not more than four years as certified
by the Department concerned.
"If any article withdrawn from the
customhouse of the post office without the
payment of the compensating tax is
subsequently used by the importer for other
purposes, corresponding entry should be made
in the books of accounts, if any are kept, or a
written notice thereof sent to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
payment of the corresponding compensating
tax made within ten days from the date of such
entry or notice. If the tax is not paid within
such period, the amount of the tax shall be
increased by twenty-five per centum, the
increment to form part of the tax.
"In the case of tax free articles brought or
imported into the Philippines by persons,
entities or agencies, exempt from tax which
are subsequently sold, transferred or
exchanged in the Philippines to non-exempt
private persons or entities, the purchasers or
recipients shall be considered the importers
thereof. The tax due on each articles shall
constitute a lien on the article itself superior to
all other charges or liens, irrespective of the
possessors thereof."
Section 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 19, 1964
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was
charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment
alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at
Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four
tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum
of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to
laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel
on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his
escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga
where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not
guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial
conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued
and was duly concluded.
I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential
informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative,
informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a
certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante,
Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional
Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team
composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio
Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit.
After securing marked money from Bustamante, the
team, together with their informant, proceeded to
Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police
authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they
reached the place, the confidential informer pointed
out appellant to Lopez who consequently
approached appellant and asked him if he had
marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and
Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then
left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to
Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him
the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment.
Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were
stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the
team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who
was the head of the back-up team, arrested
appellant. The latter was then brought by the team
to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on
board a jeep and he was placed under custodial
investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming
that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez
and the appellant. He also averred that he was the
one who confiscated the marijuana and took the
marked money from appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that
although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was
stationed farthest from the rest of the other
members, that is, around two hundred meters away
from his companions. He did not actually see the sale
that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he
saw his teammates accosting appellant after the
latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who
conducted the custodial investigation of appellant
wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to
remain silent, to information and to counsel.
Appellant, however, orally waived his right to
counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the
"Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which
appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation
of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his
possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below
that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was
that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in
exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz
corrected his entry by telling him to put "two",
instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed
to the correction since they were the ones who were
personally and directly involved in the purchase of
the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas,
examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the
latter's apprehension, and the results were
practically normal except for his relatively high blood
pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of
physical injury on the person of appellant. The next
day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's
complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the
examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has
a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to
experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit
blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with
the same complaint but, except for the gastro-
intestinal pain, his physical condition remained
normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version
of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in
question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching
television with the members of his family in their
house when three persons, whom he had never met
before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance
that they would just inquire about something from
him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep
with them. He was told that they were going to Camp
Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a
different route. While on board, he was told that he
was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep
but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some
papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was
then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints
on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana
leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came
from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why
he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having
escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he
did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After
escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle,
Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching
the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he
consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was
accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan
District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where
he was confined for three days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the
fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca,
Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and
vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that
appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even
before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-
Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan
District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant
for three days due to abdominal pain, but her
examination revealed that the cause for this ailment
was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign
of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand
pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered
confiscated in favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the
aforementioned judgment of the lower court,
contending in his assignment of errors that the latter
erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up",
(2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the
People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the
appellant actually sold only two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags
were merely confiscated subsequently from his
possession,14 the latter not being in any way
connected with the sale, the information alleges that
he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue presented
for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of
selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by
appellant, and does not include the disparate and
distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea
bags which separate offense is not charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs,
the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established.17 To sell means to give, whether for
money or any other material consideration.18 It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that
appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally
certain that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited
drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a
scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988,
did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt.
Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to
how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the
straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony
of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony
of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater
weight and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug
traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and
abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial
apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at
bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was
conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was
or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact
that they are presumed to have regularly performed
their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should
prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated
claim of appellant of having been framed,22 erected
as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To
top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while
there was a delimited chance for him to controvert
the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly
done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime
Laboratory Service of the then Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at
Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad,
a forensic chemist therein,23 confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of
the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were
positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of
marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had
been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to
him, is the matter of who really confiscated the
marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court,
Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the
confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who
seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro
who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter
since such is not an element of the offense with
which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably
clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the anymore provide a powder
possession of appellant. Even, (sic) on the object so as to
assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed determine the thumbmark
an error on who actually seized the marijuana from or identity of the persons
appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to taking hold of the object?
a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the
essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a A: We were not able to put
whole nor reflects on the witnesses' powder on these
honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere denominations because we
imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant are lacking that kind of
that he did not take part in the physical taking of the material in our office since
drug from the person of appellant, but he that item can be purchased
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation only in Manila and only few
thereof as the investigator of their unit. are producing that, sir.

Next, appellant adduces the argument that the xxx xxx xxx
twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him
were not powdered for finger-printing purposes Q: Is it not a fact that your
contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust office is within (the) P.C.
operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily Crime Laboratory, CIS, as
explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as well as the office of NICA?
follows:
A: Our office is only
Q: Is it the standard adjacent to those offices
operating procedure of your but we cannot make a
unit that in conducting such request for that powder
operation you do not because they, themselves,
 are using that in their own
work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the
failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment
purposes can under no mode of rationalization be
fatal to the case of the prosecution because the
Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions."30 The dusting
of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an
evidentiary technique for identification purposes,
which identification can be supplied by other species
of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a
relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to
witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures
taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover,
he was not reported to or booked in the custody of
any barangay official or police authorities.31 These
are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence
requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be
witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any
other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of
pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having
caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not
only authorized but were also under the obligation to
effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there
was an arrest report prepared by the police in
connection with his apprehension. Said Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that
"suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected
marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was
affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner,
the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore
mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he
acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills
from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the
aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant's conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of
the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of
his right as a person under custodial investigation for
the commission of an offense, there being nothing in
the records to show that he was assisted by
counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during the
custodial investigation that he waived his right to
counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in
the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is
not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report
is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid
exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from
his predicament since his criminal participation in the
illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven.
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation
of the selling transaction37 which happens the
moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller.38 In the present case, and in light of the
preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained
beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that
he would sell marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take
this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal
rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as
in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may
be committed at any time and in any place.40 It is not
contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to
sell to a total stranger,41 for what matters is not an
existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but
their agreement and the acts constituting the sale
and delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there
may be instances where such sale could be
improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as
the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted
on that occasion, we can safely say that those
exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to
physical and mental torture by the arresting officers
which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the
night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts
to support his explanation as to how his signatures
on the documents earlier discussed were supposedly
obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our
jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The
evidence on record is bereft of any support for
appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors,
one for the prosecution45 and the other for the
defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale
sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or
contusions on the person of appellant. What is
evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was
his peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering
even before his arrest.47 His own brother even
corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had
a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was
maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason
whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother
who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and
during his detention there.49 Significantly, he also did
not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors
despite the opportunity to do so50 and with the legal
services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that
appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly
refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and
premeditated for the NARCOM agents were
determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated
or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination,
the final act needed for his isolation from society and
it was providential that it came about after he was
caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited
drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded
on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial
court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659
effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case
and entails additional questions of law which we shall
now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law,
pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are
to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art.
II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, are hereby amended to read as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
 Sec. 4. Sale, Administration,
Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. — The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.
xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of
Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instrument of the Crime. —
The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and
9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of
the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more
of indian hemp or
marijuana
xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the
penalty shall range
from prision
correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon
the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being
prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana
with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact,
stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of
those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether
the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle
him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder,
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a
special law, albeit originally amendatory and in
substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the
Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by
force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient
provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be
given retrospective effect to crimes punished by
special laws.54 The execution in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since
habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the
third time or more of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa
or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic
Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved
nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question
would be whether this court, at the present stage,
can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to
reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That
issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case
of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in
article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring
the retroactivity of penal laws in so far
as they are favorable to persons accused
of a felony, would be useless and
nugatory if the courts of justice were not
under obligation to fulfill such duty,
irrespective of whether or not the
accused has applied for it, just as would
also all provisions relating to the
prescription of the crime and the
penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified
by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No.
7659 has already become final and executory or the
accused is serving sentence thereunder, then
practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations
would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a
writ of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter
of imposable penalties appears to have been
committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law;
thereby calling for and necessitating judicial
reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon
any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug. That penalty,
according to the amendment to Section 20 of the
law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams
or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if
the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in
the provisions on the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as
the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is
less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the
penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with
respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs
provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the
whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be
imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is
less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law
that all doubts should be construed in a manner
favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the
dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by
the imposable range of penalties under the second
paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law
provides that the penalty shall be taken from said
range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug
involved in the case. The penalty in said second
paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of
three distinct penalties, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal.
In such a situation, the Code provides that each one
shall form a period, with the lightest of them being
the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most
severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code,
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of
the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its
specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty
shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug
subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by
way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties
shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved.
Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not
altogether be disregarded. Since each component
penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be
imposed separately as determined by the quantity of
the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances
can be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of
Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition
thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for
a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated
in its second paragraph be divided into three, with
the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the
penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid
periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the
marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty
to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250
to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is
imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the
marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty
of prision correccional is consequently indicated but,
again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first
to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and
1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists
of three periods as provided in the text of and
illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the
Code. The question is whether or not in determining
the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken
from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence
or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other
circumstances modifying criminal liability should be
taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it
was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses
under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal
Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of
such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the
special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with
reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since
the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium
or maximum periods, it would consequently be
impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules
in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous
cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the
penalties in the latter were not components of or
contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where
there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a
prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although
the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case,
the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for
offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the
conventional practice in the United States but
differently from the penalties provided in our Revised
Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one
specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive
durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or
any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special
law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws
like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed
during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby
a special law would direct that an offense thereunder
shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and
in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for
instance, Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing
non-payment of salaries and wages with the
periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his
employee or laborer as required by
section one of this Act, shall prima
facie be considered a fraud committed
by such employer against his employee
or laborer by means of false pretenses
similar to those mentioned in article
three hundred and fifteen, paragraph
four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and shall
be punished in the same manner as
therein provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the
offenses defined therein were specifically punished
by the penalties as technically named and
understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are
exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged
from arresto mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing
Decree) where the penalties run from arresto
mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts
involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may
involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion
perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No.
6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8
months and not more than 17 years and 4 months,
when committed without violence or intimidation of
persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years
and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when
committed with violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and life
imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the
penalties under the special law are different from
and are without reference or relation to those under
the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory
effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules
for felonies under the Code. In this type of special
law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last
given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true
that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually
equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the
Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for
carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances
stated in the law do not correspond to those in the
Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore,
cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of
penalties and the correlative effects thereof under
the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory
enactments founded upon and applicable to such
provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the
penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special
laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised
Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give
the related provisions on penalties for felonies under
the Code the corresponding application to said
special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit
proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise
would be to sanction an indefensible judicial
truncation of an integrated system of penalties under
the Code and its allied legislation, which could never
have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a
special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was
contended by the prosecution that Article 64,
paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not
apply to said special law. We said therein that —
We do not agree with the Solicitor
General that P.D. 533 is a special
law entirely distinct from and unrelated
to the Revised Penal Code. From the
nature of the penalty imposed which is
in terms of the classification and
duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for
penalties as are ordinarily imposed in
special laws, the intent seems clear that
P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an
amendment of the Revised Penal Code,
with respect to the offense of theft of
large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be
subject to applicable provisions thereof
such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code
should, likewise, be applicable, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect
of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to
Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article
63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent
pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in
Article 10 the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to
special laws, this Court held that where
the special law expressly grants to the
court discretion in applying the penalty
prescribed for the offense, there is no
room for the application of the
provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no
explicit grant of discretion to the Court
in the application of the penalty
prescribed by the law. In such case, the
court must be guided by the rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
concerning the application of
penalties which distill the "deep legal
thought and centuries of experience in
 the administration of criminal laws."
(Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of
the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and
prescription therein of the technical penalties
defined in and constituting integral parts of the three
scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more
reason should the provisions of said Code on the
appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying
circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise,
the different kinds or classifications of penalties and
the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have
supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425,
except if they would result in absurdities as will now
be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because
this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of
modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay
down the caveat that mitigating circumstances
should be considered and applied only if they affect
the periods and the degrees of the penalties within
rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the
graduation and consequently determine the degree
of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article
61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in
Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime
and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when
there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of
section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid
anomalous results which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when
the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by
analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two
penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of
as many penalties which follow the former in the
scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and
since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full
extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion
temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It
is for this reason that the three component penalties
in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est
ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation
is to be adopted so that the law may continue to
have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law,
which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case
now before us. Apparently it does, since drug
offenses are not included in nor has appellant
committed any act which would put him within the
exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed
does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately
resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The
more important aspect, however, is how the
indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the
Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same." We hold that this quoted portion of the
section indubitably refers to an offense under a
special law wherein the penalty imposed was not
taken from and is without reference to the Revised
Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding
illustrations, such that it may be said that the
"offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the
aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for
offenses under special laws was necessary because of
the nature of the former type of penalties under said
laws which were not included or contemplated in the
scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence
there could be no minimum "within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the
illustrative examples of penalties in special laws
hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would
still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103
as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and
is justified under the rule of contemporanea
expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted
the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section
20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for
in a special law, is now in effect punished by and
under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part
of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be
out of context but also an admission of the hornbook
maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.
Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep
in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal
appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to
the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its
coverage "persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment," we have held that what is considered
is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty
imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what
the law states is "life imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding
disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence
of the principles of literal interpretation, which have
been rationalized by comparative decisions of this
Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by
the antecedents of the law and related
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the
penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No.
4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows
that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in
this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have
interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act
No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with
laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social
measure of compassion, and should be liberally
interpreted in favor of the accused.72 The "minimum"
sentence is merely a period at which, and not before,
as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner
may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does not
constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter
he still has to continue serving the rest of his
sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only
the period when the convict's eligibility for parole
may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may
readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or
his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds,
even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at
bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a
minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range we have
fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law,
the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
day of prision correccional. The difference, which
could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly
worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the
judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo
against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is
AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he
should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
ROSA LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City. 2 Both courts found petitioner Rosa
Lim guilty of twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 3 and imposing on her two one-year
imprisonment for each of the two violations and
ordered her to pay two fines, each amounting to two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial
court also ordered petitioner to return to Maria
Antonia Seguan, the jewelry received or its value with
interest, to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees and
costs. 4
We state the relevant facts. 5
On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia
Seguan by phone. Petitioner thereafter went to
Seguan’s store. She bought various kinds of jewelry
— Singaporean necklaces, bracelets and rings worth
P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated August 25,
1990, payable to "cash" drawn on Metrobank in the
amount of P300,000.00 6 and gave the check to
Seguan.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to
Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued at
P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable
to "cash" dated August 16, 1990 drawn on
Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.00, 7 and sent
the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia
Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The
checks were returned with a notice of dishonor.
Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the
checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan
the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She
never did.
On June 5, 1991, 8 an Assistant City Prosecutor of
Cebu filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
Branch 23 two informations against petitioner. Both
informations were similarly worded. The difference is
that in Criminal Case No. 22128, the bouncing check
is Metro Bank Check No. CLN 094244392 dated
August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00. The
informations read: 9
Criminal Case No. 22127 —
"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu,
accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and
for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the
time of issue of the check she does not have
sufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, with
deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing
damage, did then and there issue, make or draw
Metro Bank Check NO. 1 CLN 094244391 dated
August 25, 1990 in the amount of P300,000.00
payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was
issued in payment of an obligation of said accused,
but when the said check was presented with the
bank the same was dishonored for reason "Account
Closed" and despite notice and demands made to
redeem or make good said check, said accused failed
and refused, and up to the present time still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said
Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P300,000.00,
Philippine Currency.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Criminal Case No. 22128 —
"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu,
accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22, COMMITTED AS
FOLLOWS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and
for sometime subsequent thereto, in this City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the
time of issue of the check she does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of
gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue,
make or draw Metro Bank Check No. CLN-094244392
dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00
payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was
issued in payment of an obligation of said accused
but when the said check was presented with the
bank, the same was dishonored for reason "Account
Closed" and despite notice and demands made to
redeem or make good said check, said accused failed
and refused, and up to the present time still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said
Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P241,668.00,
Philippine Currency.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991." 10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" in
both cases.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court
rendered a decision in the two cases convicting
petitioner, to wit: 11
"WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused,
Rosa Lim and sentencing her in Criminal Case No.
CBU-22127, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
a period of ONE (1) YEAR and a fine of TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS and in
Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the same penalty of
imprisonment for ONE YEAR and fine of TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is likewise
imposed.
"The accused is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant Maria Antonia Seguan, the sum of
P541,668.00 which is the value of the jewelries
bought by the accused from the latter with interest
based on the legal rate to be counted from June 5,
1991, the date of the filing of the informations, or
return the subject jewelries; and further to pay
private complainant:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in
compensation for the latter’s worries with the
freezing of her business capital involved in these
litigated transactions;
"(b) The sum of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus
costs.
"SO ORDERED." 12
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. 13
On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision, dismissing the appeal in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
in toto.
"SO ORDERED." 14
Hence, this appeal. 15
In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew
Seguan and much more, had any "transaction" with
her. According to petitioner, she issued the two
checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to
Seguan. She gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera
from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a "security
arrangement" or "guarantee" that she would return
the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell
them. 16
The appeal has no merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The elements of B. P. Blg. 22 are: 17
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value;

"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She
argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan
and that they had no pre-existing transaction. The
checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere
guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the
value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.
18 These defenses cannot save the day for her. The
first and last elements of the offense are admittedly
present. To escape liability, she must prove that the
second element was absent, that is, at the time of
issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds
in the bank account were insufficient. She did not
prove this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris
tantum that the second element prima facie exists
when the first and third elements of the offense are
present. 19 If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a
conviction. 20
The gravamen of B. P. No. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment. And the accused
failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make
arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking
days from notice of dishonor. 21 The act is malum
prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
22 Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and
to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. 23
Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant
in determining culpability. The terms and conditions
surrounding the issuance of the checks are also
irrelevant. 24chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Unlike in estafa, 25 under B.P. No. 22, one need not
prove that the check was issued in payment of an
obligation, or that there was damage. The damage
done is to the banking system. 26
In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts
mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, "has the law been
violated?" When dealing with acts mala prohibita 27
— durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be
". . . it is not necessary that the appellant should-
have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes,
made such by statutory enactment, the intention of
the person who commits the crime is entirely
immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the
statute as a deterrent influence would be
substantially worthless. It would be impossible of
execution. In many cases, the act complained of is
itself that which produces the pernicious effect the
statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious
effect is produced with precisely the same force and
result whether the intention of the person
performing the act is good or bad."cralaw virtua1aw
library
This case is a perfect example of an act mala
prohibita. Petitioner issued two checks. They were
dishonored upon presentment for payment due to
the fact that the account was closed. Petitioner failed
to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds
were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks.
And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or
make arrangement for its payment within five (5)
banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. B. P.
No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quare
exceedingly hard but so the law is
written.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed
on petitioner. B. P. No. 22 provides a penalty of
"imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one year or a fine of not less than, but not
more than double, the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the Court." 28
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 29 we held that in
determining the penalty to be imposed for violation
of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy
is to redeem valuable human material, and to
prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. There, we deleted the
prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed
on them only a fine double the amount of the check
issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no
violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise,
they would have simply accepted the judgment of
the trial court and applied for probation to evade
prison term." 30 We do the same here. We believe
such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentences
imposed on petitioner. The two fines imposed for
each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are
appropriate and sufficient.
The award of moral damages and order to pay
attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the
decision of the Court of Appeals. 31 We find
petitioner Rosa Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of imprisonment and
hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of
P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment
not to exceed six (6) months. 32 We DELETE the
award of moral damages and attorney’s fees. The
rest of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against
petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., concurs in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, is on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 118950-54. February 6, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. LUCRECIA GABRES, also known as
MONA GABRES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Five counts of estafa were filed against the spouses
Perlito (Lito) and Lucrecia (Mona) Gabres and, except
for the names of the private complainants and the
amounts involved, the text in each of the
corresponding informations is substantially the same
in all; viz:1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The undersigned accuses SPOUSES LITO and
LUCRECIA GABRES also known as MONA GABRES of
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about the months of April, 1992 up to
July, 1992 and sometime subsequent thereto, at
Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to defraud and by means of deceit through
false representations and pretenses made by them
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud, did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously defraud JOEL PANIDA, by then and there
representing themselves as a duly authorized or
licensed recruiters for overseas employment, when in
truth and in fact they were not, thereby inducing the
said person to give to them the sum of FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000), Philippine Currency, for
placement abroad, which amount they
misappropriated for their own use and benefit and
then either fail or refuse and continue to fail or
refuse to return the same despite repeated demands,
all to the damage and prejudice of said person in the
total sum aforesaid and other consequential
damages.
"Contrary to Law."2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In addition, the spouses were charged with having
engaged in large scale illegal recruitment; thus:
"The undersigned accuses Lito Gabres and Lucrecia
Gabres also known as Mona Gabres of Illegal
Recruitment, defined under par. 1, Art. 38 of P.D.
442, as amended, otherwise known as The Labor
Code of the Philippines, and penalized under Art.
39(b) of the same Code, as amended by P.D. 2018,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the month of April, 1992 up to July,
1992 and sometime subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly recruit ORETA NISPEROS, TARCISO DACSIG,
JULIUS AOAY, JOEL PANIDA and RONALD
MIRABUENO for overseas employment, by then and
there misrepresenting themselves as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiters when in truth and in
fact they were not and by reason of said Rosario Zapanta, the spouses confirmed their being
misrepresentations, they were able to obtain from engaged in the recruitment of factory workers for
the said complainants the aggregate sum of ONE Korea. A "package deal" was reached. Each applicant
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS was to be charged a placement fee of P45,000.00.
(P185,000.00) Philippine Currency, all to the damage The parties agreed to meet again on 12 April 1992 at
and prejudice of the above-named complainants in the Dr. Yares Clinic in Baguio City. On the appointed
the total sum aforesaid sum and other consequential date and time, Mona Gabres alone showed up to
damages. meet with the applicants. The latter were joined, in
this meeting, by Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard Dulay and
"That such illegal recruitment having been Ronaldo Mirabueno, who all promised to also come
committed by in large scale, it constitutes up with the required "placement fees."
economic sabotage.
At the respective dates stated below, the accused
3
"Contrary to Law." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary spouses received the following amounts from each of
the applicants; thus:
The six cases were tried, preceded by the
arraignment of the accused, jointly. "DATE OF NAME OF PAYOR
PAYMENT
The following version of the case is culled from the 1. April 26, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil - P5,000
evidence given by the prosecution. Nisperos)
- P5,000
Some time in March of 1992, Oreta Nisperos heard Joel Panida 1800)
that the accused couple were recruiting factory -
workers for abroad. With great anticipation, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. P5,000
Nisperos, accompanied by her son, Ramil, and her 1803)
neighbors, Joel Panida and Julius Aoay,4 went to the 2 : May 1, 1992 - Julius Aoay - P5,000
residence of the Gabreses in Bauang, La Union. After 1802)
the group was introduced by Nisperos' cousin,
3 : May 5, 1992 - Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P5,000.00
On 03 July(Exh.
1992,`B'the- CR
accused
No. spouses assured Ramil
1803)
Nisperos, Joan Nisperos, Joel Panida, Tarciso Dacsig,
Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil - Jr., Julius Aoay, Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno
Nisperos) P5,000.00 (No receipt)
that they could expect within a few days their
4. June 7, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B'
departure for abroad. - CRThe
No.promise was not fulfilled.
Nisperos) 1800)
Then, in order to appease the applicants, the spouses
- explained that it was only the call of the Korean
Joel Panida P5,000.00
employer,(Exh. `B' - that
Mr. Kim, CR No.
was being awaited so as to
1800)
firm up the flight schedule. The call never came. After
a series of follow-ups, the applicants were directed
- P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No.
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. by the spouses to confer with the latter's supposed
1800)
- associate in Manila, one Rebecca (Vicky) Naval, who
Julius Aoay was said to(Exh.
P5,000.00 be managing
`B' - CR No. the Bachs and Cochs Travel
Agency. Naval initially denied any association with
1800)
5. June 10, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil the Gabreses;
- P30,000.00 she`B'later,
(Exh. - CR however, told the group that
Nisperos) she 1801)
No. had been engaged by the spouses to process the
6. June 17, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Joan travel documents,
- P5,000.00 (Exh. `C' plane tickets and flight bookings of
- CR No.
Nisperos) the applicants, and that the required visas were
1801)
7. June 18, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Jonard already being
- P5,000.00 (Exh.applied
`D' - CRfor.No.
Dulay) 1801)
After several more months of waiting and still getting
8. July 3, 1992 - Joel Panida - P35,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR
nowhere, the applicants finally demanded the return
No. 1800)
of their money from the spouses. Each applicant was
- Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P25,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR
issued four checks, each for P10,000.00, but which,
No. 1803)
when presented for payment, all
- Julius Aoay - P30,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR
bounced.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5
No. 1802)"
The would-be overseas workers sought the
assistance of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Cordillera Administrative Region
("POEA-CAR") which certified, through Atty. Justinian
O. Lichnachan, that the accused spouses were "not
licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment within the City of Baguio or any part of
the region."
Lito Gabres managed to elude arrest, and the trial
proceeded only against his wife. Mona Gabres
pleaded "not guilty" to each of the accusations. She
denied any involvement in her husband's activities.
The defense sought to establish that Mona was a
mere fish vendor in Bauang, La Union, and that this
work demanded her full attention. Her husband used
to be an overseas contract worker himself and,
thereafter, a liaison officer for Caro Fran Recruitment
Agency, whose job included the processing and
following-up of travel papers with the Department of
Foreign Affairs. In July, 1992, her husband introduced
her to Vicky Naval who requested Mona to safekeep
the collection of placement fees from the applicants.
She admitted having joined her husband, but only
once, in collecting the payments made by private
complainants on 03 July 1992 at Acop, Tublay,
Benguet, which was duly remitted to Naval.
In a decision, dated 14 December 1994, Judge Romeo
A. Brawner9 (now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) rendered judgment that concluded:
"WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, this Court finds
accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of five (5) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to nine (9) years and ten (10) months
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
"3. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, this Court finds
accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby
sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of two (2) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM to
seven (7) years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
"4. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, this Court finds
accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby
sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of two (2) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of Prision correccional as MINIMUM to
seven (7) years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
"5. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1804, this Court finds
accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres NOT GUILTY of the
offense charged due to insufficiency of evidence and
hereby acquits her with proportionate costs de oficio;
"6. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1805, this Court finds
accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
"On the civil liability in the estafa cases, accused
Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres is hereby ordered to pay to
Joel Panida, Oreta Nisperos, Julius Aoay and Tarciso
Dacsig, Jr. the amounts of P45,000.00, P55,000.00,
P40,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively, as actual
damages.
"Proportionate costs against the accused Lucrecia
`Mona' Gabres.
"In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be
credited to the full term of her preventive
imprisonment as provided for by Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, provided the conditions set forth
therein for the enjoyment of the same have been
met.
"With respect to accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres, let
these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to
their revival as soon as he shall have been arrested
and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
"In order that he may not escape the clutches of the
law, let Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the
PNP Station Commander, Bauang, La Union and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila.
Further, the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include the
name of accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres in its Hold
Departure List.
"SO ORDERED."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Mona Gabres appealed the decision to this Court.
Appellant, in main, would wish to sway the Court into
thinking that the real culprit was Lito Gabres and that
the complaining witnesses gave stress over her
participation only because her husband could not be "Q What was your agreement as to where shall you
apprehended. meet each other and the date.

The Court, regrettably, must sustain the conviction. "A I suggested that we will see each other at the
clinic of Dr. Yares.
The testimony given by each of the private
complainants unquestionably would point to both "Q Where is the clinic of Dr. Yares located?
the spouses to be the culprits in an elaborate scheme
to defraud the hopeful applicants for overseas work. "A It is located at Harrison Road, Baguio City.
The Court quotes from the transcript of the
proceedings. "Q On that particular of April 12, 1992 were you able
to meet each other?
Testimony of Oreta Nisperos:
"A Yes, ma'am.
"ATTY. PAOAD:
"Q Who were your companions?
"Now, Madam witness, you said a while ago that it
was the later part of March, 1992 that you and your "A My companions were Julius Aoay, Joel Panida and
cousin went to see the two accused in Bauang, what my son Ramil Nisperos.
transpired then?
"Q Who from the side of the accused came to see
"A They told us that they were recruiting factory you on April 12, 1992.
workers for Korea.
"A Mrs. Mona Gabres, ma'am.
"Q What else happened?
"Q How about the other accused, Lito Gabres.
"A They told us that if my children are interested we
"A He was not there, ma'am.
will see each other in Baguio City on April 12.
"Q Now, what transpired on April 12, 1992?
"A They told us that if we are interested we will pay
an advance payment of P5,000.00 each.
"Q For each applicant?
"A Yes, ma'am.
"Q What else did you talk about?
"A They told us that if we have money we will see
each other on April 26.
"Q Where will you see each other on April 26?
"A I told her that we will see at Acop, Tublay because
they knew where we are.
"Q Now, you said that you agreed to meet each other
again on April 26, 1992, what happened on that
date?
"A They came at our residence, both of them.
"Q The two accused?
"A Yes, ma'am.
"Q Now, when the two accused came to your
residence on April 26, what happened?
"A My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.
"Q Who particularly paid for your son?
"A I paid for my son, ma'am.

"Q What particular place in Acop?
"A At our residence, sir.
"ATTY. PAOAD:
"Now, how much all in all are the two accused asking
you to pay in consideration of the same in Korea?
"Q Aside from you and your son who else were
present?
"A Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.
"Q How about Julius Aoay?
"A He was also present, ma'am.

"A They were asking P45,000.00.

"Q You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on
April 26 you paid P5,000.00 for your son, what is your
basis in saying that you paid P5,000.00 on that day?
"A They issued us a receipt, ma'am.
"Q Who received the payment?
"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.
"Q Who issued the receipt?
"A It was Lito Gabres who was making the receipt,
ma'am.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q Now, after April 26, 1992 what happened?
"A They told us that they will go back at our
residence on May 1 and if the other applicants will
have their money at that time they will process their
papers.
"Q Who paid on May 1, 1992?
"A Julius Aoay, ma'am.
"ATTY. PAOAD:
"Who received the payment?
"A Both the two accused, ma'am. One will receive the
amount and the other will issue the receipt."11
Testimony of Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.:
"Q Now, to whom did you give this P5,000.00?
"A I handed it to Aunt Oreta who gave it to Mona
Gabres, Ma'am.
"Q Now, who issued you a receipt?
"A Mona Gabres.
"Q What about her husband Lito Gabres?
"A Aunt Oreta gave the P5,000.00 to Mona Gabres
who counted the money, after counting the money
Lito Gabres gave it to Mona Gabres.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q I would like to show to you this receipt dated July
31, 1992 previously marked as Exhibit `B-1' for Crim.
Case No. 92-CR-1803 and Exhibit `I-1' in Crim. Case
No. 92-CR-1805, is this the receipt you are referring
to?
"A Yes, Ma'am.
"Q Now, who issued you this receipt?
"A Lito Gabres, Ma'am.
"Q Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres
what was the participation of Mona Gabres?
"A I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he
counted it and then handed it to Mona Gabres,
Ma'am."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Testimony of Julius Aoay:
"Q I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7,
1992 which has been previously marked as Exhibit `A'
in Criminal Case 1801, as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case
1805, as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit
`C' in Criminal Case 1803 and as Exhibit `B' in Criminal
Case 1802, is this the receipt issued to you?
"A Yes, it is.
"Q Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?
"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.
"Q How about Lito Gabres what was his
participation?
"A He was the one counting the
money."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was
only accused-appellant who, in fact, showed up to
meet with the applicants for overseas work. Joel
Panida testified:
"Q On April 12, 1992 were you present in that
meeting?
"A Yes, I was also there, ma'am.
"Q Who else were present on that day, April 12,
1992?
"A Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and
Julius Aoay.
"Q Who from the side of the accused came to see
you?
"A It was Mona Gabres only, ma'am.
"Q How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?
"A He was not there, ma'am.
"Q On April 12, 1992 what transpired in that
meeting?
"A She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers
going to Korea. She also asked us that if we are
interested then we will give P5,000.00 each as down
payment." 14
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that
private complainants have prevaricated the evidence
to implicate Mona Gabres only because the
authorities have yet to succeed in arresting her
husband. It is, of course, unfortunate that the
husband, at least momentarily, is able to ward off the
long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the
end, still catch up with him.
Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by
means of deceit punishable under Article 315 (2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code.15 The trial court's brief
ratiocination is well taken; viz:
"There is no dispute that damages have been
incurred by the complainants. They parted with their
money in consideration of deployment for work in a
foreign country, but which unfortunately remains
unrestituted despite the failure in that regard of the
person or persons who promised that they will be
sent off to work
abroad."16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused-appellant is likewise guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale, an offense under Article
38(b), in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code
which provides:
"ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
"(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.rny
"Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the
first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group."
"x x x x x x x x x.
"ART. 39. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein."
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal
recruitment), namely: (1) that the offender is a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2)
that the offender undertakes any of the recruitment
activities defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code, as amended, or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the same code.
(PEOPLE vs. CORAL, G.R. Nos. 97849-54, March 1,
1994, 230 SCRA 499). Without any doubt, this Court
finds the two elements of the crime present in the
case at bar. That the accused are non-licensees or
non-holders of authority to lawfully recruit is evident
in the certification issued by Atty. Justinian
Lichnachan of the POEA-CAR Regional Extension
Office of Baguio City (Exhibit `D,' 93-CR-1800). Article
13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement as `any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.' The act of the accused in holding out a
placement fee of P45,000.00 per applicant in
exchange for an employment abroad; the several
collections made by them; and their promise to send
off the applicants for work in Korea were just some of
the circumstances that would qualify the acts of the
accused under the definition of recruitment and
placement."17
The Court, however, would have to reduce the award
of actual damages to Oreta Nisperos from P55,000.00
to P50,000.00. Oreta concededly could not present
any receipt for the supposed payments she allegedly
made on 26 April 1992 and on 05 May 1992,
for P5,000.00 each, on behalf of Ramil Nisperos. Joel
Panida, in his testimony, attested to the payment
made on 26 April 199218 but no similar evidence was
presented to prove the payment made on 05 May
1992.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be;
"2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos; and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud
be committed by any of the following means."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum shall be "within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the
offense.19 The penalty next lower should be based on
the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime.20 The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law
to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided.21 The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.22
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant
case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in
the initial determination of the indeterminate
penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the
imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the
law accords with the rule that penal laws should be
construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
two (2) months while the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved
exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year
for each additional P10,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court thus finds some need to
modify in part the penalties imposed by the trial
court; viz:
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, the amount
involved is P45,000.00. Hence, the minimum penalty
should be reduced to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, which is the
maximum of the allowable minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence. The maximum penalty
imposed by the court a quo is within lawful range.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, the amount
involved, as so modified by this Court, is P50,000.00.
The minimum penalty should then be reduced to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional (the maximum of the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence). The maximum penalty
should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor plus a period of two (2) years (one
[1] year for each additional P10,000.00) for a total
maximum period of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802 and No. 93-CR-1803,
the amounts involved in each total P40,000.00. The
minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence
imposed by the court a quo of two (2) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional is
within lawful range. The maximum penalty, however,
should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor plus a period of one (1) year for a
total maximum period of seven (7) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with modification only insofar as the
penalties therein imposed are concerned; thus -
(1) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment of from four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight
(8) years and ten (10) months of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment of from four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM, the actual damages being reduced
to P50,000.00.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment of from two (2) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant
is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of from
two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the
decision appealed from are AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. EGMEDIO LAMPAZA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The medical examination of a victim is not a requisite
for the successful prosecution of rape. Even without
a medical report, a court may convict an accused
based on the offended party's credible testimony.
The "sweetheart" defense cannot be given credence
in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes,
mementos, pictures or tokens. Love is not a license to
rape.
The Case
Egmedio Lampaza appeals the March 14, 1994
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Jose, Antique (Branch 10)2 in Criminal Case No. 3692,
finding him guilty of rape.
In an Information dated May 25, 1988 and "at the
instance of the offended party," Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Juan C. Mission Jr. charged appellant as
follows:3
"That on or about the 20th day of March, 1988, in the
Municipality of Tobias Fornier, Province of Antique,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd design, through intimidation, violence and
force and with the use of a deadly weapon, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with Teodora Wacay without and
against the consent of the offended party."
With the assistance of Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June
9, 1988.4 Trial proceeded in due course. Thereafter,
the trial court promulgated its assailed Decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:5
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and
jurisprudence, after the prosecution has presented
thorough and convincing evidence, the Court finds
accused EGMEDIO LAMPAZA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
period of Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day to
Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months as
minimum to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years as
maximum and to indemnify Teodora Wacay [in] the
amount of P30,000.00 as damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.
On June 1, 1994, appellant, through Counsel Cezar C.
Tajanlangit, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA).6 After the defense and the prosecution
filed their respective Briefs, the appellate
court7 rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of
appellant, but modifying the penalty to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:8
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that appellant EGMEDIO
LAMPAZA is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant
Teodora Wacay the amount
of P50,000.00 for moral damages.
In the light of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court,9 the CA "recalled" the entry of the above
judgment, certified the case to this Court and
elevated the records.10
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,11 the Office of the Solicitor General
adopted the following facts as summarized by the
trial court:12
"The first witness presented was a college student
who is the nephew of the private offended party,
who went to the house of the latter on March 20,
1988, without finding her there. Witness looked for
Teodora, proceeding to the place where farm animals
are grazed, which was two hills away. (pp. 2-4 TSN,
September 27, 1989)
"Witness saw [his] aunt running out [of] one of the
nipa huts in the farm. When [his] aunt reached him,
she was sobbing and very pale. She immediately
asked him to accompany her back to her house. His
aunt explained to him that she ha[d] to leave that
place immediately because she was afraid of
somebody and therefore could not stay in Sitio
Namontonan, Brgy. Camandagan, Tobias Fornier,
Antique. (pp. 5-7, TSN, Ibid.)
"During cross examination, defense counsel verified
the details regarding the testimony under direct-
examination of this witness, as to the reason witness
was in that sitio (p. 8, TSN, id.), the distance between
the house and the grazing area of the farm animals,
the location of the nipa hut and other details. (p. 9,
TSN, id.)
Witness repeated to the Court that [his] aunt was
very afraid when he met her running out of the nipa
hut although she did not tell him yet what happened.
That [his] aunt was trembling, very pale and looking
very weak. (p. 10, TSN, id.)
The private offended party herself testified, and
positively identified accused in open court. (p. 18,
TSN, id.) That in the morning of March 20, 1988 she
was in her farm lot in Sitio Namontonan, Barangay
Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. When she was
about to graze their animals, all of a sudden accused
came from behind her and twisted both her arms.
Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut
which was uninhabited. Victim struggled to set
herself free, to no avail despite kicking, shouting and
struggling to be free from the hold of the accused.
(pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)
Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa
hut; pinned both her legs including her right hand
with [his] knees [and took] off his pants. The accused
ha[d] his bolo beside him with which he threatened
the victim. Victim testified that accused raped her
then, explaining in detail the commission of the said
act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)
Witness informed her husband and her mother about
the rape that evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)
During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to
impeach the testimony of the witness by eliciting the
information that accused and victim were close
neighbors; that during the incident private offended
party passed by accused who was cutting bamboo
poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot.
(pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7, 1989). She described
again the force and intimidation emanating from the
accused in committing the act complained of. Private
offended party informed the Court of the great fear
she felt that she was trembling and almost
speechless when the incident happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-
22, TSN, Ibid.)
Witness was never attracted to the accused as she
testified on cross[-]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)
When queried by the Court as to the length of the
sexual intercourse she stated that it lasted only three
minutes, although the acts of force, intimidation and
the struggle lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp.
22-23, TSN, id.)
During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution
presented another witness in the person of the
husband of the offended party (p. 32), who testified
that the latter informed him about her being raped
by the accused; that [he] wanted to kill the accused
but he was prevailed upon by his wife and decided to
file a case in Court, hence the criminal complaint (p.
34). Witness was in another town during the
incident: that he returned to his house in the
afternoon of the following day, when his wife
informed him of the incident. (p. 32-34)
"They went to the police authorities the following
day and filed their formal complaint, contained in a
sworn statement. (pp. 34-38, TSN, id.)
Version of the Defense
Insisting that appellant and complainant were
sweethearts, the defense presents the following
version of the facts:13
"The defense's version of the case is as follows:
Accused Egmedio Lampaza and complainant Teodora
Wacay are neighbors. They have known each other
since childhood. Accused courted complainant who
later became his girlfriend. However, they married
different persons, but that notwithstanding, they
have had intimate relations.
"In the morning of 20 March 1988, accused heard a
signal from complainant. The latter informed him
that her husband was in another town, and when he
asked her "what now because your husband is not
there," complainant just laughed. Complainant told
accused that she was going to fetch her carabao, so
he followed her. When he reached the place where
she was, he put his arms around her, but she brushed
them aside, apprehensive that they might be seen.
Complainant went up the nipa hut, the same place
where they had had sexual intercourse, and made
love again, with complainant taking off her clothes
first, followed by accused taking off his pants and
shirt. They made love consensually. He did not
threaten complainant; neither did he use force [or]
violence in consummating the sexual act because the
same was with the consent of complainant (t.s.n.,
August 6, 1991.)
"Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the
accused, testified that complainant is the mistress of
her husband, the accused. Because of her husband's
extra-marital relationship, they were always
quarreling. To avoid further trouble she went to Iloilo
to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del
Rosario (pp. 49-50, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter
testified that Filomena had worked for her family as a
housemaid, and during the course of her
employment she had confided to her employer that
her (Filomena's) husband was maltreating her and
ha[d] a querida (t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992)."
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was
consensual, the trial court held that appellant used
force against the victim by twisting her arm and
bodily lifting her from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He
also threatened and intimidated her by placing a bolo
beside her during the actual rape. The trial court
ruled:14
"Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the
case show that there was force committed on the
victim when her arms were twisted and she was
bodily lifted from the farm lot to the nipa hut. She
was intimidated or there was a threat to intimidate
her, when the bolo was placed beside her during the
rape.
"This court finds that the incident complained of
which occurred on March 20, 1988 was x x x done
without the consent [or] approval of the victim.
"We do not see any reason why Teodora Wacay
related the incident to her husband the following
evening, if indeed the rape was not committed
because the husband was out of town then. Much
more, that she went to court. In People vs. Estolano,
193 SCRA 383, the Supreme Court held that
complainant would not have made the offense
subject and endured the ordeal of testifying to all its
gory detail if she had not in fact been raped."
Affirming appellants conviction, the Court of Appeals
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua and
increased the moral damages to P50,000.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant contends that the trial court committed
the following errors:15
I
x x x [I]n holding that accused-appellant used force
and intimidation on complainant in order to
consummate the sexual act
II
 x x x [I]n holding that the sexual intercourse herein
complained of was done without the consent [or]
approval of the victim
III
x x x [I]n finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape based on the
inconsistencies, contradictions, and incredibilities
palpably apparent in complainants testimony and in
[the testimonies] of her witnesses
In resolving this appeal, we shall address seriatim the
three grounds raised by appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Force and Intimidation
Appellant contends that rape was not proven
because force and intimidation were not established
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, he argues that
the testimony of the victim on this point should be
rejected, because it conflicted with her Sworn
Statement given during the preliminary
investigation. First, in her statement she averred that
he pressed [her] forward towards the nipa hut; but
she testified that he lifted her. Second, she declared
in her statement that he forcibly made [her] lie
down, but she testified that he dump[ed] [her] on the
floor. Third, she also stated that appellants bolo was
tucked to his side, but she testified that it was placed
beside her.16
We are not convinced. The "conflicts" cited by
appellant are largely semantical, not factual, in
character. Whether appellant forcibly made her lie
down on the floor or whether he dumped her makes
no substantial difference in appreciating the fact of
the crime: that she was down on the floor against her
will. Likewise, appellant makes too much ado about
the discrepancy between her being pressed forward
and her being lifted; the allegedly conflicting
statements equally mean that he forced her to go to
the nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled rule is that
inconsistencies between an affidavit and a testimony
do not necessarily discredit the witness, for affidavits
are generally incomplete17 and are not considered
final repositories of truth.18
In any event, we agree with the trial court that
appellant used force and intimidation in ravaging
complainant. Although its factual findings are not
absolutely binding on this Court because it was not
the ponente who heard the prosecution
witnesses,19 we believe and so hold that the totality
of the evidence presented indubitably demonstrates
that appellant had sexual intercourse with
complainant against her will. He twisted the arms of
the terrified victim, forced her to go inside the
uninhabited nipa hut, placed the bolo beside her, and
threatened to kill her in order to sate his lust. The
victim testified as follows:20
Q. Now, while you were untying the rope of your
carabao, do you recall of any unusual incident that
happened?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What was that incident?
A. All of a sudden, a person came from behind me
and twisted both my hands. (Witness demonstrated
with her right hand twisted towards the left side of
her body while the left hand was also twisted
towards the right side of her body, both hands in
front).
xxx
Q. Now, after the accused Egmedio Lampaza twisted
your arms, what else happened?
A. He lifted me.
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable
Court how you were lifted by Egmedio Lampaza?
A. (With Julie Magbanua acting in place of the victim
and the witness in place of the accused, the accused
stands behind the victim and place[s] both arms
around the victim while the arms of the victim are
twisted with the right arms towards the left and the
left arms towards the right side of her body and from
that position the accused lifts the victim upward,
raising the victim about three inches from the
ground.)
Q. Now, Madam Witness, while you were being lifted
by the accused in the position you have just
mentioned, what else did he do?
A. Egmedio Lampaza told me, Come, lets have sexual
intercourse.
Q. While saying that and while lifting you, what else
did Egmedio Lampaza do, if any?
A. He brought me to the nipa hut, Sir.
Q. How far is that nipa hut from where you were at
that time?
A. About five arms stretch away, Sir.
Q. Was that hut inhabited?
A. No one lives there.
xxx
Q. While you were being lifted by the accused and
being carried to the nipa hut, what did you do if you
did anything?
A. I struggled to set myself free.
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable
Court how you struggled?
A. (At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place
of the accused while the witness takes the place of
the victim and from the position previously
described, with the xxx arms [of the accused] around
the victim, the victim struggle[s] to set herself free by
moving her body towards the left and right and
trie[s] to push her head downward away from the
arms of the accused [who is] embracing her. The
witness further states that since her feet were off the
ground, it [was] hard to set herself free).
Q. Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself
from the clutches of the accused, what else did you
do if any?
A. I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a
movement as if she were pedalling an unseen
bicycle).
Q. Did you make any statement while you were trying
to struggle from the hold of the accused?
A. I did not say anything. I only struggled.
Q. Why did you not say anything?
xxx
A. Because I was afraid, Sir.
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q. Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with
you?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were already at the nipa hut, what did A If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse
the accused do, if any? with you, I am going to kill you.

A He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut. Q Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by
the accused with him?
xxx
A Yes, Sir.
Q After the accused dumped you on the floor of the
nipa hut, what happened to you? Q What was he carrying?

A The accused pinned both my legs as well as my A He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
right hand, Sir, with both of his knees.
Q Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?
xxx
A It was beside me, Sir.
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Appellant further argues that if there was any
Q Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what resistance [by the victim], it was couched in general
next did the accused do? terms.21 The argument is bereft of merit. We must
stress that the law does not impose upon a rape
A The accused took off his pants. victim the burden of proving resistance.22 Indeed,
physical resistance need not be established when the
Q While the accused was doing that, was the accused culprit employed intimidation,23 which, insofar as it
saying anything? was directed at the mind of the victim, must be
viewed in the light of the latter's perception and
A Yes, Sir.
judgment at the time.24 In the present case, the
Q What did he say? victim was terrified because the threat of the
appellant to kill her was substantiated by the bolo he
placed beside her. Furthermore, she could not have
successfully resisted because, according to her, he
was husky and strong.
Neither are we persuaded by his contention that
complainant did not undergo medical examination to
show signs of physical struggle or assault.25 The fact
that the victim had no visible signs of injury did not
by itself disprove rape.26 We reiterate that she was
too intimidated to offer serious resistance to the
advances of appellant.
More important, no law requires a medical
examination for the successful prosecution of
rape.27 Even without a medical report, the rape
victims credible testimony, standing alone, is a
sufficient basis for conviction.28 In the present case,
we find no reason to disbelieve her testimony. Time
and time again, the Court has held that no woman in
her right mind would declare to the whole world that
she was raped and subject herself to the concomitant
strain and stigma, unless she is telling the truth.29 For
his part, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to
show that the victim's testimony was false.
Second Issue: Sweetheart Theory
Appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with
the complainant that fateful day, but argues that
they were lovers and the act was consensual.30 He
adds that their respective marriages to different
persons had not prevented them from engaging in
sexual dalliances with each other.
We are not persuaded. Other than his bare
assertions, appellant adduced no independent proof
that he was the sweetheart of the victim. His defense
was neither corroborated by any other witness nor
substantiated by any memento, love note, picture or
token.31 Furthermore, even assuming that the two
were lovers, their relationship did not give him a
license to sexually assault her.32
Appellants defense is further negated by the
behavior of the victim who, according to Rogelio
Sumbilon, was running out of the crime scene
sobbing and very pale33 immediately after the
commission of the crime. Elaborating during cross-
examination, he said that the victim was in a hurry, as
if she was afraid of something and as if somebody
was running after her.34 When they reached her
house, she told him that she was afraid and that they
should hurry to her mothers house about three or
four kilometers away. Her conduct clearly belied
appellants claim that the sexual act was consensual.
Third Issue: Alleged Inconsistencies and Incredibilities
Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses
should not be accorded credence because their
testimonies were replete with inconsistencies and
incredibilities. In addition to the instances alluded to
earlier, appellant cites the following: the victim
testified that she shouted, although she said in her
Sworn Statement that she had not done so; she
allegedly told her husband of the rape on the evening
of the fateful day, but her husband testified that he
did not return home until the afternoon of the
following day.35
We are not persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies
are minor in character and, as such, do not impugn
the credibility of the complainant. Indicative of an
unrehearsed testimony, the slight contradictions
even serve to strengthen her credibility.36 Indeed, the
Court cannot expect a rape victim to remember every
ugly detail of the sexual assault.37
Equally unconvincing is the alleged physical
impossibility of the victims narration that he was
allegedly pinning her down with both his hands while
taking off his shirt at the same time.38 The alleged
impossibility does not imply the falsity of her
testimony; it only means that it was impossible for
her to remember the minutiae of appellants act.
Appellant also challenges the plausibility of the
following assertions of the victim: (a) she made no
mention of the rape to her nephew when she saw
him right after the incident;39 (b) she did not
immediately tell her husband that she had been
raped;40 (c) she did not report the outrage to the
police or to the barangay officials.41
These arguments are puerile. Complainants
testimony was not weakened by her failure to
immediately narrate the incident to her nephew or to
her husband. There is no code of conduct prescribing
the correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual
assault. When placed under a great deal of emotional
stress, the workings of the human mind are
unpredictable.42 Some may immediately relay the
incident to authorities and close relatives, but others
need time to compose themselves before deciding on
a course of action.43 Although she did not
immediately inform her nephew about the incident,
she told her husband about it after he arrived from
another town, when they were about to sleep. That
same night, she and her husband decided to report
the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her
account is far from incredible. Even assuming that
there was a delay in reporting the incident to the
police, this fact is not necessarily an indication of
fabrication.44
Crime and Punishment
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
rape is committed when carnal knowledge of a
woman is obtained under any of the following
circumstances: (1) force or intimidation is used (2)
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (3) the woman is under twelve years
of age or is demented. Herein appellant does not
deny that he had carnal knowledge of the victim.
Moreover, the totality of the evidence presented
shows that he employed force and intimidation
against her. Clearly, his conviction of rape should be
affirmed.
Under the law in effect when the crime was
committed, the penalty for simple rape was reclusion
perpetua. In imposing a lower indeterminate penalty,
the trial court erred, because the Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply when the offense
involved is punishable with reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, appellant should be ordered to pay the
victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, in line with
existing jurisprudence.45 We agree with the Court of
Appeals that he should also be ordered to
pay P50,000 as moral damages. The Court has held
that the fact that complainant has suffered the
trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages is too obvious to still require the victims
recital thereof at the trial x x x.46
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONthat
the appellant shall pay the victim P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto in addition to the P50,000
awarded as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-
Reyes, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. MANOLITO OYANIB y
MENDOZA, Accused-Appellant.
 DECISION deadly weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six
inches long and with intent to kill and evident
PARDO, J.: premeditation and by means of treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo,
the joint decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch thereby inflicting upon him the following physical
02, Iligan City finding him guilty beyond reasonable injuries, to wit:
doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing him
to an indeterminate penalty 2 of six (6) months one Cardiorespiratory arrest
day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight (8) Hypovolemic shock irreversible
years of prision mayor as maximum, 3 and to pay
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the Multiple organ injury
death of Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua,
to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
wife, Tita T. Oyanib. 4cräläwvirtualibräry
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the
Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
Iligan City two (2) separate informations charging
circumstances (sic) of evident
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with murder
premeditation.5cräläwvirtualibräry
and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6018
Criminal Case No. 6012
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
and (sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack,
assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of said
attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code.6cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the
temporary liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities 7 and was
immediately detained at the Iligan City
Jail. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the
informations against him and translating them into
the Visayan dialect. 9 He pleaded not guilty to both
charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts,
the trial court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter
Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were
married on February 3, 1979 10 and had two (2)
children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1,
Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita
separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their
two (2) children. Tita rented a room at the second
floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter
Edgardo), not far from the place where her family
lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995,
while Edgardo and his family were watching TV at
the sala located at the ground floor of their house at
Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a
commotion coming from the second floor rented by
Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite
some time. When it died down, Edgardo went
upstairs to check. 11cräläwvirtualibräry
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster,
bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito
stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while
sitting on the latters stomach. Jesus was wearing a
pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked
Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo
not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the
police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the
hospital. She died on the way to the
hospital. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General
Investigation Office, Iligan City Police Command,
Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about
9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while he
was on duty, he received an information regarding a
stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-
A, Tambacan, Iligan City. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body
of Jesus lying face up with several stab wounds in
different parts of the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt
and long pants. From the crime scene, he recovered a
knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to
check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead.
Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and
Tita. 14 The incident was recorded in the police
blotter as Entry No. 137138. 15cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon,
Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies
of Jesus and Tita. 16 Jesus sustained multiple stab
wounds, and those inflicted in the right and left
chests and stomach were fatal. 17 The cause of death
was cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock
irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple stab
wound chest and abdomen. 18cräläwvirtualibräry
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with
the fatal wounds inflicted in the left chest and right
side of the abdomen. The cause of death was
cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and
multiple stab wound. 19cräläwvirtualibräry
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of
arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live
separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2)
children. Immediately after the separation, Tita
stayed at her friend Merlyns house for two (2)
months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas
residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan
City, and rented the second floor. 20 The rented space
consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It
was arranged in a manner that if one enters the main
entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and
from the sala, directly to the door of the adjoining
room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita
back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for
the sake of the children. However, Tita was very
reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. 21 In fact, she
was very open about her relationship with other men
and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he
chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City. 22 Manolito confronted Tita
and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and
reminded her that she was still his wife. They just
ignored him; they even threatened to kill
him. 23cräläwvirtualibräry
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper,
his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from
the Iligan City National High School. The letter
mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2)
subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the
school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the
morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day,
Manolito went to Titas house to ask her to attend the
school meeting in his behalf. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of
romance (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried
open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught
his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse.
Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to
his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek.
Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus
was 59 in height and weighed about 70 kg., the
suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his
balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of
this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach.
Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to
come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
Manolito in the head, while at the same time
shouting kill him Jake, kill him
Jake. 25cräläwvirtualibräry
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting
him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito
stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed
Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle.
This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left
breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in
different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless
body of her paramour. It was at this point that
Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting,
appeared from the ground floor and inquired about
what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to
interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and
went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at
the wake of his friends neighbor. He threw away the
knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour.
At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day,
he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for
Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he
heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to
surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to
the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan
City. 26cräläwvirtualibräry
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he
went to his wifes place, Manolito said that he
brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he
received threats from his wife and her paramour,
Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live
together. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court
promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings
and pronouncements and having carefully observed
the demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby
declares accused MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide
(Crim. Case No. II-6018) and appreciating the two (2)
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation
and voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstances to consider, this Court sentences
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an
imprisonment as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum
to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as
Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the
costs.
2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.
It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment
is subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed
in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his
preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge28cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza interposed an appeal from the joint
decision of the trial court to the Supreme
Court. 29cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he
killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, which boiled down to
the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. 30 He questioned the trial courts
appreciation of the facts and the evidence,
contending that it ignored and overlooked vital
pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of
the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body
of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph
graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not
wearing any underwear, lending credence to his
defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the
Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant
failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear
and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims
under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the
trial court did not err in denying him the exempting
privilege under the Article. 31cräläwvirtualibräry
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and
her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause.
An absolutory cause is present where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy
and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed. 32cräläwvirtualibräry
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon
accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the
satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any
criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code prescribes the following essential elements for
such a defense: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or
facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter)
or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity
of the other spouse. 33 Accused must prove these
elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable. The death
caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his
spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing
by the husband of his wife must concur with her
flagrant adultery. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
There is no question that the first element is present
in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must
convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented
and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find
accused to have acted within the circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his
wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened
was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of
his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of
having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and
outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and
kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife
when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well
several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
surrendered to the police when a call for him to
surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before
affording the offended spouse the opportunity to
avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As
the Court put it in People v.
Wagas: 35cräläwvirtualibräry
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because
of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise
her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as
a purification is so severe as that it can only be
justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught
in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only
with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse
or immediately thereafter.
WHEREFORE , the Court REVERSES the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan
City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The
Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
to two (2) years and four (4) months
of destierro. 36 He shall not be permitted to enter
Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100)
kilometers from Iligan City. 37cräläwvirtualibräry
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. VALERIANO DUCOSIN, Defendant-
Appellant.
Alejandra F. Antonio for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicting the appellant of the
crime of frustrated murder was referred by the first
division to the court in banc for the proper
interpretation and application of Act No. 4103 of the
Philippine Legislature approved on December 5,
1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate
Sentence Law". As this is the first case which has
come before us involving the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, it will be convenient to set out here some of its
provisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 is as follows:
Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by acts of the Philippine
Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal
Code, the court shall order the accused to be
imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be
less than the minimum term of imprisonment
provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum
term which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
law; and where the offense is punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the
court shall sentence the accused to such maximum as
may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly
imposed under the present rules of the said Code,
and to a minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period by said Code for the
offense. Except as provided in section two hereof,
any person who shall have been so convicted and
sentenced and shall have served the minimum
sentence imposed hereunder, may be released on
parole in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 2 is as follows:
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, sedition or
espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who
are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escape from confinement or evaded sentence; to
those who having been granted conditional pardon
by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to
those already sentenced by final judgment at the
time of approval of this Act, except as provided in
section five hereof.
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of
Indeterminate Sentence" to be composed of the
Secretary of Justice as chairman and four members to
be appointed by the Governor-General, with the
advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. This
section describes the qualifications of the members.
Section 4 gives the board authority to adopt rules of
procedures and provides for the compensation of the
members.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the
physical, mental and moral record of the prisoners
who shall be eligible to parole and authorizes the
board to determine the proper time for the release
of such prisoners. After a prisoner has served the
"minimum penalty" imposed upon on him and the
board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by the
training for release and that there is a reasonable
probability that he will not violate the law again and
that his release "will not be incompatible with the
welfare of society", the board may in its discretion
authorize the release of such prisoner on parole. The
board may also recommend the release on parole of
other prisoners previously convicted of any offense
than those named in section
2.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners
released on parole for a period "equivalent to the
remaining portion of the maximum sentence
imposed upon him or until final release and discharge
by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence." Section 7
provides that a certified copy of the board's order of
conditional or final release shall be filed with the
court and with the Chief of
Constabulary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any
of the conditions of his parole, who violates any law
during the period of surveillance for which he has
been convicted, shall be subject to re-arrest and
confinement and "shall serve the remaining
unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for
which he was originally committed to prison" unless
the board grants a new
parole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall not be construed
to impair the powers given to the Governor-General
under section 64 of the Administrative Code of the
Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
By its terms, Act No. 4103 became the law upon its
approval, that is to say, on December 5,
1933.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on
September 30, 1932, for the crime of frustrated
murder upon the following information:chanrobles
virtual law library
That on or about the 23rd day of September, 1932, in
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with intent to kill, treacherously
attack, assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by
then and there suddenly and without any warning,
stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby inflicting
upon him several wounds in different parts of the
body, some of which are necessarily mortal, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a
consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of said accused, that is, by the timely
intervention of medical assistance.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to ten years and one day of prision
mayor with the accessory penalties prescribed by law
and to pay the costs. The penalty for the crime of
murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated felony is
the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for
the consummated felony, which in the present case
is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or from ten years and
one day to seventeen years and four months. The
accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstances, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, fixes the penalty within the minimum
period, that is to say, from ten years and one day to
twelve years, leaving to the discretion of the court
the precise time to be served within said range, i.e.,
not less than years and one day nor more than
twelve years. The penalty imposed by the trial judge
being within its range is correct and therefore is the
penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense which this accused has
committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
was enacted after this appeal was lodged in this
court, we are now required to revise the sentence
imposed upon the appellant and to bring the same
into conformity with Act No.
4103.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the
court must now, instead of a single fixed penalty,
determine two penalties, referred to in the
Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and
"minimum". The prisoner must serve the minimum
penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period
between the minimum and maximum penalty
indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the
condition set out in said Act, be released from serving
said period in whole or in part. He must be
sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period
which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than
the "minimum", as these terms are used in the
Indeterminate Sentence
Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
This leads up to the important question: How shall
the "maximum" and the "minimum" penalty be
determined?chanrobles virtual law library
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any
case punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in
accordance with the rules and provisions of said Code
exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, had never been passed. We think it is
clear from a reading of Act No. 4103 that it was not
its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the
body of the Act indicates any intention on the part of
the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The legislative
history of the Act further shows that attention was
called to the necessity for taking care "so as not to
bring the provisions of this bill in conflict with the
provisions of our penal laws, especially with those
treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House
of Representatives, H-3321, Ninth Philippine
Legislature, Third Session.)chanrobles virtual law
library
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code:
Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of
public funds in the amount of P10,000. No mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances are present. Under
this law the court may impose on him a maximum
sentence not exceeding ten years and eight months
but not less than nine years, four months and one
day ( see art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal Code), and a
minimum which shall not be less than four years, two
months and one day (the minimum imprisonment
period of prision correccional in its maximum
to prision mayor in its minimum. See article 61,
Revised Penal Code). The court, therefore, may
sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not less
than five years nor more than ten years or for not
less than seven years nor more than ten years and
eight months, etc.
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the
"maximum" is determined in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. In the example
given reference is made to article 217, paragraph 3,
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the
defendant shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its medium and maximum period. The penalty is
placed in the medium degree because of the absence
of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to
say, anywhere between nine years, four months and
one day and ten years and eight months in the
discretion of the court. In the case on appeal here the
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper
penalty under the Revised Penal Code because of the
plea of guilty, that is to say, between ten years and
one day and twelve years in the discretion of the
court. This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited
by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in conformity with
the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised Penal
Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let us say,
eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No.
4103 does not require this court to assess the said
penalty at 12 years, which is the longest time of
imprisonment within the minimum
degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of
imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules
of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and
established as the maximum of the sentence which
shall be imposed upon the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
We come now to determine the "minimum
imprisonment period" referred to in Act No. 4103.
Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum
which shall not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense." We are
here upon new ground. It is in determining the
"minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon
the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest
discretion that the courts have ever had. The
determination of the "minimum" penalty presents
two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical
determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonment period; and second, the broad
question of the factors and circumstances that should
guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained
limits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the
offense "to mean the penalty next lower to that
determined by the court in the case before it as the
maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by
the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion above). In
the example which the Legislature had before it in
the Committee Report above mentioned, the
maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be
the medium degree of prision mayor in its medium
and maximum period. The penalty next lower
is prision correccional in its maximum degree
to prision mayor in its minimum degree (article 61,
paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say,
anywhere from four years, two months and one day
to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act
No. 4103, simply provides that the "minimum" shall
"not be less than the minimum imprisonment period
of the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the
minimum of the penalty anywhere between four
years, two months and one day and eight years. In
the example given by the committee they stated that
the court might fix the minimum penalty at five years
or seven years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower
penalty to the maximum already determined as
aforesaid, is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is
to say, from four years, two months and one day to
ten years. As stated, it is in the discretion of the court
to fix the time of imprisonment within the said range
without reference to the technical subdivisions of
maximum degree, medium degree and minimum
degree, and in this particular the courts are vested as
stated with a wider discretion than they ever had
before.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We come now to the second aspect of the
determination of the minimum penalty, namely, the
considerations which should guide the court in fixing
the term or duration of the minimum period of
imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the
Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI,
August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a
member of society. This opens up an almost limitless
field of investigation and study which it is the duty of
the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not
be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative
necessity of protecting the social
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the
factors that should be considered are: (1) His age,
especially with reference to extreme youth or old
age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3)
his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his
previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
criminal record if any); (5) his previous education,
both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and
aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his
demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to
the crime committed; (8) the manner and
circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9)
the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act
No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes - this should
be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties
for analogous
crimes).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In considering the criminal as a member of society,
his relationship, first, toward his dependents, family
and associates and their relationship with him, and
second, his relationship towards society at large and
the State are important factors. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal
acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming
the individual for economic usefulness and other
social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law aims to individualize the administration of our
criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in
these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind
as guides, the courts can give full effect to the
beneficent intention of the
Legislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It is our duty now to assess the minimum
imprisonment period under Act No. 4103 in the case
before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this
defendant was convicted before Act No. 4103
became effective, and as we know nothing of his
antecedents because his plea of guilty rendered it
unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined
to the record before us. He plead guilty to all of the
acts which constitute the crime of murder and only
the timely intervention of medical assistance
prevented the death of his victim and the
prosecution of the appellant for murder. He was
given the full benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing
of the maximum of the sentence. With such light as
we have received from the record in this case, we
have concluded that a reasonable and proper
minimum period of imprisonment should be seven
years, which is within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to the maximum, that is to say,
within the range from four years, two months and
one day to ten years of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period. We repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require
the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment
in the minimum period of the degree next lower to
the maximum
penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The judgment of the court below is modified to this
extent: that the defendant-appellant is hereby
sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years and
one day of prision mayor in its maximum degree, and
to a minimum imprisonment period of seven years,
and as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed. With costs de
oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad
Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo
and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The
following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant
Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur,
with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children.
From there they went to live in the house of his half-
brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of
Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. After about a
month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in
the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the
stairs of the house. The accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his
bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife,
Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia
toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately
followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up
in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the
floor of the living room and then lay down beside
her. In this position he was found by the people who
came in response to the shouts for help made by his
eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed
and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her
father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant
Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D,
wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was
admittedly of jealousy because according to his
statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for
the reason that he often saw her in the company of
his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two
were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed
that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by
the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of
the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant
entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His
counsel presented the testimony of two guards of
the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to
the effect that his conduct there was rather strange
and that he behaved like an insane person; that
sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark
naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at
times he would remain silent and indifferent to his
surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath
and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in
chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by
himself without being asked; and that once when the
door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from
inside into the prison compound apparently in an
attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the
appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and
we are inclined to agree with the lower court.
According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his
opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an
imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal
liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based
on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of
Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain interpreting and applying said
provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote
Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on
the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order
that this exempting circumstances may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment;1 that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or
that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will. For this reason, it was held that the
imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely
deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of
will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that
deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility
or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be
clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition.
Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a
 person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve
him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of
will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his
being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having
killed his wife. From the case of United
States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the
following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide,
which goes no further than to indicate that the
accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical
burst of anger or passion, and other testimony
to the effect that, while in confinement
awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly
at times, is not sufficient to establish the
defense of insanity. The conduct of the
defendant while in confinement appears to
have been due to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced
that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years,
he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is
an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his
farm, raised five children, and supported his family
and even maintained in school his children of school
age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side
line he made copra. And a man who could feel the
pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the
extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an
imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were
justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he
believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some
color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as
that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the
following effect. In addition to the observations
made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D,
it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in
the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones,
the latter was living with his grandmother, and his
house was vacant. However, after the family of
Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only
frequented said house but also used to sleep there
nights. All this may have aroused and even partly
confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his
way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He
seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple,
and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not
been fully developed. His action in picking up the
body of his wife after she fell down to the ground,
dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and
lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of
remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did
not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made
no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him
down and arrest him. In his written statement he
readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the
trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all
the trouble and expense of catching him, and
insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are
not prepared to find that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission
of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not
intent or proving it. At least said aggravating
circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either
in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of
First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit
of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the
existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the
other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded
warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or
paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely that the accused is "suffering some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of action,
defense, or communication with his fellow beings,"
or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his
will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, —
that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of
jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances
without any aggravating circumstance to offset them,
at first we thought of the possible applicability of the
provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for
parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will
be observed however, that article 64 refers to the
application of penalties which contain three periods
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed
of three different penalties, each one of which forms
a period in accordance with the provisions of articles
76 and 77, which is not true in the present case
where the penalty applicable for parricide is
composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the
other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the
application of indivisible penalties whether it be a
single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties
like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore
clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the
present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that
when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme
Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10
Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying
article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code)
which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3
of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice
Arellano said the following:
And even though the court should take into
consideration the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it
can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be
reduced to the next lower to that imposed by
law, because, according to a ruling of the court
of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not
contain a precept similar to that contained in
Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the
Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30,
1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed,
the strict application of which is inevitable and
which, under the law, must be sustained, this
court now resorts to the discretional power
conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the
Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed
from with costs, and hereby order that a
proper petition be filed with the executive
branch of the Government in order that the
 latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of
the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign
power, may reduce the penalty to that of the
next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil.
604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in
affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing
defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating
circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the
penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible
penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death,
paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be
applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did
not have that malice nor has exhibited such
moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment,
and therefore under the provisions of article 5
of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully
invite the attention of the Chief Executive to
the case with a view to executive clemency
after appellant has served an appreciable
amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide
and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower
court with the modification that the appellant will be
credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay
costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken
by this same court in the two cases above cited, and
believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter
penalty, this case should be brought to the attention
of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may
reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion
perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason,
Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.