Lacson vs San Jose-Lacson August 30, 1968

FACTS:
 Alfonso Lacson (petitioner) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson(respondent) were married on February 14, 1953. They had
four children.
 On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in
Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed as civil case in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila (JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself. The spouses, through their
respective counsels, succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and
separation of property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition in the CFI of Negros Occidental, submitting that they had
mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. The terms included a) separation of property, b) all
earnings of each spouse shall belong to that spouse exclusively, c) the custody of the two elder children shall be awarded
to Alfonso and the two younger children to Carmen, d) Alfonso shall pay Carmen a monthly allowance of P200.00 for the
support of the children, and e) each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation and every summer the former
spouses shall exchange children. For that particular year, however, Carmen was allowed custody of all four children until
June of 1963, when she was supposed to return the two older children to Alfonso’s custody.
 Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law," the CFI issued an order on April 27, 1963, rendering
judgment approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. In compliance with paragraph 4 of their mutual
agreement, the petitioner spouse delivered all the four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for their
support. On May 7, however, Carmen filed a motion with the JDRC alleging that the compromise agreement was the only
way she could get custody of all the children and praying that she be relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody
and visitation of the children and that she now be awarded full custody. The petitioner spouse opposed and the JDRC
dismissed the case and denied her motion for reconsideration.
 Carmen appealed Court of Appeals and the CA filed a petition for certiorari. Carmen went to the CFI and filed a
motion for reconsideration for their compromise judgement, but was denied. The CFI favored Alfonso and ordered Carmen
to return the two older children by June, on pain of contempt. It is from this decision that the instant case springs. Carmen
instituted certiorari proceedings with the CA against the CFI, saying the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion and
acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromise agreement. The CA declared void
the portion of the agreement pertaining to the custody of children.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife.

RULING:
In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership. It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's
residence being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, considering that a lengthy
separation has existed between them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is clear. The Court
cannot constrain the spouses to live together, as: “It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. .. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouse to live under the same roof; and the experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).”

Although approving the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, the Court
does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouse. In this jurisdiction, the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109,
new Civil Code).

The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." It prohibits in no
uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court.

Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides that every child:(1) Is entitled to parental care;(2) Shall receive at least
elementary education;(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;(4) Has a right to live in an
atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development. It is clear that the provision grants to every
child rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes of his parents. His welfare should not be
subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact,
the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him by law. The
need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals
that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. The SC relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents.
To be sure, this was not a sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.
In regarding the matter of support for the children — assuming that the custody of any or more of the children will be finally
awarded to the mother. Although the spouses have agreed upon the monthly support of P150 to be given by the petitioner
spouse for each child, still this Court must speak out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. The SC may take judicial
notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and services,
not to mention the fact that all the children are already of school age. Therefore the CFI may increase this amount of P150
according to the needs of each child.

DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of G.R. L-23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is hereby
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in accordance with this decision. No
pronouncement as to costs

PRINCIPLE: ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
Yes. Since the spouses are only separated de facto, the petitioner has a duty to render mutual help and support. He is
obliged to support the respondent and her children in accordance with Article 109(a) and Article 365 of the Civil Code,
because the marriage still subsists and is valid.(right to defend the life and honor of the other spouse; medical attendance
for the sick spouse; moral assistance)
TY vs CA G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
FACTS:
 Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then
they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
 Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein
petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also
had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
 On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a case with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred
that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner
the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria
was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
 Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite
on April 3, 1979. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated
August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29,
1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence
during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil
marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage
as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
ceremony on April 4, 1982
 The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void
ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to
Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Petitioner filed for a petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
RULING:
No. Supreme Court is with the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting, she is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition
for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. (The provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case,as it would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.)
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner
Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of
the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and
Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private
respondent.
Principle:
Article 68
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
Duties and Obligations:
 In this jurisdiction the husband and wife are obliged to lived together observe love, mutual respect and fidelity and
render mutual help and support.
 Damages for failure to comply with obligations.There can be no action for damages because of a breach of
marital obligation.Hence, if a spouse in bad faith refuses to comply with his/her obligations, he or she may be held liable
under Article 19, 20 and 21.
Lilius vs Manila Railroad Co.
Plaintiffs-Appellants: Aleko Lilius et al
Defendant-Appellant: The Manila Railroad Company
FACTS:
 Aleko Lilius is a well-known journalist, author and photographer
 May 10, 1931 (7:00am):
Aleko together with Sonja Maria Lilius, his wife and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius left Manila driven by him
for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna on a sight-seeing trip. He drove from 19 to 25 miles an hour. He was
entirely unfamiliar with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap.
Before reaching the crossing, there was nothing to indicate its existence because of the houses and trees that conceals
the crossing and it was impossible to see an approaching train. As the car reaches the crossing in question, Aleko slowed
down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. However, he did not see the
crossing but he heard 2 short whistles. Afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him which turned out to be
the locomotive of the Manila Railroad Company’s train coming towards Aleko’s vehicle. The locomotive struck Aleko’s
vehicle right in the center and Sofia and Brita were thrown from the car. On the afternoon, the victims rushed at St. Paul’s
Hospital in Manila where they were treated.

● Aleko filed a complaint praying that the Manila Railroad Company be ordered to pay to said plaintiffs material and
moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the company’s employees.
● The Manila Railroad denied allegations and alleged that Aleko negligently and recklessly drove his car and prays that
it be absolved from the complaint.
● Upon investigation, there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn
the public of approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the station with a red
flag in one hand and a green one in the other. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his
post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train.
● The Supreme Court found the Manila Railroad Company liable for the accident by reason of its own negligence and
that of its employees.
● The case was centered on the sums of money fixed by the Court of First Instance as indemnities for damages which
the Manila Railroad company should pay to Aleko.
ISSUE AND RULING:
Whether or not the award of damages fixed by the CFI is proper?
The Supreme Court believed that the indemnity for damages fixed by the CFI are reasonable. With regard to the
amount of P2,500 for the loss of “consortium” (companionship, love and affection and intimacy between husband and wife
within a marriage; duty owed by a wife to her husband and vice versa) of Aleko’s wife, that is, her services, society and
conjugal companionship, as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident, the Supreme Court did
not grant such request. The provisions of the Civil Marriage Law of 1870 in Articles 44-48 provides that:
“x x x the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be
faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live
with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country
x x x”
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband’s rights is to count on his wife’s assistance. This
assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household duties. When the wife’s mission
was circumscribed to the home, she performed all the said tasks and her physical capacity always redounded to the
husband’s prejudice as it deprived him of her assistance. In the present case, Aleko failed to present any evidence
showing the existence of domestic services and their nature of Sonja as his translator and secretary prior to the accident in
order that it may serve as a basis for estimating their value for damages. Therefore, the Court ordered that in order that
Aleko may recover damages for deprivation of his wife’s assistance during her illness from an accident, it is necessary for
him to prove the existence of such assistance and his wife’s willingness to continue rendering it had she not been
prevented from so doing by her illness.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the sole modification that
interest of 6% per annum from the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment becomes final will be added to the
indemnities granted, with the costs of both instances against the appellant.
PRINCIPLES:
- Article 68 of the Family Code:
“The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
support”
- Personal Obligations of Husband and Wife:
1. Duty to live together (cohabitation/consortium)
2. Duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
3. Duty to render mutual help and support (right to defend the life and honor of the other spouse; medical attendance for
the sick spouse; moral assistance)
Ayala Investments vs. CA
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998
Facts:

Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills secured a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corp
(AIDC). As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP, executed security
agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court
issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.

Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce
the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the
said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at
public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Ruling:

NO, the conjugal partnership of Spouses Ching may not be held liable for the debt guaranteed by Alfredo for PBM.

The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the
wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other
before entering into any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated
transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the
benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss
resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

Art 73: Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the
other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection is proper, and (2) Benefit has accrued to
the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
Go vs. CA
Facts :

Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981.

The video coverage of their wedding was provided by the petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00.

The couple tried to claim the video tape of their wedding which they planned to show their relatives in the US but they
failed thrice because the tape was apparently not yet processed. Both parties agreed that the tape would be ready upon
the private respondents return.

When the private respondents came home from their honeymoon, they got furious when they found out that the tape had
been erased by the petitioners and could no longer be retrieved.

The private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against yhe petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court which ruled in the private respondents' favor.

The petitioners were dissatisfied with the decision of the RTC and appealed to the CA but the appellate court dismissed
the appeal anf affirmed the court a quo's decision.

The petitioners contend that the CA erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented which showed that they only
acted as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and thus, should not have been liable and that there is no evidence that the erasure
of the tape was done in bad faith.They insisted that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty
days, as agreed upon by in their contract, the erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice to
minimize losses.

Petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the RTC and CA holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy
regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed and argues that when his wife entered into the contract with private respondent,
she was acting alone for her sole interest.
Issue : WoN the RTC and CA erred in holding Alex Go jointly and severally liable with his wife
SC ruling :
The Court is not persuaded with the argument of the petitioners upon their lack of malice or fraudulent intent in the erasure
of the tape. They are clearly guilty for the delay of the release of the video tape. The private respondents informed them
that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later, thus their act of erasing the tape was unjustified.
The Court found merit on the contention of Alex Go. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code( now Article 73 of the Family Code,
the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the case at
bar, it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondents. Consequently, she is solely
liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only
as between the parties who execute them.
Tamargo v CA
FACTS:
- On October 1982, ADELBERTO BUNDOC, a 10-year old minor shot Jennifer Tamargo with air rifle causing injuries
which resulted in her death.
- A civil case for damages was filed by Jennifer’s adopting parents and natural parents against Aldeberto’s natural
parents.
- A criminal information was charged by the same petitioners against Adelberto for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence. However, Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability because of his minority on the ground
that he acted without discernment.
- Prior to the shooting of Jennifer, on DECEMBER 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a PETITION TO
ADOPT the minor Adelberto. The same was granted on NOVEMBER 1982, after Adelberto shot Jennifer.
- Bundoc spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents, contends that parental authority has shifted to the Rapisura spouses,
the adopting parents ofAdelberto from the moment the successful petition was filed.
- RTC: DISMISSED the civil complaint and ruled that the natural parents of Adelberto were not an indispensable party
in the case.
- RTC: DENIED Petititioner’s motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
- CA: Petitioners went to the CA on a petition for mandamus and certiorari but the same was DENIED. CA ruled that
petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RTC and CA erred in dismissing the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration and petition for review
respectively on the ground that the same was not filed within the prescription period.
2. Whether or not Adelberto’s natural parents are indispensable parties in the present case.
RULING:
1. YES. “Dismissal of appeal purely on technical ground is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage
hearings of appeal on their merits.” (Gregorio v CA)
2. YES.
 According to Article 2176, Civil Code in relation to Article 2180 of the same Code, damages may be sought against
whoever whose act or omission caused damage to another, there being fault or negligence. Moreover, the obligation is
demandable not only for ones own act or omission but as well as for those of persons whom one is responsible, parents to
the minor children who live in their company.
 “Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.”
 In the present case, the shooting of Jennifer happened when Adelberto was still under the custody of his natural
parents, thus the latter are indispensable parties to the suit for damages against Adelberto.
PRINCIPLE:
 PRINCIPLE OF PARENTAL LIABILITY or DOCTRINE OF ‘IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE’
a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents - their parental authority - which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child
 “Parental liability is anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority…The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.”
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.

Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.

FACTS:
 Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and Wendell Libi (19 y.o.) were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell demanded
reconciliation with Julie, but was refused by the latter. This prompted the former to resort to threats against her. Julie, in
order to avoid Wendell, stayed in the house of her best friend.
 Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.
 Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
 Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting
her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners,
puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third
party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness and thereby avoid identification.c
 As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, and the counterclaim of the defendants
were likewise denied for lack of merit.
 On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein
plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners
in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
vicarious liability.

RULING:
The Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180
of the Civil Code to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal
offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where
the damage is caused with criminal intent. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother
or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or
family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and
2182 of the Civil Code
Yes. The parents are civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the minor children under Art 2180 of the Civil
Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code, covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The
court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that
responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer
in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around
and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept.
In the case at bar, whether the death of Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell
Libi . Respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. The Court stated that the
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
Article 221 of the Family Code states that “Parents and other persons excercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.” In this case, Wendell was under the
parental authority of his natural parents, and was living and staying with them. Hence, Wendell’s parents are liable for the
damages caused by his quasi-delicit act.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.