G.R. No.
147703 April 14, 2004 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The
court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall
be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that
the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of
the accused.
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may,
upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the
accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their
standing in court when they abscond.
instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to
the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis
of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising
from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party
may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal
action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein,
this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may
assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the
present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can
only defend the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s
insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of
any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect
and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision
convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard
to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the
employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on
the imposition of the primary civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO
ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, Petitioners, versus OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V.
GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,* Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
2008-10-15 | G.R. No. 133347
FACTS: The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972,
just before midnight, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center
ordering the closure of all radio and television stations in the country.
Corollary thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then
president of ABS-CBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce
Enrile, of their desire to sell ABS-CBN to the government. In that same month,
however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained at Fort
Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape therefrom on September 30,
1977.
Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos government did
not materialize,
On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, relaying his plan to
temporarily use
ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9,
for such period of time as may be necessary to rebuild KBS' burned studios.
In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN
through Senator Tañada, returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV stations on a
gradual and scheduled basis.
As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed their
respective counter-affidavits, with Benedicto adopting that of Gonzales', denying
petitioners' charges.
Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the herein
assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To the Ombudsman,
the following circumstances did not give rise to probable cause necessary to
indict respondents for the various felonies charged.
On April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for respondents Tan
and Benedicto, in compliance with Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed
pleadings informing the Court of their clients' demise. Benedicto's counsel filed a
Notice of Death (With Prayer for Dismissal)12 moving that Benedicto be dropped
as respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending criminal cases
subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the party
accused."
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent, citing Torrijos v.
Court of Appeals13 which held that "civil liability of the accused survives his death;
because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations."
ISSUES:
1.WON respondent Benedicto may be dropped in the instant case for reason
“that the pending criminal cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not
survive the death of the party accused
2.whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners' complaint against the respondents.
RULING:
Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil
liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his criminal
liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:14
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as
amended. The separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by
prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench survives
because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The
Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute respondents for various
felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along
with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b)
reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action,16 is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the death of the accused
necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against him, regardless of
the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives the death
of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation provided in Article
1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused
founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil
action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action is
extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in
the same criminal action.
18
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, taking cognizance of
respondent Benedicto's death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that the latter be
dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well as civil liability
ex delicto that might be attributable to him in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to
91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in
People v. Bayotas19 by filing a separate civil action to enforce a claim against the
estate of respondent Benedicto.20 The claim against the estate of Benedicto is
based on contract-the June 8, 1973 letter- agreement-in consonance with
Section 5,21 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents
Benedicto and Tan as parties herein is in order.
2. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional
officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The raison d
'etre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to
insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate
judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash,
delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed
by public officers.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an
investigation if the complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and
substance. Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint should it
be found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain
from interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman's powers, and respect the
initiative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts
as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private
complainants.
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of martial
law and the toppling of the Marcos government, and advanced the validity of the
letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in
the same breath, aver that respondents' actuations in the execution of the letter-
agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-agreement was more
ostensible than real and to insist on the prosecution of respondents for felonies
supposedly committed in connection with this ubiquitous letter-agreement.[30]
In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS (EN BANC)
allegations of petitioners against respondents are civil in nature, bereft of G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015
criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing petitioners' complaint- G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015
affidavits.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. vs.
Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as private respondents without JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS, Accused-Appellant.
prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective estates. The
RESOLUTION
assailed Joint Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-94-1109 are
AFFIRMED. DEL CASTILLO, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Facts:

On April 2, 2003, Jose Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in

Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company staff house on board his
Isuzu pick-up after attending a despedida for one of his employees. When he was
about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned down by persons riding
in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty, David Azucena, who was
then opening the gate identified one of the assailants as herein appellant. During
trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of
appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case, admitting the
killing of Buensuceso.

However, when it was appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of
the killing, he was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday
celebration of his brother-in-law. The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant
guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA found no reason to depart from the trial
court’s findings.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Revised Penal Code provides the elements of murder, to wit:
(1) Person was killed;
(2) Accused killed him;
(3) Killing attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances –
(b) in consideration of a price, reward or promise.
In the present case, the Court held that appellant’s contention that he lacked
legal intervention and assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession
was totally belied by the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered assistance
to the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and carefully explained to the
latter the consequences of his admission. He informed appellant of his rights and
that anything he says may be used in evidence against him. Appellant then
proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Laranjo and Canadilla, for and in behalf
of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the victim for
a fee. Appellant then narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo;
how he received payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how
he executed the plan. Appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.
Notwithstanding, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based
solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the
eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing
gunshots, he saw appellant about five meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the
victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and was
holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime
scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from the
appellant.Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its
commission.
Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost
earnings is reduced to ₱9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in
lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution
until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Ricarze v. CA, G.R. No. 151785, Dec. 10, 2007
Crim Pro - Rule 110
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007
EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts:
Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation. He
was assigned to collect checks payable to Caltex. He then opened a bank account
in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of caltex. He did so by forging
the signatures of the dorsal portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that
same bank account. Upon knowledge of his crimes, he was charged by the
officers of Caltex with estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the
only offended party because the prosecutor was not informed that PCI Bank
credited certain amount to Caltex.
After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank appeared as the
complainant. Then, Ricarze averred that the information can no longer be
amended because he had already been arraigned under the original information,
and that doing so would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of
the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of
Caltex as private complainant.
Issue: Whether or not an information can be amended even after the accused
had been arraigned and had entered his plea.
Held:
A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and
time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the
case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the
civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose
of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil
liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in
Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Yes, because the amendment in the name of the complainant is one of form.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of
a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it
does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is
not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the
charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The
documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and
all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot
claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the G.R. No. 149357. March 04, 2005
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioners,
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.
vs.
SO ORDERED. HAJIME UMEZAWA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 149403. March 04, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, Responde

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of MPI, organized another
company with his wifeKimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as
Astem Philippines Corporation, withoutknowledge of the Board of Directors of
MPI. The said company would be engaged in the same businessas Mobilia.
Umezawa stole products from MPI amounting to P3,219,875.00.MPI and public
prosecutor filed criminal complaints against Umezawa. The trial court asserted
that thecontroversy involving the criminal cases was between Umezawa and the
other stockholders of MPI. It also held that the SEC, not the trial court,
had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC that the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers
over the implementation of the MPI’s standard procedure is intra-corporate in
nature; hence,within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. The petitioner MPI filed
the instant petition for review oncertiorari

.ISSUE:WON CA is correct.

petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the public prosecutor did
not expressly conform to the motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1999
Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor, through the public
prosecutor’s presence during the hearing of the said motion, his supervision and
control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing, he in effect adopted
and conformed to the said motion for reconsideration.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioner People of the Philippines is not correct. All
criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.16 When the civil action
for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the
prosecution of the offense.17 In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,18 we held that
under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as
private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the
purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits
must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action
is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him
or, in general, to maintain social order.19
The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his
prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has
been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to
take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full
responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately
prepared to pursue it to its termination.20 The prosecution of offenses is a public
function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation
or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. 21 Under
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the
accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability.— The civil liability established in
Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to
intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a
matter of tolerance.22
The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case,
in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual
conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be
present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is
absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.23
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an
appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended
party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case.24 However, the offended party or private complainant
may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal
therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.25 In so doing,
the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the
public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from
filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the
acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the trial court’s Joint Order dated January 29, 1999, praying for
the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.
The public prosecutor did not approve nor conform to the said motion. Although
petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public
prosecutor, the latter did not do so; he merely appeared during the hearing of the
said motion with the private prosecutor when the latter presented his oral
arguments in support of the said motion.
The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however,
does not mean that the same is pro forma. It must be stressed that the propriety
and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned, is
not dependent upon the conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence, the filing of
the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the
period for petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the
reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to the motion of petitioner MPI,
insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned, the period for the State
to assail the said joint order was not suspended. Only the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of
the cases could have tolled the period within which the State could appeal,
insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was concerned. The bare fact that the
public prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his adoption
of the said motion as that of the State. As ruled by this Court in Cabral v. Puno:26
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-
day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did
not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on
his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for
reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for
appeal.27
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner People of the Philippines with the CA on April 26, 1999 was filed
beyond the 60-day period as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court,28 it appearing that the public prosecutor received a copy of the joint order
of the trial court on February 2, 1999, and, thus, had only until April 3, 1999
within which to file the said petition.
Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the
People of the Philippines simply because the public prosecutor erred in not
himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on
his perception that by being present during the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of
the State’s. The settled rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its
officers and employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court
declared:
… Estoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly
mistaken acts or omissions of its agents. As we declared in People v. Castañeda,
"there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the
law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute
and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its
agents."
The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:30
… While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed,
there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. …31
Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations, the courta
quo had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. CA erred in holding that
the dispute between it and the respondentis intra-corporate in nature; hence,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned from thematerial G.R. No. 191256 September 18, 2013
allegations of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
the crimescharged. According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 Regional Trial Courts
vs.
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
GARY ALINAO, Accused-Appellant.
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whichshall DECISION
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.Case law has it that in
order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
orInformation must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not
the facts set out thereinand the prescribed period provided for by law are within
the jurisdiction of the court, and where thesaid Information or complaint is filed.
It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases isdetermined by the Facts:
allegations of the complaint or Information and not by the findings based
on theevidence of the court after trial. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Gary Alinao and his son, Jocel Alinao (at large), was found guilty of murder, with
Constitution or by the law in forceat the time of the filing of the Information or the use of illegally possessed firearm. Alinao set on fire the house of the victim
complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it isretained up to the end of Artonio Ardet, who was his brother in law, and then shot him seven times at the
the litigation. face when he came out from the burning house which caused the victim’s instant
death.

Nestor Ardet, half-brother of the victim Antonio Ardet, testified that on February
27, 2006 at around 11:00 p.m., he was inside his house, which was eight meters
away from the house of the deceased Antonio Ardet. He was awakened by the
barking of dogs. He stood and slowly opened his window, and saw Antonio
Ardet’s house burning. Gary Alinao was pointing his gun at the door of Antonio
Ardet, with Jocel Alinao behind him.

Antonio Ardet tried to get out of his house, but Gary Alinao shot him and fell
inside the burning house.

Gary Alinao is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay the
aggrieved party the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of civil
indemnity for the death of Antonio Ardet, plus moral damages in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS(P120,000.00) and actual and
exemplary damages in the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) and THIRTYTHOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) respectively. On appeal,
CA modified the amount of damages to be paid to the victim’s heir as follows:
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.The award of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages was deleted on the ground the no aggravating circumstance was
established in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premedition should be considered
Ruling of the Supreme Court on Exemplary Damages:
Accused-appellant likewise claims that there was no evidence categorically
showing evident premeditation.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be
proved: a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and, c)
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.49 The essence of evident premeditation
is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carryout the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.50
opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of his act to kill his brother-in-law
and his determination to commit the cold-blooded deed from the time of its
conception until it was carried out.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October28, 2009 in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03567, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao in Crim. Case No. 38-2006 finding accused-
appellant Gary Alinao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is
hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION reinstating the trial court's award of the
amount of P-30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim, Antonio
Ardet. Accused-appellant Gary Alinao is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Antonio Ardet interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the
amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
GR No. 191240, July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

Supreme Court ruled that an award of exemplary damages is justified if an
aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, accompanies the crime. In vs.
the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was duly
alleged in the Information and proved during the trial. Therefore, in line with PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.
current jurisprudence, SC reinstate the trial court's award of the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to heirs of the victim.
PERALTA, J.:
Alinao, in razing Antonio Ardet’s house in order to drive him out and shooting
him the moment he appears at his front door, clearly had a previously and
carefully crafted plan to kill his victim. The court was convinced that the time it Facts:
took accused-appellant and his son to device their plan, plot where the gasoline
should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms, as well as the time Petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals
it took to go to Antonio Ardet’s house, and even the time when they waited for (CA) with respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R.
Antonio Ardet to come out of the house, all afforded accused-appellant sufficient Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of Estafa.
The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is
a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational institution,
boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother,
Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she
trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children while her
annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She
agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business
would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of
promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the
operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of
US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had
the money, she handed the same to respondent Salvador which was witnessed by
her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never
operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked
respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money
was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed
that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the
US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
Respondent’s defense that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually
fell in love and had an affair. They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where
petitioner saw how popular he was among the Filipino domestic helpers, which
led her to suggest a remittance business. Although hesitant, he has friends with
such business. He denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 when he went to
Hong Kong and Bangkok. After he came back from the United States, petitioner
had asked him and his brother Ramon for a meeting. During the meeting,
petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but Ramon told her that
they should make a study of it first. He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a
money remittance business in Pasay City. Upon the advice of Roy, respondent and
petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau. He denied receiving
US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner who paid for
the plane tickets. After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union
at the First World Center in Makati City. Ramon, petitioner and her mother went
to Hong Kong to register the business, while he took care of petitioner’s children
here. He and Ramon went back to Hong Kong but denied having received the
amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the
amount of P100, 000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as
payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, which Chau had
duly acknowledged. He denied Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave him the
amount of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house. He claimed that no remittance
business was started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel
and money to operate the same. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner
never asked him about the business, as she never gave him such amount. He
intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong Kong again to buy some
goods for the latter’s boutique. He admitted that he loved petitioner and her
children very much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short; he
gave her P600, 000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very expensive
schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and
Bangkok trips
Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that
even if the Court Of Appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained
the award of damages to the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.
RULING:
The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s
only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was
civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission. inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and
(4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because
inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The petition for the award of damages is denied.
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general
presumption, “that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor.
The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of Estafa are present in this
case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
in fact, the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish clearly
and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in vs.
venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In
Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of
preponderance of evidence as follows: ROMERO, J.:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible Facts:
evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
evidence. arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in

May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to
Issue: WON the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability
raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions
and civil liability based solely on the act complained.
on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a

Held: Yes
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. The Court ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts or
quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure; and (4) the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during
the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action for in such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
VILLEGAS VS. CA
G.R. No. 82562 April 11, 1997
LYDIA VILLEGAS, MA TERESITA VILLEGAS, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR., and
ANTONIETTE VILLEGAS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA
G.R. No. 82592 April 11, 1997
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LYDIA A. VILLEGAS, ANTONIO
VILLEGAS, JR., MA. ANTONETTE VILLEGAS, MA. LYDIA VILLEGAS and ESTATE OF
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS: This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio
V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly
imputed to him acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. He did this on several occasions in August 1968 xxx
An Information for libel was filed against Villegas who denied the charge. After
losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the United States where he stayed
until his death. Nevertheless, trial proceeded on absentia. Two months after the
prosecution rested its case, the court issued an order dismissing the criminal
aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
Subsequently the Court awarded Raquiza actual, moral, exemplary damages and
cost of suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed but reduced the amount of damages.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (related to the subject matter) did the death of the accused before final
judgment extinguish his civil liability?
HELD: NO (Guys, take note of Article 33 of the Civil Code. Raquiza’s right to
recover damages arose from this article not from delict)
Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the promulgation of the
case of People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on September 2, 1994, 4 viz.:
1 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability xxx
2 Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the)
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. 8 This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case (Art. 1155)
The answer is likewise provided in Bayatas, thus:
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala’s civil civil for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without finals adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately
The resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of the main
criminal action by the trial court was technically defective. There was no proper
substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by the Heirs and repeatedly put in
issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should have been followed by the court a quo
was the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3,
in connection with Section 1, Rule 87.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and the petition in G.R.
No. 82592 is DENIED xxx without prejudice to the right of the private offended
party Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil action for damages against
the executor or administrator of the estate or the heirs of the late Antonto J.
Villegas in accordance with the foregoing procedure.

The source of Villegas’ civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel
he allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within
the purview of Article 33 9 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accused’s
civil liability dependent on two factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a
separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the
criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to
institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is
the recourse of the private offended party in a criminal case such as this which
must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine.
Now, where the civil action was impliedly instituted with it?