G.R. No.
198554 July 30, 2012
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE
T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN.
GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was
charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of
War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing
to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in
relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP
directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully
served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the
RPC (Revised Penal Code)-- Period of preventive imprisonment deducted
from term of imprisonment. . He was released on December 16, 2010
after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was
initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before
he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame
Custodial Detention Center.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the
sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and
detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum
security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP
stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is
separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military
Courts; and (2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in
the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the
1987 Constitution
RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment
deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner
was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence
confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth
by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest
sense of the word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions
of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War
and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any
provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation
and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the
deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has
been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in
the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the
1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of
Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However,
applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time
within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be
credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject
to the conditions set forth by the same law.
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia v. The Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy
GR Number 211362
Petition: Petition for Mandamus
Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
Respondent: The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, The
Honor Committee of 2014 of the PMA and HC members, and the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Date: February 24, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate
with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as
the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the
Navy.
Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for
two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for
5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were
logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for
explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring
hours.
Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per
violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts
the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at
3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class.
Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC
constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the
violation, it recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not
guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the
Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer
announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.
The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)
conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were
issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval
of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a
letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-
instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board
(CRAB) and it upheld the decision.
Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the
findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause
for Human Rights Violations.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of his right to due process and
in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs
Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due
process, education, and property should be placed in the context of
the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A
student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his
private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The
PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it
deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution.
PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of the internal rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery
mandated by Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate
(according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the
courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to
 determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including
the military, especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed.
G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO
BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C.
ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION
PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT), respondents.
Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Haydee Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo
for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
In this case of first impression, a certiorari proceeding filed on January 10,
1985, there is a persuasive ring to the invocation of the constitutional right
to freedom of expression 1 of an artist—and for that matter a man of
letters too—as the basis for a ruling on the scope of the power of
respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how it
should be exercised. The dispute between the parties has been narrowed
down. The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For
Adults Only." There is the further issue then, also one of first impression,
as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of the objections
raised. Thus the relevance of this constitutional command: "Arts and
letters shall be under the patronage of the State.2
Facts : In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October
23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions
enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was
without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board released
its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29
October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-
committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the
ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain vital
deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the
Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit
until these deficiencies are supplied
Issue : WON the rating made with grave abuse of discretion
Held : Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human
life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind
through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and
public concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary
Filipino cultural values as a standard. Moreover, as far as the question of
sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the
arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State. Given this
constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any
government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an
artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for
reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true
representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal
primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What
is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a
showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered
obscene. On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth
in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid
any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent
decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of
construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when
a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and
the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. There can be
no valid objection to the controlling standard. There was really a grave
abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is
is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO
MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The
supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young
people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to
make it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But
they refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where
television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is
so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their
way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is
called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
WHEREFORE, this Court, in the light of the principles of law enunciated in
the opinion, dismisses this petition for certiorari solely on the ground that
there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of
discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For-Adults-Only."
Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
De la Fuente, J., took no part.
June 15, 2005
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA,
and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.
Carpio, J.:
This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29 November
2000 of the Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766.
The appellate court affirmed two Orders3 issued by Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759. The Order
dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit
to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing, while the Order dated 8
June 2000 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
SUMMARY: Herrera, the putative father of Rosendo, did not want to
undergo a DNA paternity test ordered by the RTC in a paternity proceeding
against him; so he questioned the order before the CA and the SC.
Upholding the lower courts, SC ordered him to undergo the test, brushing
aside his arguments that: DNA testing is not legally accepted; DNA testing
is unreliable; and DNA testing is self-incriminatory. SC also laid down
standards for the consideration of DNA evidence with respect to its weight
and probative value, which later formed part of the basis for the DNA
evidence rule.
DOCTRINE: DNA evidence has already been accepted in the Philippine
jurisdiction, subject to the basic principle that in the assessment of its
probative value, “courts should consider, among other things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests”.
In the establishment of paternity through DNA evidence, the probability of
paternity W must at least be 99.9%. If the value of W is less than 99.9%,
the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should
be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
NATURE: Appeal from a CA decision affirming an RTC order. Original
action for compulsory recognition, support, and damages.
FACTS
• May 14, 1998 – Then only 13 y/o, ROSENDO Alba, represented by
his mother ARMI Alba, filed a petition for compulsory recognition,
support, and damages against his alleged father, Rosendo
HERRERA, before the RTC of Manila.
• Aug. 7, 1998 – In his answer with counterclaim, Herrera denied
paternity of Rosendo. He also denied having any physical contact
with Armi.
• Rosendo moved for the taking of DNA paternity testing.
o Rosendo presented as expert witness Dr. Saturnina Halos, a
molecular biologist and professor at DLSU and UP, who had
experience heading a DNA analysis laboratory in UP.
o Dr. Halos testified to the process of DNA paternity testing
and asserted that it was 99.9999% accurate in establishing
paternity.
o Herrera opposed the motion, arguing that DNA paternity
testing has not gained acceptability, and that it violates his
right against self-incrimination.
• Feb. 3, 2000 – The RTC granted the motion. Herrera was ordered
to undergo DNA paternity testing.
• June 8, 2000 – Herrera’s MR was denied.
• July 18, 2000 – Herrera filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with
the CA, advancing the following arguments:
o RTC misapplied the ruling in Lim v. CA
o DNA testing was accepted without considering the
limitations and conditions for its admissibility and regardless
of the constraints affecting the reliability of the test as
admitted by Dr. Halos herself
o The scientific findings relied upon by the RTC are unfit for
judicial notice and are not supported by experts
o DNA testing, under the circumstances, is inconclusive,
irrelevant, coercive, and unconstitutional
• Nov. 29, 2000 – CA DECISION
o RTC affirmed.
o Since the thrust of the petition is to seek a reevaluation of
the evidence, the remedy of appeal is available.
o DNA paternity testing does not violate the right against self-
incrimination, which refers only to testimonial compulsion.
o An adverse DNA paternity test result may still be refuted
anyway.
• May 23, 2001 – CA denied MR. Hence, this petition for review
under Rule 45.
ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N DNA testing should be allowed despite lack of official recognition
and presence of technical and legal constraints to its implementation (YES,
DNA analysis has been accepted as evidence)
2) W/N DNA testing is a valid probative tool to determine filiation under
Philippine law (YES, but subject to relevant standards)
3) W/N DNA testing violates the right against self-incrimination (NO)
RATIO
1) PRELIMINARY: OVERVIEW OF THE PATERNITY AND FILIATION SUIT
• Filiation proceedings are instituted not only to adjudicate paternity
but also to secure legal rights associated with paternity, e.g.,
support or inheritance.
• BURDEN OF PROOF is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child
• 4 SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
o PRIMA FACIE CASE
§ exists if a woman declares that she had sexual
relations with the putative father.
§ corroborative proof is required to shift the burden of
proof to the putative father
§ CASE AT BAR: Armi asserted that Herrera is the
biological father of Rosendo. She presented
corroborative proof in the form of letters and
pictures.
o AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
§ two are available to the putative father: incapability
to have sexual relations (due either to physical
 absence or impotency) or proof that the mother had
sexual relations with other men around the time of
conception.
§ CASE AT BAR: Herrera raised both defenses, denying
that he ever had intercourse with Armi.
o PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
§ A child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate (FC 165, 167). The presumption may be
impugned only under the strict standards provided
by law.
o PHYSICAL RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN PUTATIVE FATHER
AND CHILD
§ trial technique unique to paternity proceedings
§ may be offered as evidence of paternity
§ although likeness is a function of heredity, no
quantitative formula or standard can be used to
measure likeness. This kind of evidence appeals to
the emotions/senses of the judge.
§ CASE AT BAR: Armi submitted pictures of Rosendo
and Herrera side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.
• LAWS, RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON FILIATION
o FC 175: Illegitimate children may establish their filiation in
the same way as legitimate children.
o FC 172: Establishment of filiation by legitimate children can
be made by:
§ record of birth in the civil registry or in a final
judgment
§ admission made in a public document or in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
§ In the absence of the foregoing, by open and
continuous possession of legitimate status or by any
other means allowed by the RoC and special
laws.
o RoC 130, Secs. 39-40 relate to acts, declarations, family
tradition and reputation relating to pedigree. Pedigree
“includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree”.
o Lim v. CA: SC adopted a wary attitude towards DNA testing;
held that paternity still has to be resolved by conventional
evidence.
o To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the writing
of the putative father.
o A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence.
o Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the
child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child
on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation.
o However, a student permanent record, a written consent to
a father’s operation, or a marriage contract where the
putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing.
o Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family
pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
• Scientific advances have widened the range of evidence available to
establish paternity; it is now no longer limited to evidence of
incriminating acts. Blood grouping tests have been upheld as
conclusive of non-paternity and have been allowed by the SC in Co
Tao v. CA and in Jao v. CA.
2) DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE – CONCEPT AND PROCESS
• Deoxyribonucleic acid is the basic building block of the human
genetic makeup. It is found in all human cells and is the same in
every cell of the same person. Since genetic identity is unique, a
person’s DNA profile can determine his identity.
• DNA analysis is a procedure where a biological sample from an
individual is processed to form a DNA profile and then examined.
• Quoting from the trial court order (sorry for the copypasta, Carpio
quoted it verbatim):
o Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs
distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his
or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as
 “polymorphic loci,” which are the areas analyzed in DNA
typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other
words, DNA typing simply means determining the
“polymorphic loci.”
o PROCEDURE FOR DNA TYPING
§ From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a
molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in
several ways. There are five (5) techniques to
conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP
(restriction fragment length polymorphism); “reverse
dot blot” or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287
cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in
the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process;
VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the
most recent which is known as the PCR-
([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short
tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was
availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world.
PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in
an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match
two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error
rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
o Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing,
“matches” are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal
case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is
compared with the “known” print. If a substantial amount of
the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint
is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature
of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to
have come from the suspect.
o As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called “allele”, one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the
forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
o Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it
is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s
profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the
DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in
the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types
match, then he is not excluded as the father.
3) AS OF 2002, THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE USE OF DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE
• Prior to 2002, SC was of skeptical stance with respect to DNA
analysis as evidence, as reflected in Lim v. CA (1997) and People v.
Tijing (2001), although in the latter case, the SC recognized that UP
had already set up a laboratory capable of performing STR analysis
and DNA analysis will prove useful in the future.
• The Vallejo case, decided in 2002, represented the change in the
SC’s stance. Vallejo was meted the death penalty, partly because of
the match between the DNA profile of the sample taken from the
victim and the DNA profile of Vallejo.
• Said the Court in that case: “In assessing the probative value of
DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests”.
• Thus the SC was no longer talking about admissibility, but has
moved on to analyzing the probative value of DNA evidence. It was
no longer about the “official recognition” of DNA evidence, as the
issue is now the observance of the procedures in conducting DNA
analysis.
• In 2004, the Yatar and de Villa cases followed the Vallejo trend. In
both cases the Court gave credence to DNA evidence in disposing
of the issues.
 • NO NEED TO REFER TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL
STANDARDS REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE
o Both Herrera and Rosendo cite US cases in support of their
positions regarding the admissibility of DNA evidence.
o Frye v. US: “Just when a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”
o Frye-Schwartz standard: “While [the US Circuit Court
agrees] that forensic DNA typing has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that
admissibility of specific test results in a particular case
hinges on the laboratory’s compliance with appropriate
standards and controls, and the availability of their testing
data and results.”
o Failure to meet Frye standards with respect to expert
testimonies in product liability cases led to the development
of the Daubert-Kumho standard, which in turn led to the
amendment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
o Expert witness may testify as to specialized knowledge if:
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.
o However, in the Philippines, the Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-
Kumho standards go into the weight, not the
admissibility, of the evidence. American jurisprudence is
merely persuasive.
o The Philippine Rules of Court are more liberal – evidence is
admissible when it has such relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief or non-belief in its existence and is not
excluded by law or the rules. Neither does Rule 130, Sec. 49
on expert testimony preclude the admissibility of DNA
evidence.
o SC: Rule 130, Sec. 49 “does not pose any legal obstacle to
the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed “when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.”
4) GUIDELINES ON THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA EVIDENCE
• Basic principle has been enunciated in Vallejo: see No.3, 3rd bullet.
• With respect to paternity:
o “In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual to produce
a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the
mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of
the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other
half must have been inherited from the biological father.
The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match
the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded
as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.”
o It is not enough to state that the DNA profiles of the
putative father and the child match. A complete match of
DNA profiles does not necessarily establish paternity.
o PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY MEASURE
§ Following the Louisiana standard, courts should
require a minimum of 99.9% W prior to a paternity
inclusion
§ W stands for Probability of Paternity. It is a
numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a
putative father compared to the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate population database is required to
compute for W.
§ Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity
inclusions, W will never equal 100% (hence it is a
limit :])
 § Accuracy of W estimates is higher when the mother,
child, and putative father are all subjected to DNA
testing.
§ SC: “DNA analysis that excludes the putative father
from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%,
the results of the DNA analysis should be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the
value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is
refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable
presumption of paternity should be subjected to the
Vallejo standards.”
5) NO VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
• It has been repeatedly stated in jurisprudence that the
protection of the constitution against self-incrimination
extends only to testimonial compulsion.
• The protection relates to forced extraction of communicative
evidence. Bodily or object evidence is not covered. Thus the
SC has allowed forcible spitting of morphine, compulsory
pregnancy tests, and trying on of pants for size as
admissible evidence over self-incrimination objections.
• “The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the
right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses.”
• “Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable
through the facilities of modern science and technology,
such evidence should be considered subject to the limits
established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.”
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed; judgment affirmed.
Jaime dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 200748 | July 23, 2014 | CJ. Sereno
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela
Cruz, from the Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution2 dated 2 February
2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R.
No. 00670.
FACTS:
• NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido
claiming that Ariel Escobido (live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito) was picked up by police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
• An errand boy gave a number to the complainants. When they
called the number, they were instructed to go to the Gorordo Police
Station.
• In the said police station, they met “James” who demanded
100,000 (later on lowered to 40,000) in exchange for the release of
Ariel.
• After the said meeting, the complainants went directly to the NBI
wherein the NBI formed an entrapment operation.
• The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz through the use of
mark-money.
• Jaime dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of NBI
where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The test
yielded positive for presence of dangerous drugs.
• Based on dela Cruz’ testimony, he was contending that he refused
to the drug examination and requested to call his laywer but it was
denied by the NBI.
• RTC – found dela Cruz guilty of violating Sec. 15 of RA9165; ruled
that all the elements were present: 1) accused was arrested 2)
accused was subjected to drug test 3) confirmatory test shows that
he used a dangerous drug
• CA – affirmed RTC ruling; ruled that extracting urine from one’s
body is merely a mechanical act, hence falling outside the concept
of a custodial investigation.
ISSUE:
WON the drug test conducted upon Jaime dela Cruz was legal?
HELD:
NO. FIRST, the drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime
not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.
SECOND, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion. We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial
compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where
non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the
arrest. In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could
be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s
urine for purposes of drug testing was “merely a mechanical act, hence,
falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.”
LASTLY, the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that
petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his
rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances. Such acts
were in violation of Sec 2 and Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution. In the face
of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is
being made.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22
June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution
dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
G.R. No. 135406 July 11, 2000
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated
September 9, 1998 rendered by the former Twelfth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The assailed Decision affirmed the
judgment2 dated October 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila, finding petitioner David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended, (for
illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs) as charged in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D, respectively.
FACTS:
David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de
Venecia, Jr. was arrested by policemen in connection with the enforcement
of a search warrant in his residence at Greenhills, San Juan. Several drug
paraphernalia, which later tested positive for marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride, were seized along with a small quantity
of marijuana fruiting tops.
The four were brought to Camp Crame and were subjected to a drug-
dependency test and were asked to give a sample of their urine to which
they complied. Their urine samples all tested positive for shabu.
De Venecia, Jr. voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation
and confinement. Gutang, Regala and Jimenez pleaded not guilty. They
were found guilty of possession and use of prohibited drugs.
Gutang argued that the urine sample is inadmissible in evidence because
he had no counsel during the custodial investigation when it was taken. In
effect, it is an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and a violation of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the urine samples taken were admissible in evidence.
RULING:
The Court ruled that it was admissible. The right to counsel begins from
the time a person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for
the commission of crime. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion
of his body in evidence, when it may be material to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation and not to unearth
undisclosed facts.
An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or
his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done without going against the proscription
against testimonial compulsion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila vs.
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge,
there were commenced, by appropriate informations eight (8) criminal
actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana.
The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial
even on Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner
granted the request.(as police officers under suspension because of the
cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there
were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days
(Monday, Wednesday and Friday).
On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the
petioner judge order should be reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
Held:
Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom
may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger
to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be
shown.
There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion
of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to
decency or public morals." 21
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .
G.R. No. 195032 : February 20, 2013
ISABELO A. BRAZA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (1st Division), Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Isabelo
Braza (Braza) seeking to reverse and set aside the October 12, 2009
Resolution 1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275,
entitled People v. Robert G. Lala, et al., as well as its October 22, 2010
Resolution,2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th ASEAN
Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006. In preparation for this
international diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the designated
venue, the DPWH identified projects relative to the improvement and
rehabilitation of roads and installation of traffic safety devices and lighting
facilities. The then Acting Secretary of the DPWH, Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
approved the resort to alternative modes of procurement for the
implementation of these projects due to the proximity of the ASEAN
Summit.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the
installation of street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu
International Convention Center in Mandaue City and the ceremonial
routes of the Summit to upgrade the appearance of the convention areas
and to improve night-time visibility for security purposes. Four (4) out of
eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK Construction
and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK).
Three other projects were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or less
than two (2) weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter,
the DPWH and FABMIK executed a Memorandum of Agreement(MOA)
whereby FABMIK obliged itself to implement the projects at its own
expense and the DPWH to guarantee the payment of the work
accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects within the
deadline of ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities.
The schedule of the international event, however, was moved by the
national organizers to January 9-15, 2007 due to typhoon Seniang which
struck Cebu for several days.
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance
and Corruption Prevention Office(PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging
that the ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. A panel
composing of three investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation to
determine the veracity of the accusation. Braza, being the president of
FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the respondents. On March 16, 2007,
the Ombudsman directed the DBM and the DPWH to cease and desist from
releasing or disbursing funds for the projects in question.
Eventually, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials
of DPWH Region VII, the officials of the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu
and private contractors, FABMIK President Braza and GAMPIK Board
Chairman Gerardo S. Surla (Surla). It was alleged therein that Braza acted
in conspiracy with the public officials and employees in the commission of
the crime charged.
On August 14, 2008, the motions for reinvestigation filed by Arturo Radaza
(Radaza), the Mayor of Lapu-lapuCity, and the DPWH officials were denied
by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the
reconsideration of said resolution. On August 27, 2008, Braza filed a
motion for reinvestigation anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
import documents relied upon by the OMB-Visayas were spurious and
falsified; (2) constituted new evidence, if considered, would overturn the
finding of probable cause; and (3) the finding of overpricing was bereft of
factual and legal basis as the same was not substantiated by any
independent canvass of prevailing market prices of the subject lampposts.
He prayed for the suspension of the proceedings of the case pending such
reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated Braza's motion as his motion
for reconsideration of its August 14, 2008 Resolution.
During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan
reconsidered its August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation
of the case. According to the anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect
that no independent canvass was conducted and that the charge of
overpricing was based on falsified documents were serious reasons enough
to merit a reinvestigation of the case.
On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed
resolution admitting the Amended Information, denying Braza's plea for
dismissal of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Brazawould
not be placed in double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the
second information because his previous arraignment was conditional. It
continued that even if he was regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would
still not set in because the second information charged an offense different
from, and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the original
offense charged. Lastly, it found that the delay in the reinvestigation
proceedings could not be characterized as vexatious, capricious or
oppressive and that it could not be attributed to the prosecution.
On November 6, 2009, Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative
motion to quash the information reiterating his arguments that his right
against double jeopardy was violated and, thus, warranting the dismissal of
the criminal case with prejudice. In the alternative, Braza moved for the
quashal of the second information vigorously asserting that the same was
fatally defective for failure to allege any actual, specified and quantifiable
injury sustained by the government as required by law for indictment
under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and that the charge of overpricing was
unfounded.
On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed
resolution stating, among others, the denial of Braza's Motion to Quash the
information. The anti-graft court ruled that the Amended Information was
sufficient in substance as to inform the accused of the nature and causes
of accusations against them. Further, it held that the specifics sought to be
alleged in the Amended Information were evidentiary in nature which could
be properly presented during the trial on the merits. Braza was effectively
discharged from the first Information upon the filing of the second
Information but said discharge was without prejudice to, and would not
preclude, his prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper that a new preliminary
investigation be conducted under the new charge.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy has already set in basis of Braza
"not guilty" plea in the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be
prosecuted under the second Information.
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.
It is Braza stance that his constitutional right under the double jeopardy
clause bars further proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. He asserts
that his arraignment under the first information was simple and
unconditional and, thus, an arraignment under the second information
would put him in double jeopardy.
His argument cannot stand scrutiny.
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting
"provisional" or "conditional" arraignment of the accused is not specifically
sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Procedure of
theSandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Procedure, this Court had
tangentially recognized such practice inPeople v. Espinosa, provided that
the alleged conditions attached to the arraignment should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court further
required that the conditions must be expressly stated in the order
disposing of arraignment; otherwise, it should be deemed simple and
unconditional.
A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the
arraignment of Braza under the first information was conditional in nature
as it was a mere accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel
abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in
absentia in case he would abscond. TheSandiganbayan's June 6, 2008
Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions for
Braza'sarraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the
Information would be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to
be protected against double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be
arraigned on the amended information without losing his right to question
the same. It appeared that these conditions were duly explained to Braza
and his lawyer by the anti-graft court. He was afforded time to confer and
consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted himself to such
conditional arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense of
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been
convincingly laid out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent. It
may not be amiss to state that on the day of said arraignment, one of the
incidents pending for the consideration of the Sandiganbayan was an
omnibus motion for determination of probable cause and for quashal of
information or for reinvestigation filed by accused Radaza. Accordingly,
there was a real possibility that the first information would be amended if
said motion was granted. Although the omnibus motion was initially
denied, it was subsequently granted upon motion for reconsideration, and
a reinvestigation was ordered to be conducted in the criminal case.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and
its legal consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional
nature just to conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the
new charge under the second information. Besides, in consonance with the
ruling in Cabo v.Sandiganbayan, this Court cannot now allow Braza to
renege and turn his back on the above conditions on the mere pretext that
he affirmed his conditional arraignment through a pleading denominated as
Manifestation filed before the Sandiganbayan on November 13, 2008. After
all, there is no showing that the anti-graft court had acted on, much less
noted, his written manifestation.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional
plea, Braza cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to
avoid arraignment under the second information because the offense
charged therein is different and not included in the offense charged under
the first information. The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in
Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section
17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate
a claim for double jeopardy, the accused has the burden of demonstrating
the following requisites:
the first information charged an offense different from that charged in the
second information since both charges arose from the same transaction or
set of facts. Relying on the antiquated ruling of People v. Del
Carmen,Braza claims that an accused should be shielded against being
prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act.
It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether aware,
of the ruling in Suero v. Peoplewhere it was held that the same criminal act
may give rise to two or more separate and distinct offenses; and that no
double jeopardy attaches as long as there is variance between the
elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine of double jeopardy is a
revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused from the
risk of being prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different
one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act
or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is
forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
Petition for certiorari is DENIED.

(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the
first.

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when
a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. The test for the third element is whether one offense is
identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration
thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information.

Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if
ANITA RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Anita Ramirez (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated January 31, 20112 and June 30, 20113 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 33099, denying her "Most Deferential Omnibus Motion to
Admit Notice of Appeal and Post Bond on Appeal".
The Facts
On January 5, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
97 convicted the petitioner and one Josephine Barangan (Barangan) of the
crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100212. After several re-
settings, the judgment was finally promulgated on March 25, 2009 and
warrants of arrests were accordingly issued. According to the petitioner,
she failed to attend the promulgation of judgment as she had to attend to
the wake of her father.4cralawlibrary
Three (3) months after, or on June 6, 2009, the petitioner filed an Urgent
Ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond, which
was denied by the RTC in its Order dated October 7, 2009.5cralawlibrary
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the motion to admit notice of appeal and to
post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal of the RTC Order dated
October 7, 2009. She subsequently filed her notice of appeal on November
17, 2010.6 The OSG, for its part, did not oppose the petitioner’s belated
filing of the notice of appeal but objected to her application for the posting
of a bond pending appeal.7cralawlibrary
In Resolution8 dated January 31, 2011, the CA denied the omnibus motion.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in Resolution9 dated June 30, 2011. In denying the omnibus motion,
the CA ruled that the petitioner failed to file the notice of appeal within the
15-day reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, reckoned from the
date of notice of the RTC’s judgment of conviction, as she filed her notice
of appeal with the CA only on November 17, 2010. The CA opined that as
early as June 10, 2009, the petitioner was already aware of the RTC
judgment; however, she opted to file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest.
As such, the judgment of conviction against her has attained finality. The
CA also opined that since the petitioner knew she could not attend the
promulgation of judgment on March 25, 2009, she should have exerted
earnest efforts to confer with her counsel to request for its re-setting.
Failing to do so, the CA considered her absence without justifiable cause a
blatant disrespect of the judicial process.10 Thus, the CA denied her
application for provisional liberty in view of the finality of the judgment of
conviction against her.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner wants the Court to take note of the fact that the OSG did
not object to the belated filing of her notice of appeal with the CA. The
petitioner also attributes such lapse to her counsel whom she expected to
take care of her legal concerns. She claims that her counsel did not apprise
her of the status of the case and that it would have been unforgivable for
her not to pay her last respects to her deceased father. She also maintains
that since the CA would also be reviewing Barangan’s appeal, it would
serve the interest of substantial justice if the CA were to admit the
petitioner’s appeal. She also seeks the application of the exceptional cases
where the Court admitted a belated appeal.11cralawlibrary
In its Comment,12 the OSG contends that the petitioner is bound by the
negligence of her counsel. It also manifests that while it did not object to
her appeal being heard by the CA, it is now withdrawing such position
given the petitioner’s continued refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the
RTC despite the CA’s denial of her omnibus motion.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
the period when an appeal from a judgment or final order in a criminal
case should be taken, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has
been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of
the period begins to run.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa
was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a notice of appeal
within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the
petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to
reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010
or more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the
petitioner filed with the CA her motion to admit notice of appeal. At that
point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and cannot
be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 Thus, the CA did not commit
any reversible error in denying the petitioner’s motion inasmuch as by the
time the petitioner filed the same, the appellate court was already bereft of
any jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The Court has already stressed
that “the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.”14cralawlibrary
In exceptional cases, the Court has in fact relaxed the period for perfecting
an appeal on grounds of substantial justice or when there are other special
and meritorious circumstances and issues.15 Thus, in Remulla v.
Manlongat,16 the Court considered the one-day late filing of the
prosecution’s notice of appeal as excusable given the diligent efforts
exerted by the private prosecutor in following up its filing with the public
prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, failed to present any exceptional, special or
meritorious circumstance that will excuse the belated filing of her notice of
appeal. As correctly ruled by the CA, her assertion that her counsel on
record failed to communicate to her the status of her case is a “tenuous
and implausible” excuse.17 The rule is that the omission or negligence of
counsel binds the client. This is truer if the client did not make a periodic
check on the progress of her case.18 In this case, aside from heaving the
fault entirely on her counsel, the petitioner did not even attempt to show
that she exercised diligent efforts in making sure that she is brought up to
date as regards the status of her case or the steps being taken by her
counsel in the defense of her case.
Moreover, the petitioner should have seen to it that, at the very least,
communication was sent to the trial court to inform the presiding judge of
the demise of her father and that she could not be present during the
promulgation of judgment as she had to attend to his funeral
arrangements; or, as stated by the CA, “she should have filed a motion for
the resetting of the promulgation to another date.”19In Neplum, Inc. v.
Orbeso,20 the Court affirmed the lower court’s refusal to give due course to
the notice of appeal filed by the petitioner therein, stating that “all that
petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal - a brief
statement of its intention to elevate the trial court’s Decision to the CA. x x
x Parties and their counsels are presumed to be vigilant ,in protecting their
interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without
resort to technicalities."21cralawlibrary
While the Court commiserates with the petitioner’s loss, "the bare
invocation of ’the interest of substantial justice’ is not a magic wand that
will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules."22 Strict
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and
speedy disposition of justice. The Rules must be followed; otherwise, they
will become meaningless and useless.23cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.