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G.R. No. 129895. April 30, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had
three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the
losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of her body.
On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah was then banged on the wall by
Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as Leah
was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then
fled to the house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell again to the ground
and lost her consciousness. The trial court convicted Armando of parricide.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused.

HELD: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her death were the consequence
of the appellant’s deliberate and intentional acts. The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
thus: Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant
or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to
death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate.

G.R. No. L-4935 October 25, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, vs. JAMES L. BROBST
CARSON, J.:

FACTS: Saldivar had been fired from the mining company he was working for (he was a thief and was not welcome among
his colleagues). Brobst had been told not to let him back in. However, Saldivar came in with 3-4 friends, looking for a job, and
ignored Brobst‘s orders to leave. Brobst then struck him a blow which caused his own bolo to hit him, and Saldivar staggered
away to his sister‘s house. He arrived there 2 hours later and died on her doorstep. The death was attributed to possible
internal bleeding.

ISSUE: Is Brobst liable, given that it was not his intent to kill Saldivar and he had a right to expel Saldivar from the property?

HELD: Guilty; even though no evidence was provided to ascertain that the ―blow‖ was strong enough to cause death, no
evidence was provided to show he intervened to help Saldivar either

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Subject: Criminal Law- Proximate Cause
Ponente: Justice Hugo Guitierrez, Jr.
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
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intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.

FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which caused the flooding of the storage
area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went
to the hospital for the treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings showed that he was suffering from
tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised the case to the SC arguing
that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.

ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.

RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law
and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence,
that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs. Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause. CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Subject: Impossible Crime (Legal vs. Factual Impossibility)
Ponente: Justice Jose C. Campos Jr.
Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.

FACTS: Sometime in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other armed men, went to Salvador Mandaya’s
house and fired gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied
by his son-in-law and his family.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner raised the case to CA but the same affirmed the decision. Petitioner now
contends that he is only responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.

ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where
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he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is
done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act
which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.

Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post-dated checked worth P10,000 as
payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was deposited to the account of Jacqueline
Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check. Dyhengco filed a complaint with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6)
years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.

HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash replacement should not
be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
 That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;
 That the act was alone with evil intent; and
 That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
 The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
Therefore, the Supreme Court HELD that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an impossible crime and suffer
the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.

G.R. No. L-2800 May 30, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. TEOPISTA CANJA
BENGZON, J.:

FACTS: Defendant Teopista Canja has been maltreated by her husband Pedto Jongque. Apart from beating her, he
squandered their money and kept a woman. Per her signed confession, on the night of 25 May 1948 when the victim came
home he hit the defendant on the stomach without any reason. After dinner and going out he hit her again and Teopista felt
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utmost resentment against him. That night she took she got a hammer and a chisel and struck his head and face until he was
dead. She woke up her eldest daughter Exuperia to help her carry the body to the creek. As her defense, Teopista stated that
she woke up when a man was strangulating her and to defend herself grabbed a piece of wood and struck the assailant twice
and later on learned that it was her husband. Court of First Instance found her guilty on the basis of her daughter’s testimony
against her, her signed confession and the autopsy report showing that the injuries suffered by the victim can’t be from two
blows.

ISSUE: Whether or not Canja is exempt from criminal liability due to self defense.

DECISION: Judgment affirmed. Victim’s cruelty is not mitigating circumstance. Self-defense version was rejected due to her
voluntary and signed confession, her daughter’s testimony and the autopsy report.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs AUGUSTO A. SANTOS

FACTS: The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and
operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon III registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three
kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

ISSUE: WON violation of Section 28 of AO No.2 can give rise to a criminal liability

HELD: Act No. 4003 does not contain similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license to fish within three kilometers
of the shore line without the written permission of the Secretary. Since the act itself does not contain such prohibition, the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce cannot incorporate such prohibition. The
conditional clause of Sec. 28 of AO No.2 (A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the
Federal Penal Code.) is null and void. The act or commission as charged to Augusto Santos does not constitute a crime or
violation of criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. DISMISSED.