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ELECTIONS LECTURE: 19 June 2014 (Dayhon)
Discussion on Laws governing Elections
3 SOURCES OF OUR ELECTION LAWS
A. 1987 Constitution
B. Omnibus Election Code: BP Blg 881
C. Local Government Code: RA 7160
A. 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Article 2: Declaration of Principle & State Policies
- Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
o Provides for the reason why we have elections
o Basic premise of elections
- Sec 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral and spiritual, intellectual and social well-
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
o This is the basis why we have the Sangguniang
Kabataan elections
- Sec 23: The state shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote
the welfare of the nation.
o Serves as basis for a law referring to Party-List
representation
- Sec 26: The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
o “Law”, this has not been enacted with respect to
political dynasties
Article 3: Bill of Rights
- Sec 4: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances
o The COMELEC, one of the powers vested, is to
supervise and regulate media; this is one of the
basis why COMELEC is vested with such power
o So that everyone have equal access to exposure,
with respect to the candidates (basically what
ma’am is saying is that not all candidates can
afford [to conduct face-to-face campaigning],
thus through media, everyone is given access to
campaign as long as within the limits provided by
the COMELEC
- Sec 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
o Exception: where there is a ban in the Catholic
Church and Iglesia ni Cristo <?>
- Sec 8: The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
- Sec 16: All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.
o COMELEC entailed the filing of cases (ie
disqualification cases, election protests, quo
warranto), notwithstanding the fact that it is an
electoral case, it is still entitled to the right of
speedy disposition of cases
- Sec 18: No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
Article 4: Citizenship
- Citizenship is the basis (…); one of the basic [mandatory]
requirements for the exercise of the right to suffrage, and
for the intention of any person to file, to serve as a public
officer through the electoral process
- Sec 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the
accordance with law.
- Sec 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
Article 5: Suffrage
- It provides for the qualification of the voters as well as the
mandate for the Congress to enact a law affording all
qualified Filipino citizens to vote
- As provided under a law, RA 9189 (Overseas Absentee
Voting Law), allows Filipinos abroad [to vote]
Article 6: Legislative Department
- Provides for the composition of the HREP, qualifications,
terms of office of members; also provides for the
procedure in case there is a vacancy
- Also provides for the composition of HRET, and SET
Article 12 (sic) [it should be Art 7]: Executive Department
- Provides for the qualification of the president, VP; term of
office; limitation of their terms; manner of canvass and
proclamation; composition of the PET; and with the
matter with respect to their vacancy
Article 9: Constitutional Offices
- Art 9-A: provides for the common provisions governing
the 3 commissions
- Art 9-C: specifically deals with the COMELEC
Article 10: Local Government
- Provides for the general provisions on the local
government with respect to creation, merger, abolition of
its political unit
Article 16: General Provisions
- With respect to a general prohibition against partisan
political activities or prohibition on the appointment or
designation of a member of the AFP (in the active service)
to a civilian position in the government [Sec 5(4)]
Article 17: Amendments or revisions on the Constitution
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B. BP BLG 881: OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
- Enacted into law on Dec 3, 1985
- Sec 283: Took effect upon the approval thereof
- It is the basic statutory law of the Philippines
- Codified all previous election laws, which repealed PD
1296 (otherwise known as OEC of 1978)
History of Election Laws
First election law in the Philippines was Act 1582, which was
enacted in 1907. It was amended by subsequent acts, such as
the Administrative Code (repealed Act 1582 in 1917), which
took effect Oct 1, 1917.
The Administrative Code contains provisions governing
elections. The Administrative Code was subsequently
amended. And then, the Commonwealth was established;
Commonwealth Act 357 was known as the Election Code and
enacted to replace the amended Administrative Code.
Following the grant of independence of the Philippines, one of
the first statutes adopted by Congress in 1947 was RA 180
(otherwise known as the Revised Election Code). RA 180
repealed CA 357.
Subsequent republic acts were enacted which govern our
elections for 30 years. Until the late President Ferdinand
Marcos, by virtue of his exercise of martial law issued PD No.
1296 which was titled Election Code of 1978, and this repealed
the Revised Election Code (referring to CA 357).
PD 1296 was subsequently repealed by our present election
code (referring to BP Blg 881: OEC)
- BP Blg 881 undergone several amendments under the
1987 Constitution. The significant RAs following the 1987
Constitution that amended the OEC are as follows:
o RA 6646: Electoral Reform Law of 1987
Sec 2: re-enacted the OEC when it provided that
the “first local elections under the new
Constitution and all subsequent elections and
plebiscites shall be governed by this Act
(referring to RA 6646); and plebiscites shall be
governed by this Act and BP Blg 881 (OEC), and
other election laws not inconsistent with this Act
o RA 6735: Act Providing for a system of initiative and
referendum
o RA 7160: Local Government Code
Enacted October 1991
Provides for the qualifications and election of
local elective officials and recall of local elective
officials, and recall of local elective officials, and
local initiative and referendum
Sec 39-43, 69-75, 120-127
o RA 7166: Act providing for the synchronized national
and local elections and for electoral reforms
Enacted 26 Nov 1991
As a consequence of this law, local and national
elections are conducted simultaneously; unlike
prior to 7166, local and national [elections] are
separated.
o RA 7941: An act providing for the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system
Enacted Mar 3, 1995
o RA 8171: An act providing for the repatriation of
Filipino Women who have lost their Filipino
citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos
Enacted October 23, 1995
Why is this significant? Because it involves the
right of suffrage (whether they can exercise their
right of suffrage, or if they can run for public
office)
Basically, this law deals on citizenship
o RA 8189: An act providing for a general registration of
voters, adopting a system of continuing registration
prescribing the procedures thereof
Promulgated on 11 June 1996
There is now a continuing registration wherein
you don’t have to wait for the schedule of
registration of voters (before the COMELEC
schedules 2 weekends for registration of voters
for those who have reached the age requirement
of 18 years old)
Under 8189, as an amendment, even if you have
not reached the age of 18 yo, but you will be 18
yo on the date of election of that particular year,
then you can already register anytime at the […]
between Mondays to Friday, office hours –so this
is what we call continuing system of registration.
o RA 8295: An act providing for the proclamation of a
lone candidate for any elective official in a special
election
Enacted on 9 June 1997
If the candidate is a lone candidate, then he is
already the winner, proclamation na lang ang
kulang
o RA 8436: An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated system in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections and in subsequent national and
local electoral exercises
Sec 11: “… any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he/she is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for president and
vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she
is running …”
Impliedly repealed Sec 67 of BP Blg 881 being
inconsistent with Sec 11 (of RA 8436)
Prior the RA 8436, if a mayor is running for
mayor upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy he is NOT deemed resigned
because he is running for the same office.
But if you he is running for a governor,
then he is deemed resigned upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy. But if he is a
mayor, and he is filing a certificate of
candidacy for president and vice
president, he is NOT resigned as mayor.
The amendment is the elective official
even if he is filing [a certificate of
candidacy] different from one he is
currently holding in a permanent capacity,
he is NOT deemed resigned anymore
under RA 8436 (and subsequently
amended by RA 9006)
o RA 9006: Political advertising ban and fair election
practices act
Sec 14: expressly repealed Sec 67 and 85 of
OEC, and sections 10 and 11 of RA 6646; and
rendered ineffective section 11 of RA 8436 (it
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pertains to the manner of the filing of
certificate of candidacy)
Fair election practices lifted the political ad
ban, which means that, they (politicians) can
purchase air time, radio time, and can print
their candidacy in newspapers, tabloid; but
within a limited period and limited space.
o RA 9164: Act providing for synchronized barangay
and sk elections
Amended RA 7160 with respect to barangay
and sk elections
o RA 9189: Act providing for a system of overseas
absentee voting by qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad
Promulgated on 13 February 2003
o RA 9225: Citizen retention act of 2003
Has relation on RA 9189
o RA 9244: Eliminated the preparatory recall
assembly as a mode of instituting recall of elective
government officials
19 February 2004
Because, before, there are 2 modes under BP
337—preparatory recall assembly, or through
the petition of the registered voters through the
corresponding percentage requirement
o RA 9369: Automated system election law
Act amending RA 8436
o RA 9525
The Congress appropriated the amount of Php
11M as supplemental budget for the automated
election system
C. RA 7160: LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
- Another source of election laws, in so far as:
o Qualifications local elective officials
o Provision pertaining to local initiative and
referendum, and recall of local elective
officials
SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE AMENDATORY LAWS
The basic law on elections and these legislations (these
amendments) are designed to improve […]. The objective of
these amendments is to further enhance and improve the law
in order to achieve its purpose. What is the purpose of the
electoral law? To attain honest, orderly, peaceful, free, and
credible (HOPEFRECRE) elections; which means that the voters
are not hampered from exercising their right to suffrage. This
objective (HOPEFRECRE) is the basic premise of all these laws
taken together.
Under RA 6646, specifically Sec 2, what is the applicability of
the OEC and the amendatory laws? As provided under RA
6646, the OEC shall govern all elections of public officers and
to the extent appropriate all the referenda and plebiscite. This
is further strengthened by Sec 2, par 1, of Art IX (C) of the
Constitution which empowers the COMELEC to “enforce and
administer al laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.” And
one of the basic tasks, the power vested upon the COMELEC,
is to apply the OEC and all other statutes on the subject
[governmental] election laws; as provided in Sec 36 of RA
7166.
PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAWS
Other than the HOPEFRECRE, the purpose of an election is to
enable the electorate to choose the men and women who
would run their government, whether national, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay. It is to give the voters direct
participation in the affairs of their government, either in
determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding
some questions of public interests, and for this purpose all of
the legal voters shall be permitted, unhampered, and
unmolested, to cast their ballots. (Agpalo book, page 3)
MARUHOM vs COMELEC CASE
G.R. No. 139357 May 5, 2000
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.
FACTS:
Maruhom and Dimaporo were mayoralty candidates in Lanao during
the 1998 elections.
During the counting of votes it was alleged that serious irregularities,
anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at Maruhom’s
instance, so that votes for Dimaporo were not counted and credited in
his favor.
As a result of the irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the
petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner because he appeared to
have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered
2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes;
On May 22, Dimaporo filed a petition to annul the proclamation of
Maruhom as duly elected mayor, SPC98-228. This petition was later
withdrawn by Dimaporo.
As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, Dimaporo also
filed an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against Maruhom before the
Regional Trial Court. Maruhom submitted an answer to this complaint.
Subsequently, the COMELEC issued an order to conduct a revision of
the votes. Maruhom orally moved for the dismissal of Dimaporo’s
protest. Maruhom later followed up with a written motion to dismiss.
The COMELEC denied Maruhom’s motion to dismiss and ordered to
proceed with the revision of the votes. Maruhom filed a MFR but this
was also denied.
Maruhom filed a petition for certiorari assailing the COMELEC’s denial
of his motions to dismiss as well as his MFR. The COMELEC also ruled
that filing of a motion to dismiss after filing an answer is a prohibited
pleading.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in denying Maruhom’s
actions. NO
HELD:
The purpose of election laws
… is to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may
violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the
elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular
government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate
must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the
votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the
Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created — to promote free, orderly and honest elections. The
choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be
interfered with.
COMELEC’s power is broad enough to help it achieve HOPEFRECRE
Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There
can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it
to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
Liberal construction in defining the parameters of COMELEC’s power
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially
the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest
so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real
choice of the people is imperative, much more so in this case considering
that a mere twenty (20) votes separates the winner from the loser of the
contested election results.
Effect of filing a motion to dismiss after filing an answer: attempt to
subverting will of electorate
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the
roundabout manner within which petitioner virtually substituted his
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answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss three (3) months later is a
frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of the
electorate. Further, Maruhom only filed the motion to dismiss "when the
results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him" or right after the
creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered by the trial court.
Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for
but before filing the answer. . ." pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the case of Maruhom v COMELEC what was the factual
circumstances of the case which lead to the SC ruling on what
is the purpose of election laws?
- When COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s motion to dismiss,
petitioner alleged that COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion when COMELEC failed to perform its duties
under the rules of procedure and under the Constitution,
and the election laws.
What do you mean by protest ad cautelam?
- Literal translation to English “for security”, or “as a
precaution”
- It is often used in:
o Questioning the court’s jurisdiction and at the same
time be able to file pleadings;
o As a precautionary measure to preserve a party’s
remedies
- eg in the case of Agbayani vs COMELEC 1990, the Court
held the proper application of protest ad cautelam:
As the above-mentioned cases involved
only nine precincts, it was only prudent for
the petitioner to file his protest ad
cautelam in case the pre-proclamation
controversy was ultimately dismissed and
it became necessary for him to activate his
protest. The protest would involve all the
precincts in the province. If he had not
taken this precaution, an the other ballot
boxes would have been emptied and their
contents would have been burned and
forever lost.
Still on protest ad cautelam: It is a precautionary measure for
a security; when you file a protest ad cautelam, what is being
secured here? When you say precautionary measure, what
would that involve? Would that involve what is alleged in
your protest? Or does it refer to something outside?
What was the petition, what was the nature of the action
filed?
- Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction
- When you say prayer for preliminary injunction, you are
asking the SC to stop the COMELEC from proceeding with
its decision.
What is being challenged in the action filed by petitioner
Maruhom?
- Petitioner challenged the decision of COMELEC’s
decision denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on the motion to dismiss filed by said
petitioner.
- What is this COMELEC resolution that is being
challenged, subject to this petition for certiorari? SPR
No. 52-98
What is the purpose [of election laws], as mentioned here
[Maruhom vs COMELEC]?
- To protect the purity of elections; so that the elections is
clean, is free, is credible, the election is honest.
The SC made reference here to the case of Maruhom; what
was the circumstance which made the SC made mention
purity of election? Does it not have reference to the casting
of ballots?
- In order to ascertain the will of the electorate.
- In order to ascertain the will of the electorate, what
must be done?
Is essence and purpose the same?
How do you determine the will of the people? Going back to
Art 2, Sec 1 that we are a democratic and republican State,
what then is the basis of the will?
- Majority, which means plurality of votes.
- Where should the plurality of votes be based? On the
number of actual people who voted (note: there are 2
basis of votes: total number of registered voters, and
total number of votes actually cast)
- So the essence of elections is plurality of votes.
SUNGA vs COMELEC CASE
G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998
MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.
FACTS:
Sunga was a mayoralty candidate running against re-electionist
Trinidad in the 1995 elections in Cagayan.
On 22 Apr 1995, Sunga filed a letter-complaint with the COMELEC for
disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local
government vehicles in his campaign; as well as employing threats,
violence, intimidation etc both in violation of the OEC.
The COMELEC’s law department held hearings were Sunga presented
evidence, while Trinidad showed none.
Meanwhile, election results showed that Trinidad garnered the
highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation
of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was
proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another
motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions
were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June, the law department submitted a report to the COMELEC
en banc recommending charging Trinidad. The en banc eventually
directed the filing of 4 informations against Trinidad for various
election offenses.
Sunga filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the
Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition.
However, the COMELEC 2nd division through Resolution 2050,
dismissed the petition for disqualification because it was filed after
the elections. Sunga filed a MFR, but was denied by the En Banc.
Meanwhile, it seems that Trinidad was soon after proclaimed mayor
and assumed the position of Mayor.
Sunga filed the instant case, with a petition for certiorari contending
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition for disqualification, on the grounds that:
1. Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the
disqualification case even after the election and
proclamation, and the proclamation and assumption of office
by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction;
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it
contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646;
3. the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4)
informations against private respondent for violation of the
penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more
than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify
Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified;
4. since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if
petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed
as the duly elected mayor.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the COMELEC was correct in dismissing Sunga’s petition
for disqualification? NO
(2) WON Sunga should be proclaimed Mayor? NO
HELD:
COMELEC’S interpretation of Sec. 6 (RA 6466) in Res. 2050 tantamount to
quasi-judicial legislation.
COMELEC Resolution states a disqualification case filed after the election
but before the proclamation of winners and that which is filed after the
election and the proclamation of winners, is to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.
Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
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votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial
and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until
judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this
requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty
which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with
no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the
election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification
case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in
effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires.
A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded,
instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against
him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason
caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were
indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the
erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the
disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more
fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
Sunga may not be proclaimed mayor even if Trinidad is DQed
Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the
event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and
jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected
does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number
of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
Why was plurality of votes an issue in the case of Sunga v
COMELEC?
- When Trinidad was disqualified, Sunga now contends that
in lieu of the disqualification of Trinidad and he being the
candidate who garnered the 2nd number of votes, he
should be declared the winner in the mayoralty race.
- Because Sunga did not garner the majority of the votes,
thus, he cannot be proclaimed as winner in lieu of the
disqualification of the actual winner.
PENERA vs COMELEC CASE
G.R. No. 181613
September 11, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
FACTS:
Penera and Andanar were mayoralty rivals in Sta. Monica during the
2007 elections.
In April, Andanar filed a petition of DQ against Penera for unlawfully
engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to
the commencement of the campaign period. Note: nagmotorcade daw
kasi si Penera.
During the pendency of the petition, the elections were held; Penera
was proclaimed mayor and had assumed office.
In July, the COMELEC 2nd Div. issued a Resolution disqualifying Penera
for engaging in premature campaigning.
Penera filed a MFR before the COMELEC en banc, stating that she was
not able to produce evidence in her defense, and that the evidence
against her was disproportionately given weight. The EnBanc denied
her MFR.
Penera filed a petition for Certiorari before the SC.
Meanwhile, as Penera was DQed, Andanar prayed that she be allowed
to assume the position of mayor in Sta. Monica.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in disqualifying Penera.
NO
(2) WON rival Andanar can succeed the disqualified mayor-elect.
NO
HELD:
Penera only raising questions of fact + function of certiorari
It is not the function of the Court to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. It is not
the function of the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented.
The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and it does not include a
review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived
from actual experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before it.
Factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly
supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law
in the questioned resolutions. Unless any of these causes are clearly
substantiated, the Court will not interfere with the findings of fact of the
COMELEC.
Andanar cannot succeed Penera; LGC rules on succession to apply
Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot grant
Andanar’s prayer to be allowed to assume the position of Mayor of Sta.
Monica. The well-established principle is that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In this case, the rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall
apply, to wit:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the xxx mayor, the x x x vice-mayor concerned shall become the x
x x mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
(Emphases ours.)
Considering Penera’s disqualification from holding office as Mayor of Sta.
Monica, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as Mayor.
It was also reiterated in the Penera vs COMELEC case wherein
the SC said that it is a well-established principle that
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. In this case, in the case of
Penera, the rules on succession shall apply. RA 7160, Sec 44
provides: “If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
xxx mayor, the x x x vice-mayor concerned shall become the x
x x mayor.”
When is there permanent vacancy? (SEC 44, RA 7160)
1. An elective local official fills a higher vacant office:
the office has been vacated because of appointment
to higher office
2. The winning candidate refuses to assume office
3. The winning candidate fails to qualify or has been
removed from office
4. The elective official who won voluntarily resigned or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
functions of the office
By operation of law, it is not the second highest who is to be
proclaimed; but the rules of succession must be applied as
stipulated in the Local Government Code.
The same ruling has been reiterated in the case of Rulloda vs
COMELEC. The SC here ruled that the winner is the one who
obtained the majority or the plurality of valid votes cast in the
elections. In all republican form of government, the basic idea
is that, no man can be declared elected, and no measure like
an initiative and referendum, can be declared carried, unless
he or it receives the majority or the plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. Regardless of the fact that only 25% voted
in the elections, the majority shall be based on the 25%
because the law here provides for the plurality of the votes
cast .
RULLODA vs COMELEC CASE
G.R. No. 154198
January 20, 2003
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PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO,
PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO.
TOMAS, SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec.
Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO PLACIDO,
respondents.

FACTS:
Rulloda and Placido were Brgy Chairman candidates in Sto Tomas,
Pangasinan during the July 15 2002 barangay elections. Before the
elections, Rulloda died of a heart attack.
His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the
Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run
as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late
husband. Note, at this point Betty has not filed a COC.
One day before the elections, election officer directed the Chairman
and Brgy BOC to append ‘NOT COUNTED’ to any voted cast for ‘BETTY’
‘PETRONILA’ or ‘RULLODA.’
Despite votes for her ‘not counted’ , Betty gained 516 votes versus
Placido’s 290 votes. Placido was proclaimed winner anyway.
Betty learned that the COMELEC later resolved to deny her petition for
substitution. The basis for COMELEC’s resolution was Section 9 of the
guidelines for the synchronized Brgy and SK elections:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There
shall be no substitution of candidates for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials.
Rulloda filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the
COMELEC’s resolutions insofar as they prohibited petitioner from
running as substitute candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to
nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

ISSUE: WON Rulloda should be allowed to run in leiu of her dead husband.
YES

HELD:
Essence of elections is for the people to choose
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot,
and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the
electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the
election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Interpretation disallowing substitution would frustrate the will of

electorate; liberal construction
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay
election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no
political party from which to designate the substitute. Such an
interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of
election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters.It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate
of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be
so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot.
Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific
provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can
not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive
construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written.
Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates
where no political parties are involved than when political considerations
or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of
votes in the contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in
election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of
the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Rulloda’s letter to COMELEC asking permission to run to be treated as

COC
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioner’s favor
can not be counted because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In
other words, he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim
is refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well
as the assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that
petitioner’s letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of
candidacy.

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Discussion on Construction of Election Laws
HOW ARE ELECTION CONTESTS [laws] CONSTRUED?
- Rule 1, Sec 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure These
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.
- Why are election laws liberally construed? For what
purpose?
o As provided for under Rule 1, Sec 3 “…in order
to promote the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections and to achieve just,
expeditious and promote the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission.
- Important note: difference between the purpose and
essence of elections (laws)
SULIGUIN vs COMELEC Case
- WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER AS TECHNICALITY HERE?
The filing of the petition for certiorari beyond the
reglementary period. Because, under the rules, once
the proclamation has been made, the BOC can no
longer perform its functions.. the BOC becomes
functus officio after proclamation. That is why, among
the contentions of petitioner Suliguin is the fact that
the petition has been filed after proclamation.. after 13
days [should be: 30 days]. The technicality referred to
here is the period within which the protestee
(Sumague) raised the correction in the SOV.
- THE SC IS SAYING HERE, THE TECHNICALITY SHOULD
BE SET ASIDE. FOR WHAT PURPOSE? The SC applied
here, the liberal construction policy, which means, the
SC set aside this technicality for the sole purpose of
determining the true will of the electorate.
- The SC is also saying, while it is true that after
proclamation that the remedy available to a party is
the filing of an election contest case, but in this
particular case, the SOV being the basis for the
proclamation of the candidate; and if the proclamation
of the candidate is based on an erroneous or
mathematical error in the computation of votes, then
this technicality must be set aside and the BOC may be
ordered to reconvene in order to [count] correct
whatever error that was made in the SOV. Because if
the proclamation is based on an erroneous SOV, COV
then the proclamation is void.
- And if it is strictly construed, thus the technicality
[referring to the period] will also be construed strictly,
then this will put a stamp of validity on an erroneous
proclamation.
- Because: what is the ultimate objective? To determine
who really won, and who is the choice of the people.
G.R. No. 166046 March 23, 2006
MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, Respondents.
FACTS:
Suliguin and Sumague were candidates for the SBayan in
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the 2004 elections.
Because of a mathematical discrepancy in the SOVs for 19
precincts which credited Sumague with only 644 votes instead of
844, Suliguin was proclaimed the winner of the 8 th SB seat.
(Suliguin’s 6605 v Sumague’s 6647)
4 days after the canvassing, Sumague requested for a
recomputation of the votes in a letter on 15 May. 11 days later,
the MBOC filed a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes" attributing the error to canvassers’ extreme
mental and physical fatigue.
The COMELEC granted the MBOC’s petition 21 July, nullified
Suliguin’s proclamation as it was ‘based on an erroneous
computation of votes,’ and ordered the MBOC to reconvene and
effect the necessary corrections.
Suliguin filed an MFR which the En Banc denied. Suliguin filed a
petition for certiorari with the SC, alleging that the COMELEC
committed GAOD when it acted on the MBOC’s petition as the
petition was filed out of time.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed GAOD granting the petition of the
MBOC to nullify petitioner’s proclamation. NO
HELD:
Petition being filed on time, a mere technicality which may be set
aside in the interest of determining electorate will
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain
by all means within its command who the real candidate elected by the
electorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or
the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment
of the results.
Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election
laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will. A
proclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a
petition to correct errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even if filed out of time, may be
considered, so as not to thwart the proper determination and
resolution of the case on substantial grounds and to prevent a stamp
of validity on a palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous
tabulation of votes.
Reason for liberal construction
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly
provide that such rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of
justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the discretion to liberally construe its
rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any portion thereof
in the interest of justice. Disputes in the outcome of elections involve
public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
If based on error: no valid proclamation, may be challenged even
after assumption of office; manifest error
Where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on
a clerical error or mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and
not through the legitimate will of the electorate, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of and the same can be challenged even after
the candidate has assumed office.
Where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed
candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the Commission the
power to declare such proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Correction of mathematical/mechanical errors proper; manifest
error defined
Section 32, subparagraph 5 of Comelec Resolution No. 6669
includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate as a
manifest error. A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye
or obvious to the understanding and is apparent from the papers to
the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error
which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been
committed.
The corection of mathematical/mechanical errors does not
involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination
and/or appreciation of ballots. It only calls for a mere clerical act of
reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the
MBCs involved.
WHAT SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTURED AND WHAT
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED? WHAT PARTICULAR
PROVISIONS UNDER THE ELECTION LAW ARE TO BE
CONSTRUED STRICTLY? HOW ARE WE GOING TO
DETERMINE NOW WHAT PARTICULAR PROVISIONS
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SHOULD BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY, AND WHAT
PARTICULAR PROVISIONS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
STRICTLY?
- In applying the rules on statutory construction, the
provisions of election laws are to be divided into 3
parts—(1) those which refers to the conduct of
elections that required to be observed by election
officials; (2) those provisions which “candidate for
public elective office” are required to do and comply
with; (3) those provisions which cover procedural rules
designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual
winner in the elections.
o CONDUCT OF ELECTION REQUIRED TO BE
OBSERVED BY ELECTION OFFICIALS The rules
and regulations for the conduct of elections
are mandatory before the election, but when
it is sought to be enforced after the election,
they are to be construed as directory only
(after election note: construed directory
especially on provisions where if they were to
be held as mandatory, it will result to
innocent voters being deprived of their votes
without any fault on their part.
Example: Sec 211, OEC provides that “in
reading and appreciation of ballots, every
ballot shall be presumed to be valid
unless there is clear and good reason to
justify its rejection.” So for example, the
inefficiency of an election officer which
led to his failure to affix his signature at
the back of the ballot [affixing of
signature is in compliance with RA 7166]
does not constitute as a good and clear
reason to justify the rejection of the
ballot, thus the construction of election
laws is liberally construed in favour of the
validity of the ballot
Liberally construed in favour of the
validity of the ballot. Why? What is the
objective? To determine the will of the
electorate. Because why, if you will
invalidate the ballot, you will be
disenfranchising the voters who has no
fault in the [eg lack of the signature]
because it is the fault of the BEI.
However, the BEI shall be subject to
administrative or criminal cases as
provided for the rules.
o PROVISIONS OF ELECTION LAWS WHICH
CANDDIDATES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLY
[Requirements, Qualifications]
It is generally regarded as mandatory on
the part of the candidate for public
office, thus failure to comply is fatal to
the candidate.
Example: rules prescribing for
qualification of candidates such as age,
citizenship, or residency requirement
cannot be cured by “vox populi, vox dei”
Example: deadline of filing of COC is also
strictly construed against the candidates,
and reglementary period for filing of
election contests
o LAWS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS
Laws governing election contests (such as
election protest, quo warranto cases)
must be liberally construed.
Why? Because ultimately, the true will
must be determined. However, in the
case of Baustista vs Castro, it is required
that the signature of the Chairman [of the
BEC] to be affixed at the back of the
ballot; however if the ballot, if the issue
before the court is with respect to the
authenticity or genuineness of the ballot,
then the signature at the back of the
ballot is relevant and material to the
issue at hand.
However, the SC held, in the case of
Libanan vs HRET, a ballot without a
signature, for example the issue is on the
genuineness of the ballot, should it still
be counted? The SC said that even if
there is no signature, but there is that
prominent watermark, then the ballot is
genuine. However, assuming that the
COMELEC watermark is blurred, what
should the BEI find? So, they have to look
at the ballot if it has red and blue fibers
(ang ballot kasi class, para siyang per, it
is a special kind of paper); if it contains
that red and blue fiber, then that is
genuine, even if the COMELEC
watermark is blurred and there is no
signature at the back of the ballot.
Maruhom vs COMELEC [331 SCRA 473]
provides that “laws and statutes
governing election contests especially
the appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed and in applying
election laws. It would be better to err in
favour of the popular sovereignty that to
be right in complex but little understood
legalisms. “
PENA vs HRET Case
- This case is more on the exception to the rule on liberal
construction
- What is the relevance of the case of Pena? The SC said
that while technicalities should be set aside in order to
determine the will of the electorate, the protestant
shall rise and fall on the issues raised in its original or
amended complaint or pleading filed prior to the lapse
of the statutory period for the filing of the protest.
Why? Because the period for filing of the election
protest is strictly construed.
- What is the limitation as imposed by the SC in the case
of PENA vs HRET? Can amendments be allowed?
While technicalities may be disregarded in order to
determine the will of the electorate, to what extent
can the protestant amend his pleadings? The
mandatory period for election protests should be filed
within 10 days. However, if there is a need to amend a
day after the lapse of the 10 day period, the
amendment may be allowed. For what purpose? For
the purpose of determining the true will of the
electorate. However, the protestant is only limited to
the issues he raised in his original or amended
pleading filed within/prior to the lapse of the 10-day
statutory period for the filing of the complaint. Hindi
na siya pwedeng magdagdag, that is the limitation..
whatever issues that he raised in the original or
amended pleading filed with the 10 day reglementary
period is settled (so magraise and fall siya diyan).
While he is allowed to make amendments to his
pleading after the 10-day period, he can no longer add
what was not in his original or amended pleading filed
within that 10-day reglementary period.
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G.R. No. 123037 WHEN YOU SAY, LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION, IS THIS LIBERAL
March 21, 1997 CONSTRUCTION POLICY ABSOLUTE? [LIMITATIONS ON
TEODORO Q. PEÑA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ALFREDO E. ABUEG JR., respondents. THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION POLICY]
- No it is not absolute, as the liberal construction policy
FACTS: is not applicable in the following instances:
Pena and Abueg were rivals for the Congressional seat in Palawan [EXCEPTIONS]
during the May 8 1995 elections. Apparently, Abueg was
proclaimed winner. 1. When the amendment to pleadings in an
On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the HRET, election contest will substantially change the
claiming that the elections in the 2 nd district of Palawan were cause of action, defense, or theory of the
tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation case;
and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before,
during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and
2. When the amendment will alter a final
the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass judgment on a substantial matter;
which affected the results of the election. 3. When the amendment will confer jurisdiction
Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the upon the court when none existed before;
election by almost 7k votes. He then assailed Abueg’s
proclamation.
4. When it seeks to cure a premature or non-
Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss on June 23, existent cause of action;
averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the 5. When the amendment is intended to delay
petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In the proceedings of the case
essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact
that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive
fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point
out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result
of the same.
Pena later submitted a list of specific contested precincts on July
10, or 17 days after Abueg’s answer.
In October, the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the
petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause
of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance,
meriting its dismissal.
Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE: WON the HRET committed GAOD in dismissing Pena’s petition

ad cautelam for lack of substance (which Pena later cured)? NO

HELD:
Pena’s petition lacking substance, dismissal proper
A perusal of the Petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that
Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where
widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal
omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under
Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in
form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the
immediate dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form
and substance means that the petition must be more than merely
rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by
even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no
other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption
of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions
of this sort by the losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to
allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of "massive
fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities", without specification, and substantiation, of where and
how these occurrences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot
allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper,
otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless
stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the
water.

Substantial amendments may be allowed but must be within time

period (10 days after winner’s proclamation
The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET, that substantial
amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same
period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET
Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the
winner.

Exception to liberal construction

While it is conceded that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election
protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had
raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of
the statutory period for filing of the protest.
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul
an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the
free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of
fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a
fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled,
and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step.

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ELECTIONS LECTURE: 30 June 2014 (Dayhon) right of suffrage and not otherwise disqualified by law, and
are registered voters.
Discussion on:
- Preview on the powers and functions of the In the case of Paras vs Comelec, the SC said that the SK
COMELEC elections is not an election contemplated as regular
- Forms of Popular Intervention election. Because it is participated by voters between the
- Types of Elections ages of 15 to 21 years old, who are not qualified to vote in
- Plebiscite a regular election, because under Sec 1, Art V of the 1987
- Initiative Constitution,
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
Sec 2, Art IX-C, 1987 Constitution law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
powers and functions: one year, and in the place wherein they propose to
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. the election. No literacy, property, or other
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, exercise of suffrage.
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial The SK is not a regular election, but this pertains to the
courts of limited jurisdiction. matter of recall, that is why the SC here made a distinction
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election what would hinder or bar the holding of a recall elections.
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions 2. SPECIAL ELECTIONS
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and The second type of elections is Special Elections. Special
inspectors, and registration of voters. Elections are not regularly conducted, but are conducted or
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the held only for the purposes of:
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring a. Filling a vacancy in the HREP, for example, under
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Sec 9, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, provides
or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present
Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate
their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms
or in the House of Representatives, a
of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects
special election may be called to fill such
shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law,
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere
but the Senator or Member of the House
to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
of Representatives thus elected shall serve
government shall likewise be refused registration.
only for the unexpired term.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies
to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when Section 4, RA 7166 (otherwise known as
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their Synchorized National and Local Elections) also
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that provides
may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including Election and Special Elections. - The
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and postponement, declaration of failure of
malpractices. election and the calling of special
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize elections as provided in Sections 5, 6
election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of shall be decided by the Commission
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or members. The causes for the
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary declaration of a failure of election may
action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, occur before or after the casting of
order, or decision. votes or on the day of the election.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report
on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or In case a permanent vacancy shall
recall. occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the
One of the forms of Popular Interventions is ELECTIONS, Commission shall call and hold a
the other forms would be (1) Plebiscite, (2) Initiative, (3) special election to fill the vacancy not
Referendum, and (3) Recall. These are electoral processes earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer
than ninety (90) days after the
intervened by the people. The sovereignty is not limited occurrence of the vacancy. However, in
only to elections wherein the people vote for the case of such vacancy in the Senate, the
candidates, it is also exercised through other electoral special election shall be held
process wherein certain measures are submitted to the simultaneously with the succeeding
regular election.
people for its approval.
b. Another instance when Special Elections may be
TYPES OF ELECTIONS
called is with respect to under Sec 10, Art VII, 1987
Constitution
1. REGULAR ELECTIONS
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten
When we say Regular Elections, it is an election held on o’clock in the morning of the third day
such dates established by law at regular intervals (it can be after the vacancy in the offices of the
done in 3 years, in 6 years), whether national or local, it President and Vice-President occurs,
convene in accordance with its rules
refers to an election participated by those who possess the without need of a call and within seven
days, enact a law calling for a special
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election to elect a President and a Vice- It is a system of elections using a technology which has
President to be held not earlier than
been demonstrated in these stages also. What are the
forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill stages—voting, counting, consolidated precinct
calling such special election shall be registration <?>, and transmission of the election return.
deemed certified under paragraph 2, There is an intervention of electronics.
Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by the Congress. Section 14, RA 9369
Appropriations for the special election SEC. 12. Section 10 of Republic Act
shall be charged against any current No. 8436 is hereby amended to read
appropriations and shall be exempt as follows:
from the requirements of paragraph 4, "SEC.14. Examination and Testing of
Section 25, Article VI of this Equipment or Device of the AES and
Constitution. The convening of the Opening of the Source Code for
Congress cannot be suspended nor the Review. - The Commission shall allow
special election postponed. No special the political parties and candidates
election shall be called if the vacancy or their representatives, citizens'
occurs within eighteen months before arm or their representatives to
the date of the next presidential examine and test.
election. "The equipment or device to be used
in the voting and counting on the day
of the electoral exercise, before
voting start. Test ballots and test
c. In cases where a postponement or failure of forms shall be provided by the
elections is declared (see Lucero vs COMELEC Commission.
"Immediately after the examination
case) that is with respect to Sections 5, 6, and 7 of
and testing of the equipment or
the OEC. device, parties and candidates or
their representatives, citizen's arms
If the COMELEC declares a failure of election or or their representatives, may submit
a written comment to the election
postponement of election, then a special election may be
officer who shall immediately
called within, the law provides that the COMELEC in fixing transmit it to the Commission for
the date for special elections should see to it that appropriate action.
(1) it should be the date not later than 30 days from "The election officer shall keep
minutes of the testing, a copy of
the cessation of the cause of the postponement or
which shall be submitted to the
suspension of the election or failure to elect (ie the Commission together with the
cause of the failure to elect on May 1 is terrorism, minute of voting."
then the special election shall be called upon the "Once an AES technology is selected
for implementation, the Commission
cessation of the cause, so for example wala ng
shall promptly make the source code
terrorism, then the COMELEC can hold special of that technology available and
election 30 days after); or open to any interested political party
or groups which may conduct their
own review thereof."
(2) it should be on a date reasonably close to the date
of the election not held
- This is based on the circumstances of the RA 9369 amended RA 8436, which is the first automated
case. Like in the case of Lucero vs election system law.
COMELEC, the special elections was
conducted 1 year after the date of the Other than election, what are the other forms of popular
intervention, as we said pursuant to the power of COMELEC
elections, the date is still reasonably
close to the date of elections not held. vested in the Constitution?
Why? Because it was not the fault of the
constituents, the delayed was not HOW IS A PLEBISCITE DEFINED?
attributable as fault of the constituents, - Sec 3(e), RA 6735:
Plebiscite is the electoral process
but attributable to the lawyers. by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or
3. MANUAL ELECTIONS rejected by the people.
- What process is it connected with? Give me an
When we say Manual Elections, it pertains to manual and example! How is it done?
mechanical casting of votes, counting of votes, and - Before the people or the public vote, what is the basis
canvassing. It is limited to this process. of the conduct of the plebiscite?
- Under what circumstances are plebiscite required?
What does this involve? When you say Manual Elections, Give me an example!
what would be involved in Manual Elections? - What is the provision in the Constitution that would
a. The use of paper and writing on ballots in casting require a plebiscite?
of votes o Section 4, Art XVII, 1987 Constitution
Section 4. Any amendment to, or
b. Direct reading and manual tallying of votes in
revision of, this Constitution
several copies of election returns under Section 1 hereof shall be
c. Direct reading of election returns and copying of valid when ratified by a majority
the results in the multiple copies of the statement of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier
of votes
than sixty days nor later than
d. Manual addition of the results in the statement of ninety days after the approval of
votes and in the certificate of canvass such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2

4. AUTOMATED ELECTIONS (AES)
hereof shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not

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earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission
on Elections of the sufficiency of
the petition.
- Through an initiative, how is it done?
- If it is a plebiscite for the conduct of an initiative for an
amendment for the Constitution, what would be the
process?
Process of INITATIVE ON THE CONSITUTION [only until
plebiscite]
i. Petition filed by at least 12 percentum of the total
number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3
percentum of the registered voters [Ma’am V: that
is the basic requirement!]
- What is this 3 percentum is it included
from the 12 percentum? Inclusive!
ii. Then, if you have all the signatories, the petition is
filed. The petition is filed before the COMELEC
iii. After it has been filed and the requirement for the
publication has been complied, the COMELEC will
call an election for that purpose, which is called a
plebiscite, for the ratification of the amendment
of the Constitution through the process of
initiative
OTHER THAN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUION, IN
WHAT PARTICULAR PROVISIONS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WOULD REQUIRE A PLEBISCITE?
- Section 10, Article X, 1987 Constitution
Section 10. No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria
established in the local
government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
- When we say “local government unit” what do we
mean?
o Section 3 (g), RA 6735 defines “local government
units” as referring to provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays.
- What would be the basis for the COMELEC in
conducting a plebiscite? Would that (referring to
plebiscite for the purpose of creating a city) require a
12 percentum requirement?
o On the 12 percentum requirement vis-à-vis
plebiscite, the answer is no, because said
requirement is only with respect to initiative.
o The basis for the conduct of plebiscite by the
COMELEC is a law or ordinance, for example,
creating or abolishing a barangay. There must be
a legislative action, a law, and that the law is
subject to a plebiscite of the political unit
affected because according to the law the
political unit affected will have to intervene in
this exercise.
Generally, plebiscite is associated with the ratification
process.
SANIDAD vs COMELEC Case
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6766 ‘An Act providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region’ was enacted.
Pursuant to 6766, Baguio City and the surrounding provinces will
have to take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of 6766. The
COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2187 to govern the conduct of
said plebiscite.
Petitioner Sanidad, a local opinion columnist, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Res. 2187, which imposed a
prohibition on media practictioners, disallowing them to use their
column/program to campaign for or against the plebiscite.
Sanidad claims that the provision violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedoms of expression and of the press as it
constituted prior restraint and subsequent punishment.
In reply, the COMELEC maintained that such prohibition is valid
re: its power to supervise and regulate media during election time
(Article 9C, 1987 Consti). The COMELEC further said that if
Sanidad wanted to campaign, he could do so but only under
COMELEC space and airtime.
ISSUE: WON Section 19 of Res. 2187 is unconstitutional. YES
HELD:
COMELEC can regulate franchises, permits or other grants, but
cannot regulate free speech
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision xxx Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time,
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what
was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate
the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured.
Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par.
of R.A. 6646 cannot be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders
nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite.
Evils sought to be prohibited: unfair advantage, does not exist in
plebiscite cases; regular election distinguished from plebiscite
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or
television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign
period.
The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to
the Court’s ruling in Badoy Jr. v COMELEC does not obtain in a
plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special
political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of
specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is
asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite. In
fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.
COMELEC cannot mandate use of COMELEC space and air time
While this limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he
may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to
justify such abridgement. The Court held that this form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for
no justifiable reason.
Press freedom and free speech beneficial to public during plebiscites
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely
and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time
may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
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limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times.
- What is the basis of the COMELEC Resolution?
o RA 6766! There is this law, pursuant to which,
the COMELEC is tasked for the ratification of
said republic act.
o Class you have to take note [VIP]: the COMELEC,
in every electoral exercise pursuant to a law,
enacts or promulgates a [COMELEC] Resolution
for the rules implementing that particular law
mandating a plebiscite (or elections, or
initiative, dependent on the purpose of the
law). So, the basis for the COMELEC Resolution
(in this case) is the law creating Autonomous
Region of the Cordillera.
- What is the nature of the plebiscite that would
distinguish it from an election as to prevent the
COMELEC from supervising it strictly?
o Considering that plebiscite is involving public
interest in the creation (or abolition) of the new
local government unit. The people, in order for
them to intelligently vote, whether they are in
favour or against that proposed law should be
aptly provided with information, and the SC said
that the media should not be restricted from
discussing these issues as these are matters of
public interest that would affect the
constituents in the affected areas. As the SC is
saying, as distinguished from elections, what is
the evil sought to be prevented from [allowing
media] in an election? In an election, the
objective is to afford equal opportunity and
equal access to all candidates so that the rich
and poor will be similarly situated. That’s the
reason why the COMELEC is given that power to
regulate the media during the elections. In the
plebiscite, there is no evil sought, therefore,
media should not be prevented from discussing
it on air.
SALVACION BUAC vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 155855. January 26, 2004.
MA. SALVACION BUAC and ANTONIO BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO,
respondents, DANTE O. TINGA, SIGFRIDO R. TINGA, MILAGROS
VALENCIA-RODRIGUEZ, MARISSE BALINA-ERON, HENRY DUENAS, JR.,
ALLAN PAUL C. CRUZ, ARNEL M. CERAFICA, DELIO SANTOS, GAMALIEL
SAN PEDRO, ROBERTO DIONISIO, ELPIDIO JAVIER, HENDRY DUENAS,
SR., NICANOR GARCIA, PACIFICO SANTOS, RICARDO NATIVIDAD,
GABRIEL VICTORIA, ROMEO G. SANTOS, GEORGE A. ELIAS, DANIEL
VALDEZ, MARIANITO MIRANDA, ROLANDO C. PAAC, WILFREDO C.
VILLAR, MENANDRO O. TINGA, JULIAN MARIATEGUI, BERNARDINO
ELIAS, HERMINIA C. PEREZ and RICARDO J. JORDAN, petitioners-in-
Intervention, RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondent-in-Intervention,
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, respondent-in-Intervention.
FACTS:
In 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the
Taguig Cityhood Law (RA 8487). The plebiscite BOC declared that
the NO votes won after a complete canvas of the election returns.
Petitioners Buac at al filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul
the plebiscite results and conduct a revision of the votes, alleging
irregularities during the casting and counting of the votes. Buac’s
petition was docketed as an election protest.
PR Cayetano intervened, claiming that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction as plebiscites cannot be made the subject of election
protests. Further he claimed that jurisdiction over plebiscite
complaints belonged to the RTC.
The COMELEC gave due course to Buac’s petition and upheld its
own jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions conteting plebiscite
results.
In an unverified motion, Cayetano moved for reconsideration.
The COMELEC’s 2nd Div. this time around ruled that it had no
jurisdiction and dismissed Buac’s petition.
The COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of the 2nd Div. It held
that the COMELEC cannot use its power to enforce and
administer all laws relative to plebiscites as this power is purely
administrative or executive and not quasi-judicial in nature. It
concluded that the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the
Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under Section 19
(6) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides that the RTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of plebiscite disputes.
YES
HELD:
RTC has no jurisdiction as plebiscite disputes involve no violation of
legally demandable rights
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial
power as including “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, “the first part of the
authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law.”
The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the
Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise
of judicial power. There is no invocation of a private right conferred by
law that has been violated and which can be vindicated alone in our
courts of justice in an adversarial proceeding. Rather, the issue in the
case at bar is the determination of the sovereign decision of the
electorate of Taguig. The purpose of this determination is more to
protect the sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate the private
interest of any individual. Such a determination does not contemplate
the clash of private rights of individuals and hence cannot come
under the traditional jurisdiction of courts.
Respondents cannot invoke BP 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act);
Makalintal ruling not applicable
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
xxx
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The aforequoted provisions refer to civil cases or actions. A
civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. As
stressed above, a plebiscite involves the expression of the public will
on a public issue. The determination of the public will is a subject that
does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts are
established essentially to resolve controversies between private
persons.
Neither can respondents rely on the ruling in Makalintal, as
the Salva case resolved the validity, not of a plebiscite or its result,
but of a provision in the rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC
(Resolution 2987) governing the conduct of a plebiscite.
Granting RTCs over plebiscite disputes: possible consequences
The SC presented a hypothetical situation wherein every RTC in the
country would have jurisdiction over a dispute in a national plebiscite.
In cases like that, the court said it would be better to let the COMELEC
have jurisdiction to avoid ‘jumbled justice.’
Regular courts and quasi-judicial admin agencies only have
jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of officials. Everything else is with COMELEC.
Contests which do not involve the election, returns and
qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of
the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative
agencies. Clearly, controversies concerning the conduct of a plebiscite
appertain to this category. In the case at bar, the conduct of the Taguig
plebiscite is the core of the controversy. This is a matter that involves
the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It
falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article
IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the power “to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx
plebiscite xxx.”
Constitutional powers of COMELEC broad enough to cover plebiscites
There is no doubt that the intent of the constitutional grant
of powers to the COMELEC is to give it all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest and
peaceful and credible elections.
While the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is most commonly
invoked over popular elections—that which involves the choice or
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selection of candidates to public office by popular vote, the same may

likewise be invoked in connection with the conduct of plebiscite.

COMELEC powers over plebiscites not absolutely administrative

Article IX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit that the COMELEC
has the power to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall.” To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the
performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or
operation, a plan or measure. When we say the COMELEC has the
power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it
necessarily entails all the necessary and incidental power for it to
achieve the holding of an honest and credible plebiscite. Obviously,
the power of the COMELEC is not limited to the mere administrative
function of conducting the plebiscite.

Procedural defects in Cayetano’s Motion for Reconsideration

The COMELEC 2nd Division had no jurisdiction to entertain
his Motion as this was filed out of time and further, was through an
unverified Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a motion for reconsideration should be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of the COMELEC Order or Resolution. The records
show that it was only ten (10) days after said receipt, or on October 19,
2001, that private respondent Cayetano filed his undated and
unverified Motion for Reconsideration.

Effect of unverified motion - When a pleading is not verified when such

verification is required, it is considered nothing more than a scrap of
paper.

- What is the basis of the plebiscite?

o There is again a law, RA 8487
- Who questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC?
o Cayetano!
- What was the petition of Buac, et al before the
COMELEC?
o The annulment! Buac filed for a petition of the
annulment of the results of the plebiscite, because
the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC) did not
complete the canvass of the election returns
- Cayetano, on the other hand argued that COMELEC
has no jurisdiction. Why? What was the argument of
Cayetano, what was his basis for saying that
COMELEC has no jurisdiction? Why was it treated as
election protest?
o Because, there is no such thing as ‘plebiscite
protest’ (coined from election protest)
- What do you mean by an unverified motion?
o It is verified if the person for example narrating
the facts, signed the said document verifying the
veracity and the correctness of the content of the
document.

Based on the facts of the case, what is to be determined—

whether or not the electorate of Taguig voted for or against
the conversion.

As the motion was unverified and filed out of time, the

COMELEC has no jurisdiction from the start!

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ELECTIONS LECTURE: 3 July 2014 (Dayhon)
Discussion on: plebiscite [continuation], initiative, and
referendum
CITY OF PASIG v RTC
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
respondents.
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent.
FACTS:
In 1996, the City of Pasig proposed to create 2 new barangays, Brgy
Napico and Brgy Karangalan. Subsequently after enacting the
relevant ordinances, plebiscites for both barangays were scheduled.
The Municipality of Cainta immediately moved to suspend/cancel the
said plebiscites with the COMELEC. They contended that the
proposed barangays were in areas included in a pending boundary
dispute in the RTC of Antipolo.
The COMELEC suspended the plebiscite of the creation of Karangalan,
but dismissed the petition for Brgy. Napico, which at the time of the
COMELEC’s decision, had already held their plebiscite and ratified the
creation of Napico.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC can suspend plebiscites. YES
WON the creation of barangay Napico was fait accompli. NO
HELD:
Boundary dispute is a prejudicial question.
The boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
As a general rule, prejudicial questions are only applicable to civil and
criminal cases, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend
action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.
Creation of Brgy. Napico not moot and academic
Same reasoning as in Tan v Comelec. SC annulled and set aside
the conducted plebiscite.
Other considerations, suspension of plebiscite proper
Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. (Sec 386, RA 7160)
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of
plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the
same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the
proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Pasig.
Where territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise
in futility.
How many barangays were created? Where is it located?
What was the law creating both barangays, and was it
already ratified in a plebiscite for that purpose?
Plebiscite for both barangays? Why what happened to
Brgy Napico?
Who brought it before the COMELEC to move for the
suspension of the conduct of the plebiscite?
- The Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend the
conduct of the plebiscite as there is a boundary dispute
that is pending before the RTC.
How did the COMELEC resolve this petition [referring to
suspension of plebiscite]?
- The COMELEC granted the petition but the COMELEC
said that considering that the creation of Brgy Napico
has already been ratified in an election called for said
purpose, it is already moot and academic. But, with
respect to Brgy Karangalan COMELEC agreed to
suspend it.
There is this resolution granting the suspension of the
conduct of plebiscite for Brgy Karangalan, what happened
to that COMELEC Resolution? Who disagreed here? What
is the action taken upon the issuance of the COMELEC
Resolution? There is this COMELEC Resolution, what is the
remedy? Why did this reached the SC, who brought it
before the SC?
- The COMELEC Resolution was assailed before the SC in
a petition for certiorari with grave abuse of discretion
on the part of COMELEC
What was the issue, how did the COMELEC gravely abused
their discretion? What discretion was abused?
- The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, because,
considering the fact that the creation of Brgy Napico
has already been ratified in a plebiscite, it already
declared it as moot and academic, but it agreed to
suspend the plebiscite for the creation of Brgy
Karangalan. So the COMELEC Resolution declaring the
creating of Brgy Napico as moot and academic was
raised before the SC in a petition for certiorari wherein
the petitioner is now saying that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that the creation of Brgy
Napico is now moot and academic.
The SC is saying that it [creation of Brgy Napico] cannot be
rendered as moot and academic considering the pending
boundary dispute. Thus, the plebiscite conducted for Brgy
Napico should be declared invalid, null and void, in view
of the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and City of Pasig.
SBMA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO
A. CALIMBAS, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1992, Congress enacted RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and
Dev’t Act) which provided for the creation of the Subic
Economic Zone. RA 7227 in Section 12 also mandated the
local government units of Subic, Morong and Hermosa to
submit to the Office of the President, a resolution of
concurrence to join the SEZ. The purpose of this concurrence
was so that the LGU can be included in the metes and bounds
of the proposed SEZ.
Thus pursuant to Section 12, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong in 1993 passed Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg 10
(PB10) wherein it expressed its absolute concurrence.
Soon thereafter, PRs Garcia et al filed a petition to annul
PB10, and that it be replaced by another resolution wherein
they listed several demands for the welfare and interest of
Morong and Bataan.
The SB of Morong granted Garcia’s petition, and promulgated
PB18 wherein they asked Congress to amend certain
provisions in RA 7227 to fit the Garcia group’s demands.
Unsatisfied, the Garcia group decided to exercise their power
of initiative. Their basis was Sec. 122 of the Local Government
Code, which outlined the procedure for local initiatives:
Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the
sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through
their duly authorized and registered
representatives, may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the sangguniang
concerned.
The COMELEC en banc denied their petition for local
initiative, stating that the subject thereof was merely a
resolution (PB) and not an ordinance. Meanwhile, the
President through a Proclamation defined the metes and
bounds of the SEZ.
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued Resolutions 2845 and 2848
where it adopted a calendar of activities for the local
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referendum for Morong. 2848 issued the guidelines for the
holding of the referendum.
SBMA appealed to the SC, stating that the COMELEC
committed GAOD in promulgating Resolution 2848; alleging
that COMELEC was allowing a local initiative to amend a
national law. SBMA also stated that since the metes and
bounds of the SEZ has already been marked, the local
government of Morong can no longer withdraw their
concurrence.
The Garcia group stated that SBMA has no cause of action, as
there is no justiciable controversy yet.
ISSUE: WON SBMA’s action is premature. YES
WON the COMELEC committed GAOD when it promulgated
Resolution 2848. YES
HELD:
Resolution 2848 erroneously labelled Garcia’s Initiative as a
Referendum; distinctions
The process started by Garcia was an INITIATIVE but the Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
Initiative - is the power of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose. It is further
defined as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws,
and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly."
Referendum - is the power of the electorate to approve or
reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose;
and further defined as the right reserved to the people to
adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by
a legislative body and which in most cases would without
action on the part of electors become a law."
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-
making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people
themselves without the participation and against the wishes of
their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of
the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in
an initiative are understandably more complex than in a
referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either
"Yes" of "No" in the ballot.
SBMA’s action is premature, court did not rule WON a local
initiative can amend national law
SBMA insists that the creation of the SEZ is now fait
accompli (done deed, accomplished fact), and that by virtue of its
creation through a national law, it has ceased to be a local concern.
The court agreed with the Garcia group, that indeed, the
municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be
nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people
have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or
resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and
the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only
actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
Duties of COMELEC differ between initiative and referendum
It follows that there is need for the COMELEC to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon
extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but
also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people
is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood
and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where
the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should
thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such
part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that
"(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted
to the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be
submitted in an initiative".
Judicial powers of courts and COMELEC on initiatives; COMELEC
cannot control/change the substance of proposed legislation
Regular courts - may take jurisdiction over "approved
propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735
COMELEC – may adjudicate and pass upon proposals
(prior to approval) but only as far as their form and
language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may
be added, even as to content, where the proposals or
parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the
"capacity of the local legislative body to enact."
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance
or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may
(in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and
adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these
"people-power" features of our Constitution.
The value and importance of initiatives and referendums
Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and
valuable modes of expressing popular sovereignty. And this Court
as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound
public policy to enable the electorate to express their free and
untrammelled will, not only in the election of their anointed
lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the very
rules and laws by which our society shall be governed and
managed.
Why did the SC distinguish initiative from referendum?
- Because Res 2848 was labelled as “referendum“,
where in fact what was called for is actually an
initiative
What was the purpose of the legislative action [referring
to Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10]? Why did the
Municipality of Morong enacted PK Blg 10?
- Section 12 of RA 7277; based on that requirement
under Sec 12 of Ra 7277, that those involved (including
Municipality of Morong) as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone must express their concurrence to join
the SEZ
What happened to PK Blg 10? Where was it submitted
based on Sec 12 of RA 7227? For what purpose?
- It was submitted before the Office of the President; to
identify the metes and bounds of those who want to
join the SEZ
What was the action of the SBMA with respect to the
COMELEC Resolution 2848?
- Enjoin COMELEC from the conduct of the referendum
There is an issue of prematurity here, what is the issue of
prematurity based on the contention of SBMA?
What is the relevance of the Garcia vs COMELEC case?
- On the appropriateness of the conduct of initiative on
the basis of a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong (referring to pambayang kapasyahan, as this is
merely a resolution)
What were the other issues raised by SBMA with regard
to Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 18 because in effect PK Blg
18 amends RA 7227?
- The SBMA is saying that the law [referring to RA 7227]
is already fait accompli, and how could a resolution of
the SB amend a national law
What was specifically the basis for the SC in saying that
COMELEC prepared for a referendum and not an
initiative?
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What distinction did the SC made here with respect to

initiative and referendum in so far as the role of the
COMELEC is concerned? So if it is pertaining to a law
proposed by people, what is required? What is the role of
the COMELEC in the conduct of initiative?
- The role of the COMELEC in the conduct of an initiative
is more extensive than in the conduct of a referendum
because in the latter all that the COMELEC has to do is
to count the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’. However, in an
initiative, the COMELEC has to check whether the
petition is in the form required, whether the
constitutional requirement of 12 percentum has been
met. And more specifically, initiative is prepared by the
people without the intervention of the legislators,
whereas in the referendum, it is from the legislating
body and for the people whether to accept it or reject
it.

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ELECTIONS Lecture: 7 July 2014 (Dayhon)
Discussion on: process of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
(NO RECIT)
Based on the provision of the Local Government Code, a
resolution is a valid subject of initiative.
Also, provided in Sec 2, Art XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.
Because of this, Congress enacted RA 6735 [An Act
Providing For A System of Initiative and Referendum] or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
SANTIAGO vs COMELEC Case
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN,
ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), respondents.
FACTS:
In 1996, PR Delfin filed a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative (Delfin petition)
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC to: 1) fix a time and date for
signature gathering all over the country 2) the necessary publications
for the Initiative in newspapers of general circulation and 3) to
instruct local election officers to assist in the gathering of the
signatures.
The COMELEC granted the petiton. Sen. Roco on that same day filed
a Motion to Dismiss the petiton on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Roco claimed
that the petition, in order to be cognizable by the COMELEC, has to
already contain the signatures needed. Roco also stated that the role
of the COMELEC is not to assist them in gathering votes, but is limited
to determining the sufficiency of the petition and to call and
supervise the plebiscite if it came to that.
Later, Defensor-Santiago filed a special civil action for certiorari
alleging that:
1. That the Constitutional provision on people’s initiative was
not self-executing, and that no such law has been passed by
Congress
2. That while RA 6735 provides for the 3 systems of initiative, it
did not have a subtitle for Constitutional amendments,
which according to Santiago was indicative of the intent that
it be covered by some future legislation
3. That RA 6735 applies only to amendments to laws as it
provided for the effectivity after publication
4. That COMELEC Res. 2300 (effective 1991, which governs the
conduct on initiative on the Constitution) was ultra vires as
only Congress can enact the enabling law
5. That the Delfin petition is actually a revision and not an
amendment, which puts it outside the power of the people’s
initiative
Delfin, on the other hand, remained adamant that what he filed was
an ‘initiatory pleading’ or ‘initiatory petition’ necessary to jumpstart
the signature gathering under the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON the provision on Consti amendments is self-executing, and is
RA 6735 or COMRES 2300 sufficient to cover it? NO and NO
WON the Delfin petition complied with the requirements to be validly
recognized by the COMELEC. NO
HELD:
Consti provision non-self-executing;
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right.
In the case of Santiago vs COMELEC, whether or not the
people is vested with the right to propose amendment to
This provision is not self-executory. The Court also looked at the records to
discern the intent of the drafters.
RA 6735 intended to cover Consti amendments but is insufficient
1. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" in Section 2 of RA 6735 was
a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to
said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so
with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
2. Unlike the other systems of initiative mentioned in RA 6735, the Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. The Act also repeatedly mentions references that the
Act only covers laws.
3. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
4. RA 6735 also outlines the specific requirements for local and national
initiatives, while curiously only paying lip service to Constitutional
amendments.
RA 6735 cannot be cured by COMELEC; Resolution 2300 void as ultra
vires, failing completeness and sufficient standards test
That R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal
and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
[the] Act.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and
which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
Delfin petition should not have been entertained as it is not the initatory
petition contemplated under law
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be
signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet
gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to
obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.
COMELEC participation limited before the filing of the petitions:
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after
its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation
of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are:
1. to prescribe the form of the petition;
2. to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district
3. to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment
of signature stations
4. to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and
voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
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the Constitution pursuant to the provisions of RA 6735—
this is the first issue raised. This petition was initiated, the
petition to amend the Constitution restricting the term
limit was filed by Atty. Delfin, and Atty Delfin requested the
COMELEC for an order to assist and fix the time and dates
for signature gathering all over the country and to cause
the necessary publication of the order in newspapers of
general circulation and for COMELEC to instruct its field
officers. Atty. Delfin requested the COMELEC to establish
signing station in order for them to be able to gather the
12% and the 3% respectively.
The COMELEC agreed and granted the order of Atty. Delfin,
which caused Santiago to file a special civil action for
prohibition wherein she raised that RA 6735 does not
provide for people’s initiative to amend the Constitution
considering that the enabling law, which she authored, is
still pending before the Senate. She is saying that the
petition of Atty Delfin was not validly initiated as it did not
comply with the signature requirement for initiating an
initiative. Thus, arguing further that the COMELEC never
acquired jurisdiction over the petition considering that the
petition is still an initiatory pleading.
Based on these, subsequently, in the case of Lambino,
following issues were raised:
(1) The Constitution provision on people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by law, to be passed by Congress. Santiago is
saying that there is still no law passed, in fact, the
Senate Bill she authored was still pending.
(2) RA 6735, Initiative and Referendum Act, failed to
provide any subtitle on the Initiative on the
Constitution, unlike the other modes of Initiative
(which are Initiative on Statutes, and Initiative on
Local Legislation). She alleged that this deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some other law.
(3) RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication because based on the rules, an
amendment to the law shall become effective in
the event that it is subject to a proposition subject
to an initiative, will become effective, 15 days
following its publication in the Official Gazette.
Whereas, an initiative on amendment of the
Constitution, it will retroact on the date of the
plebiscite; but there is no provision there
(referring to RA 6735). This is one of the basis for
Santiago to say that RA 6735 does not vest on the
people the power to amend the Constitution
through the process of initiative.
(4) COMELEC Res No 2300 prescribing for guidelines
on the conduct of Initiative of the Constitution is
ultra vires. Although the COMELEC is vested with
quasi-legislative function, the powers of the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations is
limited only to what is provided under Sec 2, par
2, of Art IX-C of the Constitution which provides
that the “COMELEC is vested with the power to enforce and
implement all laws relative to election, initiative, recall,
referendum, and plebiscite.” It does not provide for the
power to promulgate laws regulating the power to
amend the Constitution.
So the people’s initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution and not the revision thereof.
Extending or removing the term limit constitutes a
revision, and is therefore outside of the power of the
people’s initative. That is why, the SC here made a
distinction between a revision and amendment.
The SC held that, revision broadly implies a change
that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision
if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
LAMBINO vs COMELEC Case
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 2006, Lambino together with many others, started gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to amend the Constitution. Later,
they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Section 5b and c and Section 7 of
RA 6735.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino initiative sought to amend Constitutional provisions on
the Legislative and Execuive Department to shift the system to a
Unicameral-parliamentary form of government. The initiative also
attempted to add Article XVIII entitled ‘Transitory provisions.’
The COMELEC denied their petition, citing Santiago v COMELEC (RA
6735 is insufficient to cover Constitutional amendments). The
Lambino group appealed, claiming that the COMELEC committed
GAOD when it relied merely on Santiago.
ISSUE: WON the Lambino initiative petition complied with Section 2, Art.
17 of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through
peoples’ initative. NO
WON the Court should revisit the Santiago ruling. NO
HELD:
No need to revisit Santiago as the petition can be dismissed on other
grounds
The present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse
of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full
text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or
as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also
obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature
sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature
sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
In depth discussions:
1. No presumption that petitioners observed proper Constitutional
requirements in obtaining signatures
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present:
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
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agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The phase where the signatures were obtained is also a great
opportunity for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer
having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer
by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting,
portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of
the proposed amendments.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it.
2. ‘Transitory provisions’ misleading and deceptive and voids the
initiative
"An initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the
nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
a. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and
thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
b. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely
until its members, who are almost all the present members of
Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament will determine the
expiration of their own term of office;
c. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes,
the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could
not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. Certainly, such an initiative
is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even
know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid
fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and
his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.
3. ‘Transitory provisions’ and logrolling; logrolling nullifies entire
proposition
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or
no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively
contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Peoples’ Initiatives intends a revision, which is outside the scope of Art 2,
Section 17
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions
of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
Quantitative test - asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.
The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.
Qualitative test - inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Learning from Santiago, Raul Lambino already gathered the
signatures. So when they filed the petition before the
COMELEC, they have already gathered the needed
signatures (12%, while 3% representing the legislative
districts). The Lambino group filed the petition before the
COMELEC to conduct a plebiscite for the ratification of the
amendments proposing their initiative petition in
accordance with Sec 5 B and C, and Sec 7 of RA 6735. The
petitioners are also claiming that they already have 6.3
million signatures which comprise the 12% of the total
registered number of voters, with the 3% district
representation. And, they also said that, the provincial and
the city COMELEC have already verified the 6.3 M
signatures. However, the COMELEC denied the petition as
there is no valid enabling law governing initative for the
Constitution relying on the Santiago ruling in 1997, where
the SC said that the RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative clause on proposal to amend the Constitution.
So, the advocates of the proposed amendments filed
before the SC a petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the basis of that COMELEC
resolution denying the petition, thus it was raised before
the SC on certiorari following Sec 7, Art IX-A of the Common
Provision for the Constitutional Commissions in the 1987
Constitution, which provides
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
So, the Lambino group went to the SC through certiorari on
the following issues:
(1) Whether the petition for initiative of the Lambino
group complied with Sec 2, Art XVII of the 1987
Constitution [recall, Sec 2, Art XVII of the 1987
Constitution provides: Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter .]
(2) Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in the
Santiago vs COMELEC which declared RA 6735 as
incomplete and inadequate for lacking of essential
provisions to implement the initiative to amend
the Constitution.
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So the SC here clarified that the Lambino petition failed to
comply with the requirements of the Constitution. For the
petition to be valid, 2 essential requisites must be complied
with:
(1) The people must author and sign the entire
The petition is filed before the COMELEC as it is the COMELEC who is vested with the power to call for the conduct of
initiative and referendum.
The COMELEC will then schedule of special registration specifically for initiative and referendum. However, following the
enactment of RA 8189, there is no more special registration because when you register under RA 8189 your record
before the COMELEC becomes permanent, and will be used by the COMELEC not only in election but in all other forms of
popular intervention also. THUS, no more need for registration.

proposal. No representative can sign on their After determining the sufficiency of the petition, the COMELEC shall within 30 days publish at least twice the petition in
behalf. Filipino and English and publish it in a newspaper of general circulation.

(2) In an initiative upon a petition, the proposed

amendment must be embodied in the petition
itself.
What is the rationale for the 2nd requirement? The SC said
So, the date for the initiative or referendum shall be set not earlier then 45 days, but not later than 90 days from the
determination of the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition.
The election registrars shall verify the signatures on the petition on the basis of their [...] of votes and their voter's
identification card

that the rationale for the 2nd requirement is that, the

signature requirement would be rendered meaningless if
When is an initiative and referendum deemed effective?
the person affixing his signature has not first seen and
For National Law, it will become effective 15 days following
understood what it is that he is signing. More importantly,
its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can
general circulation. The proposition on the other hand to
pose a significant potential for fraud. For all you know, the
reject a national law approved by majority of the votes cast
person who indicated their signatures in the signature
shall be deemed repealed and repeal shall become
sheet does not know what they are signing or probably they
effective 15 days following the completion of publication of
thought they signed one thing, but turns out to be a
the proposition and the certification of the COMELEC in the
different document.
OG or in a newspaper of general circulation. BUT, if
majority is not obtained, the National Law sought to be
In the case, what was attached to the petition was merely
rejected or amended shall remain in full force or effect.
the signature sheet signed by the 12%, but this signature
sheet did not provide for the proposed amendment. Thus,
So with regard to a proposition for an initiative on the
the SC held that they failed to comply with the essential
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast
requirements. The SC further held that for sure, the great
through a plebiscite, the same shall become effective as to
majority who signed the signature sheet did not see the full
the day of the plebiscite.
text of the proposed amendment. Further, they were not
apprised of the nature and the effect of the proposed
Discussion on RECALL
amendment among which causes substantial changes in
the Constitution such as—the term limit of the legislature
Recall is provided under RA 7160 or the Local Government
will be lifted, and that the member of the parliament can
Code, because recall is only for Local Elective Officials.
be re-elected indefinitely, and the parliament can decided
when to call the parliament elections thus giving them the
Prior to RA 9244 (Act Eliminating Preparatory Recall
absolute discretion; and within 45 days from the
Assembly), there were 2 modes of initiating recall as
ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
provided in BP Blg 337 (the Local Government Code prior
parliament can further propose a revision or amendment
to RA 7160)
to the Constitution.
(1) It is through preparatory recall assembly which is
composed of the heads of the barangays); and
Further, the SC held on the 2nd pivotal issue on revisiting
(2) Through the petition of the registered voters in
the ruling of the Court in Santiago vs COMELEC, the Court
the local government unit where the official
must avoid reversing the ruling involving the
sought to the recalled is currently elected
constitutionality of the statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a consequence
However, following the enactment of RA 9244, there is only
of the well-settled doctrine will not pass upon the
one way to initiate recall and that is through the petition of
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on
the registered voters.
some other grounds.
We said that recall is a mode of removal of an elected
The ruling of the justices were 8-7.
official prior to the expiration of his term, on what grounds?
On one exclusive ground—LACK OF CONFIDENCE.
The Lambino group filed an MR, and in the MR, the SC
struck-down the petition based on the 8-7 vote as it failed
And the mode of initiating recall is now limited to a petition
to comply with the requirement laid down in Sec 2, Art XVII,
commenced by a registered voter in the local government
1987 Constitution.
unit concerned and supported by the percentage
requirement pursuant to the Sec 1, RA 9244 amending Sec
Anyway, with respect to initiative, partly the procedure in
70 and 71 of RA 7160, which provides:
the conduct of the initiative was stated in the case of SECTION 1. Section 70, Chapter 5, Title One, Book I of Republic Acts No.
Lambino. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. -

What is the procedure in the conduct of initiative and
referendum? The Court said that it is the COMELEC who
supervises.
a. The Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official
shall be commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the local
government unit concerned and supported by the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned during the election in which the local
official sought to be recalled was elected subject to the following
percentage requirements:
1. At least twenty-five percent (25%) in the case of local
government units with a voting population of not more
than twenty thousand (20,000);
2. At least twenty percent (20%) in the case of local
government units with a voting population of at least
twenty thousand (20,000) but not more than seventy-five
thousand (75,000): Provided, That in no case shall the
required petitioners be less than five thousand (5,000);

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3. At least fifteen percent (15%) in the case of local
government nits with a voting population of at least
seventy-five thousand (75,000) but not more than three
hundred thousand (300,000): Provided, however, That in
no case shall the required number of petitioners be less
than fifteen thousand (15,000); and
4. At least ten percent (10%) in the case of local government
units with a voting population of over three hundred
thousand (300,000): Provided, however, That in no case
shall the required petitioners be less than forty-five
thousand (45,000).
Note that the petition for recall may be initiated by a
petition of a registered voter (pwede isa lang), as long as
supported by the required percentage.
Process of recall shall be in accordance with the following
procedure (as provided in Sec 1, RA 9244 amending RA
7160)
A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the petitioners before the
election registrar or his representative, shall be filed with the Comelec through its office in the
local government unit concerned.**
receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election
on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the
highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed,
and he shall continue in office.
Limitations on recall (Sec 74, RA 7160)
Section 74. Limitations on Recall. –
a) Any elective local official may be the subject
of a recall election only once during his term
of office for loss of confidence.
b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election.
What is the term of office in a local elective? 3 years, which
means that recall can only be conducted on the 2nd year
because usually the end of term of every local elective
official is June 30 and the new official will assume office on
July 1. So for example, recall can only be initiated July 1,
2014 to June 30, 2015 (for the term 2013-2016) in view of
the limitation set forth in RA 7160.

PARAS v COMELEC Case

G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996.*
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
The Comelec shall, within fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition, certify to the respondent.
sufficiency of the required number of signatures. Failure to obtain the required number of
signatures automatically nullifies the petition;
FACTS:
In 1994, Danilo Paras won as Punong barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City.
A petition for his recall was filed by the registred voters of Pula. The
If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall, within COMELEC set a recall election for November of 1995.
three (3) days form the issuance of the certification, provide the official sought to be recalled a copy of the
petition, cause its publication a national newspaper of general circulation and a newspaper of general circulation
in the locality, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners and at the same time
The recall election was rescheduled three more times, the latest being
post copies thereof in public and conspicuous places for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than one for Jaunary of 1996.
twenty (20) days, for the purpose of allowing interested parties to examine and verify the validity of the petition
and the authenticity of the signatures contained therein. This time Paras filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Paras claims
that under Section 74(b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, “no recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year
Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative immediately preceding a regular local election.”
shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the positive and thereafter prepare the list
of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled Paras claims that his recall election cannot take place as it will happen
in the same year as the Sangguniang Kabataan elections for May 1996.
Paras also invoked the ruling of the court in Associated Labor Union v
Montejo, where the SC considered the SK election as a regular local
**written petition must contain the following: election.
1. The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible form and their
signatures;
2. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to which
ISSUE: WON Paras’ recall election is barred by the SK election happening
the petitioners belong; that same year. NO
3. The name of the official sought to be recalled;
4. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore
HELD:
Intent of the law not to be defeated by literal interpretation
What is the purpose of the posting? For allowing the The Court said that the intent of Section 74b is to subject an
interested parties to examine and verify the validity of the elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.
petition and the authenticity of the signatures contained Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
therein. period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office. If Paras’ interpretation
were to be believed, then no recall election would take place - as RA 7808
After the issuance of the verification, the COMELEC must sets SK elections to happen every three years – thereby rendering inutile
proceed independently in verifying the signatures. When the recall provision of the LGC.
the COMELEC proceeds with the verification, it must be
‘regular local election’ is one where position of official sought to be
with the presence of the representative of the petitioner recalled will be contested
and the representative of the official sought to be recalled. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring
Note that in the acceptance by the COMELEC of candidates, to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought
to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
the official sought to be recalled is automatically a
candidate. Reasons for the limitations of the recall provision
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal
Date of recall, when shall recall be conducted? (Sec 2, RA working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
9244) immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due
SEC. 2. Section 71. Chapter 5, Title One, Book I of the Republic Act No.
7160, "Local Government Code of 1991", is hereby amended to read to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
as follows: elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s
(1) "SEC. 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a
valid petition for recall with the appropriate local
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office
office of the Comelec, the Comelec or its duly than a successor elected through a recall election.
authorized representative shall set the date of
the election or recall, which shall not be later than
thirty (30) days upon the completion of the
Note: Even so, the Court found that the recall election against Paras could
procedure outlined in the preceding article, in the not take place as the regular election involving the barangay office was
case of the barangay, city or municipal officials, only 7 months away.
and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial
officials. The officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered
candidate or candidates to the pertinent
The SC had the opportunity to distinguish regular election
positions and, like other candidates, shall be and the election for Sangguniang Kabataan as it was
entitled to be voted upon."
contended by Paras, a punong barangay, that the election
When is a recall effective? (Sec 72, RA 7160) of SK shall bar the petition for recall against him.
Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local
official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate

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The contention that a petition cannot be initiated against Claudio appealed to the SC.
the Punong Barangay due to the incoming elections for
ISSUE: WON the prohibited period in Section 74 includes the convening of
Sangguniang Kabataan cannot be upheld for 2 reasons—(1) the PRA. NO
election for SK is not the regular election as contemplated
under the law; (2) that the election must be the election HELD:
pertaining to the position of the local elective that is subject a. Recall is a process.
Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory
of the recall for it to effectively fall under the limitation and recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
bar the conduct of the recall. registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the
filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification
AFIADO v COMELEC Case of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election,
and the holding of the election on the scheduled date.
G.R. No. 141787. September 18, 2000.*
MANUEL H. AFIADO, JASMINIO B. QUEMADO, JR. and GLESIE L.
b. Recall in Section 74 refers only to the election itself, and does not
TANGONAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC),
include the convening of the PRA/gathering signatures.
respondent.
Section 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. On the other
hand, §69 provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the
FACTS:
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
In 1996, Amelita Navarro was elected Vice-Mayor of Santiago City.
official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power
Meanwhile, an election protest was filed against the Mayor-elect, Joel
to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office,
Miranda. While Miranda’s case was pending before the SC on July 12
the limitations in Section 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
1999, petitioners Afiado et al composed the PRA and enacted a
proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only
resolution for the recall of VMayor Navarro.
to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of
On July 28, 2000, the SC decided Miranda’s case, ruling against him and a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures
annulling his proclamation. Thus, Navarro succeeded him as Mayor of
of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
Santiago City.
Navarro then sought to annul the said recall resolution against her. c. Procedure: the PRA can convene/file recall petitions as many times
Petitioners Afiado prayed the SC to compel the COMELEC by Mandamus as they want, but only one recall election is allowed within the period
to hold the recall elections against Afiado. stated.
There may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993)
ISSUE: WON the recall election against Navarro when she was still Vice- or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC — there is no legal limit on
mayor can proceed against her as Mayor. NO the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely
preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in
HELD: §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the
Navarro’s succession to mayoralty was a supervening event registered voters. It is this — and not merely the preliminary steps required
The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of to be taken to initiate a recall — which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit
Santiago City is a supervening event which rendered the recall proceeding by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date
against her moot and academic. A perusal of the said Resolution reveals of assumption of office of an elective local official.
that the person subject of the recall process is a specific elective official in
relation to her specific office. The said resolution is replete with
statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to
recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official acts as Vice Mayor. The title
itself suggests that the recall is intended for the incumbent Vice Mayor of
Santiago City. Clearly, the intent of the PRA as expressed in the said
Resolution is to remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost
their confidence in her by reason of her official acts as such.
RA Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable to her inasmuch as
she has already vacated the office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999
when she assumed the position of City Mayor of Santiago City.

Prohibition period bars another attempt at recall against Navarro

Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to
adopt another resolution for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as
Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not prosper in view of Section
74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that “No
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s
assumption of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
election.” There is no more allowable time in the light of that law within
which to hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor of Santiago City on October
11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will be October
11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period
immediately preceding the next regular election in May 2001.

CLAUDIO v COMELEC Case

G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000.*
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.

FACTS:
In 1998, Jovito Claudio was elected Mayor of Pasay City.
Seven months after he assumed office, a group of barangay chairmen
met and discussed filing of recall proceedings against Claudio.
In 1999, 1073 members of the PRA enacted a Resolution calling for
Claudio’s recall.
Claudio opposed the petition on grounds of irregularities attending the
signatures of the PRA members, that the convening of the PRA took
place within the 1yr prohibited period, among others.
The COMELEC dismissed his petition and granted the petition for recall,
finding that the signatures of 958 PRA members were sufficient. On
whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year
from the elective official’s assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in
the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing
of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999,
exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio’s assumption of
office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.

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Discussion on: COMELEC
Qualifications of the members of the COMELEC. (Sec 1 (1),
Art IX-C, 1987 Constitution
Article IX-C section 1(1). There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
What do you understand by the term “rotational plan”?
How was this rotational plan implemented?
What is the reckoning point?
- 1987 Constitution
How was the rotational plan implemented in the 1987
Constitution with respect to the seven members of the
COMELEC following the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution? Are they appointed at the same time?
- Article IX-C section 1 (2):
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Meaning of the phrase “of those first appointed”?
- Of the first appointed following the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, 3 commissioners will be appointed
for a term of 7 years and another two for a term of 5
years, and the last two for a term of 3 years. So
following the expiration of the term of those
commissioners appointed for a term of 5 and 3 years,
those who will be appointed after them will be given a
term of 7 years [not 5 and 3 years respectively]. [So the
five- and 3-year terms only apply to “those first
appointed”], considering that the objective of the
staggered terms is what? What is the objective?
In general, what are the powers of the COMELEC? What
are the general powers granted to an agency other than
the COMELEC? What kind of power is vested? [I think
ma’am meant what are the constitutionally granted powers
of the commissions including COMELEC.]
1. Executive/Administrative
2. Quasi-legislative, and
3. Quasi-judiciary powers
What are the powers covered by the executive or
administrative functions?
- This pertains to the power to “enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
(Article IX-C section 2(1)) to ensure HOPE-FRECRE
elections.
What is quasi-legislative power? How is the quasi-
legislative power of the commission exercised?
- This refers to prescribing rules to govern procedure
such as COMELEC rules of procedure, and to
promulgation of rules and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections relative to ensure HOPE-FRECRE
elections.
Article IX-A Section 6.
Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.
In so far as the power of the COMELEC is concerned, what
particular provision [in the constitution] would refer to a
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC?
- Article IX-C Section 3.
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
So, you mean to say that it is only in quasi-judicial offenses
that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in division? That is
the manner on how the COMELEC transact business! It’s
thru an en banc and thru a division, but basically, what do
you understand by quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
[that] even by way of exception it can be considered as
judicial insofar as the COMELEC is concerned according to
the provision in the Constitution? What is the power
vested in the COMELEC in Article IX Sec. 2(2)? Which of
these powers is considered, by way of exception, a judicial
power of the COMELEC?
- Article IX-C section 2. Section 2(2).
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
Because based on sec. 2(2), the COMELEC exercises what?
Exclusive original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction.
Which of the two can be considered as judicial? Exclusive
original jurisdiction. Why? Sole judge insofar as the
elections, returns, and qualifications of elective regional,
provincial, and city officials. By way of exception, the
Supreme Court is saying that, considering that the
COMELEC exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relations to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
these elective officials, it is only thru COMELEC that
election protests, disqualification cases, or quo warranto
cases against any provincial, regional, and city officials [may
be raised].
Give me at least two powers of the COMELEC under the
Constitution. Specific powers.
- Article IX-C section 2.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
administrative relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
quasi-judicial contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission
on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or
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program of government; and accredit citizens' arms
of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered.
Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections,
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may
be prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
How does the COMELEC transact business?
- Sec 1, Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Section 1. How Business is Transacted. - In the exercise of its
Constitutional or statutory powers, functions, and duties, the
Commission may sit en banc or in to Divisions.
How many divisions? 2. Who many members? 3. In en
banc? 7.
How does the COMELEC operate in addressing cases
brought before it? As a general rule, when a case is filed
before the COMELEC, who takes cognizance of the case?
Is it en banc immediately or is it the division?
- So, all cases should be brought before a division.
What cases may be raised before the en banc?
- Decisions of any division. All cases are taken cognizance
by the division and only a motion for reconsideration of
a decision of a division shall be brought to the COMELEC
en banc.
Under what circumstances can the COMELEC en banc take
cognizance of a case en banc?
Section 2. The Commission En Banc. - The Commission shall sit en banc
in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases
upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all
other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon
a unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an interlocutory
matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided
to be referred to the Commission en banc.
So, when you say pre-proclamation case, it is taken by the
COMELEC en banc initially?
So, upon the vote of the majority of the members of the
division, an interlocutory matter is brought to the
COMELEC en banc. What else? Other matters which the
COMELEC division is not authorized to act?
- Petition to declare suspension, postponement and
failure of elections. Those are the cases which the
COMELEC en banc may take cognizance in the first
instance. Otherwise, all cases shall be brought before a
division and only motion for a reconsideration of a
decision of a division shall be brought to the COMELEC
en banc and the decision of the COMELEC en banc will
be the basis of the filing of a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court within 30 days from receipt of the
decision by the aggrieved party via rule 65.
What shall constitute a quorum? Do we have to qualify [in
terms of en banc and in division]? We said that the
COMELEC transact business via division or en banc. With
respect to a division, what would constitute a quorum? In
En banc?
- Section 5, Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Rule 3 Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. –
(a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the
Commission shall constitute a quorum for the
purpose of transacting business. The concurrence
of a majority of the Members of the Commission
shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling.
(b) When sitting in Division, two (2) Members of a
Division shall constitute a quorum to transact
business. The concurrence of at least two (2)
Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach
a decision, resolution, order or ruling. If this
required number is not obtained, the case shall
be automatically elevated to the Commission en
banc for decision or resolution.
What if the required number is not obtained? For
example, in a division. Is there a rule if the majority was
not reached? What would be the remedy? What should
be done by the members of the division if the majority is
not obtained in a division?
- It shall be referred to the COMELEC en banc. “...Upon a
unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an
interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or
proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the
Commission en banc (Rule 3 Section 5(b).
What do you mean by interlocutory?
- Interlocutory means not yet final. It is an order that has
not yet been decided by the division, elevated to the
COMELEC en banc.
What will happen to an interlocutory order referred to the
COMELEC en banc? Will it not go back to the Division?
- Upon decision of the COMELEC en banc, the
interlocutory order shall be returned to the
division.
Rule 3 Section 5(c). Any motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by
the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory
orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division
which issued the order.
Earlier we were saying that one of the exceptions where
the COMELEC en banc can take cognizance of a case [in the
first instance] is if there is an interlocutory order pending in
the division and the division upon majority of the members
elevates an interlocutory order to the COMELEC en banc.
[Concomitantly], under Article IX-A of the Constitution,
decisions, orders, and rulings of the COMELEC en banc shall
be reviewable by the Supreme Court on certiorari. Of
course, [including] those taken cognizance by the COMELEC
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
So, in this particular case, referring to an interlocutory
order, can that be a basis for a review by a petition for
certiorari? Would the decision of the COMELEC en banc in
this interlocutory order referred to it by the division be a
subject for a petition for certiorari by the Supreme Court?
- No. Since it is not yet final, it is not contemplated as a
resolution by the COMELEC en banc reviewable by the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The COMELEC en banc will
remand it to the division in order for the division to
make a decision.
Can a member of the COMELEC be inhibited to sit in a
case? What may be the legal grounds to cause a member
of the commission to be disqualified or inhibited to
participate in a particular case?
- Section 4, Rule 4, CRP
Section 1. Disqualification or Inhibition of Members. –
(a) No Member shall sit in any case in which he or his spouse
or child is related to any party within the sixth civil degree
or consanguinity or affinity, or to the counsel of any of
the parties within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
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or affinity, or in which he has publicly expressed
prejudgment as may be shown by convincing proof, or in
which the subject thereof is a decision promulgated by
him while previously serving as presiding judge of an
inferior court, without the written consent of all the
parties, signed by them and entered in the records of the
case; Provided, that no Member shall be the "ponente"
of an en banc decision/resolution on a motion to
reconsider a decision/resolution written by him in a
Division.
(b) If it be claimed that a Member is disqualified from sitting
as above provided, the party raising the issue may, in
writing, file his objection with the Commission, stating
the grounds therefor. The member concerned shall
either continue to participate in the hearing or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
question of his disqualification. His decision thereon shall
forthwith be made in writing and filed with the
Commission for proper notation and with the records of
the case. No appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by
reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency
until after final judgment in the case.
(c) A Member may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
inhibit himself from sitting in a case for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
Case: Brillantes v. Yorac
[G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.]
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her
capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
• At the time, Hilario Davide served as Chairman of the COMELEC.
However, he was named chairman of the fact-finding commission
to investigate the December 1989 coup d’etat attempt. Thus, a
vacancy in the Chairmanship of the COMELEC was created.
• Sometime after, Haydee Yorac was designated by Cory Aquino to
be the Acting Chairman.
• Brillantes opposed this, claiming that the President should not
appoint the COMELEC Chairman as the COMELEC is intended to
be an independent constitutional body. Brillantes cited an earlier
case wherein Pres. Elpidio Quirino made a similar appointment,
but which was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.
• Brillanted further claims that the choice on who should be
Chairman is an internal matter that could be resolved by the
COMELEC members themselves without the need of Presidential
intervention.
• The SolGen defended the appointment of the President, claiming
that while there was no rule/law to govern the succession at the
Commission on Elections, the appointment should be upheld for
‘administrative expidiency’ and to prevent disruption of COMELEC
functions.
ISSUE: WON Yorac’s appointment proper. NO
HELD:
Appointment is baseless and made on dubious grounds
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an
overstatement to suggest that the operations of the Commission on
Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President of
the Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman.
There did not seem to be any such problem. In any event, even
assuming that difficulty, the Court did not agree that "only the
President (could) act to fill the hiatus,”
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is
no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by
extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This
is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly
sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential
action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the
President, however well-meaning.
Choice of temporary chairman: prerogative of COMELEC
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent."
Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their
respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX- A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the
regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot
be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms
essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need
be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at
any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the
respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped
from challenging its withdrawal.
Reason for prohibition: safeguard the COMELEC’s independence
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of
the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of
tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by
designation of the President of the Philippines.
What do you mean by administrative expediency?
Important points:
- There is no rule of succession in the COMELEC
unlike in the judiciary pursuant to BP 129.
- Prohibition on the appointment in an acting or
temporary capacity (Art. IX-C sec. 1(2))
Case: Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
FACTS:
• In 1991, then Pres. Cory Aquino nominated Christian Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
• Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination as allegedly, Monsod
did not possess the 10- year practice of law requirement listed in
the Constitution under Section 1(1), Article 9C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
• Some of Monsod’s qualifications and credentials are as follows:
- Worked in father’s law office
- Operations officer for the World Bank for 2 yrs
- Chief Exec Officer for various banks and orgs such as
MERALCO
- National Chairman of NAMFREL
- Member of Davide Commission and and Constitutional
Commission
ISSUE: WON Monsod possesses the requirement of the 10 year
practice of law? YES.
HELD:
Definition of ‘practice of law’ has evovled through the years
According to Justice Cruz, since law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law or in advising others on what the
law means, are actually practicing law.
Mr Monsod is a lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar, and has
been practicing law ( according to the SC: election, international, and
constitutional law at least) for more than 10 years.
There was also no apparent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Commission on Appointments in nominating Monsod. Therefore,
Monsod’s position as chairman is upheld.
Some definitions of law as mentioned in this case:
• The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
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matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending

litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black)
• One who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law.
• Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations.
• Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.

How did the Supreme Court ruled on the issue of the

practice of law?

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ELECTIONS LECTURE: 14 July 2014 (Dayhon) WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE IN QUESTIONING COMELEC
RULING, ORDER, OR DECISION?
Discussion: Continuation on COMELEC - COMELEC Division decision, resolution, or ruling may be
questioned through a motion for reconsideration
HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SAFEGUARD THE before the COMELEC En Banc. Sec 2. Rule 19, CRP
INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS? provides
Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion
What constitutional provisions support? to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof.
- Sec 3, Art IX-A,1987 Constitution Such motion, if not proforma, suspends the execution or
Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling.
shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure
The Resolution of the CEB is now reviewable by the SC
- Sec 4, Art IX-A,1987 Constitution through certiorari.
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their
officials and employees in accordance with law.
What are decisions by CEB that may be reviewable by the
- Sec 5, Art IX-A,1987 Constitution SC through certiorari?
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their - Those rendered by the CEB in the performance of its
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released. quasi-judicial functions.
- What is the basis of their quasi-judicial functions? Sec
- Sec 6, Art IX-A,1987 Constitution 2, par 2, Art IX-C, 1987 Constitution
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any following powers and functions:
of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, xxx
or modify substantive rights. 2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective
- Sec 8, Art IX-A, 1987 Constitution regional, provincial, and city officials, and
Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions appellate jurisdiction over all contests
as may be provided by law. involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts
WHAT PARTICULAR ACTIONS MAY BE BROUGHT BEFORE of limited jurisdiction.
THE COMELEC UNDER THE COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE? FILIPINAS vs FERRER Case
1. Ordinary Actions G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985
a. Election Protests (Rule 20, CRP) FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP, petitioner, vs. HON.
b. Quo Warranto (Rule 21, CRP) JAIME N. FERRER, LINO PATAJO and CESAR MIRAFLOR as
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections; COMELEC BIDDING
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EMILIO AGUILA and MEMBERS PACIENCIO
2. Special Actions BALLON, ALEJANDRO MACARANAS, TOMAS MALLONGA and ERNESTO
a. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel LOMBOS; HON. JUDGE JOSE LEUTERIO of the Court of First Instance of
Certificates of Candidacy (Rule 23, CRP) Manila, Branch 11 and ACME STEEL MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
respondents.
b. Proceedings Against Nuisance
Candidates (Rule 24, CRP) FACTS:
c. Disqualification of Candidates (Rule 25, In preparation of the 1969 National elections, the COMELEC put
CRP) out an INVITATION TO BID calling for submission of bid proposals
for the manufacture and delivery of 11k voting booths.
d. Postponement or Suspension of Elections The voting booths had certain specifications, and so the COMELEC
(Rule 26, CRP) asked bidders to bring samples as well.
Filipinas was one of the 17 bidders, along with PR Acme Steel.
3. Special Cases Filipinas’ bid was 128/123 pesos per unit, while Acme’s price was
78 per unit.
a. Pre-Proclamation Controversies (Rule 27, The COMELEC Bidding Committee noted that while Acme bid the
CRP) lowest price, their bid had to be rejected as their sample was found
to be substandard. The Committee recommended the award of the
4. Special Reliefs contract to Filipinas.
The COMELEC, however, granted the contract to ACME.
a. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus (Rule
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued a Purchase Order for the voting
28, CRP) booths.
b. Contempt (Rule 29, CRP) Filipinas filed an injunction suit with the CFI of Manila. Filipinas also
asked for a writ of preliminary injunction, but this was denied by
5. Provisional Remedies the CFI.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the lower
a. Injunctions (Rule 30, CRP) court has no jurisdiction over the suit. The court granted the
respondents’ motion and denied Filipinas’ MFR.
6. Special Proceedings ACME later complied with its contract with COMELEC (which
a. Annulment of Permanent List of Voters should have rendered the issue moot and academic but the Court
noted the importance of the issues raised).
(Rule 31, CRP)
b. Registration of Political Parties or ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over a suit involving contract
Organization (Rule 32, CRP) awards granted by the COMELEC. YES
c. Accreditation of Citizens' Arms of the
HELD:
Commission (Rule 33, CRP) Note: this case was decided based on laws effective at the time, the
1935 Constitution and RA 180 (the prevailing Election law)
7. Election Offenses
a. Prosecution of Election Offenses (Rule Under prevailing laws, the orders of the COMELEC cognizable by the
SC are those which are exercised in its adjudicatory and quasi-judicial
34, CRP) powers
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
If you will note class, if you will read your cases, on the basis decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
of the docket filed, you will know the nature of the action Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
filed. exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

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An order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in
response to its invitation to bid DOES NOT come within the purview of
a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court
on certiorari.
Powers of the COMELEC
Under the law and the constitution, the Commission on
Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections (ADMINISTRATIVE POWER), but
also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections (QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS)
The order of the COMELEC in this case was issued pursuant
to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes.
In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of
Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court.
Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be
imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive
appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order . Any question
arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.
Why did the SC clarified what is contemplated as
“decisions, resolutions, or ruling”?
What was the position of the COMELEC?
- The RTC has no jurisdiction.
BRILLANTES vs COMELEC Case
FACTS:
In 2002, COMELEC issued Resolution 02-0170, which made for a
modernization program (automated election system, AES) for the
2004 elections. It was composed of three phases:
Phase 1 – voter registration and validation system
Phase 2 – automated counting and canvassing system
Phase 3 – electronic transmission
In Infotech v COMELEC, the SC nullified the contract awarded to Mega
Pacific Consortium (which was Phase 2).
Nevertheless, the COMELEC tried to implement Phase 3 of the AES
through an electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of
the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also
dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Sen. Franklin Drilon had doubts as to the constitutionality of the
‘unoffical quick count’ if such quick count included the results for the
positions of President and VPres. Recall only Congress may canvass the
election returns for these positions.
Soon after, the COMELEC en banc met and resolved to push through
with Phase 3, since before the SC annulled Phase 2 in Infotech, the
COMELEC had already spent 300m for Phase 3.
On April 28, 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 6712 which
contained the insrtuctions for the electronic transmission and
consilidated of advanced results in the 2004 elections. Under the
resolution, the transmitted results included local and national
positions, as well as those for the partylist system. These unofficial
results were also to be broadcast
The NAMFREL, and political parties raised their concerns as to the
Resolution. NAMFREL claimed that the Resolution disregarded RA
8173, 8436 and 7166 which authorizes only the citizen’s arm
(NAMFREL) to conduct an unofficial count. Further, the law states that
election returns may only be used for canvassing or for receiving
dispute resolutions.
Another argument against the said Resolution is that there is no basis
to push through with Phase 3 after the failures of Phase 1 and 2. The
petitioners claim that the counting and consolidation of votes
contemplated under Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436 refers to the official
COMELEC count under the fully automated system and not any kind of
"unofficial" count via electronic transmission of advanced results as
now provided under the assailed resolution.
Several members of Congress also intervened, claiming that Resolution
6712 usurped the constitutional prerogative of Congress to canvass the
votes for Pres and VPres.
ISSUE:
(1) WON COMELEC committed GAOD in promulgating Resolution
6712. YES
(2) WON the Court can take jurisdiction over Res. 6712, which is an
administrative issuance. YES
(3) WON the issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
subsequent conduct of the 2004 elections? NO.
HELD:
Issue is justiciable, SC has jurisdiction over administrative issuance as it
involves questions of law/constitutionality
The issue raised in the present petition does not merely concern the
wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on its alleged disregard for
applicable statutory and constitutional provisions. In other words, that the
petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the legality
of the respondent COMELEC’s administrative issuance will not preclude
this Court from exercising its power of judicial review to determine
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing
Resolution No. 6712.
Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify
the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been
met or the limitations respected, is justiciable – the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom. In the present petition, the Court must
pass upon the petitioner’s contention that Resolution No. 6712 does not
have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.
Certiorari proper as COMELEC acted in GAOD
There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of
certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of his judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not
have the legal power to determine the matter before it; there is excess of
jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to
determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
1. Resolution usurps Congress mandate to canvass Pres & Vpres,
even if the count is ‘unofficial’:
The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation
of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of
President and Vice-President. (Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution)
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not
prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is
"unofficial," is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is
proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the
President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason,
prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes.
2. Resolution usurps mandate of NAMFREL to conduct the quick
count and disrupts the chain of custody of ERs
Under RA 7166 and RA 8436, only NAMFREL – the accredited citizen’s arm
- is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the
conduct of an
"unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local
elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is
authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting
an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election
returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the
aforementioned laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial"
count.
The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and unsealed only when
needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in
connection with resolving election disputes that may be imminent.
However, in contravention of the law, Res. 6172 authorizes Reception
Officers (RO), to open the second or third copy intended for the
respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and transmission of
advanced "unofficial" precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also taints
the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns, as well as
the returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of custody from the
Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.
3. Resolution contravenes consti provision that “"no money shall
be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election
results projected under Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character,
meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the
government or government body.
Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003
General Appropriations Act.
4. Resolution has no basis in Constitution or law
COMELEC is the sole body tasked to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall"56 and to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
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credible elections" is beyond cavil. The COMELEC’s power to promulgate
rules and regulations in the performance of its constitutional and
statutory duties must be carried out, at all times, in its official capacity.
There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC
to undertake a separate and an "unofficial" tabulation of results, whether
manually or electronically. Indeed, by conducting such "unofficial"
tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the level
of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose. Besides,
it is absurd for the COMELEC to conduct two kinds of electoral counts – a
slow but "official" count, and an alleged quicker but "unofficial" count, the
results of each may substantially differ.
6. In 2003, the petitioners wrote to COMELEC Chair Abalos,
protesting the award to MPC “"due to glaring irregularities in the
manner in which the bidding process had been conducted.” They
further claim that MPC did not comply with eligibility
requirements, as well as other procedural and technical
irregularities.
7. The COMELEC rejected their protest. The petitioners appealed to
the SC through a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed GAOD when, in the exercise of
its administrative functions, it awarded the contract to MPC, a non-
eligible entity. YES

What exercise of power is at issue in this case?
What does COMELEC Res 6712 provide? That is the subject
for petition for certiorari and prohibition! What does it
provide? What is COMELEC Res 6712?
- VIP NOTE: always remember that the subject for a
petition for certiorari is a COMELEC resolution!
Why was this COMELEC Res issued? In relation to what
particular activity?
- Pursuant to RA 8436, which provided for the Automated
Elections, COMELEC issued General Instructions for the
Electronic Transmission and Consolidation for the
automation of May 2004 Elections
- This general instructions by the COMELEC is subject to
petition for certiorari and prohibition
- What seeks to be prohibited here?
Pursuant to RA 8436, to implement, RA 8436, what did
COMELEC do? What did the COMELEC issue to implement
RA 8436?
- It provided for 3 phases in the implementation of
the automation of the elections.
- What is Phase 1? What happened to Phase 1?
o Phase 1 refers to the validation scheme
o So there were problems as to the
implementation of Phase 1, so what was
the resolution of the COMELEC here?
o Instead of using the electronic validation,
they reverted back to the manual
validation
HELD:
The COMELEC violated laws re: bidding, RA 8189, and RA
8436.
RA 8436 states that in order to carry out the policy of switching to an
automated system of elections, the COMELEC is authorized to
purchase supplies, materials and equipment needed for the purpose
but only through ‘an expedited process of public bidding.’ In awarding
the contract to an entity that did not even participate in the process is
violative of the public policy on public biddings, as well as the spirit and
intent of RA 8436.
The whole point in going through the public bidding exercise was
completely lost. The very rationale of public bidding was totally
subverted by the Commission.
The COMELEC’s rash actions regarding the contract,
without adequately checking and observing mandatory
financial, technical and legal requirements, put its own
mandate in jeopardy.
Comelec has not merely gravely abused its discretion in awarding the
Contract for the automation of the counting and canvassing of the
ballots. It has also put at grave risk the holding of credible and peaceful
elections by shoddily accepting electronic hardware and software that
admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements.
The illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the Commission have not
only desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but have also cast
serious doubts upon the poll body’s ability and capacity to conduct
automated elections. Truly, the pith and soul of democracy -- credible,
orderly, and peaceful elections -- has been put in jeopardy by the illegal
and gravely abusive acts of Comelec.
(continuation on recitation on Brillantes case)
COMELEC issued a resolution proceeding with Phase 3.
When COMELEC issued Res 6712, NAMFREL opposed.
What was the basis of their opposition?

Phase 1 and 2 cannot be implemented because of the ruling
of the Court in the case of Megapacific (see digest below)
INFOTECH v COMELEC
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO
C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and
MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., petitioners, vs.
So, what is Phase 3?
Considering the failure of Phase 1 and 2 and that Phase 1
to 3 are in pursuit of one objective, it cannot be separated,
thus the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in pursuing
with Phase 3 despite the failure of Phase 1 and Phase 2.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN COMELEC issues Resolution not only with respect to its
ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE administrative power, but also to their Quasi-Legislative
CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE and Quasi-Judiciary power.
GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and
BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and
MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, respondents.

FACTS:
1. In 1995, RA 8046 was passed, which authorized the COMELEC to
conduct a nationwide demo of the computerized election system,
and to pilot-test the system in the ARMM elections.
2. In 1997, RA 8346 was enacted, which allowed the COMELEC to
use an automated election system (AES).
3. In 2002, COMELEC issued Resolution 02-0170, which made for a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It was composed
of three phases:
Phase 1 – voter registration and validation system
Phase 2 – automated counting and canvassing system Phase 3 –
electronic transmission
4. In 2003, PGMA authorized a release of a total 3B PHP to fund the
AES. The COMELEC soon put out an invitation to bid.
5. Out of 57 bidders, the COMELEC Bids and Awards Committee
awarded the contract to Mega Pacific Consortium despite MPC’s
bid having technical failures.

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Discussion on: Executive and Administrative Powers of the
COMELEC
EXECUTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
- Pertains to the power of the COMELEC to enforce
all laws, rules, and regulations governing the
elections with the set purpose of ensuring an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free, and credible
elections pursuant to Section 2, paragraph 1,
Article 9c of the Constitution.
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS
1. Determination of the number and location of
polling places
2. Deputization/appointment of election officials
and inspectors
3. Supervise registration of voters
4. Award of bid of contracts
5. Regulate the use of firearms
6. Call for special elections
7. Investigation and prosecution of election offenses
8. Declare postponement, suspension, or failure of
elections (exclusive to COMELEC)
9. Regulate the use of franchise or permit to operate
media of communications and information
10. Require compliance with the rules for the filing of
COCs
11. Proclamation of winners (shared with trial courts)
12. Registration of political parties and accredited
citizen’s arms
In the case of Filipinas, any action in connection with the
enforcement or any resolution by the Comelec issued in the
exercise of its administrative functions is not a matter
reviewable by the Supreme Court on certiorari because it is
an administrative function. But, in the case of Loong, an
exception is provided, the SC said, while it may be true, that
only matters taken cognizance by the Comelec in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function is
subject to the review of the SC on certiorari, the SC in this
case said, administrative resolutions of the Comelec in the
exercise of its administrative function may be properly
reviewed by the SC on certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 if the
Comelec acted capriciously or abused its discretion.
ROQUE vs COMELEC Case
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES,
ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D.
GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA.
AZUCENA P. MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE
MELO,
COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by
its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO
ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and
SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, Petitioner-in-Intervention. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Movant-Intervenor.
PRECURSOR FACTS:
• In 1997, RA 8346 was enacted, which authorizes the use of an
automated election system (AES) starting from the 1998
national and local elections. However, the 1998, 2001 and 2004
elections were still done manually.
• In 2007, RA 9369 was enacted, reviving the mandate of the
COMELEC to implement AES.
• In 2008, the COMELEC successfully managed to automate the
elections in the ARMM. This boosted the COMELEC’s confidence
that an automated election was possible nationwide.
• Subsequently, RA 9525 was enacted, which appropriated 11.3B
pesos as the budget for the 2010 elections.
• In 2009, the COMELEC invited bidders to submit proposals for
the 2010 Elections Automation Project. Under the Request for
Proposal (RFP), manufacturers and suppliers may form
themselves into a joint venture, which is defined as a group of
two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that
intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a
particular contract.
• Among the submitted bids was the joint venture (JV) of TIM and
Smartmatic. TIM is a PHL corporation, while Smartmatic was
organized under the laws of Barbados.
• The COMELEC Special Bids and Awards Committee declared that
TIM-Smartmatic as the winning bidder (as their bid proposal
contained both a continuity plan & a contingency plan). Later, it
also declared that the demo of the PCOS machines submitted
by TIM-S passed all tests with a 100% rating.
• Thus, a joint venture corporation (JVC) was created between
TIM and Smartmatic. This JVC entered into a contract with the
COMELEC for the lease of goods and services for 7billion pesos.
• In July 2009, the petitioners assailed the validity of the contract
entered into by the COMELEC and the JVC.
Grounds of the petitioners:
• The petitioners claimed that the automation contract
constituted an abdication/abandonment by the COMELEC of its
election-related mandate in favor of a foreign corporation.
• The length of the ballot (3ft long) to be used with the PCOS
would not comply with Art. V, Section 2 of the Constitition which
prescribes the secrecy of voting.
• That the COMELEC needed to conduct a ‘pilot-testing’ prior to
implementing the Automation Project under RA 8346. They
claim that the AES machines should have been used in at least 2
highly-urbanized cities in Luz, Vi and Min during the 2007
elections. This did not happen, thus the COMELEC should be
precluded from proceeding with the 2010 automated elections.
• The PCOS Machines in reality, failed to comply with the
minimum system capabilities prescribed in RA 8346.
• That the JVC violated the Anti-Dummy law
ISSUE: WON the contract entered into between COMELEC and TIM-S
should be annulled. NO
HELD:
Issue 1: COMELEC did not abdicate duty as TIM-S would only provide
hardware + software, and assistance; COMELEC personnel will still
conduct elections
In the contract, the functions of SMARTMATIC was laid out in plain
terms as such: SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the
greater track record in automated elections, shall be in charge of the
technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and
hardware, including transmission, configuration, and system
integration. SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for
preventing and troubleshooting technical problems that may arise
during the elections
The Court found that such provisio was not equivalent to a cession of
control of the electoral process to Smartmatic.
Thus, as to the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM
Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for the
automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs,
electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware
and software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation.
As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation
and its operators would provide assistance with respect to the
machines to be used by the
Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the election
thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
Issue #2: 3 foot long ballot a petty concern
Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that
the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as
demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will
personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to
preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By
the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a
way to make his vote known.
Issue #3: ‘Pilot testing’ not mandated, mooted by enactment of RA
9525
The underscored proviso of Sec. 6 of RA 8436 is not, however, an
authority for the proposition that the pilot testing of the PCOS in the
2007 national elections in the areas thus specified is an absolute must
for the machines’ use in the 2010 national/local elections.
On the other hand, the law states that in succeeding regular national
or local elections, the AES shall be implemented." Taken in its proper
context, the last part is indicative of the legislative intent for the May
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2010 electoral exercise to be fully automated, regardless of whether contests involving elective municipal officials
or not pilot testing was run in the 2007 polls. decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
To argue that pilot testing is a condition precedent to a full involving elective barangay officials decided by
automation in 2010 would doubtless undermine the purpose of RA trial courts of limited jurisdiction
9369. For, as aptly observed during the oral arguments, if there was no
political exercise in May 2007, the country would theoretically be Section 7, Article 9a of the Constitution and Rule 3 of the
barred forever from having full automation.
COMELEC rules of procedure provide that COMELEC in the
At any event, any lingering doubt should be put to rest with the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to transact business
enactment in March 2009 of RA 9525 in which Congress appropriated may sit en banc or in 2 divisions and shall promulgate rules
PhP 11.301 billion to automate the 2010 elections.
of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
The enactment of RA 9525 is a compelling indication that it was never cases, including pre-proclamation controversies and
Congress’ intent to make the pilot testing of a particular automated summon parties list to a controversy pending before it.
election system in the 2007 elections a condition precedent to its use
or award of the 2010 Automation Project. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
Issue #4: presumption of regularity in the conduct of testing the PCOS - A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
From the records, the Court is fairly satisfied that the Comelec has order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within 5
adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism, a set of 26- days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion,
item/check list criteria to ensure compliance with the above minimum if not proforma, suspends the execution or
systems capabilities.
implementation of the decision, resolution, order
Given the foregoing and absent empirical evidence to the contrary, the or ruling
Court, presuming regularity in the performance of regular duties, takes
the demo-testing thus conducted by SBAC-TWG as a reflection of the COQUILLA vs COMELEC Case
capability of the PCOS machines.
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and respondents.
Issue #5: no violation of Antid-dummy Law as foreign corporations
may be tapped by COMELEC
FACTS:
The invokation of Anti - Dummy Law was invoked ‘as an afterthought.
• Coquilla was naturalized as a US citizen sometime around 1965.
’ The RFP required the JV bidder to at least be 60% Filipino. On the
He returned to the PHL in 1998, and subsequently was
other hand, the winning bidder, TIM-Smartmatic joint venture, has
repatriated under RA 8171. He took his oath and was issued his
Smartmatic, a foreign corporation, owning 40% of the equity
Certificate of Repatriation on November 2000.
• Soonafter, Coquilla was registered as a voter of Oras, E. Samar on
The Anti-Dummy Law has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of
Jan. 2001. On February 2001, he filed his COC to run for mayor.
certain economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. For
• Incumbent re-electionist Neil Alvarez sought the cancellation of
liability for violation of the law to attach, it must be established that
Coquilla’s COC on the ground that Coquilla made a material
there is a law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a
misrepresentation that he had been living in Oras for two years,
right, franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines or
when really, he had only been for 6 months.
to corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of the capital of
• The COMELEC failed to render judgment on the case before the
which is owned by such citizens. In the case at bench, the Court is not
elections, where Coquilla was elected mayor.
aware of any constitutional or statutory provision classifying as a
• On July 19, 2001, the 2nd Div issued a Resolution which granted
nationalized activity the lease or provision of goods and technical
Alvarez’s petition and ordered the cancellation of Coquilla’s COC.
services for the automation of an election.
• 5 days after receiving the Resolution, Coquilla filed an MFR but
the en banc denied it on January 30, 2002 for being pro-forma.
In fact, Sec. 8 of RA 8436, as amended, vests the
• In the en banc’s decision to deny Coquilla’s MFR, the COMELEC
Comelec with specific authority to acquire AES from foreign sources.
said:
> Thus, the Court found that there was no GAOD on the part of
“An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for
COMELEC in tentering into the contract with TIM-S.
Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of his
averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum.
Parting words from the SC: COMELEC must be given leeway
Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and
warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second
pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
Division. This makes the said Motion pro forma.”
awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and
lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should
• On Feb 11, 2002, Coquilla filed a petition for certiorari assailing
not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the
the resolution of the 2nd Div as well as the en banc’s denial of his
case of an organization of lesser responsibility.
MFR.
• Alvarez claims that Coquilla’s petition be dismissed as it was filed
It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in
out of time: Coquilla received the 2nd Div Res. on July 28, 2001, so
devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the
that Coquilla only had until August 2001 to file the petition.
great objective for which it was created––to promote free, orderly,
• According to Alvarez, since the en banc found Coquilla’s MFR to
honest and peaceful elections.
be pro-forma, the filing of the MFR with the en banc did not
suspend the 30-day prescriptive period to question the 2nd Div.
Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with
ruling.
the Comelec’s exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature
of its office properly pertain to it. Absent a clear showing of grave
ISSUE: WON Coquilla’s petition was barred by prescription. NO WON
abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the Court should
Coquilla’s MFR with the COMELEC was pro-forma. NO
refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let
alone nullify, the acts of that body.
HELD:
Just because a MFR reiterates issues decided upon by the court, does
ADJUDICATORY/QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS not make it pro-forma
- Pertains to power of the COMELEC to resolve The Court mentioned the purpose of a MFR: to convince the court that
its ruling is erroneous and improper.
controversies that may arise in the enforcement
of election laws and resolution of cases involving The court said that the nature of a Motion for Reconsideration
regional, provincial and city officials or of election has to necessarily revisit issues already passed upon by the court. If
disputes in general a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing
party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new
Section 2, paragraph 2, Article 9c of the Constitution trial.
- Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and Instances where MFRs are considered pro-forma:
1. it was a second motion for reconsideration
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all

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2. it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify
the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law
or not supported by the evidence,
3. it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,
4. it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary
to law, or

5. the adverse party was not given notice thereof.

Note: the Court did not really explain why Coquilla’s MFR was not pro-
forma. They just said that it didn’t suffer from any of the
aforementioned defects. :/

o The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its
filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for
certiorari in this case.

COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the case even if Coquilla was
successfully elected
According to RA 6466, the rule is that candidates who are disqualified
by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the
votes cast for them shall not be counted.

But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been

rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the
complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the
grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of
candidacy are strong.

Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for

the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have
been begun before the elections, should continue even after such
elections and proclamation of the winners.

o In any case, the SC looked at the merits of the case and

found that the 2nd Division’s order cancelling Coquilla’s COC
was justified as he indeed misrepresented a material fact
on his COC.

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Discussion on:
Who determines the composition of the division? The
COMELEC en banc
RECITATION:
Q: What should be necessary for the resolution of the
COMELEC sitting en banc? Concurrence of the majority.
Q: What if the required number is not attained by a
division, what would be the effect? What would be the
procedure? What is the procedure if the required majority
is not obtained? Automatically the case is elevated to the
COMELEC en banc.
Q: What is the relevance of the case of Cayetano vs
COMELEC? This is the companion case of Salvacion Buac
wherein the SC remanded the case to the COMELEC for
further proceedings because the issue brought before the
SC is on the jurisdiction of the COMELEC with respect to
plebiscite in the exercise of its administrative powers.
CAYETANO VS COMELEC Case
Maria Laarni Cayetano and Dante O. Tinga, petitioner, vs The
Commission on Elections, respondent
FACTS:
• In the 2010 elections, Laarni Cayetano was proclaimed the
Mayor of Taguig over rival Dante Tinga.Tinga filed an election
protest with the COMELEC.
• Cayetano invoked her affirmative defense of insufficiency in
form and content of the Election Protest and prayed for its
dismissal. Cayetano also filed a counter-protest against Tinga.
• The COMELEC thereafter issued the Preliminary Conference
Order (PCO) finding Tinga’s protest and Cayetano’s counter-
protest to be both sufficient in form and substance. Cayetano’s
affirmative defenses were effectively denied.
• Cayetano filed a MFR of the PCO relative to the denial of her
defenses. The COMELEC denied this MFR.
• Cayetano filed a petition for certiorari claiming that the
COMELEC committed GAOD in denying her affirmative
defenses.
ISSUE: WON Cayetano’s action is proper. NO
HELD:
Same old ruling; interlocutory orders not reviewable
Interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor
can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule
otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also
unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This
does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a
COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The
aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the
course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc
General rule of procedure as to orders
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division
cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to
the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the
division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the
members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En
Banc.
Notwithstanding the fact that the issue involves pure
questions of law, the SC delve into the factual
circumstances. Still, the SC did not find grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC
Q: What is now the procedure if the COMELEC en banc is
equally divided?
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC rules of procedure
provides that when the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied.
MENDOZA VS COMELEC Case
G.R. No. 191084 March 25, 2010
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Mendoza was proclaimed the winning Governor of
Bulacan during the 2007 elections.
• PR Pandanganan filed an election protest with the COMELEC 2 nd
Div., alleging massive electoral fraud conducted by Mendoza.
• Subsequently, a revision of the ballots from the contested precints
was conducted.
• On Dec 21 2009, the COMELEC 2nd Div rendered a Resolution which
annulled and set aside Mendoza’s proclamation, as well as
proclaiming Pandanganan as the governor-elect.
• Aggrieved, Mendoza filed a MFR with the COMELEC en banc.
• On February 8, 2010, the en banc issued a Resolution dismissing
Mendoza’s MFR and affirming the ruling of the 2nd Div. However, it
seems that during the deliberations, there was no majority vote
obtained.
• 2 days later, Mendoza filed an Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution promulgated by the en bancon the grounds that it did
not follow procedure, mainly, the requisite that the case must be
reheard in cases where no majority is had.
• Thus, the COMELEC en banc re-heard the case on February 15.
During this rehearing, the en banc still did not manage to obtain a
majority vote. Thus, the en banc issued an order to implement the
ruling of the 2nd Division.
Translation: en banc upheld 2nd Division ruling
• Mendoza went to the SC to pray for the issuance of a TRO.
• Mendoza claims that Pandanganan’s protest should have been
DISMISSED as per Section 6 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
ISSUE: WON the en banc resolved Pandanganan’s protest according
to procedure. NO
HELD:
Rulings + Concepts:
a. Two kinds of jurisdiction in COMELEC, and why it is
important to distinguish each from the other.
Section 2 (2) of Article 9C states:
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal of officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Section 2(2) read in relation to Section 3 shows that however the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, either in the exercise of
"exclusive original jurisdiction" or an "appellate jurisdiction," the
COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and single process: to
repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en
banc.
b. Procedure when a case is brought under appellate
jurisdiction:
When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it
to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but,
if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the
banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends
without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision
stands affirmed.
In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has
been a completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that
when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate
process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in
effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is
affirmed.
Trial court decision > Division decides > If appealed, en banc decides
> if majority vote not acquired, the appealed ruling is UPHELD
c. Procedure when a case is brought under exclusive original
jurisdiction:
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If what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking
the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole
process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in
the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling.
If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an
original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision
that can be deemed affirmed.
In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed
process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the
process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to
dismiss the protest.
Summary:
Case is brought straight to Division > Division decides > If appealed,
en banc decides > if majority vote not acquired, the protest/case
should be DISMISSED
d. The latter procedure is the one applicable to the case at
bar since it was brought at first instance to the 2 nd
Division.
The COMELEC therefore erred in proceeding to execute the 2nd
Division decision. At the failure of the majrity to come to a vote on
the February 15 rehearing, they should have dismissed the election
protest against Mendoza.
The case was filed before the COMELEC and not with the
RTC since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over election
protest cases of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials. In this case, the position contested is the position
of Governor.
Q: What do you understand by an extended opinion?
Q: How does a division act on the case when it has taken
cognizance over it?
Q: Who renders the decision in the division? The ponente.
A division is composed of three members, there is a
ponente who will render a decision and he will refer the
decision to the other members if they concur.
AMBIL VS COMELEC Case
G.R. No. 143398 October 25, 2000
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND DIVISION) and JOSE
T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
FACTS:
• During the 1998 elections, Ambil Jr. was proclaimed as the
Governor of Eastern Samar over PR Ramirez. Ramirez filed an
election protest with the COMELEC, and ‘was raffled to the 1st Div.
• Commissioner Guiani proposed a resolution to the case which was
favorable to Ramirez. Commissioner Desamito dissented, while
Comm. Tangangco did not indicate her vote. (hereafter referred as
Guiani Resolution)
• In the meantime, Guiani retired and was replaced by Comm. Javier.
• On February 24, 2000 Ambil and Ramirez received the Guiani
Resolution. 4 days later, the COMELEC 1st Div. declared the Guiani
Resolution as a ‘useless scrap of paper’ and should be ignored by
both parties as there was still no proper promulgation of the said
Resolution..
• However, on March 31, 2000, the 1 st Div. issued an order setting
the promulgatio. Ambil opposed this, challenging the Guiani Res’
validity.
• Commissioners Tangangco and Javier recommended to presiding
Commissioner Desamito that they promulgate the Guiani
Resolution anyway. They said that what is controlling is the date
the ponente signed the decision. If Ambil wants to challenge it, the
Commissioners said that he can always do so through an MFR with
the en banc.
• Based on this recommendation, the 1 st Div. issued an order (dated
June 15) and set a date for the promulgation of the Resolution for
June 20.
• Fearing that the COMELEC would promulgate the adverse Guiani
Resolution, Ambil filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, seeking
to nullify the June 15 order of the 1 st Div. He filed the certiorari
petition a day before the scheduled promulgation.
ISSUE: Was this procedure proper? NO WON Ambil’s action was
premature. YES
HELD:
Order was made by Division, not en banc thus not cognizable by the
SC
As mentioned in other cases, the power of the Supreme Court to
review decisions of the Comelec as prescribed in the Constitution (Sec
7, IX-C) refers to final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."
This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en
banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division. The
Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.
Effects of promulgation, Guiani Resolution void
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of
Governor, Eastern Samar. It is within the original jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner did not ask
for a reconsideration of the division’s resolution or final decision. In
fact, there was really no resolution or decision to speak of because
there was yet no promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20,
2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Petitioner went directly to the
Supreme Court from an order of "promulgation of the Resolution of
this case" by the First Division of the Comelec.
A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is
promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a
member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution
is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision.
Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The
resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of
its members and duly promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his
retirement from office, but when he vacated his office without the
final decision or resolution having been promulgated, his vote was
automatically invalidated. Before that resolution or decision is so
signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision to
speak of.
It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before promulgation
of a decision or resolution, the ponente may change his mind.
Moreover, in this case, before a final decision or resolution could be
promulgated, the ponente retired and a new commissioner appointed.
And the incoming commissioner has decided to take part in the
resolution of the case. It is presumed that he had taken the position of
his predecessor because he co-signed the request for the
promulgation of the Guiani resolution.
Ambil’s action premature, should have exhausted administrative
rememdies first
Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was
premature. Ambil failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies
available before the COMELEC.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that "before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action.
General rule: A motion for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to
the viability of a special civil action for certiorari
Exceptions:
1. when the question is purely legal
2. where judicial intervention is urgent
3. where its application may cause great and irreparable
damage
4. where the controverted acts violate due process
5. failure of a igh government official from whom relief is
sought to act on the matter
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies explained,
exceptions
The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to
state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience
will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with so as to give the
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administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the case.
Exceptions: where doctrine may be disregarded:
1. when there is a violation of due process
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned
5. when there is irreparable injury
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the president bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention
CAGAS vs COMELEC CASE
G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, Respondents.
FACTS:
In the 2010 elections in Davao del Sur, Douglas Cagas was proclaimed
the governor as against Claude Bautista.
Bautista filed an election protest with the COMELEC 1st Div. In the EPC,
Bautista alleged fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and
violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, and prayed for the
opening of the ballot boxes.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas calimed that Bautista did not specify
the acts and omissions complained of, as required in COMELEC
Resolution 8804.
COMELEC Res. 8804 introduced the requirement for the
"detailed specification" to prevent "shotgun fishing expeditions
by losing candidates
The 1st Division issued an order upholding Bautista’s petition, finding
that it had complied with the detailed acts and omissions.
Cagas moved to consider, praying that the matter be elevated to the
COMELEC en banc.
Bautista claimed that since the 1st Division were merely interlocutory ,
they could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. Meanwhile, the 1 st
Division denied Cagas’ MFR, stating that the MFR failed to show that the
order was contrary to law.
Cagas filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, assailing both orders of
the 1st Division.
ISSUE: WON the en banc can review by certiorari an interlocutory order
issued by a Division NO
HELD:
Settled rule: interlocutory orders not reviewable, only final orders
decided under quasi-judicial powers
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the
Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC.
However, this power is limited to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued
by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the COMELEC.
Same ruling: ony en banc decisions; MFR required before elevation to en
banc
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of
the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory.
Cagas’ remedy:
The Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner.
The proper remedy is for Cagas to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits , and if the
result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative
defenses to the COMELEC en
banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the
merits.
Even if a protest may be couched in general terms, the COMELEC may
order an opening of ballot boxes
The Court has upheld the COMELEC’s determination of the
sufficiency of allegations contained in election protests, conformably with
its imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means within
its command, who was the candidate elected by the electorate.
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even
clearer. In a string of categorical pronouncements, we have consistently
ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would
require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is
the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot
boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.
RELAMPAGOS vs CUMBA CASE
G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner, vs.ROSITA C. CUMBA and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
• Relampagos and Cumba were mayoralty candidates during the
1992 elections. Cumba was proclaimed winner by a margin of 22
votes.
• Relampagos filed an election protest with the RTC. In 1994 (!), the
RTC found that Relam actually won with a lead of 6 votes.
• Cumba filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC. Meanwhile,
Relam filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial
court granted. Cumba filed an MFR against the writ of execution,
but was denied.
• Cumba then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari to
annul the RTC’s order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal.
• The COMELEC granted Cumba’s petition, asserting that it had
exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law.
• The COMELEC’s basis for this assertion was Section 50 of BP 697,
which remained in full force as it was not repealed by the OEC. The
COMELEC further explained that this power is in the exercise of its
judicial power, and that it is the most logical body to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction.
• The COMELEC dismissed the trial court’s order of execution
pending appeal because when Cumba perfected her appeal with
the COMELEC (by paying the fees), the RTC lost its jurisdiction over
the case.
• Relampagos filed with the SC the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC can issue writs of certiorari, etc. YES
HELD:
In this case, the SC abandoned the rulings in Garcia and Uy and
affirmed the COMELEC’s power to issue such reliefs by virtue of BP
697
The last paragraph of BP 697 states that:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases.
The Court found that this provision remained in full force, but only in
cases where the COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction. The COMELEC is
vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
RTC committed GAOD in issuing granting Relampagos’ motion
Cumba’s appeal with the COMELEC was filed on July 4, 1994. The
COMELEC gave it due course on July 8. Relampagos’ motion for
execution pending appeal was filed on July 12. Thus, the trial court
could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the
motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal.
Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial
court.
Policy: The COMELEC has power to issue such special reliefs, but only
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
GARCIA CASE
G.R. No. 88158. March 4, 1992.*
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And although there may be authorities in other jurisdictions which

DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO O’HARA, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO DE
JESUS and CECILIA DAVID, and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.*
TOMAS TOBON UY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSE C. NEYRA, respondents.
Note: the ruling in these cases was later abandoned in Relampagos
FACTS in Garcia:
• In 1988, Garcia and O’hara were proclaimed Mayor and Vmayor
during the 1988 elections in Antipolo, Rizal.
• The losing candidates (respondents) instituted an election protest
before the RTC, questioning the ERs in 25 precincts. The RTC issued
an order that all ballot boxes and paraphernalia used in the 25
precincts be delivered to it for examination and recounting.
• During the recount, Garcia’s counsel moved to suspend the
recount, as the irregularities in the protest do not relate to the
appeciation of ballots. Thus, the opening of boxes would not affect
the election results. Garcia later filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Opening of Ballot Boxes.
• The RTC partially granted their petition, limiting the recount
instead to 9 precincts. De Jesus and David filed a MFR but was
denied by the RTC. Thus, de Jesus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the COMELEC.
• This was objected to by Garcia, claiming that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction to issue ceriorari and mandamus.
• Thereafter the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the RTC to
open all 25 ballot boxes.
FACTS in Uy:
• Meanwhile over at Isabela, Uy lost to Neyra as the mayor of Gamu.
Uy filed an election protest with the RTC, who later declared Uy the
winner by 5 votes.
• While Neyra filed a Notice of Appeal, Uy filed a Motion for
Execution pending Appeal.
• Neyra then filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
COMELEC to enjoin the RTC from acting on Uy’s motion.
• While the RTC later gave due course to Neyra’s appeal, it also
granted Uy’s motion. Neyra filed another petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition with the COMELEC to set aside the RTC’s grant.
• The COMELEC took cognizance of both of Neyra’s petitions, and
annulled the RTC’s granting of the writ of execution pending
appeal.
• Thus, Uy filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, claiming that the
COMELEC committed GAOD when it arrogated itself the power to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
maintain that such Writs are inherent in the power of higher Courts
exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same refers to judicial tribunals,
which the COMELEC is not. What this agency exercises are
administrative and quasi-judicial powers.
Certiorari, defined
Certiorari “is a writ from a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal
commanding the latter to send up the record of a particular case”
(Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra). The function of a Writ of Certiorari is to
keep an inferior Court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Procedure: COMELEC cannot prevent RTCs to order execution
pending appeal
There is no express provision of law, therefore, disauthorizing
executions pending appeal, and the COMELEC, in its proce dural rules
alone, should not be allowed to divest Regional Trial Courts of that
authority. It deprives the prevailing party of a substantive right to
move for such relief contrary to the constitutional mandate that those
Rules can not diminish nor modify substantive rights (Section 6, Article
IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
Nonetheless, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows
Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon good
reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or
suppletorily to election contests decided by them. In retrospect, good
reasons did, in fact, exist which justified the RTC Order, dated 10
January 1991, granting execution pending appeal. Among others
mentioned by the RTC are the combined considerations of the near
expiration of the term of office, public interest, the pendency of the
election contest for more than three
(3) years
Note: it is not clear if this is principle was also abandoned

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC may issue such writs. NO

HELD:
NOTE: all this should be moot and academic considering the
subsequent abandonment in Relampagos

No provision in the Constitution or law confers such power to the

COMELEC; original and appellate jurisdiction distinguished
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or
causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. It may be classified into
original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial

cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time
under conditions provided by law.

Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-

examine the final order or judgment of a lower Court which tried the
case now elevated for judicial review.

Since the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must be
expressly conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred
from, the other.

In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction. The well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law, and never by implication.

Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was

appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution makes no mention of any
power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the case
of the Supreme Court which was specifically conferred such authority
(Art. VIII, Sec. 5[1]). The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction is
fixed by law, the power to issue such Writs can not be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.

Writs may be issued by appellate courts, but only judicial tribunals

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Discussion on:
CARLOS VS ANGELES Case
G.R. No. 142907 November 29, 2000
JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION G.
ANGELES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CALOOCAN CITY (BRANCH 125) and
ANTONIO M. SERAPIO, respondents.
FACTS:
• Carlos and Serapio were rivals in the ayoralty race in Valenzuela,
MNL during the 1998 elections.
• On May 21 1998, the Municipal BOC proclaimed Carlos the duly
elected mayor, having obtained 102k votes. Seapio filed an
election protest contesting the results.
• A revision of the ballots was conducted, but in the final tally Carlos
still had the plurality of valid votes.
• Nevertheless, the trial court set aside the final tally of the votes
because of its finding of significant badges of fraud. The court held
that the fraud was attributable to the protestee who had control
over the election paraphernalia and the basic services in the
community such as the supply of electricity.
• Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes, the trial court set
aside the procalamation of Carlos and declared Serapio as the
elected mayor of Valenzuela.
• Carlos appealed to the COMELEC on May 4, 2000, and on May 8
filed a special civil action of certiorari, this time with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the SC has jurisdiction to review by certiorari the
decision of the RTC in an election protest case involving an
elective municipal official considering that it has no
appellate jurisdiction over such decision. YES
(2) WON the trial court committed GAOD setting aside Carlos’
proclamation and declared Serapio mayor? YES
HELD:
SC has concurrent jurisdiction with COMELEC in issuing C-P-M-QW-
HC
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Sec.
5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus."
By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec) has
appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases involving elective
municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as
provided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction."
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (regional trial
courts) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The
Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. But, the Court that takes jurisdiction first shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Q: If there is a conflict between the Rules of Court and the
COMELEC rules, which would prevail?
MA’AM: If the election offense case is filed in the RTC, then
the Rules of Court shall prevail. But, in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, the COMELEC rules of procedure
shall prevail.
BASARTE VS COMELEC Case
Section 1, Rule 4 of the COMELEC rules of procedure
provides that no member shall be the ponente of an en
banc decision/resolution on a motion to reconsider a
decision/resolution written by him in a division.
SC ruled that COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion, referring the case to Agbayani vs Comelec which
held that a violation of this rule, Section 1, Rule 4 is a reason
for the reversal for the acts of the COMELEC as they should
be the first to respect its own rules to provide a proper
example to those appearing before it and avoid all
suspicion of bias.
ANGELIA VS COMELEC Case
G.R. No. 135468 May 31, 2000
DIOSCORO O. ANGELIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and FLORENTINO R. TAN, respondents.
FACTS:
• Angelia and PR Tan were Sangguniang bayan candidates in the 1998
elections in Abuyog, Leyte.
• During canvass, Angelia was proclaimed as the eighth SB member,
with only a 4-vote advantage from Tan, who ranked 9 th.
• Tan lter filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC alleging that
there were clerical errors in the counting of votes to his prejudice.
Meanwhile, Angelia took his oath and assumed office.
• Tan withdrew his quo warranto petition and filed a petition for
annulment of proclamation with the COMELEC.
• In a Resolution dated Aug 18, 1998 the COMELEC annulled Angelia’s
proclamation and ordered the MBOC to make the necessary
corrections in the ERs in the contested precincts.
• The MBOC reconvened and later declared Tan as the 8th SB member.
• Angelia filed a MFR with the COMELEC en banc alleging that he was
not given due notice and hearing. Without waiting for resolution
on his MFR, Angelia filed a petition for certiorari against the Aug
18 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC.
• Tan claims that the certiorari petition should be dismissed as it is
premature, as he had a pending MFR with the en banc.
ISSUE: WON Angelia’s filing for certiorari is proper. YES
WON Angelia’s petition for certiorari should be dismissed. YES
HELD:
Angelia’s petition for certiorari is proper as an MFR of an en banc
ruling is a prohibited pleading.
Angelia acted correctly in filing the present petition because the
resolution of the COMELEC in question is not subject to
reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it had
only one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
As the case before the COMELEC is not an election offense, according
to Rule 13, Sec1 (d), reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was
not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For him to wait until the COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow
the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari with this
Court to run and expire.
Tan did not commit forum-shopping; procedure on quo warranto
Without merit. Tan withdrew the quo warranto case before filing the
petition for annulment of proclamation.
Second, while the filing of a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, this principle
admits of several exceptions, such as when such petition is not the
proper remedy. Under §253 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
grounds for a petition for quo warranto are ineligibility or disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines of the respondent.
Since in the present case, Tan alleged the existence of manifest errors
in the preparation of election returns, clearly, the proper remedy is
not a petition for quo warranto but a petition for annulment of
proclamation.
Page 38 of 39
 2- Manresa; Case Digests (Fajardo)
ELECTIONS 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2014-2015 TRANSCRIPTIONS AND DIGESTS

Procedure: when it involves clerical errors, the proper procedure is

to reconvene the BOC, not annul the proclamation without notice
and hearing

In Castromayor v COMELEC, it was held that if the case involved a

manifest error, the expedient course of action was for the Municipal
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in
accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to
effect the necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass and
proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the basis thereof.

Quo warranto, Latin ‘by what warrant/power’

- a writ or legal action requiring a person to show by what
warrant an office or franchise is held, claimed, or exercised.
- Found under Rule 66, Rules of Court as an action for the
usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines
Ø the Court modified the en banc’s ruling and
deleted the annulment of Angelia’s
proclamation, while ordering the BOC to
reconvene

The only remedy available for Angelia here is to file a

petition for certiorari before the SC under Rule 65. There is
no other plain and expedient remedy except the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the SC.

LOONG VS COMELEC Case in relation to MACABAGO VS

COMELEC

The Court took cognizance of the case because the

resolution of the issue involved an interpretation of RA
8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power
of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the
Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The issue
is not only legal but one of first impression and
undoubtedly suffused with significance to the entire
nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the
private respondent and the intervenor to the position of
governor of Sulu.

SC said that the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion here
since they have to remedy the problem and has that power
to conduct manual counting to determine who the real
winner in that election is.

Page 39 of 39
 August 13, 2015 | Petition to Declare a Postponement, Failure or Annulment of Elections and Call for a Special Elections
Section 5 speaks of grounds for declaring postponement of
elections. Section 5 provides what are the causes, meaning to
say postponement. The Comelec is vested with the power to
postpone a scheduled election, and what would serve as the
basis for the Comelec to postpone an elections. The rules
provide that the Commission en banc may motu propio or
upon verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing whereby all interested parties are accorded
equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election to
a date which is reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted to a failure to elect but not
later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
So which means that the power to declare postponement of
elections is taken cognizance of by the Comelec en banc, and
it may be through the exercise of motu propio.
So what would now serve as basis for the Comelec to declare
a motu propio postponement of elections? As we have
discussed earlier, there are several deputies of the Comelec
which is tasked to assist the Comelec during the election
period, and one of the deputies of the Comelec is with the
securing of the peace and order. That is vested with what
agency of the Government? It is the AFP, PNP. So there is a
report from the Armed Forces of the Philippines which may be
submitted to Comelec requesting for a postponement of
election of a particular government unit, municipality or city
probably on the ground of proliferation of firearms or they
cannot maintain peace and order in that particular area if the
election is conducted simultaneously. And if the Comelec on
the basis of the report warrants the postponement of the
elections, then the Comelec may motu propio declare the
postponement of elections on that particular local
government unit. It could either be and subsequently called for
a special elections.
And when can special elections be called? Based on the rules,
it can be called within 30 days after cessation of the cause of
the postponement or suspension or failure to elect or within
the date reasonably close to the date of elections not held. We
discussed this earlier this case of Lucero v. Comelec wherein
the 30 day period is based on a mathematical computation
from the cessation of the cause for the suspension or
postponement, then the Comelec will only count, the Comelec
can call the special elections within the period of 30 days on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, may
not be held within the 30 days but still, in the Lucero case, the
SC said, even if it was conducted a year and a half after, it is
still considered a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held if it is not attributed to the fault of the
electorates.
So what are the common grounds for declaration of
postponement or suspension of elections? Section 5 provides
that
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When for -
any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism,
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records,
FM and other analogous circumstances of such a
nature that the holding of a HOPE-FRECRE should
become impossible in any political subdivision.
Section 6 on the other hand talks about conditions for the
exercise of the power to declare failure of elections. Under
what circumstances a failure of elections should be declared?
3 instances:
The election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
- meaning to say, if the election is on May 1 for
example, there was no elections that was held on
May 1
- On what grounds? Grounds could either be on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes
The election in any polling place has been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting
on account of FM, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes;
- in this instance, the election started on 7:00 and
on an hour fixed before 3:00 for the closing of the
voting, so nagkaroon ng earthquake or there was
terrorism, there was violence which resulted to
the votes not being counted
After the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the ER or in the custody of canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
the same grounds.
- There was voting and the ballots were counted,
and during the preparation, transmission of the
election returns or in the custody of canvass,
such election results in a failure to elect on the
same ground.
- So for example, after the ballots have been
round, so we are in a manual elections, the BEIs
would indicate the corresponding votes in the
election returns, so during the preparation, while
the election returns are being prepared by the
BEIs, if in any of the grounds, the preparation of
the election returns were not completed, as a
result of the same grounds, hindi natuloy. Or
assuming natuloy, so the election returns were
completed and placed inside the ballot boxes,
 August 13, 2015 | Petition to Declare a Postponement, Failure or Annulment of Elections and Call for a Special Elections
but during the transmission of the ballot box
from the precinct to the Office of the Comelec,
any of the circumstances, inambush yung
sasakyan and all the ballot boxes, so the election
returns cannot be canvassed. So that can be a
ground for declaration of failure of elections.
- Or on the third instance on an ambush, it was
duly acknowledged and received by the Board of
Canvassers, and the law says during custody of
canvass while in the possession of the Board of
Canvassers, any of these grounds occur, then the
canvass was not completed, nobody emerged as
winner, there was no proclamation of
candidates. So a failure of elections may be
declared by the Comelec.
Based on these circumstances, no winner emerged.
Based on the reading under section 6, there are 2 conditions
that must concur:
no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned
on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting
the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to
elect and
the votes not cast would affect the results of the
elections
- What do we mean by this? So for example, a
failure of election was declared only in precinct
1. Among the ten precincts for example, isang
precinct lang ang involved and which involved
only 150 voters. If the 150 voters are material
that would affect the standing of a winning
candidate, then the petition to declare failure of
elections may be made. Otherwise, if it will not
affect the result of the election, even if there was
failure on that particular precinct but it will not
affect the results of the election, then a failure of
elections may not be declared. Because a failure
of election is an extraordinary remedy.
The Comelec is warned to take precautions in immediately
declaring a failure of elections. The grounds as provided under
section 6 should be established first. The grounds must appear
and duly alleged on the petition. Otherwise the Comelec may
out rightly dismiss the petition to declare failure of election. As
held in Coquilla v. Comelec, the SC said that what is common
in these 3 instances was the result of failure to elect. In the
first instance the election was not held, in the second instance
the election was suspended, and the third instance,
circumstances attending the preparation, transmission, and
custody of canvass of the election cause a failure to elect.
The term failure to elect means nobody emerged as a winner.
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So what are the procedural rules? On the basis of a verified
complaint. So the Comelec cannot motu propio declare a
failure of election. It must be through a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, and the
Comelec may call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 4 of RA 7166 (An Act Providing for the Synchronized
National and Local Elections) provides that any declaration of
postponement, failure of election and calling for a special
elections as provided in Section 5,6, & 7 shall be decided by
the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
members. This power is exclusively vested in the Comelec as
ruled in the case of Sanchez v. Comelec 193 SCRA 849.
Loong v. Comelec 257 SCRA 1, a petition to declare failure of
elections/annulment of elections on the ground of massive
fraud in some municipalities was filed before proclamation.
Comelec dismissed the petition for having been filed out of
time since it was filed only after petitioners realized that the
annulment of election will wipe out their lead. It was ruled
that the Comelec Resolution dismissing the petition was
arbitrary as no law provided for a reglementary period within
which to file a petition for annulment of elections if there is no
proclamation yet. So if there is no proclamation yet, then a
petition to annul the election or petition to declare failure of
election may be filed since the law did not provide for a period
within which to file, as long as there is no proclamation yet.
Even if there was proclamation we will learn later that there
are still remedies available to the aggrieved party.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512, Canicosa filed with the
Comelec a Petition to declare failure of elections and to
declare null and void the canvass and proclamation based on
the following grounds (names of the RV did not appear on the
list, padlocks were not self-locking among others) which was
dismissed by the Comelec en banc on the ground that the
allegations therein did not justify the declaration of failure of
elections. Canicosa insists that it was error on the part of
Comelec sitting en banc to rule on his petition as it should have
first been heard by a division. The SC held that the matter
relating to the declaration of failure of elections or the
allegations raised by Canicosa did not involve an exercise of
QJ or adjudicatory functions. It involves an administrative
function which pertains to the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections.
If you will know, going back to section 2 rule 3 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, this rule enumerates the exceptions when
 August 13, 2015 | Petition to Declare a Postponement, Failure or Annulment of Elections and Call for a Special Elections
the Comelec en banc may take cognizance of cases at the first
instance:
1. All cases where a division cannot act, is not
authorized to act;
2. Declaring a postponement, failure or suspension of
election; and
3. Where upon unanimous vote of all member of a
division, an interlocutory order or issue relative to an
action pending or proceeding pending before a
division is brought before the Comelec en banc.
Pasandalan vs. Comelec, et. al., G.R. No. 150312 July 18, 2002,
the SC held that a petition for declaration of failure of
elections is an “extraordinary remedy” and therefore the
petition must specifically allege the essential grounds that
would justify the same. Anyway, going back to Canicosa, the
resolution of the Comelec denying the petition to declare a
failure of election was upheld by the SC and Comelec was not
found to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction because it has authority to first
take cognizance to declare failure of election at the first
instance in conformity with the rules, and the grounds relied
upon by Canicosa were not among those enumerated under
section 6 which are fraud, violence, terrorism and other
analogous circumstances, and filing of voter’s list or the name
of the voters are not on the list or that the padlocks of the
ballot boxes were not self-locking are not grounds to declare a
failure of election. Why? What would be the effect of
declaration of failure of election? It would be the
disenfranchisement of the voters, it will nullify the exercise of
the right of the voters. Otherwise, the Comelec can dismiss
the petition outright for lack of merit and no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to it, because the Comelec is
mandated to exercise this power with utmost circumspect to
prevent disenfranchising voters and frustrating the
electorate’s well.”
So what happened in Pasandalan? Psandalan filed a petition to
declare failure of election on the ground that the voting
precinct where the Cafgus indiscriminately fired causing the
voters to panic and they were not able to vote anymore, and
they left the polling places not casting their votes, and because
of the situation, ung kalaban took advantage of the situation.
So the supporters of his opponent took the official ballots and
filled them up with the name of the opponent. Also, he was
saying that the BEIs failed to affix their initials at the back of
several official ballots. So if you recall, it is required under the
rules that the Chairman of the BEIs was to affix the signature
at the back of the ballot. The ruling there is that the failure of
the Chairman of the BEIs to affix his signature will not
invalidate the ballot. Otherwise pinepenalize mo yung voter.
However, it will not invalidate the ballot, but of course the BEIs
may be held liable administratively or criminally should the law
warrants. So that is one of his allegations. What was the
supporting document of Pasandalan here? On the basis of
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affidavits of his own poll watchers insisted, prayed before the
Comelec to conduct a technical examination of the question
ballots so that the Comelec can see that the ballots were only
filled up by a few people, and he made reference to another
case where the Comelec conducted a technical examination.
So the issue here is whether the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing or denying the petition of Psandalan to
declare failure of elections. The SC said the Comelec is not
mandated to conduct a technical examination before it
dismisses a petition for nullification of election when the
petition is on its face without merit. In the case of Typoco
referred to here by Pasandalan was that Typoco buttressed his
petition with independent evidence that compelled the
Comelec to conduct a technical examination of the questioned
election returns. What did Typoco attach? He filed a motion to
admit evidence to prove a substantial number of the election
returns were manufactured and he claimed that the returns
were prepared by only one person which was based on the
report of a licensed examiner of questioned documents
through examination of copies of the election returns. To
distinguish it with the evidence submitted by Pasandalan,
Pasandalan submitted only self-serving affidavits because it
was executed by his own poll watchers. Whereas Typoco
submitted through a motion to admit evidence the report of
the licensed examiner on questioned documents on the basis
of which the Comelec resolved to conduct a technical
examination of the election returns of whether it was only
filled up by one person. Typoco was able to submit
independent evidence for the Comelec to resolve to conduct a
technical examination of whether or not the allegations in the
petition are true.
In the case of Basher, this is an exception because there are
already winners, voting took place. The SC said that the fact
that an election is actually held prevents as a rule, a
declaration of failure of elections, the Court, however, can
annul an election if it finds that the election is attended with
patent and massive irregularities and illegalities. In this case,
after a series of failed elections in Brgy. Maidan, Municipality
of Tugaya, Lanao Del Sur during the 1997 Brgy. Elections, the
election was reset to 30 August 1997. Due to the prevailing
tension in the locality, the voting started only at around 9 p.m.
and lasted until the early morning of the following day. Basher
filed a petition for the nullification of the election which was
dismissed by the Comelec on the ground that actual voting had
taken place. The SC overturned the Comelec ruling because it
found out based on the evidence that the election was
unauthorized and invalid. The electorate was not given
sufficient notice that the election would push through after
9pm of the same day. It was not conducted on a specified
precinct, and in 9:00 in the evening. Moreover, the voting did
not comply with the procedure laid down by the Comelec in its
Resolution.
 August 13, 2015 | Petition to Declare a Postponement, Failure or Annulment of Elections and Call for a Special Elections
In the case of Mitmug v. Comelec, the SC ruled that the
Comelec could dismiss out right a petition for nullification of
election if it is plainly groundless and the allegations therein
could be better ventilated with an election protest.
Banaga Jr. vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 701, the fact that a verified
petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the
case should first be held before Comelec can act on it. Because
it is an extraordinary remedy, the petition must show on its
face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure of
elections are present.
Ampatuan et. al. v. Comelec/Candao, et. al., G.R. No. 149803,
January 31, 2002, the issue here is with respect to the
jurisdiction of the Comelec, whether the Comelec continue to
have jurisdiction over the petition to declare failure of election
even after the candidates have been proclaimed. Private
respondents filed a petition for declaration of failure of
elections in several municipalities in Maguindanao. During the
pendency of the hearing of said petition, the Comelec
proclaimed petitioners as winners for the position of governor,
vice-governor and board members.
Notwithstanding, the Comelec issued an order directing the
continuation of the hearing on the failure of elections and
issued an order outlining the procedure to be followed in the
technical examination. Petitioners, relying on the case of
Typoco, Jr. v. Comelec, contended that by virtue of their
proclamation, the only remedy left for private respondents is
to file an election protest, in which case, original jurisdiction
lies with the regular courts and that Comelec no longer has
jurisdiction to conduct a technical examination as it would
defeat the summary nature of a petition for declaration of
failure of elections citing several rulings that an election
protest is the proper remedy for a losing candidate after the
proclamation of the winning candidates. It was ruled that the
fact that the candidate proclaimed has assumed office does
not deprive the Comelec from continuing of its authority to
annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In this case, it
cannot be assumed that the proclamation of petitioners was
legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections
were held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for
annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of
elections. The cases relied upon by petitioners that an election
protest is the proper remedy for a losing candidate after
proclamation of the winning candidate involved pre-
proclamation controversies. This is not a pre-proclamation
case, this is a petition to declare a failure of elections. The
proclamation of the Comelec after the hearing of the case, if it
finds that indeed the proclamation of the candidates is based
on the massive fraud and irregularities as stated in the petition
can still annul the elections and declare failure of elections.
The SC made reference to its ruling in Loong v. Comelec that
“a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action
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for annulment of election results, or failure of elections”. In
pre-proclamation cases, the Comelec is restricted to an
examination of the election returns on their face and is
without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities. The Comelec is duty-bound
to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and
other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election
results or for declaration of failure of elections conformably
with the OEC. Accordingly, the Comelec, in the case of actions
for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, may conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters’ signatures and
thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the
elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.
Similarly, just read the case of Borja Jr., v. Comelec. Borja, Jr.
v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604, a petition for declaration of failure
of elections and to nullify the canvass and proclamation was
filed by Borja wherein he alleged that there was lack of notice
of the date and time of canvass, there was fraud in the conduct
of the elections as several voters were disenfranchised,
presence of flying voters and unqualified members of the BEI.
The Comelec dismissed the petition ruling that the grounds
relied upon by Borja were ground proper only in an election
contest. SC upheld the decision of the Comelec.
So the powers attendant to the declaration of postponement
of election, suspension, and failure is the power of the
Comelec to call special election. We discussed the case of
Lucero already and in Bulaong v. Comelec, that what is the
nature of the power of the Comelec to call special election?
The SC said that the calling of the special election is
discretionary on the part of the Comelec, and being
discretionary, the Comelec cannot be compelled by
mandamus to call a special election considering that
mandamus is a remedy available only to compel to the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty, not with the
exercise of a discretionary power. So if it is a ministerial duty,
a petition for mandamus can lie because it is a duty that is
enjoined upon the public officer by law. Whereas if it is
discretionary, you cannot compel a discretionary power via
mandamus, because it will be based on the circumstances of
the exercise of such discretionary power.
In the case of Polala Sambarani v. Comelec et. al., theis case
transpired during the synchronized barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections in 2002, and the holding of special election
that failed in 5 barangays. So there was failure of election in 5
barangays. So the Comelec here refused to hold another
special election explaining that there was already a prior
special election and they wanted another special election. The
Comelec now refused to hold another special election
explaining that it is no longer in a position to call for another
special election considering that section 6 of OEC provides that
special election shall be held on a date reasonably close to the
 August 13, 2015 | Petition to Declare a Postponement, Failure or Annulment of Elections and Call for a Special Elections

date of the election not held but not later than 30 days after
the cessation of the cause of the postponement. So the
Comelec noted that more than 30 days had elapsed since the
failed election. So Comelec contend that to hold another
special election in these barangays will not only be tedious and
cumbersome, but a waste of its precious resources. So the
Comelec left to the DILG the process of appointing the
barangay captain and barangay kagawads as well as the
sangguniang kabataan chairman and kagawads in these
barangays in accordance with the Local Government Code. So
the issue here is whether or not Comelec acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying or refusing to call another special election. While
the SC stressed here that the Constitution gives the Comelec
broad powers to enforce and administer all laws , rules, and
regulations relative to the conduct of election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall, Comelec in this case
anchored its stand not to call another special election on the
last portion of section 6: on a date reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in the
failure to elect, the SC said that the prohibition on conducting
special elections after 30 days from the cessation of the cause
of the failure of election is not absolute. It is directory, not
mandatory, and the Comelec possesses residual power to
conduct special election even beyond the deadline provided by
law. So the deadline in section 6 cannot defeat the right of
suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution, and
the Comelec erroneously perceived that the deadline set in
section 6 is absolute. The SC also made reference to section
45 of the OEC which specifically deals with the election of
barangay officials. Unlike in section 6, the section 45 does not
state special election should be held on a date reasonably close
to the date of the election not held. Instead, section 45 of the
OEC states that special election should be held within 30 days
from the cessation of the cause or postponement. So logically,
the SC said that special election could be held anytime
provided the date of the special election is within 30 days from
the time the cause of the postponement has ceased. The SC
further ruled here that the reasons that Comelec posted in
refusing to call special election are void, erroneous
interpretation of the law because sabi ng Comelec saying daw
yung resources, and the perceived logistical impossibilities.
The SC said that these are not bases to refuse to call a failure
of election because the only states that special election may
be called if it is warranted within 30 days from the cessation of
the cause or on a date reasonably close to the date of the
elections not held.

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