STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

REVIEWER FOR MIDTERMS

by RANIA P.

CHAPTER III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

A. IN GENERAL
Where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, the court can avail all legitimate aids to construction so that it can ascertain the true intent
of the statute. These aids can be intrinsic or extrinsic.

INTRINSIC AIDS
- Those found in the printed page of the statute itself

EXTRINSIC AIDS
- Those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page

TITLE OF A STATUTE
- Serves as aid, in case of doubt in its language, to its construction and to ascertain legislative will
- Where the meaning of a statute is obscure, courts may resort to its title to clear the obscurity
- Title may indicate legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful
import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in the title
- Title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or as to the intention of the legislature in
enacting it, and not otherwise!
- Title carries more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title”
- Title may be resorted to in order to remove, not create, doubt or uncertainty!

CASE – City of Baguio v. Marcos

ISSUE: When to count the forty-year period to file a petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings as authorized by
RA 931 covering lands that have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the 40 years next preceding the approval of RA 931.
Should the period be counted from the date the cadastral proceeding sought to be reopened was originally
instituted in court – April 12, 1912? Or should it be counted from the date the decision therein rendered became final – Nov. 25,
1922? Petition for reopening was filed on July 25, 1961 – beyond the 40-year period if the period was to be computed from the
date the petition was originally filed, and not if it was to be counted from the date the decision became final.
HELD: Court ruled that the starting date to count the 40-year period is the date the final decision was rendered!

CASE – Central Capiz v. Ramirez

ISSUE: Whether privately owned lands come within the scope of Act 2874.
HELD: The Court ruled that examining Act 2874 in detail it was intended to apply to public lands only, for the title of the
Act—always indicative of legislative intent—reads: ‘An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain,
and for other purposes.’” The Court held that the words ‘and for other purposes’ contained in the title must be treated as non-
existent.

CASE – Ebarle v. Sucaldito

ISSUE: Whether EO 264 entitled “Outlining the procedure by which complaints charging government officials and
employees with commission of irregularities should be guided” applies to criminal actions, to the end that no preliminary
investigation can be undertaken or information filed in court unless there is previous compliance with said EO.
HELD: The Court held that EO applies only to administrative complaints! The Court ruled that the “very title speaks of
commission of irregularities.” There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal “offenses,” that is, “crimes.” While “crimes”
amount to “irregularities,” the EO could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable
thereto, as well as to use such technical terms as “accused,” “convicted,” or “acquitted.”

PREAMBLE
- That part of the statute written immediately after its title
- States the purpose, reason or justification for the enactment of the law
- Usually expressed in “Whereas” clauses
- Generally omitted in statutes passed by Philippine Commission, Philippine Legislature, National Assembly, Congress of the
Philippines, and Batasang Pambansa; in lieu of the preamble, these legislative bodies use the explanatory note to explain the
reasons for enacting the statute
- Extensively used in Presidential Decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power
- Not an essential part of a statute; hence, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, preamble can neither expand
nor restrict its operation, nor prevail over its text, nor be a basis for giving a statute a meaning not apparent on its face
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 - May be resorted to clarify ambiguity; it has been held that a preamble is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the lawmakers
as to the purpose to be achieved, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be accomplished, by the provisions of the
statute
- Sets out the intention of the legislature
- May restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law
- May express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively, in which case the law has to be given retroactive effect,
so as to carry out such intent

CASE – People v. Purisima

ISSUE: Whether the carrying of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon should be in furtherance of, or in relation to,
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder, as a necessary element of the crime.
HELD: The court ruled that pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the events that led to the enactment of PD 9,
namely, the state of martial law in the country, the desired result of Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law in the
country; and the fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder being
committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons – the clear intent and spirit of the decree
is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble as an indispensable element of the crime. The court noted that the severity
of the penalty for the violation of the decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which may only be justified by associating the
carrying out of such bladed or blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its preamble.

CASE – People v. Echavez

ISSUE: Whether a person who squatted on a pastural land could be held criminally liable for violation of PD 772, which
punishes “any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes.” The decree was promulgated to solve the squatting problem which, according to its preamble, “is still a major problem
in urban communities all over the country” and because “many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying
public and private lands belong to the affluent class.”
HELD: NO. The crime may only be committed in urban communities and not in agricultural or pastural lands because
the preamble of the decree shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban lands, more particularly to illegal
constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.

CONTEXT OF THE WHOLE TEXT

- The best source from which to ascertain legislative intent is the statute itself – the words, phrases, sentences, sections, clauses,
provisions – taken as a whole and in relation to one another
- Legislative intent should be ascertained from a consideration of the whole context of the statute and not from an isolated part or
particular provision
- The context may circumscribe the meaning of a statute; it may give a word or phrase a meaning different from its usual or
ordinary signification; in such case, meaning dictated by the context prevails!
- Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature
- The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is taken into view
PUNCTUATION MARKS
- Punctuations—comma, semi-colon, period—are grammatical marks!
- Semi-colon is used to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma!
What follows a semi-colon must have a relation to the same matter which precedes it
- Comma and semi-colon are both used for the same purpose – to divide sentences and parts of sentences, the only difference
being that semi-colon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma! They are not used to introduce a new idea
- Period is a mark used to indicate the end of a sentence
- It is a rule in legal hermeneutics that punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible
meaning of written words; the reason is that punctuation marks are neither part of a statute nor part of the English language
- However, where there is ambiguity in a statute which may be partially or wholly solved by a punctuation mark, it may be
considered in the construction of a statute
- The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the
other antecedents
- If the punctuation gives the statute a reasonable meaning and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words as thus punctuated
- Argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when
necessary, to give the statute the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks and
inserting others where necessary

CAPITALIZATION OF LETTERS
- Like punctuation marks, capitalization of letters is an aid of low degree in the construction of statute

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 CASE – Unabia v. City Mayor
ISSUE: Whether or not employees in the unclassified service of the government are entitled to security of
tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution because of the use of capital letters in the words “Civil Service” in Sections 1 and 4 of
Art. XII of the 1935 Constitution and the use of the small letters for the same words “civil service” in the Civil Service Act.
HELD: The Court held that Capital ‘C’ and ‘S’ in the words “Civil Service” were used in the Constitution to indicate the
group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. There is “no difference between the use
of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service
from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service.”

HEADNOTES OR EPIGRAPHS
- Headnotes, headings or epigraphs of sections of a statute are convenient index to the contents of its provisions
- They are prefixed to sections or chapters of a statute for ready reference or classification
- They are not entitled to much weight and inferences drawn therefrom are of little value and they can never control the plain
terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not part of the law
- If the chapter or section heading has been inserted merely for convenience or reference, and not as integral part of the statute,
it should not be allowed to control interpretation
- Where the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or
epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings are merely catchwords or
reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows

LINGUAL TEXT
- Unless otherwise provided, where a statute is officially promulgated in English and Spanish, the English text shall govern, but in
case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the English text
- Where a statute is officially promulgated in Spanish or in English or in Filipino, with translations into other languages, the
language in which it is written prevails over its translation!
- Thus, the RPC having been originally enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs as against the English text

INTENT OR SPIRIT OF LAW

- The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself!
- Legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor in the application and interpretation of a statute
- If a statute needs construction, the influence most dominant in that process is the intent or spirit of the act
- The spirit, rather than letter, of a statute determines its construction; a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent!
- For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter, and that which is within the letter but not within
the spirit is not within the statute!
- A thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within
the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers
- The intent or spirit of a statute is that which is expressed in the words thereof, which should be discovered within its four corners
aided, if necessary, by its legislative history
- The courts cannot assume an intent in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish the supposed intention,
for otherwise they would pass beyond the bounds of judicial power to usurp legislative power!

POLICY OF LAW
- The policy of law, once ascertained, should be given effect by the judiciary
- One way to accomplish this is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy!
- A construction which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law should be adopted in favor of that interpretation which
would defeat it

PURPOSE OF LAW OR MISCHIEF TO BE SUPPRESSED

- The court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and should give
the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effectuate its purpose
- Purpose of a statute is more important than rules of grammar and logic in ascertaining its meaning
- Statute must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute
- For a statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted and to construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats
such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law
- Courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish the supposed purpose

DICTIONARIES
- Where a statute does not define the words or phrases used therein, nor does its purpose or the context in which the words or
phrases are employed indicate their meaning, the courts may consult dictionaries, legal, scientific, or general, as aid in
determining the meaning to be assigned to such words or phrases
- Dictionaries generally define words in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptance and significance
- Where the law does not define the words used in a statute and the legislature has not intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words, the Court may adopt the ordinary meaning of the words as defined in the dictionaries

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CONSEQUENCES OF VARIOUS CONSTRUCTIONS
- Inquired into as additional aid to interpretation
- In construing a statute, the objective should always be to arrive at a reasonable and sensible interpretation that is in full accord
with the legislative intent
- As a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will cause injustice or hardship; result in absurdity;
defeat legislative intent or spirit; preclude accomplishment of legislative purpose or object; render certain words or
phrases a surplusage; nullify the statute or make any of its provisions nugatory!

PRESUMPTIONS
- The court may properly rely on presumptions as to legislative intent in order to resolve doubts as to its correct interpretation
- Presumptions are based on logic, experience and common sense, and in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary,
doubts as to the proper and correct construction of a statute will be resolved in favor of that construction which is in accord with
the presumption on the matter
- Presumptions include the presumptions in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, of its completeness, of its prospective
operation, of right and justice, of its effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a whole, as well as those
against inconsistency and implied repeal, unnecessary changes in law, impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship,
inconvenience and ineffectiveness.

B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Where a statute is susceptible of several interpretations or where there is ambiguity in its language, there is no better means of
ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute. The court may take judicial
notice of the origin and history of the statute which it is called upon to construe and apply, and of the facts which affect its derivation,
validity and operation.

The history of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its inception until its enactment into law. Its history proper covers the period and
the steps done from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by the legislature. It includes the President’s message if the
bill is enacted in response thereto, the explanatory note accompanying the bill, committee reports of the legislative
investigations and public hearings on the subject of the bill, the sponsorship speech, the debates and deliberations concerning
the bill, its amendments and changes in phraseology in which it undergoes before final approval thereof.

If the statute is based on, or is a revision of, a prior statute, the latter’s practical application and judicial construction, the various
amendments it underwent, and the contemporary events at the time of its enactment form part of its legislative history. If the statute is
borrowed from, or modelled upon, Anglo-American precedents or other foreign sources, its history includes the history of such precedents,
and for a proper construction of the statute sought to be construed, it is oftentimes essential to review such legislative history and find
authoritative guide for its interpretation from such precedents, their practical application, and the decisions of the courts in construing and
applying such precedents in the country of origin.

PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO LEGISLATURE

- The Constitution provides that the “President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also
appear before it at any other time.”
- President’s address or message usually contains proposed legislative measures
- President’s message indicates his thinking on the proposed legislation which, when enacted into law, follows his line of thinking
on the matter
- Courts may thus refer to the messages of the President to the legislature to determine legislative intent of the statute enacted in
response to the President’s request embodied in such messages

EXPLANATORY NOTE
- Short exposition or explanation, accompanying a proposed legislation by its author or proponent
- It contains statements of the reason or purpose of the bill, as well as arguments advanced by its author in urging its passage
- Example: where the question involved is whether a statute affected or changed an existing law and the explanatory note to the
bill which was eventually enacted into law states that the purpose is simply to secure prompt action on a certain matter by the
officer concerned and not to change the existing law, the statute should be construed to carry out such purpose
- May not be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning that is inconsistent with what is expressed in the text of the statute
- Resorted to only for clarification in case of doubt, and not where there is no ambiguity in the law
- May not be used as justification to read a meaning that does not appear, nor is reflected, in the language of a statute

LEGISLATIVE DEBATES, VIEWS AND DELIBERATIONS

- Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a
statute of doubtful meaning
- Where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning which was put to the provision during the legislative
deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted

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 - However, the views expressed by the legislators during deliberations of a bill as to the bill’s purpose, meaning, or effect are not
controlling in the interpretation of the law, for statements made by assemblymen during floor deliberations do not necessarily
reflect the views of the assembly
- Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ with each other
- And even if the statements of those who spoke reflect the views of the assembly, if the act as passed is plain and clear, then it
has to be given effect as thus enacted and not as the individual members considered it to be
- Opinions and views expressed by the legislators during floor deliberations may not be given weight at all in any of the following
instances:
o where there are circumstances indicating a meaning of a statute other than that expressed by the legislators
o where the views expressed were conflicting
o where the intent deducible from such views is not clear
o where the statute involved is free from ambiguity

REPORTS OF COMMISSIONS
- In the codification of laws, commissions are usually formed to compile and collate all laws on a particular subject and to prepare
the draft of the proposed code
- In construing the provisions of the code as thus enacted, courts may properly refer to the reports of the commission that drafted
the code in aid of clarifying ambiguities therein

PRIOR LAWS FROM WHICH STATUTE IS BASED

- Courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents of the statute involved
- Specially applicable in the interpretation of codes, revised, or compiled statutes, for the prior laws which have been codified,
compiled, or revised will show the legislative history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light on the meaning and scope
of the codified or revised statute

CASE – People v. Manantan

ISSUE: Whether a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition contained in Sec. 54 of the old Revised
Election Code which provides that “no justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate
or exert any influence in any election or take part therein except to vote x x x.” A justice of the peace was prosecuted for violation
of said provision. He claims that Sec. 54 of the Code was taken from Sec. 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
provided: “No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any
candidate x x x” and that when Sec. 54 omitted “justice of the peace,” the omission revealed the intention of the legislature to
exclude justice of the peace from its operation.
HELD: YES. The court held that the word “judge” includes “justice of the peace.” The court said that a “review of the
history of the Revised Election Code will help justify and clarify the above conclusion.”
The court noted that under the first election law, Act 1582, those prohibited from engaging in partisan political
activities were the “judge of the first instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal x x x.” Act 1707, the Administrative Code of
1917, and Act 3387 were substantially of the same tenor. However, Commonwealth Act 357, enacted on Aug. 22, 1938, reads:
“No justice, judge, fiscal x x x,” from which Sec. 54 of the old Revised Election Code was taken. This legislative history shows
that in the two instances when the words “justice of the peace” were omitted in the law, the word “judge” which preceded the
enumeration did not carry qualification of the phrase “of the first instance.” In other words, whenever the word “judge” was
qualified by the phrase “of the first instance,” the words “justice of the peace” would follow; however, if the law simply said
“judge,” the words “justice of the peace” were omitted. This pattern of legislative phraseology indicates that the legislature did
not intend to exclude said officer from the operation of the law and that it considered said officer as comprehended in the generic
and broad term “judge.”

CHANGE IN PHRASEOLOGY BY AMENDMENTS

- Indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had
- In construing the amended provision, courts may investigate the history of the provision to ascertain legislative intent as to the
meaning or scope of the amended law

AMENDMENT BY DELETION
- Amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of
the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been to effect a change
in its meaning
- Where a statute containing a provision prohibiting the doing of certain things is amended by deleting such provision, the
legislative intent is clear that the doing of said things is no longer proscribed in the amended statute

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 CASE – Gloria v. CA
ISSUE: Whether a public officer or employee, who has been preventively suspended pending investigation
of the administrative charges against him, is entitled to his salary and other benefits during such preventive
suspension.
HELD: NO. The court held that Sec. 35 of the old Civil Service Act of 1958 (RA No. 2260) which then provided that if
the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, “she shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension,”
was amended by deleting the provision regarding payment of salaries during suspension, and that said amendment is for the
purpose of disallowing the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. The Court added that this amendment by deletion
should be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

CASE – Buenaseda v. Flavier

ISSUE: What is the proper interpretation of Sec. 24 of RA 6770, which provides in part that the “Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
Investigation”? (It is claimed that under this provision, the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents
in administrative cases who are employed in his office, and not those who are employees in other departments or
offices of the government, in view of the phrase “any officer or employee under his authority.”
HELD: The court held that the power of the Ombudsman extends to other public officers or employees as
well. The Court traced the legislative history of the statute and gave much weight to the deletion of words from the
final version of the law. The Court ruled:
“The origin of the phrase can be traced to Sec. 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt
With preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to ‘suspend any subordinate or
employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation x x x.’
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (RA 2266) which superseded Sec. 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to ‘suspend any subordinate officer or employee, in his bureau
or under his authority.’
However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (PD 805), concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries and the
heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase ‘subordinate officer and employee in his bureau’ was deleted, appropriately leaving
the phrase ‘under his authority.’ Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend ‘any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation x x x.’ (Sec. 41)
xxx
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words ‘subordinate’ and ‘in his bureau,’ leaving the phrase to
read ‘suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation x x x.’ The conclusion that can be deduced
from the deletion of the word ‘subordinate’ before and the words ‘in his bureau’ after ‘officer or employee’ is that the Congress
intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office,
irrespective of whether they are employed ‘in his office’ or in other offices of the government.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE

o The rule that an amendment of a statute indicates a change in meaning from that which the statute originally had
applies only when the deleted words or phrases are not surplusage or when the intention is clear to change the
previous meaning of the old law
o The rule does not apply where the intent, as shown by the history of the enactment, is clear that the amendment
is precisely to plainly express the construction of the act prior to its amendment because its language is not
sufficiently expressive of such construction
o In the revision or codification of statutes, neither alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words in the
latter statute will be held, necessarily, to alter the construction of the former act or acts.
o The court is only warranted in holding the constructions of a statute, when revised, to be changed, where the intent of
the legislature to make such change is clear of construction
o NOTE: Condensation is a necessity in the work of compilation or codification or revision. Very frequently, words which
do not material affect the sense will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the code or revised statute, or that
some general idea will be expressed in brief phrases

ADOPTED STATUTES
- Foreign statutes adopted in this country or from which local laws are patterned form part of the legislative history of this country
- GENERAL RULE: where local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of another country, the decisions of the courts
in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of such local statutes and will generally be
followed if found reasonable and in harmony with justice, public policy and other local statutes on the subject
- The application of the adopted statute should correspond in fundamental points, at least, with its application in the country from
whence it was taken
o REASON: the legislature, in adopting from another country a statute which has previously received judicial construction
in that country, is deemed to have adopted the statute with such construction and practical application in the country of
origin

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 - Some Philippine laws are adopted from, or patterned after, the laws of the United States or of the individual states of the
American union
o Corporation law
o Tax code
o Labor laws
o Naturalization law
o Rules of Court
- Courts have always felt themselves “bound by the rulings of the Supreme Court of the US in construing and applying statutory
enactments modelled upon or borrowed from English or American originals
- THUS, adopted statutes are generally construed in accordance with the construction given similar statutes in the US, unless
special reasons, local customs and practice require otherwise

LIMITATIONS TO THE RULE

o Where the local law and the foreign statute from which the former was patterned differ in some material aspects, where
the foreign construction is clearly erroneous or has not become settled, or where the adopting state has given the
statute its own interpretation, the presumption that the foreign construction was adopted with the adoption of the statute
no longer obtains
o Philippine laws must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its lawmakers and such intention may
be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other legislation related thereto

CASE – Republic of the Philippines v. Meralco

HELD: The court ruled:
“American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive
for no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own
lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related
thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and end-all of all our laws.
And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others. x x x. What is reasonable or unreasonable
depends on a calculus of changing circumstances that ebb and flow with time. Yesterday cannot govern today, no more than
today can determine tomorrow.”

PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW

- Many of the principles of common law have been imported into this jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and
establishment of institutions similar to those of the US
- Courts may thus properly resort to common law principles in construing doubtful provisions of a statute, particularly where such
statute is modelled upon Anglo-American precedents
- However, where there is a conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF ENACTMENT

- In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have taken into account the existing conditions of things at the time of its
enactment
- It is proper, then, in the interpretation of a statute, to consider the physical conditions of the country and the circumstances then
obtaining which must of necessity affect its operation in order to reach an understanding as to the intent of the legislature, or as
to the meaning of the statute
- The court should then place itself in the situation of the legislature and so construe the statute as to give effect to such intent or
meaning

CASE – Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex (Phils.) Inc.

ISSUE: Whether a petroleum concessionaire is entitled to tax exemption even if the crude petroleum it refines is
imported.
HELD: YES. The court ruled: “When the Petroleum Act was passed and the concession was granted to respondent
under its provisions, it was well known that there was then no Philippine crude petroleum available for the use of any refinery in
the Philippines which makes it obvious that Congress could not have intended that before the exemption may be extended to a
concessionaire the latter should only refine crude petroleum produced in the Philippines, for that would defeat the very objectives
of the Act.”

HISTORY OF THE TIMES

- The court may look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the statute was enacted, and interpret
it in the light of the conditions obtaining
- It may be said that in determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the times
out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied,
and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry
- “Law being a manifestation of social culture and progress, must be interpreted taking into consideration the stage of such culture
and progress including all the concomitant circumstances. It must be interpreted by drawing inspiration, not only from the

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 teachings of history, from precedents and traditions, but from inventions of science, discoveries of arts, ideals of thinkers, dreams
of poets, that is, all the sources from which may spring guidance and help to form a truthful idea of the human relations regulated
by the law to be interpreted and applied. x x x.”

C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
Contemporary or practical constructions are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the
executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as by those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are
knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sponsors.

Contemporary or contemporaneous construction is an invaluable aid in the construction, by the courts, or ambiguous or doubtful
provisions of law. Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege – the contemporary construction is strongest in law.

EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION – the construction placed upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called
upon to execute or administer such statute

The duty of enforcing the law, which devolves upon the executive branch of government, necessarily calls for the interpretation of its
ambiguous provisions. Accordingly, executive and administrative officers are generally the very first officials to interpret the law,
preparatory to its enforcement.

These interpretations are in the form of:

o Rules and regulations
o Circulars
o Directives
o Opinions
o Rulings

THREE TYPES OF EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LAW

1. Construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called to implement the law
o May be expressed or implied
o EXPRESSED INTERPRETATION – interpretation embodied in a circular, directive or regulation
o IMPLIED INTERPRETATION – a practice or mode of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain situations or of
applying it in a particular manner; interpretation by usage or practice

2. Construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of the government
o In the form of opinions issued upon request of administrative or executive officials who enforce the law
o The opinions of the Secretary of Justice are generally controlling among administrative and executive officials of the
government, in the absence of judicial ruling on the matter and unless reprobated by the President
o However, the President or the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or
reverse the construction of a statute given by a department secretary

3. Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-
judicial power
o “There is indeed a basis for making such a distinction [between an interpretation by an executive officer charged with
the enforcement of a law and that handed down by an executive official in an adversary proceeding] because the
position of a public officer, charged with the enforcement of a law, is different from the one who must decide a dispute.
If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the case for the side which he represents, upon which lies the responsibility
of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will, at least it may, be surrendered forever, and yet it may be
right. Such rulings need not have the detachment of a judicial, or semi-judicial decision, and may properly carry bias. It
would seem that they should not be authoritative.” (Court ruling in Fishgold v. Sullivan)

WEIGHT ACCORDED TO CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION

- Where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the executive or
administrative officer charged with its enforcement will be adopted, if necessary to resolve the doubt
- Contemporaneous construction is very probably the true expression of the legislative purpose, especially if the construction is
followed for a considerable period of time
- THUS, it is entitled to great weight and respect by the courts in the interpretation of ambiguous provisions of law, and unless it
is shown to be clearly erroneous, contemporaneous construction will control the interpretation of statute by the courts
- In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency, the action of the agency would not be
disturbed by the courts
- “The rationale for the rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and
the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the
accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a

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 particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, the Court stressed that executive officials are
presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to
have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to the
government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and
informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret.” (Court ruling in Nestlé Philippines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals)
- The rule that contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight and respect in the interpretation of a statute is especially
true under the 1973 Constitution, where some ministers or heads of executive ministries or departments are also members of
the Batasang Pambansa. In this situation, it is presumed that the executive official, being a member of the legislature, knew the
legislative intent and reflected that intent in his construction of the law
- The weight given to a contemporaneous construction increases as the period in which it is followed and observed lengthens and
its acceptability widens

CASE – Philippine Sugar Central v. Collector of Customs

ISSUE: Whether the government can legally collect duties “as a charge for wharfage” required by a statute upon all
articles exported through privately-owned wharves.
HELD: YES. It appears that for the last twenty-six years, wharfage duties have been levied and collected even during
period when the government never owned nor operated any wharf. The Court held: “When we consider that the tax levied and
collected by the government before it owned or operated any wharf, and that it has spent millions of pesos in the construction of
wharves in its principal ports of entries x x x the importance of the instant case and its far reaching effect upon the finances of
the government x x x stands out in bold relief and becomes very apparent, and this court is now called upon to overthrow that
long continued construction and in legal effect to hold that, because the sugar was shipped through a privately-owned wharf,
the government is not entitled to collect the money in question ‘as a charge for wharfage.’ The long acquiescence in its
construction and the far reaching effect of such a decision makes it imperative for this court to sustain the law, if there are any
reasonable grounds upon which it can be done. x x x In view of the long continued construction which has been placed upon it
by the government officials, and for which they now continue, the very fact that Congress has not seen fit to repeal or change
the law is a very potent argument in favor of sustaining that construction.”

WEIGHT ACCORDED TO USAGE AND PRACTICE

- Principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a
particular undertaking of it, is frequently of great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been
acquiesced in by all the parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time
o Based on the legal maxim optimus interpres rerum usus – the best interpreter of the law is usage
- Where a statute granted the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office additional regular racing days, at the time of which enactment
the long continuous and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the whole
day, it is safe to conclude that when the legislature chose not to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws
and races would be held, it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing practice and the statute should thus be so construed as
not to change the practice. (Court ruling in Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board)

CONSTRUCTION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

- Rules and regulations issued by the executive and administrative officers pursuant to, and as authorized by law, have the force
and effect of laws
- Interpretation by those charged with their enforcement is entitled to great weight by the court in the court’s construction of such
rules and regulations
- An administrative agency has the power to interpret its own rules and such interpretation becomes part of the rules (Court ruling
in Guekeko v. Araneta)

REASONS WHY CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION IS GIVEN MUCH WEIGHT

- It comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus construed
- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and
purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon
- Factors leading the court to give the principle of contemporaneous construction much weight are the respect due the government
agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed
judgment, and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret
- Moreover, there is the need for certainty and predictability in the law. A statute is enacted. A regulation is issued to implement
it. It will in the normal course of events be years before the construction of the statute will come before the courts. In the
meanwhile, people will go on living and transactions will be concluded under the statute. These circumstances argue in favor of
giving much weight to contemporaneous construction

WHEN CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION DISREGARDED

- The court may disregard contemporaneous construction where:
o there is no ambiguity in the law

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 o the construction is clearly erroneous
o strong reason to the contrary exists
o the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation
- If contemporaneous construction is erroneous, it must be declared null and void
- It is the role of the judiciary to define and when necessary, correct constitutional or statutory interpretation in the context of the
interaction of the three branches of the government

ERRONEOUS CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE CORRECTION NOR CREATE RIGHTS;
EXCEPTIONS
- If through misapprehension of the law an executive or administrative officer called upon to implement it has erroneously applied
and executed it, the error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained
- The doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction of the erroneous construction by the officer himself, by his successor in
office, or by the court in an appropriate case. Nor may a person be properly heard to say that he relied upon such construction
by the executive or administrative officer and that, therefore, the court should not now apply an interpretation at variance
therewith

- An erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no vested right on the part of those who relied upon, and followed, such
construction. A vested right may not arise from a wrong interpretation of a law by an administrative or executive officer whose
primary duty is to enforce, and not to construe, the law. And the government is never estopped by the mistake or error on the
part of its agents.

- Consequently, those who benefited from the erroneous contemporaneous construction may not prevent correction of such
construction, nor excuse themselves from complying with the construction as corrected; nor can they set up such error as legal
obstacle against recovery from them of what they received pursuant to, and on the basis of, the erroneous application of law

- EXCEPTIONS: tax cases, where the interpretative circular addressed to internal revenue officers by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is rendered necessary because the tax statute to be enforced is not too plain and simple to understand and
where, in reliance on such circular, a taxpayer faithfully complied with the obligation of paying the tax required by it. In such a
case, the taxpayer may not be required to pay additional tax during the period that said circular had not been rescinded by a
subsequent circular correcting the erroneous interpretation, for while as a rule the government is never estopped from collecting
taxes because of mistake or error on the part of its agents, the principles of justice and good faith dictate and operate to create
exceptions thereto

LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION
- Legislature is not precluded from indicating its construction of a statute it enacts into law
- It may thus provide in the statute itself an interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules of construction or indicating how
its provisions should be construed
- It may also define terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a previous law, or pass a resolution indicating its
sense or intention as to given statute
- Legislative interpretation may also take the form of an implied acquiescence to, or approval of, an executive or judicial
construction of a statute
- The legislature, however, in indicating its construction of a law, cannot limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution
- Legislative interpretation is entitled to respect, especially if the executive department has similarly construed the statute
- “For the orderly and harmonious interpretation and advancement of the law, the court should, when possible, keep step with the
other departments.”

LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL
- Legislature may, by action or inaction, approve or ratify contemporaneous construction by and administrative or executive officer
- Such approval may be manifest in many ways, as when it –
o reenacts a statute previously given a contemporaneous construction
o uses words similar in their import to the language of an earlier law which has received a practical interpretation
o amends a prior statute without, in the amending act, providing anything which would restrict, change or nullify the
previous contemporaneous construction placed upon the prior law
- There is implied legislative approval by the legislature’s failure to change a long-standing administrative construction.
- It is an axiom of law that ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur – legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate

REENACTMENT
- Most common act of legislative approval of a contemporaneous construction of a statute
- Principle of legislative approval by re-enactment states that the reenactment of a statute, previously given a contemporaneous
construction, is a persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior construction
- The construction of a statute by an executive officer called upon to implement the statute is deemed to have been adopted by
the legislature when it reenacted it in substantially the same language, the presumption being that the legislature knew of such
construction when it made the reenactment

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 - To make the principle of reenactment applicable, the earlier law must have been reenacted and not merely amended, and the
contemporaneous construction thereof must be in the form of regulation to implement the law and duly published and not merely
administrative ruling embodied in a letter to a specified individual and not published
- The contemporaneous construction as approved by the legislature by reenactment is accorded greater weight and respect than
the contemporaneous construction of the statute before its ratification
- It has been held that “where a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted
is reenacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it originally receives, and is regarded as presumptively
the correct interpretation of the law x x x”
- The reason is that there is in this case an agreement between two departments – the executive and the legislative – to the
meaning of the law, and it devolves upon the judiciary to give it a deferential treatment
- The rule does not operate to freeze a meaning which is in evident conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent
- “When a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement
and the legislature thereafter reenacts the provisions without substantial change, such action is to some extent confirmatory that
the ruling carries out the legislative purpose” (Court ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Express)

STARE DECISIS
- Interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court forms part of the statute itself and of the legal system and comes from that
branch of government entrusted with the duty to construe or interpret the law
- Stare decisis et non quieta movere – one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled
/ when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same
- The rule rests on the desirability of having stability in the law
- Once a case has been decided one way, another case involving exactly the same point at issue (or same set of facts) should
be decided in the same manner. The Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying the law in
accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless
upheavals in such interpretations and applications
- Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium – the interest of the State demands that there be an end to litigation
- To invoke stare decisis, a ruling must be direct ruling; that is, must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by the
parties
- The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same. Where
the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare decisis does not apply
- An obiter dictum (an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it) does not fall within the doctrine
- “The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been
followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare
decisis does not and should not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law.”
- Only the Supreme Court itself can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by it; it cannot be done by an inferior court, nor
even by the legislature except when the legislature amends or repeals the law itself

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