1
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 75295 March 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESRAEL AMONDINA, AQUILLO CATAYTAY and
ROMULO AMANTILLO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the trial court is exceedingly long,
without any effort to trim the fat and keep it lean.
Judges are not stenographers transcribing the
testimony of the witnesses word for word. Judges
must know how to synthetize, to summarize, to
simplify. Their failure to do so is one of the main
reasons for the delay in the administration of justice. It
also explains the despair of the public over the foot-
dragging of many courts and their inability to get to
the point and to get there fast.
The 17-page single-spaced decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental convicted Esrael
Amondina, Aquillo Cataytay and Romulo Amantillo of
the murder of Floro Gantalao and sentenced them to
reclusion perpetua and a civil indemnity of
P30,000.00.1 It is now on appeal, but not because of
its inordinate verbosity although this is a valid ground
for distress. The claim is that a proper appreciation of
the evidence, especially of the defense, should have
led the trial judge to a verdict of acquittal.
The killing occurred at twilight of February 23, 1983,
at the townsite of Poblacion, Mabinay, Negros
Oriental.
According to Francisco Tangon, he was pasturing his
carabao at the time and from where be was be saw
the three accused sitting on the side of the road some
36 feet away. He recognized all of them because he
had known Amondina since 1969 and Cataytay and
Amantillo were his neighbors. When Floro Gantalao
arrived, the three men immediately and suddenly
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
attacked him. Amondina swung a pestle at Floro and
hit him in the left jaw, sending him sprawling to the
ground. Cataytay followed suit by hacking Floro with a
long bolo that bloodied and fractured the defenseless
man's head. Amantillo then struck Floro in the nape
with a piece of wood around 2 feet long as the latter
lay wounded and helpless. The three men then fled,
as so did Tangon who ran in the opposite direction
toward his house. But not before he had drawn their
attention and was recognized.2
Tangon said that later that same night, Amondina
came to his house and warned him not to tell anyone
about the incident, otherwise he would be killed.
Nevertheless, when he woke up at 4:00 o'clock the
following morning, he reported the matter to the
police, and he and four other men went to the scene
of the crime at 5:00 a.m. to retrieve Floro's body.
There were already two policemen at the scene,
namely, Jessie Mission and Jomie Moreno. Tangon
testified that he secretly told Moreno what he had
witnessed the night before.3
The victim's wife, Manolita Gantalao, declared on the
stand that on February 23, 1984, at around 6:00 p.m.
she went to the Namangyan river to get their carabao
and on her way home, espied the three accused.
Upon seeing her, they seemed frightened and started
running toward the "hagonoy" bushes. When she
reached home, she waited for her husband who was
supposed to return early because he was going to
work as a watchman at the NAPOCOR tower. It was
later that night that his lifeless body was found by a
search party composed of relatives near the road in
the "hagonoy" bushes, where she had earlier seen
the three accused.4
Jomie Moreno, the policeman who investigated the
killing in the early morning of February 24, 1984, said
that Francisco Tangon approached him then and said
that the killers of Gantalao were Amondina, Cataytay
and Amantillo. Moreno added that having been
1
informed that somebody had seen drops of blood on
the steps of the uninhabited house of Eleuterio
Acosta, he proceeded to that place and found a pestle
with stains of blood, small stones and "hagonoy"
grass sticking to it. Moreno went next to the house of
Aquillo Cataytay, whose wife allowed him to take a
pair of blood-stained pants hanging on a window
beam and one long bolo ("pinuti") which had blood on
its handle and on the point of the blade. Finally, at the
house of Romulo Amantillo, to which he was also
admitted, Moreno recovered a 14-inch machete with
blood stains on its handle.5
The injuries sustained by the victim, as reported by
Dr. Herminio
Garcia,6 who conducted the autopsy, were consistent
with the narration by Tangon of the attack upon
Gantalao by the three accused with their respective
weapons.
The common defense of the three accused was
denial and alibi. Cataytay claimed that on February
23, 1984, he worked on his farm in Barangay
Namangka and went home at around 5:00 p.m.,
staying there until the next morning. He was alone
because his wife was in Bindoy with her mother.7
Amondina testified that on that same date he too
worked on his farm, which is 1 kilometer from
Cataytay's place and 50 yards from the Namangyan
river, and went home at 5:00 p.m. to his wife and
children. He woke up at 4 o'clock the following
morning.8 Amantillo swore that on February 23, 1984,
he was working on his farm, which is 1/2 kilometer
from Cataytay's farm and 100 meters from the
Namangyan river, until 5:00 p.m., when he went back
to his house, staying there until 5:00 o'clock the
following morning with his wife and 7-month old
child.9
The appellants' brief stresses the inconsistency of the
trial court in convicting the accused after casting
much doubt on the prosecution witnesses in its order

dated October 10, 1984. 10 In that order, the trial
judge granted bail on the finding that the evidence of
their guilt was not strong.
The Solicitor General correctly observed:
The resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the
entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on
the merits. The trial court's initial finding that the
evidence of guilt is not strong cannot be treated as an
irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt thereby
ensuring an inevitable acquittal. Otherwise, the merits
of a criminal case will be resolved entirely in the bail
hearing thereby dispensing of the need to proceed
any further. 11
As for the alleged contradictions of Tangon and
Moreno, we find that they are not of such
consequence as to impair the veracity of their
testimonies in their entirety. Moreover, we have held
that contradictions in the testimony of a witness,
instead of suggesting prevarication, may in fact
indicate veracity and bolster the probative value of
such testimony as a whole. 12 The separate
testimonies of witnesses are not required to mesh
with perfect congruence.
The case for the prosecution could not have been any
stronger than if the deceased himself testified. The
prosecution presented an impartial eyewitness who
saw and described with detail the killing of the
deceased. It presented the investigating officer whose
investigation yielded physical and testimonial
evidence that corroborated the eyewitness account. It
presented the widow of the deceased whose
testimony corroborated that of the eyewitness and
provided factual basis for inferring plausible motives.
The fact that she is the widow of the victim does not
ipso facto make her a biased witness. (People v.
Urgel, 134 SCRA 483) The results of the examination
conducted by the investigating medico-legal physician
supports the version of the eyewitness as to the
manner with which the victim was killed. The evidence
adduced by the prosecution satisfies the standard of
moral certainty for conviction in criminal cases. 13
We also approve the finding of a conspiracy among
the three accused based on the concert of their acts
obviously aimed at the common purpose of killing
Floro. As conspirators, they are all equally liable for
the victim's death, whoever of them actually dealt the
lethal blow.
2
Evident premeditation is likewise not present in this
case because it has not been shown that the three
accused purposely waited for the deceased in order
to kill him. The prosecution has not established the
elements of evident premeditation, to wit: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the offense;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval
of time between that determination and the execution
of the offense. 15
We are satisfied that the guilt of the accused-
appellants in the murder of Floro Gantilao has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt and that they are
justly punished with reclusion perpetua and all its
accessory penalties. However, we shall increase the
civil indemnity, for which all three accused-appellants
are solidarily liable, to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
judgment of the trial court as above modified is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-
appellants. It is so ordered.
Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the
identity of the assailant, but not when the accused
has been positively identified, as in the case before
us. It is worth noting that, according to the victim's
wife, there had earlier been a heated argument
between Floro and Amondina over the sharing of a
harvest. Her husband had suspected Cataytay of
stealing his chickens. Amantillo on the other hand, is
the uncle of Cataytay. These might have been the
reasons for the resentment of the accused against
Floro, and their ganging up on him that night.
We fully agree with the following observation of the
Solicitor General in calling for the affirmation of the
challenged judgment:
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
The killing was qualified by treachery because of the
sudden and consecutive attacks made by the three
accused which were calculated to insure its execution
without risk to them arising from the defense the
victim might make. Treachery absorbs the
circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed
men, 14 which should not have been separately
considered by the trial court.
Scoffing at the corpse has not been proved. There is
no showing that the victim was already dead when
Amantillo struck him with the piece of wood after the
attack by Amondina and Cataytay. This conclusion is
not supported by the autopsy report or the testimonies
of the other prosecution witnesses.
2

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-36443. March 8, 1984.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. CERILO DE LEON, Accused-
Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Luciano M. Maggay for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESS; TESTIMONY OF STATE WITNESS NOT
NECESSARILY INCOMPETENT; CASE AT BAR. —
Although the testimony of the accused as a state
witness comes from a polluted source, it does not
follow that it is not admissible and competent. What
has to be done is scrutinize it carefully which the trial
court did in this case. The trial court found the
testimony sufficiently reasonable. It should also be
stated that the said testimony is partly corroborated
by that of another witness.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, ACCORDED
RESPECT ON APPEAL. — The inculpatory and
incriminatory evidence given by Jose Arandia and
Edmundo Dualan prevail over the denial of the
appellant that he had nothing to do with the
asportation and death of Raul Odiamar? The trial
court concluded that Arandia and Dualan were more
credible and We have no reason to disturb its
conclusion for it was in a position to ascertain which
of the witnesses were more credible. This policy of
appellate courts is axiomatic and is based on sound
considerations.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This case is similar to the Lindberg case where the
incident took place in Hopewell, New Jersey, the
Garden State, many, many years ago. It is about a
boy of tender years who was kidnapped for ransom
and then killed. In the cold and legalese words of the
information which was filed in Criminal Case No. 198
of the defunct Court of First Instance of Camarines
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Sur, the crime was said to have been committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about and within the period embraced
from September 2, 1970 up to and including
September 10, 1970, in the City of Naga, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent and/or for the
purpose of extorting ransom, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, being all private individuals, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and illegally take and kidnap
one RAUL ODIAMAR Y VENERACION, a 7-year old
son of the herein complaining witness, SAMUEL
ODIAMAR Y FLORECE, and the above accused,
once in custody of said minor child, did, then and
there ask and demand from the father ransom in the
amount of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and for
which only the sum of P1,000.00 was given by the
complainant to the herein accused and then the latter,
Accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength and by
employing means to insure or afford impunity, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
unmercifully hack the right knee and bash the head of
the child RAUL ODIAMAR Y VENERACION, thereby
said accused causing the inflicting fatal and mortal
wounds on the vital parts of the body of the said
victim causing the instantaneous death of the latter."
(Expediente, p. 132.)
The "above-named accused" were: CERILO DE
LEON, ARMANDO REMO, ANGEL VALENCIA,
DOMINGO VALENCIA, FRANCISCO JESALVA,
JOSE ARANDIA and BERNARDO FIEJOO who all
pleaded not guilty.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution moved for
the discharge of JOSE ARANDIA so that he could be
utilized as a state witness. The motion was granted.
3
3
The prosecution presented twenty-one (21)
witnesses; the defense had a total of twenty-five (25)
witnesses. The transcript is so bulky that it is more
convenient to reckon it by weight rather than by the
number of pages.
The decision of the trial court is equally weighty for it
consists of 222 pages and the reason is not difficult to
perceive — it contains unnecessary details which did
not improve its quality, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At about 4:00 o’clock of the same day, September 2,
1970, Cerilo de Leon borrowed from Graciano Badilla
the Cony (Exhibit H-2) telling the latter that he had a
date. Graciano Badilla gave him the Cony and the
accused Cerilo de Leon drove the Cony himself and
proceeded along Peñafrancia Avenue and on passing
in front of the Alatco station Cerilo de Leon saw Jose
Arandia. The former called the latter and asked him to
accompany him, Cerilo de Leon, being the "bilas" of
Graciano Badilla, owner of the Cony he permanently
drives everyday, and having been once his chief in
the Saldaña Lines when Cerilo de Leon acted as its
Manager while its owner, Mr. Saldaña was on a
honeymoon, readily acceded and went, sitting himself
beside De Leon in the front seat of the Cony. De Leon
continued driving the Cony himself and they
proceeded along Peñafrancia Avenue towards the
North. On reaching Santonja Street they turned left
and upon reaching Elias Angeles Street they turned
right towards the junction of Bagumbayan and Elias
Angeles Streets and turned left again to Ateneo
Avenue. On reaching the gate of the Naga Parochial
School along Ateneo Avenue, Cerilo stopped and
parked the Cony in front of the gate, and alighted
therefrom, telling Arandia to wait for him as he will just
fetch somebody." (Idem, pp. 1037-1038.)
The decision could have simply stated that Cerilo
borrowed a Cony automobile from Graciano and while
driving it he met Jose, a former driver of Saldaña
Lines which he managed for a short time and together

they went to the Naga Parochial School. The
excruciating details especially the left and right turns
clutter the decision and distract one’s attention. At any
rate, REMO, the VALENCIA’s, JESALVA and FIEJOO
were acquitted "for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt." CERILO DE LEON was found guilty and
sentenced to death and ordered "to indemnify the
heirs of Raul Veneracion Odiamar the sum of Twelve
Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos; to pay Samuel
Odiamar the sum of P920.00 part of the ransom
money received by the accused, Cerilo de Leon; and
to pay the proportionate part of the costs in this case."
(Idem, pp. 1250-1251.).
The People’s counterstatement of facts is an edited
version of the lengthy statement of the trial court as
follows:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"Samuel Odiamar and Luz Veneracion are husband
and wife with several children, the eldest among them
being Raul who at the time of the incident on
September 2, 1970 was almost eight years old (Exh.
A). Samuel Odiamar, the father of Raul was formerly
employed as Cashier at the Bicol Savings and Loan
Association, BISALA for short, in Naga City. Among
his friends and co-employees were the accused
Cerilo de Leon, Armando Remo, Loan Officer of
BISALA, Angel Valencia and Bernardo Fiejoo who
were all holding responsible positions in said banking
institution, except Bernardo Fiejoo who was a security
guard. The accused, together with Samuel Odiamar,
as a form of relaxation, used to indulge in gambling
among themselves. The accused Francisco Jesalva is
an employee of the Provincial Treasurer’s Office of
the province of Camarines Sur. Domingo Valencia is
a younger brother of Angel Valencia.
"On January 5, 1970, Samuel Odiamar resigned as
cashier. He intended to transfer to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. While thus employed, he continued
to join the gambling sessions. As luck had it, Samuel
Odiamar seemed to have always won in these
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
gambling sessions and the accused Cerilo de Leon
and Francisco Jesalva were often the heavy losers.
Consequently, Cerilo de Leon incurred indebtedness
to Samuel Odiamar. Checks issued in payment of his
gambling losses to Samuel Odiamar bounced or were
dishonored by the bank upon which they were drawn.
(Vol. I, pp. 119-121, t.s.n.).
"With this factual setting, Samuel Odiamar’s eldest
son, Raul, who was then studying at the Naga
Parochial School in Naga City did not return from
school in the afternoon of September 2, 1970. Why
Raul did not return from school is supplied by the
testimony of former accused Jose Arandia, now state
witness.
"Jose Arandia was a driver of a vehicle, commonly
called "Cony" (Exh. H-2), owned and operated by
Graciano Badilla, the brother-in-law (bilas) of
appellant Cerilo de Leon. On September 2, 1970 Jose
Arandia, after driving the Cony since early in the
evening of the preceding night, returned the Cony to
its garage at noon of September 2, 1970 (Vol. III, p. 5,
t.s.n.). At about 4:00 o’clock of the same day,
September 2, 1970, appellant Cerilo del Leon
borrowed the Cony from Graciano Badilla as he had a
date. Graciano lent him the Cony and the appellant
drove it away. While passing in front of the Alatco
Station, the appellant saw Jose Arandia. Appellant
Cerilo de Leon called Arandia and asked the latter to
accompany him. Jose Arandia readily acceded as
appellant Cerilo de Leon was the brother-in-law (bilas)
of Badilla, owner and operator of the Cony.
"The two proceeded to Ateneo Avenue. On reaching
the gate of the Naga Parochial School appellant
Cerilo de Leon stopped and parked the Cony in front
of the gate. He alighted telling Arandia to wait for him
as he will just fetch somebody. Five minutes later, the
appellant returned, this time with a child about four (4)
feet tall, wearing white T-shirt, with letters NPS on the
breast of the T-shirt which stand for Naga Parochial
4
4
School, Khaki short pants, white socks and black
shoes with a school bag slung on his shoulders.
Arandia was instructed to drive the Cony and told that
they will conduct the boy to his house at San Agustin,
Canaman, Camarines Sur, as it was then raining at
the time. On passing the Philippine Constabulary
check-point along the road in Paras, Canaman, the
boy remarked that they had already passed their
house in San Agustin, but appellant Cerilo de Leon
told the boy not to mind it because they will just go to
Calabanga to get something and he would be taken
home on their return. Upon reaching Calabanga, they
turned right to the road going to Tinambac. On
reaching Ratay Bridge, the appellant alighted and
went to the back of the Cony. He covered the
vehicle’s plate number with a cardboard similar in size
to the plate of the Cony, but bearing a different
number. He then went to the front and did the same,
after which, Jose Arandia was told to proceed, which
the latter did. Fifty meters away from the National
Road on the road to Camuning, Jose Arandia was
told to stop and to alight from the Cony. He was
instructed to wait until the appellant and the child
returned, because they would get something from
Camuning. Arandia did as he was told. He alighted
from the Cony and appellant drove it himself (Vol. 11,
pp. 23-24, t.s.n.
"What transpired in Camuning after Arandia was left
behind is supplied by the testimony of prosecution
witness Edmundo Dualan, a worker in the coconut
plantation of Felix Gutierrez, uncle of the Appellant.
"When the appellant arrived at Camuning in the
coconut plantation of his uncle, Felix Gutierrez, he
parked the Cony near the latter’s house and
approached Edmundo Dualan and Luisa Saminiano
who were in the copra shed. Cerilo told them that he
wanted to have some young coconuts. The house of
Felix Gutierrez where the Cony was parked is about
100 meters from the copra shed. The child seated
himself on a piece of wood and the appellant did the

same. It was at this time that Felix Gutierrez arrived
from Naga City. Edmundo Dualan told him that the
appellant was asking for young coconuts. (Vol. II, p.
150, t.s.n.) After being permitted by Felix Gutierrez to
get some young coconuts for the appellant, Edmundo
Dualan went to his house to get a "kawit" or scythe
with which to get the young coconuts. When he went
back to the copra shed, he told his companion and
helper, Luis Saminiano, to gather young coconuts,
and while Saminiano was gathering young coconuts,
he stayed at the copra shed because it was raining.
After the young coconuts were gathered by
Saminiano, they tied them together in pairs. The
appellant then instructed the two to load the young
coconuts in the Cony. After loading them at the rear
compartment of the vehicle, Saminiano and Dualan
went back to the copra shed. When they returned,
they found the appellant alone in the copra shed. (Vol.
II, p. 154, t.s.n.) At first Dualan was unmindful of the
child whom he thought had been sent on an errand.
The appellant asked Dualan to get a spoon which he
would use in eating young coconuts. Dualan went to
the house nearest the copra shed and borrowed a
spoon. When he returned to the copra shed and as he
handed the spoon to the appellant, Dualan saw the
child in the pit (Vol. II, p. 155, t.s.n.) which was about
3 meters deep, more or less. This pit is the place
where a fire is kindled in order to dry copra. (Vol. II, p.
156, t.s.n.). When Dualan saw the boy, he (boy) had
his hands raised, waving, and uttering words which
Dualan could not understand. Upon seeing the boy in
that condition, Dualan told the appellant that the child
fell into the pit, so Luis Saminiano also ran and he
and Dualan together pulled the boy out of the pit.
Appellant was just about ‘isang dipa’ from the pit and
he merely said ‘siyanga pala nahulog ang kasama
ko’. (Vol. II, p. 158, t.s.n) Immediately after Dualan
and Saminiano had pulled the boy out of the pit, the
boy told the appellant ‘I will report you to my father for
having pushed me into the pit.’ (Vol. II, p. 160, t.s.n.);
the boy had a bleeding wound on his forehead.
According to Dualan, the child companion of the
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
appellant was 8 years old, wearing white T-shirt, khaki
short pants, white pair of socks and black pair of
shoes. (Vol. 11, p. 144, t.s.n.) Appellant did not
answer the boy’s statement that he would report to his
father. The appellant keep silent so, Dualan
suggested to the appellant that he should bring the
boy to a doctor, and appellant promised to do so.
Appellant warned Dualan not to tell Felix Gutierrez
what had happened. The appellant decided to leave
and Dualan assisted the child in going back to the
Cony. With appellant at the wheels of the Cony, they
started on their way back.
"As the appellant and the child were approaching the
place where Jose Arandia had been left behind, the
latter observed that the plate number at the front of
the Cony was also changed. The plate number was
already 20-9. (Vol. II, pp. 20-21, t.s.n.). Appellant
stopped the Cony and asked Arandia to drive the
Cony again so that from then on, the latter drove the
Cony with the child seated in between him and the
appellant in the front seat. (Vol. III, p. 25, t.s.n.). Jose
Arandia noticed that the T-shirt of the child had blood
stains and there was a wound on his forehead.
Arandia inquired as to what happened to the child, but
both the appellant and the child remained silent. On
reaching Ratay Bridge, Jose Arandia was told to stop
the Cony. Appellant alighted, went to the back of the
Cony and removed the cardboard which he had
placed to cover the true plate number of the Cony. He
then went to the front and did the same, after which
he threw the two pieces of cardboard down the bridge
into the river. (Vol. III, p. 26, t.s.n.). Appellant returned
to the Cony and urged Arandia to move on towards
Naga. On passing the Municipality of Bombon, but
before reaching Magaras on the way to Naga, the
appellant put a handkerchief into the boy’s mouth to
gag him. Arandia stopped the Cony in order to help
the appellant gag the boy (Vol. III, p. 27, t.s.n), and
tied the handkerchief at the back of the head of the
child. (Vol. III, p. 28, t.s.n.). While the appellant was
holding the boy with his right hand he, at the same
5
5
time, pressed the child with his left shoulder to Jose
Arandia. (Vol. III, p. 29, t.s.n.). After this, the appellant
told Arandia to move on, so he started the Cony and
proceeded towards the direction of Naga City. On the
way, appellant pushed the child in front to the floor of
the Cony, obviously to hide the child from being seen
from the outside. While the boy was thus in a crawling
position in front of the floor of the Cony, the appellant
had his two legs above the child while his feet were
resting on the front compartment of the Cony. At the
same time, the appellant was holding the back portion
of the T-shirt of the child with his right hand. (Vol. III,
p. 31, t.s.n.). On reaching the corner of Libaton and
Bagumbayan streets, the appellant ordered Arandia
to turn left and go to Pacol. On reaching the place
past the house of Judge Palacio, Arandia was
ordered to turn back to direction of Naga City, which
he did. At this instance, appellant took direction of
Naga City, which he did. At this instance, appellant
took the school bag of the child (Exh. I) from behind
the front seat (Vol. III, p. 32, t.s.n.) and threw it on the
right side of the road going to Naga. Then they
proceeded on their way. On reaching Libaton street
again, they turned right and then turned left at
Bagumbayan. On reaching P. Burgos street near the
Holiday Hotel they turned right towards Igualdad
street, and then turned left. On reaching Abella street,
the appellant told Arandia ‘we are going to
Camaligon, Joe’, so the latter turned right on Abella
street. While they were in front of the Alatco
compound at Abella street, a jeep overtook them, and
as the light of the Cony hit the rear portion of the jeep,
the appellant waved his hand signaling to Domingo
and Angel Valencia who were seated at the rear
portion of the jeep.
"On reaching the crossing leading to the River Control
Office in Camaligan, Arandia stopped the Cony, but
appellant told him ‘it is not there Joe, it is further
ahead’. He backed the car and drove further ahead,
and on reaching the crossing leading to the De
Guzman compound, Jose Arandia saw Domingo and

Angel Valencia 30 meters from the crossing. He
stopped the Cony near the two and switched off the
light upon instruction of the appellant. Before the
appellant alighted from the Cony, he told Arandia to
return the vehicle. Appellant then opened the door
and alighted from the Cony and as he was getting his
artificial arm from the vehicle’s compartment, the child
tried to escape and run towards the front of the Cony.
(Vol. III, p. 36, t.s.n.) But Domingo Valencia caught
the left arm of the child while Angel Valencia caught
his right arm. Appellant ran towards them and hit the
child with his artificial arm, hitting him on the head at a
point 2 inches above his neck and the child quivered.
The appellant exclaimed, ‘it is better to finish off the
child because if we let him loose alive, he knows all of
us’. (Vol. III, p. 37, t.s.n.) On hearing this, Arandia
drove away the Cony and saw Angel Valencia and
Domingo Valencia carrying the child, with Domingo
Valencia holding the child by his armpits and Angel
Valencia holding the two legs of the child, towards the
inside of the De Guzman Compound. (Vol. II, pp. 36-
38, t.s.n.).
"In the meanwhile, when Raul Odiamar failed to return
from school his mother became worried. She went to
the town of Lagonoy that same evening to notify her
husband, Samuel Odiamar, who was then in that
town, that their child, Raul was missing. Arriving that
same evening in Naga City, they searched for Raul
going to the police precinct and then to the hospital.
Mrs. Odiamar made a public appeal on the radio
about her missing son. All these brought negative
results. The search for Raul continued the following
morning, September 3, 1970. About 9:00 o’clock that
morning the spouses Samuel and Luz Odiamar met
and stopped the accused Angel Valencia and
Armando Remo. It was then that the Odiamars were
informed by Angel Valencia of a ransom note
contained in an envelope which Angel Valencia earlier
delivered to the house of the Odiamars in San
Agustin, Canaman. It appears that earlier that
morning, the letter which subsequently was found to
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
contain a ransom note, and addressed to ‘Mr. Samuel
Odiamar, Cashier, Bicol Savings and Loan
Association, Naga City’ was found by the accused
Bernardo Fiejoo inside the Office of the Bicol Savings
and Loan Association (BISALA). Likewise, it appears
that when Angel Valencia brought the letter to the
house of Samuel Odiamar, the latter and his wife
were not there and that the letter was opened, upon
the insistence of accused Armando Remo in the
presence of Mrs. Rosario Llaguno Veneracion,
mother of Mrs. Odiamar. Samuel Odiamar read the
letter. A copy of the letter was subsequently made,
which copy was brought to the Headquarters of the
Philippine Constabulary. A photostat copy is attached
to the records of this case as Exhibit C and reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘YOUR GOOD BOY IS IN GOOD HANDS. DON’T
WORRY.
‘You are our number 5 client here in Camarines Sur,
we expect the same full cooperation from your man.
‘INSTRUCTIONS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘(a) We demand P20,000.00 Pesos all in P20.00
denominations in exchange for the life of your boy.
‘(b) Wrap the money properly in a newspaper, place
inside a 5 centavo plastic bag, then wrap in a
newspaper again.
‘(c) At about 10:00 to 10:15 P.M. a CONY will park in
front of HOLIDAY HOTEL. Instruct the driver to bring
you to NORDIA, our car will follow you at a distance.
Place the money under the seat of the cony rear
portion so we can see you from behind DON’T give
any further instruction to the driver it might prejudiced
you.
‘(d) WEAR white long sleeves shirt during that day
SEPTEMBER 4, 1970. It’s the date 10:00 to 10:15
6
6
P.M. in front of the HOLIDAY HOTEL. After we
inspect the money which we shall get from under the
CONY back seat someone will approach you inside
the NORDIA club and will give you instructions where
you will get your boy.
‘SHOULD YOU FAIL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘(a) We will send you back your boy in two equal
installments
‘(b) Our food supply for your boy is good only until
September 4 we cannot afford to be staying long.
‘SHOULD YOU HIRE PERSONAL SPIES OR
‘SHOULD YOU REPORT TO ANY
AUTHORITY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘(a) We will surely know it, by then we lost nothing.
While you might lost the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘(1) The money intended for us (If in case the spies or
authorities are tempted. We have had that experience
so many times before, we would like to inform you in
advance so you won’t commit the same error.).
‘SHOULD SOMETHING UNEXPECTED
HAPPEN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘OUR GROUP IS A SYNDICATE, WE WERE IN THIS
BUSINESS FOR ALMOST 12 YEARS NOW YOU
HAD BEEN OUR TARGET SINCE 1968. BETTER BE
COOPERATIVE.
NOTE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Return this letter together with the money. It’s part of
the bargain. Good Luck . . .’

"While Samuel Odiamar was reading the ransom
note, Angel Valencia was present and a little while
later Remo arrived and took Samuel Odiamar to the
kitchen. Samuel told Remo to go to his sister Linda
Odiamar and to inform Judge Llaguno. The
government authorities were likewise informed about
the ransom note. Col. Igual, the PC Provincial
Commander in Camarines Sur called for a secret
conference at Lindez Hotel and among those who
attended were Remo, Angel Valencia and Mr. and
Mrs. Samuel Odiamar. In the conference, it was
reported by Col. Igual that he had talked with a
manager of a bank who would lend the amount of
P20,000.00 in mutilated bills which will be used in
paying the ransom money.
"The following day, September 4, 1970, Samuel
Odiamar was informed that there was a change of
plan as the P20,000.00 mutilated bills would not be
available. Another conference was held at the
Complex Services in the office of Alfonso Ocampo. In
this conference, it was agreed that only P1,000.00
would be paid initially but the same would be
accompanied with a letter of appeal.
"In the meanwhile, still on September 3, 1970, at
about 6:00 o’clock p.m., Jose Arandia plied his route,
driving again the same Cony (Exh. H.). About 9:00
o’clock p.m. that same day, the appellant rode in his
Cony and told him ‘you beware of imparting to the
authority because the eyes of my companions are
focused on you. Lest the members of your family may
be in danger’. Arandia just answered ‘no’. After going
around the poblacion of Naga City and on reaching
the Holiday Hotel the appellant disembarked while
Arandia continued to ply his trade. (Vol. III, pp. 43-44,
t.s.n.).
"The following day September 4, 1970, Jose Arandia
drove the Cony and again plied his trade starting at
6:00 o’clock p.m. (Vol. III, p. 44, t.s.n) At about 7:00
o’clock p.m. that night while driving near the Holiday
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Hotel he was called by the appellant. (Vol. III, p. 44,
t.s.n.) Appellant was then near the monument of the
15 martyrs in front of the Holiday Hotel. After having
parked the Cony in front of the Holiday Hotel the
appellant approached Arandia and told him, he
(appellant) would like to hire the car ‘. . . I will just be
the one to drive it’. Arandia told the appellant that he
could not give the Cony to him because it was given
to him by Baby (Graciano Badilla); however, he told
the appellant that if the latter needed the car to just let
him know and he would drive it. It was then that the
appellant told Arandia to park his Cony at 9:00 o’clock
p.m. near the plaza of the 15 martyrs because he
would need it (Vol. III, p. 45, t.s.n.) So, Arandia
continued plying his route and about 9:00 o’clock
p.m., more or less, he parked the Cony near the 15
martyrs monument in front of the Holiday Hotel as per
instructions by the appellant. There, a male
passenger boarded the Cony. (Vol. III, p. 46, t.s.n.)
He was wearing a white shirt with long sleeves, and
colored pants. (Vol. III, p. 47, t.s.n.) On instruction of
the passenger, Arandia took him to Nordia near the
cocktail lounge where his passenger disembarked
and paid him P1.00. This passenger was Samuel
Odiamar. (Vol. III, p. 47, t.s.n.) Arandia returned to the
Center and parked near the Holiday Hotel near the 15
martyrs when another passenger boarded his Cony
going to Nordia. He brought him there and returned
immediately to the centre (Vol. III, p. 48, t.s.n.), where
he parked his Cony in front of the Holiday Hotel. He
alighted and talked with other drivers who were then
around, and while thus engaged in conversation with
the other drivers, he saw something wrapped on the
floor of his Cony on the right side near the rear seat.
(Vol. III, p. 49, t.s.n.) He took the wrapped item, put it
behind the driver’s seat in front, and told the drivers
with whom he was talking that he would first take
coffee. Arandia went to Concepcion Pequiña, to the
Flying A Gasoline station and had his Cony placed on
the wash rack. (Vol. III, p. 50, t.s.n. He took the
wrapped bundle, opened it and found money in
P20.00 bills and two envelopes inside a plastic bag.
7
7
He placed the two envelopes back inside the plastic
bag together with the paper wrapping and threw it on
the other side of the concrete wall. The money, he
placed under the upholstery of the front seat. (Vol. III,
p. 51, t.s.n.) He continued plying his route. (Vol. III, p.
52, t.s.n.).
"At around 5:30 A.M. of September 5, 1970, Arandia
returned the Cony to the garage and went to
Tinambacan, returning to Naga about 6:30 p.m. of the
same day. (Vol. III, p. 72, t.s.n.) Arriving in his house
that evening, he was told by his wife that the appellant
went to their house demanding the P5.00 Arandia
allegedly owed appellant. Shortly after Arandia
finished eating his meal that evening, Graciano
Badilla arrived and informed him that the Cony was
out of order and was at the Flying A Gasoline station.
Arandia repaired the Cony and he and Graciano
Badilla went together in the vehicle to the centre. (Vol.
III, p. 75, t.s.n.) On reaching near the Alex Theater,
Arandia alighted and went to the police precinct
because Badilla told him that the police were looking
for him. He was investigated by Pat. Oliva regarding
the alleged missing money. There was no mention as
to who owned the money. After the investigation,
Arandia went home. (Vol. III, p. 74, t.s.n.).
"About noon of September 6, 1970, Arandia brought
the Cony to the garage after plying his trade (Vol. III,
p. 75, t.s.n) from 6:00 o’clock A.M. that day. While he
was in the garage, the appellant arrived perspiring
and Arandia asked him immediately what was that
P5.00 he was demanding from his wife. Appellant told
him that was only an alibi because he had important
matters to talk with Arandia. The appellant then
invited Arandia to the Cony (Vol. III, p. 76, t.s.n)
where they seated themselves facing each other. The
appellant told Arandia, ‘Joe, I have here a letter,
please read it carefully’. Arandia took the letter from
appellant (Vol. III, p. 77, t.s.n.) read it; after which,
appellant took it back. (Vol. III, p. 78, t.s.n.) The letter
was inside an envelope, already opened and

addressed to Jose Tukang, care of Cerilo de Leon
(appellant). Jose Tukang is Jose Arandia himself; that
is his alias, his "bansag." (Vol. III, p. 79, t.s.n.) The
letter as recollected by Arandia on the witness stand
was as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Dear Tukang, there was money purposely left in your
car which you accidentally found. That money
belongs to the syndicate. So that within twenty-four
hours you deliver the money. Tonight you should
enter the Bichara Theater in the Balcony. And sit
yourself on the seat where there are nobody sitting
beside you. After leaving the money you leave the
place after five minutes because there will be two
persons tom take it. If the money is no longer in your
possession or that you had given it to somebody it is
your worry you will be dead at 12:00 Mafia’ (Vol. III, p.
80 t.s.n. Brasal).’
Arandia told the appellant that he had not found the
money. But the appellant answered ‘that is your
problem already’. Then the appellant told Arandia to
take him home which Arandia did. Arandia took him to
the Bello building and brought the Cony back to the
garage. This conversation inside the Cony lasted for
sometime. According to Zenaida Badilla, sister-in-law
of the appellant and wife of Graciano Badilla, they
talked that time inside the Cony for more or less two
hours. (Vol. III, pp. 409-410, t.s.n.) After having
conducted the appellant to the Bello Building, Arandia
brought the Cony back to the garage. (Vol. II, p. 81,
t.s.n.) He was bothered about what the appellant had
told him and because of the letter shown to him. He
was wondering what to do. He decided to get the
money from under the driver’s seat of the Cony, took
three P20.00 bills therefrom, and walked towards the
centre (Vol. III p. 82 t.s.n.) to look for the appellant
near the place where the latter had alighted. He saw
Remo near the corner of the BISALA. (Vol. III, p. 83,
t.s.n.) When the appellant was leaving the Bello
Building, Arandia approached him and stated ‘Ciloy,
there is the money’. Arandia also told him, the money
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
was only P950.00 because he (Arandia) spent part of
it. (Vol. III, p.84, t.s.n.). Appellant promise to take care
of the matter and told Arandia that it was necessary
for the latter to leave. Arandia told the appellant that
he could not leave because he had no money. (Vol.
III, p. 85, t.s.n.) Thereupon, appellant gave P250.00
for expenses, taken from the money Arandia had just
given him. Arandia was about to leave when the
appellant inquired where the wrappers of the money
were, and Arandia stated he threw them over the
bridge. Appellant approved the action by saying
‘good’ (Vol. III, p. 86, t.s.n.) and left. Arandia
proceeded to the supermarket (Vol. III, p. 87, t.s.n.) to
the meeting of the drivers. At the meeting, he was
confused and restless, troubled whether to leave or
not to leave.)Vol. III, p. 88, t.s.n.) Arandia went to the
Magdalena apartment at Panganiban Street where his
wife was then working and told her that he was
leaving. He went to Tinambac (Vol. III, p. 29, t.s.n.)
and told his brother that the latter should take care of
his family because he would be leaving, and he left
for Manila.
"In the morning of September 10, 1970, the Naga City
Police Department received a report that the dead
body of a child was found along the irrigation ditch at
Pacol within the vicinity of the residence of Ex-Vice
Governor Odiamar. (Vol. VI, p. 98, t.s.n.) Upon receipt
of this report, Police Major Rey, together with the City
Health Officer, Dr. Theo Santy, some Fiscals and
some members of the Police Department went to
Pacol. The dead body was examined by Dr. Santy in
the presence of Fiscal Vargas, Fiscal Rodriguez, and
members of the police department. The body was
brought to the morgue of the Camarines Provincial
Hospital for autopsy at about 8:30 to 9:30 A.M. of
September 10, 1970. (Vol. VI, p. 99, t.s.n.) When the
body of the dead child was already in the morgue,
Major Rey of the Detective Bureau directed one of his
men to get members of the Odiamar family,
particularly Samuel and his wife, for the purpose of
letting them view the body of the dead child and
8
8
determine whether it was the body of their missing
son, Raul Odiamar. Upon arriving at the morgue,
Samuel Odiamar looked at the body and kept on
tapping it while crying aloud, saying ‘Raul, Raul, my
son’. He identified the shoes, the khaki pants worn by
the dead boy and the pieces of rubber bands. (Vol. VI,
p. 100, t.s.n.) In the morgue of the Camarines Sur
Provincial Hospital, the body of Raul Odiamar was
examined and autopsied by Dr. Theo Jame Santy,
City Health Officer of Naga and Deputy NBI Medico-
Legal Officer, Bicol Region District Office, and Dr.
Juan Dialago, Medico-Legal Officer for the province of
Camarines Sur. A necropsy report was made by them
(Exh. S, p. 21, rec.) and according to the post-mortem
findings, the body was 48.5 inches high.
‘Cadaver in the advanced stage of decomposition.
‘Hair all ruptured.
‘Hair already peeled off.
‘Traces of blood from the left ear.
‘Purplish discoloration of the face, body and
extremities.
‘Abrasions, geographic, in different parts of the body
probably resulting from bites of marine scavengers
and other insects.
‘WOUND; incised gaping, 5.0 x 6.0 inches, knee,
right, cutting the tendon of the flaxer muscles of the
right leg.
‘Sutured fructure, square-temporal bone, left
extending to the occipital bone.
‘Tearing of the menenges just beneath the left square
temporal-bone.

‘Cerebral hemorrhages, subdural, traumatic,
temporal, left.
‘CAUSE OF DEATH:.
‘Sutural fracture square-temporal bone, left, with
centrecoup.
‘Injury of the right square-temporal bone; Cerebral
hemorrhage.
‘Subdural, traumatic, temporal. left.
"Now let us go back to Jose Arandia. when Jose
Arandia left Naga on September 6, 1970 (Vol. III, p.
389, t.s.n.) he went to Cavite City via Camarines
Norte and Pasay City. (Vol. III, pp. 248-250, t.s.n.) By
September 11, 1970, he was already in cavity. (Vol.
III, p. 249, t.s.n.) While in Cavite City, Jose Arandia
was fetched by Naga City Police Detectives Blando
and Tuazon and brought to Naga City on September
25, 1970 where he was investigated. (Vol. III, pp. 6,
252-253, t.s.n.) He executed an affidavit (Exh, V)
implicating the appellant. The contents of said
affidavit were reiterated by him on the witness stand.
(Vol. II, pp. 2-90, Vol. III, pp. 1-16, t.s.n.)
"On October 6, 1970, Amparo Ibasco, wife of Jose
Arandia, upon arrival from Cavite, went to the Police
Department, Naga City, to visit Arandia, (Vol. III, p.
461) From there, she proceeded to the Office of the
Chief of Police Pama, and turned over to him in the
presence of Major Rey, the ‘left over money’
(meaning what was left of what Arandia gave her),
amounting to P80.00 consisting of four 20 peso bills.
(Vol. III, pp. 461-464, t.s.n.) Chief of Police Pama
gave her a receipt (Exh. P) to show that they received
the sum of P80.00 in four 20 peso bills with their
corresponding serial numbers stated on the receipt.
(Ibid; Exhs. F, F-1, F-2 and F-3) The serial number of
these four twenty peso bills turned over to Chief
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Pama tallied with four of the serial numbers listed by
Samuel Odiamar. (Exh. E)" (Brief, pp. 2-25.)
The appellant attributes only one error to the trial
court, to wit: "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS HIS
GUILT WAS NOT PROOF BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT, IN DISREGARD OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT." (Brief, p. 27) and discusses this
argument in just four pages.
The burden of appellant’s argument is to attack the
credibility of state witness Jose Arandia and Edmundo
Dualan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The appellant claims that Arandia was an accomplice
hence his testimony comes from a polluted source
and should not be believed. He also avers that
Arandia’s testimony is "much too eloquent, so much
so that either he was well rehearsed or just
exceptionally brilliant."cralaw virtua1aw library
True it is that Arandia’s testimony comes from a
polluted source. But it does not follow that it is not
admissible and competent, (People v. , Aquino, L-
27184, May 21, 1974, 57 SCRA 43.) What has to be
done is scrutinize it carefully. This the trial court did
for it said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We have carefully scrutinized the testimony of Jose
Arandia, without forgetting for a moment that Arandia
was one of the accused in this case, but was
discharged in order to be used as prosecution
witness. We have therefore exercised the utmost care
and caution in considering his testimony. We have
carefully watched his demeanor, his behavior, the
manner he testified in Court, we have watched his
eyes -the windows of his soul; we have intently
listened to any change and variation in his voice, and
on the whole, although he committed certain
contradictions in his testimony, we found his
9
9
testimony sufficiently reasonable." (Expediente, p.
1150.)
It should also be stated that Arandia’s testimony is
partly corroborated by that of Edmundo Dualan who
testified on what happened when the appellant
brought Raul Odiamar to the coconut plantation of
Felix Gutierrez, appellant’s uncle, in Camuning.
The appellant’s claim that Arandia’s testimony is
"much too eloquent" is not supported by the record.
Arandia was able to answer the questions posed to
him because he was telling the truth.
The testimony of Edmundo Dualan is questioned on
the sole ground that he did not identify the boy who
was with the appellant as Raul Odiamar so that Raul’s
disappearance and eventual death cannot be laid to
the door of the appellant. This posture has no basis.
The appellant claims that the boy he brought to the
Gutierrez’ coconut plantation was his nephew,
Reynaldo de Leon. But on September 1, 1971, when
Edmundo Dualan was recalled to the witness stand
and Reynaldo de Leon was shown to him, he replied
that Reynaldo was not the boy who was with the
appellant. This is what the transcript shows.
"FISCAL VARGAS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
During the testimony of Cerilo de Leon, he said and
he admitted that he was at Camuning, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur on September 2, 1970 with a boy; but,
that boy, according to him is Reynaldo de Leon.
Reynaldo de Leon is now here in Court, and I would
like you to see him. We will request now, at this stage,
that Reynaldo de Leon should come forward.
(NOTE: At this stage, Reynaldo de Leon was
requested to stand up)

Q Will you tell us if this boy who stands up in the
courtroom by the name of Reynaldo de Leon, will you
tell us if that is the same boy whom you retrieved from
the pit in the afternoon of September 2, 1970 at
Camuning, Calabanga, Camarines Sur?.
A That is not the one because that is very small. (Vol.
XIII—Defense, pp. 2483-2484.)
On the positive side, Dualan identified the boy who
was with the appellant as Raul by (a) describing his
physical appearance and his attire; and (b) his
resemblance to Raul’s picture which was published in
the Bicol Mail (TSN, Vol. II - Prosecution, pp. 141-
149.)chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The bottom line in this appeal is who to believe.
Should the inculpatory and incriminatory evidence
given by Jose Arandia and Edmundo Dualan prevail
over the denial of the appellant that he had nothing to
do with the asportation and death of Raul Odiamar?
The trial court concluded that Arandia and Dualan
were more credible and We have no reason to disturb
its conclusion for it was in a position to ascertain
which of the witnesses were more credible. This
policy of appellate courts is axiomatic and is based on
sound considerations.
The trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to
suffer death but We cannot affirm the penalty
because the necessary votes cannot be obtained.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
modified in respect of the penalty and indemnity in
that the appellant shall suffer reclusion perpetua and
indemnify the heirs of Raul Odiamar in the amount of
Thirty Thousand P30,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the
judgment is affirmed. Costs against the Appellant.
SO ORDERED
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Teehankee, J., are on leave.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64164 June 22, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO BANAYO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo T Mendoza for defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Regional
Trial Court,* Branch LV at Lucena City which
convicted Alejandro Banayo of the crime of Murder
and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
Twelve Thousand P12,000.00) Pesos.
Alejandro Banayo was charged together with Donato
Banayo and Rosendo Villanueva, Jr., alias "Chito" of
the crime of MURDER in an information which reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1980, at
Barangay Bungoy, Municipality of Dolores, Province
of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
knife, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, and
with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab several times
with the said deadly weapon one Armando Abel,
thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the
different parts of the body which directly caused his
death.
Only defendant-appellant Banayo was arrested and
tried.
10
10
His co-accused Rosendo Villanueva and Donato
Alvero have remained at large. After a careful
considering of the evidence for the prosecution and
the defense, we find the facts of the case correctly
summarized by the appellee as follows:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of September 13,
1980, Romualdo Cabrera and his cousin, Isidoro
Cartena were on their way home to Bungoy, Dolores,
Quezon, when they encountered the group of
Rosendo Villanueva alias 'Chito', Donato Alvero and
appellant Alejandro Banayo, who were playing
mahjong in front of the house of Hermilando
Ventocilla. The two groups threw stones and bottles
at each other (tsn., pp. 8-10, November 4, 1981; tsn.,
pp. 8-11, May 26, 1982; tsn., pp. 7-9, August 5,
1082). Romualdo Cabrera and Isidoro Cartena
retreated. Cabrera was chased by Villanueva with a
knife but was able to take refuge in the house of his
uncle Peting Ventocilla.
While Cabrera was in the house of Peting Ventocilla,
the deceased Armando Abel passed by and went to
the scene of the incident (tsn., pp. 13-15, November
4, 1981; tsn., pp. 14-20, May 26, 1982; tsn., pp. 9-12,
August 5, 1981). Upon reaching the place of the
incident, Armando Abel talked with Chito Villanueva.
Suddenly, Villanueva stabbed Armando Abel from
behind while appellant Alejandro Banayo and Donato
Alvero held him by his two hands (tsn., pp. 16-21,
November 4, 1981; tsn., pp. 20-27, September
9,1981).
Minutes later, Barangay Captain Godofredo Valle
arrived. Chito Villanueva, Donato Alvero and
appellant Alejandro Banayo ran away leaving
Armando Abel bleeding at the side of the road (tsn., p.
14, August 12, 1981; tsn., p. 5, September 16, 1981).
With the help of Alfredo Esguerra, Godofredo Valle
loaded the victim in a jeep and brought him to a
hospital in San Pablo (tsn., pp. 15-16, August 12,

1981).lwphl@itç Thereafter, Armando Abel expired
(tsn., p. 26, August 12, 1981).
The autopsy conducted on the body of Armando Abel
revealed that the victim died of internal hemorrhage
due to several fatal wounds inflicted in different parts
of the body (Exh. "A", p. 112, Rec.; tsn., pp. 19-23,
March 10, 1982).
Defendant-appellant interposes the defense of alibi.
He claims that more or less three minutes after the
stone and bottle throwing incident between his group
and Romualdo Cabrera, his uncle Rogelio Aurelio
fetched him because his mother was sick at that time.
He insists that he was no longer at the scene of the
crime when Rosendo Villanueva, his co-accused,
stabbed Armando Abel. As earlier stated, Villanueva
is at large and was not tried.
On appeal, the defendant- appellant raises the
following assignments of errors:
I At the onsent this Court takes a rather dim view of the
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROMUALDO
CABRERA WHICH IS COMPLETELY FALSE, BIAS
AND UNFOUNDED.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALFREDO
ESGUERRA WHICH IS TOTALLY
UNCORROBORATED AS REGARDS TO THE
ACTUAL STABBING DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
SO MANY WITNESSES IN THE PLACE WHERE
THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF GODOFREDO
VALLE WHICH IS TOTALLY FALSE,
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
UNCORROBORATED AND AGAINST COMMON
EXPERIENCE.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE
WITNESSES FELICISIMO VENTOCILLA, ARNEL
VENTOCILLA, ROSAURO PALMA AND THE
ACCUSED ALEJANDRO BANAYO.
V judgment of conviction.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF MURDER WHICH IS
TOTALLY WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW OR IN FACT
ON WHICH THE DECISION MAY STAND.
VI
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE EXISTED CONSPIRACY AMONG
THE ACCUSED THERE BEING NO BASIS IN FACT
OR IN LAW ON WHICH IT MAY STAND.
apparently indifferent attitude displayed by the trial
court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by
the rendition of a decision, the body of which contains
only 63 lines spread out over less than three
typewritten pages, double spaced and wide margined.
While brevity should characterize a court's decisions
and the length of a decision is not necessarily
determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding
this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in
greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence
presented by both prosecution and the defense, the
facts as found by the trial judge based on the
evidence on record and the jurisprudence and
authorities supporting the court's conclusions.
This, the trial judge failed to do. There is not one
single citation of authority in the decision. The issues
raised by the appellant include allegations of
concocted testimony, the nature of a dying
11
11
declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery, and
superior strength. The issues raised are quite serious
and they deserved better treatment from the trial
court.
Fortunately, while the decision is compressed, the
records are quite ample. To his credit, the trial judge
allowed the prosecution and defense to fully develop
their respective cases. Going over the records
carefully, we find sufficient evidence to sustain the
The main thrust of appellant's first, second, and third
assignments of errors is against the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses Romualdo Cabrera, Alfredo
Esguerra, and Godofredo Valle.
Romualdo Cabrera testified categorically that he saw
Chito Villanueva stab Armando Abel while the latter
was being held by Donato Alvero and the defendant-
appellant. This was fully corroborated by Alfredo
Esguerra who was near the scene of the stabbing
incident. On the other hand, Barangay Captain
Godofredo Valle, who brought the victim to the
hospital, asked the victim what happened to him. The
victim who was dying answered that the group of
Chito Villanueva ganged up on him. Inspite of the
gruelling cross-examination conducted by the defense
counsel, Romualdo Cabrera and Alfredo Esguerra
stuck firmly to their testimonies. While there may have
been inconsistencies in their testimonies, these were
only on minor details and are of the same nature as
those which have been held to be badges of truth for
only the testimonies of rehearsed witnesses will tally
on every point. (People v. Paculba, 124 SCRA 383.)
The testimony of Godofredo Valle on the dying
declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule. As
held in People vs. Sagario (14 SCRA 468) there are
four (4) requisites which must concur in order that a
dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it
must concern the crime and surrounding

circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time
it was made, the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide in which the declarant was the
victim.
The first requisite is present in the ante mortem
statement of the victim, Armando Abel. The statement
made by him to Godofredo Valle while on the jeepney
which was rushing him to the hospital concerned the
cause or circumstance of the declarant's death. The
declarant at the time he was giving the dying
declaration was conscious of his impending death
having suffered six (6) stab wounds at various parts of
the body. In fact, he died before he could even reach
the hospital. The dead body of Armando Abel was
brought instead to the funeral parlor.
True, the statement of the victim before his death was
rather vague and ambiguous. He referred to the "gang
of Chito Villanueva" as the group that ganged up on
him. Barangay Bungoy, Dolores, Quezon, however, is
only a small community. The residents know who the
friends of their neighbors are and the members of a
particular group or gang. In this case, Barangay
Captain Godofredo Valle knew who were referred to
as the members of Chito Villanueva's gang. Valle
named specifically, Donato Rivero and defendant-
appellant as among the members of the gang. Taking
Godofredo Valle's testimony together with those of
Romualdo Cabrera and Alfredo Esguerra, the
appellant and Donato Alvero together with Chito
Villanueva were undeniably at the scene during the
stabbing incident.
The defense of alibi of defendant-appellant cannot be
taken seriously for the following reasons:
1. The defendants- appellant was positively Identified
by Romualdo Cabrera and Alfredo Esguerra as one of
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
the two persons who held the victim while the latter
was being stabbed by Chito Villanueva;
2. The defense witnesses admitted that defendant-
appellant was at the scene of the crime. They claim,
however, that he was fetched by Rogelio Aurelio three
or four minutes before the stabbing incident occurred;
3. Defendant- appellant's house was only a few
meters away from the scene of the crime, a distance
which could be traversed within minutes.
Well settled is the rule that alibi is a weak defense
against the positive Identification of the accused
(People vs. Cervantes, 125 SCRA 187; People vs.
Elefañio Jr., 125 SCRA 702). We also find no reason
from the records why the prosecution witnesses
should fabricate their testimonies and implicate the
appellant in such a serious crime.
Moreover, the defense has not satisfactorily shown
that it was impossible for the defendant-appellant to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. The claim of defendant- appellant that
he went home before the stabbing incident took place
because his mother was sick cannot be given any
credence. In the first place, defendant-appellant
testified that his mother was no longer feeling well
and had a slight fever at around 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of September 13, 1980. By 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, the fever had worsened. At past 8:00
o'clock, he nevertheless left home and went to his
uncle, Rogelio Aurelio. Thereafter, he proceeded to
Hermilando Ventocilla's house and watched the
people there play mahjong. If he was overly
concerned about his mother's health, he would not
have left his sick mother alone in the first place.
Further in his testimony, the defendant-appellant
stated that he went back home to his mother because
he remembered his mother told him that it was Friday
the 13th and that it was dangerous to go out on such
12
12
date. He, however, admitted that he was not
superstitious. We find the alibi of defendant-appellant
puerile and incredulous.
With regard to the fifth assignment of error, the
abbreviated method employed by the lower court in
explaining its conclusions makes it difficult to
ascertain exactly what led the lower court to convict
the defendant-appellant for the crime of murder
instead of homicide. A perusal of the information
shows that treachery was alleged as the qualifying
circumstance. No other modifying circumstance was
alleged. The decision of the lower court held,
however, that "the treachery alleged to be attendant
to the killing of Armando Abel appears to tile Court to
be more of taking advantage by Villanueva and his
group of their superior strength when he stabbed
Armando Abel." (Decision, p. 3) Assuming that the
lower court's vague statement is interpreted to mean
that there was no treachery, it is difficult to follow the
sudden jump to the dispositive portion defining the
crime as murder. The circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength was not alleged in the
information and could not therefore qualify the killing
to Murder. It should have been considered as a mere
aggravating circumstance.
But since this is an appeal from a criminal conviction,
the entire records of the case are thrown wide open
for review of this Court. In this regard, we find ample
evidence to establish treachery. Treachery exists
when the offender employs means, methods, or forms
which tend directly and specially to insure the
execution of the offense without risk to the accused
arising from the defense which the offended party
might make (Art. 14, Par. 16, Revised Penal Code).
The concurrence of the two conditions necessary for
treachery to exist are present in this case, namely: (1)
the employment of means, methods, or manner of
execution which would insure the offender's safety
from any defensive or any retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party, which means that no opportunity

is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(2) such means, method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously chosen (People v.
Macariola, 120 SCRA 92; People v. Rhoda, 122
SCRA 909). The holding of the hands of the victim by
Donato Alvero and the defendant- appellant insured
the commission of the offense without risk to the
accused. The victim was immobilized and prevented
from parrying the knife thrusts of Chito Villanueva.
The victim was in no position to retaliate.
Contrary to the contention of the defendant-appellant,
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
of the minds among the accused was proven (People
v. Velez, 58 SCRA 21). Proof of publicly observable
mutual agreement is not indispensable to establish
conspiracy Hence, there is conspiracy where two of
the accused held the victim's hands and the third
stabbed the victim from behind (People v. Rhoda,
supra). Each of the offenders performed with such
closeness and coordination indicating a common
purpose or design. (People v. Geronimo, 53 SCRA
246).
One final point. time and again, we have reminded
lower courts to employ legal terminology in the
imposition of penalties. In this case, the lower court
used the term "life imprisonment". The correct term is
"reclusion perpetua." The reason is obvious. The
various penalties have their corresponding legal
accessories and effects (People v. Mobe 81 Phil. 58:
See People v. Sabater, 81 SCRA 564).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
MODIFIED in that the appellant is found GUILTY the
crime of MURDER qualified by treachery and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Armando Abel in the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30.000.00) Pesos; and to pay the proportionate
costs.
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Chairman Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE,
petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A decision that does not conform to the form and
substance required by the Constitution and the law is
void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid,
decisions should comply with the form, the procedure
and the substantive requirements laid out in the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court hereby
discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003
Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).4
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a
Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the RTC-
Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society
(SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z.
Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal
Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie
Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-
respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of
the question "whether or not the act of a religious
leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing
the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in
13
13
urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for
a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit
of the constitutional provisions x x x."6
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain
a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein
petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for
Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-
respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued
the assailed Order, which held as follows:
"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it
was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional
provision and to declare whether acts are violative
thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive
portion because a dispositive portion is required only
in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong
suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party
wronged should get. The step that these movants
have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the
Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7
The Antecedent Proceedings
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-
Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-
respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought
the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,8
specifically on the separation of church and state; and
a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an
elective office, or urging or requiring the members of
their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the
challenged Decision in these words:
"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the
original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to

Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to
Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer
within the extended period and similarly prayed for the
dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of
the Petition on the common grounds that it does not
state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable
controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading
by way of advisement, which was closely followed by
another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss.
Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider
the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli
Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his
Memorandum. x x x.
"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and
the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike
Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo, which raised no new arguments other
than those already considered in the motions to
dismiss x x x."9
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said
that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in
praying for a determination as to whether the actions
imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has
raised only a question of law."10 It then proceeded to
a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition
– the separation of church and state – even tracing, to
some extent, the historical background of the
principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo
opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office
is a clear violation of the separation clause."11
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial
court failed to include a dispositive portion in its
assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as
mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review.12
This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2,
2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to submit their respective comments.
In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other
parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original
case below --the opportunity to comment, if they so
desired.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an
Oral Argument.14
The Issues
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the
following issues for this Court’s resolution:
"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003
rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;
"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy
in herein respondent’s Petition for declaratory relief;
"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal
interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
"4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought
to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial
determination;
"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other
than the declaratory relief; and,
"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction
over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein
respondent."15
14
14
During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed
down and classified as follows:
"A. Procedural Issues
"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action?
Did respondent have any legal standing to file the
Petition for Declaratory Relief?
"B. Substantive Issues
"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and
substance required by the Constitution, the law and
the Rules of Court?
"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro.
Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing
candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be
banned from campaigning against said candidates?"
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.
Procedural Issues:
Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which
deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in
part:
"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument,
and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine
the validity of the written instrument and to seek a
judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties
thereunder.16 The essential requisites of the action
are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy is between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.17
Justiciable Controversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition
failed to allege, much less establish before the trial
court, that there existed a justiciable controversy or an
adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS
had a legal right that was being violated or threatened
to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde
alleges that SJS premised its action on mere
speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical
issues that had not yet ripened into an actual
controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief
must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.18 The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief
fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an
existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner
and the named respondents therein. Further, the
Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal
right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents
therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter
were in breach of its rights, the law or the
Constitution.
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his
Comment,19 what exactly has he done that merited
the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not
know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well
as the assailed Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing
in this respect." His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January
28, 2003, the election season had not even started
yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively
involved in partisan politics.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial
court should contain "a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim x x x."20 Yet, the SJS
Petition stated no ultimate facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without
factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the
petitioner and his co-respondents below had
endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or
candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement "will enable [them] to elect
men to public office who [would] in turn be forever
beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the
government"[;]21 and "pos[ing] a clear and present
danger of serious erosion of the people’s faith in the
electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that
religious leaders determine the ultimate result of
elections,"22 which would then be violative of the
separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely
theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice
to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition
does not even allege any indication or manifest intent
on the part of any of the respondents below to
champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-
called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular
candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer
speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
15
15
Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS’
rights are being subjected to any threatened,
imminent and inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The
judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable23 cannot be exercised
when there is no actual or threatened violation of a
legal right.
All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that
the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be
resolved."24 In other words, it merely sought an
opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated
acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates
for political offices violated the constitutional principle
on the separation of church and state. SJS did not
ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither
did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation
of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed
from rendering an advisory opinion.25
Cause of Action
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a
petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need
not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such
petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of
a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by
one party against the other.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject
matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a
deed, a will, a contract (or other written instrument), a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition
is "the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader
to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective
office or to urge or require the members of the flock to
vote for a specified candidate."26 According to
petitioner, this subject matter is "beyond the realm of

an action for declaratory relief."27 Petitioner avers
that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the
Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence,
should have been dismissed outright by the court a
quo.
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of another,
causing injury to the latter.28 Its essential elements
are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such
defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the former to the latter.29
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is
a ground for its outright dismissal.30 However, in
special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept
of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does
not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that
an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there
has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of rights arising thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a
breach or violation should be impending, imminent or
at least threatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC
discloses no explicit allegation that the former had
any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect. We
can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor,
from its bare allegation that it "has thousands of
members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial
clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan
participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics
and in the process to insure adherence to the
Constitution by everyone x x x."32
Such general averment does not, however, suffice to
constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the
presumed interest not personal in character; it is
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain.33 The Rules require that the interest must
be material to the issue and affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from
simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question
raised.34
To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris
Secundum and submits that the "[p]laintiff in a
declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce
a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial
declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the
purpose of guiding [their] future conduct, and the
essential distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment
action’ and the usual ‘action’ is that no actual wrong
need have been committed or loss have occurred in
order to sustain the declaratory judgment action,
although there must be no uncertainty that the loss
will occur or that the asserted rights will be
invaded."35
SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own
reference – that there must be no uncertainty that the
loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be
invaded. Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely
conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-
respondents below) might actively participate in
partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength of
its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public
office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government."36
During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde
and his co-respondents below all strongly asserted
that they had not in any way engaged or intended to
participate in partisan politics. They all firmly assured
this Court that they had not done anything to trigger
the issue raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory
Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS
could base a right of relief from the named
respondents. In any event, even granting that it
16
16
sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect,
there was nevertheless no certainty that such right
would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even
the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the
Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would
have provided the certainty that it had a legal right
that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those
respondents.
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the challenged act.37 Interest means a
material interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a
mere incidental interest in the question involved.38
Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory relief
as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious
leader to endorse, or require the members of the
religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein
Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the
controversy";39 it has failed to establish how the
resolution of the proffered question would benefit or
injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality
of a law, an act or a statute must show "not only that
the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have]
sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby
in some indefinite way."40 They must demonstrate
that they have been, or are about to be, denied some
right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or
that they are about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.41

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically
prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.42
A taxpayer’s action may be properly brought only
when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.43 In the present case, there is no
allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers’
money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its
members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below,
if the question at issue was not resolved. There was
no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be
deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said
respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its
members would be denied the right of suffrage or the
privilege to be voted for a public office they are
seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of
members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters" is too general44 and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our
jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest
impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.45
Transcendental Importance
In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance
of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering
that "the issues raised are of paramount public
interest."
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus
standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of
transcendental significance or paramount importance
to the people.46 Recently, after holding that the IBP
had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
v. Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the Petition
therein. It noted that "the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents."48
Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the
constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of
paramount interest to the Filipino people. The issue
did not simply concern a delineation of the separation
between church and state, but ran smack into the
governance of our country. The issue was both
transcendental in importance and novel in nature,
since it had never been decided before.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to
determine with certainty whether it could resolve the
constitutional issue despite the barren allegations in
the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated
proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin,
however, counsels for the parties -- particularly for
Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations
or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies
hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court
would exempt this case from the stringent locus
standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile
because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved
anyway.
Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court
To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious
judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the
bench and the bar, the Court reiterates the
elementary procedure49 that must be followed by trial
courts in the conduct of civil cases.50
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon
motion of the defendant -- dismiss a complaint51 (or
petition, in a special civil action) that does not allege
the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s) cause or causes of
action.52 A complaint or petition should contain "a
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plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim
or defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the
relief sought.54
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the
payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court
shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to
the defendants or the respondents, with a directive
that the defendant answer55 within 15 days, unless a
different period is fixed by the court.56 The summons
shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not
filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by
default and may be granted the relief applied for.57
The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may
be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time
fixed by the Rules.58
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim,
it must be answered within ten (10) days from
service.59 A reply may be filed within ten (10) days
from service of the pleading responded to.60
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover
upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to
obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the
answer thereto has been served, move for a summary
judgment in its favor.62 Similarly, a party against
whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is
asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at
any time, move for a summary judgment in its
favor.63 After the motion is heard, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a
showing that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.64

Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to
the complaint or petition, the defendant may file a
motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds stated
in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During
the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit
their arguments on the questions of law, and their
evidence on the questions of fact.65 After the hearing,
the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It
shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the
reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor.66
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer
within the balance of the period originally prescribed
to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days in any
event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the
denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the
defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days,
counted from the service of the amended pleading,
unless the court provides a longer period.67
After the last pleading has been served and filed, the
case shall be set for pretrial,68 which is a mandatory
proceeding.69 A plaintiff’s/ petitioner’s (or its duly
authorized representative’s) non-appearance at the
pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the
dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court
orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be a cause for allowing the
plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and
the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.70
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs;
failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pretrial.71 Upon the termination thereof,
the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the
matters taken up at the conference; the action taken
on them, the amendments allowed to the pleadings;
and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
the parties regarding any of the matters
considered.72 The parties may further avail
themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if
they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in which
the parties shall adduce their respective evidence in
support of their claims and/or defenses. By their
written consent or upon the application of either party,
or on its own motion, the court may also order any or
all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner, who
is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the
parties.75 The trial or hearing before the
commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would
if held before the court.76
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the
commissioner shall file with the court a written report
on the matters referred by the parties.77 The report
shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall
issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in
whole or in part; or recommitting it with instructions; or
requiring the parties to present further evidence
before the commissioner or the court.78
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision
shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.79
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine
the proceedings before the trial court in the instant
case.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS.
Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately
reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained no
statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner
relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the
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relief it sought from the court, but merely asked it to
answer a hypothetical question.
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a
specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a
violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.80 As
already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial
court had no allegations of fact81 or of any specific
violation of the petitioner’s rights, which the
respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency
amounted to a failure to state a cause of action;
hence, no coercive relief could be sought and
adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive
requirements and, we repeat, should have been
dismissed at the outset.
Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings.
Within the period set to file their respective answers to
the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed
Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and
Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period, an
Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal
of the Petition.82 SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion
of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder.
Supposedly, there were "several scheduled settings,
in which the "[c]ourt was apprised of the respective
positions of the parties."83 The nature of such
settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not
disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions
to Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order84 dated
May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their
memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another
Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions
to Dismiss.
In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:
"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to
Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are submitted,
then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for
resolution."86

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2
of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Motions were not
heard. Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the
Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for
their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said
Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the
grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the
legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for
reconsideration. Pending the resolution of these
Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion
to suspend the filing of the parties’ memoranda. But
instead of separately resolving the pending Motions
fairly and squarely, the trial court again transgressed
the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to
issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues
raised in those Motions.
Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" without
allowing the parties to file their answers. For this
reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only it
had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court
would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed,
that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had
not committed or threatened to commit the act
attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act
that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a
notice of the Petition to the OSG, which was entitled
to be heard upon questions involving the
constitutionality or validity of statutes and other
measures.87
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the
questioned Decision of the trial court was utterly
wanting in the requirements prescribed by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings
of the case, the trial court indeed acted with
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law --
or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of
procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of
SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow
the process described above -- the petition must state
a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the
procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the
decision must adhere to constitutional and legal
requirements.
First Substantive Issue:
Fundamental Requirements of a Decision
The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based. No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the basis
therefor."88
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1
of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly
provides:
"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the
case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him and filed with the clerk of court."
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The
judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly
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a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
"x x x xxx x x x."
Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on
January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1,
prompting all judges "to make complete findings of
facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal
aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to
generalize and form conclusions without detailing the
facts from which such conclusions are deduced."
In many cases,89 this Court has time and time again
reminded "magistrates to heed the demand of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution." The Court, through
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of
Appeals,90 discussed at length the implications of this
provision and strongly exhorted thus:
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play. It
is likewise demanded by the due process clause of
the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say
that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled
to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than
that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties

that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through
the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed
neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative
of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of
his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on
the power of reason for sustained public confidence in
the justness of his decision."
In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:
"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be
in writing and that they must set forth clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are
based serves many functions. It is intended, among
other things, to inform the parties of the reason or
reasons for the decision so that if any of them
appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the
finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement
is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. x x x."
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the
parties to a litigation be given information on how the
case was decided, as well as an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the court.92
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had
instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that
their decisions would present a comprehensive
analysis or account of the factual and legal findings
that would substantially address the issues raised by
the parties.
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the
assailed Decision contains no statement of facts --
much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
the court’s findings as to the probable facts. The
assailed Decision begins with a statement of the
nature of the action and the question or issue
presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.
The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the
nature and the extent of the separation of church and
state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion
she has reached or specifying the relief granted or
denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision" with the
clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the
filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct
facts that gave rise to the question sought to be
resolved by SJS? More important, what were the
factual findings and analysis on which the trial court
based its legal findings and conclusions? None were
stated or implied. Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot
be upheld for its failure to express clearly and
distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the
trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional
directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of
the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one
cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances,
simply because such circumstances are unknown?
Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the
future, if there is no point of factual comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory
or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision. The
importance of such portion was explained in the early
case Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards,94 from which
we quote:
"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as
embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or
order is the investitive or controlling factor that
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determines and settles the rights of the parties and
the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the
existence of statements or declaration in the body of
said order that may be confusing."
The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us
in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To
recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief.
So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What
rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its
final statement says, "SO ORDERED." But what
exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label
its issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact
decided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion
can be found in the body of the assailed Decision. It
claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition
finally resolved by the statement of the trial court
found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which
reads: "Endorsement of specific candidates in an
election to any public office is a clear violation of the
separation clause."95
We cannot agree.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the obligation
of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly
contained in the text of the original Decision. The
Court, however, held:
"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot
supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a
mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that
where there is a conflict between the dispositive part
and the opinion, the former must prevail over the
latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the
final order while the opinion is merely a statement
ordering nothing." (Italics in the original)
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be
the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the

last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page
Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer
to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the
opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the
proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required
of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless
disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent
nullity and must be struck down as void.97
Parts of a Decision
In general, the essential parts of a good decision
consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2)
statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors;
(4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule,
separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5)
dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to
include an introduction or a prologue as well as an
epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or
novel issues are involved.98
An introduction may consist of a concise but
comprehensive statement of the principal factual or
legal issue/s of the case. In some cases -- particularly
those concerning public interest; or involving
complicated commercial, scientific, technical or
otherwise rare subject matters -- a longer introduction
or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the
specific nature of the controversy and the issues
involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the
important principles applied to the resolution of the
issues of paramount public interest or significance. It
may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or
guiding principle.
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and
the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good
decision.
1. Statement of the Case
The Statement of the Case consists of a legal
definition of the nature of the action. At the first
instance, this part states whether the action is a civil
case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title,
foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a
criminal case, this part describes the specific charge -
- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the
information -- and the plea of the accused. Also
mentioned here are whether the case is being
decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the
court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and
the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the
criminal information serves as a guide in determining
the nature and the gravity of the offense for which the
accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from
or graver than that charged.
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is
especially important when there is a question on the
sufficiency of the charge, or on whether qualifying and
modifying circumstances have been adequately
alleged therein.
To ensure that due process is accorded, it is
important to give a short description of the
proceedings regarding the plea of the accused.
Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity
therein, may render the judgment void, and further
consideration by the appellate court would be futile. In
some instances, especially in appealed cases, it
would also be useful to mention the fact of the
appellants’ detention, in order to dispose of the
preliminary query -- whether or not they have
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abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping
bail.
Mentioning the court of origin and the case number
originally assigned helps in facilitating the
consolidation of the records of the case in both the
trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final
judgment.
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the
assailed decision informs the reader of how the
appealed case was decided by the court a quo.
2. Statement of Facts
There are different ways of relating the facts of the
case. First, under the objective or reportorial method,
the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the
testimony of each witness and the contents of each
exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the
factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then
that of the defendant or defense is summarized
according to the judge’s best light. Third, in the
subjective method, the version of the facts accepted
by the judge is simply narrated without explaining
what the parties’ versions are. Finally, through a
combination of objective and subjective means, the
testimony of each witness is reported and the judge
then formulates his or her own version of the facts.
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the
version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in
the interest of fairness and due process. A detailed
evaluation of the contentions of the parties must
follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike
civil and other cases, depends to a large extent on the
factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence.
The plausibility or the implausibility of each version
can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the
facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at
its findings and conclusions should be explained.

On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the
lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all
factual and legal issues involved may partly explain
why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the
findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely,
the lower court’s patent misappreciation of the facts or
misapplication of the law would aid in a better
understanding of why its ruling is reversed or
modified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no
longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution
usually involve questions of law, grave abuse of
discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of
the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few
exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in non-
criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts
by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be
reproduced; otherwise, the material factual
antecedents should be restated in the words of the
reviewing magistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body
whose decision is under review should be laid out, in
order that the parties may clearly understand why the
lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the
reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or
concludes otherwise.
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On
appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the
appellant’s brief, may be reproduced in toto and
tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for
reconsideration of the final decision on the ground
that the court failed to consider all assigned errors
that could affect the outcome of the case. But when
the appellant presents repetitive issues or when the
assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these
may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Though not specifically questioned by the parties,
additional issues may also be included, if deemed
important for substantial justice to be rendered. Note
that appealed criminal cases are given de novo
review, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the
reviewing court is generally limited to issues
specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions
are errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but
necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or
unassigned errors that are closely related to those
properly assigned, or upon which depends the
determination of the question properly raised.
4. The Court’s Ruling
This part contains a full discussion of the specific
errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or
appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues
the court deems essential to a just disposition of the
case. Where there are several issues, each one of
them should be separately addressed, as much as
practicable. The respective contentions of the parties
should also be mentioned here. When procedural
questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it
is better to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include a
finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime
committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of
the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and
the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is
decreed, the court must order the immediate release
of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being
held for another cause) and order the director of the
Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is
detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days
from notice, the exact date when the accused were
set free.
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In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the
disposition should state whether the complaint or
petition is granted or denied, the specific relief
granted, and the costs. The following test of
completeness may be applied. First, the parties
should know their rights and obligations. Second, they
should know how to execute the decision under
alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no
need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues.
Fourth, the case should be terminated by according
the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually depends
upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may
declare their rights and duties, command the
performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also
adjudicate costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in
sequence. But they should all be present and plainly
identifiable in the decision. Depending on the writer’s
character, genre and style, the language should be
fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or
in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and
pretentious. At all times, however, the decision must
be clear, concise, complete and correct.
Second Substantive Issue:
Religious Leaders’ Endorsement
of Candidates for Public Office
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition --
WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES
BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
-- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As
stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional
issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino
citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our
country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious
procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial
court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as

not to leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the
merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to
convince the Court that there are enough factual and
legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the
other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has
sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts
supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state
directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its
claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS
candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief.
Neither were there factual findings in the assailed
Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to
answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely
sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was
beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and
jurisdiction.99
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear
violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void
and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is
nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or
even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to
take up, on the merits, the paramount question
involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored
rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will
be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned."100
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother
Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12,
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE.
The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED
for failure to state a cause of action.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Court Administrator to evaluate and recommend
whether the trial judge may, after observing due
process, be held administratively liable for rendering a
decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of
Court and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected
in this case which started out as an ordinary
complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely
presented to the Court is the validity of the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40
of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14
of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment
in Makati to the private respondent for a period of one
year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month.
Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent
deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00
to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the
leased premises except when caused by reasonable
wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private
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23
respondent vacated the property. He thereafter
requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of
P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional
ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the
lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the
lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00
for repainting of the leased premises to restore them
to their original condition.1
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati. After the submission of position
papers by the parties, a summary judgment was
rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the
complainant and holding that the repainting was not
chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay
the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the
balance of the deposit after deducting the water and
electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the
sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the Costs.2
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C.
de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a
memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and
study of the records of this case, this Court hereby
adopts by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto.3
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his
petition for review was denied on September 29,
1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on

December 1, 1987.4 He is now before us to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His
contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of
the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of
a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was
introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has
been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The
provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973
Constitution but has been virtually restored to its
original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all
courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose
has always been the same, viz., to inform the person
reading the decision, and especially the parties, of
how it was reached by the court after consideration of
the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable
laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this
explanation if only to assure them that the court
rendering the decision actually studied the case
before pronouncing its judgment. But there are more
substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party
must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision
so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may
consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For
another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned,
may convince the losing party of its merits and
persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace
instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless
appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
exposition of the facts and the law on which they are
based, especially those coming from the Supreme
Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that
can serve as useful references and even as
precedents in the resolution of future controversies.
As the Court said in Rosales v. Court of First
Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they
are on all fours or at least substantially Identical with
previous litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege.
Earlier decisions are guideposts that can lead us in
the right direction as we tread the highways and
byways of the law in the search for truth and justice.
These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the
past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking to
the future. Except where there is a need to reverse
them because of an emergent viewpoint or an altered
situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the
trodden path is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision
rendered by the regional trial court should be revoked
for non-compliance with the above-quoted
constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be
remanded to the regional trial court for a full blown
hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision
stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. For his part, the private
respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum
decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes
the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals,
6 Which sustained the said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. —
Every decision or final resolution of a court in
appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it
is based which may be contained in the decision or
final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from
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24
those set forth in the decision, order or resolution
appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case,
together with a similar rule embodied in Section 18 of
P.D. No. 946, providing that:
All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now
pending before the Court of Appeals shall remain in
the Division to which they have been assigned, and
shall be decided within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Decree; Provided, however, That if
the decision or order be an affirmance in toto of the
dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from,
then the Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering
an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's
findings of fact and pronouncements of law which
have been adopted as basis for the affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a
unanimous Court, declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations consisted of thirteen pages, single
space. The above-quoted decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals consists of four pages, three of
which contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the
decision appealed from. The remaining page is
devoted to an explanation of why "for judicial
convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby
adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts and
conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision,
as integral part of this Our decision." The said
decision may be considered as substantial
compliance with the above-quoted provisions in
Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129.
Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable
misgiving and to express the following reservation:

The authority given the appellate court to adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
from those set forth in the appealed decisions should
be exercised with caution and prudence, because the
tendency would be to follow the line of least
resistance by just adopting the findings and
conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly
studying the appealed case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly
observed:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as
important as the intrinsic validity of a decision is the
perception by the parties-litigants that they have been
accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and
responsible magistrate before judgment is rendered. It
is this perception, coupled with a clear conscience,
which enables the members of the judiciary to
discharge the awesome responsibility of sitting in
judgment on their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in
authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite
the termination of litigations for the benefit of the
parties as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the
administration of justice, the Constitution now
contains a number of provisions aimed at correcting
this serious difficulty that has caused much
disaffection among the people. Thus, Section 16 of
the Bill of Rights reiterates the original provision in the
1973 Constitution guaranteeing to all persons "the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."
Section 14(2) of the same Article III retains the rule
that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall
not only be public and impartial but also speedy. In
Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme Court is
expressly permitted to temporarily assign a judge
from one station to another when the public interest
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
so requires, as when there is a necessity for less
occupied judge to help a busier colleague dispose of
his cases. In paragraph 5 of the same section, it is
stressed that the rules of court to be promulgated by
the Supreme Court "shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." In Section 15, of the same article, maximum
periods are prescribed for the decision or resolution of
cases, to wit, twenty-four months in the case of
Supreme Court and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts
and three months for all other lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with
the tremendous number of cases in their dockets
which, to make matters worse, continues to grow by
the day despite the efforts being taken to reduce it. In
the Supreme Court alone, an average of 400 cases is
received every month as against the average of 300
cases disposed of during the same month, leaving a
difference of 100 cases monthly that is added to some
5,000 still unresolved cases that have accumulated
during the last two decades or so. At this rate, the
backlog will increase by 1,200 cases every year on
top of the earlier balance, much of which, despite its
age, is still viable and have still to be resolved.
Considering that the Court spends four days of the
week for studying and deliberating on these cases in
its en banc and division sessions, one can appreciate
the limited time allowed its members for the actual
writing of its decisions. (This particular decision, while
extended, happens fortunately to be less complicated
than many of the other cases submitted to it, which
require more time to write, not to mention the
antecedent research that may have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations,
the memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed
as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with
the case load of the courts of justice, But expediency
alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-
compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more
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familiarly, the end does not justify the means. It is
plain that if Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is
unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made
by the metropolitan trial court in compliance with the
rule on summary procedure. The decision consisted
of three typewritten pages, single space, and stated
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
was based. It was a concise and well-written decision,
and a correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B.
Balita is to be commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that
in affirming this judgment, the regional trial court of
Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that
simply adopted by reference the findings of fact and
law made by Judge Balita and then concluded,
without saying more, that "there was no cogent
reason to disturb the same." It is claimed that as
Judge de la Rama did not make his own statement of
the facts and the law as required by the Constitution,
his memorandum decision was a total nullity. Worse,
when the appeal was taken to the respondent court,
what it reviewed was not the memorandum decision
of the regional trial court but the decision rendered by
the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking,
was not before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals
did not review the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court which was the subject of the
petition for review. A reading of its own decision will
show that it dealt extensively with the memorandum
decision and discussed it at some length in the light of
the observations — and reservations — of this Court
in the Romero case. Moreover, in reviewing the
decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of
Appeals was actually reviewing the decision of the
regional trial court, which had incorporated by
reference the earlier decision rendered by Judge
Balita.

The question, of course, is whether such
incorporation by reference was a valid act that
effectively elevated the decision of the metropolitan
trial court for examination by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama
availed himself of the convenience offered by Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in accordance
with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the
use of the memorandum decision. It must also be
observed that even if the respondent court appeared
to be partial to the reservation rather than the rule in
the said case, it nevertheless had the duty — which it
discharged — to abide by the doctrine announced
therein by the highest tribunal of the land. The
respondent court could not have acted otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we
may re-examine our own rulings and modify or
reverse them whenever warranted, we take a second
look at the memorandum decision and the Romero
case and test them on the touchstone of the
Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision
and simply suggests that the court may adopt by
reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law stated in the decision, order or resolution on
appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed; the
conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P.
Blg. 129 does not even employ the term
"memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in
the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have
been introduced in this jurisdiction not by that law but
by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines,
reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. — -The judgment
or final resolution of a court in appealed cases may
adopt by reference the findings of fact and
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
conclusions of law contained in the decision or final
order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate
court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the
conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a
memorandum decision as envisioned in the above
provision. The distinctive features of the
memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an
appellate court, and second, it incorporates by
reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law
contained in the decision, order or ruling under
review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the
decision, although it is not impossible that the
approval of the findings of fact by the lower court may
lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher
court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher
court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the
body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions
of the lower court since they are being approved or
adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also
allowed in the United States, but its form (at least)
differs from the one under consideration in this case.
Such a decision is rendered in that country upon a
previous' determination by the judge that there is no
need for a published opinion and that it will have no
precedential effect. The judgment is usually limited to
the dispositive portion but a memorandum is attached
containing a brief statement of the facts and the law
involved, mainly for the information of the parties to
the case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we
employ the presumption in favor of its
constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v. Commission
of Elections, "to justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
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26
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication."7 Courts will bend over backward to
sustain that presumption. In case of doubt, it is the
duty of the judiciary to exert every effort to prevent the
invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of
the legislature that enacted it and the executive that
approved it. This norm is based on a becoming
respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the
political departments of the government which, it must
be assumed in fairness, thoroughly studied the
measure under challenge and assured themselves of
its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the
challenge posed against the memorandum decision
as now authorized by law. Taking into account the
salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing
in mind the above-discussed restraint we must
observe when a law is challenged before us, we have
come to the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129, as we shall interpret it here, is not
unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it
gives for the appellate court to merely adopt by
reference in its own decision the judgment of the
lower court on appeal. It is easy to understand that
this device may feed the suspicion feared by Justice
Feria that the court has not given the appeal the
attention it deserved and thus deprived the parties of
due process. True or not, this impression is likely to
undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial
forum which hears before it decides and bases its
decision on the established facts and the applicable
law.
No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in
having to search for the decision referred to, which,
having been incorporated by reference only, does not
have to be attached to the memorandum decision.
The Court had occasion earlier to complain about this

difficulty in the case of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where we
said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may
adopt in toto either expressly or impliedly the findings
and conclusions of the inferior court, and as a rule,
such adoption would amount to a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate discussed
herein, but where, as in this case, the specific
arguments presented against the decision of the
inferior court are of such nature that a blanket
affirmance of said decision does not in fact
adequately dispose of the strictures against it, it is but
proper, if only to facilitate the action to be taken by the
appellate court on the petition for review, that the
concrete bases of the impugned decision should
appear on its face, instead of the appellate court
having to dig into the records to find out how the
inferior court resolved the issues of the case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly
points out that it does not exist in the case at bar
because the decision of the Court of Appeals
extensively quoted from the decision of the
metropolitan trial court. Although only incorporated by
reference in the memorandum decision of the regional
trial court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless
available to the Court of Appeals. It is this
circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that
has validated the memorandum decision challenged
in this case and spared it from constitutional infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to
lay down the following requirement, as a condition for
the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court only by remote reference, which
is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and
immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
access to the facts and the law being adopted, which
must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should
actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and
made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the
suspicion that no study was made of the decision of
the lower court and that its decision was merely
affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and
the law on which it was based. The proximity at least
of the annexed statement should suggest that such
an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course,
also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section
14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will
rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the
memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest
it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is
an additional condition for its validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the
facts are in the main accepted by both parties or
easily determinable by the judge and there are no
doctrinal complications involved that will require an
extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases,
where the appeal is obviously groundless and
deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the
memorandum decision, it is still desirable that the
appellate judge exert some effort in restating in his
own words the findings of fact of the lower court and
presenting his own interpretation of the law instead of
merely parroting the language of the court a quo as if
he cannot do any better. There must be less
intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship in
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27
the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an
appellate court.
It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings
with a pair of scissors and a pot of paste as if he were
a mere researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo.
The case usually becomes progressively simpler as it
passes through the various levels of appeal and many
issues become unimportant or moot and drop along
the way. The appellate judge should prune the
cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He
cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the lower
court. He must use his own perceptiveness in
unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in
discovering the law. No less importantly, he must use
his own language in laying down his judgment. And in
doing so, he should also guard against torpidity lest
his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a
technical tract on the values of horse manure as a
fertilizer. A little style will help liven the opinion
trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all its
whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does
not have to be a bore.
The interpretation we make today will not apply
retroactively to the memorandum decision rendered
by the regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the
decision of the respondent court such decision on the
strength of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier
observed, there was substancial compliance with
Section 40 because of the direct availability and
actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
incorporated by reference in the memorandum
decision of Judge de la Rama. The memorandum
decision as then understood under the Romero
decision was a valid act at the time it was rendered by
Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect.
We also affirm the finding of the respondent court that
the summary judgment without a formal trial was in
accord with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that
the award of attorney's fees is not improper.

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply
with the requirements herein set forth both as to the
form prescribed and the occasions when they may be
rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict
enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a
lawless disobedience
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner. This decision is immediately
executory. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150092. September 27, 2002
GLOBE TELECOM, INC., DELFIN LAZARO, JR.,
and ROBERTO GALANG, Petitioners, v. JOAN
FLORENDO-FLORES, Respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals of 25 May 2001 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 60284 which affirmed the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission of 28
January 2000 in NLRC RAB-CAR 05-0170-98, NLRC
NCR CA No. 020270-99.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. Petitioners Delfin Lazaro Jr.
was its President and Roberto Galang its former
Director-Regional Sales. Respondent Joan Florendo-
Flores was the Senior Account Manager for Northern
Luzon.
On 1 July 1998 Joan Florendo-Flores filed with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) an amended
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
complaint for constructive dismissal against GLOBE,
Lazaro, Galang, and Cacholo M. Santos, her
immediate superior, Luzon Head-Regional Sales. In
her affidavit submitted as evidence during the
arbitration proceedings, Florendo-Flores bared that
Cacholo M. Santos never accomplished and
submitted her performance evaluation report thereby
depriving her of salary increases, bonuses and other
incentives which other employees of the same rank
had been receiving; reduced her to a house-to-house
selling agent (person-to-person sales agent or direct
sales agent) of company products ("handyphone")
despite her rank as supervisor of company dealers
and agents; never supported her in the sales
programs and recommendations she presented; and,
withheld all her other benefits, i.e., gasoline
allowance, per diems, representation allowance, and
car maintenance, to her extreme pain and
humiliation.3cräläwvirtualibräry
GLOBE and its co-petitioners claimed that after
receiving her salary in the second week of May 1998
Florendo-Flores went AWOL (Absent Without Leave)
without signifying through letter or any other means
that she was resigning from her position; that
notwithstanding her absence and the filing of her
case, respondent Florendo-Flores' employment was
not terminated as shown by the fact that salary was
still provided her until July 1998 to be released upon
her presentation of the attendance-record sheet
indicating that she already returned and reported for
work; that she continued to have the use a of
company car and company "handyphone" unit; that
she was replaced only when her absence became
indefinite and intolerable as the marketing operations
in Northern Luzon began to suffer; that during the pre-
trial conference it was learned that Florendo-Flores'
complaint rested on her alleged personal and private
disagreement with her immediate superior Cacholo M.
Santos; that there was no official act from GLOBE or
from other officers of the company, including
respondents Lazaro and Galang, which called for
28
28
Florendo-Flores' termination, diminution in rank,
seniority and benefits, or would imply, even remotely,
any of the same; and, that Florendo-Flores filed the
complaint without going through the grievance
process of GLOBE's Human Resources Department
and without informing its officers of her problems with
Cacholo M. Santos.
Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan declared Florendo-
Flores to have been illegally dismissed and ordered
petitioners to reinstate her without loss of seniority
rights and full benefits; and to pay full back wages,
inclusive of basic pay, allowances and bonuses as
prayed for in the complaint amounting to
P307,625.00, exemplary damages in the sum of
P200,000.00, and ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award as attorney's fees. However, the
Labor Arbiter set aside the claim of abandonment as
the company failed to send the requisite notice to
Florendo-Flores,4 hence, there was no adherence to
procedural due process. Although he recognized that
the problem brewed and eventually boiled over due to
the acts of Cacholo M. Santos, GLOBE's former Head
of Regional Sales, Luzon Area, the Labor Arbiter
found the company negligent in monitoring all its key
personnel, and thus assessed against it exemplary
damages at the same time deleting actual and moral
damages.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners appealed the decision to the NLRC which
modified the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
ruled that petitioners did not dismiss Florendo-Flores
but that the latter actually abandoned her employment
because of a disagreement with her immediate
superior which she failed to bring to the attention of
GLOBE and its officers, particularly petitioners Lazaro
and Galang.6 However, the NLRC declared that if
only as an act of grace for the latter's past services
with the company, GLOBE, Lazaro and Galang
should be held accountable for the back wages of
Florendo-Flores amounting to P307,625.00 minus the
amount of P63,000.00 for the value of the company

car in Florendo-Flores' possession, or the net amount
of P244,625.00.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Both parties elevated the NLRC decision to the Court
of Appeals, each side through a petition for certiorari.
In its Resolution of 2 September 2000 the appellate
court dismissed the petition of Florendo-Flores for
failure to append the required verification and
certification of non-forum shopping,8 while it gave due
course to the petition of GLOBE, Lazaro and Galang.
In their petition before the appellate court, GLOBE,
Lazaro and Galang averred that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ordered them to pay Florendo-
Flores full back wages and damages despite its
express finding that they did not cause the dismissal
of Florendo-Flores as the latter had actually
abandoned her employment on account of her
personal differences with her superior.
In its Decision of 25 May 2001 the Court of Appeals
found that Florendo-Flores was constructively
dismissed and that payment of back wages and
damages was in order. On 21 June 2001 GLOBE,
Lazaro and Galang filed a motion for reconsideration
but the motion was denied in the appellate court's
Resolution of 19 September 2001.
Petitioners pose the following questions in this
petition: In a special civil action for certiorari where
factual findings are deemed to be final and
conclusive, can the Court of Appeals alter or
substitute the findings of fact of the lower
court/tribunal? In the face of the finding of the NLRC
that respondent abandoned her employment because
of a personal squabble with her immediate superior,
and that petitioners had nothing to do with the
severance of Flores' employment, can petitioners be
held legally liable for back wages while the guilty party
Cacholo M. Santos is legally absolved of liability?
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
Petitioners submit that the answers to both questions
must be in the negative. They argue that the appellate
court can neither alter nor substitute the factual
findings of the NLRC as they are legally deemed to be
final and conclusive in a certiorari proceeding. They
contend that a special civil action for certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy created not to correct mistakes
in the factual findings or conclusions of the lower
court or tribunal, but a remedy intended to rectify
jurisdictional errors and grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, the Court of Appeals cannot make its own
factual findings and substitute them for the factual
findings of the NLRC, and on such basis render a
decision.
Petitioners further note that the appellate court failed
to address the issues raised in their petition. They
reiterate their position that they cannot be held liable
for payment of back wages as an act of grace in view
of the express finding by the NLRC that respondent
abandoned her employment because of a personal rift
with her immediate superior and not due to any act
attributable to them. They stress that there can be no
liability in the absence of any wrongful act.
Invoking the principle of res inter alios acta declaring
that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the
act, declaration or omission of another, petitioners
insist that since the NLRC found that respondent's
problems arose from the acts and deeds of Santos,
he alone should be held liable. Petitioners find special
exception to the NLRC's application of the concept of
"act of grace" to justify the award since an "act of
grace is not a source of demandable obligation. They
argue that it is not within the power of any judicial or
administrative agency to compel an employer to be
liberal.
In the review of an NLRC decision through a special
civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to
issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the labor tribunal.9 Hence, the Court
29
29
refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower
courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions,
such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court
is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as
in the instant case, the findings of the NLRC
contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.
In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction may look into the records of the case and
re-examine the questioned findings.10 As a corollary,
this Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in
their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.11
The same principles are now necessarily adhered to
and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its
expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated
through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see no error
on its part when it made anew a factual determination
of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of
the NLRC.
Glaring however is the discrepancy between the text
of the decision of the appellate court which declares
that respondent Florendo-Flores "was unlawfully
constructively dismissed" from employment,12 and its
dispositive portion which declares that "the assailed
judgment is affirmed."13 It should be noted that the
"assailed judgment" referred to the NLRC Decision
which declared that respondent was not illegally
dismissed but that she abandoned her employment.
Even in the award of back wages and exemplary
damages the two (2) decisions are at odds: The
award of back wages made by the NLRC was a
gratuity or an act of grace from petitioners while the
award made by the Court of Appeals could be
assumed to be anchored on its finding of illegal
dismissal. How should the inconsistency be
reconciled?
Where there is conflict between the dispositive portion
of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive

portion controls irrespective of what appears in the
body.14 While the body of the decision, order or
resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner
the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the
dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of
those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or
obligations.15 Hence, for the Court of Appeals to
have affirmed the assailed judgment is to adopt and
uphold the NLRC finding of abandonment and its
award of full back wages to respondent as an "act of
grace" from petitioners.
However, we believe this is not the proper view as the
records reveal that respondent was constructively
dismissed from service.
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation
of work because "continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay."16 All these are discernible in respondent's
situation. She was singularly edged out of
employment by the unbearable or undesirable
treatment she received from her immediate superior
Cacholo M. Santos who discriminated against her
without reason - not preparing and submitting her
performance evaluation report that would have been
the basis for her increased salary; not forwarding her
project proposals to management that would have
been the source of commendation; diminishing her
supervisor stature by assigning her to house-to-house
sales or direct sales; and withholding from her the
enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar
benefits that were necessary for her efficient sales
performance. Although respondent continued to have
the rank of a supervisor, her functions were reduced
to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales
agent. This was tantamount to a demotion. She might
not have suffered any diminution in her basic salary
but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she
was deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
and position, benefits which she apparently used to
receive.
Far from pointing to Santos alone as the source of her
woes, respondent attributes her degraded state to
petitioners as well. Florendo-Flores cited petitioners'
apathy or indifference to her plight as she was twice
left out in a salary increase in August 1987 and May
1998, without petitioners giving her any reason.17 It
eludes belief that petitioners were entirely in the dark
as the salary increases were granted to all employees
across-the-board but respondent was the only one left
receiving a P19,100.00 per month basic salary while
the rest received a basic salary of almost P35,000.00
per month.18 It is highly improbable that the exclusion
of respondent had escaped petitioners' notice. The
absence of an evaluation report from Santos should
have been noted by petitioners and looked into for
proper action to have been made. If a salary increase
was unwarranted, then it should have been
sufficiently explained by petitioners to respondent.
Petitioners argue that respondent Florendo-Flores
could have brought to their attention the deplorable
treatment she received from Santos by resorting to
the company's grievance machinery so that the
problems in her relationship with Santos could then
have been easily ironed out, but she did not. It
remains uncontroverted that respondent had inquired
from petitioners the reason why her other benefits had
been withheld and sought clarification for her
undeserved treatment but petitioner company and
Santos remained mum.19cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, contrary to the observation of the NLRC, the
dispute was not a mere private spat between
respondent Florendo-Flores and her immediate
superior Santos. Granting that this was the case, it
had exceeded the periphery of simple personal affairs
that overflowed into the realm of respondent's
employment.
30
30
Respondent narrates that sometime in June 1997
Santos wrote her a baseless accusatory letter, and he
together with GLOBE Sales Director Roberto Galang,
one of petitioners herein, verbally told her that she
should resign from her job, but she refused.20
Thereafter, in July 1997 and the months subsequent
thereto all of respondent's other benefits were
withheld without any reason nor explanation from the
company.21 Even as petitioners endeavored to lay
the blame on Santos alone, he would not have been
able to single-handedly mastermind the entire affair
as to influence Sales Director Galang and manipulate
the payroll. It only stands to reason that Santos was
acting pursuant to a management directive, or if not,
then petitioners had condoned it, or at the very least,
were negligent in supervising all of their employees.
As aptly observed by the Labor Arbiter -
x x x x it would appear however that the respondent
company was negligent in monitoring all its key
personnel. For it is the bounden duty of the corporate
officialdom to constantly monitor their managerial staff
if only to ascertain the smooth flow of work and
operations, which includes the inter-personal relations
of each and every key segment of the corporate
machinery. For such, it must be assessed with just
and reasonable exemplary
damages.22cräläwvirtualibräry
The unauthorized absence of respondent should not
lead to the drastic conclusion that she had chosen to
abandon her work. To constitute abandonment, there
must be: (a) failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) a clear
intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever
the employer-employee relationship,23 requisites that
are negated by the immediate filing by respondent
Florendo-Flores of a complaint for constructive
dismissal against petitioners. A charge of
abandonment is totally inconsistent with the
immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal;

more so, when it includes a prayer for
reinstatement.24cräläwvirtualibräry
The reduction of respondent's functions which were
originally supervisory in nature to a mere house-to-
house sales agent or direct sales agent constitutes a
demotion in rank. For this act of illegal dismissal, she
deserves no less than full back wages starting from
the time she had been illegally dismissed until her
actual reinstatement to her former position without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits - earned,
accrued and demandable. She shall continue to enjoy
her benefits, privileges and incentives including the
use of the company car and "handyphone."
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel
must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion.
It must always bear in mind the basic elements of
justice and fair play. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner that right is exercised.
Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the
employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker.25cräläwvirtualibräry
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the
burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an
employee are for just and valid grounds such as
genuine business necessity.26 The employer must be
able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It must
not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of
salary and other benefits. If the employer cannot
overcome this burden of proof, the employee's
demotion shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive
dismissal.
It should be noted that the award of back wages in the
instant case is justified upon the finding of illegal
dismissal, and not under the principle of "act of grace"
for past services rendered. There are occasions when
the Court exercises liberality in granting financial
awards to employees, but even then they contemplate
(LEGAL WRITING 1A2) A.G.H.GONZALES
31
only the award of separation pay and/or financial
assistance, and only as a measure of social justice
when the circumstances of the case so warrant, such
as instances of valid dismissal for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on the
employees' moral character.27 Proper regard for the
welfare of the labor sector should not dissuade us
from protecting the rights of management such that
an award of back wages should be forthcoming only
when valid grounds exist to support it.
An award of actual and moral damages is not proper
as the dismissal is not shown to be attended by bad
faith, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.28
Exemplary damages are likewise not proper as these
are imposed only if moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages are
awarded.29cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
MODIFIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of
25 May 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 60284 affirming the
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
of 28 January 2000 declaring that respondent Joan
Florendo-Flores had abandoned her work is SET
ASIDE. Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc., Delfin
Lazaro, Jr., and Roberto Galang are ordered to pay
respondent Joan Florendo-Flores full back wages
from the time she was constructively dismissed on 15
May 1998 until the date of her effective reinstatement,
without qualification or deduction. Accordingly,
petitioners are ordered to cause the immediate
reinstatement of respondent to her former position,
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Mendoza, J., on official leave.
31