LUIS S. WONG, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Petitioner Luis Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. LPI would
print sample calendars, then give them to agents to present to customers.
The agents would get the purchase orders of customers and forward them to LPI. After printing the
calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the customers. Thereafter, the agents would come
around to collect the payments. Wong, however, had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly
acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed with his wife. Hence, Wong's customers were
required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18,025.00, all dated December
30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI. These are all drawn against Allied Banking Corporation.

Before the maturity of the checks, Wong prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks and promised to
replace them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI
deposited the checks with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for
the reason "account closed." The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBC return slip.
On June 20, 1986, Manuel T. Limtong (The manager of LPI) through counsel notified the Wong of the
dishonor. Wong failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5) banking days.

On November 6, 1987, Wong was charged with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 under three
separate Informations for the three checks and another 2 were also filed.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testified on behalf of the company. Limtong averred that he
refused to accept the personal checks of petitioner since it was against company policy to accept
personal checks from agents. Hence, he and petitioner simply agreed to use the checks to pay
petitioner's unremitted collections to LPI. According to Limtong, a few days before maturity of the checks,
Wong requested him to defer the deposit of said checks for lack of funds. Wong promised to replace them
within thirty days, but failed to do so. Hence, upon advice of counsel, he deposited the checks which were
subsequently returned on the ground of "account closed."
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to guarantee the 1985 calendar
bookings of his customers. According to petitioner, he issued the checks not as payment for any
obligation, but to guarantee the orders of his customers. In fact, the face value of the six (6) postdated
checks tallied with the total amount of the calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the accused,
namely, Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00), New Society Rice and Corn Mill (P5,500.00),
Cuesta Enterprises (P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New Asia Restaurant (P3,375.00), and
New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these customers had already paid their respective orders,
petitioner claimed LPI did not return the said checks to him.
Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985 purchase orders (PO's) of his
customers. He contends that private respondent is not a "holder for value" considering that the checks
were deposited by private respondent after the customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing
the checks, private respondent should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner further assails the
credibility of complainant considering that his answers to cross-examination questions included: "I cannot
recall, anymore" and "We have no more record."
In his Comment, the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might have been initially intended by
petitioner to guarantee payments due from customers, but upon the refusal of LPI to accept said personal
checks per company policy, the parties had agreed that the checks would be used to pay off petitioner's
unremitted collections. Petitioner's contention that he did not demand the return of the checks because he
trusted LPI's good faith is contrary to human nature and sound business practice, according to the
Solicitor General.
whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 pertinent to the present case, are:
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have su􏰁cient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment."
Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were not issued to apply for
account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case
by claiming that the checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to
guarantee were already paid.
This flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks were in
payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for
what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.

Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after the
December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P.
Blg. 22 should not apply to him. He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank
account active and funded beyond the ninety- day period.
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
involves a state of mind di􏰁cult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check." To mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within
􏰁five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements
for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require a maker to maintain
funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment
within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be
deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner
from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section
186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days.
Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks
cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but
such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court,
private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would
issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the
checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full
payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the
checks. And despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent court's
affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on
November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a fine of not less than
but not more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 but the penalty imposed on him is hereby MODIFIED so that the sentence of
imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay a FINE of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the
amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent to double the
amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12058, and (3) P11,000.00, equivalent to double
the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055, with subsidiary imprisonment 24 in
case of insolvency to pay the aforesaid fines. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is also ordered to pay
to LPI the face value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest thereon from the time of filing
the criminal charges in court, as well as to pay the costs.

Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. He had a history
of unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged in a con􏰁rmation receipt he co-signed with his
wife for LPI. Hence, petitioner's costumers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI would
accept their purchase orders. Wong issued 6 postdated checks all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn
payable to the order of LPI. The checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of
customers who failed to issue postdated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused to
accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the payment of
petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984. Before maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI
not to deposit the checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. He failed to honor his words and
upon deposit of LPI, the checks were returned for the reason of "account closed." After being noti􏰁ed,
petitioner still failed to make arrangement for payments. He was charged with three counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 under three separate informations