Uncontrolled copy from the catalogue dated August 2004

Railway Group Standard

GE/RT8014
Issue One
Date June 2001

Hot Axle Bearing

Detection

Synopsis
This document mandates the means
by which the timely detection of hot
axle bearings can be achieved and the
measures to be taken when such an
event occurs.

Submitted by

This document is the property of

Railway Safety. It shall not be
reproduced in whole or in part without
Anne Blakeney the written permission of the Controller,
Standards Project Manager Railway Group Standards,
Railway Safety.

Authorised by Published by
Railway Safety
Evergreen House
160 Euston Road
London NW1 2DX

Brian Alston © Copyright 2001 Railway Safety

Controller, Railway Group Standards
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Railway Group Standard

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Hot Axle Bearing Detection Issue One
Date June 2001
Page 1 of 11

Contents
Section Description Page

Part A
Issue Record 2
Technical Content 2
Responsibilities 2
Compliance 2
Health and Safety Responsibilities 2
Supply 3

Part B
1 Purpose 4
2 Scope 4
3 Definitions 4
4 Introduction 5
5 Rail Vehicle Requirements 5
6 Infrastructure Controller Requirements 8
7 Alarm Activation 9
8 Incident Recording and Reporting 9
9 Change Control and System Integrity 10

References 11

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Issue One
Hot Axle Bearing Detection
Date June 2001
Page 2 of 11

Part A
Issue Record
This document will be updated when necessary by distribution of a complete
replacement.

Issue Date Comments

One June 2001 Original Document
Supersedes GM/RT2242, GM/RT2243,
GM/TT0142, GO/OP0006 and GO/RT3207

Technical Content
Approved by:
Keith Rose, Principal Vehicles Engineer, Railway Safety
Richard Evans, Principal Operations, Railway Safety
Haydn Peers, Principal Plant Engineer, Railway Safety
Enquiries to be directed to Railway Safety – Tel. 0207 557 8774

Responsibilities
Railway Group Standards are mandatory on all members of the Railway Group
* and apply to all relevant activities that fall into the scope of each individual’s
Railway Safety Case. If any of those activities are performed by a contractor,
the contractor’s obligation in respect of Railway Group Standards is determined
by the terms of the contract between the respective parties. Where a contractor
is a duty holder of a Railway Safety Case then Railway Group Standards apply
directly to the activities described in the Safety Case.

* The Railway Group comprises Railtrack PLC (known as Railtrack), Railway

Safety, and the train and station operators who hold railway safety cases for
operation on or related to infrastructure controlled by Railtrack PLC.

Compliance
The effective date of this document is 6 October 2001 and the requirements
mandated shall be complied with no later than the dates detailed below:

The design requirements are to be complied with by all vehicles with a

Certificate of Conformance for Vehicle Design signed on or after 4 October
2003. In addition to this the design requirements shall be complied with from
7 October 2006 by any future vehicles, built to the same design as a vehicle
already having Engineering Acceptance. The requirements mandated in this
document do not apply retrospectively to existing vehicles. The exception is that
where vehicles are being modified in the area covered by the scope of this
document, the requirements shall be applied so far as reasonably practicable.

All other requirements mandated within this document shall be complied with
from the effective date of this document.

Railway Group members shall not deviate from the requirements set out in this
document unless they have obtained prior authorisation to do so in accordance
with the requirements of GA/RT6001, GA/RT6004, or GA/RT6006.

Health and Safety

Responsibilities
In issuing this document, Railway Safety makes no warranties, express or
implied, that compliance with all or any documents published by Railway Safety
is sufficient on its own to ensure safe systems of work or operation. Each user
is reminded of its own responsibilities to ensure health and safety at work and
its individual duties under health and safety legislation.
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Date June 2001
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Supply
Controlled and uncontrolled copies of this document may be obtained from the
Industry Safety Liaison Dept, Railway Safety, Evergreen House,
160 Euston Road, London NW1 2DX

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Hot Axle Bearing Detection
Date June 2001
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Part B
1 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to set out the obligations of train operators and
the infrastructure controller to ensure the timely detection of hot axle bearings.
The document also sets out the obligations for dealing with HABD activation,
keeping records, monitoring trends and minimising future occurrences.

2 Scope
The overall scope of Railway Group Standards is as specified in Appendix A of
GA/RT6001.

This document contains requirements which are applicable to the duty holders
of the following categories of Railway Safety Case:

a) Infrastructure controller
b) Train operator

Specifically the contents of this document apply to:

a) the railway routes which form part of Railtrack controlled infrastructure

b) all rail vehicles that operate on Railtrack controlled infrastructure. Rail-
Mounted Maintenance Machines and Road-Rail Vehicles that are only
permitted to operate within possessions are excluded from the
requirements of this document.

3 Definitions
Axle Bearing
Bearing on a rail vehicle axle that transmits a proportion of the weight of the
vehicle directly to the wheelset. For the purpose of this definition it excludes
those bearings associated with the mounting of traction motors or final drives.

Hot Axle Bearing

An axle bearing overheated, or in the process of overheating, because of failure
or of damage to the bearing.

Hot Axle Bearing Detector (HABD)

A device on the lineside that triggers an alarm when it detects a hot axle bearing
of a passing rail vehicle.

Inside Bearing
An axle bearing located between the adjacent wheel and the centre of the axle
shaft.

Rail-Mounted Maintenance Machine

A rail-mounted maintenance machine is a vehicle that meets the requirements
of GM/RT2402.

RIDDOR 95
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995.

Road-Rail Vehicle
A road-rail vehicle is a vehicle that meets the requirements of GM/RT1300.

Target Area
That area on the axle or axle bearing that will be scanned by a HABD for
thermal data.

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Date June 2001
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4 Introduction
4.1 Failed Axle Bearings
Failed axle bearings on trains create a hazard to the safe operation of the
railway. One indication that a bearing is about to fail is a rise in temperature
and the heat that is generated by the bearing. Failing bearings can be detected
through this overheating. If a hot bearing is not detected in time, failure of the
bearing and axle end may result. An axle bearing failure can have serious
consequences.

4.2 Bearing Design Requirements

The requirements for the design, construction, testing, operation, maintenance
and repair of axle bearings are contained within the suite of Railway Group
Standards which together form GM/RM2525 Wheelset Manual.

4.3 Additional Control Measures

Experience has shown that despite the control measures contained within the
documents forming GM/RM2525, there remains a risk of axle bearings
overheating that is required to be mitigated by additional control measures. To
achieve this mitigation, this document mandates the installation of equipment
for detection of hot axle bearings, either on the vehicles or at the lineside.

5 Rail Vehicle
Requirements
5.1 Vehicle Compatibility with Lineside Detection Systems (HABDs)
5.1.1
Rail vehicle designs that depend on HABD equipment shall enable the lineside
observation part of that equipment to view a suitable target area on either the
axle or axle bearing assembly. In this regard there shall be two separate target
areas (T1 and T2) and these are defined in the following paragraphs and
identified in Figures 1 to 3.

See Figure 2

K( K)

Wheelset
Centre Line

Figure1 Cross Section Through Axle - Sketch of Target Areas

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Hot Axle Bearing Detection
Date June 2001
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Target Area 1 (T1)

Target Area 2 (T2)

840mm
From wheelset centre line 920mm

1030mm
1110mm

Figure 2 Detailed Offset Dimensions

Qo

0o

Figure 3 Elevation of Wheel - Illustration of Angle Q

Target Area 1
This target area shall lie at a distance between 840mm and 920mm from the
wheelset centre line. A continuous length of at least 80% of this distance
(64mm) shall extend around the circumference of the axle or axle bearing to an

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Date June 2001
Page 7 of 11

angle Q of ±135 from the zero point on the underside of the axle or bearing.
o

These criteria dimensions form a symmetrical strip around the axle or axle
bearing that shall be visible to HABD equipment.

Target Area 2
This target area shall take the same profile as Target Area 1, except that it shall
lie at a distance between 1030mm and 1110mm from the wheelset centre line.

5.1.2
It shall be permissible to disregard one of the target areas on a vehicle where it
can be demonstrated that an affected vehicle will not pass particular HABD
types that would view the target area disregarded.

5.1.3
To facilitate the setting of trigger levels of HABDs, train operators shall make
available to the infrastructure controller, upon request, the normal permissible
maximum temperatures of axle bearings, for the vehicles that they operate.

5.1.4
The lineside equipment shall be able to view the target areas on either the axle
or axle bearing without being obstructed by shrouds or other equipment. Such
shrouds or other equipment including vehicle side skirts or bogie structural
members but exclude bearing housings or end caps.

5.1.5
Each rail vehicle design shall minimise false alarms from any other heat source
present on a vehicle, that falls within a longitudinal viewing window extending
beyond the wheelset bearing assembly. The longitudinal viewing window will
depend on the start trigger position for the scanner, the viewing angle of the
scanner and the distance travelled by the wheelset during the scan.

5.1.6
Where it is not reasonably practicable to shield an unwanted heat source on a
vehicle from the view of HABDs, the train operator shall agree with the
infrastructure controller the necessary actions to avoid repeated vehicle
examinations and ensure those necessary actions are implemented.

5.2 On-Vehicle Detection Systems

5.2.1
Where a vehicle design prevents the detection of hot axle bearings in the target
areas by lineside detection equipment or a vehicle is fitted with inside bearings,
that vehicle shall be fitted with an on-vehicle hot axle bearing detection system.
The on-vehicle hot axle bearing detection system shall function either by thermal
or other means, and monitor all axle bearings on a vehicle.

5.2.2
All new vehicles that operate at speeds in excess of 125 mph shall be fitted with
an on-vehicle hot axle bearing detection system.

5.2.3
For all new vehicles, or where a vehicle undergoes a change of use, train
operators shall undertake a risk assessment to determine whether fitment of an
on-vehicle hot axle bearing detection system is appropriate.

5.2.4
When an on-vehicle hot axle bearing detection system determines that there is a
potentially predetermined unsafe axle bearing temperature, the system shall
provide an indication of the axle concerned and shall cause the following to
occur:

a) On passenger carrying vehicles arrangements shall be that the driver be

alerted.

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Hot Axle Bearing Detection
Date June 2001
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b) On non-passenger carrying vehicles:

i) the driver shall be alerted, or

ii) the train brakes shall automatically apply in full service or emergency
application mode.

6 Infrastructure
Controller Requirements
6.1 Existing HABD Sites
The infrastructure controller shall not withdraw any existing HABD site without
the consent of those train operators whose vehicles rely on the monitoring
provided at that HABD site. The infrastructure controller shall demonstrate to
the train operators affected that alternative controls exist such that the facilities
are no longer appropriate.

6.2 Provision of New HABD Sites

New HABD sites shall be provided where the infrastructure controller determines
that installation of HABDs reduces an identified risk of hot axle bearings to As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

Where any new vehicle condition monitoring equipment is to be installed, such

as the provision of Wheel Impact Load Detection equipment, consideration shall
be given to the inclusion of HABD equipment at that site.

Similarly, where a new or existing HABD site is to be installed or upgraded,

consideration shall be given to include additional monitoring equipment
including, for example, Wheel Impact Load Detection equipment or Hot Wheel
Detection equipment.

Where signalling concentration schemes are being planned that will remove the
presence of lineside signallers, then the infrastructure controller shall consider
the provision of an additional HABD site(s) as part of the scheme to ensure that
the situation will remain ALARP.

6.3 HABD Positioning

The infrastructure controller shall install HABDs on routes or sections of line
having regard to:

a) physical characteristics of the route

b) the proximity of any existing detectors or vehicle condition monitoring

systems

c) the proximity of facilities to inspect and where necessary, detach, examine

and attend to overheated axle bearings

d) the proximity of suitable vehicle stabling facilities.

The positioning of new HABDs shall be undertaken in consultation with the

relevant train operators.

6.4 Capability of HABDs

All HABD installations shall be capable of detecting hot axle bearings on as
many rail vehicle types that operate on the infrastructure as is reasonably
practicable and shall be set to view at least one of the target areas as set out in
section 5.1.1.

6.5 HABD Installations

HABDs shall be installed and maintained in accordance with the design and
maintenance instructions of that equipment. The provision of new HABDs or the
refurbishment of existing HABDs shall be in accordance with a programme
published by the infrastructure controller. The programme shall be discussed in
advance with the relevant train operators for each route and their views shall be
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taken into account. The relevant Sectional Appendix shall detail the location of
each HABD. The requirements for the keeping of records of infrastructure
equipment are contained in GI/RT7001.

6.6 Activation of HABDs

HABDs shall be set to trigger an immediate alarm in the appropriate signalling
centre or operations control centre, when pre-set values are exceeded.

6.7 HABD Performance

Each HABD installation shall enable accurate recognition within the target area
of a passing hot axle bearing, including the location of the axle bearing within
the train formation.

6.8 HABD Alignment

Each HABD installation shall minimise false alarms and detection of heat
sources that are separate and distinct from hot axle bearings.

7 Alarm Activation
7.1 Instructions Following Detection of a Hot Bearing
Instructions in the event of activation of either an on-vehicle hot axle detection
equipment or a HABD are contained in Section H of GO/RT3000 The Rule
Book, GO/RM3053 Working Manual for Rail Staff and GO/RM3061 Signalling
General Instructions.

7.2 Agreed Procedures Following Activation

There shall be a method, agreed between the train operator and the
infrastructure controller, for dealing with a vehicle that has activated either an
on-vehicle hot axle bearing detector or a HABD such that any potential risk from
a hot axle bearing is minimised.

7.3 Actions Following Confirmed Hot Axle Bearings

The train operator and the infrastructure controller shall have agreed procedures
in place to ensure that a rail vehicle identified as having an overheated axle
bearing is prevented from re-entering service until:

a) a competent person has specified the actions to be taken to make the

vehicle safe

b) those actions have been carried out.

7.4 False Activation of HABD Equipment

Where the infrastructure controller identifies the regular activation of a HABD by
a heat source other than a hot axle bearing, the infrastructure controller shall
agree with the relevant train operator/s the actions to be taken to mitigate such
false alarms. When requested, the infrastructure controller shall make available
to train operators information on settings for installed HABD equipment.

8 Incident Recording
and Reporting
8.1 Initiation of a SMIS Report
Details of each overheated axle bearing together with all activation of either an
on-vehicle hot axle detector or a HABD shall be input to the Safety Management
Information System (SMIS) in accordance with the requirements detailed in
GE/RT8047. The train operator shall initiate reports originating from on-vehicle
hot axle detector activation. The infrastructure controller shall initiate reports
originating from HABD activation. The type of activation shall be recorded in all
instances.

8.2 Conclusion of a SMIS Report

Where either an on-vehicle hot axle detector is activated or HABD activation is
due to a confirmed heat source on a vehicle, the train operator of the vehicle

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Date June 2001
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concerned shall conclude the SMIS report. For all other activations, the
infrastructure controller shall conclude the SMIS report.

8.3 Monitoring of Overheated Axle Bearings

Train operators shall monitor, record and report confirmed hot axle bearings as
part of their safety performance monitoring and defect reporting procedures.
Requirements for such reporting arrangements are contained in GE/RT8250.
HABD performance and availability shall be recorded by the infrastructure
controller and the information made available on request. The requirements
contained in this document do not remove the reporting obligations mandated
by RIDDOR 95.

8.4 Review of Detector Activation

Train operators and the infrastructure controller shall review the activation
records of on-vehicle hot axle detectors and HABDs at regular agreed intervals
in order to identify trends and incidents that could compromise safe running.
The parties shall jointly agree proposals for corrective action and shall
implement the agreed actions accordingly.

9 Change Control and

System Integrity
9.1 Changes to Rail Vehicles
When a train operator proposes changes to rail vehicles that run on Railtrack
controlled infrastructure and covered within the scope of this document, the train
operator shall review and, where necessary, enhance controls to manage the
risk from hot axle bearings (see section 5.2.3). The train operator shall ensure
that a risk assessment of the proposed changes is undertaken, if appropriate
with the infrastructure controller, and any action agreed and implemented.

9.2 Out of Service on-Vehicle Hot Axle Detection Equipment

Arrangements for managing out of service on-vehicle hot axle detection
equipment are contained in the Rule Book GO/RT3000.

9.3 Infrastructure Changes

The infrastructure controller shall advise and agree with train operators any
changes to Railtrack controlled infrastructure that could impair the effectiveness
of lineside HABD systems prior to introduction of the change. The infrastructure
controller shall ensure that a risk assessment of the proposed change is
undertaken in conjunction with the relevant train operators, and any appropriate
action agreed and implemented.

9.4 Out of Service HABDs

When a lineside HABD is taken out of use due to a defect or maintenance, the
infrastructure controller shall implement alternative monitoring arrangements
agreed with each train operator that uses those HABD facilities within 48 hours
of each HABD being taken out of use..

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Date June 2001
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References
GA/RT6001 Railway Group Standards Change Procedures
GA/RT6004 Temporary Non-Compliance with Railway Group Standards
GA/RT6006 Derogations from Railway Group Standards
GE/RT8047 Reporting of Safety-Related Information to Railtrack
GE/RT8250 Safety Performance Monitoring and Defect Reporting of Rail Vehicles
and Plant and Machinery
GI/RT7001 Management of Safety-Related Records of Elements of the Infrastructure
GM/RM2525 Wheelsets Manual
GM/RT1300 Engineering Acceptance of Road-Rail Vehicles
GM/RT2402 Engineering Acceptance of Rail-Mounted Maintenance Machines
GO/RT3000 The Rule Book
GO/RM3053 Working Manual for Rail Staff - Handling and Carriage of Dangerous Goods
GO/RM3061 Signalling General Instruction and Train Signalling Regulations Manual

Related documents

GE/RC8514 Code of Practice : Hot Axle Bearing Detection

The Catalogue of Railway Group Standards and the Railway Group Standards
CD-ROM give the current issue number and status of documents published by
Railway Safety.

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