Land Registration Fraud Case Addresses Torrens System Vulnerabilities

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 18, 2008.]
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M.

MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L.
TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL
MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE
V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK,
SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON,
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L.
MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L.
MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS
JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented
by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok , petitioners, vs . HEIRS OF
HOMER L. BARQUE, Represented by TERESITA BARQUE
HERNANDEZ , respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA , J : p
The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles

have helped stabilize land ownership in the Philippines. Its underlying principle is
security with facility in dealing with land. 1 Its fundamental purpose is to quiet title to
land, to perpetually enjoin any question in the legality of the title, 2 hence, the titles
issued under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system is imperfect in that it
remains susceptible to fraud, either in the original registration proceedings or in
subsequent transactions. 3
These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices relating to the attempts
at registration of the subject property. Necessarily, they call for the correct application
of entrenched principles in land registration. At the same time, they afford this Court
the opportunity to again defend the Torrens system against unscrupulous elements
who use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to exert judicial might in
ensuring that fraud does not prevail in the end.
These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the Special First Division
which had initially ruled on them, most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12
December 2005. 4 They were accepted by the Court en banc in a Resolution dated 26
July 2006. Subsequently, the parties presented their various contentions before the
Court in an oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the submission of their
respective memoranda. While the cases were under consideration of the Court en banc,
the participation of the O ce of the Solicitor General was required, 5 and a set of new
parties was allowed leave to intervene. 6
The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005 Decision, but are summarized
herein for convenience.
On 11 June 1988, a re gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating,
among others, records stored in the O ce of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
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That re has attained notoriety due to the numerous certi cates of title on le with that
o ce, which were destroyed as a consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze on
speci c property registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in a
number of cases since then. 7 These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the
most contentious of those cases thus far.
Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) led a petition 8 with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of
Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of
Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by
the 1988 re. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged
owner's duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a
Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property.
Learning of the Barques' petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks)
led their opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque
title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481
[372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et al. They further
alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both the Barques' and the
Manotoks' titles advert to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated
in the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The Barque title actually involves
two parcels of land as part of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, with an aggregate area
of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title concerns only one parcel of land, but
with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting o cer of the LRA,
denied 9 the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and
171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823
Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered
in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-
213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated
by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in
his letter dated February 19, 1997.
CAaDSI
xxx xxx xxx
The Barques' motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order
10 dated 10 February 1998; hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA.
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting o cer
should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner's
duplicate certi cate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have con ned
himself to the owner's duplicate certi cate of title. The LRA further found anomalies in
the Manotoks' title. It observed that:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and
convincing evidence that TCT No. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid,
genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . . The Register of Deeds of Quezon City
himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a
certi cation to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not
salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 . . . .
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot
re ected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries
of Lot 823 Piedad Estate . . . as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L.
Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands . . . .
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of
TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such
circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is
mandatory . . . . CacEIS
It would be necessary to underscore that the certi ed copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was
duly issued by the o ce of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR
whose o ce is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National
Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian
thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said
plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines O cial Receipt No. 2513818 Q
dated 9-23-96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos
. . . con rmed that a micro lm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on le in the Technical Records
and Statistics Section of his o ce. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed
to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his o ce has no
records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certi ed copy of the computer
print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered
into the micro lm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number
410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box
Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Official Receipt . . . .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the
legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence
presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the
fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. . .
.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was fraudulently
reconstituted, the LRA noted that only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the
Manotok title as a Torrens title. It thus ruled, 1 1 that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT
No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation
of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
The Manotoks led a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
Barques with a prayer that the reconstitution be ordered immediately. The LRA denied
1 2 the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration and the Barques' prayer for immediate
reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The Barques' petition for review 1 3 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66700, while the Manotoks' petition for review 1 4 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute the
Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title should rst
be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Manotoks
argued in their own petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the Manotok title was
spurious and fake.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan led a motion for leave to
intervene. 1 5 She sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the subject property. CTacSE
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a

Decision 1 6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, denying the Barques' petition and a rming the
LRA Resolution. The Barques led a motion for reconsideration. 1 7 Subsequently, the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision
1 8 dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-
22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith
petitioners' valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177. 1 9
The Manotoks led a motion for the reconsideration of the amended decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, but this was denied. 2 0
On the other hand, as to the Manotoks' petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 2 1 on 29 October 2003 which
a rmed the resolution of the LRA. 2 2 The appellate court held that the LRA correctly
deferred in giving due course to the Barques' petition for reconstitution, since there was
as yet no nal judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title. The Barques led a
motion for reconsideration of this ruling. 2 3 As had occurred with the Barques' petition,
the Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the Barques' motion for
reconsideration and on 24 February 2004, promulgated its Amended Decision 2 4
wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this
Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the
LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.
Aggrieved with the twin decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, both ordering the cancellation of the Manotok title,
the Manotoks led separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No.
162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively. On 2 August 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of G.R. No. 162605 with G.R. No. 162335. 2 5
On 12 December 2005, the Court's First Division rendered its Decision 2 6
a rming the two decisions of the Court of Appeals. 2 7 The Manotoks led a motion for
reconsideration, which the Court's First Division denied in a Resolution dated 19 April
2006. 2 8 Thereafter, the Manotoks led a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for
Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration attached. The Court denied the
same in a Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further ordered that entry of
judgment be made. 2 9 Thus on 2 May 2006, entry of judgment was made in the Book of
Entries of Judgment. 3 0
The Barques led multiple motions with the Court's First Division concerning the
execution of the judgment, including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For
Execution. 3 1 In response, the Manotoks led an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for
Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral
argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division referred these
cases to the Court en banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc promulgated a
Resolution accepting the cases. 3 2
On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan led a motion
to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. 3 3 Movants alleged
that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605 was
owned by them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was
issued Sales Certi cate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Moreover,
they attached to their petition the ndings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be. 3 4
The Director of the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
recommended to the Director of the LMB that:
. . . steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-
22481(372302) and all its derivative titles so that the land covered may be reverted to the
State. 3 5
Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the O ce of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in these cases, directing the OSG to le its Comment. The OSG led its
Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments were eventually held on 24 July 2007. TDSICH
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the
Solicitor General to submit their respective memoranda.
I
As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are
attended by a few procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court en banc's
move on the Special First Division's referral for re-evaluation of these petitions when an
entry of judgment had already been made in favor of the Barques. Yet the prevailing
consensus within the Court en banc was to proceed with the re-evaluation of these
cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in such rare
manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings by the
First Division and the Special First Division warranted either a rmation or modi cation
by the Court acting en banc.
It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modi ed or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc". It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of the
First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision
alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within
the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the
earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to
administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be
stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts which
implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.
The O ce of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before
had sanctioned the recall entries of judgment. 3 6 The power to suspend or even
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be nal. 3 7 The militating concern for the
Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties,
but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of
jurisprudence on the field.
It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved
to accept these petitions in 2006, we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December
2005 Decision of the Court's First Division, as well as the Resolutions dated 19 April
and 19 June 2006 of that same Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As
earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed
jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.
II
In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the
Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and
forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although
it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation through
the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of
Appeals initially upheld the LRA's position, but ultimately, upon motion for
reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of
the Barque title.
Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the
cancellation of Torrens titles in the Philippines.
To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably
directed the cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of
the Barque title. The obvious question is whether the Court of Appeals was empowered
to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the
Barques and the Manotoks. It could not.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides that "[a] certi cate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack [. . . and] cannot be altered, modi ed, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law". 3 8 Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title
cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the
Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as
fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's
administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property.
Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa
(B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the
regional trial court. 3 9 Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the
Barques' and the Manotoks' petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction 4 0 over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens
title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory
authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
Note that the O ce of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for the
government and its agencies including the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has
jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a
certi cate of title. It invokes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC under
Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over "all civil
actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein .
. . ." That the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over actions seeking the
cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is re ected
in hundreds if not thousands of examples in jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation
of "exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC", there is statutory basis for the LRA to
exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we can perhaps
assess such law separately from B.P. Blg. 129.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land
Registration Commissioner, as follows:
SEC. 6. General Functions. —
(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to nal judgments of the
courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by
the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and
other personnel of the Commission;
(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision
of, Registers of Deeds;
(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and
personnel of the Court of First Instance throughout the Philippines
with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation
to the registration of lands;
(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative
to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;
(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-
subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496
except those covered by P.D. No. 957.
Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to
cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that con rms
the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26
as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of
titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to
ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing
Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to
cancel the Manotok title. The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted
correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative reconstitution
of the Barque title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative
reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certi cates of titles have been lost due to
"flood, fire and other force majeure". The petitioner in such a case is required to execute
an affidavit, containing the following averments: AEIHaS

(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been
presented for registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of
its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whether the
registration of such deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment;
(2) That the owner's duplicate certi cate or co-owner's duplicate is in due
form without any apparent intentional alterations or erasures;
(3) That the certi cate of title is not the subject of litigation or
investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness
or due execution or issuance;
(4) That the certi cate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was
lost or destroyed;
(5) That the certi cate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued
by the Assessor's Office; and
(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years
prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution. 4 1
Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, further
provides:
Sec. 19. If the certi cate of title considered lost or destroyed, and
subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in
whose favor the reconstituted certi cate of title has been issued, the Register of
Deeds or the party concerned should bring the matter to the attention of the
proper regional trial court, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the
cancellation of the reconstituted certi cate of title and render, with respect to
the memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the
reconstituted certi cate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice
and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certi cate
of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether
voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certi cate of title
has been issued, the procedure prescribed above, with respect to the
memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on the reconstituted
certi cate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the
new certi cate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may
have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof. 4 2
Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or
other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and
all persons having knowledge thereof.
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination
obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution and,
upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than two years but
not exceeding ve years or the payment of a ne of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but
not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public o cer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a
decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be subject to
criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment of not less than
ve years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a ne of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos but not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 4 3
These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution of
Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the subject
property is not covered by an existing title in favor of a person other than the applicant.
Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are
not the venue for con rmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a
previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued
to its owner. 4 4
The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development
Corporation v. Valenzuela, 4 5 which we held that "[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction
over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed
titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names
of their duly registered owners". 4 6 That such doctrine was established for cases of
judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of administrative
reconstitution. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in
Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over
a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a Torrens title.
After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or to diminish its
legal effect. Even assuming that the previously issued title is obviously fraudulent or
attended by aws and as such cannot be countenanced by the legal system, the
corrective recourse lies with the courts, and not with the LRA.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is led with the LRA, and it appears
from the o cial records that the subject property is already covered by an existing
Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but
to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but
the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not there is a
previously existing title covering that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals
at that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over the
property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the
existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the
Republic. cSTDIC
III
The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco, 4 7 where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial
reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case led by
Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor
General, which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to
the "fatal in rmities" of Molina's cause of action, the Court itself nulli ed the
reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of
Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques' petition.
The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary because
in that case the trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively
led by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for reconstitution of Molina's
titles. Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the Court of Appeals would have then
reviewed the trial court's decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct resolution
which was the annulment of Molina's titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special
civil action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these
alternative results — the more prudent recourse of directing the trial court to act on the
notices of appeal and to forward the case records to the Court of Appeals, or the more
immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process and the Court itself by directly
annulling Molina's titles.
The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the
Manotok title with that undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the
Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the
Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel
the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence
to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRA's ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot
be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional
defects that attended the actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have
effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive authority.
IV
The 2005 Decision accepted the ndings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals
that the Manotok title was spurious and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even
though no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial court. That the 2005
Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our earlier
explanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA
from inquiring into the validity of that title.
ASIDTa
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to
have ruled de nitively on the validity of the Barques' claim to title. After all, since neither
the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation of the Manotok title, any
declaration that the Barque claim was valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in
order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best for this
Court to test the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had
concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record before
the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task.
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot
823 of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900. 4 8 The
Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus, it
could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the name of
Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name of
Manotok Realty, Inc. 4 9 This detracts from the Barques' claim that the Manotoks do not
have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title
registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the
anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made
in favor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a con ict as
to its actual existence in the les of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of
correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of FLS-
3168-D in the EDP listing, 5 0 nor did the LMB have a record of the plan. 5 1 However, a
micro lm copy of FLS-3168-D was on le in the Technical Records and Statistical
Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital Region
(DENR-NCR). 5 2 The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore
the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from its office. 5 3
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of
FLS-3168-D as veri ed from its micro lm le was the same as the copy sent by the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital Region Lands
Management Sector. 5 4 The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it
was a forged document. 5 5 To amplify the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent
a detailed explanation to prove that it did not come from its o ce. 5 6 In a letter to the
administrator of the LRA, the hearing o cer concluded that "it is evident that there is an
attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it
is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC for investigation and ling of
charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this o ce under your administration". 5 7
IEaCDH
There are signi cant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of
the Piedad Estate as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the
Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR. 5 8 The DENR-con rmed
technical description reads:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Payatas Estate ; on the SE., by Tuazon Estate ;
along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 818 ; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822,
all of Piedad Estate. 5 9
However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are critical changes with
respect to the boundaries named therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in the
subdivision plan would read:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Diez Francisco ; on the SE., by Diez Francisco ;
along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 826 ; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822,
all of Piedad Estate. 6 0
The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the
subdivision plan it relies on and the DENR record. They also do not contradict the
nding of the National Archives that there is no copy in its les of the deed of sale
allegedly executed between Setosta and Barque. 6 1
Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA
dated 23 August 2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out that
the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line falls outside
Quezon City". This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the
boundaries of Quezon City. 6 2 A similar nding was made by the Land Management
Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the
Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate. 6 3
These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in
acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported
Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have been
dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques' claim of ownership
is exceedingly weak.
V
In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind
eye on the evidence and points raised against the Manotok title. The apparent aws in
the Manotoks’ claim are considerable and disturbing enough. The Court, as the ultimate
citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the integrity of the land registration
system of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain silent on the
apparent defects of the Manotok title, re ective as they are of a scourge this Court is
dedicated to eliminate.
Many of these aws have especially emerged through the petition-for-
intervention of Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in
these cases. The Manahans had led a petition with the OSG seeking that it initiate
cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That petition was
referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of the
Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the
appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the
Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000. 6 4
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs Roseller S. dela Peña a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued
to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering that query through a
Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the Manotoks could not
have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.
6 5 The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT No.
22813, purportedly issued by the O ce of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper
half, to the point that it is not visually discernible what year the same was issued. More
crucially, a certi cation was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January
2000 stating thus:
After a thorough veri cation from the les of this O ce, it appears that the documents
leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found from the les of this
Office. 6 6
These ndings were twice veri ed with due diligence and recon rmed by the
DENR, according to Undersecretary dela Peña. 6 7 TIADCc
The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in conducting the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales certi cates
and assignment of sales certi cates in the names of the purported predecessors-in-
interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and Felicisimo
Villanueva — certi cates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry Report No.
C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded
that the said documents "could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be". 6 8
According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the O ce of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City a Deed of Conveyance for registration and mandatory
issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant to Section 122 of the Land
Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of Conveyance was referred to the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001.
Also on record 6 9 is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate
dated 5 July 1989, authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources O ce (CENRO), NCR-North Sector and addressed
to the CENRO O cer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No. 823 had
actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in 1908. In 1939,
Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was issued Sales
Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated:
Records show that the Sale Certi cate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was
issued to Valentin Manahan as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman Manahan as
(Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 23,
1974. Based on my research at the Land Management Bureau (LMB), Central O ce, it
appears that original claimant of lot 823 was Valentin Manahan. 7 0
All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks' claim dissuade us from
being simply content in re exively dismissing the administrative petition for
reconstitution filed by the Barques. Indeed, we have to take further action.
VI
The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent
in the Manotok title is the fact that we are not engaged in the review of an original
action for the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the questionable
title were now properly at issue, the Court would without hesitancy rule on such
question. Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed warrants more
deliberation.
The conservative approach would be to still a rm the continuing validity of the
Manotok title until the proper case for its cancellation is led with the regional trial
court. Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse for us is to direct the
Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot
No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor General can
le the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. However, it is already
apparent, following the evaluation of these cases, that there is evidence — unrefuted
thus far — indicating that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as awed as that of the
Barques.
Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v.
Cebu Country Club, 7 1 the subject property therein had originally formed part of the
Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the administrative
reconstitution of the title to the property, leading Alonso to le a complaint for
nulli cation of such title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property. Alonso's
complaint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. While the case
was pending with this Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment on the
validity of Cebu Country Club's administratively reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court
concluded that Cebu Country Club had not been able to establish a clear title over the
contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its decision declared "that Lot No.
727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certi cate of Title Nos.
251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines".
The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in
Alonso, 7 2 extensively discussed why it had taken that extraordinary step even though
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, had not participated or
intervened in that case before the lower courts.
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over
which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property
of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements
of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
xxx xxx xxx
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear and
convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for both
respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private property. Both parties
failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded to prove their claim of
ownership over the subject property.
xxx xxx xxx

Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is
an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent
failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the lengthy
possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor,
as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the
Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning
decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes
of limitation do not run against the State, unless therein expressly provided, is founded on
"the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the
public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the o cers or agents to whose care
they are confided." DEAaIS
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally
belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law insofar
as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a Friar Land and both parties failed to
show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of the State or that it had
become private property. 7 3
T h e Alonso approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the
subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No.
1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater
concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if
at all.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any su cient
evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record
indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the
Manotoks' claim to title is awed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal
reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise
structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court
of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for
reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before — in
Republic v. Court of Appeals 7 4 and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v.
Court of Appeals. 7 5 Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court
may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on
such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or o ce. 80 The
delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review ndings of fact. Its
conclusions as to ndings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a
body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters,
including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to
the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former
Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy,
more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or
'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such
postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of Appeals
therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly
thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of
authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule
32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner
when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in
any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can
be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise
rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a
report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In
Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the nal adjudication by the Court on
the matter. The same result can obtain herein. 7 6
The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in receiving
and evaluating evidence should be whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title
to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was
a Friar Land. On that evidence, this Court may ultimately decide whether annulment of
the Manotok title is warranted, similar to the annulment of the Cebu Country Club title in
Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the respective claims to title by
other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they may submit
on their behalf, may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the
Manotok title. It would thus be prudent, in assuring the accurate evaluation of the
question, to allow said parties, along with the OSG, to participate in the proceedings
before the Court of Appeals. If the nal evidence on record de nitively reveals the
proper claimant to the subject property, the Court would take such fact into
consideration as it adjudicates final relief.
For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and
receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its
ndings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice of this
Resolution.
To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the O ce of
the Solicitor General is directed to secure all the pertinent relevant records from the
Land Management Bureau and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
and submit the same to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19
April and 19 June 2006 of the Court's First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry
of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24
February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7 November
2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the
Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in
Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TcSICH
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to
raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
Puno, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., joins in the dissent of J. Santiago.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Corona, J., please see Separate Opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., also concurs with J. Carpio's Separate Opinion.
Azcuna, J., joins the dissent of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Chico-Nazario, J., joins the dissent of Justice Consuelo Santiago in addition to
her dissenting opinion.
Nachura, J., related to one of the counsel. Took no part.
Reyes, J., joins the dissent of J. Santiago.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the dissent of Justice Santiago.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO , J., concurring:
The Antecedents
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita
Barque-Hernandez led a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy
of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was
allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support
of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner's duplicate certi cate of title, Real
Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting O cer and Chief of the
Reconstitution Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter dated 29
October 1996, 1 addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer Dalire), Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. Atty.
Bustos requested Engineer Dalire to furnish him with a certi ed copy of Subdivision
Plan Fls-3168-D (Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated letter addressed
to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management Services, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-NCR). 2
In his reply dated 7 November 1996, 3 Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that
the Lands Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28
November 1996, 4 Engineer Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive), Chief of the Surveys
Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a micro lm copy of Fls-
3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of their office.
The letter of Engineer Erive con rming the existence of a micro lm copy of Fls-
3168-D con icted with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his o ce has no record of Fls-
3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2 December 1996 5 to Engineer
Dalire requesting for clari cation. In a letter dated 5 December 1996, 6 Engineer Dalire
requested the Regional Technical Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D
for evaluation. Engineer Dalire wrote:
In connection with the letter of clari cation dated December 2, 1996 of the
Reconstituting O cer and Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the certi ed
reproduction plan FLS-3168-D (micro lm) issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical
Section on September 23, 1996 and our letter dated November 7, 1996 that we have no record
of Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward to us the copy on le in that o ce (DENR-
NCR) from where the Chief of Technical Records and Statistical Section reproduced a copy he
issued to LRA for our evaluation. In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us
by LRA) from the copy of that o ce issued to LRA, the said copy on le in your
o ce did not emanate from this O ce. The stamp, particularly, bearing the name
of this o ce and the Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not the same stamp we are
using.
Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment.
A letter dated 2 January 1997, 7 purportedly from Engineer Dalire, addressed to
the LRA Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records
Section on 7 January 1997. The letter states: TcDAHS
SUBJECT: Copy of Plan FLS-3168-D

Caloocan, M.M.
02 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the
copy of the subject plan was forwarded to this o ce by the Chief, Technical
Records and Statistical Section of the National Capital Region Lands
Management Sector for our evaluation. As per veri cation and comparison made
in our micro lm records, it was found out that they are identical and bore the
same stamps and initials used in this office.
In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated
Nov. 7, 1996 we indicated the status thereof because we failed to verify
from our index cards then for our last result, hence, this case be given
due course for Administrative reconstitution (sic).
Very truly yours,

For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J. G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
Interestingly, Engineer Dalire wrote another letter dated 5 January 1997 8

addressed to the Regional Technical Director, LMS-DENR-NCR, thus:
This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December 1996 to that
O ce in connection with the letter of clari cation dated December 2, 1996 of the
Reconstituting O cer and Chief Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration
Authority relative to the certi ed reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D (micro lm)
issued by that o ce (signed by Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical Records
and Statistics Section) on September 23, 1996 to Teresita Hernandez and our
letter dated November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have no records of Fls-3168-D.
The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us with
machine copy of Fls-3168-D reproduced from the copy issued by that
O ce and we found out that the copy of Fls-3168-D le (sic) in your
o ce did not emanate from this O ce. We reiterate that we have no
records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.
May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy

of plan Fls-3168-D on le in your o ce for our evaluation and
comment.
Engineer Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997 9 to the LRA
Administrator. The letter states:
31 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative Reconstitution
of the Original Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 210177 in the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, Homer L. Barque, Sr., Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez,
Petitioner) you requested us to clarify the fact that the Regional O ce has a
micro lm copy of plan Fls-3168-D, while our o ce does not have a record of the
same. In that letter, you attached for our reference the following:
1. Xerox copy of a certi ed true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS,
NCR;
2. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;

3. Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29,
1996
In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996

the DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the
plan Fls-3168-D led in that O ce from where the reproduced copy furnished to
LRA did not emanate from our o ce. We requested them to forward to us the
said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we
made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and
requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is
regretted, they did not respond.
Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by
DENR-NCR, it is certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan
which may have been inserted in the le. We requested for the copy in their
le last 05 December 1996 and 05 January 1997 but until this writing, NCR has
not sent us the copy for authentication as required by DENR Administrative Order.
We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our le, our Micro lm
Computer list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do
not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious
copy.
1) The certi cation (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The
certi cation and the signing o cial are separate. Ours is one-piece.
ADCTac
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the
syndicates (sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the “s”
plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for
Registration/Titling For Reference Only" is smaller than our stamp. It
is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in addition to [the] above is "of
_________".
5) The copy bears forged initials of my action o cer and

myself. I sign completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in

the master copy.
7) Again, it is certi ed that this Bureau does not have copy of
Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your

O ce as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be
disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources. This
involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area
of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the
reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.
Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to nd out to whom lot 823

(or portion thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed.
Very truly yours,
For the Director,

Lands Management Bureau:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
In a letter dated 13 February 1997 1 0 to the LRA Administrator, Engineer Dalire

explained that the 2 January 1997 letter was forged. Thus:
13 February 1997
The Administrator
East Avenue, NIA Road
Quezon City
ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos

Reconstituting Officer
Sir:

In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today,
please be informed that as per the inventory of approved surveys which are
o cially enrolled in our le, the locator cards, the micro lm, list of plans on le
which were decentralized to our regions, that are on le in this Bureau show that
plan Fls-3168-D is not among the plans in our le. The non-existence of plan
Fls-3168-D in our le, hence there is none to decentralize to our
National Capital Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07
November 1996 (copy attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy

attached to your letter, this letter de nitely did not come from this
o ce; it is a forged document. The statement that the subject plan was
forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical Records Statistics Section of
the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not turned over the plan
they reproduced in compliance with our urgent requests dated 03
January 1996 and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06
February 1997 (copies attached).
With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to

your letter of December 2, 1996, our detailed ndings tending to prove it is a
spurious copy have been discussed in our letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.
Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the le of NCR for

investigation and/or validation under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991.
HCISED
Very truly yours,

(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997, 1 1 Engineer Dalire requested Atty. Bustos
to disregard Fls-3168-D for being spurious, thus:
19 February 1997
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
East Avenue, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Bustos:
In reply to your query whether or not
a) the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot 823,

Piedad Estate as surveyed for Emiliano Setosta;
b) the letter dated 07 November 1996, and
c) the letter dated 02 January 1997

are authentic and really coming from this office.
The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this
Bureau has no records of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of
Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans o cially led in this Bureau, the
Locator Cards, and the micro lm all show that we have no records or information
about Plan Fls-3168-D.
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2,
1996 is not issued by this O ce. There are many markings on the copy to
prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:
1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on le so how can we issue

a copy of plan that is non-existing?
2) The copy of plan bears two "Certi cations" at the top and at lower
half. This is not our practice;
3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the
certi cation and another for the signing o cial. We use one piece
rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one rubber
stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans

with the initials of my action o cers and their codings
below my signature. These are not present in the spurious
copy of plan;
5) The letter size of the rubber stamp “NOT FOR

REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY” is smaller than
our rubber stamp;
6) The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our
rubber stamp "GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF ___________________ "This is stamped on all
micro lm copies we issue because all micro lm copies are for
o cial use only of our LMS. We have shown you our rubber stamps
to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a
spurious plan.
I rmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02
January 1997 stating that copy of subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was
forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section
of the NCR and that as per veri cation, the plan is identical to the
micro lm and that the case be given due course for administrative
reconstitution. Certainly this is not true. This is the handiwork of
forgers. How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy
in their le for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is
mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the subject of
our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06
February 1997 (copies attached). De nitely this letter was never
prepared and issued by this O ce. Our record books and le attest to
this. We do not use letterheads for letters involving this topic.
Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted

and did not reach you. HcISTE
For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the
letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents.
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer

In an Order dated 30 June 1997, 1 2 Atty. Bustos denied the petition for
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D , containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs.
and 171,472, respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to
duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate , containing an area of 342,945 Sq.
Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of
Severino M. Manotok, et al ., reconstituted under Adm.
Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991 ;
2. T h e submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as

categorically stated by Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire , Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division, Lands Management Bureau, in his letter dated February
19, 1997. 1 3 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10

February 1998, 1 4 Atty. Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.
The Heirs of Barque (Barques) led an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin.
Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998, 1 5 the LRA gave due course to the appeal.
The LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13, 1 6 only the owner's or co-owner's
duplicate of an original or transfer certi cate of title may be used as a source of
administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of
documents other than the owner's duplicate TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engineer
Dalire failed to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2
January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an o cial communication
from Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator personally opined that the Manotoks'
TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. Thus:
It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in question, is located at
Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several documents submitted by oppositors
particularly the several Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance including the real
estate tax receipts would show that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong,
and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to "77" inclusive "79", "84" and "85" of Opposition] which is
grossly inaccurate. The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position Paper] would
show that there is no such barrio as Payong. It must likewise be noted that there is a Barrio
Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio Matandang Balara and they do not
adjoin each other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the real estate tax receipts for
payments made after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by re on 11 June 1988 would show
that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio Matandang Balara [Annexes
"91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition], while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes "103" to
"114" inclusive of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the property in
question. This is highly questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax
receipts also re ect the tax declaration of the property covered thereby. It is highly irregular
that the tax declaration numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations
which appear to have been canceled would again be revived. STHAaD

The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-22481
[372302] covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D
shows that the property in question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B.
The same is being buttressed and corroborated by the certi ed copy of the tax map over the
property in question issued by the Quezon City Assessor's O ce [annex "H" of Petitioners
Position Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the
property in question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot
823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of
original survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot
822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when at the time of the
original survey, there were no such Psd's yet.
Examination of the technical description and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-
22481 [372302] would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform to the certi ed
technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question]
which are the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands
[Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners' Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas
Estate nor Tuazon Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not
at all adjoin the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per
certi cation issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners' Position Paper]. As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT No. RT-
22481 [372302]. It was not, however, indicated whether or not it was Lot 822 of the Piedad
Estate. 1 7
However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted after a
court of competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the
name of the Manotoks. The dispositive portion of the LRA Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT
No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation
of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks upon order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 1 8 (Emphasis supplied)
The Manotoks led a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14 June
2001, 1 9 the LRA denied the motion.
The Manotoks led a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642
before the Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001
Order of the LRA.
The Barques led a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
praying for the modi cation of 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the
LRA. The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without
prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) by a court of competent jurisdiction.
aHTcDA
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

CA-G.R. No. 66642
CA-G.R. No. 66642 was initially dismissed in the Resolution of 23 October 2001
2 0 for failure to show that Rosa Manotok was authorized to sign the veri cation and
certi cation against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for
reconsideration led by the Manotoks, the petition was reinstated in the Resolution of
27 November 2001. 2 1
In its Decision of 29 October 2003, 2 2 the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks'
petition and a rmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for
reconsideration of the Barques, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended
Decision on 24 February 2004, 2 3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this
Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the
LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.
SO ORDERED. 2 4
The Manotoks came to this Court for relief. Their petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 162335.
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, 2 5 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the Barques' petition and a rmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. The
Barques moved for reconsideration of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003, 2 6 the Court of
Appeals reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-
22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith
petitioners’ valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 2 7
The Manotoks led a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its
Resolution of 12 March 2004, 2 8 the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Manotoks led a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
162605.
The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2 August 2004.
In a Decision dated 12 December 2005, 2 9 the First Division of this Court denied
the petitions and a rmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66642 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. In its 19 April 2006 Resolution, 3 0 the Special
First Division of this Court denied the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration. No
proceeding of any kind took place before any trial court assailing the validity
of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Yet, as the nal resolution of the Barques'
simple petition for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this Court
cancelled the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not
only reconstituted, but also valid.
In a Resolution dated 12 September 2006, this Court, among others, granted the
Motion for Leave to Intervene led by Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
(Manahans).
In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division of this Court
referred the cases to the Court en banc. In its 26 July 2006 Resolution, the Court en
banc accepted the cases. In the Oral Argument on 24 July 2007, the Court en banc
considered the following issues:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners' TCT No.
RT-22481 without a trial before the proper regional trial court in a
proceeding directly assailing the validity of petitioners' title?
2. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the
allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the
previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the
same property?
3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners'
TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case led by
respondents with the LRA?
4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of
title filed by respondents?
The Ruling of This Court

We set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court.
cDTSHE
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court
overturns well-entrenched doctrines of this Court , such as the decision in Sps.
Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon. 3 1 Second, the LRA has
no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques' title because of the pre-existing Torrens title
of the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct proceeding
assailing its validity is led before the proper Regional Trial Court. Fourth, the Barques
submitted patently forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their
title, and even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August 2007.
FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four "firsts". First, it
is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative reconstitution
of title resulted in the cancellation of the Torrens title of another person without a direct
attack of the cancelled title in any trial court. Second, it is the first decision in Philippine
jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to reconstitute administratively a Torrens title
despite the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over the same property in the
name of another person. Third, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where
the issue of ownership of land is decided with nality in a petition for administrative
reconstitution of title. And fourth, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence
where the petitioner in an administrative petition praying for a simple reconstitution of
title received an unexpected and undeserved windfall — the declaration of validity of his
reconstituted title and the cancellation of a previously issued Torrens title in the name
of another person over the same property.
LANDMARK DOCTRINES OVERTURNED
The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines rmly established in
numerous decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division, many of them landmark
rulings. To name a few of these decisions starting in the year 1915 : Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 3 2 Magay, etc. v. Estiandan, 3 3 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 3 4
Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al., 3 5 MWSS v. Hon.
Sison, etc., et al., 3 6 Liwag v. Court of Appeals, 3 7 Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 3 8 Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 3 9 Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco, 4 0 Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 4 1 and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,
Inc. 4 2

The three well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First Division has
overturned are:
1. A Torrens title can be cancelled only in a proceeding directly attacking
the title's validity before the proper regional trial court. 4 3 This is the
bedrock principle that provides enduring stability to Torrens titles.
2. A reconstitution of Torrens title, whether judicial or administrative,
cannot proceed once it is shown that another Torrens title has already
been issued to another person over the same property. The
reconstituting body or court has no jurisdiction to issue another
Torrens title over the same property to the petitioner. 4 4 The
existence of a prior title ipso facto nulli es the reconstitution
proceedings. 4 5 The proper recourse is to assail directly in a
proceeding before the regional trial court the validity of the Torrens
title already issued to the other person.
3. The reconstituting o cer or court has no jurisdiction to decide the
issue of ownership over the property or the validity of the title. 4 6 The
purpose of reconstitution is solely to replace a certi cate of title that
was lost or destroyed in the same legal status it existed at the time of
the loss or destruction. The validity of a Torrens title, reconstituted or
not, is a separate issue from the reconstitution of title.
DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY NOT APPLICABLE
The dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First
Division has already become nal and executory, and thus has become immutable and
unalterable. The dissenting opinion states that there is no compelling reason to depart
from the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions.
On the contrary, the 12 December 2005 Decision never became nal and
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions necessarily
applies only to nal and executory decisions . If the decision never became nal
and executory, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions has no
application. Before nality of a decision, a court has "plenary power to alter, modify or
even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the
decision becomes final." 4 7
There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005
Decision of the First Division never became nal and executory. First, the First Division
has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division.
The Court en banc has ruled in Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group,
Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar 4 8 that a decision of a division is void if it overturns a
doctrine established by the en banc or another division. There, the Court held:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
". . . no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court
en banc or its Divisions may be modi ed or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc."
A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of the above
constitutional provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid .
4 9 (Emphasis supplied)

A void decision vests no right, creates no obligation, grants no title, and settles
no issue. A void decision protects no one and is subject to attack, directly or
collaterally, 5 0 at any time. A void decision has no existence in law. Therefore, a void
decision cannot become final and executory against, or in favor of, any one. ETDHaC
Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if

the trial court or hearing o cer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision
rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void and cannot become nal and executory. Such decision cannot even become res
judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or
hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. 5 1
In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the
title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral
attack on the p re-exist ing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property.
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 5 2 states that a "certi cate of
title shall not be subject to a collateral attack". The LRA, or even any court for
that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack 5 3 on a Torrens title. The
Manotoks' prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed
through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings. 5 4
THE MANOTOKS' PRIOR TITLE NULLIFIES RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS
OF BARQUES
In fact, the existence of a prior Torrens title over the same property in the name
of another person ipso facto nulli es the reconstitution proceedings and renders the
reconstituted title void. 5 5 Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, 5 6 penned by Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, is instructive and summarizes the law on this matter:
But a judgment otherwise nal may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic
fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra v.
Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held
that if a certi cate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of
another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision
has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any
time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides that "in case a certi cate of title, considered lost
or destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certi cate of
title". It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of
judgment of the petitioners. 5 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Even before Demetriou, this Court had already ruled in Republic v. Court of
Appeals 5 8 that the existence of a prior Torrens title ipso facto nulli es the
reconstitution proceedings, thus:
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918
ipso facto nulli ed the reconstitution proceedings and signi ed that the evidence in
the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombasi cannot be given
any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were led in bad faith. Such
humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate
rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
certi cates of title that are missing and not ctitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a
patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certi cates of title that are on le and available in the
registry of deeds.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are void
because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 2 6 and beyond the purview of that
law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds
and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to
allow Republic Act No. 2 6 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453,
480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a
registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens
titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. 5 9 (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court are so essential in providing stability to land titles that
overturning them now would be catastrophic to our Torrens system of land
registration.
A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN A DIRECT ACTION
ASSAILING ITS VALIDITY BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
The LRA has also no jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks
because the exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title belongs to the
Regional Trial Court. The LRA, moreover, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership
dispute over a parcel of land 6 0 between the Barques and the Manotoks because
jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of disputed real properties belongs to courts of
justice.
Two speci c provisions of law confer exclusive original jurisdiction on Regional
Trial Courts to cancel a Torrens title. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
provides: cTACIa
Section 48. Certi cate not subject to collateral attack. — A certi cate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in
a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of the Judiciary Act 6 1 provides that the "Regional Trial Court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in all civil actions, which involve the
title to . . . real property".
That the proper Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to
entertain any action to cancel a Torrens title is reinforced by Section 108 of the
Property Registration Decree. Section 108 states that "no erasure, alteration or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certi cate of
title . . ., except by order of the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court)."
LRA DECISION ON RECONSTITUTION DOES NOT BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only to
decisions that are capable of becoming nal and executory. Decisions of the LRA on
administrative reconstitutions of title never become nal and executory. An
administrative reconstitution of title is merely a restoration or replacement of a lost or
destroyed title in its original form at the time of the loss or destruction. 6 2 The issuance
of a reconstituted title vests no new rights and determines no ownership issues. 6 3 At
any time, the LRA can revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost or
destroyed title is subsequently found. 6 4 The issuance by the LRA of a
reconstituted title is an executive function, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Only
judicial or quasi-judicial decisions can become res judicata. This Court stated in A.G.
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals: 6 5 "[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination". 6 6
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division grants to the Barques much
more than what the Barques prayed for in their petition for administrative reconstitution
of title. In their petition before the LRA, the Barques only prayed for the reconstitution of
their allegedly destroyed title. The Decision of the First Division grants the
reconstitution, declares the reconstituted title valid, awards ownership over the
disputed property to the Barques, and cancels the Torrens title of the Manotoks. This
violates the "cardinal principle that (a court) cannot grant anything more than what is
prayed for" 6 7 in the petition.
A SURFEIT OF FORGERIES AND BADGES OF FRAUD
Equally disturbing, there are patent forgeries, badges of fraud, and other
dubious circumstances that the First Division inexplicably brushed aside in its
Decision. These forgeries alone are more than su cient grounds to deny the
reconstitution of the Barques' title. These forgeries provide compelling reasons for this
Court to require compliance with Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree in
determining the validity of the Manotoks' title. Section 48 requires a proceeding before
the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Torrens title before
such title can be cancelled.
First: Forged Plan Fls-3168-D
The Barques submitted to the LRA reconstituting o cer patently forged
documents in support of their petition. On 31 January 1997, Engineer Dalire wrote the
LRA reconstituting o cer that the copy of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D submitted to
the LRA "bears forged initials of my section o cer and myself", 6 8 and that the
Lands Management Bureau National O ce "does not have copy of Fls-3168-D." 6 9
Engineer Dalire urged the LRA that plan Fls-3168-D and the accompanying
authentication letter "be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious
sources". 7 0
Plan Fls-3168-D is vital in establishing the authenticity of the Barques' Torrens
title, which contains two lots as subdivided by plan Fls-3168-D from the original Lot
823. The Manotoks' title covers only one lot, Lot 823, without subdivision. Both the
Manotoks and the Barques claim the same original Lot 823. If there is no record in the
Lands Management Bureau National O ce of plan Fls-3168-D showing the subdivision
of Lot 823 into two lots, then the Barques' title is spurious.
During the oral argument of these cases, counsel for the Barques was asked if
the Barques have ever secured a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certi ed by the Lands
Management Bureau National O ce. Counsel for the Barques showed the Court a
copy of what purported to be plan Fls-3168-D but on closer examination the copy was
certified not by the Lands Management Bureau National O ce but by the NCR Regional
O ce. What counsel for the Barques showed was the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D
that Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National O ce, had rejected as a forgery in his 31 January 1997
and 19 February 1997 letters to Atty. Bustos. In his letters, Engineer Dalire stated that
there is no plan Fls-3168-D in the les of the Lands Management Bureau National
Office.

Second: Forged 2 January 1997 Letter
On 13 February 1997, Engineer Privadi J. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys
Division of the Lands Management Bureau National O ce, wrote the LRA reconstituting
o cer that the 2 January 1997 letter, purportedly coming from Engineer Dalire,
"definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document". 7 1
In his 19 February 1997 letter, Engineer Dalire also informed the LRA
reconstituting o cer that the 2 January 1997 letter purportedly coming from him was
the "handiwork of forgers". 7 2 In the questioned 2 January 1997 letter 7 3 addressed
to the LRA reconstituting o cer, Engineer Dalire allegedly stated that the Chief of the
Technical Records and Statistics of the National Capital Region-Lands Management
Bureau (NCR Regional O ce) had forwarded a copy of Fls-3168-D to Engineer Dalire's
office. Engineer Dalire has repeatedly denounced this 2 January 1997 letter as
a forgery, not only because he never signed this letter, but also because his
office never received a copy of Fls-3168-D from the NCR Regional Office. AcHCED
Third: Plan Fls-3168-D Is Void Unless Validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques then undertook to present to
the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certi ed by the Lands Management Bureau
National O ce. In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, counsel for the
Barques explained why they could not present a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certi ed by
the Lands Management Bureau National Office:
Following the order of the Honorable Justice Carpio for respondents to secure a
certi ed true copy of Fls-3168-D from the Land Management Bureau, National O ce, they
went to said National O ce to secure said certi ed true copy of Fls-33168-D but were instead
given a copy of a form letter (Annex "J") issued in reply to a prior request for transmittal of
Plan FLS-3168-D with the information that records of said plan had already been turned over
to the National Capital Region.
The form letter (Annex "J") from the Records Management Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National O ce, that the Barques attached to their Memorandum,
states —
. . . plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of and situated in Caloocan Rizal was among
those survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region
(NCR), Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our le no. NCR-199, for their
reference/file purposes.
The form letter bears the printed name of Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records
Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National O ce although someone
whose signature is not legible signed for Rainier D. Balbuena.
The Barques also submitted a Certi cation dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I")
signed by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management
Bureau National Office, stating:
This is to certify that according to the veri cation of the Records Management
Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila, EDP's Listing has available record
with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, Xerox copy of which is herewith attached, situated in Caloocan,
Rizal (Now Quezon City), in the name of Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.
In sharp contrast, the Manotoks attached to their Memorandum dated 23 August
2007 a certi cation signed by three persons from the Lands Management Bureau
National O ce, namely, Bienvenido F. Cruz, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division ;
Rodel Collantes, Chief, Technical Services & Survey Records Documentation Section;
and Teodoro A. de Castro, researcher. This certification, dated 2 August 2007, states:
August 2, 2007
LUISA T. PADORA
2830 Juan Luna St. Tondo
Manila
S i r /M a d a m:
This is in connection with your request on the veri cation of survey plan.
As per our inventory we found out the following:
Survey No . Accessio n No .
Lo catio n
Fls-3168-D No t listed in E DP listing.
Verified By:
(Sgd)
RODEL COLLANTES
Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section
Researched by:
(Sgd)
TEODORO A. DE CASTRO
Very truly yours,
(Sgd)
BIENVENIDO F. CRUZ
OR#: 3041650
Date: 08/02/07
Amt. Php 40.00
The certi cation of the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division prevails over the
certi cation of the OIC, Records Management Division. Under paragraph 2.4 of Lands
Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, "no copies of white print,
blue prints or photographic copies of plans shall be issued unless said
secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division". The
same paragraph 2.4 further states that unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Divisions, copies of such plans "should be temporarily expunged from the
records of the Records Division until they are validated and returned for
official file". SEDaAH
Thus, no secondary copies of plans, like the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, can have
any evidentiary value unless validated by the Geodetics Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National O ce. More importantly, copies of plans, like the
Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, which have not been validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Division, are deemed "expunged from the Records of the Records Division". The
inescapable conclusion is that the form letter (Annex "J") issued by the
Records Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau National
O ce, and the Certi cation dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by
Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management
Bureau National O ce, both of which refer to the existence of the Barques'
Fls-3168-D plan, are absolutely worthless and are mere scraps of paper.
The Barques' explanation is further belied by the 19 February 1997 letter of
Engineer Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management
Bureau National Office, that:
. . . Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans
o cially led in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the micro lm all show that
we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their le for
validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No.
49 for our validation . This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05
December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). . . . .
7 4 (Emphasis supplied)
As pointed out by Engineer Dalire, under DENR Administrative Order No. 49,
series of 1991, the copy of plan Fls-3168-D must be forwarded by the NCR
Regional O ce for validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National O ce . No copy of the survey plan can be issued by
the NCR Regional O ce without the validation of the Geodetic Surveys Division.
Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49 states:
Section 4. Preparation of Certi ed True Copies of Approved Plans. —
The following considerations on the preparation of Certi ed True Copies of
Approved Plans shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
4.3 Decentralized whiteprints or photographic copies of plans
especially those marked "SGD" (i.e. SIGNED) shall not be used for the issuance of
patent or certi ed true copy or titling purposes, EXCEPT, upon or prior
authentication by the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) after diligent
comparison with the records of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and other
depository of surveys records.
xxx xxx xxx

4.5 The Chief of the Regional Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Service in the concerned Regional O ce shall certify all copies for
land registration and for other purposes as true, correct and exact replica of the
original plan. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement of validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division is reiterated and

amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, thus:
2.4 No copies of white print, blue prints or photographic
copies of plans shall be issued unless said secondary copies have been
validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division (see paragraph 4.3, DENR
A.O. 49, s-1991) . The Survey Records Section shall turn over all print (white,
blue, xerox) copies and photographic copies in its le to the Geodetic Surveys
Division for examination, investigation and/or validation. These copies should
temporarily be expunged from the records of the Records Division until
they are validated and returned for o cial le. (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau
National O ce, secondary copies of survey plans, such as the Barques' plan Fls-
3168-D, have no evidentiary value because they are "temporarily . . . expunged from
the records of the Records Division ".
The Geodetic Surveys Division validates the survey plans based on the "back-up
le in the Central Records O ce ". Despite the decentralization of the records of
survey plans, the Lands Management Bureau National O ce retained "back-up les" of
the decentralized records. Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 states:
1. General Policy
1.1 It is the general policy that all isolated survey plans and
other survey records be decentralized immediately to the Lands
Management Sector for their reference and file after establishing a back-up
le in the Central o ce for records preservation. The latter can be done
thru micro lming or reproduction of the original records. (Emphasis
supplied)
The NCR Regional O ce failed to submit to the Geodetics Survey Division a copy
of plan Fls-3168-D despite repeated requests from Engineer Dalire. In his 31 January
1997 letter to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire stated:
. . . please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your
letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D led in that O ce
from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA (sic) did not emanate from our o ce. We
requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment.
Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no
records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our
evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond. 7 5 (Emphasis
supplied) TcADCI
This repeated and manifest failure by the NCR Regional O ce is echoed by the glaring
failure of the Barques to submit, as they had promised to the Court during the oral
argument, a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certi ed by the Lands Management
Bureau National Office.
This Court has already recognized that copies of survey plans are void unless
validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative
Order No. 49, series of 1991. In Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 7 6 the Court held:
Finally, private respondents' cause of action against petitioner is
defeated by the ndings of Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands, contained in his letters to the
Regional Technical Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region IV dated 12 November 1992 and 15 December 1992,
respectively:
12 November 1992
xxx
MEMORANDUM:
15 December 1992
FOR: The Regional Technical Director of Lands

The Chief, Regional Surveys Division
DENR, Region IV
L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard
Manila
FROM: LMB
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white print copy certi ed by Engineer
Robert Pangyarihan to have been "prepared from a tracing cloth plan on le in the
NCR" for validation. We returned the white print plan prepared by Engineer
Pangyarihan because we should examine the "tracing cloth plan" and it is the
tracing cloth plan, white prints and photographic copies sent by the Central
Records Division to be returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated 27 November 1992, Engineer Pangyarihan explained that he
prepared the copy which he certi ed from a white print plan on le in the region
as the applicant claims to have lost the tracing cloth. While the explanation may
be considered, yet the preparation of the plan is not yet in accordance
with Sections 1.3 and 4.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49, s-1991
which requires that the white prints or photographic print of the plan
other than the original plan which have been decentralized must rst be
authenticated by this Bureau before a certi ed true copy is issued by
the region. It is evident therefore that the issuance of a certi ed true
copy of Psu-201 from a white print is premature, and considered void
ab initio.
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is different from the print copy is
subjected to eld ocular inspection of the land and on the basis of the ndings,
the region may reconstruct the plan to be approved as usual. Certi ed copies may
now be issued based on the reconstructed and approved plan. The white print of
Psu-201 should therefore be subjected to ocular inspection.
Our records of inventory of approved plans show Psu-201 as a survey of J. Reed
covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila. That plan was heavily damaged and
its reconstruction was not finalized. This should be included in the investigation.
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division. 7 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, in the present cases the copy of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D issued by
the NCR Regional O ce is likewise void unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, as
ampli ed in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92. Up to this time, the Barques
have failed to submit a copy of their plan Fls-3168-D as certi ed by the
Geodetic Surveys Division. The inescapable conclusion is that the Barques'
plan Fls-3168-D is void ab initio.
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques submitted to the
Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D, certi ed by the NCR Regional O ce, to support
the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168-D that the Barques had earlier submitted to the
reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
c. Photo Copy of Plan FLS-3168 (micro lm) duly certi ed by Carmelito A.
Soriano for the Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR, Annex "H" hereof. This
microfilm copy is exactly the same as the Tracing Cloth Plan copy, Annex G.
First, there does not appear in Annex "H" a signature over the printed name
Carmelito A. Soriano, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR National Office.
Second, Annex "H" is not certi ed by the Chief of the Regional Surveys Division,
Lands Management Service of the NCR Regional O ce as required by Section 4.5 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 49.
Third , Annex "H" is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that purportedly
originated from the o ce of Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau. Annex "H" is also the same
copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for the Barques showed to the Court during the
oral argument. Engineer Privadi Dalire has categorically declared this copy of
Fls-3168-D as "spurious" in his 19 February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus:
HETDAC
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is

not issued by this O ce. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not
come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:
1. We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on le so how can we issue a copy
of plan that is non-existing?
2. The copy of plan bears two "Certi cations" at the top and at lower
half. This is not our practice;
3. The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the
certi cation and another for the signing o cial. We use one piece
rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one rubber
stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4. The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans
with the initials of my action o cers and their codings
below my signature. These are not present in the spurious
copy of plan;
5. The letter size of the rubber stamp “NOT FOR

REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY” is smaller than
our rubber stamp;
6. The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our
rubber stamp "GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF ___________________ "This is stamped on all
micro lm copies we issue because all micro lm copies are for
o cial use only of our LMS. We have shown you our rubber stamps
to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a
spurious plan. 7 8 (Emphasis supplied)
Engineer Dalire ended his letter by advising Atty. Bustos to "disregard the plan
Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be
spurious documents". 7 9
Again, in his 31 January 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire reiterated
that plan Fls-3168-D, which purportedly was certi ed by him, did not come from his
office. Engineer Dalire stated in his 31 January 1997 letter:
. . . We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our le, our Micro lm
Computer list of plans available for decentralization all show that
we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue
any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a
spurious copy.
1) The certi cation (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The
certification and the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the
syndicates (sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the "s"
plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for

Registration/Titling for Reference Only" is smaller than our stamp. It
is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in addition to [the] above is "of
_________".
5) The copy bears forged initials of my action o cer and
myself. I sign completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in
the master copy.
7) Again, it is certi ed that this Bureau does not have copy of
Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your O ce

as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or
rejected as they come from spurious sources. This involves the
reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473
Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of
title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area. 8 0 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Barques have the temerity to foist on this Court their copy of plan Fls-3168-D
which has been repeatedly denounced as a forgery by Engineer Dalire, the very
person whom the Barques claim certi ed their copy of Fls-3168-D. Engineer
Dalire is the best person to determine the authenticity of Fls-3168-D not only because
he allegedly signed it as claimed by the Barques, but also because he is the Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National O ce, the o ce
that has the "inventory of approved plans . . . (and) Micro lm Computer list of plans
available for decentralization". aESIDH
Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of Administrative Reconstitution

Order No. Q-535(96)
On 7 February 1997, the Barques had written the LRA Administrator complaining
against the LRA reconstituting o cer's alleged "pattern of effort to delay the
administrative reconstitution". 8 1 The Barques attached to their 7 February 1997 letter
an alleged order of reconstitution signed by Atty. Bustos approving the
reconstitution of the Barques' TCT No. 210177. In his 14 February 1997 reply to
the LRA Administrator, Atty. Bustos exposed the alleged order of reconstitution
submitted by the Barques as a "tampered document".
The Barques also informed the LRA Administrator that there was a
"recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys,
Lands Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due course to the said
reconstitution". However, in his 13 February 1997 letter 8 2 to the LRA reconstituting
o cer, Engineer Dalire, the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau,
disowned this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery.
On 14 February 1997, the LRA reconstituting o cer wrote the LRA Administrator
that: 8 3
1. There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the
aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of the
submitted documents;
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and

the name of Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a
tampered document. For your comparison, herewith is a copy of the
genuine order of reconstitution, marked as annex "A";
3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997,

by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged
document. Attached for your reference is a copy of the letter which is self-
explanatory, together with its enclosures, directly received by the undersigned
from Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR,
marked as annex "B";
4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of

171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq. m., respectively, purportedly covered by
TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823, Piedad Estate, containing
an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302, registered in the
name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached
as annex "C". (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In his 14 February 1997 letter, the LRA reconstituting o cer complained to the
LRA Administrator that "there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action
by submitting forged documents".
The tampering refers to the insertion of (1) the name of "Homer L. Barque",
and (2) the title number "210177" in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). The
Barques justi ed the authenticity of the copy they presented by claiming that their copy
was "initialed in each and every page." 8 4 However, the Barques' copy of Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) differed from the original of Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that the LRA reconstituting o cer himself signed on 27
January 1997. To repeat, the original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-
535(96) was an order issued and signed by the LRA reconstituting o cer,
Atty. Bustos. Indeed, the Barques' copy 8 5 of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-
535(96) shows that it was signed by the same LRA reconstituting o cer, Atty. Bustos,
handling the Barques' then pending petition for administrative reconstitution.
The Barques also failed to explain why they still pursued their petition for
administrative reconstitution of their title if indeed they had already obtained an
approved reconstitution on 27 January 1997 under their copy of Administrative
Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96). On 13 August 1998, the LRA reconstituting o cer
filed before the LRA Administrator the following Comment:
2. That we maintain our position denying the reconstitution of TCT No.
210177, on the grounds stated in our Order dated June 30, 1997, and on the
following additional grounds, to wit:
2.1 If the late Homer L. Barque, really purchased the subject
property in the year 1975, why did he not take possession of it upon
purchase, and up to now his descendants, the Petitioners, are not in
possession of the property, but the Oppositors?;
2.2 Why was the property declared, and realty taxes were paid in
the name of Barque, only in the year 1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and
their predecessors have been paying realty taxes on the property since the
year 1965;
2.3 Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a
tampered copy of Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)? 8 6
(Emphasis supplied)
The LRA reconstituting o cer ended his Comment by urging the LRA Administrator
t h a t "this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission for investigation".
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques explained the
circumstances of the order of reconstitution they submitted to the LRA in this manner:
The said resolution was issued on January 27, 1997 when there was, as
yet, no opposition from anyone to the Barques' petition for reconstitution and
after the Barque had already submitted their Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
210177 which entitled them, like the several other petitioners listed in Mr. Bustos'
aforesaid Resolution, to a reconstitution thereof under R.A. 6732.
In his letter, Atty. Turgano surmised that:
"The animosity and bias of Mr. Bustos against petitioners may be
explained by the fact that he was responsible in giving due course and
approving with dispatch the administrative reconstitution of the Manotok
title which is TCT No. RT-22481 (372302).
Mr. Bustos' bias was likewise shown when he alerted the Manotoks of the Barques'
Petition for Reconstitution which prompted them to le their opposition to the Barques'
petition on April 14, 1997. He, therefore, apparently had the motive to delete the title
and name of the Barques from his resolution.
At any rate, said resolution of Bustos was completely irrelevant to the LRA proceedings
since it is his Order denying Barques' petition for reconstitution that was raised on appeal
before the LRA Administrator. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the Barques represent to this Court that their copy of Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96), listing their TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L.
Barque, Sr. as one of the titles approved for reconstitution by Atty. Bustos, is authentic,
genuine and untampered. This is contrary to the categorical declaration of Atty. Bustos
that the copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) submitted by the Barques
is a "tampered document", and that the original Administrative Reconstitution
No. Q-535(96) that Atty. Bustos himself signed, which original is on le in his
o ce in the LRA, does not include TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L.
Barque, Sr.
Ironically, the Barques put the blame on Atty. Bustos for "delet(ing) the title
and name of the Barques from the resolution". The Barques are now accusing
Atty. Bustos of falsi cation by deleting the Barques' name and title in Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before such deletion, the Barques insist that
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) included the Barques' name and title,
which is the copy that the Barques submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the rst place, there was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to include the
Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). When Atty.
Bustos signed the order on 27 January 1997, he was still corresponding with Engineer
Dalire on the forgery found in the Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D. The last letter of Engineer
Dalire to Atty. Bustos was on 31 January 1997. On 14 February 1997, Atty. Bustos even
wrote the LRA Administrator about the "attempt to mislead us (LRA) into favorable
action by submitting forged documents". Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not have included
the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques gave the lame
excuse that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now "completely irrelevant"
because what was raised on appeal to the LRA was the order of Atty. Bustos denying
the Barques' petition for reconstitution. If their copy of Administrative Reconstitution
Order No. Q-535(96) is truly authentic and untampered, the Barques should insist that
their petition for administrative reconstitution was in fact approved by the
reconstituting o cer Atty. Bustos. The Barques do not claim or even mention this now,
instead they agree that Atty. Bustos denied their petition, contrary to their claim that
Atty. Bustos granted their petition by including the Barques' title and name in
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply brush aside their submission of tampered or forged
documents. These patent forgeries are grounds to render the Barques' reconstituted
title void ab initio. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6732 (RA 6732), 8 7 the law allowing
administrative reconstitution of titles, provides:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or
other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and
all persons having knowledge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court would never countenance these blatant and glaring forgeries. The present
cases involve 34 hectares of prime land located beside the Ayala Heights Subdivision in
Quezon City. Its value is estimated conservatively at P1.7 billion. CIcTAE
Fifth: The Barques’ Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City Hall Fire
The Barques led their petition for administrative reconstitution on 22 October
1996, eight years after the original of their Torrens title was allegedly burned in the
11 June 1988 re that destroyed the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds. In
contrast, the Manotoks administratively reconstituted their Torrens title on 1 February
1991, three years after the fire and just one year after the effectivity on 17 July 1989
of RA 6732 allowing again administrative reconstitution of titles under certain
circumstances.
Sixth: The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax Declarations
The Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the following notation in the tax
declarations they submitted to the LRA reconstituting o cer: "Memo: This property
appear (sic) to duplicate the property of Manotok Realty, Inc., declared under
TD No. B-067-02136 with area of 343,945 sq.m./P.I. no. 21-4202." 8 8 In their
Petition For Review dated 30 March 2004, the Manotoks submitted certi ed true
copies of the Barques' Tax Declarations 06892 8 9 and 06895 9 0 containing this
notation. In their Memorandum of 23 August 2007, the Manotoks again submitted
copies of the Barques' tax declarations containing the same notation.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques denied the erasure of the
notation on the Barques' tax declarations. However, counsel for the Barques admitted
that he has not seen the original tax declarations on le with the Assessor's O ce,
thus:
Justice Carpio:
. . . The Manotoks are claiming that the Barques erased, removed
annotation in the tax declaration of the Barques that in the tax declaration
on le with the Assessor's O ce the tax declaration of the Barques is
supposed to contain annotation that this property appears to be registered
in the name of Manotok Realty Inc., is that correct?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, that is a serious accusation, Your honor and I have no knowledge

about that.
Justice Carpio:
But does the tax declaration of the Barques contain that notation?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There is none that I know, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio:
How about the tax declaration on file with the Assessor's Office?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I have not seen those, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
You have not seen those?

Atty. Flaminiano:
I have not seen those. 9 1
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques ignored completely

the Manotoks' claim that the Barques erased the notation.
Seventh: The Barques Paid Realty Tax only for 1987 to 1996
The Barques rst paid real estate tax on the property only in 1996, 92
for realty taxes for the years 1987 to 1996, because the Barques were
required to pay the current and preceding years’ realty taxes before they
could le their petition for administrative reconstitution. The Barques have
not paid any realty tax after 1996, or before 1987. 9 3 In contrast, the LRA
reconstituting o cer found that the Manotoks have been paying realty taxes on the
property since 1965. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks claim
that they paid their realty taxes on the property from 1933 until the present, attaching
to their Memorandum representative copies of their realty tax payments.
Eighth: The Barques Have Never Set Foot on the Property
The Barques have never set foot on the property since the time Homer L. Barque,
Sr. allegedly purchased the property in 1975. Counsel for the Barques admitted this
when he stated during the oral argument that the Barques merely "went around" the
walled property. On the other hand, the Manotoks assert that the property is publicly
known in their neighborhood as the Manotok Compound. The Manotoks further claim:
[A]s owners of said Lot 823, oppositors (Manotoks) had introduced substantial
improvements, amounting to several millions, thereon consisting of, among
others, high wall hollow block fence; their respective houses, apartments;
o ces and employees quarters, as early as in 1960, photographs of
which are hereto attached as Annexes "115" to "134"; 9 4 (Emphasis
supplied)
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen the pictures of
the various houses, buildings and concrete perimeter fence that the Manotoks
constructed on the property since 1960.
Ninth: LRA Administrator Relied only on Map Submitted by Barques
In calling the Manotoks' title "sham and spurious", the LRA Administrator cited
the non-existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City. The LRA Administrator stated: "The
map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position paper] would show
that there is no such barrio as Payong". 9 5 This is a nding of fact that is based
not only on self-serving and suspect evidence, but also on a patently erroneous claim.
The LRA Administrator relied on Annex "N" of "Petitioners", that is, the map
of the Barques who were the petitioners before the LRA Administrator assailing the
LRA reconstituting o cer's denial of their reconstitution on the ground of pre-existence
of the Manotoks' title and the submission of a spurious document by the Barques.
Obviously, this Court should not rely on the LRA Administrator's ndings which were
admittedly based on the map of the Barques, who had earlier submitted forged
documents to the LRA reconstituting officer.
The existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City has been judicially
acknowledged almost three decades ago in the Decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court of Appeals and
Macaya, 9 6 involving the same property under dispute in these cases. In Spouses
Tiongson, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular inspection of Barrio Payong
in Quezon City, thus: CADacT
On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court
to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question, which is as
follows:
"Conformably with 'Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection' led

with this Court on even date and as stated in paragraph 2 thereof, the Clerk
of Court is hereby directed to conduct an ocular inspection of the
landholding in question situated at Payong, Quezon City, which as
agreed upon between them is set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock A.M.
(sic), wherein the parties shall meet at the site of said landholding and to
determine:
(a) Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the plaintiff
and/or his children;
(b) Portions of the property where the rice paddies are located;
(c) Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and vegetables;

(d) Portions of the property where the houses of the plaintiff
and/or his children are built and located;
(e) Portion of the property which, according to the defendants,
had been, before the ling of the complaint in this case, worked on by
Victorino Macaya and returned by him to the defendants, through Atty.
Perpetua Bocanegra, with an area of more or less one hectare;
(f) Portions burned by the plaintiff."
Upon accomplishment thereof, said Clerk of Court is hereby directed

to submit his report as well as his sketch plan for further disposition of the
Court.
On June 27, 197[8], the Clerk of Court submitted his "REPORT", which is
as follows:
"In compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated
June 20, 1978, undersigned together with Mr. Victor Flores of this
Branch, proceeded to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on June 23,
1978, to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding involved
in this case. . . . 9 7 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The recognition of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Barrio Payong exists in
Quezon City is based on the ocular inspection conducted on 23 June 1978 by
the Clerk of Court of the Court of Agrarian Relations. In contrast, the statement of the
LRA Administrator that there is no Barrio Payong in Quezon City is based merely on
the map that the Barques submitted in their petition for administrative
reconstitution , which was filed only on 22 October 1996.
I n Spouses Tiongson, there were 28 petitioners. 9 8 Of these 28 petitioners, at
least sixteen are petitioners composing part of the Manotoks in these cases. Of
these sixteen petitioners, eight — Miguel A.B. Sison, Ma. Cristina E. Sison, George M.
Bocanegra, Philipp Manotok, Maria Theresa Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jesus
Jude Manotok, Jr., and Jose Maria Manotok — were then minors at the time of Spouses
Tiongson and were thus represented by judicial guardians. These eight are now of age
in these cases.
Tenth: The Barques Bought the Property Knowing the Manotoks Had Constructed
Buildings and Perimeter Wall on the Property
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen a
picture of the 34-hectare Manotok compound completely surrounded by a high
concrete perimeter wall. When counsel for the Barques was asked if his clients
made an ocular inspection of the property at the time his clients purchased it in 1975,
Barques' counsel answered as follows:
Justice Velasco:
Did your client prior to buying the lot from Mr. Setosta go to the land to
investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The one who bought the property was the father of Barques now.
Justice Velasco:
Would you know if the father of respondent visit and inspect and
investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I was told that he visited the property because the father of the Barques
used to work for Mr. Antonio Florendo. I think he was the manager of one
of the businesses of Mr. Florendo in Davao City having to do with
accessory parts of cars and trucks and he was at one time also the
operator of a public transportation company.
Justice Velasco:
Okay. Did the father of Mr. Barque nd any building or structures on the
land now subject of this dispute?
Atty. Flaminiano:
We would not know because Mr. Barque died already, Your Honor. 9 9
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Carpio:
Now, when did they take possession of the property since Mr. Homer L.
Barque purchased it in 1975, when did he take possession of the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The reason why they could not take really possession of the property
because they were trying to get some papers from an Aunt of Mr. Barque to
whom the property was mortgaged before he died. I understand that the
property was mortgaged for something like One Million to Two Million
Pesos.
Justice Carpio:
So, from 1975 to the present they have not taken possession of the
property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There were attempts to take possession, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
What kind of attempts, did they file ejectment suit?
Atty. Flaminiano:
In fact Your Honor I understand that some of the Barque girls even went
around the property. AEHTIC
Justice Carpio:
Went around the property (interrupted)
Atty. Flaminiano:
Went around the property to take a look at the property but after that they
left for the United States and for one reason or another they have not been
able to take the proper steps (interrupted)
Justice Carpio:
So, they never led any suit to recover possession of the property, is that
right?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
Did they send any demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property
since they were the owners?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Clearly, the Barques have never set foot on the property from 1975 up to the
present. The Barques merely "went around" the fully fenced property. The Barques
never sent a demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property. The Barques never
filed an ejectment or any action to recover possession of the property.
Eleventh: The Barques' Chain of Title Stops in 1975
The Manotoks can trace their Torrens title to the purchase by their
predecessors-in-interest of the property from the Government in 1919. In their
Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks state:
9.5 The Manotok chain of titles began with the purchase by Zacarias
Modesto, Regina Geronimo and Feliciano Villanueva of Lot 823 from the
Philippine government on March 10, 1919. Attached hereto as Annex E is a Land
Management Bureau-certi ed xerox copy of Sale Certi cate No. 1054 issued by
the Friar Lands Division, Bureau of Lands, to Modesto, Geronimo and Villanueva.
Ownership over Lot 823 was later consolidated in Modesto, who in 1920 assigned
his interests thereon to M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok. Attached hereto as
Annexes F and G are Land Management Bureau-certi ed xerox copies of
Assignments of Certi cate of Sale No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 and June 7,
1920.
9.6 In 1923, M. Teodoro assigned his share and interests over Lot 823
to Severino Manotok, making him the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 823. A
certi ed xerox copy of Assignment of Certi cate of Sale No. 1054 dated May 4,
1923 is attached hereto as Annex H.
9.7 Through a series of transfers within the Manotok family and the
Manotok Realty, Inc., a company owned by petitioners, Lot 823 was titled under
TCT No. 372302 on October 16, 1987 in the names of all of the Manotoks. The
Manotok's chain of titles to the property, with deeds of conveyances, are attached
hereto as Annex I, with sub-annexes.
9.8 Fire gutted the Quezon City ROD on June 11, 1988, and shortly
thereafter (i.e., on August 31, 1988) the Manotoks led reconstitution proceedings
before the LRA, and were issued a reconstituted certi cate of title, TCT No. RT-
22841 (372302), by the ROD of Quezon city in 1991. A xerox copy of the petition
for reconstitution led by the Manotoks with the ROD, with attachments, is
attached hereto as Annex J, while a certi ed true copy of TCT No. 372302 (the
title sought to be reconstituted in this petition) is attached hereto as Annex J-1.
On the other hand, the Barques can trace their chain of title only up to 1975 when
Homer Barque, Sr. purchased the property from Emiliano Setosta, who the Barques
claim bought the property directly from the Government in the 1940s. The Barques
have not presented the deed of conveyance by the Government to Setosta.
The claim of the Barques that Setosta purchased the property directly from the
Government in the 1940s is belied by the 1927 Annual Report of the Director of Lands,
stating that:
With the exception of the estates of Calamba, Imus, Isabela, Lolomboy,
Naic, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Santa Maria de Pandi,
and Talisay-Minglanilla, where there are still some vacant lands, all the others
of the 23 Friar land estates had already been entirely disposed of . . . .
1 0 0 (Emphasis supplied)
At the end of 1927, the Government had already sold all of the Piedad Estate, a Friar
land. Thus, the Government could not have sold directly to Setosta the disputed
property in the 1940s.
Twelfth: Lands Management Bureau Relocation Survey Shows Barques' Property
Located 5.6 Kilometers from Piedad Estate
Intervenors Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans) have submitted a
relocation survey made by the Lands Management Bureau NCR Regional O ce of the
Barques' plan Fls-3168-D showing that the Barques' property is located "some 5.6
kilometers away from Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, outside of Quezon
City". 1 0 1 The relocation survey plan is signed by Ludivina L. Aromin, Chief of the
Technical Services Division, and Engineer III Evelyn G. Celzo. In their Memorandum
dated 22 August 2007, the Manahans attached as Annex "M" a copy of the Lands
Management Bureau relocation survey of plan Fls-3168-D. SHaIDE
A DULY ISSUED TORRENS TITLE IS ONE ISSUED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

IN THE REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES
This Court ruled in Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et
al. 1 0 2
that courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of title involving
a property already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person.
The dissenting opinion claims that the Barques' title was already existing at the time of
the reconstitution of the Manotoks' title in 1991. This is an egregious error. When the
Manotoks’ title was reconstituted in 1991, the Barques' title had not been reconstituted,
and even up to now the reconstitution of the Barques' title is still pending resolution in
the instant case. In contrast, when the Barques led their reconstitution in 1996, the
Manotoks' title had already been nally reconstituted and existing. Clearly, it is the
Barques' still pending reconstitution that can no longer proceed because of the existing
title of the Manotoks.
I n Alabang, the Court held that a "duly issued existing Torrens title . . .
cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles by third parties without rst securing by nal judgment the
cancellation of such existing titles". The phrase "duly issued existing Torrens title"
simply means a title veri ably issued by the proper Register of Deeds . The
validity or invalidity of the title is not material at that point. What is material is whether
the Register of Deeds actually issued the title as part of his regular functions.
Clearly, at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks' title, the Barques had
no "duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When
the Barques led the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior title,
which was the only "duly issued existing Torrens title" over the property issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Manotoks' title could be veri ed against the
reconstituted original title on le with the Register of Deeds. In fact, the LRA
Administrator has admitted that the Manotoks' title "is existing as a reconstituted title
at the Office of the Register of Deeds." 1 0 3
The Barques could not produce even up to now a "duly issued existing Torrens
title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Barques' owner's duplicate
certi cate of title could not be veri ed with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
because the Barques' title has no corresponding original title, whether reconstituted or
not, on le with the Register of Deeds. Thus, the reconstitution of the Barques' title,
which is still pending in this case, can no longer proceed.
Once the reconstituting court or o cer establishes that the Register of Deeds
has in fact issued an existing title in the name of another person, the proper step is to
le an action before the Regional Trial Court to annul such title. It is in such
proceeding before the regional trial court that the validity or invalidity of the
title is determined. In such proceeding, any party may introduce in evidence the LRA
Administrator or the NBI's ndings. In the meantime, no reconstitution
proceeding can prosper until after the cancellation by nal judgment of such
existing title.
The Alabang ruling necessarily involves a situation where there is an existing title
issued by the Register of Deeds at the time of ling of a petition to reconstitute
another title over the same property in the name of another person. The Alabang
ruling states that in such a situation the reconstituting authority has no jurisdiction to
proceed with the reconstitution until a nal judgment cancels the other title. This is
clear from the Court's ruling in Alabang:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly
issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles led by third parties without rst
securing by nal judgment the cancellation of such existing titles . (And
as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in
cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing
evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his".) The courts simply have
no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly
lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept
of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens
System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two
certi cates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof.
A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly
registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void.
Applicants, land o cials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental
principles will be held duly accountable therefor. 1 0 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The Decision of the First Division misapplies the Alabang ruling by holding that
the LRA Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title by a nding that
the title was not "duly issued". Even the Register of Deeds, who physically issues a
Torrens title as part of his regular functions, cannot adjudicate on the validity of a title.
The Decision states that the "function of the (LRA) is adjudicatory in nature — it can
properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution". This is
grave error. DHIaTS
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even judicial
reconstitution, does not con rm or adjudicate ownership over a property. 1 0 5
Reconstitution merely restores a missing certi cate of title in the same condition that it
was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the
time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest, 1 0 6
the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director of Lands
v. Gan Tan: 1 0 7
But the lower court claims that petitioner, even if he complied with all the
requirements of the law, is not entitled to have his title reconstituted for
the reason that, being an alien, he is not quali ed to acquire the land
covered by said title under our Constitution. However, we nd this claim
untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The rule on this matter is that this issue can only
be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose (Legarda vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). Moreover, it is a well known doctrine that a Torrens title, as
a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Kane, 61 Phil., 504),
and our duty is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected
unless challenged in a direct proceeding.
To our mind, the only issue here is whether there is a title to be
reconstituted. That is the only purpose of the law (Rep. Act No. 26). If there is,
then it is the duty of the court to comply with its mandate. Whether the
petitioner has the right to acquire the land or not, is beyond the
province of this proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper
action. The two proceedings are distinct and should not be confused .
1 0 8 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The fallacy in the dissenting opinion's argument is that it assumes that the LRA
Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title. The original jurisdiction
to adjudicate or to decide the validity of a Torrens title is vested by law exclusively in
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree.
Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in the Regional Trial Court the "exclusive original
jurisdiction" to decide factual and legal issues "which involve the title to . . . real
property". This means the Regional Trial Court rst decides the validity of the
Torrens title, and this power to rst decide is to the exclusion of all other organs of the
State. Not even the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court can usurp this exclusive
original power of the Regional Trial Court. Any judgment resulting from such usurpation
is void.
What the LRA Administrator or agencies like the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) can issue are administrative, non-adjudicatory ndings on
whether a Torrens title is spurious or authentic. These ndings are mere
evidences that must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court, which alone
has the power to adjudicate whether the title is void. Findings by the LRA or
the NBI that a title is spurious are merely administrative opinions, not a
judicial determination that settles rights and obligations between parties
over a disputed property. These ndings are merely evidences, not the
judgment itself of validity or invalidity which can only come from the Regional
Trial Court. These ndings do not become res judicata, while the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court can become res judicata.
Clearly, the grant of a reconstituted title is not an adjudication of the
title's validity. The Barques received an undeserved windfall when the First Division
declared their reconstituted title valid when the only relief they sought in the
administrative reconstitution was the restoration of their title in its condition at the time
of the alleged loss or destruction. This Court has ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,
Inc.: 1 0 9
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not
determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate
certi cate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or
resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A
reconstituted title, like the original certi cate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. 1 1 0 (Emphasis in original)
Thus, the LRA has no jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to
rule which between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two
claimants over the same property is the lawful owner. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act
vests in courts of justice the "exclusive original jurisdiction" to decide factual and
legal issues involving "the title to . . . real property" .
EQUITY JURISDICTION DOES NOT APPLY
The dissenting opinion further argues that the Manotoks are estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the LRA Administrator or the LRA reconstituting o cer.
The dissenting opinion asserts that the Manotoks failed to question in the proceedings
before these LRA o cials their jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques'
title. This invocation of equity jurisdiction in favor of the LRA Administrator and the LRA
reconstituting officer — for the benefit of the Barques — is grossly erroneous.
First, the settled doctrine is "he who seeks equity must come to court with
clean hands". 1 1 1 The Barques have submitted patently forged documents to the LRA
reconstituting o cer. In the development of equity jurisdiction through the ages, the
constant principle from which there was no deviation was that equity could never be
used to reward those who commit fraud. This Court should not depart from the noble
intention that motivated the development and use of equity jurisdiction. As this Court
aptly stated in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.: 1 1 2
Pagasa cannot rely on equity because he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. Equity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one
seeking its active interposition who has been guilty of unlawful or
inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks relief
1 1 3 (30 C.J.S. 1009). (Emphasis supplied)
aSCHIT
Second, the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel applies only to those who have
sought a rmative relief in the wrong court, lost there, and then assail the adverse
decision of that court. This estoppel applies against a party "who has invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an a rmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an adverse decision". 1 1 4
However, it was the Barques, not the Manotoks, who sought the a rmative relief of a
reconstituted title. In their Opposition 1 1 5 before the LRA reconstituting o cer, the
Manotoks sought a defensive, negative relief — that the Barques' petition "be
dismissed for lack of merit". It was also the Barques, not the Manotoks, who invoked
the jurisdiction of the LRA, which had no jurisdiction over the Barques' petition because
of the pre-existing title of the Manotoks. Moreover, it was the Barques, not the
Manotoks, who lost before the LRA reconstituting o cer and who assailed the adverse
decision before the LRA Administrator. The Barques even lost before the LRA
Administrator who refused to reconstitute the Barques' title without the intervention of
a "court of competent jurisdiction". Clearly, jurisdiction by estoppel cannot apply to the
Manotoks.
Third, the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting o cer refused to
assume jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques' title. The LRA
Administrator denied the Barques' petition because of the existence of the Manotoks'
title, which in the words of the LRA Administrator must first be cancelled by "a court of
competent jurisdiction" before the Barques' petition may be given due course. The
LRA reconstituting o cer also denied the Barques' petition because of the existence of
the Manotoks' title which the LRA had already reconstituted. In short, these LRA
o cials admitted that they had no jurisdiction over the Barques' petition.
Since these LRA o cials refused to assume jurisdiction, there was no assumption of
equity jurisdiction that the Manotoks could have questioned. For the same reason, there
is no assumption of jurisdiction that this Court can now recognize and validate through
equity principles.
Fourth, the principle of equity jurisdiction arising from estoppel or any other
reason applies only to courts of justice. The jurisdiction of courts of justice arises
from either statute or equity, or both. In legal systems which recognize equity
jurisdiction, equity is an inherent power of courts by virtue of their duty to dispense
justice to the full extent possible. Equity jurisdiction is a judicial power.
Administrative agencies or o cers exercising administrative, executive, or ministerial
functions cannot assume equity jurisdiction because they do not exercise judicial
functions. Thus, it is gross error to invest on the LRA Administrator and the LRA
reconstituting o cer equity jurisdiction because these LRA o cers perform
administrative or executive functions in petitions for administrative reconstitution of
titles.
Fifth, the Manotoks did in fact raise the issue of the LRA Administrator's
jurisdiction in relation to the LRA Administrator's opinion that the Manotoks' title was
"sham and spurious". In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 August 1998 before
the LRA Administrator, 1 1 6 the Manotoks stated:
Moreover, it is not disputed that herein oppositors are the holder of an
existing valid and effective TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covering the same land
embraced by TCT No. 210177 in question found which, as stated, is non-existing
and spurious. Given said fact, no administrative reconstitution of TCT
No. 210177 should proceed. As held by the Supreme Court, to wit:
So too, this Court has stressed "that lands already covered by

duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the
Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles led by third
parties without rst securing by nal judgment the cancellation
of such existing titles". (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco, 234 SCRA 458 [1994]) 1 1 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Sixth, the principle of estoppel applies only if the LRA had in fact
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks, so as to bar the
Manotoks, who previously claimed that the LRA had no jurisdiction, from later taking a
contrary position. Thus, the Court declared in People v. Casiano: 1 1 8
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position — that the lower court had jurisdiction.
Here, the principle of estoppel applies. . . . 1 1 9 (Emphasis supplied)
The LRA never had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the
Manotoks. Jurisdiction, as ruled in People v. Casiano, "must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel". It is
axiomatic that only the law can confer jurisdiction. No amount of estoppel can vest
jurisdiction on an officer or court that the law has not conferred jurisdiction.
The LRA Administrator expressly admitted that only the proper Regional Trial
Court has the jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Only the Barques
insist that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title of a third party in an
administrative reconstitution proceedings led by another party, a contention that is
patently baseless. SaIHDA
Seventh, and most important of all , equity jurisdiction can never be used to
violate the law. Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a
court of law is unable to render judgment to meet the special circumstances of a case
because of the limitations of its statutory jurisdiction. 1 2 0 However, equity follows
the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still apply the law and
have no discretion to disregard the law. 1 2 1 Where the law prescribes a particular
remedy with xed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity
jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows. 1 2 2 Thus, this Court has
ruled:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside
legality,' this is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunquam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they
should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 1 2 3
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has
expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court.
No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a
Torrens title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of
Section 48 of the Property Re g i s t r a t i o n D e c r e e expressly prohibiting
collateral attacks on Torrens titles.
This rule has special application to Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree, enacted speci cally to foreclose any possible collateral attack on a
Torrens title, as well as any possible cancellation or modi cation of a
Torrens title without a proceeding in the Regional Trial Court directly
assailing the validity of the title. Strict compliance with Section 48 is what gives
Torrens titles enduring stability, preventing confusion and fraud in land ownership. To
extend equity jurisdiction to LRA o cers to allow them to entertain collateral attacks
on a Torrens title is a gross and blatant violation of the clear and express command of
a positive law. Any extension of equity jurisdiction that operates to negate Section 48
will destroy the most basic safeguard in the Property Registration Decree. Certainly,
equity jurisdiction cannot be used for this purpose.
WHETHER ASSAILED AS FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED OR NOT, A TORRENS TITLE
CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48 OF THE
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE
In cancelling the Manotoks' Torrens title without any trial before any court, the
First Division of this Court completely disregarded Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act. Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree provides that a Torrens title "cannot be altered, modi ed, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law".
That law is Section 19 of the Judiciary Act which states that the "Regional Trial
Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in all civil actions,
which involve the title to . . . real property". These two provisions mandate that no
Torrens title can be cancelled unless there is a proceeding in the proper Regional Trial
Court directly assailing the validity of such title.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed a gross violation of Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act when it ordered the
cancellation of the Torrens title of the Manotoks without a prior proceeding before the
proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Manotoks' title.
Likewise, the First Division of this Court committed the same violation — totally
disregarding Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the
Judiciary Act, and in the process overturning well-entrenched doctrines of this
Court.
The validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not , can be
assailed only in a direct proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court in
accordance with Section 48. In Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, 1 2 4 the Court declared:
What is worse, in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certi cate of Title No.
383675, respondent Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction. After all, it is
hornbook law that a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of
validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be
posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable,
and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 15 29, that a certi cate of title can never be the
subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modi ed, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with law. . . . 1 2 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
The LRA Administrator has admitted that the Torrens title of the Manotoks "is
thus presumed valid". 1 2 6 The law recognizes that the Manotoks' Torrens title is
"evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein". 1 2 7 Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the prior title of the
Manotoks is spurious, still under Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, 1 2 8 such title can only
cancelled by the proper Regional Trial Court in a direct proceeding assailing its validity.
The dissenting opinion cites Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
129 as authority that the Court of Appeals and this Court "have jurisdiction to declare
the title void even if the appealed case was not originally led with the Regional Trial
Court for nulli cation of title" under Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. The
ponente has obviously misread Rexlon Realty. Rexlon Realty was a petition led with the
Court of Appeals for annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial Court on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of lost owner's
duplicates of titles to respondent Alex David. Rexlon Realty proved that the titles were
not lost but were in its possession as the rst buyer of the properties from Alex David
who had later sold again the properties to Paramount Development Corporation. Rexlon
Realty also proved that Alex David delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the
sale. ECTSDa
Rexlon Realty does not involve two con icting titles over the same property,
which is the situation in the present case. In Rexlon Realty, the opposing parties agreed
that there was only one set of titles covering the same properties. The only issue in
Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were lost, and if so, the trial court had jurisdiction
to grant the reconstitution of the titles; but if the titles were not lost, then the trial court
had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David, which
covered properties that Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex David. Rexlon Realty's
obvious interest was to maintain the validity of the titles to the properties it
had purchased, the titles to which were in Rexlon Realty's possession. Thus,
Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, the law
requiring a direct proceeding in the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing the
validity of a Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title, which is at
issue in direct proceedings under Section 48, is a separate and distinct issue
from the propriety of a reconstitution of title.
What Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in issuing
replacement titles to the properties in the name of Alex David who claimed that he
lost the titles. In assailing as void the trial court's judgment, Rexlon Realty invoked, as
stated by the Court, "Section 2, of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure",
which provides "the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower court . . . [based on] fraud
and lack of jurisdiction". Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
. . . In the Strait Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, also on
facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that if an owner's
duplicate copy of a certi cate of title has not been lost but is in fact in
the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the
court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently,
the decision may be attacked any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and
genuineness of the owner's duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the
possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have
not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said owner's
duplicate copies of said certi cates of title, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case at bar, we simply annulled the decision of the RTC, acting as a
land registration court in L.R.C. Record No. 8843, to issue new owner's duplicate
copies of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538, for lack of jurisdiction. The dispute
between petitioner Rexlon and respondent David regarding ownership
over the parcels of land will have to be threshed out or determined in a
more appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate copy of a certi cate of title in lieu of one allegedly
lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court, has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land
covered by the lost owner’s duplicate copy of the certi cate of title.
Possession of a lost owner’s duplicate copy of a certi cate of title is
not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The
certi cate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an
evidence of title over a particular property. 1 3 0 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, Rexlon Realty supports the Manotoks' contention that once it is shown
that there is a pre-existing title duly issued by the Register of Deeds over the same
property which is the subject of reconstitution proceedings, the reconstitution cannot
proceed for either of two reasons. First, the reconstituting o cer or court has no
jurisdiction to reconstitute a title that has never been lost or destroyed. Second, the
reconstituting o cer or court has no authority to decide which of two con icting titles
is valid. Thus, Rexlon Realty categorically ruled that in reconstitution proceedings,
whether administrative or judicial, the reconstituting o cer or court has no jurisdiction
"to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land" covered by the lost title
because the "certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership".
GUARANTY OF STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree is the cornerstone of our land
registration system providing stability to land titles. Without Section 48, our land
registration system will crumble. Section 48 guarantees every landowner with a Torrens
title that his title can never be cancelled unless the validity of his title is rst directly
assailed in court where he can adduce evidence in his favor. The Decision of the First
Division erases this guarantee. In one stroke, the Decision of the First Division has
overturned over a century of jurisprudence fortifying a guarantee essential to the
stability of our land registration system.
In 1915, after the introduction in 1903 1 3 1 of the Torrens system in this country,
this Court waxed poetic in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby 1 3 2 in describing the
cornerstone of the then new system of land registration. Declared the Court:
. . . The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
at the time of registration, in the certi cate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting
in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa", to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. . . .
. . . The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modi ed, enlarged, or
d i m i n i s h ed , except in some direct proceeding permitted by law .
Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. . . . 1 3 3
(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
This Court has reiterated the doctrine in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, now
embodied in Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, in innumerable decisions.
In the 2003 case of Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 1 3 4 a decision penned by
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, this Court declared: DcCITS
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a

certi cate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not
be altered, modi ed, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action
is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed.
The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside
such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack
is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof. 1 3 5 (Emphasis supplied)
The Decision of the First Division cancels a Torrens title without any proceeding
in a trial court directly attacking the title as required by law. What this Court warned
against in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby is now before us — a situation where "all
security in registered titles [is] lost". Every landowner holding a Torrens title will
now have to camp in the corridors of the courts, or constantly watch in the balcony of
his house, just to avoid losing his titled land. The Decision of the First Division, by
destroying the stability of land titles, will usher in an era of land disputes, which before
the advent of the Torrens system were often violent and bloody.
The Decision of the First Division denies to the Manotoks a basic guarantee
under the Constitution — that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law. 1 3 6 The Decision deprives the Manotoks of their P1.7 billion property
without any trial in any court contrary to the clear and express mandate of
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. This Court should never allow
such blatant, gross and shocking violation of a fundamental constitutional right.
A FINAL WORD ON RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
This Court has often warned of the pitfalls of reconstitutions of titles, which have
resulted in innocent landowners losing their titled lands to crime syndicates
specializing in forged titles and documents. The p a t e n t l y forged documents
presented in these cases remind us of what this Court stated in Heirs of Pedro Pinote v.
Dulay: 1 3 7
There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme
caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26.
Experience has shown that this proceeding has many times been misused as a
means of divesting a property owner of the title to his property. Through
fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover
that his certi cate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a
reconstituted title in someone else's name. 1 3 8 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, I vote to (1) GRANT petitioners' letter motion for reconsideration
dated 19 July 2006, (2) REVERSE the Court's First Division Decision dated 12 December
2005 and Resolution dated 19 April 2006, (3) RECALL the Entry of Judgment dated 2
May 2006, and (4) DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 filed by respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
CORONA , J : p
The integrity of the Torrens system of land registration should be zealously

guarded. Otherwise, transactions involving registered lands will be utterly confusing
and public faith in the Torrens system and the value of certi cates of titles may be
seriously impaired. 1 It is therefore the duty of courts, specially this Court, to tread
carefully and cautiously in cases where its adjudication will allow or tend to allow
doubts on the integrity of the Torrens system to linger. With this in mind, I respectfully
submit the following opinion.
The Court of Appeals May, in Proper
Instances, Order the Cancellation of a
Certificate of Title in an Appeal of the
Land Registration Authority's Decision
in an Administrative Reconstitution
Proceeding
In resolving controversies, this Court’s duty is to apply or interpret the law. It
cannot make or amend the law without treading the perilous waters of judicial
legislation. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the
Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. 2 It cannot be
(1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or
diminished by any act or omission of the parties or (3) conferred by the acquiescence
of the courts. 3
I submit that the First Division, in its December 12, 2005 decision, enlarged the
scope of the authority of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in administrative
reconstitution proceedings when it recognized the authority of the LRA to rule that
petitioners' certificate of title was a sham, spurious and not duly issued.
Section 6 of PD 4 1529 5 limits the LRA’s functions to the following:
SEC. 6. General Functions. —
(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following
functions: HESAIT
(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to nal judgments of

the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the
Register of Deeds of the corresponding certificate of title;
(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Register of Deeds
and other personnel of the Commission;
(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from
decision of, Register of Deeds;
(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and
personnel of the [RTCs] throughout the Philippines with respect to the
discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of
lands;
(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated
relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefore;
(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and
consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No.
496 except those covered by PD No. 957.
(2) The [LRA] shall have the following functions:
(a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department
of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the
implementation of the land reform program of the government;
(b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings; and
(c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration
of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and
consolidation plans of titled lands.
Thus, under PD 1529, the LRA has no authority to rule on the authenticity and
validity of a certi cate of title. While Section 9 6 of RA 7 6732 vested the LRA with the
quasi-judicial 8 power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or a rm any decision of the
reconstituting o cer or Register of Deeds" on appeal in administrative reconstitution
proceedings, the LRA nonetheless did not acquire any authority to declare a certi cate
of title void. Such power properly and exclusively pertains to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). 9
Indeed, the separate opinions on the December 12, 2005 decision recognized
that these cases should have been tried by the RTC. 1 0 However, the said opinions
stated that to remand these cases for trial at this stage would only be "a time-
consuming and pointless exercise". With due respect, justice should not be sacri ced
for expediency. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court be right. 1 1
Nonetheless, while the LRA cannot rule on the authenticity and validity of a
certi cate of title, the Court of Appeals possesses such power when presented with an
appeal of the decision of the LRA in a case such as this where the validity and
authenticity of a certi cate of title covering a particular property is challenged in the
course of and in connection with the administrative reconstitution of another certi cate
of title purportedly covering the same property.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that while Section 48 1 2 of PD 1529 provides
that a certi cate of title "cannot be altered, modi ed, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law", it is silent as to the speci c court where the
petition for cancellation of a certi cate of title should be instituted. In contrast, Section
108 1 3 of PD 1529 expressly states that petitions for amendment or alteration of a
certi cate of title covering a particular property after original registration of that
property should be led in the then Court of First Instance, now the RTC. This difference
in the treatment between cancellation of a certi cate of title and the alteration or
amendment/modi cation thereof shows the legislative intent to distinguish between
these actions. Thus, courts other than the RTC, such as the Court of Appeals,
have the authority and jurisdiction to order the cancellation of a certi cate of
title which may be found to be false or fraudulent when this is necessary in
the adjudication of a controversy brought before them.
Speci cally, the Court of Appeals is vested under Section 9 (3) of BP 129 (in
connection with RA 5434) with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all nal judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the LRA in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. This is re ected in Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, while its
jurisdiction to review the judgment, decision, resolution or award of the LRA is
designated under BP 129 as "appellate", the Court of Appeals actually exercises original
jurisdiction (in its traditional sense) as it is the rst time that the said case becomes
the subject of a judicial action. 1 4 This is the proper character of the authority exercised
by the Court of Appeals in an appeal of the judgment, decision, resolution, order or
award of the LRA in an administrative reconstitution proceeding. This also supports the
view that the Court of Appeals has the power to pass upon the authenticity and validity
of a certi cate of title covering a particular property (and to order its cancellation)
when the same is put in issue in connection with the reconstitution of another
certificate of title covering the same property.
This neither runs counter to nor encroaches on the power of the RTC under
Section 19 (2) of BP 129, as amended, to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest
therein". In so canceling a certi cate of title, the Court of Appeals does not
resolve a civil action involving title to real property. "Title" to real property is not
the same as the "certi cate of title"; the certi cate of title is distinct from the title itself.
The certi cate of title may get lost, burned or destroyed and later on reconstituted but
the title subsists all the while and remains unaffected unless transferred or conveyed to
another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance. CSTEHI
Title is the "union of all the elements (as ownership, possession and custody)
constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property". 1 5 It is the "legal link
between a person who owns property and the property itself". 1 6
Though employed in various ways, title is generally used to describe either the
manner in which a right to real property is acquired, or the right itself. In the rst
sense, it refers to the conditions necessary to acquire a valid claim to land; in the
second, it refers to the legal consequences of such conditions. These two senses
are not only interrelated, but inseparable: given the requisite conditions, the legal
consequences or rights follow as of course; given the rights, conditions necessary
for the creation of those rights must have been satis ed. Thus, when the word
'title' is used in one sense, the other sense is necessarily implied. 1 7
On the other hand, a Torrens certi cate of title is the certi cate of ownership
issued under the Torrens system of registration by the government thru the Register of
Deeds naming and declaring the owner in fee simple of the real property described
therein, free from all liens and encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted
thereon or otherwise reserved by law. 1 8 Legally de ned, a certi cate of title is the
transcript of the decree of registration made by the Registrar of Deeds in the registry.
19
Whereas title is the claim, right or interest in land, a certi cate of title is the
document evidencing that right. The issuance of a certi cate of title does not give the
owner any better title than what he actually has. He secures his certi cate of title by
virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. 2 0 To reiterate, the loss or destruction
and subsequent reconstitution of a certi cate of title does not affect the subsistence
of the title unless it (the title) is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a
lien or encumbrance.
These Cases Should Be Remanded
to the Court of Appeals for Consideration
of Contentious Factual Issues
Having a rmed the authority of the Court of Appeals to order the cancellation of
a certi cate of title in this instance, does it follow that this Court should uphold the
December 12, 2005 decision of the First Division? I do not believe so.
Considering the serious and grave imputations against the respective
certi cates of titles of the contending parties, it would be precipitate as well as
imprudent for the Court to simply adopt the ndings of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP Nos. 66642 and 66700. A "surfeit of forgeries, badges of fraud and other dubious
circumstances" 2 1 is alleged to have attended respondents' administrative petition for
reconstitution of their TCT No. T-210177. Similarly, signi cant irregularities and fatal
defects 2 2 have been cast on petitioners' reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481. Indeed, the
parties trade serious accusations of fraud and deceit. Similarly, both parties invoke
Section 11 of RA 6732 in support of their respective positions:
other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all
persons having knowledge thereof.
Any decision in favor of one party at this moment will be a declaration (express
or implied) that there is prima facie evidence that the other party obtained or sought to
obtain his certi cate of title by means of fraud, deceit or other machination. Such
statement will give this Court no legal option but to order the criminal
prosecution of the losing party pursuant to Section 12 of RA 6732:
SEC. 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other
machination obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to
criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a
period of not less than two years but not exceeding ve years or the payment of a
ne of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public o cer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in
securing a decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled
thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be
liable for imprisonment of not less than ve years but not exceeding ten years or
payment of a ne of not less than Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One
hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
Since any declaration of fraud or deceit on the part of one party will expose that
party to criminal prosecution, this Court should refrain from making any such
declaration until and unless the complicated and contentious maze of factual matters
is clearly resolved. While these matters have been brought to the attention of the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700, the Court of Appeals at that time was
not able to exhaustively evaluate and analyze them.
The controversial factual matters were, however, brought to light extensively and
in great detail during the oral arguments of these cases as well as in the respective
memoranda submitted by the parties and by O ce of the Solicitor General after the
oral arguments.
To reiterate, what is crucial and critical in these cases is the complete
determination of contentious factual issues.
However, the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond the province of
this Court as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to appreciate evidence at the
rst instance. 2 3 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has the competence to
perform that task. Indeed, we stated in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation: 2 4
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for
certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate
the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an
appropriate court, agency or o ce. The delegate need not be the body that
rendered the assailed decision.DcCIAa
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review ndings of fact.
Its conclusions as to ndings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this
Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in
appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
There are indeed many factual questions looming over the respective certi cates
of title of the contending parties. These can only be threshed out in a remand to the
Court of Appeals. Hence, I respectfully submit that the proper and prudent course now
is for the Court to constitute a special division of the Court of Appeals to be composed
of three associate justices to be designated by us for the purpose of hearing these
cases on remand. The special division will hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its ndings and recommended
conclusions within three months from finality of the Court’s resolution in this case.
Accordingly, I vote that these cases be REMANDED to a special division of the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J., dissenting :
I maintain that the December 12, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court's First Division in
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 became nal and executory. The same had been recorded
in the Book of Entries of Judgments in a Resolution dated May 2, 2006.
Despite the Entry of Judgment, the Court en banc took cognizance of the cases
when counsel for petitioners, Ret. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano wrote the Court and
prayed for the suspension of the effects of the Entry of Judgment. Thereafter, the
cases were set for Oral Argument.
From the presentations made by the parties and the questions propounded by
the members of the Court during the oral argument held on July 24, 2007, two main
factual issues emerged, to wit: 1) Whether or not Plan Fls-3168-D which is re ected in
the technical description of respondents' TCT No. 210177 duly exists in the o cial
records of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB); and 2) Whether or not Barrio Payong,
which is indicated in petitioners’ various documentary exhibits as location of the
property allegedly covered by their TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) exists as a barrio in
Quezon City or Caloocan City.
Re Plan Fls-3168-D:
During the Oral Argument, the following discussion took place on the issue of
whether Plan Fls-3168-D duly exists, to wit:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
When the Barques led their petition for reconstitution, on 22 October

1996, they attached a copy of their TCT, TCT 210177 and in TCT 210177 it
says there that property is subdivided into two lots, lot 823A and lot 823B
per subdivision plan FLS-3168-D approved by the Bureau of Lands on 10
January 1941. Okay, so Atty. Bustos of course he knows how to
verify whether this approved plan is genuine or not because there
are two agencies in the government that would possibly have
files of this approved plans and one of that is the National Office,
the Land Management Bureau, National O ce where all approved
plans are stored. It is a repository of all approved plans all over
the country. When the Land Management Bureau decentralized
for NCR they transmitted to the NCR all the approved plans
covering NCR.
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, Atty. Bustos wrote the two o ces, the national o ce and the regional
o ce asking for their comment on whether this FLS-3168D exist in their
les. Now, it looks like Atty. Bustos was zeroing in on the authenticity of
FLS-3168D. Of course, the national o ce said, we don't have this on le.
The regional o ce said, we have this on le but they could not give a copy
to Atty. Bustos and they refused to answer Atty. Bustos despite several
demands or request for the copy. They never replied to Atty. Bustos. My
question is this, why did Atty. Bustos think or consider the authenticity of
FLS-3168D important for the purposes of the reconstitution of the Barques
title.
Yes, Your Honor. If the division or subdivision of lot 823 were genuinely
and truly, honestly undertaken they should have applied for two certificates
of title, they applied only for one certi cate of title and it is for that reason
that Atty. Bustos wanted to determine the correctness or authenticity of
that subdivision plan because the same piece of land or substantially the
same piece of land was covered only, constituted only one lot per the title
already reconstituted of the Manotoks. So the . . .
JUSTICE CARPIO:

Atty. Bustos was of the mind that if FLS-3168-D is not authentic, is not on
le, then there could have been no subdivision of lot 823 and therefore the
title of the Manotoks specifying only one lot 823 would seem to be in
order. aSHAIC
Correct, sir.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
But if there is on le FLS-3168-D then it will be the title of Barque that
would seem to be in order rather than the title of the Manotok because the
approved subdivision is on file, is that correct?
I would think so, sir. I would think so.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, thank you. 2
Thereafter, the Court required counsel for respondents to submit a certi ed copy
of plan Fls-3168-D from the LMB, National O ce. This is in addition to the certi ed
photocopy of the Tracing Cloth plan 3 and certi ed photocopy (micro lm) of Plan Fls-
3168-D 4 which respondents obtained from the LMB, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) and already submitted before
the Court.
In compliance with the directive, respondents submitted a copy of a letter 5
furnished them by the LMB, National O ce, explaining why it could not issue a certi ed
copy of Fls-3168-D, thus:
In reply to your letter dated April 24, 2006, please be informed that
according to the veri cation made by the Survey Records Section, Records
Management Division from their Lists of Transmittal of Survey Records, plan
FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal was among
those survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital
Region (NCR), Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our le no.
NCR-199, for their reference/file purposes.
It is therefore suggested that you address your letter-request to the Chief,
Surveys Division, DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), L & S Bldg., 1515 Roxas
Boulevard, Ermita, Manila, relative to the said plan.
Thus, as expressly mentioned in the above-quoted letter, "plan FLS-3168-D

covering parcel/s of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal was among those survey records
already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region".
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 6 dated June 10, 1987, DENR was
reorganized and regional o ces of the Bureau of Lands were established in each of the
country's 13 administrative regions. 7 The functions of a unit in the national o ce were
transferred to the newly established regional o ce, which likewise include the transfer
of records to said regional o ce. Hence, the reason why respondents could not be
furnished by the LMB Head Office with a certified copy of Plan Fls-3168-D.
However, they were able to obtain a Certi cation dated June 19, 2007 from the
Records Management Division of DENR Head O ce that its Electronic Data
Processing (EDP) Listing includes plan Fls-3168-D, Lot 823 in the name of Emiliano
Setosta. 8 The Certification reads, thus:
This is to certify that according to the veri cation of the Records
Management Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila, EDP's
Listing has available record with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, xerox copy of which is
herewith attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (now Quezon City), in the name of
Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.
xxx xxx xxx
The certi cation by the Records Management Division of the DENR-Head O ce

also con rmed the authenticity of the other computer print-outs submitted by
respondents showing Fls-3168-D as among those listed, namely:
1. A certi ed true photocopy of a computer print out earlier issued by the
Land Management Bureau, Head O ce, showing that Plan Fls-3168-D is
listed in its EDP listing of approved plans and O cial Receipt #8994774
issued in payment for the Certification. 9
2. The same computer print out, as that attached as Annex F, which shows
Fls-3168-D of E. Setosta as one of those listed therein duly certi ed by
Melchor Magsanoc, Asst. Regional Exec. Director for Operation, LMB,
DENR-NCR. 1 0
The computer print-outs show that Plan Fls-3168-D is the second plan in said
list, followed by Fls-3169-D of Chua, then Fls-3170-D of Loyola. Said o cial list is a
credible piece of evidence proving the existence of Stetson's Plan Fls-3168-D.
Respondents also furnished the Court photo copies of Plan Fls-3168-D issued by
the Land Management Bureau-National Capital Region (LMB-NCR) and certi ed by
different officials:
1. A photo copy of Plan Fls-3168-D (micro lm) issued on September 23, 1996
and duly certi ed by Carmelito A. Soriano for Ernesto S. Erive, Chief,
Regional Technical Director, NCR. 1 1
2. A photocopy of a File Copy of the Tracing Cloth Plan of Fls-3168-D, duly
certi ed on July 9, 1999 by Teo lo R. Laguardia, Chief, Technical Records
and Statistics Section, LMB, Regional Office, NCR.
Notwithstanding the above certi cations which clearly show the existence of
Plan Fls-3168-D, the Majority Opinion chose to lend credence to petitioners' claim that
Fls-3168-D does not exist in the government les based solely on Engr. Dalire’s
allegations in his February 19, 1997 letter. This is unfortunate considering that Dalire's
credibility was completely repudiated by the LRA. Dalire’s claim that the documents
presented by the respondents were forgeries was disregarded as frivolous and
baseless, thus: ECaTDc
Based on the documents presented, petitioners (Barques) have

established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177
was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and
effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists
TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . . The Register of Deeds of Quezon
City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177
when he issued a certi cation to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the
titles destroyed and not salvaged from the re that gutted the Quezon City Hall on
11 June 1988 . . . .
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of
the lot re ected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical
description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate . . . as indicated in the B. L.
Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the
Bureau of Lands . . . .
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and
effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the
petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given
due course and the same is mandatory.
xxx xxx xxx
It would be necessary to underscore that the certi ed copy of
Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the o ce of Engr. Ernesto Erive,
Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose o ce is the lawful
repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital
Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by
the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and
Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by
Republic of the Philippines O cial Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-
96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to
Atty. Bustos . . . con rmed that a micro lm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is
on le in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his o ce.
Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty.
Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that
his o ce has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is
belied by the certi ed copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the
Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into
the micro lm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned
Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report
No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer
print-out is duly supported by an Official Receipt . . . .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does
from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The
documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed
aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by
Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. . . . 1 2
In his letter dated January 31, 1997, Dalire alleged that plan Fls-3168-D was not
included in the inventory of approved plans enrolled in their le. However, this allegation
was belied upon presentation of a photocopy of the tracing cloth plan of Fls-3168-D
duly certi ed by Teo lo R. Laguardia, Chief of the Technical Records and Statistics
Section of the LMB-NCR.
Dalire next claimed that plan Fls-3168-D was not included in their computer list of
plans available for decentralization. However, this claim was categorically debunked by
the LRA, thus:
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his
o ce has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by a
certi ed copy of the computer print-out issued by the Bureau of Lands
indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered in the micro lm
records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession
Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of
Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 . . . .
In light of the evidence on record, I completely agree with the conclusion reached
by the LRA that the "evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply
brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by
Engr. Dalire in his February 19, 1997 letter".
Therefore, on the issue of due existence of Fls-3168-D, I nd no justi able basis
to disturb the LRA nding that Plan FLS-3168-D indeed exists in the o cial les of LMB,
DENR. Accordingly, I nd respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, which describes Lot 823
as subdivided into Lots 823-A and 823-B in accordance with Fls-3168-D, in order.
Moreover, the LRA correctly found that petitioners' reconstituted title TCT No.
RT-22481 (372302) is spurious, considering petitioners' failure to prove facts contrary
to the LRA ndings. The long-settled rule is that factual ndings of an administrative
agency which are not shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence can be validly
sustained and, in fact, are oftentimes binding on the court, 1 3 especially when a rmed
by the Court of Appeals, 1 4 as in this case. HSTaEC
Re Location of the Property:

Petitioners' documentary exhibits simultaneously and/or alternately referred to
Barrio Payong and Barrio Culiat as the location of the property covered by their title.
However, as noted by the LRA, after the re that burned the records of the Quezon City
Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988, the receipts for realty taxes of the property
covered by petitioners' title already indicated the location of the property as Barrio
Matandang Balara. However, no basis or explanation, whether in the form of o cial
documents or otherwise, was shown or presented by the petitioners before the LRA,
the Court of Appeals and this Court, why the location of the property supposedly
covered by their title was transferred from Barrio Payong and Barrio Culiat to Barrio
Matandang Balara. Signi cantly, petitioners' reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) does not state the barrio where the property described therein is located.
Petitioners' counsel failed to give any explanation for this seemingly anomalous
situation. However, he readily agreed with the possible rationalization provided during
the Oral Argument:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Counsel, can you ash on the screen again the 1940 Tax Declaration of
the Manotoks? It says there, what barrio is that now?
Payong, that's 1933, Sir.


That's 1933. The 1940. 1941 is okay. What is the barrio there?
Barrio Culiat.
So, it started as Barrio Payong became Barrio Culiat later on it became
Matandang Balara the present name.

Yes, Sir.
Because the themes 1 5 of barrios changed overtime and we're talking of

eighty-five (85) years, is that correct?
That's right, Sir. 1 6
This is pure speculation which deserves no credence at all, especially in the light
of evidence in the form of o cial certi cations from relevant government o ces in
Quezon City 1 7 and Caloocan City 1 8 that Payong had not existed as a barrio in Quezon
City or in Caloocan City before the property became a part of Quezon City.
The map of Quezon City, 1 9 as prepared by NAMRIA, the o cial mapping agency
of the government, also shows that both Barangay Culiat and Barangay Matandang
Balara are existing Barangays of Quezon City but are clearly far away from each other.
Payong does not exist in the map.
Moreover, Barangays Culiat and Matandang Balara were almost simultaneously
created as barangays. Culiat was created on March 26, 1962 while Matandang Balara
was created as a barangay on May 10, 1962. The simultaneous creation of Culiat and
Matandang Balara as barangays thus showed the fallacy of petitioners' claim during the
Oral Argument that the disputed property was originally located in Payong, but was
later converted into Barangay Culiat and finally as Barangay Matandang Balara.
Signi cantly, it also appears from Intervenors Manahans' Memorandum that the
property covered by their alleged Deed of Conveyance dated October 30, 2000 is
likewise located in Barangay Culiat, Quezon City. The relevant portion of the technical
description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate in Manahans' Memorandum 2 0 which
shows Barrio Culiat as the location of the property is quoted below:
A parcel of land (Lot 823, Piedad Estate, LRC Record No. 5975), situated in
the Barrio of Culiat, Municipality of Caloocan, Metro Manila. 2 1
Intervenors Manahan also alleged that petitioners Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481
is fake and spurious for not being based on authentic documents. 2 2
I do not agree with the claim that Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals 2 3 which
mentioned the Agrarian Court's order to its clerk of court to conduct an ocular
inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong, Quezon City, constitutes
credible evidence as to the location of the property. There was no mention at all as to
how the said court made the determination of the location of the property. Moreover,
there was nothing in the Agrarian Court’s Order stating exactly where, in Quezon City,
Barrio Payong was located, which indicates that petitioners themselves may have
brought the inspecting parties to the property they were occupying.
Similarly, the Court in the case of People v. Siguin, 2 4 did not make a nding as to
the existence and location of Sitio Payong but merely referred to the Information led
which alleged that the crime was committed in Sitio Payong, Matandang Balara. SaTAED
In any event, petitioners are bound by their own documentary evidence and verbal
admission during the Oral Argument that the property is located in Payong, Culiat or
simply Barrio Payong or Barrio Culiat. Since petitioners presented the said
documentary evidence to prove their ownership of the property and the source of their
title, they have thereby judicially admitted that the location of the property covered by
their title, as shown in said exhibits, is Payong, Culiat, or Barrio Payong, or simply Barrio
Culiat, Quezon City. They are, therefore, bound by said admissions, 2 5 especially since
they have neither alleged nor proven that said admissions were made through palpable
mistake. 2 6
It is also important to note that, except for Tax Declarations and realty tax
payments that were issued after the re that gutted the records of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, petitioners did not present any credible evidence showing that
the property they are occupying and covered by their reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) is located in Barrio Matandang Balara.
Consequently, since the property covered by petitioners’ reconstituted title is not
the property in Matandang Balara that they are occupying as clearly shown by their own
documentary evidence, it necessarily follows that they are not the owners of such
property. The Court's ruling in Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 2 7 is pertinent. Thus:
Documents proving ownership such as transfer and original certi cates of
title are the legs on which petitioners' case stands. Premised on the relevance of
these documents, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the
proverbial legs of evidence are broken. While the titles presented by
petitioners show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed,
but over the adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in the titles
presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and adjoining owners of the
land claimed by MWSS for registration. . . .
The Deed of Sale between Emiliano

Setosta and Homer Barque, Sr.:
Petitioners alleged that the deed of sale between Emiliano Setosta and Homer
Barque, Sr. was not a public document because the document does not appear to be
recorded in the Notarial Register Records of Atty. Eliseo Razon.
Granting that the Notarial Register of Atty. Eliseo Razon does not re ect the said
Deed of Sale executed by Emiliano Setosta in favor of Homer Barque, Sr., nonetheless,
applying the presumption that o cial duty has been regularly performed, I nd that the
Deed of Sale was duly notarized as otherwise the instrument would not have been
registrable and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City would not have issued TCT No.
210177 to Homer Barque, Sr. on the basis of said Deed of Sale.
Such presumption cannot be overcome by the mere failure, even if true, of Atty.
Razon to record the deed in his Notarial Register since said failure does not make the
notarization less genuine. Neither could the respondents be faulted for said failure. In
any event, respondents submitted a Certi cation under oath of Mr. Gregorio B. Faraon
28 attesting to the existence of said Deed of Sale in the records of the Clerk of Court of
the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481.
The Decisions of the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals both a rmed the LRA
ndings that petitioners' reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 was spurious and a sham
and that respondents' TCT No. 210177 sought to be reconstituted is genuine, valid and
existing.
The Court of Appeals, being the tribunal to which the appeal was elevated
pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides that nal Orders or
Resolutions of the LRA may be appealed to the Court of Appeals, has the
corresponding authority and jurisdiction to decide the appealed case on the basis of
the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the petition, comment, reply,
rejoinder, and memoranda, led by the parties, 2 9 and to apply the law applicable in
administrative reconstitution proceeding which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732. 3 0
Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court speci cally mandates that "the ndings
of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence,
shall be binding on the Court of Appeals ". Since petitioners were not able to show
that the LRA ndings of fact were unsupported by evidence, 3 1 the Court of Appeals
committed no error of jurisdiction when it confirmed such findings.
Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that:
other machination is void ab intio as against the party obtaining the same and all
persons having knowledge thereof.
Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners'
reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it a rmed the ndings of the LRA that
petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 is spurious and void ab initio. Having also a rmed the
LRA nding that respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and existing, the
Court of Appeals likewise had the authority to order its reconstitution since this was
the final step in the administrative reconstitution process.
It must be noted that Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (or The
Property Registration Decree) does not expressly provide for the specific court that can
order the cancellation of a certi cate of title. On the other hand, Section 108 thereof
clearly provides that only the Court of First Instance (now RTC) can order an erasure,
alteration or amendment in a certificate of title. AECcTS
The variance is a clear indication of the intent to distinguish between these two
actions. Thus, under Section 48, courts other than the Regional Trial Court, such as the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are possessed with authority and jurisdiction
to order the cancellation of a Torrens title which they con rmed to be spurious, as in
this case, when this is necessary in the disposition of a case elevated before them on
appeal.
Moreover, there has been a change in the traditional concept of "original
jurisdiction" on account of Rule 43, Rules of Court, where the Court of Appeals has the
power to take judicial cognizance of a case for the rst time through its review powers.
Thus, this Court said in Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation 3 2 that:
Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the rst time under conditions provided by
law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine
the nal order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for
review.
xxx xxx xxx
The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered by Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a slew of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial tribunals or their o cers
whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), ineluctably confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court of
Appeals over nal rulings of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commission, by explicitly using the phrase "appellate jurisdiction". . . .
Consequently, when an administrative reconstitution proceeding is

appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the Court of Appeals would be acting
as a court of original jurisdiction with regard to said appealed cases, hence, BP 129
would not apply.
In view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly acted within its
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) of
petitioners after it confirmed the LRA finding that said title is fake and spurious.
Signi cantly, the Court has ruled in Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
33 that it has jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed case was not
originally led with the Regional Trial Court for nulli cation of title. We held that the
Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the title issued in the name of Paramount in the
light of the facts of this case, and that:
[I]n order for a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case, we must
decide on the effect of void duplicate copies of a certi cate of title that
served as a basis for the sale of the property it represents and the eventual
issuance of title in the name of respondent Paramount. To require another
proceeding only for the purpose of annulling the said new titles when
the same could be decided in this very petition would promote judicial
bureaucracy, a practice abhorred by our legal system . As we have ruled in
Gayos v. Gayos, it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. 3 4
More pertinently, the Court ruled in Rexlon, thus:

On whether this Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the titles issued
in the name of respondent Paramount in the light of the facts of this case, we rule
in the affirmative.
xxx xxx xxx
Secondly, respondent Paramount has duly consented to put in
issue the validity of its titles by invoking in this appeal the reasons
espoused by the appellate court and respondent David for the dismissal
of the petition to annul the decision of the trial court. In its
Memorandum and respondent David’s comment that it adopted,
respondent Paramount has not made any jurisdictional objection as
regards its inclusion in the appeal to the petition for annulment of
judgment, and even participated in the discussion of the merits of the
case. Based on the principle of estoppel, respondent Paramount is
barred from raising any objection over the power of this Court to nullify
its titles. 3 5
Jurisdiction of the Land Registration

Authority (LRA) to administratively
reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT
No. 210177 in the name of respondents
despite the previously reconstituted TCT
No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over
the same property.
To resolve this issue, it is relevant to rst consider whether petitioners' TCT No.
RT-22481, in fact, covers the same property identi ed and described in respondents'
TCT No. 210177.
Respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, indicates Barrio Matandang Balara as
location of the property. On the other hand, the reconstituted title of petitioners, TCT
No. RT-22481, does not indicate the barrio where the property described therein is
located. As shown by petitioners' documentary evidence, the property which they claim
to be covered by their TCT No. RT-22481 is located in Barrio Payong, or Barrio Culiat,
Quezon City.
More importantly, the technical description in respondents' title, TCT No. 210177,
indicates boundaries totally different from those stated in petitioners' title, TCT No. RT-
22481. Furthermore, the technical description of respondents' title shows that it covers
two lots while petitioners' title covers only one lot.TCHEDA
The claim that the LRA has no authority to pass upon the genuineness of a
certi cate of title in an administrative reconstitution proceeding is an absurdity. Will the
LRA just accept any title and order its reconstitution although it is facially void? Such an
absurd interpretation would necessarily result in the reconstitution of a patently fake
and spurious title and the consequent proliferation of fake titles, a situation that the
legislature could not have contemplated when it enacted R.A. No. 6732 authorizing the
administrative reconstitution of titles.
It is, therefore, misleading and baseless for petitioners to assert that their
previously reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covers the same property as
that identi ed and described in respondents' TCT No. 210177 so as to deprive the LRA
of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for reconstitution.
However, even assuming that both petitioners' and respondents' titles cover the
same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents' petition for
reconstitution.
As petitioners themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution
of their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the other hand, respondents'
TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued on September 24, 1975 by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. Its existence was likewise con rmed by the LRA in its Resolution
of June 24, 1998 based on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list
of titles lost during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988.
Respondents' TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time petitioners
led their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 3 6 the Court ruled
that:
[I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as
March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original
certi cate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO 12890 (N.A.) over Lot
No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria
Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void.
It, therefore, follows that petitioners' reconstituted title, even assuming the same
to have been duly reconstituted, was deemed nulli ed by the mere existence of
respondents' title at the time of the administrative reconstitution of petitioners' title. 3 7
Pertinently, the Court held in Alabang Development Corp. v. Hon. Valenzuela 3 8 that:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued
existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be
the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles led
by third parties without rst securing by nal judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. . . .
Moreover, since petitioners recognized the jurisdiction of the LRA when they led
their opposition to respondents’ petition for reconstitution and submitting evidence
therein, they cannot thereafter turn around and impugn such jurisdiction after the LRA
ruled against their prayer for the denial of the petition for reconstitution. We ruled in
Salva v. Court of Appeals: 3 9
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that while
an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings in
the tribunal which rendered the order or decision will bar such party
from attacking its jurisdiction. . . .
In the instant cases, it is undisputed that petitioners actively participated in the

proceedings and submitted evidence in support of their claim. Estoppel does not apply
only as against plaintiffs who sought a rmative reliefs. It equally applies to defendants
who actively participate in the proceedings, thus:
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-
dealing by parties who are disposed to tri e with the courts by taking inconsistent
positions, in utter disregard of elementary principles of right dealing and good
faith. This applies not only to parties who are plaintiffs, complainants or
others who initiated the case by actually ling the action, but also to
parties who are defendants or respondents, if the latter fail to timely
raise the jurisdictional issue and instead actively participate in the
proceedings. 4 0
There is, therefore, no further need to require another proceeding for the
cancellation of petitioners' reconstituted title before the LRA can proceed to
reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177.
Jurisdiction of the LRA to adjudicate
on the validity of petitioners'
reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the administrative
reconstitution case filed by
respondents.
In its comment dated March 30, 2007, the O ce of the Solicitor General
categorically declared that:
While it is true that the Register of Deeds and the Administrator of the
LRA, in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers over petitions for
administrative reconstitution, have the authority to receive evidence, it
is limited for the purpose of determining whether or not the certi cates
of title sought to be reconstituted are valid, authentic, genuine and in
force at the time they were lost or destroyed, and to the end of either
granting or denying the prayer of the petition . Also, their jurisdiction to hear
administrative petitions for reconstitution does not encompass any other title
except that which is the subject matter of the petition. Otherwise, they exceed their
jurisdiction. 4 1
Furthermore, the technical expertise of the LRA with regard to reconstitution of

titles is such that the Court has long directed the lower courts to strictly observe the
LRA circulars on reconstitution and land registration cases. It said: DHIcET
In recognition of these developments that have placed under a cloud the

integrity of the once unassailable Torrens Title, spawned the proliferation of fake
land titles and encouraged the mushrooming of land grabbers and squatters on
legitimately-titled lands, Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa issued on July 15, this
year, Administrative Circular No. 7-96 addressed to all judges of all court
levels and their Clerks of Court enjoining the strict observance of Land
Registration Authority (LRA) circulars on reconstitution and land
registration cases. 4 2
Since the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for reconstitution as well as
petitioners' opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the title of the parties,
using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for reconstitution should be
given due course, or denied as prayed for by the petitioners. Thus:
[W]hen an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to
its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of
said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. 4 3
Moreover, even assuming that petitioners are correct in claiming that the LRA
had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of validity of title in a petition for reconstitution,
nonetheless, since petitioners opposed respondents' petition for reconstitution and, in
fact, ventilated before the LRA the issue of validity or genuineness of their title and
submitted evidence in support thereof, instead of going to the courts to enjoin the LRA
proceedings on account of their possession of a purported reconstituted title over the
same property covered by respondents' TCT No. 210177, petitioners are estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction. We ruled in Laxina, Sr. v. O ce of the
Ombudsman, 4 4 that:
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows that he participated in the
proceedings by ling his counter-a davit with supporting evidence. . . . Thus, it
has been held that participation in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after
an adverse decision is rendered against them. 4 5
Again, even assuming that the Regional Trial Court should have had a rst chance
at resolving the issue of validity of the title, nonetheless, under the circumstances, this
Court, upon elevation of the issue before it, had the unquestionable jurisdiction to
declare petitioners' reconstituted title void and order its cancellation, under the same
rationale relied upon by this Court in Board of Commissioners (CID) v. dela Rosa: 4 6
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court.
But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted
by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide
the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not
without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served
if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision
raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court . . . .
The ruling in Islamic Directorate of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 47 is

likewise applicable, to wit:
The resolution of the question as to whether or not the SEC had jurisdiction to
declare the subject sale null and void is rendered moot and academic by the inherent
nullity of the highly dubious sale due to lack of consent of the IDP, owner of the subject
property. No end of substantial justice will be served if we reverse the SEC’s conclusion
on the matter, and remand the case to the regular courts for further litigation over an
issue which is already determinable based on what we have in the records.
Beyond all that, however, is the unalterable fact that this Court's First Division had
already resolved in its Decision of December 12, 2005, the jurisdictional issues raised
by petitioners.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
or the LRA to decide the ownership
of the disputed property in the
administrative reconstitution of
title filed by respondents.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership before the LRA when they presented
evidence in the form of a Deed of Sale, ve (5) Unilateral Deeds of Conveyance, tax
declarations, and realty tax receipts to prove their ownership of the property allegedly
covered by their reconstituted TCT RT No. 22481. Petitioners supported their claim of
genuineness of their reconstituted title with documentary evidence showing their
supposed acquisition of ownership of the land.
However, the LRA gave no credence to the evidence of ownership submitted by
the petitioners, mainly because the property described therein appears to be located in
a barrio different and far from the barrio where the property in dispute is actually
located.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioners again adverted to the same
documentary evidence they presented before the LRA in support of their claim of
ownership of the property covered by their TCT No. RT 22481 and to buttress their
contention that their title is genuine and authentic.
However, the Court of Appeals a rmed in toto the Resolution of the LRA which
found their reconstituted title a sham and spurious and respondents' title, genuine,
authentic and existing. In addition, the Court of Appeals also ordered the cancellation of
petitioners' TCT No. RT22481 and the reconstitution of respondents' TCT No. 210177.
AHTICD
In short, since petitioners themselves laid before the LRA and the Court of
Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted title and their
ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had the corresponding
authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.
In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 4 8 the Court ruled, thus:
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for
reconstitution of certi cates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of
ownership for determination in the said petition, that they were given the full
opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support
thereof, and that the evidence presented was su cient and adequate for rendering a
proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid
and binding. It being a valid judgment, res judicata applies.
Indeed, petitioners are barred from thereafter impugning the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to rule on these issues. In the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 4 9
it was stressed that:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure a rmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction . . . .
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or the power of the court. . . . [I]t is not right for a party
who has a rmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an a rmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
. . . [W]e frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse . . . .
In the light of all the foregoing, I nd no compelling reason or overriding

consideration to further require the referral of these cases to the Regional Trial Court or
the Court of Appeals for a re-litigation of the issues already raised and resolved by the
two divisions of the Court of Appeals and a rmed by the Court's First Division in its
final and executory Decision dated December 12, 2005.
More importantly, the doctrine of immutability of nal and executory decisions
which became part of our legal system almost a century ago and reiterated time and
again by this Court precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented action.
As held in Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 5 0 every consideration of expediency and
justice is opposed to the uncontrolled exercise of discretion by the courts in opening
up cases after judgments entered therein have become nal. 5 1 The interest of the
individual, as well as of the community, demands there should be a de nite end to every
litigation; and nothing could be more impolitic than to leave it to the discretion of every
court to revise and review and reconsider its judgments without limit. 5 2
Furthermore, the question of whether the Court can reopen a nal and executory
judgment has constitutional implications since a reopening of the nal and executory
December 12, 2005 Decision would violate the prevailing parties' right to due process.
As the Court said in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v.
Inciong: 5 3
A nal judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by
law under the due process clause of the Constitution. . . ..
Thereafter, in Fortich v. Corona, 5 4 the Court ruled against a reopening of a nal
and executory judgment since this is not a mere question of technicality but that of
substance and merit, thus:
It should be stressed that when the March 2, 1996 OP Decision was
declared nal and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein
petitioners . . . . Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of
technicality but that of substance and merit. . . .
Considering all the foregoing and the fact that these cases do not involve an
issue of transcendental importance, such as life, liberty or the security of the state, no
compelling reason exists to depart from this well-settled doctrine, nor to ignore the
fundamental public policy behind it.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that these cases be referred back to the Court's Special
First Division for nal disposition in accordance with its Decision of December 12,
2005.
CHICO-NAZARIO , J., dissenting :
This is to express my dissent in the majority opinion which set aside the nal and
executory Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court, recalled
the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 in the present cases, and remanded the
same to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence.
I emphatically call attention to the fact that the Decision, dated 12 December
2005, the fallo of which reads —
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February
24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to
reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November
7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to
reconstitute respondents' TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED[,]
AIcECS
had become FINAL AND EXECUTORY. The two Motions for Reconsideration of the
petitioners were both denied in Resolutions dated 19 April 2006 and 19 June 2006. The
Entry of Judgment was already made on 2 May 2006.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a nal judgment is executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modi ed
in any respect, even if the modi cation is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modi cation is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The
doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments must become nal at some de nite point in time. 1
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors.
Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes nal, executory and unappealable,
the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge
devised by the losing party. Unjusti ed delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at
naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality. 2
Apparent from the foregoing are the two-fold purposes for the doctrine of the
immutability and inalterability of a nal judgment: rst, to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Obviously, the rst purpose is in
line with the dictum that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes
that the court properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive at a
judicious decision. The end should always be the meting out of justice. As to the
second purpose, controversies cannot drag on inde nitely. The rights and obligations
of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an inde nite period of time. It must be
adjudicated properly and seasonably to better serve the ends of justice and to place
everything in proper perspective. In the process, the possibility that errors may be
committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be discounted. 3
The only recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are the corrections of
clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, where the judgment is void. 4 Void judgments may be
classi ed into two groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and
those obtained by fraud or collusion. 5 Petitioners assert, and the majority opinion
effectively sustains, that the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of
this Court, a rming the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the LRA rendered
without jurisdiction, may be set aside for belonging to the rst group of void
judgments. I cannot subscribe to such a view.
It is argued that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) has no jurisdiction to
reconstitute administratively the respondents' title because such reconstitution
supposedly constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the petitioners' pre-existing
Torrens title over the same property.
It is worthy to note that the LRA itself, despite nding clear and convincing
evidence that respondents' title was valid, genuine, authentic, and effective, while
concluding that petitioners' title was fraudulently reconstituted, held back from actually
canceling the petitioners' title. According to the dispositive portion of the LRA Decision
—
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of [herein respondents'
predecessor] Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of
TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of [herein petitioners] Manotoks upon
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
From the said LRA Decision, the parties led separate appeals with the Court of
Appeals.
Respondents' petition for review was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, which
the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals, in its
Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2003, resolved as follows —
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby
reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed
to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of [herein petitioners] and the LRA is hereby directed
to reconstitute forthwith [herein respondents'] valid, genuine and existing
Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
Petitioners' petition for review, on the other hand, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 66642, disposed by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its Amended
Decision, dated 24 February 2004, in the following manner —
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one
entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel [herein
petitioners'] TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith
[herein respondents'] TCT No. T-210177. ICESTA
It was not the LRA which ordered the cancellation of petitioners' title but the two
Divisions of the Court of Appeals which separately decided CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. Petitioners contend, however, that even the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of their title. They maintain that their title
can only be attacked in a direct action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Decision, dated 12 December 2005, of the First Division of the Court already addressed
the said arguments, thus —
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to
determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal
the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two
divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners' title is
forged. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue

in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to
the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of
an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before
it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the
remand thereof.
While the Court, when it nds that a lower court or quasi-judicial body is in error,
may simply and conveniently nullify the challenged decision, resolution or order and
remand the case thereto for further appropriate action, it is well within the
conscientious exercise of its broad review powers to refrain from doing so and instead
choose to render judgment on the merits when all material facts have been duly laid
before it as would buttress its ultimate conclusion, in the public interest and for the
expeditious administration of justice, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case. 6
Such a course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court." 7 Sound
practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal
of the case. A marked characteristic of the judicial set-up in this country is that where
the dictates of justice so demand, the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality. 8
The decisions of the LRA, the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
First Division of the Court, consistently nding that it is respondents' title to the land
which is authentic and genuine, and that of the petitioners is false and fraudulent, are
su ciently supported by the evidence on record. Petitioners' evidence to prove their
title to the land was already considered and weighed by the LRA and the courts as
against the respondents' evidence. There is no showing that petitioners had any other
signi cant evidence that they can only present before the RTC in another proceeding
directly attacking their title. Thus, although the proceedings canceling petitioners' title
to the land did not follow the ordinary course, which should have been initiated with the
RTC, the Court of Appeals and the First Division of the Court had all the material facts
before them and evidence on record to already render judgment on the merits in the
instant cases.
Moreover, when petitioners opposed respondents' petition for reconstitution of
title, on the basis of their prior existing title to the same piece of land, petitioners
submitted their title to the scrutiny of the LRA. The LRA could not dismiss respondents'
petition for reconstitution of title on the mere presentation by petitioners of their
supposed title. It was still incumbent upon the LRA to determine the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of petitioners' title, so as to preclude the reconstitution of
respondents' title over the same piece of land. To make such a determination, the LRA
had to examine and weigh the evidence of both the respondents and the petitioners in
support of their own respective titles; and as a result thereof, the LRA came to the
conclusion that petitioners' title was fraudulently reconstituted.
Given the foregoing, it cannot be simply said that the issuance by the LRA of
reconstituted titles is a purely executive function. Before the LRA can issue a decision,
either granting or denying petitions for reconstitution of title, it must consider and
weigh the arguments and evidence presented by those seeking and those opposing the
reconstitution; irrefragably, a quasi-judicial function. An act by an executive agency or
o cer becomes quasi-judicial in nature when the parties involved are given the
opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence, and such evidence is weighed before
a decision is rendered thereon. 9 The fact that the LRA is a quasi-judicial agency
exercising quasi-judicial function becomes incontestable especially considering that its
decisions are among those explicitly identi ed in the Supreme Court Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 as appealable to the Court of Appeals. 1 0
Again, it must be stressed that, despite its nding that petitioners' title was
fraudulent, the LRA left the cancellation of their title to a court of competent
jurisdiction. While under ordinary circumstances, such a court of competent jurisdiction
would have been the RTC, the First Division of the Court properly found, in accordance
with public policy and the dictates of justice, that the instant cases need no longer be
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The two Divisions of the Court of
Appeals, in promulgating their respective Amended Decisions, already had all the
material facts and evidence before it to render judgment on the validity of petitioners'
title. Hence, the Decision, dated 12 December 2005, of the First Division of the Court,
declining to remand the instant cases to the RTC and a rming the Amended Decisions
of the Court of Appeals therein, is a valid decision which could and had, in fact, attained
finality. cDSaEH
It is time that the Court nally put an end to the controversies between
petitioners and respondents in these cases, and thwart further attempts by any party to
still prolong the same. Unfortunately, the Resolution of the majority opinion has the
contrary effect. It not only protracts the litigation, but also complicates the same by
giving undue consideration to the evidence and points raised by Felicitas and Resendo
Manahan (Manahans) in their much delayed petition-in-intervention.
When the Court en banc reopened the present cases, it expressly delineated the
four issues to be resolved and upon which the parties were to be heard in the oral
arguments. These issues were:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners' TCT No.
RT-22481 without a trial before the proper Regional Trial Court in the
proceeding directly assailing the validity of petitioners' title?
2. Does the Land Registration Authority [LRA] have jurisdiction to

administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the
name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-
22481 of the petitioners over the same property?
3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners'
TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case led by
respondents with the LRA?
4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of
title filed by respondents?
Even just a cursory reading of the foregoing issues would readily reveal that
these are mainly legal and jurisdictional issues. The parties, namely, the petitioners and
the respondents, have the right to rely on the adherence by the Court en banc to the
said issues in its determination of whether or not to still subject the said parties to
more litigation proceedings. For the Court en banc to consider and rule upon issues
which are outside of the four afore-stated and on which the parties were heard during
the oral arguments is a denial of due process.
The matter of whether or not the factual issues in the instant cases should again
be relitigated cannot be anchored on the factual allegations of the parties, moreso,
when such allegations were made by the Manahans. The Manahans were not even
allowed to intervene in the oral arguments nor submit issues for the oral arguments.
Thus, the majority opinion palpably erred in remanding the cases to the Court of
Appeals for further reception of evidence on the basis of the assertions of the
Manahans, which contradict the claims of both the petitioners and the respondents, the
original parties in the cases at bar. The courts are bound to look no further than the
record and cannot even consider contrary evidence to determine where the
preponderance thereof lies. 1 1 These cases must be resolved upon the evidence
submitted to the LRA, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a
trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive ndings are not in
violation of the Constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and
whether they nd reasonable support in the evidence. 1 2 Further proceedings before
the Court of Appeals following the remand of the instant cases thereto, would
undoubtedly be tantamount to a new trial and investigation.
Wherefore, I vote to DENY all motions and prayers of the petitioners for the
setting aside of the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court
and the remand of the present cases to the Court of Appeals for the reception of
further evidence, in my rm belief that the said Decision must stand and be honored for
already being nal and executory. I also vote to GRANT the motions for execution and
possession filed by the respondents pursuant to the same Decision.
Footnotes
1. F. Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System: A Textbook on Land Titles, Deeds, Liens,
Descent and Mortgage at 120.
2. Id. at 121.
3. Id. at 125.
4. G.R. No. 162605, rollo, pp. 666-732. See also 477 SCRA 339.
5. Id. at
6. Id. at 969-A.
7. See, e.g., Medina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107595, 2 February 1994, 229 SCRA 601;
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455;
In Re: Azucena Garcia, 393 Phil. 718 (2000); University of the Philippines v. Rosario, 407
Phil. 924 (2001); Republic v. Holazo, G.R. No. 146846, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 345;
Cañero v. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156380, 8 September 2004, 437 SCRA
630; Encinas v. National Bookstore, G.R. No. 162704, 28 July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 572;
Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 128122, 128184 & 128229,
18 March 2005, 485 SCRA 234; Subido v. Republic, G.R. No. 152149, 25 April 2006, 488
SCRA 178: Heirs of Nicolas v. Development Bank, G.R. No. 137548, 3 September 2007,
532 SCRA 38.
8. Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 74.
9. Id. at 86.
10. Id. at 87.
11. Id. at 95.
12. Id. at 96.
13. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 2-23.
14. CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, rollo, p.7-45.
15. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, pp. 172-201.
16. Id. at 244-248.
17. Id. at 256-275.
18. Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Justices Eloy R. Bello,
Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. dissented.
19. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 432. aEHTSc
20. Justice Enriquez maintained his dissent.

21. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Justices Remedios Salazar-
Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
22. CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, rollo, p. 144-149.
23. Id. at 151-171.
24. Id. at 218.
25. G.R. No. 162605. Rollo, p. 386.
26. Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by the Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and by Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Adolfo S. Azcuna.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio dissented.
27. Id. at 667-684.
28. Id. at 830.
29. Id. at 881. Entry of judgment was recorded on 2 May 2006.
30. Id. at 884.
31. Id. at 908-918.
32. Id. at. 947-A.
33. G.R. No. 162335, rollo, p. 891.
34. Id. at 1320.
35. Id. at 1075.
36. Citing Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, 30 September 2004, 439 SCRA 675; Chiong v.
Hon. Cosico, 434 Phil. 753 (2002).
37. Ginete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, 24 September 1988, 292 SCRA 38.
38. See Sec. 48, Pres. Decree No. 1529.
39. Sec. 9(1) & (2), B.P. 129, as amended.
40. See Sec. 9(3), B.P. 129, as amended.
41. See Rep. Act No. 26, Sec. 5, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732.
42. See Rep. Act No. 26, Sec. 19, as amended.

43. See Rep. Act No. 6732, Secs. 11 & 12, Rep. Act No. 6732.
44. See e.g., Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-34080 & 34693, March 22, 1991,
195 SCRA 482. HCacTI
45. 201 Phil. 727 (1982).

46. Id. See also Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 44.
47. G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
48. Rollo, p. 127.
49. Id. at 1200-1201.
50. Rollo, p. 157.
51. Id. at 132.

52. Id. at 134.
53. Rollo, p. 136.
54. Id. at 137.
55. Id. at 142.
56. Id. at 144.
57. Id. at 143.
58. See "Annex A", Memorandum of Intervenor. "Extracted from Technical Descriptions
appearing on Deed of Conveyance No. 200022 with Sales Cert. No. 511 issued by the
OIC Director of Land Management Bureau on Oct. 30, 2000 and was further checked and
verified against the Land use Map of Q.C., C.M. 14-40 N. 121-05'E., Sec. 4-A, Brgy. of
Matandang Balara on file at the Projection Unit of LSVS-DENR-NCR and plan Sp-00-
000779 on file at TSS-DENR-NCR."
59. Id.
60. Annex "G", Respondents' Memorandum.
61. Rollo, p. 210.

62. Id. at 949.
63. See id. at 1107.
64. Id. at 1075
65. Id. at 1077.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1320.
69. See id. at 1321-1322.
70. Id.
71. 426 Phil. 61 (2002).
72. See 462 Phil. 546 (2003) .
73. Id. at 563-566.
74. 359 Phil. 530 (1998).
75. G.R. Nos. 123346 & 134385, 14 December 2007, 540 SCRA 304.
76. Id. at 351-352.
CARPIO, J., concurring:
1. Rollo, (G.R. No. 162335), p. 131. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the petition for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, supposedly registered in the name of Homer L.
Barque Sr., please furnish us with a certified copy of subdivision plan Fls-3168-D, for our
record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
2. Id. at 133. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the above-entitled petition, please
furnish us with a certification as to the existence and authenticity of plan Fls-3168-D,
supposedly covered by TCT No. 210177, for our record and reference. TSacID
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.

In reply to your letter dated October 29, 1996 requesting for certified copy of plan Fls-
3168-D for reference in connection with administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177. Relative to the plan Fls-3168-D, please be informed that we have no records
(sic) of Fls-3168- D.
In reply to your undated letter, please be informed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS-
3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of this Office.
Relative to the above-entitled petition, we would like to clarify the fact that the Regional
Office has a microfilm copy of Plan Fls-3168-D, while your Office does not have a record
of the same.
Attached for your reference are the following:
a. Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
b. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
c. Your reply letter dated November 7, 1996.
Your clarification is of utmost importance in the resolution of the instant case.

6. Id. at 136.
7. Id. at 137. Emphasis supplied.
9. Id. at 139-140. Emphasis supplied.
11. Id. at 144-145. Emphasis supplied.
12. Id. at 146.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 147.
15. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 88-95. Penned by Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit.
16. Re: Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Lost or Destroyed Certificates of
Title Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6732.
17. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 93-94.
18. Id. at 95. HDTSCc
19. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 96-97. Penned by Administrator Senecio O. Ortile.
20. CA rollo, pp. 78-79.
21. Id. at 90-91.
22. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 106-111. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with
Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
23. Id. at 113-118.

24. Id. at 117.
25. CA rollo, pp. 244-248. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Justices
Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
26. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 56-69. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J.
Guerrero with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine,
concurring and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissenting.
27. Id. at 65.

28. Id. at 71-73.
29. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 667-683.
30. Id. at 830-832.
31. 450 Phil. 615 (2003).
32. 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
33. 161 Phil. 586 (1976).
34. 183 Phil. 426 (1979).

35. 201 Phil. 727 (1982).
36. 209 Phil. 325 (1983).
37. G.R. No. 86074, 20 December 1989, 180 SCRA 420.
38. G.R. No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743.
39. G.R. No. 34080, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
40. G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
41. 452 Phil. 238 (2003). EScHDA
42. Resolution, 462 Phil. 546 (2003).

43. Section 48, PD 1529; Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, supra note 32; Magay, etc. v.
Estiandan, supra note 33; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 38; Heirs of
Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, supra note 41.
44. Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc. et al., supra note 35; MWSS
v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al., supra note 36; Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39;
Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 40.
45. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
46. Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Liwag v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37;
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., supra note 42.
47. Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 19 December 1990, 192 SCRA 388.
48. 438 Phil. 252 (2002); Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 210 Phil.
482 (1983).
49. Id. at 278-279.
50. Estoesta, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 203.
51. Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, 11 March 1994, 231
SCRA 88.
52. Presidential Decree No. 1529.
53. A direct attack on a Torrens title is an action whose principal purpose is to alter or
annul the title. Such direct attack can be filed only before the proper regional trial court.
An indirect or collateral attack is an action whose principal purpose is other than to alter
or annul a title but its indirect consequence is at the very least to put doubt on the
validity of the title. A petition for reconstitution of title over property that is already
covered by a pre-existing Torrens title is an indirect attack on such Torrens title. See
Leyson v. Bontuyan, et al., G.R. No. 156357, 18 February 2005, 452 SCRA 94.
54. Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140752, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 543.
55. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591,
597-598 (1999). In Alipoon, the Court ruled:
We are convinced that based on the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals correctly
upheld the genuineness of TCT No. T-17224 issued by the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental on March 16, 1933 covering Lot No. 663 in the name of Marcelina P. Alvarez,
predecessor of private respondents herein. Inasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in
existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original
certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO-12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the
name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally
doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void. (Emphasis supplied)
56. G.R. No. 115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158.

57. Id. at 161-162.
58. Supra note 34.
59. Id. at 432-433. SaICcT
60. See note 46.

61. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
62. Zafra v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875 (1953); Bunagan v. Branch VI CFI of Cebu, 186 Phil. 31
(1980).
63. Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
64. Section 18 of RA No. 26 allows the Register of Deeds to cancel the reconstituted title if
the lost title is subsequently found and both titles are still in the name of the same
registered owner. Section 18 states:
SECTION 18. In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found or
recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and, if both
titles appear in the name of the same registered owner, all memoranda of new liens or
encumbrances, if any, made on the latter, after its reconstitution, except the
memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, shall be
transferred to the recovered certificate of title. Thereupon, the register of deeds shall
cancel the reconstituted certificate of title and spread upon the owner's duplicate, as well
as on the co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate, if any has been issued, such
annotations of subsisting liens or encumbrances as may appear on the recovered
certificate of title, cancelling at the same time the memorandum of the reservation
referred to in section seven hereof: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate
of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or
involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the
recovered certificate of title shall be likewise cancelled, but all subsisting liens or
encumbrances, if any, appearing thereon shall be transferred to the new certificate of
title and to its owner's duplicate, as well as to any co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate that may have been issued, the memorandum of the reservation referred to in
section seven of this Act, if any, being thereby ipso facto cancelled. (Emphasis supplied)
65. 346 Phil. 136 (1997).
66. Emphasis supplied.
67. Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 (1958).
68. Supra note 9.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Supra note 10.
72. Supra note 11.
73. Supra note 7.
74. Supra note 11.
75. Supra note 9. ECDAcS
76. G.R. No. 120958, 16 December 1996, 265 SCRA 614.

77. Id. at 642-643.
78. Supra, note 11.
79. Id.
80. Supra, note 9.
81. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 141. The Barques' 7 February 1997 letter states in full:
February 7, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
Sir:
Re: Administrative Reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City
We write in behalf of our clients, the Heirs of the late Homer L. Barque, Sr., the registered
owner of the properties covered by TCT No. 210177.
We are constrained to bring to your immediate attention a pattern of effort to delay the
administrative reconstitution of the above title in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 6732 and LRA Circular No. 13 dated July 26, 1989 SR [sic] notwithstanding the
recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land
Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due course to the said reconstitution.
We respectfully request that this matter be looked into in order to expedite the long
overdue reconstitution of the title to the said properties.
With our highest esteem.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN D. TURGANO
Counsel of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque
Lot 9, Blk 11, Don Jose Avenue
Don Jose Heights, Fairview, Quezon City
82. Supra note 10.
83. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 143. The 14 February 1997 letter of the LRA reconstituting
officer states in full:
February 14, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
This Authority
Sir:
In connection with the letter dated February 7, 1997, of Benjamin D. Turgano, counsel of
the Heirs of Homer L. Barque, petitioners in the Administrative Reconstitution of TCT No.
210177, please be informed of the following:
1. There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the aforesaid title. What
we are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of the submitted documents; EHCaDS
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the name of Homer L.
Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a tampered document. For your comparison,
herewith is a copy of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked as annex "A";
3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997, by the Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged document. Attached for your reference is a
copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together with its enclosures, directly received
by the undersigned from Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division,
LMB-DENR, marked as annex "B";
4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq. m.,
respectively, purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823,
Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302,
registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached
as annex "C".
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable
action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case be
referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as
envisioned by this office under your administration.
Very truly yours,

(SGD.)
BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
84. LRA Records, p. 204.
85. Id. at 357-360.
86. Id. at 253. The LRA reconstituting officer's Comment reads in full:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
QUEZON CITY
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY
OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 210177 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
QUEZON CITY
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, Petitioner.
ADMIN. RECONS. NO. Q-547(97)
COMMENT ON OPPOSITOR'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated July 27, 1998
COMES NOW, the undersigned Reconstituting Officer, by way of comment to the
Oppositor's Motion for Reconsideration, respectfully states:
1. That we support the Oppositor's prayer that the challenged Resolution dated June 24,
1998, be reconsidered, reversed, and set aside for lack of factual and legal basis;
2. That we maintain our position denying the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, on the
grounds stated in our Order dated June 30, 1997, and on the following additional
grounds, to wit:
2.1 If the late Homer L. Barque, really purchased the subject property in the year 1975,
why did he not take possession of it upon purchase, and up to now his descendants, the
Petitioners, are not in possession of the property, but the Oppositors?;
2.2 Why was the property declared, and realty taxes were paid in the name of Barque,
only in the year 1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and their predecessors have been paying
realty taxes on the property since the year 1965; HDTCSI
2.3 Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy of Adm.
Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)? (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Oppositor's Motion for Reconsideration be given due
course; the challenged Resolution be set aside; and the Order dated June 30, 1997 be
upheld.
It is further prayed that this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission for investigation.
Quezon City, Philippines, August 13, 1998.
(SGD.) BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS Reconstituting Officer & Chief, Reconstitution Division
Enclosure:
Xerox Copy of tampered Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
87. An Act Allowing the Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Certificates of
Titles Lost or Destroyed Due to Fire, Flood and other Force Majeure, Amending for the
Purpose Section One Hundred Ten of Presidential Decree Numbered Fifteen Twenty-Nine
and Section Five of Republic Act Numbered Twenty-Six.
88. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 438.
89. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 213. Annex "BB", Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30
March 2004.
90. Id. at 214. Annex "BB-1", Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
91. TSN, Oral Argument, pp. 353-355.
92. Supra note 86.
93. Annex "M-21", Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
94. LRA Records, p. 412, Opposition dated 8 April 1997.
95. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 99.
96. 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
97. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 174-175.
98. SPOUSES CAYETANO and PATRICIA TIONGSON, SPOUSES EDWARD and PACITA GO,
SPOUSES ROBERTO and MYRNA LAPERAL III, ELISA R. MANOTOK, SPOUSES IGNACIO
and PACITA MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., SPOUSES FAUSTO and MILAGROS
MANOTOK, ROSA R. MANOTOK, Minors MIGUEL A. B. SISON and MA. CRISTINA E.
SISON, represented by their judicial guardian FILOMENA M. SISON, SPOUSES
MAMERTO and PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, represented by
his judicial guardian MAMERTO BOCANEGRA, SPOUSES FRANCISCO and FILOMENA
SISON, JOSE CLEMENTE MANOTOK, SPOUSES JESUS and THELMA MANOTOK, Minors
PHILIP MANOTOK, MARIA TERESA MANOTOK and RAMON SEVERINO MANOTOK,
represented by their judicial guardian SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., Minors JESUS JUDE
MANOTOK, JR. and JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, represented by their judicial guardian
JESUS MANOTOK, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO S.
MACAYA, respondents. Supra note 96.
99. TSN, Oral Argument of 24 July 2007, pp. 445-447.
100. Annual Report of the Director of Lands For the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 1927,
p. 106, Annex "M-22", Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
101. Intervenors' Memorandum dated 22 August 2007, p. 22. In its 12 September 2006
Resolution, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Felicitas B. Manahan
and Rosendo Manahan
102. Supra note 35. DaCTcA
103. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 94. LRA Resolution dated 24 June 1998.
104. Supra note 35 at 744.
105. Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
106. Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680 (1987).
107. 89 Phil. 184 (1951).
108. Id. at 186-187.
109. Supra note 42.
110. Id. at 565.
111. Catingub v. Court of Appeals, et al., 206 Phil. 83 (1983); Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v.
Maritime Building Co., Inc., 175 Phil. 476 (1978).
112. 216 Phil. 533 (1984).
113. Id. at 535.
114. The dissenting opinion cited Tijam v. Sibonghanay, et al., 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
115. Supra, note 94.
116. LRA Records, pp. 254-277.
117. Id. at 273.
118. 111 Phil. 73 (1961).
119. Id. at 93-94.
120. Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
121. Arsenal v. IAC, 227 Phil. 36 (1986).
122. Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA
252.
123. Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84672, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA
178, 184 citing Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).
124. 390 Phil. 1161 (2000).
125. Id. at 1174.
126. See note 15.
127. Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, 3 August 1990, 788 SCRA 321; Eduarte v. Court of
Appeals, 370 Phil. 18 (1999).
128. Supra.
129. 429 Phil. 31 (2002).
130. Id. at 44-46.
131. Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, was approved by the
Philippine Commission on 6 November 1902 and took effect on 1 February 1903. See
Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922).
132. Supra note 32.
133. Id. at 593-594.
134. Supra note 41.
135. Id. at 252-253.
136. Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
137. G.R. No. 56694, 2 July 1990, 187 SCRA 12.
138. Id. at 20. cIHSTC
CORONA, J.:
1. Concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Renato C. Corona in Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 123346, 134385 and 148767, 14
December 2007, 540 SCRA 304.
2. Municipality of Kananga v. Madrona, G.R. No. 141375, 30 April 2005, 402 SCRA 330.
3. Republic v. Estipular, 391 Phil. 211 (2000).
4. Presidential Decree.
5. Property Registration Decree.
6. SEC. 9. The Land Registration Authority Administrator may review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm any decision of the reconstituting officer or Register of Deeds. Any appeal shall
be filed within fifteen days from the receipt of the judgment or order by the aggrieved
party.
7. Republic Act.
8. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative o cers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their o cial actions and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature. (Midland Insurance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 71905, 13 August 1986, 143 SCRA 458.) A quasi-judicial adjudication would mean
the determination of rights, privileges, and duties resulting in a decision or order which
applies to a speci c situation. ( Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77372, 29 April
1988, 160 SCRA 180)
Under Section 9 of RA 6732, the power of the LRA Administrator to review, revise, reverse,
modify or a rm any decision of the reconstituting o cer or Register of Deeds is quasi-
judicial in nature. He is given the authority to exercise discretion of a judicial nature to
investigate facts and draw conclusions from them as a basis for his o cial action. His
adjudication is quasi-judicial as it is a determination of the right of the applicant or
petitioner to have his certi cate of title reconstituted as well as of the correlative duty of
the Registrar of Deeds to reconstitute the said certificate of title.
9. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980), as amended, it is the RTC which has sole jurisdiction to nullify or declare as void
a Torrens certificate of title.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any
interest therein . . . (emphasis supplied)
10. In his separate opinion, Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing stated:
While at the inception of this controversy, a trial by the Regional Trial Court would have
been in order, remand of this case for trial at this late stage would only be a time-
consuming and pointless exercise. Prompt resolution of this controversy is in order to
avoid further delay. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Justice Azcuna noted the following in his separate opinion:
. . . It is, therefore, in my view, unnecessary to go through the exercise of proving this
matter again in the regular courts, as would ordinarily be required, since the point is
indubitable.
I thus nd applicable the ruling of this Court in Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership v. Veloso, as it would be unjust to require respondents to undergo a time-
consuming and pointless exercise to cancel an evidently sham and spurious title.
(emphasis supplied)
11. Urbano v. Chavez, G.R. No. 87977, 19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 347.
12. SEC. 48. Certi cate not subject to collateral attack. — A certi cate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modi ed, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. EICSDT
13. SEC. 108. Amendment and alteration of certi cates. — No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certi cate of
title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds,
except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person
having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with
the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the
court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certi cate, have terminated and
ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certi cate have arisen or been
created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certi cate or any
memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certi cate; or that the same or any person on
the certi cate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if
registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of
heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered
land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine
the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation
of a new certi cate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certi cate, or
grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration,
and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other
interest of a purchaser holding a certi cate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and
assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certi cate is
not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions led under this Section as well as under any other provision of
this Decree after original registration shall be led and entitled in the original case in
which the decree or registration was entered.
14. See Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 154993, 25 October
2005, 474 SCRA 258.
15. Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1522.
16. Id.
17. Id. citing Kent MacNeill, Common Law Aboriginal Title.
18. Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71753, 26 August
1989, 176 SCRA 736.
19. Philippine National Bank v. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil. 317 (1927).
20. Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
21. These include the (a) letter dated January 2, 1997 of Engr. Privadi J. Dalire, chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, (b) plan Fls-3186-D, (c)
copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) submitted by respondents, (d)
the length of time it took respondents from the occurrence of the Quezon City Hall re to
le their petition for administrative reconstitution, (e) erasures of the notation on the tax
declarations of respondents, (f) realty taxes paid by respondents were only for 1987 to
1996, (g) respondents have never set foot on the disputed property, (h) the existence of
Barrio Payong in Quezon City, (i) respondents' knowledge that petitioners had
constructed buildings and perimeter wall on the disputed property, (j) respondents chain
of title stops in 1975, (k) location of respondents' property as showed by the relocation
surveys of the Lands Management Bureau and (l) the deed of sale between Emiliano
Setosta and respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Homer Barque, Sr.
22. These include the (a) identity and description of the property in petitioners' certi cate of
title, particularly the location, boundaries and technical description of the property
indicated in the said certi cate of title and (b) the existence of respondents' title when
petitioners' caused the reconstitution of TCT No. RT-22481. AaHcIT
23. Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, supra.

24. Id.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:
1. Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing and
Adolfo S. Azcuna; Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio dissented.
2. TSN, July 24, 2007, pp. 68-71; Emphasis supplied.
3. Annex G, Respondents' Memorandum.
4. Annex H, Respondents' Memorandum.
5. Annex J, Respondents' Memorandum.
6. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 192. PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES; RENAMING IT
AS THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES; AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
7. See Sec. 24 (c).
8. Annex I-1, Respondents' Memorandum.

9. Annexes F and F-1, respectively, Respondents' Memorandum.
10. Annex I, Respondents' Memorandum.
11. Annex H, Respondents' Memorandum.
12. Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 12,
2005, 477 SCRA 339, 346-348. HTCDcS
13. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., No. L-75501,
September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 57-58.
14. Miralles v. Go, G.R. No. 139943, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 596, 604.
15. Should be names.
16. TSN, July 24, 2007, pp. 146-148.
17. Annex D, Respondents' Memorandum.
18. Annex E, Respondents' Memorandum.
19. Annex B of Respondents' Memorandum.
20. Page 4.
21. Annex B, Intervenor Manahans' Memorandum.
22. Intervenors Manahans' Memorandum, p. 9.
23. 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
24. G.R. No. 126517, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 124.
25. RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 4.
26. Id.
27. G.R. No. 109111, June 28, 2000, 334 SCRA 454, 462.
28. Annex N, Respondents' Memorandum. TSEAaD
29. See Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120138, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 793,
809.
30. AN ACT ALLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL COPIES OF
CERTIFICATES OF TITLES LOST OR DESTROYED DUE TO FIRE, FLOOD AND OTHER
FORCE MAJEURE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION ONE HUNDRED TEN OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED FIFTEEN TWENTY-NINE AND SECTION FIVE OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED TWENTY-SIX.
31. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., supra note
17.
32. G.R. No. 154993, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 258, 268.
33. G.R. No. 128412, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 306.
34. Id. at 320.
35. Id. at 319, 320.
36. 364 Phil. 591 (1999).
37. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA
865.
38. 201 Phil. 727, 744 (1982).
39. G.R. No. 132250, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 632, 652-653.
40. Id. at 654.
41. Comment, Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 21-22; Temporary rollo, no. 3.
42. Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283, 287.
43. Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation, G.R. No. 79622, September 29, 1989, 178
SCRA 164, 168.
44. G.R. No. 153155, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 542.
45. Id. at 554-555.
46. G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 875-876.
47. G.R. No. 117897, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 454, 472-473.
48. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589, 607.
49. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36.
50. 38 Phil. 29 (1918).
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id.
53. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 663, 681.
54. G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998, 298 SCRA 679, 693.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., dissenting:
1. Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 377,
386.
2. Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22, 28 (2000).
3. Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 55 (1998).
4. Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, supra note 1 at 386.
5. Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 910 (1997).
6. CAPANELA v. National Labor Relations Commission, 311 Phil. 744, 765 (1995).
7. Board of Commissioners v. Hon. dela Rosa, 274 Phil. 1156, 1194 (1991).
8. Tejones v. Gironella, G.R. No. L-35506, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 100, 106. IcDCaT
9. See Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 450.
10. Relevant provisions of Supreme Court Revised Administrative Order No. 1-95 read —
1. Scope. — These rules shall apply from judgments or nal orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, nal orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these
agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, O ce of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electri cation Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments and Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission.
11. Mauleon v. Court of Appeals, 160 Phil. 794, 801 (1975).
12. Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401, 1410 (1963).

Land Registration Fraud Case Addresses Torrens System Vulnerabilities

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Land Registration Fraud Case Addresses Torrens System Vulnerabilities

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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 18, 2008.]

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M.

The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: Copy of Plan FLS-3168-D

Very truly yours,

Interestingly, Engineer Dalire wrote another letter dated 5 January 1997 8

May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy

2. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;

In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996

5) The copy bears forged initials of my action o cer and

6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in

In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your

Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to nd out to whom lot 823

For the Director,

In a letter dated 13 February 1997 1 0 to the LRA Administrator, Engineer Dalire

ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy

With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to

Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the le of NCR for

Very truly yours,

In reply to your query whether or not

a) the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot 823,

b) the letter dated 07 November 1996, and

c) the letter dated 02 January 1997

1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on le so how can we issue

4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans

5) The letter size of the rubber stamp “NOT FOR

Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted

The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer

2. T h e submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as

Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10

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The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Ruling of This Court

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

xxx xxx xxx

The requirement of validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division is reiterated and

FOR: The Regional Technical Director of Lands

The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is

5. The letter size of the rubber stamp “NOT FOR

4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for

In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your O ce

Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of Administrative Reconstitution

2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and

3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997,

4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of

Well, that is a serious accusation, Your honor and I have no knowledge

There is none that I know, Your Honor.

You have not seen those?

In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques ignored completely