Josefina Franciso vs Master Iron Works & Construction Corp and Roberto V.

Alvejo

One-liner: Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco got married, notwithstanding Eduardo's prior valid
marriage. Later on, two lots were auctioned off to satisfy Eduardo's civil liability. Josefina opposes by
citing Art 148 of FC, claiming the lot to be paraphernal properties as they were acquired solely from the
help of her sisters and mother and without participation of Eduardo. SC ruled that they were not
paraphernal as she failed to present evidence that she acquired the property through her personal
funds.

Facts:

Josefina Castillo and Franciso Eduardo got married in 1983. A little more than a year into the marriage,
she bought two parcels of land worth 320,000.

Eduardo would later on waived his claims over the property, saying that they were purchased by
Josefina before the marriage with her own savings. Josefina then mortgaged the property. It appears
that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.

In 1990, Master Iron Works & Construction Company (MIWCC) filed a complaint against Eduardo for
failing to pay for 7,500 bags of cement worth 768,750 he bought in his capacity as the General Manager
and President of Reach Out Trading International. The court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and
ordered Eduardo to replace the bags of cement or pay back the amount he owed MIWCC.

To satisfy his civil liability, Sherrif Alejo levied on the two parcels of land earlier mentioned.

Josefina filed a third party claim in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal properties bought
through her own money and that Eduardo had no interest over them, as evidenced by the waiver he
executed. However, the public auction proceeded, and the property was sold to MIWCC as the highest
bidder.

Josefina then filed a complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo, praying for damages and that whatever
entries appearing in the title as a result of the levy be canceled. However, before she could commence
presenting her evidence, she filed a petition to annul her marriage with Eduardo on the ground that
Eduardo had a valid subsisting marriage with one Carmelita Carpio. During the trial of this case, Josefina
declared that she bought the property through the help of her sisters and brother and that Eduardo had
no participation in the said acquisition.

In the meantime, he insisted in her case against MIWCC that she purchased the property when she was
single with her mother's financial assistance.

In 1996, the RTC declared Josefina and Eduardo's marriage null and void for being bigamous.

In 1997, the trial court found the levy and sale of the contested property to be null and void as the
property was the sole and exclusive property of Josefina, applying 144, 160, 175, and 485 of the New
Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals reversed this an ruled that the property was presumed to be conjugal property of
Eduardo and Josefina and that the latter failed to rebut such presumption. The waiver was also void for
being contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code.
Josefina petitioned for review before the SC.

Issue:

WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo and, therefore, can be held
liable to answer for the personal obligations of the husband.

Ruling:

Subject properties are not paraphernal properties of the wife and can be held to answer the liabilities of
the husband.

Article 148 of the Family Code, stating that "only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common,"
governed Josefina and Eduardo's property relationship. It could be applied retroactively to their
marriage as Josefina failed to prove that she had vested right of the property.

There is no conjugal property in their marriage but only a co-ownership based on actual contribution.

In Josefa's case, she failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that she acquired the properties with
her personal funds and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property.

Her conflicting testimonies regarding the time (note that she had both said that she purchased the
property before and during the marriage) and the source of funds used to acquire the property (she
implied in her third party claim that she used her own money but later said that she was helped by her
mother and sister) did not help in persuading the court.

The SC also doubted that she had enough funds of her own to purchase the property as she was only 23
years old when the sale supposedly happened. Her claim that the funds were provided by her mother
and sister was just an afterthought.

Josefa’s petition is denied for lack of merit. CA’s decision was affirmed
Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. vs Juana Gonzales et al.

Facts:

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was married to Capitolian Aguilar with whom he had seven children (the
petitioners herein). When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzalez as his common-
law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano Favis. When Dr. Favis and Juana eventually married in
1974, he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is
married to Larcelita Favis, with whom he has four children.

Dr. Favis died intestate in 1995, but prior to his death, he executed a Deed of Donation transferring and
conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.

Dr. Favis' children with his first marriage filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps Mariano and Larcelita,
and their children. They were claiming that the donation prejudiced their legitime.

The RTC ruled for the children of Dr. Favis from his first marriage, nullifying the Deed of Donation. It
found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illness (Parkinson's disease and Hiatal Hernia
among other things), could not have full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of
Donation. However, it also declared that Juana and Mariano are also compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis,
owing to Dr. Favis and Juana's subsequent marriage that legitimated the status of Mariano. Juana,
Mariano, and Dr. Favis' heirs by his 1st marriage shall inherit equal shares in Dr. Favis' estate as his
compulsory heirs.

CA, on the other hand, ordered the dismissal of the nullification case brought by the children of the first
marriage. It motu proprio ordered its dismissal for their failure to make an averment that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made, as mandated by Art. 152 of the Family Code.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Spouses Mariano and Larcelita filed an instant petition to the SC.

Issue:

WON the CA may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made.

Ruling:

The CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.

The appellate court hinged its decision on Art. 151 of the Family Code and correlated it with Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, saying that failure to allege earnest effort is a ground for a motion to
dismiss.
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filling the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

The CA erred in ruling that may moto proprio dismiss the complaint, as among 10 grounds provided
under Rule 16, there are only 4 instances when the court can moto proprio dismiss the case. As provided
for under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they are: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) res judicata, and (4) prescription of action.

Rule 16 itself requires that a motion to dismiss should be filed before the filing of an answer or a
pleading in the trial court. Upon failure to do such, the defense is deemed waived.

In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with a condition precedent as filed
in the trial court; neither was such assigned as an error in the appeal brought before the RTC.

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable
to the respondents. The CA thus did not have any authority or basis to motu proprio order the dismissal
of the complaint filed by the children of the first marriage.

CA's decision was reversed and the RTC decision is affirmed.