EVIDENCE

1. ONG CHIA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina,
with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended.

On August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted Ong Chia to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending
that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to
state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner
stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as
"Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The state also annexed income tax
returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show
that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already
been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed
the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented
in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.

Ong Chia's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified
the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued, because under
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Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.

Ong Chia admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7.

ISSUE: Whether the documents annexed by the State to its appelant’s brief without having been
presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s decision

RULING: YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied. Petitioner failed
to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that - These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents. It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law.

The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered
is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Ong Chia cannot claim that
he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief
he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus: The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization
(SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been
established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization… is 031767 while the
case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally
unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.

2. CECILIA ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents belonging
to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed against her husband. Dr. Martin
filed an action before the RTC of Manila which rendered a decision declaring him as “the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress.” The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
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issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the same documents were
admissible as evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible as
evidence.

RULING: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in the proceeding.”

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. YATAR

DOCTRINE: No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves
the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented. The kernel of the right is not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.

FACTS:
 8.30AM—Kathylyn handed a letter to Yatar. The letter came from Yatar’s wife.
 9:00AM—Judilyn, who was Kathylyn’s first cousin, left the latter alone in the house owned by
Isabel, their grandmother.
 10:00AM—Anita Wania, Kathylyn’s aunt, saw Yatar behind the house. Anita asked him what he
was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.
 12:30PM— while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw Yatar descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house. She later noticed Yatar, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing
back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as Yatar and his wife used
to live in the house where Kathylyn lived.
 1:30PM— Judilyn again saw Yatar when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing
a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Yatartold her that he would not be getting the lumber
he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish
and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell
him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back
of the house of Isabel.
 Later that night, Isabel discovered Kathylyn’s lifeless body sprawled on the floor, her intestines
protruding out of her stomach.

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 The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
 Yatar was caught, and charged and convicted of the complex crime of Rape with Homicide. He
was sentenced to death, hence the automatic review pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC.
 Yatar argued that the RTC erred in giving much probative weight to the evidence presented by
the prosecution, and that the prosecution had failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: In view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25
in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED
to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages
is DELETED.

Whether the Court wrongly gave probative value to the DNA evidence presented.—No.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellant’s gene type.
 In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
 In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to
that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match
exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in
open court during the course of the trial.
 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
 Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
 Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal,
the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt:
1. Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba;
2. In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels;
3. Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the
early morning on June 30, 1998;

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 4. Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30,
1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a
dirty white shirt with collar;
5. Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m.,
wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt;
6. Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching;
7. Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the
house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead;
8. The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope;
9. The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from
her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery;
10. Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
11. The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with
blood;
12. DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are
identical;
13. Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.
 Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is
the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the blood sample taken from Yatar as well as the DNA tests were conducted in
violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under
Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.—No.
 This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
 We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed
is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
 Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood
and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement
in an offense of which he is accused.
 It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Whether the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto
law.—No.
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 This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of
DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under
the Rules of Court.
 Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Whether Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi can be sustained.—Yes.

 The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his
presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably
link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
 Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two
places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens
his alibi.

Whether Yatar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.—Yes.

 Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason
or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s
lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
 The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means
of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman. However, in rape committed by close
kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it
is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence and intimidation. The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not
negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.
The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch
without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.
 In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than
the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his
mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to
the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s
house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.

4. TATING VS. MARCELLA

FACTS: Daniela Tating sold a parcel of land to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Tating.
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela
in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the land was transferred in the name of Nena, who, in
turn, declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon
for several years. The land, however, remained in the possession of Daniela. Eight years later,
Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the
property to Nena and that the true agreement between them was simply to transfer title over the
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land in favor of Nena to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the land to help her defray her
business expenses. She, however, later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgaged
the property so she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the property to be reconveyed
to her. Daniela died, leaving her children as heirs. In a letter, Carlos, one of Daniela’s heirs, informed
Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed and as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the land as
heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply and subsequent efforts proved futile, which prompted Carlos to
file a complaint against Nena. In her answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation
attended the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and prayed for dismissal. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Daniela’s heirs and declared the sale null and void. The appeal and MR having
both denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in nullifying the sale by relying solely on the sworn
statement as its sole and main evidence.

RULING: No. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. It is settled that affidavits
are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay,
unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds
that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and
the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving
that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated.

5. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALAFRANCA

DOCTRINE: An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets

the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

FACTS: A certain Johnny Bolanon was stabbed. The assailant ran away but Bolanon was still able
to walk to the house of his uncle, Rodolfo Estao, in order to seek help. On the way to the hospital,
Bolanon told his uncle that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him. Bolanon was pronounced
dead upon arrival at the hospital. Salafranca was charged, tried, and held guilty of murder. His
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and now comes to the Court for a reversal of the
assailed judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salafranca’s conviction was correct.

RULING: Yes. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that
at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal
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case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were
met herein. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when
he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e.,
his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way,
res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.

6. SCC CHEMICALS CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corp. through its chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice
president Pablito Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI). To secure
the payment thereof, Danilo and Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the
loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili but notwithstanding
payment thereof, no payment was made. SIHI filed a civil case for a sum of money with a prayer
for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta and Halili. Due to several defaults by SCC, the court
rendered judgment in favor of SIHI. On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness
presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not
established and there was no showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC
further maintained that no proof was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the
documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor
offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were
not presented in court. The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law when it failed to disallow the
admission in evidence of the testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section 36, Rule
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130 of the Rules of Court which provides that “A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.”

RULING: No. Petitioners’ reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a
rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of
an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The
rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that
it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a
witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of
a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded
several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s witness. Petitioner
repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had waived its right to
cross-examine the opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter
of hearsay evidence.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of
SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his
testimony were satisfied.

7. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS

ARENAS-BANAL

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of agricultural
land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily
acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as
amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Respondents
rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land.
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with
the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just
compensation. In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production
figures in another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without
conducting a hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties

RULING: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the
knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the
Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before
a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

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“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon
if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The RTC failed to observe the above
provisions.

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KULAIS

FACTS: Five Information for kidnapping for ransom and three informations for kidnapping were
filed before the RTC of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais,Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin
Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and several John and Jane Does. The information for
kidnapping for ransom set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims. The three
informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise alleged
identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims. Of the twelve accused, only nine
were apprehended. The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed
upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal
detention for the kidnapping of MonicoSaavedra and Calixto Francisco. [May 7, 1991] Jailon Kulais,
Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice
of Appeal. In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew
their appealbecause of their application for amnesty (said motion granted). Hence, only the appeal
of Kulais remains for the consideration of the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in
another case, also pending before it, affects the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt byother clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial
and documentary.

RULING: No. The appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit. In the case at bar, appellant Kulais argues
that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in
another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops
that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to
cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's
testimony should not be used against him even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's
testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

10
9. LAUREANO VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL).
In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano was
one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed
a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead
filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the
case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid
pursuant to Singaporean law. The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among
others. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.

RULING: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not
proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed
valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However,
the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising
from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from the time the cause of
action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he only
filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is already barred by
prescription.

10. MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American and showing as evidence a travel
record that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on
25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November
2009.

11
COMELEC ruled that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Arnado argues that section 349 of the immigration and naturalization act of the United States
provides that his execution of an affidavit of renunciation of American citizenship has the effect of
expatriation and thus was divested of all the rights of an American citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnaldo’s argument regarding Section 349 of the immigration act of United
States is applicable in this case.

RULING: The court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof.” Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

11. PEOPLE THE PHILIPPINES VS. BAHARAN

FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was in its usual southbound route, via EDSA Avenue.
According to the bus conductor, two men insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged
and let them in. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue the two
immediately got off the bus and ran. Moments after, they left they felt an explosion and then saw
fire quickly engulfing the bus.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio
station DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Arroyo. Trinidad gave
ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. The bus conductor identified Baharan and
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening
of 14 February. Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were then charged with multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the
other accused remain at-large. Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as they assert
that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the
conspiracy was insufficient.
 Whether or not the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. That statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only
when made during the existence of the conspiracy.

RULING:
 Yes, the guilt of the accused was proven as the accused's plea of guilt was not the sole basis of
the condemnatory judgment under consideration. The Court notes that prior to the change of
plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt - one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both
accused during pre-trial), and the other via judicial admission (pre-trial stipulation).

12
 That while it is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against aco-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as
the Court ruled that if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.

12. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a complaint against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and
Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected.

Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another
set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.
Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’ the
rights of stockholders of ETPI, especially in the election of the members of the board of directors.
Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders
meeting for 1992 under the court’s control and supervision and prescribed guidelines. The
Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion with only the registered owners, their duly authorized
representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.

On appeal, the PCGG imputed grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter
alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition, the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very Urgent Petition for
Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing ETPI’s Authorized
Capital Stock". The Sandiganbayan granted the holding of the special stockholder’s meeting
prompting Africa’s filing of a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the principle of judicial notice

RULING: The petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and
rested its case"; and that it "had terminated the presentation of its evidence”. In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions, the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist on
the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting
of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally offered. To
begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition,
was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence and thus could not
have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without
proof because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a court
13
of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on
convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione. The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense
with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter
is so notorious that it would not be disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129
either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial
departments of the Philippines,” or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters
"ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." On the other hand, a party-litigant
may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be
heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with
the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made
to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis
exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.

The issue before the Court does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of
judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice
seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a
genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases as
evidence in the "parent" case or "of the whole family of cases."

First, the supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve
only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously
obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has
generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity.

Following the logic of the petitioner’s argument would be espousing judicial confusion by
indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is
the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies
upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.

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13. MONICO LIGTAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine: Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; It is true that trial courts are not mandated
to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.—It is true that trial courts are not
mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. In declaring that the
DARAB’s findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant are
immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Cornes, et al. v. Leal Realty
Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545 (2008).

Facts: Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the
plantation of belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers,
valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas
pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is the one who cultivated
such, he further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that the alleged taking did not
happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio
Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened but later on
when confronted he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being a tenant
of 1.5 to two hectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the land which he
himself cultivated.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000.
On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant
of the land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as
evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both
the trial court and Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of the People of the
Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that “the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of tenancy was not supported
by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita
Pacate duly corroborated by any witness.”

Issue: Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be taken
judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft?

RULING: Yes. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done
without the owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority
to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. No
less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until
proven guilty. “It is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person.”
Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.” Equally
settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with
guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted.”

In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court

15
and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge; Rule admits of exceptions.

14. JUNIE MALILLIN y LOPEZ v. PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be; The likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition
at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The
same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering— without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not —dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when
the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form
to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.

FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City,
Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos,
Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. Petitioner was charged with violation of Sec 11, Art 2 of RA 9165
for Illegal Drugs; search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as
petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets
of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance. But
herein petitioner pleaded not guilty. During hearing proving the flow of the search and seizure of
object; as testified when it is on the process to be delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the
afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a
certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.

The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by
the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup
and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police
officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner’s wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila’s body inside the same
16
bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in
his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police
officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that
nothing was found on Sheila’s body. Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together
with her children.1Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the
mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the
portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him “sachet of shabu” which according
to him came from a pillow on the bed. The OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly
performed its duties in the conduct of the search.31 It points to petitioner’s incredulous claim that
he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two filled sachets was made
in his and Licup’s presence. It likewise notes that petitioner’s bare denial cannot defeat the positive
assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima facie
existence of animus possidendi.

ISSUE: Whether the accused be convicted notwithstanding the irregularities in the procedure?

RULING: No. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange.40 In other words, the exhibit’s level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering —without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at
any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration
or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence
was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item
has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. A mere fleeting
glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of
the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.

17
14. G.R. No. 179029. August 9, 2010
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO

DOCTRINE: “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.
It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case,
the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively negates this presumption.

FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states: “That on or about December 27, 2003 at
about 4:30 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused was caught
during a by bust operation. But he pleaded not guilty, whereas the facts shows that After having
received information that the appellant was selling illegal drugs in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaim de
Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter Almare and SPO1 Domingo Balido—who were both in
Santiago City—and informed them of a planned buy-bust operation, they agreed to meet at the SSS
Building near LMN Hote in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. On their arrival there Captain de Vera
conducted a briefing and designated PO Almarez as the poseur buyer.

Thereafter, Captain de Ver introduced PO3 Almarez to the police informant (tipster), and gave him
(PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills (Exhibits “D and “E”) which the latter marked with his initials. The
operation pushed thru, though the defense presented a different version of the events, that instead
to be that one selling, appellant was informed to be an asset by Captain de Vera but he was later
on turned to be the one arrested. He was convicted from RTC to CA, and that his defense of
instigation was found unmeritorious by the CA affirming RTC’s decision.

The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior surveillance on the appellant was
not fatal to the prosecution’s case. It reasoned out that the police are given wide discretion to select
effective means to apprehend dru dealers. A prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary,
especially when the police are already accompanied by their informant. The CA further ruled that
the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It
explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the plasti sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his
initials, and transmitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero conducted a
qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the presence of shabu. According to
the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that the substance seized was the same specimen
submitted to the laboratory and presented in court, notwithstanding that this specimen was turned
over to the crime laboratory only after two days.

ISSUE: Whether the accused be convicted due to the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties by the police?
18
Held: No. He is therefore acquitted. The prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of
this Act.

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.
It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case,
the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively negates this presumption.
As we explained in Malillin v. People:

“The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable

by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which
the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates
a finding of guilt.”

Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome this constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all
the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant
deserves no less than an acquittal.

16. NARCISO SALAS VS. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

DOCTRINE: A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.

FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem claimed that Narciso Salas is the father of her son Christian Paulo
Salas. However, when Matusalem refused the offer of Salas’ family to take the child from her, he
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Hence,
she filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Salas in the RTC of Cabanatuan City. Petitioner
filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described respondent
as a woman of loose morals and denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by
no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery
of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in
exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner
rented testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case
was considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence. The trial court rendered its

19
decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the CA dismissed petitioner’s
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner?

HELD: Yes. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity. Also, while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence
to prove paternity. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is
the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the
expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity. As to the handwritten notes of
petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these,
too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child.
Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article
175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The testimonies of
respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial
support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said
apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial”.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006
and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 26 is DISMISSED.

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERIC ROSAURO Y BONGCAWIL

DOCTRINE: The essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

FACTS: On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that drugs were being
distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements

20
led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their
confidential agent.

There, they saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent and in exchange for the one (1)
sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso
bill with serial number YZ7 12579. After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding
place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot, who
taped it, marked it with the marking “Exhibit A”, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures
of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request
for Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime
laboratory. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and
claimed that he was merely a victim of instigation. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits
ensued. Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant,
the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction

After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled that
what transpired in the case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant when his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: No. This Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful
prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by
the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the
proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.

Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that the
statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.

The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established
with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation
is the same item offered in court as exhibit.

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item
to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it “Exhibit A.” Upon reaching the police
station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory
examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and accused-appellant were
then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo
Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police
Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the
same item seized from accused-appellant. Accused-appellant’s guilt having been established, we
likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present appeal is DISMISSED.

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18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

DOCTRINE: Failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS: On November 13, 2003, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO
and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that
while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic
dispute with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th
Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab and fired
their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a
police station nearby where he reported the incident. The police officers on duty immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where
they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired
their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were
subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez
recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38 revolver. Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by
P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeals found no
reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana found in Calantiao’s possession was inadmissible as evidence
against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial
chain was broken?

HELD: No. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
"to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed
with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from
being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy
the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it
was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain
of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

22
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time
the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to
the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason
to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized
drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in
evidence. Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending
officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. Y BINAYUG AKA
“JOJIT"

DOCTRINE: Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use
as reference point. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of
the chain of custody that the law requires.

FACTS: In a buy-bust operation conducted in the city of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan P03
Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in exchange for
P1,000. However, P03 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of
shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station, P03
Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPOZ Tamang, who was
also a member of the buy-bust team. P03 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the
marking “NET” on the said sachets of shabu. However, P03 Hernandez, another member of the buy-
bust team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one
who put the marking “NBT” on the plastic sachets upon the team's return to the police station. To
complicate things even further, P/Slnsp Tulauan, the Forensic Chemist, also declared before the trial
court that the marking “NBT” on the two plastic sachets of shabu were made by SPos Nelson B.
Tamaray, the duty officer who received the specimens at the crime laboratory on cross-examination,
P/Slnsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that SP03 Tamaray had claimed making the
marking on the sachets of shabu. Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why P03
Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu
purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the
custody of the same to another police officer.

ISSUE: Whether the provisions regarding the Rule on Chain of Custody have been strictly complied
with by the arresting officers.

RULING: No. In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration, and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of
shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." And in the prosecution of these offenses,
the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other
related articles have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until
their presentation as evidence in court. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
23
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.

Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn-over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds glaring
inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The
inconsistent testimonies of P03 Domingo, P03 Hernandez, and P/Slnsp. Tulauan as to who, when,
and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the
two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from
Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a
very early stage.

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference
point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of
evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain
of custody that the law requires.

20. PEOPLE VS. MERCURY DE LA CRUZ.

DOCTRINES: The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been observed in the absence of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with; the accused has the burden
to prove this.

Failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence, provided such
procedural lapse is satisfactorily explained and justified.

FACTS: During the course of a buy-bust operation, the arresting police officers involved testified
that following the consummation of the drug purchase transaction, a commotion erupted when the
accused-appellant resisted and shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion
eventually gave accused-appellant the opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting officers
further alleged that the people who gathered around them were already aggressive prompting them
to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for their safety. In fact, the arresting officers
24
even had to fire a warning shot and arrest Arthur Tabasa Ortega, the person who intervened in the
arrest of accused-appellant, in order for them to pacify the people around them. The accused-
appellant, who evaded arrest, was arrested only after, by virtue of a warrant of arrest. She
contended that that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at
the police station and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item nor was it
photographed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is fatal to a
case.

RULING: No. Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provided the exception to the strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution
should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial compliance with the
legal requirements on the handling of the seized item” is sufficient. The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items
seized inadmissible in evidence.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The guilt of the accused will not be affected as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as
in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were
not faithfully observed.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden
of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption
of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers
properly discharged their duties. In this case, the accused-appellant failed to present any plausible
reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the
apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, accused-appellant did not even question
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.

21. SPOUSES SILOS V. PNB

DOCTRINE: There is no ruling that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence.

FACTS: Spouses Eduardo and Lydia Silos secured a revolving credit line with Philippine National
Bank (PNB) through a real estate mortgage as a security. After two years, their credit line increased.
Spouses Silos then signed a Credit Agreement, which was also amended two years later, and several
Promissory Notes (PN) as regards their Credit Agreements with PNB. The said loan was initially
subjected to a 19.5% interest rate per annum. In the Credit Agreements, Spouses Silos bound
themselves to the power of PNB to modify the interest rate depending on whatever policy that PNB
may adopt in the future, without the need of notice upon them. Thus, the said interest rates played
from 16% to as high as 32% per annum. Spouses Silos acceded to the policy by pre-signing a total
of twenty-six (26) PNs leaving the individual applicable interest rates at hand blank since it would
be subject to modification by PNB.

25
Spouses Silos regularly renewed and made good on their PNs, religiously paid the interests without
objection or fail. However, during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Spouses Silos faltered when the
interest rates soared. Spouses Silos’ 26th PN became past due, and despite repeated demands by
PNB, they failed to make good on the note. Thus, PNB foreclosed and auctioned the involved security
for the mortgage. Spouses Silos instituted an action to annul the foreclosure sale on the ground
that the succeeding interest rates used in their loan agreements was left to the sole will of PNB, the
same fixed by the latter without their prior consent and thus, void.

PNB argued that the Silos’ claims of signing credit agreements and promissory notes in blank was
never raised in the lower court, and that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence;
Lydia Silos’ testimony in this regard is self-serving, unsupported and uncorroborated, and for being
the lone evidence on this issue. The fact remains that these documents are in proper form,
presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by Silos – who is an experienced business
person – that she signed questionable loan documents whose provisions for interest rates were left
blank, and yet she continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of years.

ISSUE: Is PNB’s contention that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence correct?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that PNB’s contention that documentary evidence deserves
no consideration because it has already found credible the testimony of Lydia in this respect.
Respondent failed to discredit her; in fact, its witness PNB Kalibo Branch Manager Aspa admitted
that interest rates were fixed solely by its Treasury Department in Manila, which were then simply
communicated to all PNB branches for implementation. If this were the case, then this would explain
why petitioners had to sign the promissory notes in blank, since the imposable interest rates have
yet to be determined and fixed by respondent’s Treasury Department in Manila.

22. MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.

DOCTRINE: Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2)
the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

FACTS: MCMP Construction and Monark Equipment Construction Corporation agreed to the lease
of heavy equipment by MCMP from Monark thru a Rental Equiptment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Monark delivered five pieces of heavy equipment to MCMP’s project site in Tanay Rizal, evidenced
by Documents Acknowledgment Recipt No. 04667 and 5706, received by MCMP representatives
Jorge and Rose. During trial, Reynaldo, Monark’s representative, testified that there were two
original copies of the contract, one for MCMP and one for Monark; however, Monark’s copy was lost
and despite diligent efforts, cannot be located, hence he presented photocopy of the Contract which
he had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of the secondary evidence to prove the contents
thereof, since there were no diligent efforts to locate it, but did not produce MCMP’s copy of the
contract despite a directive from the trial court to produce it. After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of
Monark, ordering MCMP to pay the balance of the rental fees inclusive of interest as well as 25%
attorney fees. MCMP appealed to the Court of Appeals when its motion for reconsideration was
denied by the RTC, but the appeal was also denied, hence it elevated its case to the Supreme Court,
on the issue of whether or not secondary evidence may be presented in the absence of the original.
It argues that the custodian of the original document was not presented to prove its loss; its loss
26
was not even reported to the police; it was only searched by Monark for purposes of the instant
case.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence
to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule.

HELD: No. “Petitioner’s contention is erroneous. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring
the production of the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is
contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:

“Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by
a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. — If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.”

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements before
a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever
the original copy has been lost:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the
offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and
the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of
Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such
testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, “findings of
27
facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.” Hence, the
Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino. MCMP, to note,
contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it
has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to
produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked
for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even
explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance
with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption
adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that “evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.”

23. WILGEN LOON ET AL. VS. POWER MASTER, INC.ET AL.

DOCTRINE: While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied
documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the
adverse party to present the original documents for inspection.

FACTS: Respondents employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various
PLDT offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims
and illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter (LA) partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. Both parties
appealed the LA’s ruling with the NLRC. Six (6) months after filing their notice of appeal,
Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized
copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal.
This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. On the other
hand, petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the
supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the
supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of
the respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that
they only agreed to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002. Third¸
the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged
signatures. NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized payroll records ruled in favor of
respondent. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an
indispensable factor for their authenticity. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence filed 6 months from notice of
appeal are admissible in evidence where there is an allegation of forgery by the adverse party.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is
not required in labor cases, the liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a
party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should
sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Respondents, in this case, failed to sufficiently
prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized
copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question
that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for
purposes of appeal. While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to
photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should
prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon
the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted
their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the
28
opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals.
Failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.

24. THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO

G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

DOCTRINE: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

FACTS: Respondent spouses filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages against the petitioners.
Later on the complaint was amended to an action for recovery. Respondent alleged: (1) that the
disputed property was originally owned by Buenaseda; (2) had long been partitioned between her
two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila; and (3) that owned 1/3 of the portion of Perfecto’s
share by virtue of a deed of sale executed between them and one of Perfecto’s heir, Pedro. While
in their original answer, petitioner alleged that the subject property had already been extra-judicially
partitioned between the heirs of Vitaliano and Perfecto, they subsequently changed their position
when the complaint was amended. They now claimed that the property was not partitioned with
specific metes and bounds. What is cleared among the heirs is their respective shares thereof. RTC
ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA found that Spouses
Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the certified true copy of cadastral map and the municipal assessor's
records. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioners argued that the cadastral
map, which serves as the basis of the alleged partition, is inadmissible in violation of the best
evidence rule and hearsay rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is inadmissible in evidence on the
ground that it violates the best evidence rule and hearsay rule.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is
a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued
by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the
record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of
the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers.

As to the Hearsay Rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries
in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made
in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's
attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The
document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
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Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute,
supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral
map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were
prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

25. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MUPAS

DOCTRINE: Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the
terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under the
best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be produced in court.

FACTS: On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government - through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC)and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)- for the construction and development
of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the
MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's unsolicited
proposal in accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules

Paircargo consortium also submitted their competitive proposal to build the NAIA-IPT III

Both AEDC and Paircargo offered to build, however, Paircargo submitted a bid superior to AEDC’s
unsolicited proposal, thus DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO)

PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign corporations
organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO defaulted on its
obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments
until June 2003.

Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was
required to submit the original documents to the court, however PIATCO argues that his non-
submission is justified under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous
accounts.

ISSUE: w/n the non-submission of original documents is justified

RULING: The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission due to
numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under the rule. However, as a condition precedent
to the admission of a summary of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation
for the admission of the original documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must
prove that the source documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in court.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under the best
30
evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document,
the original of the document must be produced in court.

Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented in courts are
authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be admissible as
evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the project.

26. ORTAEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the contract, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which
are not mentioned at all in writing – unless there be fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Two parcels of lands were sold, private respondents received the payments, but failed to
deliver the titles to petitioner, petitioner demanded for the delivery of the titles, but the petitioners
refused, claiming that the first lot is in possession of another person, and the second lot is subject
to petitioners certain conditions. During trial, private respondent Oscar, a former judge, orally
testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such was not incorporated in
deed of sale. Petitioner objected on the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless admitted
them eventually. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parol evidence here in proferred is admissible.

RULING: No, under the general rule in Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms
of the agreement are reduced into writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
no evidence can be admitted other than the content thereof – such that whatever is not found in
the instrument is deemed waived and abandoned by the parties. Here, after examination of the
deed, the court cannot make an inference that the sale was subject to a condition. Thus, the decision
of CA shall be reversed and the case be remanded back to trial court for proper disposition of the
case. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the contract, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in writing – unless there be fraud or mistake.

27. LAPU-LAPU FOUNDATION AND ELIAS TAN VS CA AND ALLIED BANKING

DOCTRINE: Parol evidence is generally admissible to explain the meaning of a written contract, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating unto said contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned in the writing, unless there be fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Elias tan, president of Lapu-Lapu, obtained four loans covered with four promissory notes
from respondent Allied Banking, Obligation became due and the petitioners failed to pay the same,
Allied Banking was constrained to file a case of collection against the respondents, holding Elise and
Lapu-lapu solidarily liable.

However, in the foundation denied incurring the obligation, contending that the loan was contracted
by Tan on his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit, the foundation maintained that it
never authorized tan to co-sign in his capacity as President
31
Tan, admitted however, that the loans were actually in his personal capacity, and further alleging
that there was an oral agreement between Tan and an employee of allied bank, that the loans shall
be paid from Tan’s dividends on his shares of common stocks from the Foundation, and that the
loans were to be rolled-over every year at an amount including unpaid interest, until such time it
would be actually paid by Tan.

ISSUES: Whether or not the alleged oral agreement between Tan and an employee of allied bank,
is valid and enforceable

HELD: No, the court held that under Sec 9 of Rule 130 of the rules of court that [w]hen the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. That the promissory notes clearly and
explicitly contained maturity dates, that nowhere is it stated therin that they would be renewed on
a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares
in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made
to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.

Thus, while parol evidence is generally admissible to explain the meaning of a written contract, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating unto said contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned in the writing, unless there be fraud or mistake.

28. MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ

DOCTRINE: When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other
than what is contained in the written agreement.

FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths (¾)
and one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan. In
September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her share to Benigna Llamas. When Benigna died, she willed her
share equally to her two sisters, Alejandra and Josefa. Alejandra’s heirs sold their predecessor’s
share to the respondent. Josefa sold her own to the respondent and the petitioner. The respondent
and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property. The
parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their
name for taxation purposes. In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the
subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained
in his name two transfer certificates of title: one, TCT No. 195812 - covering an area of 3,020 square
meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of 1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024
square meters). The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion, on
the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties’
Agreement. The respondent contested the authenticity of the petitioner’s documents. Particularly,
the Benigna Deed by presenting Benigna’s death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna
could not have executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner,
in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria
have sold to the parties her three-fourths (¾) share in 1969 because she had already sold her share
32
to Benigna in 1932. In his defense, the petitioner claimed in signing the Agreement, he was led to
believe, based on the parties’ rough estimation, that the area he actually possessed is only 3,020
square meters contrary to the parties’ real intention - i.e., the extent of their ownership would be
based on their actual possession.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the
petitioner’s titles despite the fact that the assailed Agreement does not contain the true intent of
the parties in accordance to the allegations of the petitioner. –

HELD: No. The petitioner’s argument calls for the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e., when
the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all
the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained
in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived
and abandoned. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party
to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. At the trial, the petitioner
attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting the
Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed
his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the petitioner’s staunch assertion
that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties’ true intention. In
the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is
fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondent’s cause of action for reconveyance of the
disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects
what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner’s admission, coupled with the respondent’s
denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this
document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s defense. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim
that his actual possession determines the extent of his ownership, it is the parties’ Agreement that
defines the extent of their ownership in the subject property. One of the legal effects of partition,
whether by agreement among the co-owners or by judicial proceeding, is to terminate the co-
ownership and, consequently, to make the previous co-owners the absolute and exclusive owner of
the share allotted to him. While the CA correctly nullified the petitioner’s certificates of title, the CA
erred in ordering the reconveyance of the entire subject property in the respondent’s favor. The
respondent himself admitted that the 3,020- square meter portion covered by TCT No. 195812 is
the petitioner’s just share in the subject property. Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No.
195812 using the same spurious documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed
in favor of the respondent since he is not the rightful owner of the property covered by this title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are MODIFIED. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to RECONVEY to the respondent
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 195813. Costs against petitioner.

29. SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
33
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

FACTS: Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and Kimwa is a construction firm
that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa
entered into a contract where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier
to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at
₱240.00 per truckload.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this,
however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages.

In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an
upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement
articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15,
1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras
were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.

ISSUE: Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.

HELD: Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to
acquire from Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced into writing:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be
introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant,
tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms
averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.

34
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not
been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented
serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.

Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed
before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure
to express the true intent of the parties. Further, Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to
petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing
admission of parol evidence.

It is true that petitioners’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as "mistake,"
"imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that
the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement "entered into
on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the parties’ supposed understanding that the
quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling
be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area. The Special
Permit’s condition (issued to Paras) that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
may be extracted by petitioner Lucia Paras from the permitted area lends credence to the position
that the aggregates "allotted" to respondent Kimwa was in consideration of its corresponding
commitment to haul all 40,000 cubic meters. This is so, especially in light of the Agreement’s own
statement that "the said Aggregates is for the exclusive use of [respondent Kimwa.]"57 By allotting
the entire 40,000 cubic meters, petitioner Lucia Paras bound her entire business to respondent
Kimwa. Rational human behavior dictates that she must have done so with the corresponding
assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not ridiculous, of her to oblige herself to make
this allotment without respondent Kimwa’s concomitant undertaking that it would obtain the entire
amount allotted.

Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from November
14, 1994 lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras’ assertion that, in entering into the Agreement
with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's promise that
hauling can be completed by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner
Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently clear to any party she was transacting with that she could
supply aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that the other party's hauling must be completed
by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence, for otherwise, any contract she would
enter into would be negated; any commitment she would make beyond May 15, 1995 would make
her guilty of misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be rendered illusory.

30. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM. PASIMIO

DOCTRINE: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered
as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-
in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.

FACTS: Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, she alleged
having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 and
US$5,170.80, respectively; that both investment placements have matured; and when she sought
to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige. PNB admitted the fact
of deposit placement but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal, the
35
deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the
bank. PNB narrated how the set off of sort came about: Pasimio and her husband took out three
"loans against deposit hold-out" from the PNB Sucat branch, as follows: Three Million One Hundred
Thousand Peso (P3,100,000) loan on March 21, 2001; a One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Peso
(P1,700,000) loan on April 2, 2001; and a Thirty-One Thousand One Hundred US Dollar (US$31,1
00) loan on December 7, 2001. During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied
obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding
signing certain documents which turned out to be the Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan
Applications, the Promissory Notes and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and
Assignment of Deposit Substitute and the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan
Documents), she professed not understanding what they really meant. She agreed to affix her
signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the
PNB Sucat branch manager and Customer Relations Officer led her to believe that what she was
signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products. Pasimio would also deny re-lending the
loan proceeds to Paolo Sun.

The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had
proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from PNB. As a
corollary, the trial court held that there was no evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan
proceeds to Pasimio. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for
a sum of money.

HELD: In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's never having received any loan proceeds,
the CA doubtless disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the best evidence of the
transaction embodied therein; also, to prove the existence of the loan, there is no need to submit
a separate receipt to prove that the borrower received the loan proceeds. Indeed, a promissory
note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on the
date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has been held, a
person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed
by him through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his
promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead
its sharp repudiation.

The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear
and unequivocal manner in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow
the recitals of such instrument, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence is
necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud. Following this doctrine, Pasimio's
notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be upheld, absent,
as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.

The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has
not questioned the genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes,
she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot
plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any loan, and receive the value of the notes
or any consideration therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these promissory notes.

But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the existence
of the loan. Here, each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan application form
36
and disclosure statement, all of which carried Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from each other, these
documents might not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken together, collectively, they
show that Pasimio took the necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their
terms and conditions. Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore,
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing.

Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a
written document, except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a
written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the existence
of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the
written agreement.

Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to
overturn the written agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the
documents embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94079 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Ligaya M. Pasimio's complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0195 before the Regional Trial Court of
Paranaque City, Branch 196 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

31. HEIRS OF SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA

DOCTRINE: The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Just
because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the
fact in dispute.

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents before the
Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court. It alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and
actual possessor of the land. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
Francisco Comorposa, being a close family friend of Marcos, approached the late Saezs son, Adolfo,
to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. He occupied a portion of without paying any rental. He was
succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are
occupying the premises through petitioner’s tolerance. On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made
upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed
that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor of the premises. An
action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents. The Municipal Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on
appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither is
there error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits
by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self-serving.

37
HELD: Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting
that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure
of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an
admission by silence. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered
at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an
issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While in summary
proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of the
adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners
still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.

32. TORRES VS. PAGCOR

DOCTRINE: A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the

functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

FACTS: Ellery March G. Torres was a slot machine operator supervisor for PAGCOR. Within the
period November 2066 to March 2007, there was a complaint filed before the office of the HR
department of the respondent for the involvement of Torres in the allege padding of the credit
meter reading of the slot machines. The investigation conducted affirmatively proved that Torres
was involved with the said crime. The administrative tribunal adjudge for the dismissal of Torres.
Torres filed a motion for reconsideration for the said judgment through facsimile transmission. The
Administrative tribunal denied such motion, affirmed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and
further affirmed by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC erred in ruling that there was no valid letter reconsideration
submitted.

HELD: No. The mode used by the petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery. ”A facsimile is
not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by them party and his counsel. It may,
in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx” (Garvida vs Sales, Jr.) “We, therefore, conclude that the terms
“electronic data message” and “electronic document” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.” (MCC Industries Sales Corporation vs
Ssangyong Corporation). Petition denied.

33. ANG V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a
former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. The
38
public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads: On or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality
of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent
through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one
Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is
depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional
anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. On August 1, 2001, the RTC
found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). The CA denied Rustan’s
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in
the case.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. Rustan claims that the obscene
picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). However, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too
late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it
was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In
conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

34. PEOPLE VS. ENOJAS

DOCTRINE: Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions: To be admissible, text messages are
to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
of them.

FACTS: The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police while parked suspiciously in front
of a glass shop. Enojas provided the police with identification that the officers suspected to be fake.
The officers then asked Enojas to accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed. On the
way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. The officer who went into the store
apprehended two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the officer. The other officer got out of the
car upon hearing the gunshots. Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled the scene.
Later, the police searched his abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They monitored the
messages on the phone and communicated with the other suspects, resulting in an entrapment
operation. Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in 2006 before

39
the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
conviction. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.

HELD:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are
to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to
the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.

2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that
meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the
circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of
all the accused.

35. SYHUNLIONG VS. RIVERA

DOCTRINE: In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who
made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least,
had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or
duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements
in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.

FACTS: Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in the
instant case. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF)
while Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation as Accounting Manager
of BANFF, effective on February 3, 2006 and continued working for BANFF until March of the same
year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas).
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining
salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the
check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by
Syhunliong. Hence, on April 6, 2006, Rivera sent libelous text message to one of BANFF's official
cellular phones held by Lumapas. Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to
16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund. On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution

40
of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the public
prosecutor finds probable cause to indict Rivera the crime of libel.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
the offense of libel?
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the
complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were
privileged communication?

RULING: There is no merit in the instant petition. Prescription had set in. Well settled rule in
statutory construction that the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes emanates
from the liberality of the State, any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
thereof, the accused. As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute
and punish the same. In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint
against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas.
Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not
alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90
of the RPC. In relation thereto, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the prescription
of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal liability. Prescription of the crime is
already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the libel information, but the
Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of
a qualified privileged communication. The rule on privileged communication means that a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest,
or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication
under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in
the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice. Presiding from the above, the Court thus
finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified
privileged communication since she was speaking in response to duty, to protect her own interest,
and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.

36. MARCOS VS HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO, 700 SCRA

DOCTRINE: As provided in Rules of Evidence, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses, and may only be disqualified if the
witness possesses any disqualifications specified under the rules.

FACTS: Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died, and left behind several
parcels of land including the subject lot located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The spouses were
survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda,
and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents
herein. Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership
41
of the subject lot based on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters,
through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.'s signature on the affidavit
and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate.

After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the
RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting
PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice was
given to them before the examination was conducted.

Thus, PO2 Alvarez's report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and
irrelevant.

ISSUE: WON PO2 Alvarez is disqualified as a witness.

HELD: No. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception
to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a
witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents'
motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these
grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the
credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness
may be received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. She has the qualifications
of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion
of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an expert
witness. The value of PO2 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if PO2 Alvarez is not even
allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.

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37. PEOPLE VS GOLIMLIM

FACTS: Evelyn G. Canchela is a mental retardate. When her mother Amparo Hachero left for
Singapore to work, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her sister Jovita Guban and
the latter‘s husband appellant Salvador Golimlim. In August 1996, Jovita left the house to meet
someone, leaving Evelyn with Golimlim. Taking advantage of the situation, Golimlim instructed Eveln
to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at
her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what Golimlim did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe
her. Lorna Hachero, Evelyn‘s half-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her
to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Quezon City. Dutifully, Lorna immediately
proceeded to Golimlim‘s home and brought Evelyn with her to Manila. A week after she brought
Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing
belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor for check-up and ultrasound examination. The
examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became
pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a
knife. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon convicted Golimlim of the crime of rape. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Was Evelyn disqualified to testify due to her retardation?

RULING: No. The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies, as has
repeatedly been held by the Supreme Court, is accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real
and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. In the present case, no cogent
reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect
to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her
as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth. It can not then be gainsaid that a mental
retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or
her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. Thus, in a long line of cases, the Supreme
Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the
victim who was a mental retardate. And from a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there
is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility.

38. ALVAREZ VS. RAMIREZ

FACTS: Susan Ramirez filled an information for arson against herein petitioner Maximo Alvarez.
According to Susan, herein petitioner tried to burn down her house while she and her sister,
Esperanza Alvarez was still inside the said house. Esperanza Alvarez was the estranged wife of
herein petitioner, Maximo Alvarez. During the trial for the criminal case, complainant presented
Esperanza Alvarez as witness; this prompted the accused Maximo to object, alleging that it is in
violation of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court with respect to marital disqualification. Complainant
Susan Ramirez filed an opposition upon the objection of the accused. The trial court ordered the
testimony of Esperanza to be deleted from the records and that it was in violation of the aforesaid
rule. Complainant filed for a motion for reconsideration, but was subsequently denied, such order
prompted complainant to file a certiorari under Rule 65 upon the CA. The CA set aside the order of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Was Esperanza’s testimony against her husband admissible in evidence?

43
RULING: Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. The reasons
given for the rule are as follows, to wit:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.

The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony
to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. In the case
at bar, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were
separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented
reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an
interest the State aims to protect.

39. PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

FACTS: On the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents. Benjamin forged the signature of Victoria in a deed of sale executed by the accused
wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership, making it appear that Victoria
consented to the sale thereof, when in fact she had not. The prosecution called the complaint-wife
to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking the marital
disqualification rule. The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case
falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband. A motion for
reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Was Victoria disqualified from testifying?

RULING: No. It is undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging
her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection
with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against
her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed.
In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which

44
the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.

40. RAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: In Dead Man’s Statute, the rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against
the estate of the deceased person.

FACTS: The petition centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered
by Stock Certificate No. 003, registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the
corporation. The RTC declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner, is the owner of the said shares
of stock. The CA however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the
deceased father of defendant Vicente B. Chuidian, is the owner of the shares of stock. Enrique
Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while
Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to
the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. Petitioner Razon assails the appellate court's
decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant
case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “dead man’s satute” is applicable in this case.

HELD: No. The rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against
the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased
person. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente
Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime
of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant
unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was
filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony
of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

41. SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHUA

DOCTRINE: The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.

FACTS: Respondent Chua alleged that he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane LPG in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly
agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER under
the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner
Cecilia and his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations of Shellite without respondent's
45
consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting of Jacinto’s net
shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Thus, respondent filed a case against
petitioners. Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death.
In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent
and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under
Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have
been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by
petitioners.

HELD: No. The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the
trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this
case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason
that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine
is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned
before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent,
the latter being the party plaintiff.

42. BORDALBA VS. CA

DOCTRINE: The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

FACTS: Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part
of a land owned by her late parents; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-
judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied
by Nicanor Jayme with her permission. Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay
filed their opposition contending that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in
the 1947 extra-judicial partition. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu
46
City, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of
her mother.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent, private respondents
filed with the RTC the instant complaint against petitioners praying that he Free Patent No be
declared void. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent
declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. Petitioner filed the instant petition,
contending that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on
matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court,
as the same violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies given by the witnesses violated the dead man’s statute.

HELD: No. As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said rule
finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth
of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through
personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the
witness. Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present
case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not
on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly
admitted by the trial court.

43. CHAN VS. CHAN

FACTS: On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Johnny Chan. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family
due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Johnny resisted the action, claiming
that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. He agreed for marriage counseling but suddenly
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection on their way to the
hospital. Eventually, the marriage relations had gotten worse. During the pre-trial conference,
Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof of his
forcible confinement. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.” On August 22, 2006 Josielene motioned for a subpoena
duces tecum to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was confined. Johnny
opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
RTC sustained the opposition. CA likewise sustained the opposition reasoning that if courts were to
allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by
the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

RULING: The RTC and CA is correct on denying the motion. SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication provides:

The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
47
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended
to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and
provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to
court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to
clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

Josielene claims that the hospital records are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of
the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician
"cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional
conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the
examination of the physician at the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that to allow the disclosure during
discovery procedure of the hospital records, the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him would be to allow access
to evidence that is inadmissible because it is without the patient’s consent. Disclosing them would
be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

Josielene again argued that since Johnny attached in his answer the Philhealth claim form covering
his confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records.
Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party,
the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled that such argument is premature as trial in the case had not yet begun.
It cannot be said that Johnny already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence. Johnny was
not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. He attached the Philhealth
form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.

44. JUDGE LACUROM VS. ATTYS. JACOBA & VELASCO-JACOBA

FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a
civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos. The
MTC of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the
RTC. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. On 29
June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor
of Veneracion.
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On July 30, 2001, the plaintiffs’ consuel filed a Motion for reconsideration with request for inhibition
containing the words and phrases; abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible
error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process, which are in
utter disprespect to the court. On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear
before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.

In her Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the
subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively
participate in this case. Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for
whatever mistake committed and agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off
the record.

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. Velasco-

Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon
hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba stopped her and said (“Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed
on time.”) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her
husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future. This pleading turned out
to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
suspension from the practice of law.

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Atty. Jacoba to
explain why he should not be held in contempt. Atty. Jacoba filed his answer with another Motion
for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against
Velasco-Jacobas’ statements implicating him, Atty. Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the statement of Atty. Velasco-Jacobas’ statement is covered by the Martial
privilege rule.

RULING: Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because
of her husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of
signing each others’ pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to
Velasco-Jacoba, so implicit is their trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the
years, she already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other. By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation
is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary
action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.

We now consider the evidence as regards Atty. Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July
2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the
author of the motion. The Court cannot easily let Atty. Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes’ account. Instead, Atty. Jacoba
impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns and fired at the
errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Atty. Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
49
Hence, the statement is not covered due to its implied consent.

45. SAMALA VS. ATTY. VALENCIA

FACTS: On May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala filed a disbarment case against Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending
parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating
numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being
immoral by siring illegitimate children. After Atty. Valencia’s filed comment, the Supreme Court, in
its Resolution referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Raval. After a series of
hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda and the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. Commissioner Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation, the Court found Atty.
Valencia guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Valencia violated Section 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties.

RULING: Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, it provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act
as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may
not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic
interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from
the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not
only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. An attorney owes loyalty to his
client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney
and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney
from accepting professional employment from the client’s adversary either in the same case or in a
different but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a
former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to
the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. Further,
Under Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, it states that a lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. The reason
for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence
of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. It is evident that Atty. Valencia’s
representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case,
and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court. Thus, Atty. Valencia is guilty of misconduct suspending him
in the practice of law for three years.

46. ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ

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FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces
tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and
to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of
the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The
subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and
a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several
government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. [Claim: The EIIB has a syndicate
headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called
"ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA).] To put this case in perspective it
should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a citizen for information under
the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the power of the
Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it
vis-a-Government. There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones
revolve on the question whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to
personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are
classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of
EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla will necessarily [lead to]
knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being"
and this could "destroy the EIIB." Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue
a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or materiality of the documents required to be produced,
to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should
be on the Government's claim of privilege.

HELD: In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting
the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine
from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other considerations. Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation
which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA
Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention that there is adequate
safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of expenditure which should
be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of
rewards."

The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the
documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate
the confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to
account for its funds to the proper authorities. The need for the documents thus outweighs the
claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there might have been compelling reasons
for the claim ofprivilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years later, these
reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose identities

51
could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert missions
to which they might have been deployed might either have been accomplished or abandoned.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988
unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and put to
illegal use, remains. Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively
privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their
nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be
sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case
should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the
extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
protection of the documents delivered.

47. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as
the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the
said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee
as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend
the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were
sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO
464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only
2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation
of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions
of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
52
The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to
be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
– which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on
the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt
of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary
to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only
to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary .When Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid
of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

53
48. ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ONACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then
invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) Whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) Whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for
his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised
executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate vs. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several
jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power
presidential.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

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In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases
are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at
all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

49. OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO AND CASIMIRA MATURINGAN VS.

HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO, REPRESENTED BY LAQUINDANUM, PEDRO JR., ASUNCION

DOCTRINE: Judicial Admissions - Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of
the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting
the issues to be tried. As contemplated in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general
rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation
of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.

FACTS: This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which
needed to be proportionally subdivided among heirs. Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors
of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered
55
parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration 208143 consisting of 240 square
meters situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his
six (6) children. On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion) and Josefina
Cailipan (Josefina), great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a
complaint5against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan,
grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman” dated 10 August 1992,6 Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-10022
(02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro Sr. In the said
complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of
ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sqm.) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of
respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. The issuance of the new tax declaration was
allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious document denominated as
“Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,” wherein the petitioners misrepresented themselves as the
sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, respondents sought to annul the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman” as well as the Tax Declarations that were issued on the basis of such document. On 15
August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations
and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial on the merits
ensued. On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding
that they are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either
one of them. Not convinced, the respondents appealed the aforequoted decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA) raising, among others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of
“in pari delicto” in declaring the validity of the document “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.” In
its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring
that the “Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” dated 5 December 1968 they executed covering the
192 sqm. lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Thus, the CA
went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto
themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the
document entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968 pertains to a
different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is erroneous for the
trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.

ISSUE: The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure
of the CA to appreciate the existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the
propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine.

RULING: Yes. The CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents during
the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534
consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr. The respondent's admissions against respondents’
interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No.
9534, which was transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in one of
the issues submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included: “Whether or not the “Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” is enforceable against the plaintiffs, thus curing the legal
infirmities, if any, of the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” an issue earlier mentioned. Judicial
admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases
is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. As contemplated in Section
4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission
upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is
shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no
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such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by
denying that he made such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192
sq m lot, respondent Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation
as to how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr. Consequently, respondents are bound by
the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right over the property subject matter
thereof. In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law. Accordingly, in
order not to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws as contemplated by the parties in the
instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any circumvention of the law cannot
be countenanced.

50. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY OR DODO

DOCTRINE: Circumstantial Evidence - Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court,
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction,
all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

FACTS: That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality
of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, the accused, Rolendo “Lendoy” Gaudiaby had
carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will. That said incident transpired when
Remelyn was left with her younger sister in their house situated in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, as
their parents gather pigs food at Bulatukan. As Remelyn's mother, Amalia came back home, she
noticed that the former was nowhere to be seen. Thereafter, Amelia tried to locate Remelyn within
the vicinity of their neighborhood. As Amelia called for her daugther, she then heard Remelyn calling
out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil-ipiltrees. Amalia rushed toward the place, but was
met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their house. She found Remelyn
crying, naked, (walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-
ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn
home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming
from Remelyns private organ. It was later discovered that Remelyn was raped. Tulon Mik, a neighbor,
came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn. At
this point, the parents the accused told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle
this, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed. Police
officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police
precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalias statement was taken. On 26 March 1997, Amalia
executed her affidavit complaint. Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had told her “Buang Lendoy
iya kong lugos”. (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in
her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic)
brought me to the ipil-ipil trees. The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and
a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and
his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. Mik saw appellant carrying
a small girl in his arms. He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola.
Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees. The appellant, ROLENDO
GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he
57
went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections. After trial, the
trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime
of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant
was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
to pay the costs of suit.

ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution and by which the trial
court based its decision is sufficient to convict the accused-appellant for the crime of rape beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING: Yes. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based
on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant
is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him
carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house. As a
neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn.
The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil. The second
circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn emerged naked
from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and
walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyns private organ was bleeding and excreting a white
mucus-like substance. The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to
her mother that it was appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove and forced her to do
something against her will. There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining
Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken
hymen, as well as fresh vaginal lacerations. From these, the culpability of the appellant can be
inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned circumstances have been indubitably proven,
both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability
of the appellant to discredit their veracity.

51. CONRADO C. DOLDOL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: An offer of compromise in criminal cases. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court-
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. We hold that said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with
appellant's commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of
compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled
or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

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FACTS: The Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, Conrado C. Doldol was charged with
two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-2760,
following his unlawful use and benefit of the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE PESOS and 54/100 (P1,134,421.54), as discovered by
a team of State Auditors led by State Auditor Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors Lydia Naoe and
Beverly T. Cruz as members following an audit of the cash account of the accused. The State Auditors
discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P1,134,421.54. Consequently, the State Auditors
demanded the immediate refund of the said amount, and for Doldol to submit within 72 hours a
written explanation on the said shortage. Doldol failed to respond and was, thereafter, relieved of
his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was directed to transfer the account to Assistant Municipal Treasurer
Loida Cancino. The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said account, this time
covering the another period. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash shortage
of P149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol dated July 27, 1995, the State Auditors demanded the
immediate restitution of the missing fund, and directed him to submit within 72 hours a written
explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol failed to respond. On the same day, Doldol
wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account,
taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors. Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit,
Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the
Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to
pay the balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on
or before November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his promise. Two informations for
malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Carlos City. Thereafter, he was found guilty of the crime charge against him. On appeal, the CA
rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision, and, likewise, denied Doldol's motion for
reconsideration thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the offer of refund of the missing funds by the accused is an implied admission of
his guilt to the crime of malversation of public funds.

RULING: Yes. Following the audit conducted, the State Auditors demanded that the petitioner
immediately produce the missing funds. He was also required to submit within 72 hours a written
explanation why the shortage occurred. However, the petitioner failed to respond to such demand,
and failed to object to the findings and conclusions of the State Auditors.

The petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove that the missing funds were
actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner could have offered in
evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of the cash advances,
but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the
missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October
31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on
September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the
petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds.

With respect to the balance of the missing funds, appellant promised to pay the same in installment
basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking. Said payment is of no moment and
could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as guided by Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment, particularly when taken in
conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a
clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that
59
he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

52. LADIANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood all of it.
An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.

FACTS: The crime committed was Robbery with Homicide. The accused are Antonio Manuel Uy and
Ricky Ladiana. That on or about the 27th day of June 2001, in Pasay City, upon conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the
following jewelry belonging to Jeepney Shopping Center. In the same evening, appellant and Ricky
went to the house of Eduardo dela Cruz in Antipolo. Ricky told Eduardo that they were in trouble
and asked him to accompany appellant to the house of Panfilo dela Cruz in Zambales. Ricky told
Eduardo that appellant will be staying in Zambales for two to three days. Eduardo acceded to such
request. While waiting for a bus going to Zambales, they drank coffee in a nearby store. During
their conversation, Eduardo asked appellant what happened. Antonio confessed to Eduardo that he
and Ricky entered a place in Pasay City and they killed two persons and seriously wounded another
whom they left fighting for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which contained
money and that if "he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will live comfortably”.
After a week, Eduardo went to SPO3 Rodrigo Urbina of the PNP Regional Mobile Patrol Group.
Eduardo told SPO3 Urbina what was confessed to him by appellant and that he brought appellant
to Zambales. SPO3 Urbano coordinated with the Pasay City Police Station, Crime Investigation
Division, for appellant's arrest. The joint team of the Regional Mobile Patrol Group, the Pasay City
Police Station and the Palauig Police Station arrested appellant in the house of Panfilo in Zambales.
Antonio was frisked and a cross pendant was recovered from his pocket.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession to Eduardo Dela Cruz was sufficient to convict of the crime.

RULING: Antonio's confession to Eduardo, who is not a police officer, is admissible in evidence.
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. Appellant's admissions are not
covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, because they were not extracted
while he was under custodial investigation. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard
and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must
be given in its substance.

53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ULIT

DOCTRINE: It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-examination. The
basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which
can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not
present and available for cross-examination.

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FACTS: The crimes committed were 2 counts of rape and 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness. The
accused was Feliciano Ulit, the uncle of the victim. When the prosecution offered in evidence the
appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay before the barangay chairman as part of the testimony of Barangay
Tanod Fernando David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant
was not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same.
Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement as part of David’s testimony. The appellants
counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of victim’s sworn statement on the ground that she
was incompetent to give the same because of her mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn
statement of victim in evidence as part of her testimony.

ISSUE: Whether the Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant Raped the
Victim.

RULING: We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The
victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on clarificatory
questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in November 1996.

We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of Lucelle
are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her signatures therein.
By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the
credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and
competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the information. It signifies all
evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited,
and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-examination. The basis for the exclusion appears
to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which can ordinarily be applied for
the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for cross-
examination.

In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional
provision while the accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying
against him. Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the
contents thereof are hearsay evidence. Such affidavit must be formally offered in evidence and
accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court for the simple reason that
the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and accepted.

In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement which
she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the appellant
raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-examined by the appellants counsel and
answered the trial courts clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn statement as
part of her testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without objection on
the part of the appellant.

54. PEOPLE VS. SAYABOC

DOCTRINE: The failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation
renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.

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FACTS: The crime committed in this case was murder. The trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death; and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. The accused attacked, and
assaulted Joseph Galam, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. SPO4 Cagungao was called
to to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being
interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part
of the room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional
rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc
could not name one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. The police officers brought
Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao
heard Sayaboc say, okay, he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent
the entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would
leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano
dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum
of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was
also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson. The appellant argues
that the extrajudicial confession may not be admitted in evidence against him because the PAO
lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent,
vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire
proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police
Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of
accused Sayaboc when it was taken without the assistance of not competent and independent nor
by effective and vigilant counsel.

RULING: Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him, since it was
made after he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights. Jurisprudence provides that
extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption,
however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding
an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when
the extrajudicial confession has been denounced.

The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial
investigations.

Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant
did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform
a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible. The Court likewise ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a
competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo
was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution
witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial
investigation. The Court held, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving
his guilt for the crime of homicide.

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55. TANENGGEE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.

FACTS: Five separate Information for Estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
filed against petitioner. After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision dated June
25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged. Petitioner appealed the judgment of
conviction to the CA. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming with
modification the RTC Decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its
September 6, 2007 Resolution. The petitioner admits signing a written statement, however, he
refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same
without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his
rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right
to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been
admitted in evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is
just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation. Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed
to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been
executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein
attest to its voluntariness.

56. MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS Y ILAGAN VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made,

constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane
person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator
of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession,
thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case.

FACTS: An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar,
and Carpon. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully
deprived Cebuana of cash/money when she took out pawned items and released them to redeeming
pledgors in exchange for redemption payments which she, however, did not turnover to the
pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain. She gravely abused the confidence
concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when she exploited her exclusive and
unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her position entailed a high degree of
confidence reposed by Cebuana as she had been granted daily unsupervised access to the vault.
Also, the petitioner knew the combinations of the branch’s vault and nobody was allowed to enter
the vault without her presence. Without the authority and consent of her employer, she repeatedly
took and appropriated for herself the redemption payments paid for the pawned items with the
63
aggregate appraised value of ₱414,050.00. The accused submitted pawn tickets which were
surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective pledgors. She submitted
them during the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00
missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

HELD: Yes. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one
of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime,
unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges
on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case. The language of the confession letter
was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt
upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner.
Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than
risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus implausible for
one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The
petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully understood the consequences of her
confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus,
negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an administrative sanction.

57. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MERCY SANTOS Y ENTIENZA

DOCTRINE: A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows
that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution.

FACTS: Charmaine Mamaril, a kindergarten pupil, was brought to school, the Kaligayahan
Elementary School, in Novaliches, Quezon City by her mother, Raquel Mamaril, at noontime on
March 8, 1993. Raquel left Charmaine in her classroom with her classmates but stayed awhile, going
home only after 12:30 p.m. She would be going back for Charmaine, according to her daily routine,
at 2:00 p.m. When she returned to fetch Charmaine before 2:30 p.m., Charmaine’s teacher Ms.
Grace Lucena, met and asked her if the child had already reached home; Raquel replied that
Charmaine did not know the way home. She then looked for her child in school until someone
informed her that a woman had earlier fetched her daughter. She immediately reported the matter
to the police authorities stationed in Novaliches at around 3:00 p.m. and then to the National Bureau
of Investigations the next day; she also approached radio and television stations for help. She and
her family conducted their own search from then until her daughter was finally found on March 13,
1993. Raquel recounted how her child was recovered. According to her, a police sergeant came to
her house on March 13, 1993 and asked for her; he told her to contact Kagawad Aida Bautista of
Sto. Domingo. When contacted, Bautista informed her that a child named Charmaine was with her;
Raquel immediately went to Bautista with some identification papers of Charmaine, and the child
was turned over to her after showing the birth certificate. This occurred on a Saturday. Although
Charmaine’s kidnapper was not immediately caught, the matter did not end with the return of
Charmaine to her family’s bosom. Two days later, on Monday, Bautista telephoned Raquel to tell
her that the woman, a certain Mercy Santos, had returned to her place to claim Charmaine. Raquel
wasted no time notifying NBI Agent Roel Jovenir, who, in turn and with other NBI agents,
accompanied by Raquel and her husband, proceeded to Bautista’s place and arrested Santos.
Following the arrest of Santos, the kidnapping was investigated at the NBI office, where Raquel
gave her written statement she admitted the kidnapping; that during the investigation by question
64
and answer, Atty. Uy would raise objections by cautioning Santos against answering, in which case
the objection and the question objected to were not anymore typed in the statement; and that
photographs were taken of Charmaine and the accused during the confrontation.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

HELD: No. A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows
that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III
thereof, provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely -- without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false
promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind. A
confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order because no
person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime
unless prompted by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold
objectivity of the exclusionary rule. Consequently, the burden of evidence to show that it was
obtained through undue pressure, threat or intimidation shifts to the accused. The trial court erred
in admitting appellants extrajudicial confession without showing that Atty. Gordon Uy was indeed
the competent and independent counsel of appellants own choosing. The Court notes appellants
insistent and persistent disavowals of knowing said Atty. Uy, much less of retaining him as her
counsel of choice. The prosecution, for unexplained reasons, failed to present Uy as a witness to
show his role in the taking of the alleged confession.

58. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFREDO NARDO Y ROSALES

FACTS: Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution presented the
victim as its main witness, while, the defense presented a number of witnesses who testified to
different occasion for which the victim was caught lying.
After the trial, trial court, giving credence to the testimony of the victim, convicted the accused. On
appeal, the accused presented series of letters allegedly written by the victim to the defense counsel
asking said counsel to help her father be acquitted.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies on a number
of occasion.
(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is contrary to
testimony made in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony.

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HELD:
(1) The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that:
"Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming
them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging
one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Furthermore, as
a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed, for the trial
court is in a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that testimonies
of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

(2) An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason
or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Recantations are frowned upon by the courts because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction
does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction
of the accused deserve only scant consideration.

59. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.

FACTS: Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the said
application, Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation to the Bureau of Lands.
Less than 3 months after the application, free patent was issued. Sometime in April 1979, the heirs
of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an investigation for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a
foreshore land in favor of respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator,
submitted his Report. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted
an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Thereafter, government instituted an
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent. Trial court
ruled in favor of the petitioner. In reversing the RTC, CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani
Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the
free patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission of a third person
who was not presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence for being a hearsay.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person — the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may
then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged
admission may be considered as "independently relevant." Thus, because Cartagena took the
witness stand and opened himself to cross- examination, the Investigation Report he had submitted
to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report
that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. On the other
hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as independently
relevant. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
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communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their
truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant
to the existence of such fact. Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the
investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted
by the trial court.

60. ANNA LERIMA PATULA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlocker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa
for failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company
where misappropriated by the accused, submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers
listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt
numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan
herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in the
documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that
the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another
person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence.

HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness
is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon
for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information. The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the
witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined
and cross-examined. Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis
of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution
witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay
rule applies. Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e.,
Misappropriation on the part of the accused through documentary evidence of which the witness
has no personal knowledge, the same is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.

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61. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SONNY GATARIN Y CABALLERO ALYAS "JAY-R"
AND EDUARDO QUISAYAS

DOCTRINE: A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death.

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.

FACTS: On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way
home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion,
Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that
the accused ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing
their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running
at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the
policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when
it became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There
they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the
policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag
Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that
it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein,
while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large. At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended
to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon
were found in Januario’s body which eventually caused his death. CA affirmed RTC decision hence
this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is admissible evidence.

HELD: No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the
declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it
is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived;
and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.

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In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death
and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible.
The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration.

However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are
so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

62. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE”

DOCTRINE: A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.

FACTS: At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old
grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3
Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television
when four (4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2
Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from
SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the
other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.

PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the
Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta
that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -who shot him. This
69
statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who followed him at the
hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds
on his head and trunk.

The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and his
companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive identification of the
eyewitnesses to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him constituted
an ante mortemstatement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence
against Palanas. It further opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre's killing as he had no inkling
that the attack would take place, and that he was in no position to mount any feasible defense.12 The
RTC, however, did not appreciate evident premeditation because of the absence of the following
elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification increasing amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2
Borre to F75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether Palanas's conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the basis of
Dying declaration And as part of the res gestae.

HELD: Yes. For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four
(4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is
the victim. On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus,
constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained
to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity
of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that
his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order
and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn
and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae.
"Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony." In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i. e., him being
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shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to
contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it identified
Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by
Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

63. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE

DOCTRINE: Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

FACTS: That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating together and helping
one another, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor
with his friends as Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away using the
PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said Bienvenido Openda,
Jr. of his liberty against his will. A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his
arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.2 On the other hand, Theodore
Bernal testified for his defense. On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding
Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and
disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of
P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral suffering." Bernal assails the lower court for giving
weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting
him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the application of Declaration against interest is correct and to merit accused
conviction.

RULING: Yes. With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
(3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary
to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true."

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.

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64. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON AND RENE R. DEZOLLER VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
TEODORA DOMINGO

DOCTRINE: The conditions for the admission of declarations about pedigree under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, are the following: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that
such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was
made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

General Rule: Where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant
and declarant—not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate—the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself, but this requirement
does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.

FACTS: The case involves an action for reconveyance filed by petitioners against private respondent
over a parcel of land with a house and apartment and which was originally owned by the spouses
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
the sister of petitioners’ father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioner’s father, Hermogenes, died hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero by right of representation.

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute.
Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo. Martin Guerrero died and
subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners filiation to their father and their aunt,
to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora
and Hermogenes; death certificates; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; several joint affidavits executed by third persons; and the marriage certificate of
Martin and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer
of these exhibits to which a Comment was filed by herein private respondent.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the ground that
petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in
accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving,
uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under
Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of
the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavits certifying to the date, place of birth and
parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination.

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The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family
picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish
filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

RULING: We find for petitioners. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible,
as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant
be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be
shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem
motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis
is the third element. American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the
relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations
of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde.

The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be
some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof
than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to
reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations
to the property of some other member of the family.

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the
estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the
reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving
such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute
failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent’s
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew
of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the
declarants own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.

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Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while
the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason
of private respondents failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being
offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

Accordingly, the documents offered in evidence can be deemed to have sufficiently established the
relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that
a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. Finally,
it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the
declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. The
petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

65. FRANCISCO L. JISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MONINA JISON

DOCTRINE: The enumeration contained in the second portion of Rule 130, Section 40, in light of
the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as “family possessions,”
or those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree
of a person. It is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common
reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree.

FACTS: In a complaint filed with the RTC, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to
a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter,
Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood,
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts
and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her
education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA)
and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize
her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support
and treat her as such.

In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza
Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early
as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA,
expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO
contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred
by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award
of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to documentary evidence
presented by the private respondent as evidence of filiation considering that the same are hearsay,
self-serving and cannot bind the petitioner under the basic rules of evidence.

RULING: The court finds merit against the probative value of some of MONINA’s documentary
evidence. The various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives allegedly attesting to
74
MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA witnessed
the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or
unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by
evidence other than the documents in question. As to the admissibility of these documents under
Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further elaboration. Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. - The reputation or tradition existing
in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may
be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section
containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether the various
notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, as private documents, fall within the scope of
the clause “and the like” as qualified by the preceding phrase entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light
of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family
possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as to
the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well known
to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation
or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

Plainly then, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, as private documents
not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule
130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation, it having been observed that:

The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx Thus matters of pedigree may
be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation
in the community.

Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives,
inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her
testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his
daughter.

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66. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR
MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRAN ALVIR

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. Considering that the statements of
the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible
as evidence given in res gestae.

FACTS: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of
the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of
them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information for murder was filed against several
members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, with the Regional Trial Court. A separate information were
also filed against them for the attempted murder and another for frustrated murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible.

RULING: Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in
this case. According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene,
he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since
they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae. As a general rule, "a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony
are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several
exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:

Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part
of the res gestae.

In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that a declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. x x x

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way,
res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
76
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony. There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made
immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res
gestae.

In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience”:

x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we
cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because
different persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points
in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the
attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked. When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become
merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore,
must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

67. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. “BERTING” GILBERTO
VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, AND RICKY VILLARICO

FACTS: On or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 o’clock in the morning at Barangay Bolinsong,
Municipality of Bonifacio, Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with a short
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot
HAIDE CAGATAN at the back penetrating through the neck which caused the instant death of said
victim and that he had no chance to avoid or defend himself from the attack. The RTC accorded
faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution’s witnesses, and disbelieved
their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical improbability for them to be at the
crime scene, for the distances between the crime scene and the places where the accused allegedly
were at the time of the commission of the crime were shown to range from only 100 to 700
meters.17 The RTC found, however, that the Prosecution was not able to prove treachery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in convictine the accused-appellants of murder despite of
failure of the prosecution to prove the identity of the assailant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: The term res gestae refers to “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act”. In a general way, res
gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
77
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is
thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

68. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NORMAN PALARCA Y MERCADO ALIAS “BONG”

FACTS: At the time of the incident, private complainant Concepcion C. Javier, was a 70 year old
widow who personally tended her 24-hour sari-sari store located at 101 Rosal Street, Alido Heights
Subdivision, Bulacan. She was suffering from recurrent insomnia, thus, she regularly took sleeping
pills to ward off her sleeping problem. Twenty-eight year old accused-appellant, single, was then
working as a keyboardist and sequencer of an establishment that produces “minus one” music. He
was a resident of the same subdivision and a frequent buyer at private complainant’s store during
the wee hours of the morning. Suddenly, accused-appellant entered through the kitchen door. He
swiftly darted towards private complainant; shoved her on the forehead and pushed her against the
kitchen counter. When she attempted to run, he grabbed her arm and punched her twice on the
abdomen, causing her to fall to the ground. Though private complainant was reeling from the
physical assault as well as from the effects of the sleeping pill, she felt accused-appellant raise her
duster and remove her underwear. She saw him unzip his pants and pull down his briefs. Then,
accused-appellant forced her legs open and raped her. She felt pain and bled, but she could do
nothing as she was feeling very weak. Moments later, accused-appellant put on his pants and
pointed the blood on the floor to private complainant. After accused-appellant left, private
complainant struggled to get up and wiped the blood on the floor. Then, she proceeded to the
bedroom where one of her daughters, Teresa, was sleeping. Teresa woke up and saw the bloodied
underwear of her mother. Private complainant told her that she was raped by accused-appellant
but failed to give the details as she dozed off to sleep. The following day, May 20, 1998, private
complainant submitted herself for physical examination at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory in
Malolos, Bulacan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: At any rate, private complainant’s thorough narration of the rape incident on the witness
stand, which remained firm and consistent under exhaustive cross-examination by the defense,
convinces us that she was indeed raped. It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed.
It is hard to believe that a 70-year old woman who was not shown to have any grudge against
78
accused-appellant would concoct a humiliating rape story and spend the remaining days of her life
in sending a man to prison if her motive was not to avenge her honor and have her ravisher
punished. Bolstered by the medical findings showing that private complainant sustained multiple
abrasions on the vaginal wall, as well as bruises on the abdomen and right arm which confirmed
that she was indeed boxed and grabbed by accused- appellant, we see no reason to doubt her
testimony.

69. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,
MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA

FACTS: Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipa
Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight
No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25
p.m. The tickets were bought sometime in August 1985. Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they
went to the check- in counter of the defendant’s Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the
published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but
upon checking-in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their
tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila
by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees for breach of contract
of carriage. Defendant disclaims any liability, claiming that the non- accommodation of plaintiffs on
said flight was due to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is averred that even if
defendant is found liable to the plaintiffs such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB
Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with P.D. 589. The trial court rendered judgment finding
defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in bumping-off the plaintiffs from its F264 flight
of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to pay the plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga
City to Manila.

HELD: Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove
his affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to
support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is
more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. In the absence of any controverting
evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL’s witnesses
are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private
respondents, exhs. “1”-“4”(with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage
regarding check-in time as well as on the notation „late 4:02‰ stamped on the flight coupon by
the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger
Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. “5” (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and
the private respondents) are entries made in the regular course of business which the private
respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection.

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70. RUDY LAO VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.

FACTS: Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was
insured with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc to cover any damages that might be caused
to his goods. While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24,
1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No.
FBS-917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and
was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692,
while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed
at P35,000 more or less. Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from
his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its
adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo
Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident. Petitioner assails the
admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter. He contends that the same entry
was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman
himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured
vehicle. Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony were of dubious nature. Both
trial and appellate courts noted that the report was made three days after the accident and did not
form part of the official police records.

ISSUE: Whether or not the police blotter is admissible as evidence.

RULING: The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under
the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the
public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information. The police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries
in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent
evidence to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected
the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was
driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said
that entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, since
the Court there found that the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars.

Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The
person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct
the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating
officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No
explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

71. MEYNARDO SABILI VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORENCIO LIBREA

FACTS: Petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that
he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections,
80
he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the
4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative
of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it
is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were
then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Private respondent
Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification, against
him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent alleged that petitioner made material
misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year
residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner falsely
declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and
eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections. Private respondents evidence shall
be grouped as follows: (1) Certificates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter
Registration and Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in previous
elections; (3) Certifications regarding petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City
residents. While for petitioners evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns
and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from
the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette
Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation
from the barangay parish and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification and
find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary
public, Honrades Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled
to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative,
Inc., we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to
be admissible in evidence:(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to keep
an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay. Regarding the second requisite, we have
explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, that it is the business of a punong
barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third requisite,
the Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be
privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the
COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not
notarized.
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72. SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON VS. VICENTE
CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND VIOLETA
C. BINADAS,

FACTS: Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed
that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were
married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented
a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church.
Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law
to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim
to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded
as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that
said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the
requirement of authentication. In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate
heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage
certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. In their Comment,
respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and the fact that marriages
are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document.
Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to
prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations
therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry arguing that
it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact
of marriage.

RULING: Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom
its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her
mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its
execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it
is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit.

Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that:

1) is more than 30 years old;
2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.

The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old.
On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration. The marriage contract however does not
meet the second requirement. Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come
from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is
proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to
render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally
be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.
82
73. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, LEONARDO
QUISUMBIN AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION.

DOCTRINE: Statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein.

FACTS: On 27 January 1999, the Court granted a petition and orders the public respondent are set
aside. The parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the
terms and conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors orders of
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement
fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the
legal personality of the Meralco retirement fund. It was noted that the respondent labor union,
MERALCO Employees and Workers Association’s request for increases in benefits including salaries
and wages were based on the Asia Capital report.

ISSUE: Whether information published in the Asia report can be relied and can be received as
evidence.

HELD: No. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides: "Commercial lists and the like. -
Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth
of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." Under the afore-quoted rule,
statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that compilation is published
for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere
newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which
carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally
rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally
regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not
admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in
evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or
projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case
can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain
governmental requirements.

74. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE

DOCTRINE: A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that
an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is
guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the
commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis
for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him.

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FACTS: The accused Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with large scale illegal recruitment by the
complainants in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and
Rosamar del Rosario. Ortiz-Miyake was convicted by the RTC of Paranaque by a complaint by
Elenita Marasigan alone for the charge of estafa. The RTC of Makati convicted Ortiz-Miyake. The
decision therein of the RTC stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as
those in the illegal recruitment cases before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusion
established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction
in the cases before it.

ISSUE: Whether the court adopt the finding of facts of a previous decision of another court.

HELD: No. The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be merely
for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based
on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque where appellant was found guilty
of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario. It is argued that the Makati court could not
validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Paranaque court to show that illegal
recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was
allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan.
Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense
in large scale. He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision
of the Paraaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal
recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that
is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
x x x (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with
due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.x x x

It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following
provision of Rule 130:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation.
Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to
allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. This
right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce
a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony
is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The
previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and
expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the
decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation
84
as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses
made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo
and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and
utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous
decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only
prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the
accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving
the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a
basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him. As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance
on the previous decision of the Paranaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based
on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it.
A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where
what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who
testified therein and upon which the decision is based.

75. HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., ET. AL.

DOCTRINE: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's
right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It
cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution
witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his
fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

FACTS: That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following
manner, to wit: all said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare
parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills
Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed
of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing
that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the
same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION
as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY
LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less.

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution's complaining
witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country
back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial
dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13, 2005, the private
prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he
was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.

ISSUE: Whether oral deposition may be taken outside court for criminal cases.
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HELD: No. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is
Covered under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial
and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the
Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions
as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of

witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the
case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos explicitly states that –

"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery
that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the
testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow
the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring
supplied)

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil
cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a
foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate
of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads
thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than
the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the
motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise: The condition of the private
complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the
86
Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section
15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through
live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the
hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of
deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend
the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution
witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the
witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the
Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that - While we recognize the
prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional
rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a
witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.

76. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE AND ALFREDO
(FREDDIE) NULLA Y IBANEZ

DOCTRINE: The rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness.

FACTS: That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a soil digger (bareta) and with intent
to kill one Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said soildigger (bareta) the said Wilfredo Atendido y
Dohenog, hitting the latter on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which
directly caused his death. During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the
other hand, remained at large; the case against him was archived. Thereafter, trial ensued. The
prosecution’s version was testified to by the victim’s wife and daughter, in succession. On that
fateful day, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session
with Jesus and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredo’s daughter, an adolescent at
the time, was underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of a neighbor, three (3) meters away
from the place where Wilfredo and his companions were ostensibly in merrymaking. Rachel saw her
father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-
shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed
of vision as his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while
Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredo’s chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit
Wilfredo in the head. Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on father.
Thereafter, she saw her mother running out of their house and crying for help. On that same
auspicious date, 29 August 2004, Rowena, Wilfredo’s wife and Rachel’s mother, was inside their
house taking care of their youngest daughter. She heard a commotion coming from the neighboring
house, about eight (8) steps away, so she rushed in that direction. Once outside their house, she
saw Wilfredo prostrate on the ground covered with blood on his face and forehead. Upon reaching
Wilfredo, Rowena saw accused Jesus, standing one meter away from Wilfredo, holding an iron bar.
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Edwin and Alfredo stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt. Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran
away while Edwin went home. Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However,
Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive and was pronounced dead on arrival. Expectedly, the
defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo, proffered an altogether different version of the events. The
two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and
professed to being at the scene of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.
The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that
Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could
barely read, and did not know how to tell time. The Trial Court found hereby accused guilty and the
Court of Appeals did not deviate from the RTC’s ruling and affirmed its finding of guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Lower Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony
of Rachel?

HELD: No. The Court held that Rachel’s testimony cannot be taken lightly simply because she was
a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is
no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident
truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed
by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified
to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the
child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of
a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and
tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to
who killed her father.

77. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALVIN ESUGON Y AVILA

DOCTRINE: Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

FACTS: That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines,
the above-named accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force
and violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
cash money amounting to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said
JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly caused
her death. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident,
he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their
house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a
knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there
was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood
come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively
identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his
mother.

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On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise
admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light. Upon being asked
by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he
was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground
floor through the stairway. Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he
and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they have four children:
Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At
about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their
baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m.,
his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later,
he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" He turned on the light and saw that their door was open.
He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned and heard his wife
moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his
brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent
₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the wake and burial.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his wife
since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant. Sharon,
sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they
were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw
that there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed
that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside and went to the
billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita,
sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since there were many
people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he
answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who
stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung
pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and
sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim. PO1 Fabela also testified that after it
was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the hospital then to the crime
scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively identified the
appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was
arrested and brought to the police station. In turn, the appellant denied the accusation.

The RTC pronounced the Accused- appellant guilty of the crime. The appellant argued that the RTC
erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide
based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the
product of his imagination. However, The Court of Appeals sustain such decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year
old?

HELD: Yes, The Court states that the qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate
to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes
clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
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Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion,
ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to
be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The
generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs,
interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are
not grounds for disqualification. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for
disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in
the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-
07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

78. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO, AND
JANUARIO DOSDOS

DOCTRINE: An expert witness is “one who belongs to the profession or calling which the subject
matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he
proposes to express an opinion”.

FACTS: At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then
aboard his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when
he heard a couple of gunshots. He looked around and saw a man running unsteadily towards the
intersection of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmea Boulevard). The man was shouting
Tabang, tabang! (Help! Help!). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red Jiffy make a U-turn near the gate of the
city central school that nearly ran over the man shouting for help. The man turned back and
staggered towards the direction of Bacalso Avenue and Urgello Private Road, but after a few meters
on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.

Meanwhile, the Jiffy followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a tall, thin man alighted. The
man fired several shots at the prostrate figure. He boarded the Jiffy which sped away towards Leon
Kilat Street. Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights on the victim. In the
meantime, PO3 Alexander Rustela was at a vulcanizing shop near the intersection of Bacalso Avenue
and Leon Kilat Street, when he heard gunshots coming from the north. He ran towards where the
gunshots came and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, the Jiffy with three persons on board
sped past him and made an abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat Street. Rustela immediately radioed for
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assistance. Minutes later, patrol car No. 201 with PO2 Herbert Ramos on board arrived. Rustela
boarded the car and they followed the Jiffy, while broadcasting an alarm to police headquarters and
other mobile patrol cars. On nearby Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana and PO2 Romeo Abellana
were cruising aboard patrol car No. 208, when they heard a radio message that the suspects in the
shooting incident were aboard a Jiffy. As they turned left at Leon Kilat Street, they saw the Jiffy
heading towards Carbon Market. They pursued the Jiffy which stopped in front of the Don Bosco
Building near BBRC, when police car No. 205, with PO Eugenio Badrinas and PO2 Gerald Cue aboard,
blocked the Jiffys path. Cue fired a warning shot and three persons alighted.

The driver was appellant Astellero, whom Cue had recognized and seen before at the BBRC.
Abrigana and Cue approached the trio who stood a meter away from the Jiffy. SPO1 Abrigana frisked
Abriol and seized from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with serial number PO8485 with six (6) empty
shells in its cylinder. Under Abriols seat, the police also found a .45 caliber pistol bearing serial
number PGO 13506 with nine (9) live rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber pistol with
serial number 52469 loaded with five (5) unfired bullets. While the patrol cars were chasing the
Jiffy, another police team proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm. This team from
Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the victim to the Cebu City Medical Center,
where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator
of Police Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from the victim’s
body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain, and submitted them to the Region 7
PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics testing. Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime
Laboratory autopsied the victim’s body. He found that the cause of the victim’s death was
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds to the
trunk and head. Dr. Diola recovered a .38 caliber slug from the corpse, which he later submitted for
ballistics examination.

SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported the following:
1. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-1 to JA-3 possesses similar individual characteristics markings
with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 with SN: PGO13506;
2. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-4 and E-69-6 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: 52469;
3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked JA-5 possesses similar individual characteristics markings with
test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: PGO13506;
4. Fired cartridge cases marked E-45-1 to E-45-6 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;
5. Fired bullets marked as JA-6 and LD possesses similar individual characteristic markings with the
test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445.

The following day, appellants underwent a paraffin test. The hands of appellants were found positive
for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test on the firearms showed that the three handguns were
also positive. Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP Region 7 Crime
Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms had been fired, and that appellants had fired
the guns within a period of seventy-two (72) hours prior to the examination. The widow and relatives
of the victim testified on the possible motive behind the killing. They claimed the victim, a confessed
drug user, may have been rubbed out on the orders of Navales for failure to remit P31,000 as
proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. After failing to deliver the drug money to Navales, for
whom he was repeatedly pushing drugs, the victim went into hiding, but later returned to Cebu City
because he missed his family.

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Appellants deny the accusations. Appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser,
the prosecutions ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics
instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with
the required references concerning ballistics, particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities.
(3) He could not scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet. Since P/Inspector Caser lacked
adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and
cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable.
Appellants also assail Casers failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not P/Inspector Lemuel Caser can qualify as an expert witness?

HELD: Yes, an expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject
matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he
proposes to express an opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the
following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with
the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is
based.

The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms. Much
stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied
(with) Casers examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope. Casers conclusion
based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired
cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene
of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his victim, he releases a
chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints
on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These marking
might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are as infallible
for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger.

P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the

Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness
in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness
need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his
findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence
bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar
characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

79. BAUTISTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The case stems from a Deed of Absolute sale over a parcel of land by the deceased owner
to his niece. A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale was filed, alleging that the
signatures therein were forged. The Petitioner presented expert witnesses in support of his claim -
(1) Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service (2) Chief of the Fingerprint Division of
the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service

ISSUE: Is the testimony of the expert witnesses conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly
executed and notarized deed of absolute sale?
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RULING: In another case, examination of questioned handwriting, even with the aid of experts
and science, is, at best, inconclusive. No evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence
indicative of vitiated consent was presented other than the respondent’s self-serving allegations.
The Deed of Absolute Sale is valid.

80. AVELINO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Renato Sosas, an employee of Bobby Avelino overheard the group composed of Toto Mata,
Nato, Domeng Bakukang, Bobot Tuwad, Boy Muslim, Angkol, Charlie, Sonny Muslim and Mon and
Bobby Avelino where said Avelino uttered "Papatayin is Chairman", Bobot Tuwad asked "Sino pong
chairman?", Avelino responded "Sino pa, Ninong Chairman Gener". Alfredo Manalansang, while on
his way to Tondo in a tricycle, gave way to a jeep owned by the barangay driven by Generoso
Hispano (the victim). A man emerged and blocked the jeep. Manalansang heard gunshots and saw
Hispano's lifeless body and saw 3 men who drove away using the same jeep. The jeep, on its way
towards Divisoria, was blocked by a white car which prompted the companion of appellant to shout
"tabi-tabi". Mary Ann Canada saw appellant, wearing a green hacket and a bonnet, she readily
recognized the appellant as she was familiar with the face of teh appellant having seen him driving
the jeep of the Hispano several times before. The jeep was reovered in front of a house in binondo
manila with gun shells scattered on the floor. RTC: Avelino - Guilty, murder qualified by treachery.
Farouk Musa, Benjamin Elbona, Renato Menses - Acquitted failure to prove beyond reasonable
doubt. Avelino raised in his appeal the fact of inconsistency between the statements of Manlangsang
and the findings of the Medio-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman
and the CA not giving credence to the latter.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in not appreciating the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI?

RULING: No. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that
requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the
petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial. Slight
inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value.
It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very
material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the
testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies
therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the
integrity of a prosecution witness. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman
by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Canada, must stand.

81. PEOPLE VS. DURANAN

FACTS: The accused allegedly raped AAA (25 years old) on two occasions, taking advantage of her
feeblemindedness. BBB, AAA's mother, took her for examination in Camp Crame headed by Dr.
Rosalina Cosidon. The accused raises the defense of alibi that the victim is not competent to testify
in court due to her mental deficiency

ISSUE: Was the psychological evalutation of an expert witness required in this case?

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RULING: No, the mother's testimony was enough through a series of questions propounded to her.
The mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her mother, the trial courts
observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior and her intelligence. Although the
complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what the accused had done
to her and to answer the quetions of both the prosecutor and defense counsel.

82. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RAFAEL DIOPITA Y GUZMAN

DOCTRINE: The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Indeed, religiosity is not always an
emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob
and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on
the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any
peradventure of doubt.

FACTS: Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, on her way home from work, a man appeared
from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would
die.[2] The man then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the
plants were a meter high and far apart. Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned
out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he proceeded to divest her of her
belongings. Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge
of Dominga. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic calls
for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. He then warned Dominga not
to tell anyone and that should he hear that she told anybody about the incident he would shoot her
to death. Then he dressed up and left, walking casually to the opposite direction of the subdivision
before disappearing in the darkness. Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on her clothes and
walked away in the direction of her house. Finding it locked, she asked help from her neighbors
who called the police.

Thereafter, Dominga was brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen
Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-
Vergara at the Davao Medical Center who found her "positive for spermatocytes." Dominga gave a
description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. Acting on that information, PO3 dela Cruz
went to the scene of the crime to investigate and there he recovered a colored white/yellow, size
ten (10) slipper. Since the victim earlier disclosed that the suspect headed north after committing
the crime, he proceeded to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses about fifteen (15)
to fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team was called and they rounded
up all the residents therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were
invited to the police station for questioning, including the accused.

The police invited Dominga to identify the suspect at the police station. Thereat, Dominga saw the
four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at accused-appellant. The police then had him
try on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him. Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were
released. The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between
8:30 to 12:00 oclock in the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow
Jehovahs Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an
informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan. Accused-appellant also claimed that

94
during those hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his
alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s defense of good moral character as a ministerial servant of
their faith make him innocent

HELD: No. We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime
charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no
guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is
not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the
impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than
sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.
Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court to
give credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs
Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at
the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once more, and with
approval, the pertinent portion of the trial court’s ruling on this point.

x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which the
witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the
respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best,
self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted
and fabricated (underscoring supplied). x x x

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently
performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not
reflected in the records.[25] Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest
respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect
the result of the case.[26] There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.

83. FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY VS. ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, A.K.A. ROBERT MAR
G. CHAN

DOCTRINE: Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden;
and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply
the production burden or the burden of evidence.10 In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the
truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case
at which the issue arises.11 In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning
or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking,
burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in
its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.

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FACTS: Civil Case was filed by petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) in the RTC,3 to recover
from Chan the principal sum of ₱770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount
fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s Current Account No. 5012-00340-3 with the use of Far East
Card No. 05-01120-5-0. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of
May 5, 1992, Chan had used Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 to withdraw funds totalling
₱967,000.00 from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila. FEBTC
added that at the time of the ATM withdrawal transactions, there was an error in its computer
system known as "system bug" whose nature had allowed Chan to successfully withdraw funds in
excess of his current credit balance of ₱198,511.70; and that Chan had taken advantage of the
system bug to do the withdrawal transactions. n his part, Chan denied liability. Although admitting
his physical possession of Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 on May 4 and May 5, 1992, he denied
making the ATM withdrawals totalling ₱967,000.00, and instead insisted that he had been actually
home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible "inside job" as the cause of the
supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTC’s had
admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as
information available to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human
being like him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. He contested
the debiting of his account, stating that the debiting had affected his business and had caused him
to suffer great humiliation after the dishonor of his sufficiently-funded checks by FEBTC.

The records show that FEBTC discovered the system bug only after its routine reconciliation of the
ATM-MEGALINK transactions on May 7, 1992; that it immediately adopted remedial and corrective
measures to protect its interest in order to avoid incurring further damage as well as to prevent a
recurrence of the incident; that one of the measures it adopted pursuant to its ATM Service
Agreement with Chan was to program its computer system to repossess his ATM card; that his ATM
card was repossessed at the Ermita Branch of FEBTC when he again attempted to withdraw at the
ATM facility there; that the ATM facility retained his ATM card until its recovery by the bank; and
that FEBTC conducted an in-depth investigation and a time-and-motion study of the withdrawals in
question.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan can be held liable.

HELD: No. Although there was no question that Chan had the physical possession of Far East Card
No. 05-01120-5-0 at the time of the withdrawals, the exclusive possession of the card alone did not
suffice to preponderantly establish that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he had caused
the withdrawals to be made. In his answer, he denied using the card to withdraw funds from his
account on the dates in question, and averred that the withdrawals had been an "inside job." His
denial effectively traversed FEBTC’s claim of his direct and personal liability for the withdrawals, that
it would lose the case unless it competently and sufficiently established that he had personally made
the withdrawals himself, or that he had caused the withdrawals. In other words, it carried the
burden of proof.

Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the
risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty
of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production
burden or the burden of evidence. In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given
proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the
issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden
of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first
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concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.The party who
alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not
evidence of it.13 Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. In civil cases, the
burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This
is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting
the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden
of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant
denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on
the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative
defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. Being the plaintiff, FEBTC
must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its
burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used
to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another
person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds
supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account. We remind that as a banking institution,
FEBTC had the duty and responsibility to ensure the safety of the funds it held in trust for its
depositors. It could not avoid the duty or evade the responsibility because it alone should bear the
price for the fraud resulting from the system bug on account of its exclusive control of its computer
system.

84. BAAN RURAL BANK INC. VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MR. AND MRS. RAMON
TARNATE

DOCTRINE: When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an
obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.

Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.[7]

FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots. On March 21, 1976,
the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein petitioner]. On June 11, 1976,
with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon
Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and
the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public
auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the
Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The
certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the
sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On September
23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption
amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the ground that it had
consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground
that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots. Private respondents
filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They alleged
that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon
them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they
offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the
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2-year redemption period. The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private
respondents had no right to redeem the lots because they were not the real parties in interest; that
at the time they offered to redeem on September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as
more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979;
that there was no need of personal notice to them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the
posting of notice of sale at three public places of the municipality where the properties are located
was required.

ISSUE: What was the period of redemption: two years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the
contract, or one year as fixed by law?

HELD: When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its
contents.[5] For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the
certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period
especially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the
part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.[6] By
its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years
within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from
asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already
lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another
to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc.,[8] where the court held that the one year period of redemption provided in
Act No. 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it bears
noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption period. Thus, the
concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into conventional redemption. This
is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the sheriff unilaterally and
arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in the Certificate of Sale. The parties
were not even privy to the extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the
bank can not after the lapse of two years insist that the redemption period was one year only.

Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a
property. The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the
solicitousness of the law in giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to recover
his lost property. Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence,
meticulousness and mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the Certificate of
Sale it could have easily discovered that the period was extended one year beyond the usual period
for redemption. Banks, being greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise a degree
of diligence in the handling of its affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business firm.

85. ALCARAZ VS. TANGGA-AN

DOCTRINE: The petitioners after recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract of lease on the ground that the

98
respondents lost ownership of the house, having created a conclusive presumption by their own
declaration that the said contract exists.

FACTS: Tangga-an (respondents) leased a residential bldg. to petitioner (Alcaraz) limited to the
use of said house for a monthly rental of 4k starting 1991 for five years. They agreed however, that
the rental did not include the lot on which the rented house was constructed because the same was
owned by the NHA. By 1994 petitioners were in arrears in the amount of 48k. Despite demand by
the respondents to vacate and pay petitioner refused to comply. Respondents were thereafter
compelled to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners. The petitioners on the other
hand answered that the ownership of the lot was transferred from the NHA to Virgilio and that
this change in ownership resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between them and
respondents, freeing them from the obligation to pay rent. The MTC ruled that the petitioners were
liable for the payment of rent and ordered them to vacate. The RTC upheld the municipal trial courts
decision in ordering the ejectment of the petitioner spouses from the house they were renting for
lack of evidence showing that the lease was modified. The CA affirmed lower court decision
reasoning that the claim of ownership is not a ground to suspend the ejectment proceeding. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners able to substantiate their claim that the contract was
rescinded.

HELD: No, they were not able to prove their claim. After examining the records, the Court found
out that all the petitioner spouses presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the certificate
of title over the lot. No other document was ever shown evidencing cession of the subject house in
Virgilio’s favor. Therefore Virgilio’s title could not be used to prove ownership over the house built
on said lot as it carried no reference at all to the house. A building by itself is a real or immovable
property distinct from the land on which it is constructed and therefore can be a separate subject
of contracts. Furthermore, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of Virginia, they were
the rightful owners of the subject house. They presented a tax declaration in the name of their
trustees, co-respondent Hermes Tangga-an and his wife, which tax declaration sufficiently
evidences their co-ownership and acquisition of title following the death of the decedent
Virginia. Thus, the petitioners are not excused from paying rent. The ruling of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.

86. UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO VS. BSP

DOCTRINE: Courts have created a presumption that corporate acts are valid if on their face, the
acts were within the corporation’s powers or purposes and that contracts entered into by
corporations in the exercise of their incidental powers are not ultra vires. However, this should not
be interpreted to mean that such presumption applies to all cases, even when the act in question is
on its face beyond the corporation's power to do or when the evidence contradicts the presumption.

FACTS: Guillermo Torres (G) who chaired the board of Trustees of University of Mindanao (UM)
and previously operated a thrift bank First Iligan Savings & Loan Associations (FISLAI) requested
and was granted by BSP an emergency credit of 1.9M for FISLAI. As mortgage for said loan UM
through its vice president for finance Saturnino petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate mortgage
(REM) over UM’s property in Cagayan de Oro in favor of Banko Sentral (BSP). BSP extended to
FISLAI another loan in the amount of Php600k over which a REM was executed over UMs properties
in Iligan City. Thereafter FISLAI became subject of a merger and became Mindanao Savings and
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Loan Association (MSLAI). G died. Thereafter BSP sent a demand letter for payment of the loan.
UM denied receiving any loan and thereafter filed two complaints for nullification and cancellation
of mortgage, one with RTC Cagayan de Oro and the other with RTC Iligan City. The RTC of CDO
decided in favor of UM declaring the REM involving properties in CDO be cancelled reasoning that
there was no board resolution giving Saturnino authority to execute the mortgage on behalf of UM
and upon Aurora de Leon’s testimony that there was no board resolution and that she signed the
certificate only upon G’s orders. The RTC of iligan City also rendered a similar decision to which BSP
appealed. The CA reversed the decision of the two trial courts and upheld the right to foreclose of
BSP reasoning that there is a presumption of regularity in the decisions of corporations absent any
sign of fraud. That this presumption is proved by the certificate executed by aurora de leon as
secretary, which had clothed saturnino with apparent authority to execute the mortgage and that
BSP relied in good faith on the said certificate. UM therefore is estopped from denying saturnino’s
authority.

ISSUE: Was the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra vires.

HELD: Yes, it was ultra vires because a corporation may exercise only powers given by law and as
provided in its charter. Securing loans from third persons is not among the purposes for which
petitioner UM was established. As an educational institution, it is limited to developing human capital
through formal instruction. It is not a corporation engaged in the business of securing loans of
others The Court ruled that The RTC decision of November 23, 2001 and December 7, 2001 are
reinstated.

87. ROSAROSO VS. SORIA

DOCTRINE: Self-serving testimony, such as that of Lourdes, to which the Appellate Court based
its decision, is not enough to overthrow a disputable presumption. What is needed is clear and
convincing evidence as required by law to despute said presumption. As such the presumption that
there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.

FACTS: Spouses Luis rosaroso and Honorata duazo acquired several real properties in Cebu
including the subject properties. They had 9 children who later on became the parties to this case
over the parcels of land left by Luis when he died. A complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents was filed by Luis (petitioner) against her daughter Lucila and Meridian Realty Corp
(respondents) because of the Lucila’s fraudulent execution of an SPA and subsequent selling of the
subject properties to Meridian notwithstanding the fact that Luis had already sold the same to
Antonio, Angelica and Cleofe (Lucia’s siblings). The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners sustaining the
validity of the first sale and declaring that the SPA is null and void and ordering respondents to pay
damages while dismissing the crossclaim by meridian. The CA however decided that the first sale
to petitioners was void for failure of petitioners to prove that there was consideration for the sale
of the land. The CA relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay Luis and with
respect to the second sale it was declared valid because the document was notarized and as such
enjoyed the presumption of regularity. Petitioner argues that the second deed of sale was null and
void because Luis could not have validly transferred the ownership of the subject properties to
Meridian, he being no longer the owner after selling them to his children. No less than Atty. William
Boco, the lawyer who notarized the first deed of sale, appeared and testified in court that the said
deed was the one he notarized and that Luis and his second wife, Lourdes, signed the same before
him. He also identified the signatures of the subscribing witnesses.24 Thus, they invoke the finding
of the RTC. Petitioners also assert that Meridian was a buyer in bad faith because when its
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representative visited the site, she did not make the necessary inquiries. The fact that there were
already houses on the said lots should have put Meridian on its guard and, for said reason, should
have made inquiries as to who owned those houses and what their rights were over the same.

ISSUE: Which of the two deed of sale is valid.

HELD: The first Deed of Sale was valid. In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said
presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they
failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural
law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules
of Court. The decision of RTC Cebu City is reinstated.

88. HEIRS OF TRAZONA VS. HEIRS OF CANADA

DOCTRINE: It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their
due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant.

FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Cipriano), who owned an untitled parcel of land
located in Minglanilla, Cebu. The land was purchased from the government. Since then, Cipriano
had taken possession of the land, cultivated it and diligently paid taxes thereon. Dionisio bought the
adjacent parcel of land. It was later found that he had encroached on a small portion of Cipriano’s
lot. He was then summoned by Cipriano for a confrontation before the barangay. Dionisio offered
to buy the encroached portion, but Cipriano refused the offer. Later on, Cipriano gave Dionisio
permission to temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands. No action for ejectment
was filed against Dionisio during the lifetime of Cipriano, who eventually died. The latter’s son
Hermogenes, one of the petitioners herein who had cultivated the lot since. Dionisio also eventually
died.

The controversy arose when petitioners tried to secure a copy of the tax declaration of the property.
To their surprise, they were informed that the tax declaration had been cancelled and, in lieu
thereof, a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Dionisio. Apparently, respondents had
caused the issuance of the new tax declaration by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly
executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. As conciliation proved to be futile, petitioners filed a
Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of tax
declaration, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and payment of attorney’s fees.
Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery. Respondents, in their
Answer, alleged that the assailed deed was a genuine document. RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners while CA reversed the decision in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners were not able to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed
deed.

RULING: Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their
due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and convincing
evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.
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First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had
been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second, the RTC did not just rely on
expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. Third, the existence of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 11 April 1953 brings into question the regularity of the assailed deed. This deed was
never disputed by respondents at any stage of the proceedings, and was in fact admitted by them
in their Comments. Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since the
time he acquired it from the government, and even after its purported sale to Dionisio, until his
death.

Petitioners continued paying the taxes thereon even after Cipriano had died. Respondents started
paying taxes on the property only after Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued in Dionisio’s name in
1997. It would be absurd for petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.

89. UY VS. LACSAMANA

DOCTRINE: There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held
that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of
marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then
became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally
married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.

FACTS: Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose
Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband
of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married
in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone
in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of their marital property
regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Rosca
denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using
her paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their
marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because
of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure
a marriage contract. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming
that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which
stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject property. Uy died and is two daughters, Lydia Uy
Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Rosca and
respondent Jose Lacsamana also died. Meanwhile Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon
Buena (Buena). Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as
respondent in this case. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

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RULING: Yes. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established
in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held that
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well
as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible
to prove the fact of marriage.

Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from
his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage
allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant
evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted
showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant
Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage
was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the
onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy
to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy
therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally
failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their
property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple
living together were not incapacitated from getting married.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless
there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able
to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that
any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house
and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even
without Uy's consent.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and
Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

90. DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this,
case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule,
it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The

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effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

FACTS: An Information for estafa was filed by Leticia S. Arcilla (Leticia) against Dolores Diaz
(Dolores) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds
from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on consignment basis
from respondent. Leticia alleged that she is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling
goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter
shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted.
She averred that she entrusted merchandise worth P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter. However, petitioner was only able to remit the amount
of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored respondent's demands
to remit the proceeds or return the goods. In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous
business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used
to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from respondent on installment basis and
that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs
and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long
been settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from
respondent on February 20, 1996. RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her
civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of P32,000.00. CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It
ruled that respondent was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction with
petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth
P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which
having been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt. To this, the CA rejected petitioner's
attempt to discredit the said receipt which she denied executing on the ground that she was only
made to sign blank documents, finding that even if petitioner was indeed made to sign such blank
documents, such was merely a safety precaution employed by respondent in the event the former
reneges on her obligation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be held civilly liable.

RULING: Yes. At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of the credible evidence," is required.
Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts established by
the evidence so warrant, as in this case.

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt
in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying
her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that "[h]e who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence."

On the contrary, espondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the
transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth
P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This was
established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996,
which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from
respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return
the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.

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In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates
that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself
of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally
presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting
party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome
the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case,
petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's
possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same
has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or
more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly
preponderates in respondent's favor.

91. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN
MIGUEL

DOCTRINE: The non-presentation of victim on the witness stand cannot be considered as

suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal
of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

FACTS: Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, among others, were charged with rape in an
amended information. The facts indicated that the accused broke into the house of the victim
(Rowena), poked a knife at its inhabitants (Nimfa), and committed the act. Before they left, they
warned the sisters not to report the incident or else, they will kill them. Despite the threats, the
inhabitants reported the incident to the police. However, based on the police blotter, it was only
Padrigone who raped Rowena. The medical examination reported that Rowena was suffering from
Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition, that the mental disorder was not hereditary because before
the incident took place, she did not exhibit any unusual behavior. It concluded that the mental
illness was strongly related to a traumatic experience. The trial court held Padrigone guilty of the
crime of rape. Padrigone appealed, contending that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the witness (Nimfa), and
that the witness’ reaction after the rape of her sister was unnatural, especially since she slept
thereafter and even reported for work the following day. Also, throughout the trial, it was Nimfa
who stood at the witness stand, and not Rowena.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was suppression of evidence in this case, considering that the victim
(Rowena) did not take the witness stand.

HELD: No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as
suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal
of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in
this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did
not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second,
Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot
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stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third,
in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation
committed on her sister. Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in convicting him on the
basis of Rowena’s statement as recorded in the police blotter. His conviction was based on the trial
court’s findings of facts and assessment of the witness’s credibility. Well-settled is the rule that the
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath, all of which are
useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings
are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which
the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the results of the case. Besides, in rape cases where the offended parties
are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, we have consistently held that
the victims version of what transpired deserves credence, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court
trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, exposed
them to. This is not to say that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize
that skepticism should be kept under control. Nonetheless, no young and decent Filipina would
publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would
be instinctive on her part to protect her honor and obtain justice for the wicked acts committed
upon her. Not to be overlooked is the complainant’s willingness to face police investigators and to
submit to a physical examination which are eloquent and sufficient affirmations of the truth of her
charge.

92. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which
imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very
nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to
produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his
prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a party
having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to
prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.

FACTS: Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered his property for sale to private
respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage
indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property. Pending
negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP, went to the
METROBANK to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK
obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00. The deed of sale
and the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually
executed and signed. Twelve days later, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK and paid P116,416.71,
for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This notwithstanding,
petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite
repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific
performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia
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denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property.
Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage upon the advise of Mr.
Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent GTP, and by the fact that there
are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property. RTC ruled in
favor of GTP. CA reversed the decision of RTC. In a motion for reconsideration filed before CA,
Metrobank failed to bring before the court the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia
secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released. METROBANK's counsel did not appear;
only the lawyers of respondent GTP and Mr. Chia appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel
to file a memorandum in lieu of oral arguments in support of its motion for reconsideration, to which
a reply memorandum from Metrobank was filed. Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard
look at the evidence on hand and seriously considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid
debt secured by the subject property. It ruled that the debts and loans of Chia contracted with
METROBANk could not be adjudged as part of the mortage debt. It held that, "The stipulation in
subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors' debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the
same security became inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee the mortgaged property with
the knowledge of the mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4, 1980, it was obvious that whatever
additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same was not chargeable to and collectible from
plaintiff-appellee. It is then decisively clear that Metrobank is without any valid cause or ground not
to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question, despite full payment of the mortgage debt assumed
by appellee."

ISSUE: Whether or not METROBANK's failure to bring before CA the current statement evidencing
the alleged "other unliquidated past due loans" is tantamout to suppression of evidence.

HELD: Yes. Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of
Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at
the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, lost for petitioner METROBANK
to defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence
tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to
produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not
founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence,
if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. No rule of law
is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved,
would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.
Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that
the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to
do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the
inferences afforded. The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own
control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable
construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as
claimed by the opposing party. Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence
only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain
since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not
avail.

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93. FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND
MAUREEN A. BIEN VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONERS

DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail
in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.

FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of
Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief,
appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT)
Health Program (TNT Program). It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and
recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for an amount
not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit
may be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently
disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines
intended for the indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy,
subject to reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official receipts and other
documents. In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote
petitioner Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter to purchase needed
medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy
which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the DOH. Several years after the enforcement of the
MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of
medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. Petitioner Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded
Dr. Alquizalas, created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. The fact-finding
committee created by Delos Santos affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable” irregularities attendant
to the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an
“unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds”; (b) the VSMMC management
was completely “blinded” as its participation involved merely “a routinary ministerial duty” in issuing
the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery receipts that appeared on
their faces to be regular and complete; and (c) the detection of the falsification and forgeries “could
not be attained even in the exercise of the highest degree or form of diligence” as the VSMMC
personnel were not handwriting experts.

CoA's review however found several irregularities, including fictitious patients and falsified
prescriptions. Also, it alleged that the prescriptions allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy and
already paid by VSMMC from the PDFA were falsified. Examination of the records and interviews
with the personnel involved showed that the purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program
were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for the mere
preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified. Subsequently, the Special Audit
Team disallowed a sum of money for the payment of drugs and medicines with falsified prescription
and documents, and held Delos Santos, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable
therefor. Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals before the CoA which were denied,
maintaining their solidary liability. By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC
was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke
good faith in the performance of their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed
Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were
attended by malice or bad faith.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of VSMMC may be held solidarily liable, on the ground that
VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds, and thus, was in good faith.

HELD: No. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail
in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. SC found that the petitioners herein have
equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and
regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor
the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the
patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been
an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and
the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing
funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the
procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that
it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the
admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries, be
justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the hospital.”
In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the TNT Office
were already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the
same remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she
was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC, she was informed of the irregularities.
Hence, having known this significant information, she should have probed into the matter further,
and, likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos
contented herself with giving oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of
Clinics not to leave pre-signed prescriptions pads. The falsification and forgeries continued, and it
was only a year after that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities.
By then, too much damage had already been done. All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as
detailed in the assailed CoA issuances reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully
discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the
irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 10473
and 10574 of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on
Settlement of Accounts, as prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly,
the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public
cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected and even
rendered illusory.

94. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HADJI SOCOR CANDIDIA

DOCTRINE: Presumptions; Official Duty; In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-
motive on the part of the police officers;

SAME; SAME; SAME; Minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification
of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a
coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld.

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FACTS: While performing her duty as a female frisker at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I,
Marilyn Trayvilla, a Non-Uniformed Personnel of PNP, frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at
the departure area and noticed something unusual and thick in the area of her buttocks. Upon
inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin but unconvinced with Cadidia’s
explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani Bagsican brought the accused to the
comfort room, asked Candidia to remove her underwear and found two sachets of shabu. Cadidia
denied that the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified
person to bring the same. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3
Appang. SPO3 Appang turned the items over to the Intelligence and Investigation Office of the 2nd
Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), which was then turned over to SPO4 Villaceran of NAIA-
DITG. SP03 Appang placed his initials on the confiscated items at the PDEA Office located at the
NAIA. The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the NAIA-DITG to Forensic Chemist
Reyes of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. In open court, Trayvilla
identified the two sachets containing shabu previously marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3." She also
identified the signature placed by her co-employee, Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as
the picture of the sanitary napkin used by the accused to conceal the bags of shabu. An Information
was filed against Candidia for violation of the Anti-Dangerous Drugs Act where the testimony of
Trayvilla was corroborated by Bagsican & Appang. The RTC found Canidia guilty of the offense
charged. At the CA, on appeal, respondent Candidia pointed to an inconsistency in the testimony of
the witnesses as to who among them instructed the accused-appellant to bring out the contents of
her underwear. Another contradiction pressed on by the defense was the recollection of Bagsican
that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for
safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out
of the comfort room, they immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-
appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the conflicting testimonies given by the witnesses should not be given credit and
should result in the acquittal of the accused

RULING: No, the testimonies of the witnesses should be given credit and should result in the
conviction of the accused.

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of
the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Even
assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, minor inconsistencies do not
negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As
long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility
would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another
on material details surrounding the commission of the crime.

In the case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the
crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled
the accused. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in
her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted
Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the
accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when they
found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused
on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they
harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot
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prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on
circumstances surrounding the apprehension.

95. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JESUS EDUALINO

DOCTRINE: Presumptions; A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with
human nature and the course of things.

FACTS: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape in an information filed by complainant AAA.
The complainant’s version of fact states that she was invited to drink one bottle of beer by then a
drunk Edualino. When she was semi-conscious, she was dragged in a place where the rape was
consummated. The accused arguments rely on alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1) that there
was foreplay and orgasm that occurred in the alleged consummation and that according to the
defense bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition of a consensual intercourse 2) that
the character of the complainant is of ill-refute on the basis that no responsible and decent pregnant
married woman, would be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a
decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer 3) that the complainant merely concocted
the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs
and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she previously tried to seduce
accused-appellant while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.

ISSUE: Whether the constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been

overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: Yes, the constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome
by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that the crime committed by accused-
appellant is rape. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim
provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature
and the course of things. On whether the acts of accused-appellant constitute rape, the victim’s
testimony was sufficiently clear to show that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and
with force and intimidation. The testimony of the victim is supported by the findings in the medical
certificate which shows that the injuries suffered by the victim are consistent with the charges of
rape. On accused-appellant's contention that the presence of force and intimidation was not proven,
the Court has consistently ruled that force and intimidation should be viewed in the light of the
victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense. Lastly, Court cannot
believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal
addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The SC ruled that it failed to understand
how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.

96. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE

DOCTRINE: Presentation of Evidence; Order of presentation of evidence; the cross-examination of

a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The trial court is not
bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is
not cross-examined by the other party.

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FACTS: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own 13-year-
old daughter, and was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. The trial court gave
credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the young
complainant. In the proceeding for automatic review, one of the errors assigned by the accused is
that the RTC gravely erred in not giving credence of his defense of alibi and denial when he was
adjudged guilty even though the prosecution did not cross examine him and did not allow him to
present any rebuttal evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the
prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and allow him to present any rebuttal evidence

RULING: No, testimony of appellant cannot acquire added strength merely because the prosecution
did not cross-examine him. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against
whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the
statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies
may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore
adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court
thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on
direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party. The evidently candid
and straightforward testimony of the victim should be more than enough to rebut the claim of
innocence made by appellant.

97. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PEREZ

DOCTRINE: Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; Leading Questions; General Rule;
Exceptions.—As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions
when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant
lips.

FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez, guilty
of raping Mayia P. Ponseca (Mayia for brevity), and imposing on appellant the death penalty.
Antecedent facts shows that on January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay
Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia was walking along Sulok on her way to her house
in Sitio Camiling when appellant approached her. Appellant introduced himself as Johnny and
immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. Appellant then proceeded to
lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayias panty. He then inserted his penis
inside Mayias vagina. After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away.
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant
points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when
the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia
identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named Johnny and did not give any
description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia
identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done
with the usual police line-up.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the RTC gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the appellant has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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HELD: No. Appellant’s contention is untenable. As a rule, leading questions are not
allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it
is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions
are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was
justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making
the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamo:

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of
a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.

Mayia’s simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her
accusation was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in numerous
cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

98. PEOPLE VS. CASTILLANO, SR.

DOCTRINE: Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be
impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present
testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and
thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a
chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state
the circumstances under which they were made.

If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of
the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the
other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the
right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due
notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible.
This process of cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called
in the practice of the American courts “laying a predicate” for the introduction of contradictory
statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-
examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness; though
undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

It bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses
do not necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and
calibrated in their entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages. And then again,
minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do
not relate to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in
impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors.

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FACTS: Diosdado Volante, a farmer, his wife Luz, and their four children lived in their farmland
located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur. About 200 meters
away from Diosdados farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano, Sr. He tasked his son, Jaime
Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to reside there. Jaime, Sr., his wife
Concepcion, their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other children lived at their family residence in
Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur, approximately three kilometers away from their farmhouse in Sitio
Danawan. Sometime in the early part of June 1996, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun indiscriminately. At
around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Their children were already
fast asleep. Diosdado was tired after a day’s work of spraying chemicals at the rice field. He reclined
on a bamboo bench near the main door of their house. Suddenly, Luz heard voices near their house.
She saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and his two sons, Jaime Jr. and Ronald, on their way to the
house. All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdados house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her
baby daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the rear door. She was about five meters away
from her husband when the Castillanos barged inside their house and ganged up on Diosdado.
Jaime, Jr. and Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took turns in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed
Diosdado on the right side of his breast, right thigh and on the back. He also struck him with a one-
meter long pipe. Not satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. On
December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of murder
qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime
on reasonable doubt. The trial court gave no credence to Ronald’s claim that he acted in self-
defense. Now appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of
Diosdado, was inconsistent with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal
trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of
SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the physical evidence on record. On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the prosecutions
principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination before
the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason
that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the
appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz
with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police
investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies,
as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:

How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be

impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and
if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness
before any question is put to him concerning them.

Issue: WON, the Prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the
ground that the testimony of the witnesses must be impeached because of inconsistencies.

Held: No. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a
witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior
statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the
predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being
cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent
inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made
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This Court held in People v. Escosura: that the statements of a witness prior to her present
testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to
the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said
inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and truthfulness
of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination.

In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any
discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination
and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript
and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present
testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript
and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

99. PEOPLE VS. PLASENCIA

DOCTRINES: The focus of this appeal is clearly one of credibility. The initial assessment on the
testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard
notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one who personally may
have heard the testimony. The reliance on the transcript of stenographic notes should not, for that
reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge. The continuity of the court and the efficacy
of its decision are not affected by the cessation from the service of the judge presiding it or by the
fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague who presided at the trial.

A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded
by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or
at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded; but in such casethe writing or record must be produced and may be inspected
by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it
in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no
recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated
the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.” (Italics supplied.)
Allowing a witness to refer to her notesrests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case,
the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she
merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

FACTS: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery
with homicide in an information, dated 20 December 1984. Antecedent facts shows that at around
ten o'clock in the morning of 29 November 1984, Herminio Mansueto, wearing a blue and white
striped t-shirt, maong pants, Seiko 5 stop watch and a pandan hat, left on his bicycle for Barangay
Patao, Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00 cash which he would use to purchase hogs
from a certain "Ruby." In Patao, Francisca Espina, also known in the locality as Pansing and whose
house was just across the street from the respective residences of the three accused, saw at the
roadside Herminio Mansueto and Roberto Descartin alias "Ruby" engaged in conversation. Pansing
approached them and asked Mansueto if he would be interested in buying two of her pigs for
P1,400.00. Mansueto said "yes" and promised that he would be right back.

Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito Descartin and his brother-
in-law Rene were also seen going to the place. After some time, Pansing noticed Joelito take
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Mansueto's bicycle. Believing that Mansueto was already preparing to leave and in her desire to
catch up with him, Pansing promptly walked towards the piggery which was around 100 meters
away from her house. She could see Mansueto leaning on the pigsty with Ruby on his right side and
Antonio Plasencia alias "Tonying" on his left; behind was Joelito.2 Midway, she was halted on her
tracks; she suddenly saw Antonio stab Mansueto. The latter staggered towards Ruby who himself
then delivered another stab blow. Mansueto fell on his back. Joelito started hitting Mansueto on the
forehead while Rene held Mansueto's legs.3 Except for a coconut tree and some ipil-ipil trees around
the area, nothing obstructed Pansing's line of vision. Pansing rushed back home. The image of
Antonio waving the weapon and the thought that she might herself be killed kept her from revealing
to anyone what she saw.

The following day, in Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, where Mansueto resided, his daughter Rosalinda
reported to Francisca Tayo, the barangay captain, that her father had not returned home. Tayo
proceeded to Putian, which was in Mansueto's itinerary, and then to Ruby's piggery in Patao, where
a youngster, who turned out to be Ruby's son, innocently informed her that Mansueto's bicycle was
taken by Joelito. The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted
the three accused of murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code), instead of
robbery with homicide, explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the information in its generic
sense. Finding conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by both treachery and
abuse of superior strength with the latter, however, being absorbed by the former.

ISSUE: Whether or not, that the testimony of Francisca Espina who at times be seen reading some
notes be not given worth.

HELD: No.The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed.
Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at
the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded ; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party,
who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction
when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (Emphasis supplied.)

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case,
the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she
merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

100. ROSELLA D. CANQUE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SOCOR CONSTR UCTION
CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of
the following conditions: 1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or
unable to testify; 2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; 3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were

116
made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral
or religious; and 5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

FACTS: Rosario Canque is a contractor doing business under the na me RDC Construction. Canque
had contracts with the go vernment and in relation to the projects, she entered into tw o contracts
with Socor Construction Corporation for supplying as well as ap plying certain materials in the
construction sites. When Soc or Construction billed Canque, it amo unted to a total of P299,717.75
which included interest. Canque refused to pay the amount, c laiming that Socor Construction failed
to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in m etric tons of the items an d the
acceptance thereof of the government. This led to a complaint b eing filed with RTC of Cebu for
recovery the amount stated. During trial, Socor Construction pres ented its Vice President, Sofia
Sanchez and its bookkeeper Dolores Aday while Canque’s evi dence consisted only of her own
testimony. The trial court ruled in favor of Socor Construct ion, ordering Canque to pay the amount.
The CA affirmed. Canque contests the ad missibility of the said Book of Collectible Accounts (Exhibit
K). On its part, Socor Construction said that that although the entries cannot be considered an
exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitte d under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Books of Collectible Accounts referred into by the private respondent in
refreshing the memory of the witness is admissible in evidence.

HELD: No. It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another
purpose. Private respondent’s counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of
petitioner’s indebtedness. He said:

Exhibit “K,” your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of
the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of Two hundred ninety
- nin e thousand seven hundred seventeen pesos and seventy - five centavos (P299,717.75) and
reflecting as well the accumulated interest of three percent (3%) monthly compounded such that
as of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by the pl aintiff is Six hundred
sixteen thousand four hundred thirty - five pesos and seventy - two centavos (P616,435.72); This
is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of
Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, i t is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not the
purpose for which it is offered. Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not
itself constitute evidence. As explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: Under the above provision
(Rule 132, s.10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute
evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the
same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified
independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence.

It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly
by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open - court declaration with
written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute,
unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priory laid down. What is more, even where this
requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must
be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence
of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the
admission of such evidence. As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal
knowledge, they could only corro borate Dolores Aday’s testimony that she made the entries as she
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received the bills.

101. YASUO IWASAWA, PETITION ER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA
GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY

DOCTRINE: There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all
public documents. As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it
disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records
custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof
of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain
unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to
the contrary.

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married
before." Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to
the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed.
Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it.
To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that
indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place
on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the d eclaration of his marriage to
private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on
Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines. During trial, aside from
his testimony, petitione r also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the
National Statistics Office (NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove
the fact of marriage between the parties on Nov ember 28, 2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked
as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as E xhibits "C" and "C - 1" to prove
the fact of the latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the
office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove t hat private respondent
in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June
20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.

The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admi tted the
authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre - trial. RTC rendered
the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s
prior existing valid marriage to another man. It he ld that while petitioner offered the certificate of
marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage.
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The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of
privat e respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger
to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death
certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO cer tification is likewise
unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authen ticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded
evidentiary weight.

RULING: Yes. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all
public documents. As provided in the Civil Code:

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authentici ty and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated the rein. And in
the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent
nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. As correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the documentary exhibits taken together concre tely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The marriage of
petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and
VOID.

102. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. VS. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (NOW CHARTIS
PHILIPPINE S INSURANCE, INC.

DOCTRINE: Remedial Law; Evidence; Public Documents; Private Documents; The nature of
documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence
in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are
self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in
court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.—The nature of documents as either public or private
determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as
enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require
no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement
is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed
under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules: SEC. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
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proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only
be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity
of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c)
when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the
document is not being offered as genuine.

FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (Universal Motors) 219
packages contai ning 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2 model, without
engine, tires and batteries, on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The
shipment, which had a declared value of US$81,368 or P29,400,000, was insured with P hilam
against all risks under Marine Policy No. 708 - 8006717 - 4. The carrying vessel arrived at the port
of Manila on April 20, 1995, and when the shipment was unloaded by the staff of ATI, it was found
that the package marked as 03 - 245 - 42K/1 was in bad orde r. The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargoes dated April 21, 1995 identified two packages, labeled 03 - 245 - 42K/1 and 03/237/7CK/2,
as being dented and broken. Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount of
P643,963.84 against Westwind, A TI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal
Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated in the sum
of P633,957.15 by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt dated
November 15, 1 995 in favor of Philam. On January 18, 1996, Philam, as subrogee of Universal
Motors, filed a Complaint for damages against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage,
Inc. before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. On September 24, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment
in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and severally, the sum of
P633,957.15 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, P158,989.28 by way of attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation. On appeal, the CA a ffirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. All
the parties moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied in a Resolution dated January
11, 2008. Thus, they each filed a petition for review on certiorari which were consolidated together
by this Court considering that all three petitions assail the same CA decision and resolution and
involve the same parties.

ISSUE: Whether the Marine Certificate No. 708 - 8006717 - 4 and the Subrogation Receipt are
private documents.

HELD: Yes. The nature of docu ments as either public or private determines how the documents
may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, are self - authenticating and require no further authentication in order t
o be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is pro ved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The
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requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
a. when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules;
b. when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically
denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the
document h ave been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708 - 8006717 - 4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their bus iness.
Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains
in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam withou t being
properly authenticated.

103. ALUDOS VS. SUERTE

DOCTRINE: Rule 132, Section 34. Offer of Evidence- the Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the offer must be specified.

FACTS: Deceased Petitioner acquired from the City Government to occupy two stalls as evidenced
by a permit. Petitioner entered into an agreement with Respondent to transfer over the rights of
the two stalls as evidenced by an acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document. Before full
payment of the agreement Petitioner backed out of the agreement and opted to return the money
paid by Respondent. Respondent protested the return of his money and insisted on the continuation
and enforcement of his agreement with Petitioner. When the latter refused, Respondent filed an
action against the other. The RTC ruled against Respondent as the Petitioner was a mere lessee of
the two stalls and has no authority to transfer the lease without the consent of the City Gov’t.
Petitioner appealed the case to the C.A. which ruled that the Motion was denied after finding that
Petitioner’s lawyer misrepresented the governing lease contract between Petitioner and the City
Gov’t. The contract was never offered in evidence before the RTC and could not be considered
pursuant to the ruled of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in not considering the lease contract as evidence.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court. The
Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of the fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the Court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight. What was formally offered was the 1969 permit, which
only stated that the Petitioner was permitted to occupy a stall and nothing else. In other words no
evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all improvements in the
market stalls shall be owned by the City. Gov’t.

104. WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS. FRANCIA ET. AL.

DOCTRINE: Rule 132, Section 34. Offer of Evidence- the Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the offer must be specified.

FACTS: They former failed to collect upon maturity and their investment were rolled over for which
confirmation advices were issued by Petitioner indicating Pearl Bank as the actual borrower of the
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funds invested. Failing again to collect Respondents filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
arising from their investments against Petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner did not object on or
comment to the evidence offered by Respondent and filed a Motion to postpone the hearings 3 days
before the scheduled hearing for presentation of Petitioner which was denied. The RTC considered
Petitioner to have waived its right to present evidence and held that Petitioner was solely liable to
Respondent and dismissed the case against Pearl Bank. Petitioner appealed the case to the C.A. but
was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the C.A. was correct in not admitting the documents attached to Petitioner’s
pleadings.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. It appeared that Petitioner was given ample
opportunity to file its comment and objection to the formal offer of evidence of Respondent but it
chose not to file any. All documents attached by Petitioner to its pleadings before the C.A. cannot
be given weight or evidentiary value for the reason that as correctly observed by the C.A. these
documents were not formally offered as evidence in Court. To consider them now would deny the
other parties the right to examine and rebut them. In accordance with Rule 132, Section 34 of the
Rules of Court.

105. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP. VS. CIR

DOCTRINE: The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by
the court. If a party's offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request
that it be attached to form part of the records of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance
of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded
evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered
against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.

FACTS: Petitioner is the manufacturer and producer of its cigarette brands and prior to 1997 were
subject to ad valorem tax. However on Jan. 1, 1997 R.A. 8240 took effect and caused a shift from
ad valorem tax to specific tax. As a result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were subjected
to specific tax. Petitioner later on filed a claim for tax credit or refund under Sec. 229 of the NIRC
for illegally collected specific taxes. After trial on the merits the Court ruled that it was contrary to
law and that there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund. Petitioner elevated the case
to the CTA but the latter found no cause to reverse the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant or grant the Petitioner’s claim for tax
refund.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The denial of Petitioners claim for tax refund in this case
is based on the ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and amount
thereof. As a result, Petitioner seeks the Court to re-examine the probative value of its evidence
and determine whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid. This
cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law can be raised in a petition under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of the SC. to analyze or weight all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The Court’s jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only the errors of the law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
resolution of the factual issues is the function of the lower court whose findings on these matters
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are received with respect. A question of law which the Court may pass upon must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

106. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELFIN CALISO

FACTS: The accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old
and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent. The records show that AAA died in the
river and that the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to
smothering;

The lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when
she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy. The lone witness narrated that the whole
time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards
her; that she nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar
with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident; that he
interviewed Amegable who identified the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants);
that based on such information, he traced Caliso as AAA’s killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial
admission of the killing of AAA.
The RTC and CA found Caliso guilty of Murder.

ISSUE: Whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA was positive and
reliable.

HELD: No. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to
prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond
reasonable doubt.

Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her
barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming
that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction hangs by a
single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as the perpetrator
of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is
entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted. The constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the
Prosecution.

The decision is REVERSED and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of
murder.

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107. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA

FACTS: AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines to her sick
grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her. Upon
reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store. Upon
arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket. Appellant
then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister, brother-
in-law, nephews and nieces live. Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs
and tied her to a sewing machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced
AAA to inhale, causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as
appellant removed AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Accused countered that he offered to bring AAA to her house but the
latter refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her
mother, who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.
The lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Forcible
Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: Yes. The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created
reasonable doubt. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution. The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received
with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving
undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim
whose charge is not corroborated and who’s conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation. AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight
(8) days – in the same house where appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces
also lived. AAA even called appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members
of the appellant’s family could have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if
the accusations were really true." Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex
slave for eight (8) days in a house where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor
nephews and nieces live.

108. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSENDO DELGADO ALIAS "NONGNONG",

FACTS: The accused, with the use of a deadly bladed weapon, with intent to kill and treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and wound one Santos
Zamora's, who, as a result thereof, sustained wounds on the different parts of his body which
directly caused the death of said Santos Zamora's. The facts to which the trial court gave credence
in its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are based on the narration of the lone eyewitness,
Rogelio Zamora's, supported by the postmortem examination report and the testimonies of
Leonardo de Ballon and Aurora Zamora's. The appellant while admitting the stabbing, however,
claims self-defense. In these errors, the appellant questions the trial court's appreciation of the
testimony of Rogelio Zamora’s as against his own testimony.
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ISSUE: Whether or not lower court erred in giving full credit to the testimony of the lone witness
Rogelio Zamora.

HELD: Yes. A person who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and convincing evidence
the presence of the necessary justifying circumstance for having admitted wounding or killing his
adversary, and he is criminally liable unless he is able to satisfy the Court that he acted in legitimate
self-defense. For there to be legitimate self-defense, there must be three requisites as provided in
paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) unlawful aggression (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. The appellant contends that the victim was the unlawful
aggressor. This contention is negated by the physical evidence. If indeed, the appellant and the
victim were in the positions described by the appellant, it would have been impossible for him to
inflict the back stab wound described in the post-mortem report. In the case at bar, the testimony
of Rogelio Zamoras is not as patently absurd as contended by the appellant. It was natural for
Santos Zamoras, after he had stabbed Clemente, to realize the gravity of his act, sit on the concrete
pavement, place one hand over the other, and press his head (obviously the forehead) on top of
the two hands. The appellant states that it was abnormal for the eyewitness to deduce from the act
that Santos Zamoras was going to sleep. We do not think so. The attribution of sleepiness instead
of remorse, reflection, or fear indicates naivete and guilelessness. The guilt of the accused having
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

109. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. HON.

FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR.

DOCTRINE: In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence"
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts
of an offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23,
1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. Petitioner Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case, a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After
hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge allowing private respondent to post
bail. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it
was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail since there is nothing in the Constitution
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or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings.

HELD: No. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks
of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint
of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September
23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having
been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide
for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive
an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor
the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private
respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

110. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO

DOCTRINE: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

FACTS: Alfonso Fontanilla was charged of murder for allegedly strucking Olias in the head with a
piece of wood called Bellang causing the latter fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him
again in the head with a piece of stone. As a result, the victim died. Fontanilla claimed self-defense
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alleging that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when
Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although
he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him
with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, hadalso kicked him with both his legs; that he
had thus been forced to defendhimself by picking up a stone which he had hit the victim’s head.
The RTC in rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense noted that he did not suffer any injury despite
his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no
medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released
from the hospital; that Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the
police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is self-defense in the instant case.

HELD: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted
inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a
prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the
death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to
the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-
defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings. Fontanilla did not
discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful
aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone,
causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to
the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

111. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA

DOCTRINE: In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the
evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., defined
"preponderance of evidence" in the following manner: "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC against
Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB
alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch
manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks in the total amount of
P10,782,150.00. On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint
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to implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s
alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Manager’s
checks to 34, in the total amount of P11, 937,150.00. The RTC granted this motion. Since
Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an
Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos, he is a reputable
businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one
of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks
that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s
money. The RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint
against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with
Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that there is no evidence to hold that respondent Ramos
acted in complicity with respondent Balcameda.

HELD: No. From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond question
that Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager of PCIB’s Sta. Cruz, Manila
branch, was able to apply for and obtain Manager’s checks drawn against the bank account of one
of PCIB’s clients. The unsettled question is whether Ramos, who received a portion of the money
that Balmaceda took from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of this money to the Bank.
PCIB insists that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda
in the scheme to fraudulently secure Manager’s checks and to misappropriate their proceeds. Since
Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any participation in Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is
an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from any liability. PCIB,
as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos
conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the Bank. On its face, all
that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when he filled up the
application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that
Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to
conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were made
payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank
adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would justify his separate
treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmaceda’s brother-in-law, their relationship is
not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable, absent concrete proof of his actual participation in
the fraudulent scheme. Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on
his own when he applied for the Manager’s checks against the bank account of one of PCIB’s
clients, as well as when he encashed the fraudulently acquired Manager’s checks.

112. DELA LLANA VS. BIONG

FACTS: Dra. Dela Llana was involved in a car accident, wherein she suffered minor wounds. After
two months, she began to feel pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. She was diagnosed a
whiplash injury and underwent an operation on her spine and neck. She demanded from Biong
compensation for her injuries but the latter refused to pay.

On trial, Dra. Dela Llana, a surgeon, presented herself as ordinary witness. No other physician was
presented. She also showed pictures of collusion as well as copy of medical certificate. The RTC
ruled in favor of Dra. Dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of the whiplash injury was the

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accident. CA reversed the RTC ruling for failure to establish a reasonable connection between the
accident and the whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accident is the proximate cause of Dra. Dela Llana's whiplash injury.

HELD: No. Dra. Dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The pictures
only demonstrate the impact of the collusion. The medical certificate cannot be considered because
it was not admitted in evidence. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been submitted cannot
be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. The medical certificate has no
probative value for being hearsay.

The doctor who has personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate was not presented
to testify in court. Dra. Dela Llana's opinion that the driver's negligence caused her whiplash injury
has no probative value because even though she was a physician, she testified as an ordinary
witness, not an expert witness.

114. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES

FACTS: Reyes and Pealoza, employees of LTO-Camiguin, were alleged to be illegally exacted money
from Acero, an applicant for a driver's license. Pealoza submitted a counter affidavit pointing Reyes
as the main culprit. Affidavits of witnesses were also submitted in evidence in support of Pealoza's
claim. Reyes, without receiving copy of those affidavits, submitted its counter affidavit to the
complaint filed by Acero. The Ombudsman, there being substantial evidence, finds Reyes guilty of
grave misconduct and meted a penalty of dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct was sufficiently proven by substantial
evidence.

HELD: No. One of the principles of due process is that the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and disclosed to parties
affected. In the instant case, petitioner rendered its decision on the basis of evidence that were not
disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that
imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also
rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.

115. XAVIER C. RAMOS VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. AND/OR ALFONSO L.
SALCEDO, JR.

DOCTRINE: The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence
is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion."

FACTS: Ramos was a former Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division of
BPI Family. During his tenure, a client named Trezita B. Acosta entered into and obtained several
auto and real estate loans from BPI Family which were duly approved and promptly paid. Acosta
later purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family for the purchase of a Toyota Prado
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vehicle which had remained unpaid. As it turned out, she did not authorize nor personally apply for
the subject loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent. The amount of losses suffered by BPI Family
was divided between Ramos’ benefits, which accrued upon his retirement, and his three (3) other
subordinates. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint
against BPI Family before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Ramos’ complaint, which was later
reversed by the NLRC. In a petition filed before the CA, BPI Family was held concurrently negligent
with Ramos; hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it found the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits to be illegal and
unreasonable.

RULING: In labor disputes, the NLRC’s findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion
when its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence as held in the case of Mercado v.
AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., citing Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co.:

As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is
limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as
an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the
NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence.

The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of
labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence.

The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s
retirement benefits was improper on two (2) grounds:

First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its
imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon
the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos
merely followed standing company practice when he issued the PO and ATD without prior approval
from the bank’s Credit Services Department.

116. JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS S. LUCAS

DOCTRINE: A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading. The requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in
civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.

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FACTS: Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC Branch 72 of
Valenzuela City. His mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao to work in a prominent
nightspot in Manila, where she had an intimate relationship with his alleged father, Jesus S. Lucas.
The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in the petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth, but Elsie
later told petitioner that his father is the respondent.

Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two
(2) years. When their relationship ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer of support and
decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts
to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.The RTC dismissed the case
since the petitioner failed to establish the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defense, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. In a petitioner for
certiorari, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC; hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it essentially ruled that DNA testing can only be ordered
after the petitioner establishes prima facie proof of filiation

RULING: The Court held the petition meritorious. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are
four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. A prima
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. In
some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under the Constitution, must be preceded by
a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

117. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. AMELIO TRIA AND JOHN DOE

DOCTRINE: Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused.

FACTS: Amelio C. Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB, assigned at theMetropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-MWSS). MWSS opened a current account with PNB-
MWSS, which was intended as a depository for a loan from ADB to fund a contract. After sometime,
said account became dormant. PNB-MWSS later received a letter-request from MWSS instructing
the deduction of PhP 5,200,000 (plus charges) from said current account and the issuance of the
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corresponding managers check in the same amount payable to a certain Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes,
who was later found to be fraudulent. After verification processes were conducted, the transaction
was effected. Aside from the missing pertinent documents, it was later realized that MWSS did not
apply for the issuance of the managers check payable to Atty. Reyes. PNB conducted its own
investigation and found Tria liable for qualified theft. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed
the charge of qualified theft against Tria, which was later affirmed by the DOJ Secretary and the
CA; hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that probable cause against Tria and Atty. Reyes was
not established since the employees of PNB made the encashment after their own independent
verification of the subject manager’s check

RULING: The Court held the petition meritorious. It must be emphasized at the outset that what
is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable cause to believe
that he is guilty of the crime charged. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information,
are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. The acts of Tria and the relevant
circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more than sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified
theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft.

118. RUBEN DEL CASTILLO AKA “BOY CASTILLO” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the
same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to immediately disembark
from the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it.

The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in
the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they
will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed
that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits
of the place. They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place
where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a
few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods. In the presence of
the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover.

His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay
tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs
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containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent
plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of
the charge against him in the Information. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but
the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. Petitioner insists that there was no
probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police
officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a
test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to support the search warrant

RULING: Yes, there was probable cause. The SC held that, “This Court finds no merit on the first
argument of petitioner. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the
circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible,
totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb
the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis
means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

119. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA Y CABILLO AND

FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ A.K.A. LANDO CALAGUAS

FACTS: About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house. Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife,
were out of the house at that time. Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices
saying, We will kill her, kill her now and another voice saying, Not yet! Hiding under her blanket,
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AAA later heard someone saying, We only need money, we only need money. Thereafter, AAA
observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as accused Dick Taedo,
Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias Al Camara, and
Fernando Fernandez alias Lando Calaguas. One of the intruders approached her and told her not to
move. Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to
her surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized
as Dick Taedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Taedo, Why Kuya? Taedo replied, Somebody will
die. After a brief commotion, appellant alias Lando Calaguas asked the group saying, What shall we
do now? They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her outside the house.
Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle. The group later
brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita Taedo there. The
group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away. Later, alias Fred returned telling the
group, Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets in his body, and the one left is for this
girl. When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias Lando Calaguas and Fred
boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded towards San Miguel Tarlac.
The RTC found Aacused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder
of Abad. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. Lando and Al, through the
PAO, alleged that the prosecution failed to prove their guil of the murder beyond reasonable doubt,
considering that there are no direct eyewitnesess to the said crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder.

RULING: Yes. The SC held that. “The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness
in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
SCircumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower
court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence. The testimony of AAA had clearly established
the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several
persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and
heard the latter uttering somebody will die;
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad
Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto
Taedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy.
San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
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6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by
Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her
in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): Make a decision
now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl.

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter Usapan
natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way
should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002,
appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred,
Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought
them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia,
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The
autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that
several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that
the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of
cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth
was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.

In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas,
tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and
buried.

120. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO, ELMER
DEOCAMPO AND EDWIN DEOCAMPO

FACTS: Melanio and Lucena Alolod adopted accused Maritess and took her into their home
in Barangay Poblacion, Lebak, Sultan Kudarat. Maritess had two children with her lover,
Efren Deocampo, who was never allowed to set foot on her parent’s house since they loathed
him. In May 1998, the old couple, Melanio and Lucena, suddenly went missing. Neighbors and
relatives testified last seeing the old couple on May 27, 1998. A neighbor, Magdalena Ato, recalled
that the two were in good health. In fact, Melanio even went to market early in the day. At around
8:30 that evening, as he was making his rounds, a security guard at Salaman Institute, Demetrio
Nebit, saw two men standing near the fence that separated the school from the Alolod house. On
seeing Nebit, the two hurried into a nearby toilet but the security guard followed and told them to
come out. Nebit identified one of the two to be Efren Deocampo, a former classmate, and his brother
Edwin. At about 2:00 a.m. on the following day, May 28, Victor Ato, Magdalenas husband, awakened
to strange sounds coming from the Alolod house just five to six meters away. Victor heard a woman
sobbing and what sounded like a pig being butchered. He looked out through the window but,
seeing no one, he just went back to bed. When Victor woke up at 5:30 a.m., he saw Efren at the
kitchen of the Alolod house. Later that day, Magdalena had the chance to ask Maritess about the
sounds coming from their house during the night. Maritess explained that Melanio was ill and she
was having a difficult time giving him medicine. Maritess added that her parents had left for Cotabato
City early that morning.

Meantime, on inspection that morning, the school security guard noticed that the cyclone wire of
the fence where he saw Efren and Edwin standing the night before had been cut. He reported the
incident to the school principal. Annaliza Relles, the grandniece of the Alolods, noticed the absence
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of the old couple when she came over that morning to cook for them. Only Maritess and her two
children were there. Maritess told Annaliza that her parents had left for a vacation. Annaliza tried to
use one of the toilets in the house but it was padlocked. Maritess told her to just use the other
toilet. On May 29 Generita Caspillo, Maritess relative and close friend, stayed at the Alolod residence
to keep them company because according to Maritess, her father suffered a stroke and had to be
brought to Cotabato for medical treatment. While Generita was there, she noticed a pile of red soil
near the well at the garden. On May 30 Annaliza and Generita saw Efrens younger brothers Edwin
and Elmer at the Alolod residence. The next day, during their town fiesta, friends and relatives
came by to visit the old couple but Maritess told them that they had gone to Davao City and would
not return until August 16 or 17.

By June the couple’s grandchildren who would stay at their house for school began arriving. They
observed the frequent presence of the Deocampo brothers in the house. Sometime in August,
Generita and her mother, Lucenas sister, came to pay a visit. They saw Efren wearing Melanios
wristwatch. Maritess insisted that her parents were still in Davao for medical check-up. In August,
Maritess and her children, together with the Deocampo brothers, left the Alolod house to live at
Sitio Gila-gila, Barangay Kuya, South Upi, Maguindanao. When the Alolod spouses did not return to
their home, their relatives started looking for them. They found out that the missing couple did not
go to either Davao or Cotabato or to their relatives in Iloilo. Their clothes and other personal effects
were still in the house. The last entry on the recovered diary of Melanio was on May 27. Suspecting
that something was amiss, the couple’s relatives, Francisco Estaris and Joel Relles, searched the
house for clues. They even dug up elevated and depressed soil formation around the place but for
naught.

Finally, on October 9, 1998 Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco
found the place unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the
house said that it was Maritess and Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco
dug up the suspected spot. There they found the decomposing bodies of Melanio and
Lucena. Based on the post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire; Lucena was stabbed.
RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of Lucena and Melanio, with Efren and Edwin as
principals and Maritess and Elmer as accessories. While the case was on appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the request of Maritess and Elmer to withdraw their appeals, leaving only those of
Efren and Edwin for its consideration. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Efren and Edwin appealed
to this Court. Edwin, however, on a letter to the Office of the Solicitor General dated December 7,
2008, manifested his intention to withdraw his appeal. The Court granted Edwin’s withdrawal,
leaving Efren as the sole accused-appellant in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that accused Efren was
responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence

RULING: No. The SC held that, “The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the
commission of the crime provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

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The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion:
the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. Here, those circumstances abound.

1. Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved
his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that
house.
2. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998.
3. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night
of May 27 or early morning of May 28.
4. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing
on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. They even tried to conceal
themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had been
cut.
5. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed
like the butchering of a pig.
6. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.
7. From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the
old mans watch.
8. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to
Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were of course
buried in the garden.
9. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the
house.
10. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.

The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not
encourage belief. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the
couple’s house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of that
house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not physically impossible for
the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao was
merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.”

121. EDUARDO CELEDONIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain
Adriano Marquez (Marquez) witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De
Guzman (De Guzman) while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one
was left in the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio,
which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident,
De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedomo be investigated for possibly
having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez. Later, a follow-up operation was
conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque) and SPO2 Adrian Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied
by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for the possible
identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a
motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down
Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed
his head. SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still
remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?"
Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw
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some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a
wristwatch, among others. PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter
answered, "Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights.
More items were seized from Celedonio at the police station. RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force upon things. Insisting on his innocence,
Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC erred in convicting him of
the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court's
ruling that the petitioner's guilt was proven based on circumstantial evidence.

RULING: No. The SC held that, “Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the
only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The
lack of direct evidence does not ipso factobar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as
the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant's participation in the crime through credible and
sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the
imputed crime, the latter should be convicted. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when
taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio
was the perpetrator. The CA opined that: xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these
circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by
another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses and ransacking a room in
complainant's house; during the time, no one was inside complainant's house as all of them were
at the wake of private complainant's recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the
items discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the accused's
motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were
identified by the complainant as her stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen
items were found in his possession and claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators
to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused could not explain his possession of the recently
stolen items found in his sole possession. Xxx. We find the conviction of accused-appellant based
on circumstantial evidence factually and legally tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned
circumstances arose have been proved through the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, POi
Rommel Roque and Carmencita de Guzman. The defense does not refute the existence of the
commission of robbery. In fact, Celedonio himself acknowledged that the prosecution's
circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery
had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash
were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods.”

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