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Domicile

Laurel v. Garcia

187 SCRA 797 (1990)

Facts: The Philippine Government owned several properties located in Japan which
properties were part of the Reparations Agreement with Japan. One of these
properties is the Roppongi property which the Philippine Government wanted to
sell or dispose of to non-Filipino citizens and entities. The first bidding resulted in
a failure while the second bidding was restrained by the Court. The Secretary of
Justice asserted that Japanese law should apply in determining who can acquire the
properties from the Government.

Issue: Whether the Roppongi property is governed by Japanese law or Philippine

law?

Held: It is governed by Philippine law.

1. It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should
be the ones to insist that in the Bale of extremely valuable government property,
Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese Iaw-its coverage
and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provision-is not presented to the
Court. It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese Iaw should apply
without stating what that law provides, It is asserted on faith that Japanese law
would alloww the sale

2. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of
law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a
dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take
and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and
effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance are to be
determined ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic
law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

3. In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not
concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
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validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule
of lex situs does not apply.

4. The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring
the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
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PROPERTY

Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez

111 SCRA 704 (1982)

Facts: Jose Ramirez died leaving a will where, among other dispositions, he
granted a usufruct over a real property in favor of an alien, Wanda Wrobleski. This
was opposed on the ground that it violated the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the testamentary disposition in favor of Wanda Wrobleski is valid?

Held: No, the testamentary disposition violates the Constitution. The court a quo
upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables
aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be
able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

San Luis v San Luis

G.R. No. 134029,

Facts: Former Laguna Governor Felicisimo T. San Luis died leaving as heirs the
following:

1) children from first wife Virginia Sulit: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and
Manuel;

2) second wife, Merry Lee Corwin, and son, Tobia (Merry has since obtained a
decree of divorce from a court in Hawaii); and

3) third wife, Felicidad Sagalongos.

December 17,1993 Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo filed motion to dismiss on the ground
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of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. He alleged that Laguna
was Felicisimo's place of residence before his death and that Felicidad had no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Linda
likewise filed a motion to dismiss based on the same grounds. The RTC denied
both motions to dismiss but upon a motion for reconsideration, the RTC dismissed
the petition for letters of administration on the ground that Felicisimo was a
resident of Laguna and that Felicisimo's marriage to Felicidad was bigamous. It
ruled that the divorce obtained by Merry Lee cannot be given effect in the
Philippines.

Respondent Felicidad appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which, in

reversing the RTC decision, held that venue was properly laid in Makati City and
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by the
Hawaii divorce decree. Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the divorce obtained by Merry Lee in Hawaii could be recognized
in our jurisdiction?

Held: Yes.

1. Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal to file the petition for letters of
administration, Personality we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino
who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative

2. The case of Van Dorn u. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner
and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest
in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. As to the effect of
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the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. us to rule in the affirmative.

3. The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition
of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted
as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of
a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

4. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through

judicial precedent.

5. Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

6. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

7. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
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Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

174 SCRA 653 (1989)

G.R. No.80116, June 30, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private

respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany
in 1979. Their relationship became strained and private respondent was able to get
a decree of divorce in 1986 from a German court. On June 27, 1986, private
respondent sued his former wife for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila. The
City Fiscal found probable cause and two complaints for adultery were filed with
the RTC of Manila. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information but this was
denied by the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court

Issue: Whether the divorced husband may file a case for adultery against his
divorced wife?

Held: No

1. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse

2 Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of
adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents, or guardian of the offended
party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned does not apply to adultery and concubinage. In
other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate
the action therefor.

3. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
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4. In the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,

and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to
refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

5. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the

Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.

6. Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no

longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that h was the offended spouse at the time he filed the
suit.

Roehr v. Rodriguez 452 Phil. 608 (2003)

G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, German citizen, married private respondent

Carmen Rodriguez, Filipino citizen, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. On
August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati City. Petitioner sought
to dismiss the petition but this was denied by the trial court. In the meantime,
petitioner was able to obtain a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg- Blankenese on December 16, 1997. The decree included the award of
custody of the children to the petitioner Petitioner then filed a Second Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent. The RTC granted the
Second Motion to Dismiss. Private respondent moved to reconsider, praying that
the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody and the
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distribution of the properties. Petitioner opposed on the ground that there is nothing
to be done anymore as the marriage between petitioner and private respondent had
been dissolved by the decree of divorce. The RTC granted the partial motion for
reconsideration of private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the RTC was correct in reopening the case to litigate the issues of
custody and distribution of assets despite the divorce between the parties?

Held: Yes.

1. In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16,
1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of
parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and
binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the
present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandrs Kristine, to petitioner.

2. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are

recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts
can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

3. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign

judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and,
as such, is subject to proof to the our contrary.

4. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard tothe rights of petitioner to have
parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were
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summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent's participation in the

proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree
itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given
her opinion to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented
by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by
virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived
separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree
did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding
that private respondent is unfit to obtain the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, car, support,
and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance
with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child's welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody

WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Bohanan v. Bohanan

106 Phil. 997 (1960)

Facts: Bohanan was a citizen of the United States and Nevada at the time of his
death. In his will, he distributed majority of his estate to his grandson, to brother,
and to his sister. He gave his two children the paltry sums of P6,000.00 each and
left nothing to their mother, his former wife, whom he had already divorced. The
former wife and her two children opposed the project of partition.

Issue: Is the former wife and her two children entitled to their legitime?

Held: No, they are not entitled to their legitime.

1. The court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada
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and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property
between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can no longer claim any
portion of the estate left by the testator.

2. The old Civil Code, which is npplicable to this case because the testator died in
1944, expressly provides that by the national law of the person whose succession is
in successional rights to personal property are to be governed question. Says the
law on this point:

Nevertheless, successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to

the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the
country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the
same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)

3. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil legal and testamentary Code,
the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of
the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a
testator to dispose of all his property according to his will.