Risk Assessment Survey

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT FOR AWA-SALAWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD
Prepared by
SECON PVT. LTD.

Vadodara - 390 002
ISO 9001: 2008 Phone/ Fax No.:91-265-6630700/6630707
E-mail: secon.baxoda@secon.in
Green Circle Inc.

Integrated HSEQR Consulting Engineers. Scientists & Trainers
MoEF Recognized Environmental Laboratory
(An ISO 9001, 14001 & OHSAS 18001 Certified Company)
TH E GREEN PEOPLE
June 2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
WE EXPPESS OUR SINCERE THANKS TO MANAGEMENT & EMPLOYEES OF

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED, FOR THEIR CO-OPERATION &
UNSTINTED HELP WITHOUT WHICH THE ‘RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT’ COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. THE COURTESY EXTENED TO OUR TEAM IS HIGHLY
APPRECIATED.
For: GREEN CIRCLE, INC.

SECON PRIVATE LIMITED
AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
LEGAL DISCLAIMER & LIABILITY

The consulting services conducted by Green Circle, Inc in association with Secon Private Limited.
Were performed using generally accepted guidelines, standards, and/or practices which the
Company considers reliable. Although the Company performed its consulting services pursuant to
reliable and generally accepted practices in the industry, the Company does not guarantee or
provide any representations or warranties with respect to Client’s use. Interpretation or application
of the findings, conclusion. And/or suggestions of the consulting services provided by the Company.
Moreover, the findings, conclusions, and the suggestions resulting from the consulting service are
based upon certain assumptions, information, documents, and procedures provided by the
Customer. AS SUCH, IN NO EVENT AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHALL THE
COMPANY BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, INDIRECT, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMGES
OF ANY NATURE WHATSOE\/ER, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY LOST REV/ENUE
OR PROFITS OF IHE CUSTOMER OR ITS CUSTOMERS, AGENTS AND DISTRIBUTORS,
RESULTING FROM, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH, THE SERVICES PROVIDED
BY THE COMPANY. The Customer agrees that the Company shall have no liability for damages,
which may result from Client’s use, interpretation or application of the consulting services provided
by the Company.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter No Contents Page No.
Chapter 1: Technology Profile
1.1 Description of Project 1.1
1.1.1 Justification with respect to Project Attributes 1.2
1.1.2 Justification with respect to Environmental Attributes 1.2
1.2 Proposed Pipeline Route 1.3
1.3 Selection of Route Criteria 1.10
1. 4 Pipeline Elements 1.10
1.5 Pipeline Design Parameters 1.10
1.5.1 Design Details 1.10
1 5.2 Operating Parameters: 1.11
1. 5.3 Pipeline Materials 1.11
1.5.4 Sectionalized Valve Stations 1.11
1.5.5
Telecommunication, SCADA, Electrical and
Instrumentation System
1.6 Main Phases of the Project 1.13
1.6.1 Construction Phase 1.13
1.6.2 Operational Phase 1.16
1.7 Pipeline Leak Detection System 1.17
1.8 Safety Provisions 1.18
1.9 9 Control & Maintenance 1.20
1.10 Aspects Likely to Cause Environmental Effects 1.20
1.1 1 Power Requirement 1.22
1.12 Workforce Arrangements 1.22
1.13 Abandonment ofOperations 1.2

Page No.
Contents
Chapter No
Chapter 2: RA DMP - Introduction
2.1 Genesis of the Project 2.1
2.2 Location of the Project 2.3
2.3 Need for the Project 2.6
2.3.1 2.7
Pipeline route selection criteria
2.4 Economics of Transportation 2.7
2.4.1 Contribution to Economy of the Country 2.7
Environmental Friendliness 2.8
2.4.3 Advantages of Pipeline Project 2.8
2.5 Objective of the Study 2.9
2.6 Methodology of QRA Study 2.9
Disaster Management Plan 2.9
Chapter 3: RA DMP — MCA Analysis
3.1 Introduction 3.1
3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis 3.2
3.2 Hazard Identification 3.3
3.3 MCA Analysis 3.3
3.3.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxic Scenarios 3.5
3.3.1.1 Jet Fire 3.6
3.3.1.2 Flash Fire 3.6
3.3.1.3 Vapor Cloud Explosion 3.6

3.7
3.3.1.4 Pool Fire
3.3.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit 3.7

3.3.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat Load and Shock
Wave 3.9
3.3.3 Model for Pressure Wave 3.9
3.3.4 Vulnerability Models 3.10
3.4 Computation of Damage Distances 3.11
Chapter 4: Risk Mitigation Measures
4.1 Introduction 4 .1
4.2 Pipeline Hazards 4.1
4.3 Pumps 4.3
4.4 General Recommendations 4.3
4.5 Electricity Hazard 4.4
4.6 Risks to Personnel 4.4
4.7 Training 4.4
Chapter 5: Disaster Management Plan
5.1 Preamble 5.1
52 Introduction 5.1
5.2.1 Facilities Provided at Station Along the Pipeline Route 5.2
5.2.2 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System 52
5.2.3 Communication System 5.3
5.2.4 Fire Protection Facilities 5.4
5.3 Need for Disaster Management Plan 5.5
5.4 Objectives of the Disaster Management Plan 5.6
5.5 Statutory Requirement 5.6
5.6 Different Phases of Disaster 5.6
5.7 Key Elements 5.7
5.7.1 Basis of the Plan 5.8

ii
5.7.2 Accident Prevention Procedures/Measures 5.8
5.7.2.1 General 5.8
5.7.2 2 Operation 8 Maintenance 5.9
5.7.2.3 Protecting the Pipeline Against Corrosion 5.10
5.7.2.4 Emergency Planning and Response Procedures 5.10
5.7.3 On-site Disaster Management Plan 5.11
5.7.3.1. Emergency Actions for Various Accident Scenarios 5.11
5.7.3.2. Various Phases of Onsite Disaster Management Plan 5.35
5.7.3.3 Emergency Organization Structure 5.37
5.7.3.4. Role and Responsibilities 5.40
5.7.4 Off-site Disaster Management Plan 553
5.7.4.1 Fire 5.54
5.7.4.2 Explosion 5.54
5.7.4 3 Assistance from Outside Agencies 5.55
5.7.4.4 Various Phases of Onsite Disaster Management Plan 5.55
5.8 Mock Drills 5.59
5.9 Evacuation Plan 5.60
5.9.1 Purpose 5.60
5.9.2 Fire Escape Drill Procedure 5.60
5.10 Training 5.61
5.11 Checklist for Capability Assessment 5.62
Annexures 1-12
Abbreviations
ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ANSI - American National Standard Institute
API - American Petroleum Institute
ASPL - Awa Salawas Pipeline Project
CEPI - Comprehensive Environmental Pollution index
CP - Cathodic Protection
DG - Diesel Generator
DMP - Disaster Management Plan
EC - Environmental Clearance
EIA - Environmental Impact Assessment
EMP - Environmental Management Plan
EPABX - Electronic Private Automatic Branch Exchange
GSSR - Guru Gobind Singh Refinery
HMEL - Hindustan Mittal Energy Limited
HSD - High Speed Diesel
MCA - Maximum Credible Accident
MDPL - Mundra Delhi Pipeline
MMI - Man-Machine Interface

MMSCMD - Million Metric Standard Cubic Meter per Day
MMTPA - Million Metric Tonnes Per Annum
MS - Motor Spirit
MoEF - Ministry of Environment & Forest
NH - National Highway
NOC - No Objection Certificate
OFC - Optical Fiber Cable
OISD - Oil Industry Safety Directorate
O&M - Operation & Maintenance
PNGRB - Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board
PFD - Process Flow Diagram
P&ID - Piping & Instrumentation Diagram
P&MP - Petroleum & Mineral Pipelines Act
PSU - Public Sector Unit
QRA - Quantitative Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment
-
ROU - Right of Use
RTD - Resistance Temperature Detectors
SPCB - State Pollution Control Board

SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SH - State Highway
SKO - Superior Kerosene Oil
SMYS - Specified Minimum Yield Stress
SO2 - Sulphur Dioxide
SV - Sectionalizing Valve
TFMS - Tank Farm Management System
UPS - Uninterrupted Power Supply

ECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as "HPCL") is a Navaratna PSU and
one of the largest oil refining and marketing company in India. The company has commissioned
Mundra Delhi pipeline in the year 2007 for the movement of white oil products to Northern Indian
markets with end terminal at Bahadurgarh (in Haryana) having rail wagon loading facilities and smaller
distribution terminals at Palanpur, Ajmer, Jaipur and Rewari en route.
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed spur line project from
Awa (District Pali) to Salawas, Near Jodhpur along with change in service from HSD to MS in Two Nos.
of Tankages and interphase of Two Nos. of Tankages, Two no. SV Stations and allied facilities. The
pipeline will originate from Awa. near Pali and terminate at Salawas near Jodhpur in the state of
Rajasthan.
HPCL proposes to lay 10‘’ pipeline as spur line from existing Awa Pumping Station of MD PL to existing
Marketing Depot at Salawas, near Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
The retail market in and around Jodhpur is currently being catered to by Ajmer & Jaipur Terminal of
Mundra Delhi Pipeline.
Laying of Spur line to Salawas from Awa Pumping Station will result in savings in road transportation
that are likely to be generated, by feeding the Salawas depot via pipeline, instead of the present
arrangement of feeding from Ajmer and Jaipur depots via road movement.
The product shall be made available from the existing Mundra- Delhi Pipeline. The proposed pipeline
shall have a thruput of 0.619 MMTPA in Phase I (2018-19) and 0.785 MMTPA in Phase It (2023-24).
The Pipeline Route passes through the districts of Pali and Jodhpur in the State of Rajasthan.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore I Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT FOR AWA-SALWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
Proposed cross country multiproduct white oil spur pipeline will transport petroleum products like MS,
HSD and SKO from the existing AWA Pumping Station of Mundra Delhi Pipeline
OBJECTIVES OF RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY

• Identification of vulnerable units with resources to hazard indices
• Generation of release scenarios for escape of flammable chemicals
• Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release based on different scenarios
• Suggestion of risk mitigation measures for the Terminal based on consequence analysis
• Approach to Disaster Management Plan
SCOPE OF THE WORK

The scope of work includes the Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan for the
Awa Salawas Petroleum Product Pipelines for the Awa Salawas Pipeline Project.
2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS
Specifically, the project facilities would include:
a. Awa- Salawas Pipeline and associated SV/CP station
b. Pumping and receipt facilities at Awa Pumping station and Salawas receiving Station
(Piping up to & including individual tank body valve) respectively
c. Augmentation/ conversion of storage at Salawas Depot including facilities associated with
addition of tankage & fire protection etc.
d. Study the impact on the Mundra- Delhi Pipeline hydraulics and batching on account of Awa-
Salawas Spur line proposed for both the phases
INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL & COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

INSTRUMENTATION & AUTOMATION
The major components of the Control & Instrumentation package include the following.
a. Local Gauges (Pressure)
b. Pressure & Temperature Transmitters and Switches
c. Thermal Safety Valve (TSV)
d. Main line Sectionalizing Valve / Isolation Valves / Actuators & accessories
e. Metering Skid
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore II Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT FOR AWA-SALWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
a. Pressure control valve

b. Surge relief System
c. Optical Fiber Cable
d. Control Panel and accessories
e. Fire Detection systems
f. Fire Alarm Panel
g. Sulphur analyzer
h. Density meter
i. Telecommunication
j. SCADA / RTU
k. Instrument Control & Signal Cables
l. Junction boxes & cable glands
m. SS Tubes and fittings
SCADA SYSTEM: The SCADA system aims at ensuring effective and reliable control,
management and supervision of the pipeline from the centralized locations using Remote Telemetry
Units. The system shall be adequately sized to cater for complete monitoring and control
requirements of the proposed pipeline.
The major components of the Control & Instrumentation package include the following:
n. Transmitters and Switches

o. Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)
p. Control Panel and accessories
q. Fire Detection systems
r. Density Transmitters
s. TAS System integration
t. Radar Gauges, Density & Pressure instruments for Tank Farm System
u. Instrument Control & Signal Cables
v. Junction boxes & cable glands
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore II Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

New telecommunication system equipment shall be provided at SV stations and Salawas Receipt
station to meet the communication requirement of the operation & control requirement of the pipeline
and it shall be integrated to the existing system at Awa. For this system optical fiber cable based
system is proposed to be provided. The OFC system shall be linked with VHF system for security of
Pipeline. Within plant & for patrolling HF VHF system is provided. All plant walkie-talkies sets are
intrinsically safe. CCTV shall be provided at all stations including SVs. Other facilities viz. video
conferencing, internet connectivity and ERP for Pipeline operations shall be provided
The telecommunication system shall consist of SCADA system, PA system, EPABX system, CCTV
system, IP based telephone system, Video conferencing system, NMS system & VHF system for
plant communication.
Telecom system shall be OFC based. Necessary STM based network system in all Stations and
necessary VOICE, DATA & SCADA interface required as per detailed specifications shall be supplied.
Explosion proof / weather proof telephones shall be provided.
The system (SDH) shall be interfaced / Integrated with existing telecom network at Awa station.
Telecom equipments shall be interfaced to the existing NMS at Awa station.
SAFETY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY

Petroleum Industry occupies an important segment of our economy and is a source of large benefit
to the society. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in volumes handled to meet the
increasing demand. Products such as, Euro III MS, Euro Ill HSD, and SKO are highly flammable, and
safety which forms an integral part of the industry, has always been given paramount importance.
Several Government authorities, both at the centre and state levels such as Inspectorate of Factories,
Department of Explosives etc. are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring safe handling and
accident prevention measures. In spite of the measures, possibility of accidents either due to human
errors and/or due to equipment/system failure cannot be ruled out. The lessons learnt from the
disasters all over the world, made it essential to draw an Emergency Preparedness Plan to negotiate
such eventuality. The imperative of Emergency Preparedness to minimize the adverse effects due to
an unfortunate accident occurring in manufacture,
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore IV Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

storage, import and transport of any hazardous substance is thus well recognized by all concerns.
An Emergency Preparedness Plan is essential to obviate such an eventuality by providing the

measures to contain the incident and minimize the after effects. To assist the Industry, it is considered
essential to provide the guidelines for preparing such plans based on the interactions within the oil
industry.
Over the years the oil industry has developed and refined its own directives in the field of safety,
health and environment which are to be followed stringently by their members. In addition to the
environmental legislation, the OISD (Oil Industry Safety Directorate) makes it mandatory for its
members to implement its directives on these issues. HPCL has thus formulated its own corporate
policy on environment and safety which is followed in all its installations.
UTILITIES
One UPS power feeder and one NON-UPS power feeder (for non - critical loads such as panel light,
fan, power sockets, thermostat, space heater etc.) shall be provided for control panels. Distribution to
panel instruments and field instruments shall be provided within the control panel. All field transmitters
shall be 24 VDC loop power through barrier / isolators. Internal arrangement shall arrange to convert
the power supply from 230 VAC to 24 VDC. Signal transmission for transmitters shall be 4-20 mA DC
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore V Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

3.0 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA) ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION
Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of an
event or sequence of events resulting into fire. explosion or toxic hazards to human health and
environment.
Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to the
public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous events at an industry and
categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible events are
calculated for different combinations of weather conditions to simulate worst possible scenario. These
consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the entire facility.
MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum damage
distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include quantification of the
probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the selection of accident scenarios for MCA
analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis
especially in accident analysis.
Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in order to assess the
magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or toxic
hazards in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and ecological
imbalances.
METHODOLOGY
The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential vulnerability.
The data requirements for MCA analysis are:
• Operating manual
• Flow diagram and P&I diagrams
• Detailed design parameters
• Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals
• Detailed plant layout
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore VI Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

• Detailed area layout

• Past accident data
Following steps ate involved in the MCA analysis:

• Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases
• Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the hazardous material
• Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities and
atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves
• Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental re lease of
chemicals
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the generation of
accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further investigation are subsequently
determined by its significance, normally using a cut off or threshold quantity.
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the risk it presents to
the employees and the neighboring community. In principle, both probability and consequences
should be considered, but there are occasions where it either the probability or the consequence
can show to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be made on just one factor.
During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken into account.
• Chemical identities
• Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.
• The types and design of process units
• The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and
• The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapors or mists, fire, explosion, large quantities
stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or
releases.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore VII Green Circle Inc.-Baroda

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards and compute the
consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, toxic releases, vapour cloud
explosion etc. A list of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due
to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials ale examined to establish their credibility.
Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum
effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed.
Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The extent of the damage
is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the material. In the present
report the consequences for flammable hazards are considered and the damages caused due to
such releases are assessed with recourse to MCA analysis.
Flammable substances on release may cause Jet fire and less likely unconfined vapor cloud
explosion causing possible damage to the surrounding area. The extent of damage depends upon
the nature of the release. The release of flammable materials and subsequent ignition result in heat
radiation wave or vapor cloud depending upon the flammability and its physical state. Damage
distances due to release of hazardous materials depend on atmospheric stability and wind speed.
It is important to visualize the consequence of the release of such substances and the damage
caused to the surrounding areas. Computation of damage distances are carried out at various
atmospheric stability conditions for various wind velocities.
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGE DISTANCES

Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have been computed at 2F,
3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2. 5, 3 and 5 are wind velocities in m/s and F
and D are atmospheric stability classes. These weather conditions have been selected to
accommodate worst case scenarios to get maximum effective distances. DNV based PHAST Micro
6.53 software has been used to carry out consequence analysis. Damage distances computed for
fire and explosion scenarios for the Pipeline running from Awa to Salawas depot are described
below.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore VIII Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

JET FIRE
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 10 mm, 20 mm and 50 mm in for pipeline
under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to
50 mm leak for stability class 5D for the for pipeline failure 13.18 m at heat load of 37.5 KW/m2.
POOL FIRE
under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to
50 mm leak for stability class 5D is 133.52 m at heat load of 12.5 KW/m2 condition.
FLASH FIRE
under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities for the LFL concentrations. The
damage distances due to 50 mm leak are 21.13 m, 19.55 m and 16. 86 m for stability classes 2.5F,
3D and 5D conditions respectively.
VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due
50mm leak at stability class 3D is 28.22m for overpressure wave of 0.3 bar Pipeline
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore IX Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

4.0 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES

PIPELINE HAZARDS
PIPELINE EXTERNAL CORROSION PROTECTION AND MONITORING
Pipeline should be epoxy coated line. Periodic intelligent pigging survey and pipe- to-soil potential
surveys shall be conducted for pipeline health monitoring in accordance with the requirement of
codes and best industry practices. Following are some common design criteria used in insulation
system design for piping application
• Providing personnel protection
• Limiting or retarding surface condensation
• Providing process control
• Economic optimization or energy conservation
• Providing fire protection
• Providing freeze protection
• Providing noise control
SECTIONALIZING BLOCK VALVES

• Main line block valves should be provided as per the requirements of ANSI/ASME B 31.4 and
OISD 141 based on population density and land use along the pipeline route. Provision should be
made for safe blow down of gas contained in each section of the pipeline into the atmosphere.
• Valve maintenance should be performed every six months to ensure effective operability.
PIGGING FACILITIES
• For maintenance of the pipeline, pig launching and pig-receiving facilities should be provided at
the beginning and end. The launchers and receivers should be suitable for intelligent pigging.
• Pigging is partly an experience-driven technique. From a wide selection of pig types, the
knowledge operator must choose an appropriate model, design the pigging protocol including
pig speed, distance and driving force and assess the progress during the operation. The evaluator
should be satisfied that the pigging operation is indeed beneficial and effective in removing
corrosive products from the line in a timely fashion.
X Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore
PIPELINE TESTING
• All welds should be radiographed and hydrostatic testing of the pipeline should be performed at
a pressure up to 1.4 times the design pressure of the pipeline system based on the design
code requirements. The test pressure should be held for a minimum period of 24 hours. This
will ensure complete structural integrity of the pipeline.
LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM

• State-of-the-art Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system supported by leak
detection software module, precision instrument and dedicated communication system should
be installed to monitor the integrity of the pipeline. The shutdown system of the pipeline will act
to close the sectionalizing valves based on leak detection system and will alert the pipeline
operator about the potential leaks along the pipeline route. Typically, the time required
detecting / confirming a leak, raising alarm and taking action to isolate the leaking section is
around 100-150 seconds. The entire pipeline system should be monitored continuously from a
control station having a SCADA system. The remote control and monitoring are typically done
from a centralized system on a 24/7 basis. The systems are typically computer based and most
have a back-up computer and other redundant features. The centralized SCADA system
typically communicates with the field and remote devices through a dedicated communication
network such as land telephone lines, satellite system, microwave towers, or directional radio
frequencies with most systems having reluctant communication frequencies.
• The measures that should be employed to protect security of SCADA systems include:
• Maintain integrity of communication parts throughout the system
• Verification of transmitted signals on regular basis
• Inspection of status of field devices through fixed time schedule
• Regular feedback of control signals to check its reliability
• Database protection from viruses to avoid system failure
• Accessing control to the control center by defined procedure
PUMPS
• Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps will be observed as per equipment
manual.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore XI Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
• Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of responsibility for the fire
service. Following are the general recommendations for the proposed facility
• Following firefighting facilities can be used to tackle the fire
o Water supply
o Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation Foam
system
o Water fog and sprinkler system
o Mobile Firefighting equipment
Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware of the safety
precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap due to pipeline. This can effectively be done by
conducting the safety training programs
o Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line
o Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in emergencies
o Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness and efficiency of the
DMP and EPP and records should be maintained
o Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of emergencies should be
installed at various locations
ELECTRICITY HAZARD
• All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing. Earthed electrode shall
periodically tested and maintained
• Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including the operator's room to carry
out safe shut down, ready identification of firefighting facilities such as fire water pumps and fire
alarm stations.
• All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease
• Use of approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse tongs,
discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder and not wearing metal ring
and chain.
• Flame and shock detectors and central fire annunciation system for fire safety should be
provided.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore XII Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

• Temperature sensitive alarm and protective relays to make alert and disconnect equipment before
overheating
• Prevent higher humidity and temperature near electric insulations.
• Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be prevented by providing
fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection
• Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used for electrical fires
RISKS TO PERSONNEL
• Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management procedure and competency
assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to carry out jobs safely and without
causing any injury to self, colleagues and system.
• For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow the safety practices
/ procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If every team member starts working with
this attitude, zero accident rates are not a distant dream.
• Any operation is a team effort and its success depend upon the sincerity, efficiency and
motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty of a single person, but it
is everyone’s job.
Training
• On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a long way in
improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of the facility,
especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with emergency situations arising out
of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary for industries to prepare an
exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency preparedness plan.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore XIII Green Circle, Enc.-Baroda

5.0 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

The objective of any terminal should be safe and trouble free operation this is ensured by taking
precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/pipeline as per
standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules and
instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the
plant/pipe line by trained manpower. In spite of all precautions
accidents may happen due to human error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of
hazardous material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial
installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural
disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like major fire,
explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and liquids from pipeline storage
terminals, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc.
The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for loss surrounding the event.
It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might strike on undertaking.
However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. preplanned procedure involving proper
utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize the loss to a minimum and
resume the working condition as soon as possible.
NEED FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Following are the general types of Emergency /Disaster which lead to preparation of disaster
management plan:
Following are some major Accidents / disasters
• Leak
• Fire
• Leak & Fire
• Burst
• Burst & Fire
OBJECTIVES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The plan includes
activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:
XIV Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organizational setup and arrange
proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any
• Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources
• Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.
• Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.
• Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.
• Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry
• Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions. The
above objectives can be achieved by -
• Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and
identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.
• Arrange/augment facilities for firefighting, safety, medical (both equipment and Manpower)
• Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and communication facilities as well
as warning procedure.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for all petroleum products marketing terminals
to tackle the emergencies. The plan has been prepared in view of the following regulations
• Factories Act, 1948 and as amended
• Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under
Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.
• Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents, 1996.
• Stipulations of OISD-168
• Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
KEY ELEMENTS
Following are the key elements of Disaster Management Plan:
• Basis of the plan
• Accident prevention procedures/measures
• Accident/emergency response planning procedures
• On-site Disaster Management Plan
• Off-site Disaster Management Plan
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore XV

Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda
Chapter 1
Technology Profile
1.1. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed pipeline project from
Awa (District Pali) to Salawas, Near Jodhpur along with change in service from HSD to MS in Two
Nos. of Tankages and interphase of Two Nos. of Tankages, Two no. SV Stations and allied facilities.
The pipeline will originate from Awa which is intermediate pumping station of MDPL in the Tehsil Marwar
Jn. near District Pali and terminate at Salawas in the Tehsil Luni near District Jodhpur in the state of
Rajasthan.
The details of terminal and facilities proposed to be developed therein and environmental impacts,
mitigation measures, and EMP are separately dealt with in REIA reports for the respective terminals.
10" Dia Pipeline from Awa (Rajasthan) to Salawas (Rajasthan) (approx. Length 93 Km)
a. Take off Point at Awa with Product Dispatch Station & Pig Launcher facility
b. SV/CP Station with associated facilities - 2 Nos. along the pipeline route
c. Terminal Point at Salawas (Jodhpur) with Product Receiving Station & Pig receiving facility
The details of terminal and facilities proposed to be developed therein and environmental impacts,
mitigation measures, and EMP is separately dealt with in REIA report for Salawas Depot.
The entire pipeline is passing through a fair and leveled ground. The pipeline shall be laid at minimum
1.2 m below the ground level. The land shall be reinstated to its original land use. The pipeline shall
be laid as per API & OISD guidelines.
The proposed pipeline route does not pass through any sanctuaries or any other ecologically
sensitive areas.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: 1.1 Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda
1.1.1. JUSTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO PROJECT ATTRIBUTES
• The company has commissioned Mundra Delhi pipeline in the year 2007 for the movement of
white oil products to Northern Indian markets with end terminal at Bahadurgarh (in Haryana)
having rail wagon loading facilities. HPCL is also the JV partner in M/s HMEL (Hindustan Mittal
Energy Limited) 9 MMTPA green field Guru Gobind Singh refinery (GSSR) which is coming up
at Raman Mandi in Punjab and likely has been commissioned in the year 2011.
• HPCL has entered into an agreement with HMEL for evacuation of the refined while oil products
from GSSR refinery. As a result of this, 2 new pipelines have been laid from the refinery premises
at Raman Mandi to existing HPCLs Bhatinda depot and Bahadurgarh Terminal. Thus,
Bahadurgarh terminal will receive products from both HMELs GSSR refinery and also from
Mundra Delhi pipeline. The demand trend in Northern India indicates requirement of additional
products, which will have to move through existing Mundra Delhi Pipeline
• HPCL also desires to lay a multiproduct spur pipeline (called Awa Salawas Pipeline or ASPL
Project) for the distribution of products from Awa to Salawas. The pipeline shall be laid to transfer
BS-III MS, BS- IV MS, BS-III HSD and SKO from the existing MDPL pumping station at Awa, in
Pali district of Rajasthan, up to Salawas depot in Jodhpur district of Rajasthan. The products
shall be made available to this pipeline from existing Mundra- Delhi pipeline. This cross country
multiproduct white oil pipeline will supply above mentioned products to Jodhpur and adjoining
areas in the state of Rajasthan, India. The Capacity of the proposed Pipeline is 0.613 MMTPA in
Phase I (2019-20) and 0.755 MMTPA in Phase II (2023-24).
1.1.2. JUSTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTES
• The proposed route has suitable geological and geo-structural properties.

• The proposed route doesn't require any major deforestation.
• The proposed pipeline does not pass through any Wildlife Sanctuaries, environmentally sensitive
areas such as national monuments, bird sanctuaries etc. accept Salawas village which is
included in CEPI ( Comprehensive Environmental Pollution Index) list declared as
environmentally sensitive area by MoEF, vide notification no.J-11013/5/2010-IA.II(I) at Sr. No.23
as CEPI -75.19( As_Wc_Ls)
• Transportation of Petroleum products through pipeline in inland condition is an interesting and

ecofriendly option in comparison to other alternatives like road. rail transport etc. as it offers a
safer option, its ability to traverse through difficult terrains, controlled rate, continuous supply
and unaffected by external factors like weather, law and order, etc. and hence offers rapid 8 reliable
supply at low unit cost.
• As a consequence of the rapid rate of industrialization in India, fuel needs are increasing at an
equally rapid rate and the supply-demand gap is widening and steps must be taken to address
this issue
• Overland transport of fuels by trucks is uneconomical, unsafe, and is a contributor to
environmental degradation in terms of the fuel consumed and pollutants released by vehicles
in transit and by accidents and spillages (common on Indian roads)
• Pipelines are internationally recognized as the preferred alternative for transport of fuels from
the point of view of safety, economy and relative environmentally friendliness. The qualities of
underground pipelines that make them desirable from these angles are that they are buried
underground (at a minimum depth of 1m), are controlled by SCADA systems which allow
continuous monitoring and rapid closure of valves, etc., and that they are routed to avoid human
settlements and ecologically sensitive areas
1.2. PROPOSED PIPELINE ROUTE

The proposed alignment also meets the broader requirements of the laying criteria for the pipelines.
Accordingly, the present pipeline route has been selected for supply of Petroleum products to
various retail outlets industries and consumers in North India.
The pipeline route is optimized based on the following considerations:

• Safety of public lives and property and safety of the pipeline from engineering and other
considerations
• Shortest pipeline length
• Easy and favorable terrain condition free of large water bodies, low lying marshy lands,
obstacles like ravines, depressions and unstable grounds, meandering rivers, etc.
• Ground profile for pipeline hydraulics and avoidance of steep rising and falling ground, hills
and valleys having sloping right of way
• Availability of infrastructure and access to the pipeline route during construction and
maintenance
• Environmental impact and avoidance of environmentally sensitive lands, such as reserved

forests, marine parks, built-up areas, places of worship. burial and public events
• Minimum crossing of existing pipelines, transmission lines, parallel alignment, etc.
• Minimum road, rail, river and Canal crossings
• Avoidance of rugged and intricate grounds with hard strata, exposed rocks, boulders and
quarries.
• Existing and future developments in the region. such as roads, rail lines, Canal network,
reservoirs, townships, industrial units, etc.
• Scope for future expansion of the pipeline
The salient features of the pipeline route showing Tehsils and Districts in concerned states are
shown below:
TEHSIL WISE CHAINAGE LIST

Table 1.1 Tehsil wise Chainage List
Chainage in Km Length Total Length

Sr.No. Tehsil District Km Km
From To
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
01 Marwar Jn. Pali 0/000.00 76.162 76.162 76.162
02 Luni Jodhpur 76.162 92.961 16.799 16.799
TOTAL 92.961
SALIENT FEATURES OF TANKAGES AT AWA- SALAWAS PROJECT

It is also proposed to change in service from HSD to MS in Two Nos. of Tankages and interphase
of Two Nos. of Tankages at Salawas
Page No: 1.4 Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

HAZOP STUDY, RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
AWA-SALAWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
Item Descripti Capacity Product Dyke

Product Dimension API Remarks
No. on Class No.
TK- 1 TANK MS 18MØx12.5M HT. 2900 API-650 Change in Service from HSD to
3
CRVT KL A MS
TK- 2 TANK MS 18MØx12.5M HT. 2900 Change in Service from HSD to
API-650 3
CRVT KL A MS
TK- 3 TANK HSD 9MØx9W HT. 500 KL B API-650 3 EXISTING
CRVT
TK- 4 TANK SKO 9MØx9W HT. 500 KL B API-650 3 EXISTING
CRVT
TK- 5 TANK lnterpha 10MØx9M HT. 500 KL A API-650 Change in Service from MS to
4
FRVT se Interphase.
TK- 6 TANK lnterpha A Change in Service from MS to
10MØx9M HT. 500 KL API-650 4
FRVT se Interphase.
TK- 10 TANK WATER 10MØx12M HT 940 KL API-650 EXlSTING
CRVT
TK- 11 TANK WATER 10MØx12M HT. 940 KL API-650 EXISTING
CRVT
TK- 12 TANK HSD 18MØx14.5M HT. 3500 B API-650 EXISTING
KL 2
CRVT
TK- 13 TANK HSD 18MØx14.5M HT. 3500 B API-650 2 EXISTING
CRVT KL
TK- TANK SKO 12MØx10M HT. 1000 B API-650 EXISTING
CRVT KL 2
14
TK- 16 TANK 4985 B
HSD 24MØ x12M HT. API-650 1 EXISTING
CRVT KL
TK- 17 TANK HSD 24MØx12M HT. 5000 B API-650 EXISTING
1
CRVT KL
TANK 12.5MØx10.5M API-650 EXISTING
TK- 19 910 KL 5
FRVT HT. B
TK- 20 TANK WATER 12MØx15M HT. 1625 EXISTING
ORVT KL API-650
Item Capacit Product API Dyke

Product Dimension Remarks
No. Description y Class No.
TS-1 U/G TANK MS 2MØx5M Long 25 KL A IS:10987- - EXISTING

P/L 92
TS-2 U/G TANK MS 2MØx5M Long 20 KI. A IS: 10987- - EXISTING
P/L
92
U/G TANK HSD 3MØx11M Long 75 KL B IS:10987- - EXISTING
TS-1
92
U/G TANK SKO 3MØx11M Long 70 KL B IS:10987- - EXISTING

TS-2 92
As per
U/G TANK MS 3.2MØ x 12.M 70 KL IS:10937- 92 - EXISTING
TS-3 A
LONG
U/G TANK As per -

TS-4 MS 3MØ x 11M LONG 45 KL EXISTING
A IS:10937-
SUMMARY OF TANKS: -
TOTAL GLASS A PRODUCT = 7870 KL (MS: 6870 KL, INTERPHASE: 1000 KL
TOTAL CLASS B PRODUCT = 19130 KL (HSD: 17560 KL, SKO: 1570 KL)
TOTAL CAPACITY: 27000 KL
Table 1.2 Schedule of Tanks
Table 1.3 Schedule of Existing Facilities

SR. ITEM NO. IN AREA
DESCRIPTION SIZE (M)
NO. DRAWING (SQM)
1 26 FIRE WATER PUMP HOUSE 12Mx8M 96
2 27 LUBE WATER HOUSE (EXISTING) 20M X9M 160

30Mx15M
LUBE DRUM YARD + GREASE
3 28 570
DRUM SHED
5Mx15M
4 29 LUB GODOWN-3 30Mx15M 450

5 30 CAR / SCOOTER PARKING SHED 12Mx7.SM 90
6 31 CALIBRATION SHED 8Mx8M 64
7 32 PROJECT SITE OFFICE
15Mx8M 142
8 33 OFFICE BUILDING
7.5x3.0M
Table 1.4 Features of The Awa — Salawas Route

Sr. No. Facility/Natural Resource Description
1 Canal 08
Nil. However, at roads and canal crossing are Social

2 Forest Length /protected forests. No reserved forest are present on
the pipeline route
3 Rivers (Seasonal) 06
4 Drains & Nallahs 3 numbers Drains and 2 numbers Nallahs in Rajasthan
5 Rail crossings 02
6 NH 02
7 SH 03
Environmentally sensitive
None
areas within project area
9 Other Road Crossings 49
Table 1.4 Features of The Awa — Salawas Route

Sr. No. Facility/Natural Resource Description
10 Cart Track 42
11 Other lines Crossing 44
12 States Enroute Rajasthan
Proposed HPCL Pipeline Route runs through Pa li and

13 Districts Enroute
jodhpur districts of Rajasthan state.
14 Environmentally sensitive
None
areas within project area
The pipeline will originate from Awa near Pali District

16 Districts Enroute and terminate at Salawas near Jodhpur in the state of
Rajasthan.
17 List of Villages 30
The proposed pipeline section Awa Salawas is 92.961 km long 10" Dia long. The route of the pipeline
passes through 38 villages of Rajasthan. The route of the pipeline normally runs in the North - West
direction. The entire pipeline route mainly consists of Sandy Silty and Silt Clay with Gravel type of
soil.
1.3. SELECTION OF ROUTE CRITERIA

A key environmental mitigation measure already implemented is the routing of pipeline to avoid high
environmentally sensitivity areas. The route of the Awa - Salawas pipeline has been finalized taking
into consideration the following factors:
• Connectivity between supply and demand centers

• Least disturbance to the environment
• Least disturbance to human habitations during construction and operation phase,
• Avoiding environmentally sensitive areas such as sanctuaries, Biospheres, Marine Parks and
National parks etc.
• To avoid any disturbance to archaeological sites and any areas of ecological significance or
sensitivity;
1.4. PIPELINE ELEMENTS

The proposed pipeline system shall comprise of the following elements:
1. Proposed pipe line that carries the petroleum products from Awa Pumping Stat ion of Mundra
Delhi Pipeline (MDPL) to existing marketing depot at Salawas (Near Jodhpur), Rajasthan for the
proposed stretch of 92.961 km long 10” Dia, 18 m wide ROU shall be acquired. Additional
requirement of land will be for SV stations, which will be retained permanently.
2. Intermediate sectionalizing valve (SV) stations
3. Cathodic Protection system
4. Pigging facilities at stations
5. SCADA and Telecom facilities
6. Instrumentation and control system for safe and efficient operation
7. Power supply from the nearest source with DG set back up in case of power failure at SV
stations for lighting, instrumentation, opening and closing of SV and battery charging for
Cathodic Protection and Telecom system.
8. Miscellaneous utility and safety systems
1.5. PIPELINE DESIGN PARAMETERS

1.5.1. DESIGN DETAILS
The details of the proposed lines along with their pipe length are furnished in Table 1.6
Table 1.6 Details of the Proposed Pipeline Section

Sr. Name of Size Length Remarks
No. Pipeline (Inch) (Km)
Existing MDPL pumping station at Awa, District
Awa to
1 10" 92.961 Pali t o Salawas depot, District Jodhpur of
Salawas
Rajasthan State
1.5.2. OPERATING PARAMETERS
Table 1.7 Operating Parameters of the Proposed Pipeline Section

Sr. No. Description Details
1 Length of pipeline 92.961 km Approx.
2 Diameter of pipeline 10" (with Thickness 6.4mm min.)
3 Pipe material Carbon Steel
Awa — Salawas (kg/cm2g)

4
Design Pressure 98 (Ch.0.00km to Ch. 76.162km)
98 (Ch. 76.162km to Ch. 92.961km)
5 Design Temperature: Inlet & Outlet inlet: 15-50 'C
Outlet: 15-50 'C

6 Operating Temperature 15-50 0C
7 Pipeline material and grade of steel Carbon steel having API 5L Gr X-52, 6.1
mm from Awa - Salawas
1.5.3. PIPELINE MATERIALS

The pipeline will be fabricated in carbon steel conforming to the American Petroleum Institute (API)
Specification 5‘L’. The grade of steel will be API SL Gr X-52. The minimum allowable yield stress will
be 65,000 pounds per square inch. Material grade and final wall thickness of pipeline will be selected
based on design conditions defined in the basic engineering package and classification of locations
and type of construction. Wall thickness will not be less than 6.4 mm.
1.5.4. SECTIONALIZED VALVE STATIONS

The sectionalizing valve stations shall be provided at regular intervals of 30 kms (approx.) to facilitate
isolation of main pipe line section based on terrain features and class locations as per ASME B 31.4.
The location of SV stations is governed by various factors including a recommended maximum
spacing of SV. The spacing shall however be adjusted to permit an SV to be installed in more
accessible location depending upon the availability of land during execution. Facilities for emergency
closing of "sectionalizing valves shall be available at each end of the pipeline and at each SV station.
Two numbers of SV stations are envisaged for this pipe li.ne. In case of power failure DG Power
back up is envisaged for SV Stations.
1.5.5. TELECOMMUNICATION, SCADA, ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION

SYSTEM
Telecommunication: A dedicated Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) based telecommunication system is
proposed to be implemented to meet the requirements of this pipeline and for future telecom
requirements. This system shall provide voice, data and video communication. In
Addition to this direct dialing facility, conference facility, hotline facility, data communication for
SCADA, Facsimile communication, EPABX network connection and video conferencing.
SCADA: A centralized control room shall remotely monitor and control the operation of the pipeline.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are provided to ensure safe and
efficient remote monitoring and control of the dispatch terminal, pipeline and receipt terminals. All
the pipeline facilities are considered in the SCADA system. SCADA system is basically managed
through Optical Fiber Cable (OFC) network.
Function of SCADA: The general functional responsibilities of the SCADA include following
• Data Acquisition
• Control
• Alarm and Event Presentation
• Real- time and Historical Trending
• Man-Machine Interface (MMI)
• Report Generation
• Archiving
• Communication Handling and Error Recovery
• Database Configuration
• System Maintenance and Security
• Cathodic Protection and Monitoring
• Leak Detection
Customer Information through SCADA will be on Real-time data. The following parameters will
be monitored / controlled through SCADA:
• Pressure & Temperature
• Flow readings at each terminal
• Cathodic protection parameters
• Emergency shutdown
• Down loading of flow and Pressure controller set points
• CP Station power supply status monitoring
Electrical: The electrical work shall involve the supply of power for the permanent cat4«›Jic
protection system (impressed current), telecommunication loads, SCADA loads, telemetry
loads, lighting for the substations.
Instrumentation: State-of-art electronic/ micro-processor based instrumentation shaII be

provided for safe and efficient control monitoring of the entire pipeline. Flow measuring/metering
facilities suitable custody transfer application shall be provided at dispatch, receipt and
intermediate stations. For temperature signals, a field mounted RTD with transmitters shall be
provided. In general, all field instruments shall be intrinsically safe.
1.6. MAIN PHASES OF THE PROJECT

The proposed project, involves two phases construction and operation of the pipeline:
1.6.1. CONSTRUCTION PHASE

A. FOR PIPELINE
The pipeline shall be designed and engineered, laid and tested in accordance with the provision
of ANSI/ASME Code B31.4 for 'Transmission and Distribution Piping System’ and other relevant
Codes and Standards as described below:
. The pipeline facilities shall be designed in accordance with the basic laws, codes, rules and
standards that are mandatory by law in India. The latest edition of all the codes and standards
applicable shall be followed.
Basically, the following are applicable

Laws- Codes & Rules as mandatory under the legislation of India, among others, but not limited to
and due attention shall be paid to the following:
a. OISD: Oil Industry Safety Directorate
b. P&MP Act: Petroleum & Mineral Pipelines Act, 1962
c. PNGRB Rules: Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board Rules
d. Railways/Forest/NH/Other Pipelines— Terms and conditions applicable
e. Petroleum Act 1934 & Rules 2002
f. MOE&F- Ministry of Environment & Forest guidelines
• The set of Laws-Codes and rules twat have been agreed between HPCL and the
authorities for the implementation of the high pressure system where applicable
• ASME (ANSI) B31.4 American Code and relating US code applicable for similar Facilities
• The "Rules of Good Practice” commonly used by the worldwide Oil Industry.
• The "Rule of Art" and” Sound Practice’’ of the engineer, whichever is the most stringent in
case of a contradictory stipulation, the more stringent condition shall prevail.
The pipeline construction is proposed to be carried out through deployment of mainline spreads.
During construction, the following activities will be carried out:
1. Clearing and Grading

An 18 m wide Right of Use (ROU) area shall be cleared off for vegetation and other obstacles such
as boulders etc. In scrubland, vegetation will be stockpiled for re-spreading as part of the
restoration process.
2. Trenching
Trenchers and backhoe type excavators will be used to dig the trench for laying the pipeline. The
topsoil will be removed and segregated from the remaining backfill material excavated from the
trench. The topsoil will be replaced in its original position during the backfilling operation.
3. Stringing
The pipes, after unloading using side booms will be strung adjacent to the trench. Trailers and
cranes will be used for the maneuvering of pipes.
4. Bending
The pipe will be bent using a bending machine to the appropriate angle to match the vertical and
horizontal alignment of the trench.
5. Welding
Welding will be done using conventional manual welding involving a crew of experienced
welders and fitters.
6. Radiography
Each field weld will be 100% radio graphed using X-Ray to test for the soundness of the weld in
compliance with specifications.
7. Joint Coating
Pre-coated pipes will be used for the project. Joint welds, which are not pre-coated, will be coated
at the site.
8. Lowering
Padding will be provided, wherever required, in the bottom of trench to prevent damage to the
coating.
9. Backfilling
The excavated soil will be returned to the trench. The topsoil, which has been preserved on the side
of the Right of Use, will be spread over the filled-up trench. A crown of soil will be kept on top of the
trenched portion to allow for future settlement. Excess or unsuitable material will be cleared from the
site and disposed of at a suitable site.
10. Crossings
The method used for the crossing of waterways and other infrastructure facilities like national
highway, state highway, major dis1rict roads, canals, rivers, nalas and railway lines will vary from
place to place depending on the environmental setting and the geo-technical features of the area.
Open cut as well as trenchless methods will be used for crossings.
11. Restoration
Restoration of the ROU will be conducted progressively / following the completion of construction
works. This will involve removal of foreign material such as construction debris. The terrain will be
returned to its original condition by spreading the topsoil over the ROU and agriculture activities will
be restored to original.
B. FOR ASSOCIATED FACILITIES

At SV station sites, the construction will be undertaken within the station. The other steps of
construction shall be more or less same as the pipeline as below:
• Clearing of the identified location

• Modification of the boundary wall wherever required.
• Leveling and approach road laying
• Foundation works
• Construction water supply
• Structural works
• Mechanical erection
1.6.2. OPERATIONAL PHASE

A. FOR PIPELINE
The activities involved in the operational phase of the project are as follows:
Commissioning of the pipeline: Prior to commissioning of the pipeline, a number of pre-

commissioning operations like cleaning and hydrostatic testing of pipeline, starting of mechanical and
rotating equipments will be carried out. After successful pre- commissioning activities, the pipeline
shall be commissioned for transfer of petroleum products.
Utilities: The water requirement in the pumping stations during the operational phase will be met
by existing bore wells or outsourced through road tankers.
Normal operation: During the normal operation of pipeline, the activities will be mainly
confined to the battery limits of terminals.
Infrastructure facilities: Infrastructure facilities to support the anticipated worker population and
the project like municipal facilities, firefighting facilities, sewerage maintenance, power supply, water
supply and maintenance etc, will be provided where ever required.
Post construction protection system: The entire pipeline will be protected against external
corrosion by a cathodic protection system. Pipe external coating will be done at the coating plant
before it is transportation to site. Pipeline is protected front internal corrosion by injecting corrosion
inhibitors at the rate of 8-10 ppm during pumping of products through pipeline.
Inspection of pipeline: Regular inspection of the pipeline shall be carried out as per standard
practices. A SCADA monitoring and control system will be utilized ensuring effective and
Reliable control, management and supervision of the pipeline network system. In addition to SCADA,
physical patrolling along the pipe line route will also be carried out by line walks daily.
B. FOR ASSOCIATED FACILITIES

Once the pipeline is commissioned, there will be a regular visit by the operation engineers as per
drawn up schedule to ensure safe operations. Inspection work will be undertaken on a routine basis
Inspection pigs will be propelled in the pipeline once in two years to check the health and dimension
of the pipeline.
1.7. PIPELINE LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM

A. BEFORE OPERATION (DURING CONSTRUCTION)
As per the construction standard, the welds are required to be radio graphed by x-ray and then
followed by the hydrostatic test. This will ensure that there are no leaks from the pipe manufacturing
source or the construction work. After confirming the leak test by the contractor, sectionalizing valves
will be installed in accordance with the design at intervals of 35km approximately.
The pipeline will be hydrostatically tested to a pressure of at least 1.5 times the design pressure of
the pipeline system. Also, the hoop stress will not be allowed to exceed 90% of the specified minimum
yield stress (SMYS). The hydrostatical test will be for a minimum of twenty-four hours and will be
conducted as per the internationally accepted standard for high pressure pipeline design;
construction and testing in the above standard and those specifics to pipelines on land will be referred
to ASME B 31.4.
B. DURING OPERATION
The entire system will be monitored continuously from a control station. This monitoring will be
electronically supervised by a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA). The
monitoring station will be manned continuously. An electronic leak detection system capable of
detecting a leak up to certain size in the pipeline and leak location within certain range will be provided
by the SCADA system. All stations shall have necessary detectors to give necessary alarm in event
of leakage and this alarm shall be repeated to Central control Room through SCADA system.
SCADA system along with telecommunication system and instrument system shall be supplied power
through uninterrupted power supply source with a t2-hrs battery' back up The main source of power
supply will be from Rajasthan State Electricity Board supply and as and when required in case of
emergency or power failure, Back up from DG sets will be utilized. Besides UPS, Diesel Generators
shall also be installed in case of power failure for more than 12 Hours.
1 .8. SAFETY PROVISIONS

A. DURING CONSTRUCTION
Majority of the potential adverse impacts will be avoided by the use of standard environmental
protection and prevention measures during construction and operation as recommended by Oil
Industries Safety Directorate (OISD).
External/Internal Corrosion Coating

Suitable anti-corrosive coating would be provided for external corrosion protection, compatible joint
material shall be provided at the joints following welding. Three-layer external PE coating consist of
epoxy, adhesive and Polyethylene having coating thickness of 2.2 mm. minimum shall be provided.
Pipeline is protected from internal corrosion by injecting corrosion inhibitor at the required rate during
pumping of products through pipeline.
Insulating Joints
Insulating joints would be provided between underground and above ground portions of the pipeline
for electrical isolation. Insulating joints would be of mono block type and suitable for above
ground/below ground installation.
Cathodic Protection
The proposed pipeline shall be catholically protected using a galvanic sacrificial anode system during
construction period. After commissioning, the pipeline would be catholically protected by an
impressed current system. Cathodic Protection (CP) stations would be located at a suitable distance
based on the attenuation calculation during the designing of the CP system.
All the CP stations are monitored online with help of the SCADA system. Test stations for regular
monitoring of the health of the pipeline are installed at intervals not exceeding 1 km. Moreover,
different surveys like Closed Interval Potential Survey, Pearson Survey and Interference Surveys are
also carried out to determine the health of the CP system and the pipeline. CP system shall be
powered by local Electricity Board’s grid power and DG set in case of power failure from Grid Supply
B. DURING OPERATION
After the commissioning of each pipeline section, it will be handed over to O&M Team; O&M team
will also be involved during pipeline commissioning The manual has been prepared on the basis of
ASME B31.4 .This is supplementary to the Engineering and Vendor Documentation O&M manual
provides the general operating instructions and guidelines for preparing and testing the unit prior to
commissioning, operating procedures for special equipment and also broad guideline on safety
The Operation and Maintenance manual is being issued in a controlled manner with a proper record
of the recipients. Anytime a change is done or the manual is updated, either copy of the changed
pages or the complete manual will be given to all the original recipients. It shall be the duty of the
recipients to either replace the updated sheets (with new revision number) in the manual or the old
manual or the old manual should be destroyed after receipt of an updated manual.
1.9. CONTROL & MAINTENANCE

SCADA SYSTEM: The SCADA system aims at ensuring effective and reliable control,
management and supervision of the pipeline from the centralized locations using Remote Telemetry
Units. The system shall be adequately sized to cater for complete monitoring and control
requirements of the proposed pipeline.
Preventive Maintenance: Equipment manufacturer / supplier’s maintenance manual would be
followed for details of the steps to be taken. An overall preventive maintenance manual would be
followed for details of steps to be taken. An overall preventive maintenance schedule shall be
evolved. Some of the common steps to be taken in general would be change to top up of maintenance
and performance will be maintained for each component of the pipeline system.
Since the Petroleum product service is hazardous in nature and contamination of I he main line
products is not tolerable, great care will be taken while preparing the equipment for maintenance
and also while taking the equipment back in line.
Maintenance of Cathodic Protection: Maintenance of Cathodic protection is most important

single item in preventive maintenance of pipelines. Maintenance of Cathodic protection› at effective
levels require regular check to ensure that equipments such as rectifiers are continuously operating
and other sources continue to produce adequate amounts of Cu front Service interruptions for a few
days may not be serious, but it is easy to overlook cases of inadequate protection unless regular
periodic checks are made. It is therefore, essential to make a schedule for inspection of Cathodic
protection system of the pipeline.
The entire pipeline system will be monitored continuously from a manual control station. This
monitoring will be electronically supervised by a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System
(SCADA). The monitoring station will be manned continuously. An electronic leak detection system
capable of detecting certain leak size and leak locations will be provided by the SCADA system.
1.10. ASPECTS LIKELY TO CAUSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

The Awa - Salawas pipeline project would cause some temporal environmental impacts d ue to
associated construction activities These impacts shall be temporary in nature and shall be mitigated
or eliminated by implementing a well—organized Environmental Management Plan (EMP) during the
construction and operational phases of the project as described below.
Air Emissions: The emissions to the atmosphere shall be from construction equipments / vehicles
or activities during construction phase and DG sets/ diesel engines during operation phase.
Water requirement: Requirement of water is about Approx. 9 KL/day for domestic use and Approx.
10 KI/Day for Industrial process (i.e. for gardening / maintenance works/cleaning of floors/equipments
etc.). This requirement shall be met by tankers from suitable sources in the surrounding area.
Wastewater generation: No waste water on continuous basis from pipeline operations is

envisaged. The waste water generated during hydrostatic testing of equipment and pipeline is a
temporary and onetime activity. The same water will be reused for multiple tests in other
Sections. The residual hydrostatic testing wastewater at the end of the test will be non-toxic and
disposed of suitably.
Noise: During construction phase, noise shall be generated through Vehicle movement,
construction activities. SV stations and DG sets etc.
Land: The land required for the pipeline project shall be obtained on Right of Use (RoU) basis and
there will be temporary disturbance during construction phase. The land will be reinstated to its
original position once pipeline laying is completed. The pipeline is buried all along its length hence
impact on land use pattern will be marginal and reversible.
As mentioned in earlier, the project envisages requirement of additional land for flue requirements
shown below:
The land requirement for each Sectionalizing valve station (SV) is approx. —0.5 Acres. Thus, the
total land requirement for establishment of 2 SV stations is about Approx. 1.0 Acres 167.4 ha Land
for ROU will be required temporarily for construction and laying of pipeline, restored back and handed
over to land owners for using the same for agricultural purpose. The Rout shall be acquired from
private /government lands as per P & MP Act, 1962(Right of User in land). Crop and land
compensation will be paid as determined by the competent authority.
Solid and hazardous waste: No major solid wastes except the soils from trenches and no
hazardous wastes other than oils used for maintenance are envisaged from pipeline construction
and operation activities.
Flora and Fauna: No rare, endangered, endemic or threatened species of plants are envisaged
to be located along the proposed route. Pipeline is not passing through any dense forest which is
conducive for existence of significant wild life in the area.
Socio-Economic: The proposed activities shall generate indirect employment in the region.
1.11. POWER REQUIREMENT

Required power for sectionalizing valve stations (SV) shall be drawn from nearest local power source
of State Electricity Board. However, DG sets will be kept stand by at pumping and storage installation.
The details of the DG sets are as below:
`
Dispatch Terminal- AWA: 1 X 250 KVA

Receipt Station- SALAWAS: 1 X 160 KVA
SV Stations: 2 X 25 KVA
1.10. WORKFORCE ARRANGEMENTS

The construction works will be temporary, except at sectionalized valve stations. The
laborers will be deployed at various locations depending upon the requirement
during the construction period. Temporary camp sites will be set up with all treatment
facilities near development facilities for construction purposes. Construction workers
will be preferably drawn from nearby villages.
1.11. ABANDONMENT OF OPERATIONS

At the completion of the pipeline laying and commissioning program, an orderly
withdrawal of all personnel and the removal of all construction & testing equipment’s
and non-fixed items from the site will be undertaken. Upon completion of pipeline
laying, the soil and top spoil will be backfilled into pits and the area will be restored
close to normal. The land will be restored to its near original condition except at the
permanent installations like SV stations.
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore PageNo:1.21 Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

Chapter 1
RA DMP - Introduction
2.1 GENESIS OF THE PROJECT
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as “HPCL") is a Navaratna

PSU and one of the largest oil refining and marketing company in India. The company has
commissioned Mundra Delhi pipeline in the year 2007 for the movement of white oil products to
Northern Indian markets with end terminal at Bahadurgarh (in Haryana) having rail wagon
loading facilities and smaller distribution terminals at Palanpur, Ajmer, Jaipur and Rewari
enroute.
To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed spur line project from
Awa (District Pali) to Salawas, Near Jodhpur along with change in service from HSD to MS in Two
Nos. of Tankages and interphase of Two Nos. of Tankages, Two no. SV Stations and allied facilities.
The pipeline will originate from Awa near Pali and terminate at Salawas near Jodhpur in the state of
Rajasthan.
HPCL proposes to lay 10 “ pipeline as spur line from existing Awa Pumping Station of MDPL to
existing Marketing Depot at Salawas, near Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
The retail market in and around Jodhpur is currently being catered to by Ajmer & Jaipur Terminal of
Mundra Delhi Pipeline.
Laying of Spur line to Salawas from Awa Pumping Station will result in savings in road transportation
that are likely to be generated, by feeding the Salawas depot via pipeline, instead of the present
arrangement of feeding from Ajmer and Jaipur depots via road movement .
RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR AWA-SALAWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
The product shall be made available from the existing Mundra- Delhi Pipeline. The proposed
pipeline shall have a thruput of 0.619 MMTPA in Phase I (2018-19) and 0.785 MMTPA in Phase II
(2023-24).
The Pipeline Route passes through the districts of Pali and Jodhpur in the State of Rajasthan.
Proposed cross country multiproduct white oil spur pipeline will transport petroleum products like
MS, HSD and SKO from the existing AWA Pumping Station of Mundra Delhi Pipeline (MDPL) to
existing marketing depot at Salawas (Near Jodhpur), Rajasthan
Table 2.1Salient features of the Awa — Salawas Pipeline Project

Sr.
Feature Details
No.
1 Total Length 92.961 km long 10" Dia
2 Diameter of the pipeline 10"
3 Pump Station 1
4 Products to be transported BS -III MS, BS -IV MS, HSD and SKO
Throughput (MMT) 0.619 MMTPA (Ph-I)
2018-2019
5
2023-2024 0.755 MMTPA (Ph-II).
Location Type originating Pumping
Station Existing
Awa
Chainage 0.0 Kms.
Latitude 25°-35'-09"
6 Longitude 73°-40'-23"
Elevation 296 Mts.MSL
Marketing Terminal at Salawas Existing

Chainage 92.961 Kms.
Latitude 26°-08'-12"
Longitude 73°-01’-10’
Elevation 192 Mts. MSL
Features of the Awa- Salawas route
8 Canal crossings Eight numbers of canals in Rajasthan
Canals/minors 08
Table 2.1 Salient features of the Awa — Salawas Pipeline Project

Sr.
Feature Details
No.
Nil. However, at roads and canal crossing are
Forest Length Social /protected forests. No reserved forest are
9 present on the pipeline route
3 numbers Drains and 2 numbers Nallahs in Rajasthan

10 Drains & Nallahs
11 Rail crossings 02
12 River (Seasonal) 06
Highway / Road crossings
NH 02
13 SH 03
Other Road Crossings 49
Cart Track 42
Other lines Crossing 44
14 Environmentally sensitive areas within None
project area
The pipeline will originate from Awa near Pali District

16 Districts Enroute and terminate at Salawas near Jodhpur in the state of
Rajasthan.
17 List of Villages 30
2.2 LOCATION OF THE PROJECT

The proposed pipeline will pass through the state of Rajasthan and will pass through the
districts/ Tehsils of state as mentioned in the Table 2.2:
Table 2.2 Location of the Awa — Salawas Pipeline Project

Chainage in Km Length Total Length
Sr. No. Tehsil District
From To Km Km
1 2 3 4 7
1 Pali Pali 0/000.00 76.125 76.125 76.125
2 Luni Jodhpur 76.125 92.961 16.095 16.095
TOTAL 92.961
Figure 2.1 shows the geographical location of the proposed pipeline route passing through the states
of Rajasthan.
Figure 2.1 Geographical Location of the Awa- Salawas Pipeline Project
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.

AWA - SALAWAS PIPELINE
Page No: 2.5

2.2 NEED FOR THE PROJECT

As a consequence of the rapid rate of industrialization in India, (‹Tel needs are increasing at an
equally rapid rate and the supply-demand gap is widening and steps must be taken to address this
issue.
Overland transport of fuels by trucks is relatively uneconomical, unsafe, and is a contributor to

environmental degradation in terms of the fuel consumed and pollutants released by vehicles in
transit and by accidents and spillages (common on Indian roads).
Pipelines are internationally recognized as the preferred alternative for transport of fuels from the point
of view of safety, economy and relative environmentally friendliness. The qualities of underground
pipelines that make them desirable from these angles are that they are buried underground at a
minimum depth of 1.2 m as per applicable OISD standard, are controlled by SCADA systems which
allow continuous monitoring and rapid closure of valves, etc., and that they are routed to avoid human
settlements and ecologically sensitive areas.
The laying of transport pipelines for fuels (such as in proposed project), are an improvement to
environment as they greatly reduce transport fuel usage and movement of heavy vehicles. The Ministry
of Environment and Forests, Govt. of India, has recognized significance and viability of transportation
of Petroleum products through underground pipeline, therefore EIA report is required to be submitted
for oil/gas pipelines. The main aim of the project is to avoid the need for costly and environmental
damaging overland transport by trucks, and to lay pipeline networks and ensure more reliable
supplies. Petroleum Products, which will be transported through underground pipeline from Village
Awa in District Pali to Village Salawas of District Jodhpur, in the state of Rajasthan, is relatively clean
burning fuel and has advantages over other fuels (such as coal). From the environmental angle, its
advantage is that it burns cleaner and emits significantly less pollutants, including particulate matter and
SO2.
The transportation of petroleum products is known to have following advantages also:

• Safe & Reliable mode of transportation
• Economical & Easily Accessible
• Long term Infrastructural Option
• Reduces traffic congestion
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: 2.6 Green Circle, Inc. - Baroda
 Minimal effect due to natural calamities

 Optimal land cost.
 Energy Efficient Solutions
2.3.1 PIPELINE ROUTE SELECTION CRITERIA

A key environmental mitigation measure already implemented is the routing of pipeline to avoid high
environmentally sensitivity areas. The route of the Awa Salawas pipeline has been finalized taking
into consideration the following factors:
• Connectivity between supply and demand centers

• Least disturbance to the environment
• Least disturbance to human habitations during construction and operation phase;
• Avoiding environmentally sensitive areas such as sanctuaries. Biospheres. Marine Parks and
National parks etc.
• To avoid any disturbance to archaeological sites and any areas of ecological significance or
sensitivity;
2.4 ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION

Transportation by pipeline is comparatively less expensive than the other modes of transport, both
in the capital and operating costs. If a good network of pipelines is implemented throughout the
country, this will ensure that the pipeline-transported products will be available to the consumers at
a lower cost than alternate modes of transport.
One of the additional advantages of pipeline transportation is that the scope of economic offences
like theft / pilferage and adulteration of products would be almost negligible and the consumers will
get immense benefit and value for money.
2.4.1 CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY

The pipeline transportation would avoid movement of equivalent fuel energy by road or rail, resulting
in savings of petroleum products. These savings in petroleum products and road/rail vehicles would
be available for movement of alternative products. Any savings in petroleum products would reduce
India's dependence on imports, thus saving valuable foreign exchange.
Also, road transport gets hampered by state-wide / countrywide transport strikes. There is no stink
impedance to pipeline operations. In addition, the load on the road and rail network well reduced
and could be utilised for the transportation of other essential cargo.
2.4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL FRIENDLINESS

The pipeline will result in decongestion of roads, eventually minimizing road accidents and
environmental pollution that are generated by other means of transport. This includes bot h air as
well as noise pollution.
Also, the pipeline. being underground, will provide lesser direct contact with the populace thereby
reducing its impact as well as provide better overall security.
2.4.3 ADVANTAGES OF PIPELINE PROJECT

This pipeline network is planned keeping in view the above mentioned advantages. Pipelines have
proved to be the most environment friendly and safest mode of transportation of hydrocarbon in liquid
forms. Specifically in India, there are over 10,000 km of pipelines transporting various hydrocarbon
products to industrial and domestic consumers. These pipelines have not only contributed towards
the economic development of the region, but have, when compared with other modes of
transportation such as rail and road, helped in preserving the environment. Guidelines for minimum
cover of the pipeline from OISD Standard 141 are represented in Table 2.3
Table 2.3: OISD (Std. 141) Guidelines for Minimum Cover

Sr. No. Location Min. Cover (m)
1 Industrial, commercial & residential areas 1.2
2 Minor water crossings / canals 1.5
3 Rocky areas 1.0
4 Uncased / cased road crossings 1.2
5 Rail crossings 1.7
6 River crossings 2.5
7 Marshy Land/Creek Area 1.5
2.5 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The study is aimed at generating directional pointers with respect to potential risk to the
Personnel and property due to the above mentioned pipelines.
2.6 METHODOLOGY OF QRA STUDY

The methodologies for QRA study are as follows:
• Hazard Identification
• Generation of scenarios for accidental release of the product due to leak or rupture along
the pipeline route
• Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis for operational hazards
• Computation of damage distances based on consequence analysis and vulnerability
analysis for credible and worst case scenarios
• Event Tree Analysis
• Risk Evaluation
• Delineation of risk mitigation measures
2.7 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

• Evaluation of organization of disaster management plan for the facilities
• Delineation of risk prevention and mitigation measures for the proposed facilities
Chapter 3
RA DMP - MCA Analysis
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of
an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or toxic hazards to human health
and environment.
Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to the
public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous events at an industry and
categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible events are
calculated for different combinations of weather conditions to simulate worst possible scenario. These
consequence predi4ions are combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the entire facility.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) considers probability of occurrence of an accident and magnitude
of its consequence. Hence, one way to estimate the risk for an undesired event (disaster) is to evaluate
the expected frequency per unit time and the expe4ed damage, which is magnitude oi a consequence.
Risk (R) can be mathematically expressed as R= f x D where, R is the risk (individual or societal), f is the
frequency of occurrence of an undesired event and D is the expected damage due to likely occurrence of
a disaster.
QRA is categorized in two phases
The first phase deals with accidental release of hazardous chemicals and its effect on population &
environment. This phase is termed as f'4aximum Credible Accident (F1CA) analysis and quantifies risk in
terms of extent of damage. The recommendations based on study help in containing the hazards within
the plant boundary limits, thus minimizing the damages.
The second phase of QRA encompasses computation of risk in terms of likelihood of failure of systems
and evaluation of risk with recourse to surrounding population and finally suggesting
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: Green Circle, Inc. - Baroda
3.110
risk mitigating measures which help in formulating onsite and offsite emergency preparedness plan.
MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum damage
distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include quantification of the
probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the selection of accident scenarios for MLA analysis
is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in
accident analysis.
Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in order to assess the
magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards
in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss o£ life, property and ecological imbalances.
3.1.1. METHODOLOGY OF MCA ANALYSIS

The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of
potential vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:
• Operating manual
• Flow diagram and P&I diagrams
• Detailed design parameters
• Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals
• Detailed area layout
• Past accident data
Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:
• Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure occurs.

• Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of hazardous material
• Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities and
atmospheric stability classes for heat radiation and pressure waves
• Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental release
Of chemicals.
3.2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the generation of
accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further investigation are subsequently
determined by its significance, normally using a cut-off or threshold quantity
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the risk it presents to the
employees and the neighboring community. In principle, both probability and consequences should
be considered, but there are occasions where it either the probability or the consequence can show
to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be made on just one factor.
During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken into
Account.
• Chemical identities
• Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.
• The types and design of process units
• The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and
• The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapors or mists, fire, explosion, large quantities
stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or
releases
3.3. MCA ANALYSIS

MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards and compute the consequent
effects in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, toxic releases, vapor cloud ’explosion etc.
A list of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage
and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the
effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding
environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. Flow chart of accidental release of
hazardous chemicals is presented in Fig 3.1
A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized as an accident with maximum damage
potential, which is still believed to be probable.
Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The extent of I fee damage
is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the material. In the present
report the consequences for flammable hazards are considered and the damages caused due to
such releases are assessed with recourse to MCA analysis.
MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident.
Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly the level of probability that is still believed to be
credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat arbitrary. In practice, the selection of accident scenarios
representative for MCA Analysis is done on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the
field of risk analysis studies, especially accident analysis.
Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA analysis. MCA
analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and calculate the consequent
effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic releases, vapor cloud explosion etc. A
host of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage
and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon
the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the
surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed.
As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and storage units and
activities, which are believed to represent the highest level of risk for the surroundings in terms of
damage distances. For this selection the following factors have been taken into account:
• Type of material viz. flammable or toxic,

• Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity and
• Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and presence of
incompatible materials.
In addition to be above factors, the location of a unit or activity with respect to adjacent activities is
taken into consideration to account for the potential escalation of an accident. This phenomenon is
known as the Domino Effect. The units and activities, which have been selected on the basis of the
above factors, are summarized; accident scenarios are established
In hazard identification studies, while effect and damage calculations are carried out in MCA analysis
Studies.
Flammable substances on release may cause Jet fire and less likely unconfined vapour cloud
explosion causing possible damage to the surrounding area. The extent of damage depends upon
the nature of the release. The release of flammable materials and subsequent ignition result in
heat radiation wave or vapour cloud depending upon the Flammability and its physical state. Damage
distances due to release of hazardous materials depend on atmospheric stability and wind speed.
It is important to visualize the consequence of the release of such substances and the damage
caused to the surrounding areas. Computation of damage distances are carried out at various
atmospheric stability conditions for various wind velocities and the result is tabulated. Pasquill-Giffard
atmospheric stability classes with corresponding weather conditions are listed in Table 3.1
Table 3.1 Pasquill-Giffard Atmospheric Stability

Sr. Stability
Class Weather Conditions
No.
01 A Very Unstable - Sunny, Light Wind
02 A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy
03 B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy
04 B/C Moderately Unstable - Moderate sunny and moderate wind
05 C Moderately Unstable - Very windy/sunny or overcast/light wind
06 C/D Moderately Unstable - Moderate sun and high wind
07 D Neutral - Little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night
08 E Moderately Stable - Less overcast and less windy night
09 F Stable - Night with moderate clouds and light/moderate wind
10 G Very Stable — Possibly Fog
3.3.1. FIRE, EXPLOSION AND TOXIC SCENARIOS

Combustible materials within their flammable limits may ignite and burn if exposed Lo an ignition
source of sufficient energy. On process plants, this normally occurs as a result of a leakage or
spillage. Depending on the physical properties of the material and the operating parameters, the
combustion of material in a plant may take on a number of forms like jet fire, flash fire and pool fire.
3.3.1.1 JET FIRE

Jet fire occurs when (flammable material of a high exit velocity ignites. In process industries this
may be due to design (flares) or an accidental. Ejection of flammable material from a vessel, pipe
or pipe flange may give rise to a jet fire and in some instances the jet flame could have substantial
"reach". Depending on wind speed, the flame may tilt and impinge on pipeline, equipment or
structures. The thermal radiation from these fires may cause injury to people or damage equipment
some distance from the source of the flames.
3.3.1.2 FLASH FIRE

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud resulting from a release of flammable
material into the open air, which after mixing with air, ignites. A flash fire results from the ignition of a
released flammable cloud in which there is essentially no increase in combustion rate. The ignition
source could be electric spark, a hot surface, and friction between moving parts of a machine or an
open fire.
Flash fire may occur due to its less vapor temperature than ambient temperature. Hence, as a result
of a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative buoyancy of cold vapors and subsequently by
the atmospheric turbulence. After the release and dispersion of the flammable fuel the resulting
vapor cloud is ignited and when the fuel vapor is not mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results
in diffusion fire burning. Therefore, the rate at which the fuel vapor and air are mixed together during
combustion determines the rate of burning in the flash fire.
The main dangers of flash fire are radiation and direct flame contact. The size of the flammable cloud
determines the area of possible direct flame contact effects. Radiation effects on a target depend on
several factors including its distance from the flames, flame height, flame emissive power, local
atmospheric transitivity and cloud size. Most of the time, flash combustion lasts for no more than a
few seconds.
3.3.1.3. VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

The Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) begins with a release of a large quantity of flammable vaporizing
liquid or gas from a storage tank, transport vessel or pipeline producing a dangerous
' Overpressure. These explosions follow a well-determined pattern. There are basically four
features, which must be present for an effective vapor cloud explosion to occur with an
effective blast. These are:
First, the release material must be flammable and at a suitable condition of temperature and
pressure which depends on the chemical. The materials which come under this category, range
from liquefied gases under pressure (e.g. butane, propane); ordinary flammable liquids (e.g.
cyclohexane, naphtha) to non-liquefied flammable gases (e.g. ethylene, acetylene)
Second, before the ignition, a cloud of sufficient size must have been formed. Normally ignition
delays of few minutes are considered the most probable for generating the vapor cloud
explosions
Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range of the material to
cause extensive overpressure
Fourth the flame speed determines the blast effects of the vapor cloud explosions, which can
vary greatly
The flammable content of a gas cloud is calculated by three-dimensional integration of the

concentration profiles, which fall within the flammable limits. If the gas cloud ignites, two
situations can occur, namely non-explosive combustion (flash fire) and explosive combustion
(flash fire + explosion).
3.3.1.4 POOL FIRE
Vapors of flammable liquids. When spilled outside due to leak in the. Storage tank or process
unit can give rise to a flammable mixture with air which when ignited is called as pool fire.
Burning of the spilled liquid can affect the other process units. Main hazards of pool fire are due
to the heat radiations generated.
3.3.1.5. LOWER AND UPPER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT
In case of any spillage and leakages of hydrocarbons / flammable material, probability of getting
ignited is depending on whether the air borne mixture is in the flammable region. The Lower
flammability limit corresponds to minimum proportion of combustible vapor in air for combustion.
The Upper flammability limit Correspond to maximum proportion of combustible
Vapor in air for combustion and the concentration range lying between the lower and the upper limit is
called as flammable range.
Figure 3.1: Accidental Release of Chemicals: A Scenario
Top
Radiation
TOXICITY
OMPUTION
3.3.2. MODELS FOR THE CALCULATION OF HEAT LOAD AND SHOCK WAVES
If a flammable gas or liquid is released, damage resulting from heat radiation or explosion may
occur on ignition. Models used in this study for the effects in the event of immediate ignition (torch
and pool fire) and the ignition of a gas cloud will be discussed in succession. These models calculate
the heat radiation or peak overpressure as a function of the distance from the torch, the ignited pool
or gas cloud. The physical significance of the various heat loads is depicted in Table 3.2
Table 3.2 List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads

Heat Type of Damage Intensity
Sr.
Loads
No. (kW/m2) Damage to Equipment Damage to People
100% lethality in 1 minute, 1%
01 37.5 Damage to process equipment
lethality in 10 seconds
Minimum Energy required to ignite 50% lethality in 1 minute,
02 25.0
wood Significant Injury in 10 seconds
Maximum thermal radiation i ntens it y
03 19.0 allowed on thermally unprotected -
equipment
Minimum Energy required to melt
04 12.5 1 % lethality in 1 minute
plastic tubing
First degree burns, causes pain
05 4.0 - for exposure longer than 10
seconds
- Causes no discomfort on long
06 1.6 exposures
3.3.2. MODEL FOR PRESSURE WAVE

A pressure wave can be caused by gas cloud explosion. The following damage criteria are assumed
as a result of the peak overpressure of a pressure wave: 0.03 bar over pressure wave is taken as
the limit for the occurrence of wounds as a result of flying fragments of glass
Following assumptions are used to translate an explosion in terms of damage to the

Surrounding area:
• Within the contour area of the exploding gas cloud, Casualties are due to burns or
Asphyxiation. Houses and buildings in this zone will be severely damaged.
• In houses with serious damage, it is assumed that one out of eight persons present will be killed
as a result of the building collapse. Within the zone of a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of
death in houses is 0.9 x 1/8 = 0.1125, and in the zone with a peak over pressure
of 0.1 bar the probability of death is 0.1 x 1/8 = 0.0125, i.e. one out of eighty people will be
Killed.
The significance of the peak over pressure 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar, 0.03 bar and 0.01 bar are
depicted in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves

Human Injury Structural Damage
Peak Over Pressure Peak Over Pressure

Type of Damage Type of Damage
(bar) (bar)
5-8 100% Lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)
Repairable (10%
3.5-5 50% Lethality
damage)
2-3 Threshold Lethality 0.03 Damage of Glass
1.33-2 Severe Lung Damage 0.01 Crack of Windows
1-1.33 50% Eardrum rupture - -
3.3.3. VULNERABILITY MODELS

Vulnerability models are used in order to determine how people are injured by exposure to heat load.
Such models are designed on the basis of animal experiments or on the basis of the analysis of
injuries resulting from accidents; which have occurred.
Vulnerability models often make use of a probit function. In this function, a link is made between the
heat load and the percentage of people exposed to a particular type of injury.
It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered or gas cloud will be burnt to death or will asphyxiate
Human fatality is a function of heat flux and exposure time. The probit expressions for the prediction of
mortallty due to thermal radiation from fire scenarios are proportional to the product of t and q4/3. The
probit equation (ion usually used is that proposed by Eisenberg and coworkers*
Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 In (10-4 q4/3t)
In which,
Pr = Probit the measure of the percentage of people exposed to a particular injury
t = exposure time in seconds
q = thermal load in W/m2

For 1% lethality in the exposed persons the corresponding probit value is 2.67.
Table 3.4 gives time is seconds for percentage of fatality at various heat
radiations
Table 3.4 Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects
Seconds Exposure for % Fatality
Heat Flux
(kW/m2) 1% 50% 99%
1.6 500 1300 3200
4.0 150 370 930
12.5 30 80 200
37.5 8 20 50
3.4. COMPUTATION OF DAMAGE DISTANCES

It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered or gas cloud will be burnt to death or will
asphyxiate. Human fatality is a function of heat flux and exposure time. The probit expressions for
the prediction. Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have been
computed at 2.5F, 3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2.5, 3 and 5 are wind velocities
in m/s and F and D are atmospheric stability classes. These weather conditions have been selected
to accommodate worst case scenarios to get maximum effective distances. DNV based PHAST
Micro 6.53 software has been used to carry out consequence analysis. Damage distances computed
for fire and explosion scenarios for the pipeline facilities in Awa Salawas Pipeline are described below.
JET FIRE
This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 10 mm, 20 mm and 50 mm in Pipeline at
various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The
computed damage distances for pipeline failure for 10 mm, 20 mm and 50 mm leak sizes at heat loads of
37.5 KW/m2, 12.5 KW/m2 and 4.0 kW/m2 given in Table 3.5.
Damage Distance (m) for Various

Scenario Considered Leak Leak Source Weather Heat Loads
Size Strength
(mm)
37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2
2.5 F - 21.15 45.23
10 2.5 3D - 23.23 46.52
Pipeline Failure at Awa 5D 10.25 25.32 47.52
Dispatch Station 2.5 F - 31.55 65.53
20 6.25 3D - 33.63 67.15
5D 11.52 35.47 69.22
2.5 F - 51.55 85.53
50 15 3D 10.25 53.63 86.15
5D 13.10 55.47 88.24
2.5 F - 21.15 45.23
10 2.5 3D - 23.23 46.52
Pipeline Failure at Salawas 5D 10.25 25.32 47.52
Receiving Station
2.5 F - 31.55 65.53
20 6.25 3D - 33.63 67.15
5D 11.52 35.47 69.22
2.5 F - 51.55 85.53
50 15 3D 10.25 53.63 86.15
5D 13.18 55.47 88.24
Table 3.5 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario
POOL FIRE
various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities.
The computed damage distances for pipeline failure for 10 mm, 20 mm and 50 mm leak sizes at heat
loads of 37.5 KW/m2, 12.5 KW/m2 and 4.0 KW/m2 are given in Table 3.6
Table 3.6 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario

Damage Distance (m) for
Scenario Leak Size Source Pool Weather Various Heat Loads
Considered (mm) Strength Radius 37.5 12.5 4.0
kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2
2.5 F - - 65.14
10 2.5 5.48 3D - - 67.52
Pipeline Failure at Awa
Dispatch Station 5D - - 68.12
2.5 F - 77.59 78.9
20 6.25 6.57 3D - 100.6 101.22
5D - 124.05 124.22
50 15 11.21 2.5 F - 88.59 89.10
3D - 107.58 109.53
Damage Distance (m) for

Scenario Leak Size Source Pool Weather Various Heat Loads
Considered (mm) Strength Radius
37.5 1 2.5 4.0
kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2
5D - 133.52 133.75
25F - - 65.14
10 25 5.48 3D - - 67.52
5D - - 68.12
Pipeline Failure at Salawas
2.5 F - 77.59 78. 9
Receiving Station 20 6.25 6.57 3D - 100.6 101.22
SD - 124.05 124.22
2.5 F - 88.59 89.10
50 15 11.21 3D - 107.58 109.53
5D - 133.52 133.75
Table 3.6 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario
FLASH FIRE
various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The
computed damage distances for other process units at LFL distances are given in Table 3.7
Table 3.7 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario

Leak Size Source LFL
Scenario Considered LFL Weather Distance
(mm) Strength
Concentration (m)
2.5 F 4.58
10 2.5 3D 4.01
7000 5D 3.85
Pipeline Failure at Awa
2.5 F 5.87
Dispatch Station 20 6.25 3D 5.11
5D 4.97
2.5 F 21.13
50 15 3D 19.55
SD 16.86
2.5 F 4.58
10 25 3D 4.01
Pipeline Failure at Salawas 5D 3.85
Receiving Station 7000 2.5 F 5.87
6.25 3D 5.11
20
5D 4. 97
2.5 F 21.13
50 15 3D 19.55
5D 16.86
VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities.
The computed damage distances for Pipeline Facilities are given in Table 3.8
Table 3.8 Consequence Analysis for Vapor Cloud Explosion

Damage Distance (m) for Various
Scenario Leak Size Source Weather Heat Loads
Considered (mm) Strength
0.03 0.1 bar 0.3 bar
bar
2.5 F 29.38 20.08 19.52

10 2.5 13.58 11.58
3D 18.98
Pipeline Failure at Awa 5D 17.41 12.51 10.51
Dispatch Station 2.5 F 39.31 25.00 23.87
20 6.25 3D 28.29 14.73 13.66
5D 27.41 14.51 13.49
2.5 F 58.84 41.25 40.41
50 15 3D 37.52 29.54 28.51
5D 36.11 29.15 28.22
2.5 F 29.38 20.08 19.52
10 2.5 3D 18.98 13.58 11.58
5D 17.41 12.51 10.51
Pipeline Failure at Salawas
Receiving Station 2.5 F 39.31 25.00 23.87
20 6.25 3D 28.29 14.73 13.66
5D 27.41 14.51 13.49
2.5F 58.84 41.25 40.41
50 15 3D 37.52 29.54 28.51
5D 36.11 29.15 28.22
Chapter 4
Risk Mitigation Measures
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum Credible Accident (MCA)
Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed for the identification and screening of
vulnerable sections and consequence analysis was carried out for the accidental release scenarios
of hazardous chemicals at various atmospheric conditions. The following are mitigation measures for
pipeline hazards
4.2 PIPELINE HAZARDS

PIPELINE EXTERNAL CORROSION PROTECTION AND MONITORING
Pipeline should be epoxy coated line. Periodic intelligent pigging survey and pipe-to-soil potential
surveys shall be conducted for pipeline health monitoring in accordance with the requirement of
codes and best industry practices. Following are some common design criteria used in insulation
system design for piping application
• Providing personnel protection

• Limiting or retarding surface condensation
• Providing process control
• Economic optimization or energy conservation
• Providing fire protection
• Providing freeze protection
• Providing noise control
SECTIONALIZING BLOCK VALVES

• Main line block valves should be provided as per the requirements of ANSI/ASME B 31.4 and
OISD 141 based on population density and land use along tone pipeline route. Provision should be
made for safe blow down of gas contained in each section of the pipeline into the atmosphere.
• Valve maintenance should be performed every six months to ensure effective operability.
`

PIGGING FACILITIES
• For maintenance of the pipeline. pig launching and pig-receiving facilities shout J toe provided
at the beginning and end. The launchers and receivers should be suitable for intelligent pigging.
• Pigging is partly an experience-driven technique. From a wide selection of pig types, the
knowledge operator must choose an appropriate model, design the pigging protocol including
pig speed, distance and driving force and assess the progress during the operation. The evaluator
should be satisfied that the pigging operation is indeed beneficial and effective in removing
corrosive products from the line in a timely fashion.
PIPELINE TESTING
• All welds should be radiographed and hydrostatic testing of the pipeline should be performed at
a pressure up to 1.4 times the design pressure of the pipeline system based on the design code
requirements. The test pressure should be held for a minimum period of 24 hours. This will ensure
complete structural integrity of the pipeline.
LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM

• State-of-the-art Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system supported by leak
detection software module, precision instrument and dedicated communication system should
be installed to monitor the integrity of the pipeline. The shutdown system of the pipeline will act
to close the sectionalizing valves based on leak detection system and will alert the pipeline
operator about the potential leaks along the pipeline route. Typically,the time required to detect /
confirm a leak, raising alarm and taking action to isolate the leaking... section is around 100-150
seconds. The entire pipeline system should be monitored continuously from a control station
having a SCADA system. The remote control and monitoring are typically done from a centralized
system on a 24/7 basis the systems are typically computer based and most have a back-up
computer and other redundant features. The centralized SCADA system typically communicates
with the field and remote devices through a dedicated communication network such as land
telephone lines, satellite system, microwave towers or directional radio frequencies with most
system having reluctant communication frequencies.
• The measures that should be employed to protect security of SCADA systems include:
• Maintain integrity of communication parts throughout the system
 Verification of transmitted signals on regular basis

 Inspection of status of field devices through fixed time schedule
 Regular feedback of control signals to check its reliability
 Database protection from viruses to avoid system failure
 Accessing control to the control center by defined procedure
4.3 PUMPS
• Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps will be observed as per equipment manual
4.4 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
• Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of responsibility for the fire
service. Following are the general recommendations for the proposed facility
• Following firefighting facilities can be used to tackle the fire.
o Water supply
o Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation
o Foam system
o Water fog and sprinkler system
o Mobile Firefighting equipment
Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware of the safety
precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap due to pipeline. This can effectively be done by
conducting the safetv training programs
o Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line

o Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in emergencies
o Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness and efficiency of the
DMP and EPP and records should be maintained
o Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of emergencies should be
installed at various locations
4.5ELECTRICITY HAZARD
• All electrical equipments shall be provide cl with proper earthing. Earthed electrode shall
periodically tested and maintained
• Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including the operator’s room to
carry out safe shut down, ready identification of firefighting facilities such as fire water pumps
and fire alarm stations.
• All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease
• Use of approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse tongs,
discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder and not wearing metal ring
and chain.
• Flame and shock detectors and central fire annunciation system for fire safety should be
provided.
• Temperature sensitive alarm and protective relays to make alert and disconnect equipment before
overheating
• Prevent higher humidity and temperature near electric insulations
• Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be prevented by providing
fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection
• Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used for electrical fires
4.6 RISKS TO PERSONNEL

• Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management procedures and competency
assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to carry out jobs safely end without
causing any injury to self, colleagues and system.
• For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow the safety practices
/ procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If every team member starts working with
this attitude, zero accident rate is not a distant dream.
• Any operation is a team effort and its success depend upon the sincerity, efficiency and
motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty of a single person, but it
is everyone's job.
4.7 TRAINING
• On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a long way in
improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of the
FOR AWA-SALWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
facility, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with emergency situations
arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary for industries to
prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency preparedness plan.
Chapter 5
Disaster Management Plan
5.1 PREAMBLE
In spite of various preventive and precautionary measures taken in works, the possibility of a mishap
cannot be totally ruled out. Hence the need to prepare emergency plan for dealing with the incidences
which may still occur and are likely to affect life and property in the residential areas and other places
are identified in this plan. Such an emergency could be the result of malfunction or non-observance
of operating instructions. It could, at times, be the consequences of acts outside the control of
residents / employees like severe storm, flooding, or deliberate acts of arson or sabotage.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) desires to lay a multiproduct spur pipeline for the
distribution of products from Awa to Salawas. The pipeline shall be laid to transfer EURO-III MS,
EURO-III HSD and SKO from the existing MDPL Pumping Station at Awa in Rajasthan up to Salawas
Depot (existing) Rajasthan. The products shall be made available to this pipeline from existing
Mundra-Delhi pipeline. The length of the pipeline shall be 92.22 km (approx.)
5.2 INTRODUCTION
The objective of the plan is to formally document steps to handle emergency situations that may arise
due to leakage/spillage of the various chemicals and fuel which may lead to explosion and/or tire in
the plant/ pipeline route. The objective of the disaster Management Plan (DMP) is to ensure that the
effect on employees and public at large is minimized and normalcy is restored within shortest
possible time.
This DMP is prepared to meet any such grave emergency which can occur due to fire in the plant,
missile hit due to air raid, heavy leakage of flammable liquid or gas or explosion (internal or external).
An Emergency Response Plan (action plan) has been drawn to fix responsibility and actions to be
taken by various groups to meet and contain the emergency within shortest possible time and with
minimum loss to men, material, machines and property. It is the responsibility of all
`
individuals in their respective areas to ensure the success of this plan. This plan shall be circulated for
benefit / training of all individuals working in the Project.
5.2.1 FACILITIES PROVIDED AT STATION ALONG THE PIPELINE ROUTE
A cross country pipeline of 92.22 km length from HPCL’s proposed dispatch station at Awa.
• 1nos. Pigging station at Awa.

• 2 nos. SV stations
• 1nos. Pig Receiving Station at Salawas
• Augmentation of Tankage storage capacities at existing Salawas marketing Depot.
Awa Pumping Station (control Room 02935-211200 & M-80030903870)
Dispatch station, one Unidirectional Pig launcher suitable for 10" pipeline.
As per the hydraulic analysis there is no need of installation of main line pump and Booster
pump at Awa.
Receipt station cum marketing Depot at Salawas
• Receipt Uni-directional Pig Receiver suitable for 10" pipeline along with Basket
• Filters, Control valve, Density meter, flow meter etc.
• 2 nos. SV stations
• SV stations with extended stem main line valves and other related facilities.
5.2.2. INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL & COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

a. Local Gauges (Pressure)

b. Pressure & Temperature Transmitters and Switches
c. Thermal Safety Valve (TSV)
d. Main line Sectionalizing Valve / Isolation Valves / Actuators & accessories
e. Metering Skid
f. Pressure control valve
g. Surge relief System
h. Optical Fiber Cable
i. Control Panel and accessories

j. Fire Detection systems
k. Fire Alarm Panel
l. Sulphur analyzer
m. Density meter
n. Telecommunication
o. SCADA / RTU
p. Instrument Control & Signal Cables
q. Junction boxes & cable glands
r. SS Tubes and fittings
SCADA system: The SCADA system aims at ensuring effective and reliable control, management
and supervision of the pipeline from the centralized locations using Remote Telemetry Units. The
system shall be adequately sized to cater for complete monitoring and control requirements of the
proposed pipeline.
a. Transmitters and Switches

b. Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)
c. Control Panel and accessories
d. Fire Detection systems
e. Density Transmitters
f. TAS System integration
g. Radar Gauges, Density & Pressure instruments for Tank Farm System
h. Instrument Control & Signal tables
i. Junction boxes & cable glands
5.2.3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

New telecommunication system equipment shall be provided at SV stations and Salawas Receipt
station to meet that communication requirement of the operation & control requirement of the pipeline
and it shall be integrated to the existing system at Awa. For this system optical fiber cable-based
system is proposed to be provided. The OFC system shall be linked with VHF system for security of
Pipeline. Within plant & for patrolling HF / VHF system is provided. All plant walkie-talkies sets are
intrinsically safe. CCTV shall be provided at all stations
including SVs. Other facilities viz. video conferencing, internet connectivity and ERP for
Pipeline operations shall be provided.
The telecommunication system shall consist of SCADA system, PA system, EPABX system, CCTV
system, IP based telephone system, Video conferencing system, NMS system & VHF system for plant
communication.
Telecom system shall be OFC based. Necessary STM based network system in all Stations and necessary
VOICE, DATA & SCADA interface required as per detailed specifications shall be supplied. Explosion proof /
weather proof telephones shall be provided.
The system (SDH) shall be interfaced / Integrated with existing telecom network at Awa station
Telecom equipments shall be interfaced to the existing NMS at Awa station.
5.2.4 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES
Fire Tender & Gully Sucker (ERV) at Awa
The fire protection facilities envisaged at Salawas station for additional tanks shall be as per OISD
117 guidelines
a. Fire water system - Pressurized and integrated with existing fire water network.
b. Foam system for additional tanks
c. First Aid / Fire Fighting equipment and safety accessories
d. Mobile Fire Fighting equipment.
e. Additional Fire Water Tanks and Pumps as per OISD-116/117 (latest) The
facilities provided shall consist of following units:
• Additional Fire water storage tanks if required

• New Fire water pumps and jockey pumps if required
• Fire water piping
• Fire Hydrants & High-Volume Long-Range Monitors
• Foam system for new tanks
 Water/foam monitors for new tanks

 Fixed water spray systems for new tanks
 Mobile Fire Fighting equipment
 Portable extinguishers
 Hydrocarbon Detectors
 Manual Call Point (Break Glass unit) integrated with Fire Alarm System
5.3 NEED FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Following are the general types of Emergency /Disaster which lead to preparation of
disaster management plan:
FIRE
a. At Stations
b. At cross country locations.
LEAKAGE OF OIL DUE TO DAMAGE
a. To equipments.
b. To mainline.
OPERATIONAL
a. Fire at station: Due to leakage of oil, Short circuit Spark from Engine exhaust, Mechanical
Seal failure etc.
b. Fire at Mainline. Leakage pilferage, Sabotage, Burst of Pipeline etc. Leakage from mainline
due to corrosion
c. Oil spillage: Leakage at stations due to line burst or open valves /flanges or failure of gaskets or
overflow of tanks.
NATURAL CALAMITIES.
a. Flood resulting in washout or breaches.

b. Earthquake.
c. Cyclonic Wind.
d. Lightening.
e. Landslides.
MAN MADE
a. Sabotage.
b Pilferage.
c. War.
d. Riots.
e. Civil commotion.
5.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

The main objectives of the Disaster Management Plan would be to ensure that
Loss of life and injuries to persons are minimized. Property

losses are minimum.
iii. Relief and rehabilitation measures are put into effect/ action in the Shortest possible time.
Potential loss due to prolonged shut down of facilities is minimized.
5.5. STATUTORY REQUIREMENT

Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for all petroleum products marketing stations
to tackle the emergencies. The plan has been prepared in view of the following regulations
• Factories Act, 1948 and as amended

• Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under
Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.
• Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents, 1996.
• Stipulations of OISD-168
• Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
5.6. DIFFERENT PHASES OF DISASTER

WARNING PHASE (BEFORE DISASTER)
Emergencies /disasters are generally preceded by warnings during which preventive measures may
be initiated. For example, release of light hydrocarbons, uncontrollable build-up of pressure
In process equipment, pipe line weather forecast give warning about formation of vapor cloud, cyclones,
equipment failure, cyclones respectively.
PERIOD OF IMPACT PHASE (DURING DISASTER)

This is the phase when emergency /disaster actually strike and preventive measures may hardly be
taken. However, control measures to minimize the effects may be taken through a well-planned and
ready-to-act disaster management plan. The duration may be from seconds to days.
RESCUE PHASE
This is the phase when impact is almost over and efforts are concentrated on rescue and relief
measures.
RELIEF PHASE (POST DISASTER)

In this phase, apart from organization and relief (measures internally, depending on severity of the
disaster, external help should also be summoned to provide relief measures (like evacuations to a
safe place and providing medical help, food clothing etc.). This phase will continue till normalcy is
restored.
REHABILITATION PHASE
This is the final and longest phase. During which measures required to put the situation back to normal as
far as possible are taken. Checking the systems, estimating the damages, repair of equipments and
putting them again into service are taken up. Help from revenue/insurance authorities need to be
obtained to assess the damage, quantum of compensation to be paid etc.
5.7. KEY ELEMENTS

Following are the key elements of Disaster Management Plan:
• Basis of the plan

• Accident prevention procedures/measures
• Accident/emergency response planning procedures
• On-site Disaster Management Plan
• Off-site Disaster Management Plan
5.7.1. BASIS OF THE PLAN

Identification and assessment of hazards is crucial for on-site emergency planning and it is therefore
necessary to identify what emergencies could arise in storage of various products Hazard analysis
or consequence analysis gives the following results.
Hazards from spread of fire or release of flammable and toxic chemicals from storage end
production units.
Hazards due to formation of pressure waves due to vapor cloud explosion of flammable gases and oil spill
hazards.
5.7.2 ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROCEDURES/ MEASURES
5.7.2.1 GENERAL
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers first published the ASME code in the US in 1935. It
was adopted by the Government's Department of Transportation in the United States as the minimum
Federal Standard (192) for Gas Transportation Safety.
ASME 31.4 as amended by OISD 117 is used for firefighting facilities. OISD standard 118
gives the codes for layouts of stations.
ASME 31.4 explicitly requires that each operating company having gas transmission or
distribution facilities within the scope of ASME 31.4 shall:
• Have a written plan covering operating and maintenance procedures in accordance with the
scope of code
• Have a written emergency plan covering facility failure or other emergencies
• Operate and maintain its facilities in accordance with these plans.
• Modify the plans from time to time as experience dictates and as exposure of the public to the
facilities and changes in operating conditions require
• Provide training to employees in the procedures established for their operating and maintenance
functions. The training shall be comprehensive and shall be designed to prepare employees for
service in their area of responsibility
 Keep records to administer I he plans and training properly
OISD 117 is used for firefighting facilities. OISD standard 118 gives I he codes for layouts of
stations.
A separate plan is provided to deal with situations, which necessitate emergency action. The
emergency response plan includes details of the organizational response to emergencies and the
safety precautions to be observed in preventing loss of life and damage to property.
5.7.2.2. OPERATION & MAINTENANCE

The oil and gas handling system will be fit for purpose after testing and commissioning. Oil and
gas industry experiences throughout the world have shown that the main physical dangers a well
or a pipeline faces during operation are mechanical damages caused by excavation works
adjacent to them and corrosion resulting from breaks in the coating system, which leave the pipe
wall steel exposed.
To guard the pipeline against damage, a system of regular surveillance and inspection to warn of
mechanical or corrosion damage is employed.
Repairs will have to be made to any mechanical and corrosion damage on the pipeline, which the
inspection program discovers. The repairs shall comply with OISD 141 as a minimum.
Following are the main factors, which determine whether the pipeline will stay free of significant defects:
• Well protection against external interference such as caused by nearby excavations

• Changes in the well or pipeline environment
• Adequate well or pipeline markers
• The effectiveness of the pipeline’s corrosion protection
• The pipeline’s protection against external interference such as caused by nearby excavations
• The influence of ground movement from natural or man-made causes such as settlement
geological faults, washouts or mining
5.7.3. ON-SITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Onsite Emergency/disaster is an unpleasant event of such magnitude which may cause extensive
damage to life and property due to the emergencies resulting from deficiencies in Operation,
Maintenance, Design and Human error, Natural Calamities like Flood, Cyclone and Earthquake; and
deliberate and other acts of man like Sabotage, Riot and War etc. An Onsite Disaster may occur all
of a sudden or proceeded by a Major Fire.
Purpose for the on-site disaster management plan is
• To protect persons and property of the equipments in case of all kinds of accidents,
emergencies and disasters
• To inform people and surroundings about emergency if it is likely to adversely affect them
• To inform authorities including helping agencies (doctors, hospitals, fire, police transport etc.)
in advance, and also at the time of actual happening
• To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their places,
potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above happenings. Review. revise,
redesign, replace or reconstruct the process, facility, vessels and control measures if so
assessed.
In order to handle disaster / emergency situations, an organizational chart entrusting responsibility to

various personnel showing their specific roles should be available as shown in following Fig. 8.1 in
Annexure -2
5.7.3.1 EMERGENCY ACTIONS FOR VARIOUS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

There are instructions that whoever detects fire will give a fire alarm and rush to the spot with the Fire
Extinguisher and try to extinguish the fire. Fire Hydrant System is operated & Foam/water is sprayed
to keep the exposed tanks pipelines & pumps cool. Following are the emergency actions to be taken
in case of occurrence of following Incidents
Following are some major Accidents / disasters
• Leak
• Fire
• Leak & Fire
• Burst
• Burst & Fire
LEAK IN THE STATION CAUSES

1. Corrosion
2. Mechanical Failure
3. Operational Failure.
4. Third Party Activity.
CONSEQUENCES
5. Oil spillage
6. Fire Hazard
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Prevent Ignition.
2. Stop Oil Spillage.
3 Clean the Area.
CHECK LIST FOR MOBILISATION REQUIRED

MANPOWER
1. Co-coordinators.
EQUIPMENTS
1. Fire Fighting Equipments viz.
a. Extinguishers.
b. Foam compound.
LEAK OF THE PIPELINE IN OPEN FIELD

CAUSES
1. Corrosion
2. Mechanical Failure.
3. Third Party Activity.
a. Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.

b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt (or pilferage, riots etc.)
4. Damage due to Natural Calamities

a. Breaches due to flood
b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
a. Oil Spillage
b. Fire Hazard
CONTROL MEASURES.
1. Cordon the Area
2. Prevent ignition
3. Stop Oil Spillage
4. Clean the Area
CHECK LIST FOT MOBILISATION REQUIRED

MANPOWER
1. Co-ordinators.
2. Police/Home Guard.
3. Labourer
EQUIPMENT.
1. Fire Fighting Equipment
a. Extinguishers
b. Foam Compound
2. Car, Jeep
3. Communication Equipment
4. Mainline Emergency Equipments

LEAK OF THE PIPELINE IN POPULATED AREA

CAUSES
1. Corrosion
3. Third Party Activity
a. Damage to the pipeline due to construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of the third party (Attempt for pilferage riots
etc.)
4. Damage due to Natural Calamities
b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire Hazard
3. Water Pollution
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Cordon the Area
2. Prevent Ignitions
4. Spray of Oil Dispersant
5. Evacuation of people, if necessary
CHECK LIST FOR MOBILISATION REQUIRED

MANPOWER
1. Coordinator
2. Police/ Home Guards / District / PWD / Irrigation Authorities
3. Labourer
EQUIPMENT
`
a. Extinguishers
b. Foam Compound
2. Fire Tender
3. Car, Jeep
a. Mobile Public Address System
FIRE IN THE STATION

CAUSES
1. Ignition due to Short Circuit, Static Electricity Generation, Spark from Engine Exhaust etc.
2. External Source of Ignition
3. Lightening
CONSEQUENCES
1. Damage to Equipment and/or Structure

2. Injuries
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Extinguish Fire
2. Cooling of the neighboring Equipments
CHECK LIST FOR

MOBILISATION MANPOWER
1. Coordinators.
2. Fire Fighting Crew.
3. Police.
EQUIPMENT
1. Fire Fighting Equipment.

a. Extinguishers
b. Foam Compound
c. Water Source
2. Fire Tender
3. Ambulance
LEAK AND FIRE IN THESTATION

CAUSES
1 Corrosion
3. Operational Failure
a. Damage to the pipeline due to construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of the third party (Attempt for pilferage riots etc.)
5. Ignition due to Short Circuit, Static Electricity Generation, Spark from Engine Exhaust etc.
7. Lightening
CONSEQUENCES.
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire
3. Damage to Equipment and/or Structure.
4. Injuries
CONTROL MEASURES:

2. Extinguish Fire
3. Clean the Area
4. Cooling of the neighboring equipments
CHECK LIST FOR MOBILISATION

MANPOWER:
1. Coordinators
2. Fire Fighting Crew
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: 5.I6 Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda
3 Police/Home Guards
4. Labourer
EQUIPMENT.
a. Extinguishers
b. Foam Compound
LEAK AND FIRE IN THE OPEN FIELD

CAUSES
1. Corrosion
a. Damage to the pipeline due to construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of the third party (Attempt for pilferage riots
etc.)
5. Lightening
CONSEQUENCES
a. Oil Spillage
b. Fire
CONTROL MEASURES

2. Extinguish Fire

MANPOWER
1. Coordinators
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: 5.I7 Green Circle, Enc.-Baroda

3. Police/ Home Guards / District authority / P.W D. Authorities
EQUIPMENT

a. Fire Tender
b. Extinguishers
c. Foam Compound
d. Water Sources
2. Car, Jeep
4 Tent, Chairs.
5. Portable Generators, Cables, Bulbs, Bamboo etc.
LEAK AND FIRE IN THE POPULATED

AERA CAUSES
1. Corrosion
a. Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intentions of the third party. (Attempt of pilferage,
riots etc.)
4. Damage due to the Natural Calamities
b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: 5. 18 Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

8. Injuries
CONTROL MEASURES:
1. Cordon the Area

3 Evacuate the people, if necessary
4 Extinguish Fire
5. Clean the Area

MANPOWER
1. Coordinators
2. Supervisory/Non-Supervisory Personnel from Base and Other Stations.
4. Police / Home Guard / District authority / PWD Authorities.
EQUIPMENT

a. Fire Tender.
b. Extinguishers.
2. Foam Compound.
3. Water Sources.
4. Mobile Public Address System.
5. Mainline Emergency Equipments.
6. Ambulance.
BURST OF THE PIPELINE IN STATION

CAUSES
1. Corrosion

b.Damage to the pipeline with malicious intentions of the third party. (Attempt of pilferage, riots etc.)

b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire Hazard
3. Pollution of the Irrigated Land
4. Water Pollution
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Prevent Ignition
3. Contain Spread of Oil
4. Reclaim Oil.
5. Clean the Area

MANPOWER:
1. Coordinators.
3. Labourer
EQUIPMENT

a. Fire Tender.
b. Extinguishers.
c. Foam Compound.
d. Water Sources.
`````
2. Equipment for constructing the bunds to contain spread of Oil

a) Pick Axe
b) Shovel
c) Basket etc.
3. Equipment for Recovery of Oil
a) Hoses Buckets, Barrels
b) Pneumatic Pumps, Hoses etc.
c) Oil Dispersant
d) Emergency Repair Equipments
BURST OF THE PIPELINE IN OPEN

FIELDS CAUSES
1. Corrosion
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intentions of the third party. (Attempt of pilferage, riots
etc.)
c. Breaches due to flood
d. Earthquake
e. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire Hazard
3. Pollution of the Irrigated Land
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Cordon the Area

2. Prevent Ignition
4. Contain spread of oil
`````
5. Reclaim Oil

MANPOWER
1. Coordinators
Supervisory/Non-Supervisory Personnel from Refinery and Marketing
4. Police / Home Guard / District Authority/ PWD/ Irrigation Authorities.
5. Labourer
EQUIPMENT
1 Fire Fighting Equipment

a. Fire Tender
b. Extinguishers
c. Water Sources
2. Equipment for constructing the bund to contain spread of Oil
a Pick Axe
b. Shovel
c. Basket
a. Mugs, Buckets, Barrels
b. Pneumatic Pumps hoses etc.
4. Tank lorries for Transportation of recovered oil
5. Tank lorries for Transportation of laborer and other Equipment
6. Cars, Jeeps
8. Communication equipments
9. Tent, Chairs
10. Portable Generators, Cables. Bulbs etc.
11. Sand Bags
BURST OF THE PIPELINE IN POPULATED

AREA CAUSES
1. Corrosion
etc.)
b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage.
2. Fire Hazard.
3. Injuries.
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Prevent Ignition.
3. Contain Spread of Oil.
4. Evacuate People.
5. Reclaim Oil.
6. Clean the Area
CHECK LIST FOR

MOBILISATION MANPOWER
1. Coordinators.
2. Supervisory/Non-Supervisory Personnel from Base and Other Stations.

4. Police / Home Guard / District Authority/ PWD Authorities.
EQUIPMENT
Fire Fighting Equipment
a. Fire Tender
b. Extinguishers
c. Foam Compound
d. Water Sources
2 Equipment for Recovery of Oil
Pneumatic Pumps hoses etc.
3. Tank trucks for transportation of recovered oil
4. Tank Lorries for transportation of laborer and other Equipment
5. Cars, Jeeps
6. Communication Equipments
BURST AND FIRE IN THE STATION

CAUSES
1. Corrosion.
2. Mechanical Failure.
3. Ignition due to short circuit, static electricity generation, spark from Engine exhaust
4. Third Party activity.
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire
3. Damage to Equipment and/or structure
4. Injuries
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Stop oil spillage

2. Extinguish Fire.
3. Contain spread of Oil
4. Reclaim of Oil
5. Clean the Area.

MANPOWER
1. Coordinators
3. Police / Home Guard / District Authorities
EQUIPMENT

a. Fire Tender
b. Extinguishers
c. Foam Compound
d. Water Sources
2. Equipment for Constructing the bund to contain spread of Oil
a. Pick Axe
b. Shovel
c. Basket etc.
b. Pneumatic Pumps, hoses etc.
4. Emergency repairs equipments
BURST AND FIRE IN THE OPEN

FIELD CAUSES
1. Corrosion
etc.)

b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
5. External sources of ignition
CONSEQUENCES
1 Oil Spillage.
2. Fire
3. Pollution of land/damage to property.
CONTROL MEASURES
1. Cordon the Area.

3 Extinguish Fire
4. Contain Spread of Oil.
5. Reclaim Oil.
6. Clean the Area

MANPOWER
1. Coordinators
2. Supervisory/Non-Supervisory Personnel from Base and Other Stations
4. Police / Home Guard I District Authorities. / PWD/Irrigation Authorities
EQUIPMENT

a. Fire Tender
b. Extinguishers
c. Foam Compound
d. Water Sources
2. Equipment for constructing the bund to contain spread of oil
a. Pick Axe
b. Shovel
c. Basket
b. Pneumatic Pumps hoses
5. Tank lorries for transportation of laborers and other Equipments
6. Cars, Jeeps
8. Ambulance
BURST AND FIRE AT POPULATED

AREA CAUSES
1. Corrosion
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intentions of the third party. (Attempt of pilferage riots
etc.)
b. Earthquake
c. Cyclone
d. External sources of ignition
CONSEQUENCES
1. Oil Spillage
2. Fire
3. Damage to civilian property
4. Injuries
5. Fatalities

CONTROL MEASURES
• Cordon the Area

• Stop Spillage
3 Extinguish Fire
4. Evacuate people
5. Reclaim Oil
6. Relief Measures to the affected People
7. Traffic Diversion
8. Temporary Support to the Pipe

MANPOWER
1. Coordinators
2. Supervisory/Non-Supervisory Personnel from Base and Other Stations
a) Fire Fighting Crew
b) Police / Home Guard / District Authorities / PWD/Irrigation Authorities
c) Medical Personnel
EQUIPMENTS

a. Fire Tender.
b. Extinguishers.
c. Foam Compound.
d. Water Sources.
2. Equipment for Constructing the bund to contain spread of oil
a. Pick Axe
b. Shovel
c. Basket etc
3 Equipment for Recovery of Oil
b. Pneumatic Pumps hoses etc
5. Tank lorries for transportation of labourer and other Equipment

6. Cars, Jeeps
8. Tent, Chairs
9. Portable Generators, Cables, Bulbs etc
DRY GRASS FIRE

EMERGENCY ACTION
Dry grass is normally avoided in the station premises and it is ensured that there is no grass (dry)
at any point of time by ensuring better housekeeping. In the event of fire, Fire Fighting Team will
rush to the spot. Closing of main switch, closure of all the valves and activation of Fire Hydrant
System for putting off the fire and also to keep the tanks cool, if being affected; will be carried out
Tanks if it is being loaded, will be disconnected
Following fire protection facilities are available to combat the emergencies and depending
upon the type of emergencies any one or combination of the facilities are applied.
• Fire Water System
• Carbon Dioxide System
• Foam System
• First Aid Fire Fighting Equipment
• Mobile I- ire Fighting Equipment
• Gas / Fire Detection and Alarm System
EXTERNAL EMERGENCIES
Extrinsic factors like possibilities of lightening/storm, floods, missile attack during war, sabotage &
bomb threats have been considered in the DMP as follows.
FLOOD & CYCLONE SCENARIO
Due to heavy rain or cyclone, water level in surrounding areas may start rising. State
Government issues warning of Flood
EMERGENCY FLOOD PLAN

Flood Plans can enable a flexible response to problems caused by flooding. Although barriers may
protect potential food areas from predictable tidal or storm surges, flooding can occur at any time.
FLOOD WARNINGS
A typical flood warning time is around 30 to 60 minutes by Govt. Sample flood warning messages are:
• Flood Alert — Flooding is possible

• Flood Warning — Flooding of homes, businesses and main roads is expected
• Severe Flood Warning — Severe flooding may cause Imminent danger
• All Clear —No Flood Alerts or Warnings are in force
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

When a flood warning message is received, Emergency Disaster Management will be activated
by blowing sirens. Depending upon the scale of potential flooding, the main management
includes
• Care of evacuated, hurt people

• Protecting of station utilities and taking shutdown if needed
• Availability of transport
• Providing emergency health advice
• Providing road barriers and signs
• Coordinating emergency support
• Control, fires and leakages, if any
• Minimize environmental dangers
• Liaison with ambulance services and medical services
• Medications, warm clothing, sealed food, blankets, matches, candles, flashlights,
portable radio, spare batteries, rubber gloves, personal documents
• Turn off electricity and gas
SANDBAGS
• Fill sandbags not more than 3/4 full

• Lay them in layers with each row tight to each other, end to end
• Stamp them down before laying another row on top
• If a wall is more than two sandbags high, place a double line of bottom sandbags, followed by a
second double line, then a single line on top.
• Make sandbags with compost bags, carrier bags or pillowcases filled with sand or earth
• Put a plastic sheet down first to act as an extra seal
• Protect all water entry points including air bricks, air vents and utility openings
• If gas vents are sealed, disconnect any gas supply
• Seals around doors and windows should be made watertight
• It can take 60 sandbags to correctly seal an external door
EARTH QUAKE SCENARIO

It is a sudden, rapid shaking of earth caused by the breaking and shifting of rock beneath the Earth’s
surface. It can occur at any time, at any place without any warning. At oil installations particularly
PHBPL, large amount of petroleum products are handled at pressure. In the event of an earthquake,
sudden release of such hazardous materials further aggravates the devastation caused by
earthquake. In an earthquake scenario, it becomes further difficult to effectively address fires and
explosions resulting from loss of containment of hydrocarbons as most of the fire protection/fighting
facilities are rendered non-functional. Movement of mobile firefighting equipment and availability of
personnel become seriously restricted.
EFFECTS
THE DIRECT EFFECTS OF AN EARTHQUAKE ARE
• Ground shaking
• Ground lateral displacement
• Ground uplift and subsidence
INDIRECT EFFECTS ARE
• Ground settlement
• Soil liquefaction
• Slope failure-avalanches, landslides, mud slides
• Floods
• Tsunamis & seiches
• Fires
TYPES OF FAILURES
Failures will depend on magnitude, intensity and duration of the earthquake besides construction of
the structure and soil condition. The types of failures that cause hazardous materials releases at the
refineries during earthquake include:
• Building structural failures

• Failure of storage tanks, Horton spheres and pipelines
• Dislodging of roofs
• Underground pipelines break due to soil movement
• Industrial equipment problems due to sliding or overturning, or internal failure
Other factors that can complicate the ability to respond to these releases include:
• Breakdown in utilities including power, water & communication

• Malfunctioning of control or alarm systems
• Disruption of transportation supply/distribution systems
• Shortage of emergency and clean-up personnel
• People not following established procedures or not using the safety devices
Failure modes of some critical process equipment due to earthquake are given below: Storage
Tanks
• Rupture of the connection between tank wall and the floor

• Ripping of the tie-down strap
• Excessive displacement of the base of the shell and rupture of the connection pipes
• Overturning at the foundation
• Combination of hydrostatic plus hydrodynamic pressure on the tanks side wall
• Failure of roof due to liquid slosh
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Green Circle, Inc.-Baroda

Page No:5.32
Above ground pipelines
• Breaks in short connector pipes due to differential movement between pipes and structures
• Impacts of other structures or equipment
• Damage from failing pipe supports
PREVENTIVE AND REMEDIAL MEASURES

We can protect ourselves from earthquake by constructing earthquake resistant structures end
facilities. In a given structure, well-rehearsed plans can limit the damage.
CONSTRUCTION
Understanding the response of structures during earthquake and using this information for improving
the structural design can protect us from future earthquakes. Developing code and continuously
improve the same after major earthquake, can certainly help us design of earthquake resistant
structures. Codes are the public’s first line defense against earthquake. The codes specify the levels
of earthquake forces that structures must be designed to withstand.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Ground shaking of small duration causes large scale death and destruction. Many peoples become
homeless and residences become dangerous for occupancy. Rescue of the trapped person, fighting
fires, treatment of the injures and arrangement of food & shelter to assist people recovering from
disaster are to be arranged on war-footing. In petroleum handling facilities quick mobilization of men
and materials including foam compounds are the essence of success.
Disaster Management Plans (DMP) is to be updated for earthquake scenario considering the
complexity of the situation. Some of the suggested activities for improving the plan are as under:
The outcome of the earthquake may be fires and explosions which are covered in the DMP. However,
in case of earthquake, large area including residential locations of the employees is likely to be
affected. Each employee should be trained to prepare his family members to respond to earthquake.
Some key members of the employee’s family may also be trained in First Aid functions.

Normal communication system is likely to fail. Full power back-up for the communication
systems, mobile phones and VHF sets are to be maintained always at operational readiness.
Availability of firefighting and rescue equipment particularly at other locations which can be
Mobilized should be pre-planned. Some of the suggested equipment is:
1. Cranes
2. Bulldozers and other earthmoving equipment
3 Gas cutters
4. Expanders
5. Dewatering pumps
6. Mobile firefighting equipment
7. Foam compound
8. Breathing apparatus
PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL

• During earthquake, taking a wrong step could be fatal. Awareness about hazards of earthquake
and steps to be taken is an absolute necessity. Educate your near and dear ones about do’s and
don’ts.
• Move only a few steps to a nearby safe place. If you can’t make it, hide under sturdy furniture.
Stay indoors until the shaking stops and you are sure it is safe to exit.
• If you are near an interior wall of a building, hold on to it.
• If you are in bed, hold on and stay there, protecting your head with a pillow.
• The danger zone during an earthquake is areas adjacent to exterior walls of buildings.
• Stay away from windows, mirrors and cupboards.
• If you are out doors, find a clear spot away from buildings, trees and power lines. Drop to the
ground.
• If you are driving at that time, stop and run to an open space. If there is none, stay put.
• Stay where you are till all is quiet. Aftershocks may follow.
• Post-earthquake, check gas connections, electricity and sewage lines.
• Make sure all family members know how to respond after an earth quake.

Page No: 5.34
MISSILE/AIR ATTACK DURING WAR

If bombing on station takes place due to war scenarios it would be completely destructed leading to
loss of millions of Rupees. There would be a significant loss of Product Property and Human beings.
The supply of petroleum product will be affected.
EMERGENCY ACTION
• Station personnel should contact district authorities like collector, police immediately
• All pipeline and tank valves should be closed and all the operations inside the Station should be
stopped. The intensity of operations should be reduced once the weather department announces
the possibility of storm or cyclone
• The Station lighting should be stopped during night time
• Persons inside the Station should be evacuated as soon as possible
• In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called
• In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called
5.7.3.2 VARIOUS PHASES OF ONSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

BEFORE CRISIS
• Prepare a plan of the storage, handling and pumping stations premises and surroundings
showing therein the areas of various hazards like fire, explosion, toxic releases and also location
of assembly points, fire station or equipments room, telephone room, medical facilities will be
provided by arrangements with nearby hospitals, emergency control room, main gate, emergency
gates, normal wind direction, outside fire station, hospital and other services, Mention their
distances from proposed activities.
• The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all the time and firefighting
system should be periodically tested for people functioning logged for record and corrective action.
• The firefighting training shall be provided to all officers, truck drivers and other employees who
are likely to be present in installation
• There should be regular mock fire drills once a month record of such drills shall be
maintained.

Page No: 5.35
• Every employee or authorized person working in the production /storage shall be familiarized
with the fire alarm signal and shall know the location of fire alarm point nearest to place of work
• Assign key personnel and alternate responsible for site safety
• Describe risk associated with each operation conducted.
DURING CRISIS
• Monitor the behaviour of entrant for any effects that suggests they should be evacuated
• Evacuate the space, any hazard that could endanger, if the entrant is detected
• Perform no other duties that may interfere with their primary responsibilities
• Notify the attendant if they experience any warning signs or symptoms of exposures or
Detect a dangerous condition
• Exit the permit space when instructed by attendant
• Reporting Procedure
• In the event of fire from accidental release of flammable gas or liquid, a person seeing the
incident will follow the laid down procedure in the facility and report as follows:
• Will dial the nearest telephone
• Will state his name and exact location of emergency
• Will contact affected officers on duty
• People reporting the accident will remain near the location to guide emergency crew arriving at
the scene
• In case of fire emergency, person should activate the nearest available push button type
instrument which will automatically sound an alarm in fire control room indicating the location of
fire.
AFTER CRISIS
• Report injuries or blood or body fluid exposures to the appropriate supervisor immediately
ASSEMBLY POINTS
• Assembly points shall be set up farthest from the location of likely hazardous events, where pre-
designed persons from the works, contractors and visitors would assemble in case of
Emergency. Up-to-date list of pre-designed employees shift wise must be available at these
points so that roll call could be taken. Pre-designated persons would take charge of these points
and mark presence as the people come into it
• Wash wounds and skin sites that have been affected with soap & water
• Workers should be seen as soon as possible by a health professional
• Provide information to the relevant public au1hority and community including other closely
located facilities regarding the nature of hazard and emergency procedure in event of major
accident
• Record and discuss the lessons learned and the analysis of major accidents and misses
With employees and employee representative
5.7.3.3 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
Following are the key personnel and the units in the stations which are responsible to lake
appropriate actions during emergencies.
SITE MAIN CONTROLLER

President/SSM - (the senior most functionary available at site).
The President/Site Shit Manager (SSM) will be designated as the Site Main Controller at the time of an
emergency and report at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) which will be the Primary Command
Post. He will be the Chief Co-ordinator and take overall command of the emergency management. He
will be assisted by other co-ordinators as designated for various functions. The Site Main Controller will
provide all decisions support and resources support to the Site Incident Controller at the incident site for
initiating appropriate actions for emergency control. He will also liaise with mutual aid members and all
outside agencies including Local Crisis Management Committee, District Contingency Plan
Committee (District Collector), Police, Civil Defence, Factories Inspectorate, etc. to seek
assistance/help and provide necessary information to them.
Normally, the SSM is available on round the clock duty at the site to co-ordinate overall manufacturing
activities and management of emergency (if any). In the event of an emergency, the Site Shift Manager
(SSM) will assume the charge of the Site Main Controller till the Executive or the President arrives.
SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Sr. Mgr / Mgr. - (next lower to the senior most functionary of operation available at site)
The next lower to senior most functionary of operation available at site will be Site Incident Controller.
On receiving information about the emergency, he will report at the incident site and take over from
the Deputy Incident Controller (shift-in-charge). He will lake overall command of the emergency
control operation as the Site Incident Controller and will take decisions in co- ordinations with Site
Main Controller for controlling emergency situation. He will co- ordinate with all the key personnel,
firefighting and rescue team leaders and other support services and provide necessary information
and advice to them for effectively managing control measures / actions.
DEPUTY INCIDENT CONTROLLER

The shift-in-charge is available on round the clock duty in site. He is competent for the operation and
responsible for all activities related to storage / maintenance including prevention/ control of incidents
and handling emergencies (if any) in the station. He will be designated as the Deputy Incident
Controller. In the event of an emergency in the station, he will immediately assume the charge of
the site Incident Controller and take decisions in consultation with the Site Main Controller. To initiate
immediate actions for controlling/mitigating emergency situation at the incident site till the Site Incident
Controller (next senior personnel in production) arrives.
CO-ORDINATORS
The senior most functionaries available at site in the respective services will be the coordinators at
the time of an emergency. They will report at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC), known as the
Primary Command Post, unless and otherwise instructed by the Chief Co-ordinator (The Site Main
Controller). They will assist and advise the Site Nain Controller in all matters for effectively managing
control measures and mitigating operations.
EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC) (THE PRIMARY COMMAND POST)

In the event of an emergency, SSM Office will be designated as the Emergency Control Centre,
which will be known as the Primary command Post. If, the SSM office is likely to be affected due to
unfavorable wind direction or any other reasons, the Emergency Control Centre will be shifted to the
Construction Conference Room which will be having necessary

Page No: 5.38
Facilities to connect communication links as provided in the SSM Office.

Following facilities and documents will be available in the Emergency Control Center.
• P&T/DoT / internal telephone like UHN sets

• Hazardous area drawing.
• Process and instrumentation flow diagram
• Route map of mainline under respective jurisdiction
• Disaster Management Plan
FIELD COMMAND POST (INCIDENT SITE)

An emergency requires co-ordination of numerous activities beyond spill containment and
countermeasure efforts from a safe location at the incident scene. The Field Command Post will be
established in the "Cold Zone" for staging deployed apparatus, resources and equipment with means
of communications and manning to effectively co-ordinate control efforts.
ASSEMBLY POINTS
Two alternate locations for safe assembly points have been earmarked at all the operating locations.
These locations are designated for assembling non-essential workers, visitors, and other persons
who are not required at the site at the time of emergency but they are to be moved to safe places.
These locations have been provided with sign boards displaying "Assembly Points" for easy
identification
The persons required to be assembled at the assembly point should choose safer assembly point
out of the two, considering the wind direction at that time. The control room will also announce the
same on the PA system, if possible
The person assembled at the assembly point shall follow the instruction for evacuation of the station
area and move to safe locations as directed. They should move in the cross-wind direction or up-
wind direction, whichever is safer
Page No: 5.39

5.7.3.4 ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

SITE MAIN CONTROLLER
The Site Main Controller will be the chief co-ordinator and shall be assisted by other co-
ordinators (senior most functionaries in the respective disciplines). He will take overall
command of the emergency management and his duties and the responsibilities are as below:
He will:
• Report at the Emergency Control Centre as soon as he gets information about the emergency
at site and will assume overall responsibility if taking decisions and directing actions as
necessary for mitigating the situation and managing the emergency effectively with due
consideration and priorities for personnel safety, safety to the company's property and the
environment
• Assess the magnitude of the situation in co-ordination with the Incident Controller / Dy. Incident
Controller and decide whether major emergency exists or is likely to develop, requiring external
assistance. Accordingly, he will decide to inform Local/District emergency Chief and other
emergency control groups for help and the nature of help required including assistance from
mutual aid members and declare on-site emergency
• Decide the safe route of entry for external assistance/help to reach at site of the incident
considering wind direction and the place of the incident and also the place of reporting such
assistance. He will also direct the security to guide them properly
• Ensure that the Key Personnel and Co-ordinators are called in
• Ensure that all non-essential workers, visitors, contractors are safely moved to assembly points
and direct for search and rescue operation within the affected areas, if necessary
• Be in constant communication with the Site Incident Controller to continuously review and
Assess the situation and possible developments
• Direct actions for safe shut down of station or section of the station and evacuation of station
personnel and other necessary action is in consultation with the other co-ordinators
• Exercise direct operational control over areas in the complex other than those affected in
Consultation with other co-ordinators
• To liaise with the local meteorological office to receive early notification of changes in wind
Direction and weather conditions
• Liaise with the senior officials of Police, Fire Brigade, Medical and Factories Inspectorate and pass
on information on possible effects to the surrounding areas outside the factory premises and
necessity of evacuating the area and moving the people to safe places
Page No: 5.40

• Liaise with various co-ordinators to ensure that various team are functioning well, casualties
are receiving attention and traffic movement within the works is well regulated
• Arrange for a log of the emergency to be maintained in the Primary Command Post
• Release authorized information to press through the media co-ordinator
• Control rehabilitation of the affected persons and the affected areas after cessation of the
emergency
SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER

The Site Incident Controller is the Key Personnel for operations function reporting at the incident site
and will take the overall command of actions for emergency control operation on his arrival at the
incident site. He will be supported by other key personnel representing various emergency services
and initiate emergency control actions under the direction of the Site Main Controller (Primary
Command Post). The duties and the responsibilities of the Site Inc ident Controller include the
following:
He will:
• Report at the incident site immediately after getting information about an emergency. Upon his
arrival at the site he will assess the scale of emergency in consultation with the Deputy Incident
Controller and evaluate, if a major emergency exists or is likely to develop and inform Emergency
Control Centre (primary Command Post) accordingly asking for assistance and indicating kind of
support needed
• Take overall control of handling the emergency at site and take action for isolation of source of
containment loss to the extent feasible. Simultaneously, in case of fire organize appropriate fire
response in co-ordination with Key personnel (Fire & Safety) to get the situation under control
and to prevent its escalation
• Set up communication point (Field Command Post) and establish contact with Site Main
Controller (Primary Command Post) and keep him informed about the development
• Keep on assessing the emergency situation at the site and communicate to the Site Main
Controller (Primary Command Post) and keep him informed about the development
• Co-ordinate the activities of other key personnel reporting at the Field Command Post, under his
overall command
• Direct all operation with the affected areas giving due priorities for safety of personnel and to
minimize damage to environment, the facility and property
• Provide advice and information to Firefighting and rescue personnel, external fire services
Page No: 5.41

And other emergency services/teams as and when they arrive at the incident site and co-
ordinate with them for effective control actions
• Ensure that all non-essential workers and staff within the affected area are evacuated to
appropriate assembly points and that areas are searched for casualties
• Organize rescue teams for search of casualties in the affected areas (if any) and send them to
safe areas / medical centre for first aid and medical relief
• Seek additional support and resources as may be needed through Primary Command Post
• Send decision support from the Primary Command Post for decision such as precautionary shut
down of neighbouring facilities. Precautionary evacuation of people in the neighbouring facilities,
activating mutual aid plan, etc.
• Be in constant liaison with the Site Main Controller and keep him informed about the situation
at the incident site
• Preserve all evidences so as to facilitate any inquiry into the cause and circumstances,
Which caused or escalated the emergency (to arrange photographs, video, etc.)
• Arrange for head count after the emergency is over with respect to the personnel on duty in the
affected areas
DEPUTY INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Normally, the Shift-in-charge of a station being always available at the site and well aware of the
station operating conditions at all times will be designated as the Deputy Incident Controller and
assume the charge of the Site Incident Controller at the time of an emergency till the Site Incident
Controller arrives at the incident site, he will assist the Site Incident Controller on his arrival and work
under his direction in emergency control operation.
The responsibilities and duties of the Deputy Incident Controller will be as defined for the Site Incident
Controller. In addition, he will ensure the following:
He will:
• In the event of an emergency, caused due to any incident in the station, he will immediately actuate
station level emergency siren (hooter) to warn the field personnel, contractors' employees, etc.
and also arrange for announcement about the emergency and necessary instruction for them for
assembling at the safe assembly point or evacuation, etc.
• Ensure that the SSM and senior station personnel have been informed about the emergency
Fire Services Personnel
• Main role of Fire Services personnel is firefighting and rescue operations, helping in operations
like, prevention of loss of containment of hydrocarbon, spill/leak containment, etc.
CHIEF OF FIRE (OR NEXT SENIOR MOST FIRE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE)
• He will be the Key Personnel for the Fire and Safety Services at the incident
scene and coordinating and commanding all the related operations in
consultation with the Site Incident Controller
• He will report at the Field command Post (Incident Site) immediately after receiving
the information about an emergency at site, contact the Site Incident Controller and
the first turn out leader for necessary information/advice to decide control strategies
• He will take overall command of firefighting/rescue operations and other
measures as necessary to control and mitigate the situation and lead the
firefighting crew including outside / mutual aid firefighting teams
• He will assess the severity/magnitude of the situation and decide the level of the
emergency in consultation with the Site Incident Controller and inform the Site
Main Controller (Primary Command Post) at ECC. He will also advise him for
declaring on-site emergency (if necessary)
• He will call for additional resources/help from other Depts. (AFS personnel),
mutual aid members, etc. through Primary Command Post as necessary and
deploy them appropriately for firefighting and rescue operation at the incident
scene. He will also co- ordinate with other key personnel
• He will ensure that sufficient personnel protective equipment, masks, Breathing
Air sets, Spare Breathing Air, Cylinders etc. are available at the field Command
Post for use by the crew members and ensure that no one access the "Hot Zone"
without adequate personnel protection. He will call for logistic
• Support (mobilising additional supplies through Primary Command Post (Site Main
Controller/HSE&F Co-ordinator)
• He will keep constant contact with Primary Command Post and seek decision
support from the Site Main Controller in critical matters/operations and also
inform him, if other stations in the complex or surrounding population are likely to
be affected
• He will co-ordinate with Security Key Personnel for access control and barricading the
affected area in order to prevent vehicular movement

Page No: 5.43
• He will assist in rescue and first aid operations
SHIFT FIRE OFFICER (RIDING OFFICERS)
• Upon receiving emergency call/alarm, he will quickly prepare for the fire turn out and mount the
leading fire tender along with the crew members and rush to the incident site taking a safe route
of entry considering the wind direction
• Report to the Dy. Incident Controller/the Incident Controller and Position the Fire Tender
strategically at a location in consultation with the Dy. Incident Controller/the Incident Controller
• He will decide the line of action for firefighting and/or other control actions at the scene in
consultation with the Dy. Incident Controller/Incident Controller and take appropriate actions for
firefighting and control measures
• He will guide and lead the firefighting crew in firefighting and rescue operation till the arrival of
F&S Key person (the Chief of Fire or next senior most person)
• He will ensure the safety of the crew members and that crew members are fully equipped with
necessary personnel protection prior to enter "Hot Zone"
• He will assess the severity of the situation and may call for second turnout/additional help through
the Dy. Incident Controller/Incident Controller (Field Command Post)
• He will keep constant contact with the key personnel (F&S) at the Field Command Post and inform
about the situation and probable developments
FIREMEN ON DUTY AT THE FIRE CONTROL ROOM
• The fireman on duty at the Fire Control Room will acknowledge the emergency alarm received
on the panel and promptly note the facility area/where the incident occurred
• He will note down the information, if emergency call is received through telephone. He will sound
the fire bell to inform the fire crew to get ready and take their positions, simultaneously brief the
Shift Fire Officer about the emergency message
• He will intimate the Site Shift Manager and the Security Dept. about the emergency giving short
description about the occurrence (if known)
• He will actuate emergency siren after receiving instruction from Primary Command Post (Site
Main Controller/HSE&F Co-ordinator)

Page No: 5.44
• He will ask telephone operator to pass on to the communication about the emergency to the
Auxiliary Fire Squad of the station on receiving the instruction from HSE& F Co- ordinator/Site
Main Controller
• He will always be ready and alert for receiving any message / instructions from Primary
Command Post/Field Command Post
AUXILIA RY FIRE SQUAD MEMBERS
• AFS Members shall be ready on hearing emergency siren and will report to
• site incident controller at site (Field Command Post) on receiving message from ECC
• They will do the firefighting under the instruction of Shift Officer. Help to bring firefighting
equipment from nearby stations
• AFS Members of the station under emergency will immediately go to the emergency site and
will start first aid fire fighting
• As per the emergency situation they will use the fixed firefighting equipment to protect station
equipment from heat exposure
• They will guide non-essential personnel in case of evacuation
• They will do monitoring/closing of storm water drains if required
• They will help key personnel for taking action on site. Help to Security Personnel for traffic
Control
NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL
Employees, contractors’ employees, visitors, etc., (other than emergency response personnel) present at
the incident site that is not required to be present at the incident site during the emergency at the site.
In the event of declaration of an emergency in the station/area, these persons shall quickly assemble
at the safe assembly point of the station/area and shall respond as instructed by the Site Incident
Controller.
INSTRUCTION TO THE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL
• Do not panic. Ensure that persons in your immediate vicinity are warned
• Remain alert for announcement from the Control Room, such "Proceed to Safe Assembly Point" and act
accordingly
• Do not rush to the scene to be a spectator
• Await instructions at the Assembly Point, report your presence to the superiors/ or the Site
Incident controller, inform his whereabouts of your colleagues if they have not arrived
• Do not engage telephone/talk back system and other communication channels, unnecessarily
• Do not approach Control Centers without urgent/or important reasons
• If you are not assigned any specific role, move away as directed
• Do not offer non-authentic information/unconfirmed facts/fact/or conjecture
TELEPHONE OPERATOR
All the time of emergency, communications both inwards as well as outward are very essential and
telephone operator's swift action becomes very important. He plays very important part in
communicating information/messages to the concerned personnel/outside agencies/mutual aid
members/staff members etc. and also receiving a large number of outside calls. His main
responsibilities and duties are as below:
• He will keep the board free to the extent possible for incoming calls
• He will immediately convey message to the “Key Personnel” and the “Co-ordinator" about the
emergency as per the instruction of the Site main controller. The designated personnel list is
given in the On-site Emergency Plan (Flip Chart)
• The telephone operator will follow instructions from the Site Main Controller/or Media Co-
ordinator only, for passing on any information to outside agency about the emergency or
direct all such queries to the media co-ordinator for appropriate reply
• As far as possible he should not entertain unknown/unimportant outside calls/inquiries during
initial few hours of the emergency
EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION
Telephone Numbers of internal/External authorities shall be provided as separate attachments in
annexure no. 9
HSE & FIRE COORDINATOR
• He will report at the Emergency Control Centre (Primary Command Post) immediately after
receiving information about the emergency. He will assist the Site Main Controller for taking critical
decisions and provide necessary advice and information

• He will co-ordinate with Key Person (Fire & Safety) and will assist the Site Main Controller for
providing decision support and resources support to the Key Persons (F&S), as may be
necessary
• He will arrange for mobilizing off-duty fire personnel from their residence; and call other members
of the staff for assistance
• He will ensure that the AFS members have been called for assistance and liaise with mutual aid
members / Fire Brigade for mobilization of additional resources
• He will co-ordinate with the materials/stores co ordinator and mobilize additional resources, viz.,
spillage containment equipment/firefighting equipment/ material, personal protective equipment,
spare breathing air cylinders, etc., as may be required at the incident site for control measures
• He will liaise with Factory Inspectorate / Pollution Control authorities in consultation with the Site
Main Controller and provide necessary information. He will also ask for the help, if necessary to
evacuate neighbouring area outside the complex as advised by the Site Main Controller
• He will organize relieving groups for fire fighting
• He will also initiate necessary actions to minimise impact on Environment
MEDICAL CO-ORDINATORS
The Chief Medical Officer (or the next in command available at site) will be the Medical Co-ordinator
and perform the following duties:
• He will contact the Site Main Controller immediately after receiving the information about the
emergency
• He will report immediately at the Emergency Control Centre (Primary Command Post) or OHC as
instructed by the Site Main Controller and contact the Key personnel (Medical) and take stock of the
situation
• He will assist and advise the Site Main Controller in all critical decisions in the area of
health/medical services to the affected persons and keep constant liaisons with him
• Organize rescue and first aid arrangements for the affected persons at the site in the “cold Zone", as
may be necessary with essential staff/equipment and post additional ambulance for transporting
seriously injured persons
• Ensure that adequate paramedical staff, equipment and medicines are available at the OHC. He
will mobilize additional resources from neighbouring industries, if necessary

• To liaise with the Local Medical Authorities and City Hospitals, if the causalities are more and
situation demands treatment at additional medical centers
• To co-ordinate with the Transport Co-ordinator for transporting victims to various hospi tals
• To arrange for additional ambulances from another hospitaIs/ Municipal Corporation
• The Medical Co-ordinator should ensure the upkeep of agreed medical supplies, antidotes and
equipment that should always be kept in stock for treating victims of burns and hazardous
chemicals. The medical authorities should be aware of the type of treatment to be administered
• He will liaise with the media co-ordinator for release of news to the press.
SECURITY CO-ORDINATORS
The Chief of Security or the next in command available at site shall be the Security Co- ordinator.
He will have the following duties / responsibilities:
• He will instruct and deploy the security personnel to ensure that the law and order is maintained;
and unnecessary gathering of the personnel at the scene of emergency is prevented and ensure
control of traffic movement in and out of the factory areas
• He will instruct the security personnel / Security Gates to direct and guide external emergency
vehicles (Fire tenders/ambulances etc.) called for assistance/help from neighbouring
industries/Local administration, to the scene of incident
• He will instruct security personnel who could be spared to assist Site Incident Controller/Key
Personnel (fire and Safety) in firefighting and evacuation of personnel, at the Incident Site
• He will take action to regulate traffic movement and prevention of traffic jams inside the works as
well as outside the factory gates for proper and speedy movement of the emergency vehicles,
ambulances, other vehicles carrying outside resources, etc.
• He will mobilize additional security force for help, as necessary
• He will liaise with the police and other local authorities for external help, as necessary for
evacuation of the neighbouring areas outside the factory premises in consultation with the Site
Main Controller
• If necessary, he will arrange for announcement through the mobile P.A. system for alerting and
instructing the population in the surrounding areas as directed by the Site Main Controller

Page No: 5.48
ENGINEERING CO-ORDINATORS
• He will report to the Site Main Controller at the Emergency Control Centre (Pf4mary Command
Post) immediately after receiving information about On-site emergency
• He will take stock of the situation and assist/advise the Site Main Controller in deciding control
strategies
• He will mobilize the team from the Maintenance Dept. to assist the Site Incident Controller in
control operation at the Field Command Post
• Arrange isolation of electrical lines horn distribution point/substations as required by the Site
Incident Controller by calling the Electrical Engineer / Electricians
• Provide all other engineering support, as may be required
• Liaise with Key Personnel (Eng./Maintenance) and co-ordinate with other groups
COMMUNICATION CO-ORDINATORS
Communication Co-ordinator plays very important part at the time of an emergency particularly when
extensive disruption of services takes place. He has the following duties and responsibilities:
• To ensure all available communications links remain functional

• To quickly establish communication links between the Field command Post and (if this happens
to be in remote off site area) and the Primary Command Post
• To arrange for announcement on the public address system and maintain contacts with
congregation points like canteen, main gate, control rooms etc.
• To ensure that previously agreed inventory of various types of communication equipment is
maintained in working condition" and frequent checks are carried out and records maintained
• To maintain voice record of significant communications with timings received/passed from the
Primary Command Post
• To provide additional/alternate communication facilities as required at the site
P&A Co-ordinators
• He will report at the Primary Command Post (ECC) immediately after getting information about an emergency
at the site and assist/advise the Site Main Controller in taking important

Page No: 5. 49
• To arrange for vehicles from outside local transport agencies, if required

• To keep in contact with the Site Main Controller for evacuation of personnel and transportation
of victims
THE WELFARE / CANTEEN CO-ORDINATORS
• The Welfare Co-ordinator will have the following responsibilities:

• Ensure that casualties receive adequate attention and arrange additional help (ex-gratia
payment etc.), if required with consultation with the Chief Co-ordinator
• Inform the relatives of the victims
• When emergency is prolonged, he will arrange for relieving personnel and organize refreshment
/ catering facilities and arrangements for their rest (bedding, and other necessities)
• He will arrange to procure and keep stocks of necessary food items and other necessary
supplies as may be required for the personnel working round-the-clock
• He will arrange for hot drinks / snacks and food and other necessary items for emergency
response personnel, as required
MEDIA CO-ORDINATORS
The Media Co-ordinator will co-ordinate the following under the direction of the Site Main
Controller (The Chief Co-ordinator):
• He will liaise with various media and release written statements to the press through prior
concurrence of the Chief Co-ordinate
• He will handle media interview with various media groups make arrangements for televising the
information about the incident, the number of casualties, etc
• He will inform State and Central Government and the statutory bodies of the nature and
magnitude of the incident, the number of casualties, etc.
• He will locate himself such that media persons/third parties do not need to go past the
complex security gates and that adequate communication links exists
• Media personnel often insist on visiting incident scene. He will escort media team(s) If such visits
are approved by the Chief Co-ordinator
• He will be in constant contact with the Medical Co-ordinator, and other co-ordinators to be aware
of latest development and closely liaise with the Chief Co-ordinator
FINANCE CO-ORDINATORS
• He will report at the Emergency Control Centre immediately after getting information about
the emergency at site
• He will release finance (cash / cheques, etc) as directed by the Site Main Controller (Chief
Co-ordinator)
• He will assist the Purchase Co-ordinator for emergency procurement
• He will liaise with Insurance Company personnel as directed by the Site Main Controller
PURCHASE CO-ORDINATORS
• The Purchase Co-ordinator will report at the Emergency Control Centre as soon as the is informed about
an emergency at site
• He will assist the Site Main Controller and arrange for emergency purchase of necessary items as maybe
required during the emergency
• He will co-ordinate with the Materials Co-ordinator and other co-ordinator for necessary emergency items
to be procured
• He will mobilize necessary manpower as may be required, etc.
MATERIALS CO-ORDINATORS
The Materials Co-ordinator will ensure:
• Availability of the materials required by the Site Incident Controller

• Arrange issues of materials from the General Stores round-the-clock during an emergency
• Arrange emergency procurements form local dealers / vendors or from neighbouring industries
• Arrange transportation of materials from General Store to the Incident Site in co-ordination with the
Transport Co-ordinator
ELECTRICAL CO-ORDINATOR
• To arrange all electrical facilities at site.

• To ensure electrical safety at work place.
• To provide electrical technician round the clock to attend any electrical equipment failure.
• To arrange electrical generator and other major electrical equipments as an emergency
standby.
The role of shift personnel during odd hours will be as follows:
1. On getting the information/ seeing any emergency in the Station, Shift Engineer (Station Co-
ordinator) should take the station under emergency shut down and immediately inform central
dispatch.
2. With the actuation of ESD ho shouted ensure that elation is by passed or otherwise station
has to be by passed by local operation of station inlet and station outlet MOVs
3. Subsequent to operation of ESD, Shift Engineer should sound the fire siren
4. Helper should rush to start firefighting pumping unit.
5. Shift Engineer of central dispatch should communicate the emergency message to Chief Co-
ordinator of the station, upstream and downstream stations apart from informing local fire brigade.
6. Chief Co-ordinator should immediately rush to the station for establishment of Emergency Control Centre and
act as per DMP.
7. Shift engineer should assess the scene and start firefighting operation/ try to control the situation with the help
of shift helper.
8. Upon arrival of Chief Co-ordinator, Shift Engineer should assist the crew in fighting fire/
trying to control the situation.
9. CISF personnel in station should be involved to assist the crew in firefighting / trying to control the situation.
5.7.3 OFF-SITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
Emergency is a sudden unexpected event, which can cause serious damage to personnel life, property and
environment outside the boundary wall of the refinery as a whole, which" necessitate evolving Off-site
Emergency Plan to combat any such eventuality. In Offsite disaster management plan, many agencies like
Revenue, Public Health, Fire Services, Police, Civil Defence, Home Guards, Medical Services and other
Voluntary organization are involved. Thus, handling of such emergencies requires an organized
multidisciplinary approach.
In case of a leak from the pipeline and storage tanks, the control system may not be sophisticated
enough to detect the same. Hence the leak has to be notified by the eyewitness to the owner who
would immediately shut down the pumping operation. This may not necessarily result in declaration
of the disaster. In absence of an eyewitness, the leak may go

5.7.4.3 ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE AGENCIES
LIAISON
Assistance may be required during the course of an emergency from any or all of the following
agencies and unit heads will be responsible for establishing liaison with these agencies to effect
assistance as rapid manner as possible
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND POLICE

EMERGENCY IN THE STATION
Fire Fighting
• Wireless communication facilities

• Evacuation of people, if required
• Deployment of Home g u a r d s
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM NEIGHBOURING INDUSTRY
• Repair equipment like portable Generator. Compressor and Welding machine.

• Technicians for carrying out the Welding/ Repairs
• Water/Foam Tender and crew.
• Pneumatic Pumps and Hoses
• Tank Lorries and Tank Trucks for movement of labour, equipment and recovered product.
• Facilities for Radiography
• Helicopter
5.7.4.4 VARIOUS PHASES OF ONSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

BEFORE CRISIS
This will include the safety procedure to be followed during an emergency through posters, talks and
mass media in different languages including local language. Leaflets containing dos/ don’ts before
and during emergency should be circulated to educate the people in vicinity.
• People in vicinity of hazardous installation, and others who are potentially affected in the event
of an accident, should be aware of the risks of accidents, know where to obtain information
concerning the installation, and understand what to do in the event of an accident.
• Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) (Such as environmental humanitarian and

Consumer group) should motivate their constituents and others, to be involved in risk
reduction and accident prevention efforts. They should help to identify specify concerns and
priorities regarding risk reduction and prevention, preparedness and response activities
• NGO’s should facilitate efforts to inform the public and should provide technical assistance to
help the public analyze and understand information that is mane available
• Public authorities (at all levels) and management of hazardous installation should
Established emergency planning activities/ program’s for accidents involving the hazardous
Substance
• All parties who will be involved in emergency planning process. In this respect public Stealth
authorities, including experts from information centers should be involved in relevant aspects of
offsite emergency planning
• Emergency warning alert system should be in place to warn the potentially affected public or
there is an imminent threat of an accident
• The system chosen should be effective and provide timely warning. Suitable warning system
could include or a combination of for e.g.: sirens, automatic telephone message, and mobile
public address system
DURING CRISIS
Central Control Committee: As the off-site plan is to be prepared by the government a central control
committee shall be formed under the chairmanship of area head. Other officers from police, fire,
factory, medical, engineering, social welfare, publicity, railway, transport and requisite departments
shall be incorporated as members. Some experts will also be included for guidance. The functions
of committee should be:
• To work as main co-coordinating body constituted of necessary district heads and other
authorities with overall command, coordination, guidance, supervision, policy and doing all
necessary things to control disaster in shortest times
• To prepare, review, alter or cancel this plan and to keep it a complete document with all
• details
• To take advice and assistance from experts in fields to make plan more successful
• To set in motion all machineries to this plan in event of disaster causing or likely to cause severe
damage to public, property or environment
• The incident control committee, traffic control committee and press publicity committee will
FOR AWA-SALWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE
first be informed, as they are needed first

• Medical Help, Ambulance and Hospital Committee: This committee consisted of doctors for medical
help to the injured persons because of disaster. Injuries may be of many types as such doctors are
rarely available, we have to mobilize and utilize all available doctors in the area. Functions and
duties of the committee include:
• To give medical help to all injured as early as possible
• Civil surgeon is the secretary who will organize his team
• On receiving information to rush to spot he will immediately inform his team and will proceed
with all necessary equipments
• First aid and possible treatment shall be provided at the spot or at some convenient pIace and
patients may be requested to shift to hospitals for further treatment
• All efforts shall be made on war basis to save maximum lives and to treat maximum injuries
• Continuity of the treatment shall be maintained till the disaster is controlled
• Traffic Control, Law and Order: The committee is headed by District Superintendent of Police.
Functions and duties of this committee should be:
o To control traffic towards and near disaster, to maintain law and order
o To evacuate the places badly affected or likely to be affected
o To shift the evacuated people to safe assembly points
o To rehabilitate them after disaster is over.
o Necessary vehicles, wireless sets and instruments for quick communications shall be
maintained and used as per need
AFTER CRISIS
At the time of disaster, many people may badly be affected. Injured people shall be treated by medical help,
ambulance and hospital committee, but those not injured but displaced kept at assembly points, whose relative
or property is lost, houses collapsed and in need of any kind of help shall be treated by this welfare and restoration
committee. Functions and duties of this committee are:
• To find out persons in need of human help owing to disastrous effect. They may give first aid if
medical team is not available
• They will serve the evacuated people kept at assembly points. They will arrange for their food,
water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and guidelines to reach any needful places
• They will look for removal and disposal of dead bodies, for help of sick, weak, children and
needy persons for their essential requirements

• The tears will also work for restoration of detached people, lost articles, essential commodities
etc.
• The team will also look after the restoration of government articles
• The team will also ensure that the original activities, services and systems are resumed again
as they were functioning before the disaster
POLICE DEPARTMENT
• The police should assist in controlling of the accident site, organizing evacuation and removing
of any seriously injured people to hospitals
• Co-ordination with the transport authorities, civil defence and home guards
• Co-ordination with army, navy, air force and state fire services
• Arrange for post mortem of dead bodies
• Establish communication center
FIRE BRIGADE
• The fire brigade shall organize to put out fires and provide assistance as required
• Hospitals and Doctors
• Hospitals and doctors must be ready to treat any injuries.
• Co-ordinate the activities of Primary Health Centers and Municipal Dispensaries to ensure
required quantities of drugs and equipments
• Securing assistance of medical and paramedical personnel from nearby Hospitals/institutions
• Temporary mortuary and identification of dead bodies.
MEDIA
• The media should have ready and continuous access to designated officials with relevant
information, as well as to other sources in order to provide essential and accurate information to
public throughout the emergency and to help avoid confusion
• Efforts should be made to check the clarity and reliability of information as it becomes
available, and before it is communicated to public.
• Public health authorities should be consulted when issuing statements to the media concerning
health aspects of chemical accidents
• Members of the media should facilitate response efforts by providingmeans for informing the public
with credible information about accidents involving hazardous substances
Non-governmental organizations (NGO)
• NGO’s could provide a valuable source of expertise and information to support emergency
response efforts. Members of NGOs could assist response personnel by performing specified
tasks, as planned during the emergency planning process. Such tasks could include
psychological & social assistance to members of community and response personnel.
• Duties of NGO are listed below:
• Evacuation of personnel from the affected area
• Arrangements at rallying posts and parking yards
• Rehabilitation of evacuated persons
• Co-ordination with other agencies such as police, medical, animal husbandry, agriculture
electricity board, fire services, home guards and civil defence.
• Establishing shelters for rescue, medical, firefighting personnel.
5.8 MOCK DRILLS
As per the Industrial Major Accident Hazard Rules,
a) The occupier shall ensure that a mock drill of the o n -site emergency plan is conducted every
six months.
b) A detail report of the mock drill conducted under sub-rule (4) shall be made immediately
available to the concerned authority.
Accordingly,
• Onsite Disaster Mock Drills are conducted once in six months.

• Also, Major Fire and Minor Fire mock drills are conducted once in three months and one month
respectively.
LESSONS LEARNED SYSTEM FOR MOCK DRILLS

Performances during the mock drills are reviewed by CEC. Co-ordiua1crs and other involved
persons including Observers. Observations / shortcomings are reviewed and recommendations are
made for improvements which are followed by F&S for compliance. The action points from the mock
drill observations should be circulated to all concerned for liquidation. The critical point shall be
presented to management in Apex Loss control meeting bimonthly.
ALL CLEAR / RE-ENTRY PROCEDURES

Chief Emergency Controller (CEC) will declare ‘All Clear’ after control of the Incident and arrange
measures required for post Disaster control period and ask fire Station to BIow 2 minutes straight run
siren.
After incident normalization, CEC would ask Unit in-charge to visit and check the incident site along with
representatives of Inspection and F&S and also Maintenance (Electrical / Mechanical / Civil/
Instrumentation Rotary) as needed. Standard Checks particular to a un it will be provided by respective Area
Managers.
Based or feedback or the team, SEC would allow re-entry / resumption of operations at the incident
site.
5.9 EVACUATION PLAN
5.9.1 PURPOSE
To establish method of systematic, safe and orderly evacuation of all the occupants in case of fire or
any emergency, in the least possible time, to a safe assembly point through nearest safe means of
escape. Additionally, to use available fire appliances provided for controlling or extinguishing fire and
safeguarding of human life.
5.9.2 ESCAPE DRILL PROCEDURE FIRE
In the event of fire condition or on hearing the fire alarm all the occupants of the building shall
immediately leave the work area and proceed towards nearest safe escape route. A care should be
taken before leaving the workplace so that the escape route shall not be blocked due to chairs or
another similar object.
• Security In-charge will ensure the access control system is defeated for safe evacuation of all the
occupants from the affected building.
• The occupants will have to leave the affected area / block / building in a speedy and orderly
Manner.
• Before leaving the workplace, occupants will switch off electrical gadgets such as AC Computers,
Water heaters, etc. The area owner of the building will ensure electric supply cut off to the
affected building.
• The emergency exit / normal exit if not affected due to tire and / or smoke shall be used for
Speedy evacuation.
• All occupants will follow in a row while escaping from the block / building. Unnecessary haste
and crowding shall be avoided on the escape route. Panic actions of the occupants will definitely
delay the evacuation.
• The occupants having visitors shall ensure the safe evacuation of the visitor along with them to
the safe assembly point.
• Efforts shall be made to control or extinguish the fire with the help of available fire
Extinguishers in that area.
• Building / block in-charge shall ensure the safe escape and orderly evacuation of aII the
Occupants.
• All occupants after being evacuated shall assemble at designate safe assembly point. Block /
building in-charge will arrange for head count to ensure that all the occupants have been safely
evacuated.
• Security In-charge shall ensure that all the visitors have been evacuated as per visitor entry
register / gate pass register. The visitors shall evacuate from the building / block along with the
occupants and report to security in-charge.
• The missing / suspected trapped occupants will be searched and rescued by the fire crew.
• Upon All-Clear signal from the incident controller, occupants can go back to their work place.
5.10 TRAINING
On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a long way in improving
their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of station, especially from the safety
stand point. In order to combat with emergency situations arising
ANNEXURE-3
PUBLIC RELATIONS
DO’S
1. Release only authorised verified written information.
2. Escort the press to the nearest safer place on the emergency site.
3. Keep accurate records and logs of all the enquiries and news coverage.
4. Only station Manager/ unit head will be the spokesman.
DON’TS
1. Speculate on resumption of normal operations.
2. Speculate on causes of the emergency.
3. Speculate on the outside effects of emergency.
4. Interfere with the legitimate duties of media representatives like AIR/ TV/press.
5. Place blame for emergencies.
FORMAT FOR INFORMATION TO OUTSIDE

AGENCIES TO POLICE
1. Location
2 Type and nature of accident
3. No. of dead/ injured
4. Situation
5. Security arrangements required for cordoning the area
6. Help of the police wireless for communication
TO HOSPITAL
1. Location
2. Type and nature of accidents.
3. No. of injured
4. Type of treatment required for burns/ injuries etc.
5. Assistance required: ambulance, services of doctors etc.
TO VILLAGE OFFICIALS / DISTRICT MAGISTRATE/ PWD AND IRRIGATION

AUTHORITIES:
1. Location
2. Type and nature of accidents
3. Situation
4. No. of dead / injured
5. Precaution to be taken
6. Assistance required
7. Any other relevant information.
INFORMATION TO PRESS/MEDIA DURING DISASTER
A mishap has occurred at our place on at hrs. The situation is un‹4er

control. As a first hand report, operation has been stopped and all necessary arrangements have
been made for keeping the situation under control. Government Authorities like Police, District
Collector, and SDM etc. have been informed for necessary help. An emergency control room has
been set-up to monitor and co-ordinate restoration activities, till the situation is back to normal.
Presently the situation is well within control with the in-house resources. There is no loss of human life. The
operation will be resumed shortly
ff
sssssss
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ANNEXURE-6
RUDIMENTARY FIRST AID
MEASURES BASICS OF FIRST AID
Although every injured person must be sent to hospital without delay, there are always certain first
aid measures twat may be administered to prepare the patient for treatment and perhaps even
save his life, before the doctor’s services can be obtained. Some of the common injuries and
rudimentary first aid measures are as follows:
FIRST AID TREATMENT FOR BURNS
The following instructions apply to large burns that are to those involving an area of more than two
fingers to burns. Which raise blisters or break the surface of the skin. In general, remember that a
man who is severely burnt may also be severely injured
i. Clear the burned area of any loose burnt clothing do not attempt to wash or clean the area otherwise.
Do not disturb any blisters.
ii. As in all serious injuries. Keep the patient warm and as comfortable as possible. Relieve his pain with
pain tablets Demerol, two tablets every three hours, if necessary. If two men are burned, give each
one Demerol tablet. Tell the doctor, the patient has had Demerol.
iii. When the burned area is adequately exposed, cover the entire area with ‘Jelonet’ dressings. (These
are single layers of mesh gauze covered with sterile Vaseline and separated by squares of stiff
paper).
iv. After the burned area is covered with Jelonet, lay on sterile gauze squares, then cover the area with
a layer of cotton wool, machinist’s waste (clean) or strips of clean towel. The whole area is to be
bandaged firmly but not so as to break blisters. Once in place the dressings should not be disturbed.
v. Penicillin: Give one tablet at once and follow this by one tablet every eight hours.
vi. Give the patient frequent drinks of hot, sweet tea or coffee, well salted, clear soup is excellent.
Water will do if these are not available. It is important in a severe burn that the patient receives plenty
of fluid. Do not use alcoholic drinks.
vii. Remove the patient to the care of a Doctor as soon as possible.
BURNS INVOLVING EYE

Pull down the lower lid and squeeze on a ribbon of Aureomycin ointment. Then have the patient
close the eye, cover with an eye pad taped into place and evacuate to the nearest doctor.
BURNS FROM ACID OR A LKALIES

ACID BURNS
Bathe the affected part freely with a weak alkaline solution. Such as, Mo teaspoonful of baking soda
in 500 cc of water. If alkaline solution is not available flood with water, warm, if possible.
ALKALINE BURNS
Bathe affected part freely with a weak acid solution such as, vinegar and equal quantity of
Warm water. If not, available flood affected area with water. Warm. If possible.
VARIOUS DEGREES OF SKIN BURNS

Skin burns are divided into three different degrees of seriousness: 1st. 2nd and 3rd degrees of skin
burn.
1st degree
Only the very outside layer of the skin has been injured. It can be observed as skin redness.
2nd degree
An injury going deeper with a blister arising because the fine blood vessels on the surface have been
damaged and leaked plasma. Around a skin burn of 2nd degree there is always a skin burn of the
1st degree in a large or small zone.
3rd degree
Carbonization of the tissues, sometimes as far as the bone. The damaged parts are either wholly carbonized
or at various stages of dying tissue. If they are not removed, they will form an excellent substratum for bacteria
and can become the starting point of very serious infections. In case of burning clothes of a person, skin burns
of 3rd degree is almost always caused.
HEALING
A skin burn of the 1st degree heals within a day or two. A skin burn of the 2nd degree is healed in about two
weeks, but a skin burn of the 3rd degree demands a very Iong time to heal, Sometimes as long as half a year
and then very often the wound leaves a scar
THE “RULE OF NINE"

When planning treatment of a burn, it is important to be able to estimate the size of the damage
I.e. how large a part of the body surface that has been damaged by burn roughly. The palm is 1%
of the body surface.
A useful mnemonic rule is the so-called “Nine rule". Each arm is 9% of the body surface, the head
and neck 9%, the front 2x9%, the back 2x9%, each leg 2 x 9% and the genital organs 1%.
In practice, one is of opinion that all damage covering more than 10% of the body surface area is
dangerous (5% according to certain sources), and thus a casualty with larger burn damage than
10% shall be treated against shock, even if there are no signs of a shock in the person affected to
begin with.
TREATMENT OF BURNS
Treatment of burns stepwise may be done as follows
• Estimation of the size of damage
• Estimation of shock risk
• Prevention of treatment of shock
• Pain relief
• Infection control
• Treatment of wounds
PAIN RELIEF
Even a small burn can be very painful. Casualties having 1st degree and 2nd degree burns can, as a
rule, be relieved from pain if given one or two analgesic tablets. In case of larger burn damage, pain
relieving injections are usually required. If water is available, the burnt area should be cooled with
water immediately. The water lowers the temperature of the damage
medium and has also a pain believing effect to some extent. If the casually is relieved from pain,
the shuck risk is very much reduced. In other words, it is important to start pain reliving measures
as soon as possible.
INFECTION CONTROL
The damaged area shall be cleaned with a disinfectant. Not only the burn itself but also a large
area around it shall be cleaned.
TREATMENT OF WOUNDS RESULTED OUT OF BURN

The wounds shall be covered with burn damage compresses or with clean (preferably sterile) pieces
of cloth. The blisters should not be opened
ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION
The general procedure for artificial respiration is:
i. Lay the patient on his stomach head turned to the side, check resting on one hand.
ii. Clean the mouth and throat for any obstruction. Kneel at the victim's head.
iii. Stretch your palm them with thumb tips together on the patient’s back just below the shoulder
blades.
iv. Rock forward slowly to exert pressure. Keep your elbows straight. Release pressure by flexing
elbow. Do not push away. Rock back and slide hands upon victims back and out along his/her arms.
v. Grasp his arms half way between elbow and shoulders. Pull upwards and towards yourself until
you feel resistance.
vi. Lower arms and repeat backpressure. Repeat cycle, ten or twelve times a minimum.
vii. Do not interrupt rhythm. Continue artificial respiration until victim is breathing. Let someone else
loosen tight clothing. Go for help.
MOUTH TO MOUTH METHOD

i. Lay the patient flat on his back- raise shoulders
ii. Tilt the head backward, maintain clear air way (clean the mouth, throat for any obstruction)
iii. Open your mouth wide & take a deep breath.
iv. Pinch his nostrils with your fingers.
v. Seal your lips around his mouth.
i. Minor cuts and abrasions, it must not be left to the man to decide whether the injury is simple or
serious.
ii. If an ambulance is required, the hospital should be contacted by telephone, advising the nature
of the injury. Subsequent action in regard to the welfare of the casualty will be decided by the medical
authorities.
iii. In rendering first aid, particular care must be taken so that (here is no adverse effect on the injury.
Normally first aid should be rendered by a trained person, but in an emergency, anybody may have
to render the first aid.
SERIOUS INJURY
iv. In case of serious injuries, first aid will be rendered at the spot, if applicable, and at the same
time the hospital will De requested for an ambulance giving precise nature of injuries.
v. The station-In-charge or his representative and the concerned Department Head will be informed
by telephone or by messenger and they should proceed at once to the spot for any such action as
the circumstances may require.
FATAL INJURY
vi. In case of fatal injury, the statutory obligation requires that the situation where the accident accrued
should remain as far as possible, undisturbed.
vii. The medical officer, station-in-charge, unit P&A will be informed immediately of any fatal injury.
The Personnel Department will take early action to inform the relatives, police and the factory
inspectorate.
An enquiry will be held by a Committee, constituted by the Management in all cases of fatal injury.
MINOR WOUNDS
i. Do not touch the wound with anything.
ii. Proceed to the hospital immediately.
WOUNDS WITH SPURTING FLOW OF BLOOD

i. Stop or retard the bleeding by placing a clean bandage a clean handkerchief or the like over the
wound and applying moderate pressure with fingers on the bandage. In case bleeding still

Persists apply a tourniquet around the arm or leg between the arm, leg between the wound and the heart
and twist tightly enough to stop the circulation of blood to the injured part. The tourniquet must De
loosened at intervals for not more than twenty minutes to allow re-circulation of blood or death to limb
may result.
ii. Lay the patient down and keep him warm.
iii. Trai1spoit by ambulance to medical.
FRACTURES
i. Don't bend or twist a limb to determine whether the bone is broken.

ii. Keep patient laying down and keep him warm.
iii. For fracture of the back or neck or distorted fractures of the arm or leg, don’t move the patient
except in case where the life of the injured is in danger in which case, remove the injured gently.
Call the doctor.
iv. For fracture of any other part of the body - place the patient gently on stretcher and transport by
ambulance to hospital.
ELECTRIC SHOCKS
GENERAL GUIDELINES
i. Act at once — delay is fatal.

ii. Death from electric shock is rarely instantaneous.
iii. Patient may become unconscious only due to interruption of breathing system due to severe
Shock. Therefore, life can be saved by immediate artificial respiration.
iv. Send for, but never wait for, a doctor.
v. Continue artificial respiration until a doctor pronounces death.
vi. Removal from electric contact.
vii. If the person who has received the shock is still in contact with the apparatus / circuit, immediate
action should be taken to remove him.
viii. Switch off the current immediately or send someone to do so.
ix. If it is not possible to switch off the current immediately and render the injured person keeping in
mind that the circuit is alive.
x. Care should be taken that the rescuers do not themselves become casualties. Contract through
bare skin of the person to be rescued and the rescuer with the passage to earth must be avoided.
xi. Do not attempt to remove a person from contact with high voltage without using articles suitably
insulated for the system voltage. When attempting to free a person (rom contact with low or medium
voltage use rubber gloves, boots, mats or insulated sticks, but if these are not available use a loop
of rope or a coat to drag the person free. Whatever is used should be dry and non-conducting.
ACTION AFTER REMOVAL FROM ELECTRICAL CONTACT
i. If the person’s clothes have caught fire, extinguish the fire by smothering.
ii. Get the patient into fresh air.
iii. In cold weather, avoid exposure of the casualty to cold, if possible, use blankets
iv. If the patient is unconscious, immediately check and remove, all foreign matters like tobacco,
false teeth etc., if any, in his mouth and throat. Now start ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION at once.
MISCELLANEOUS TIPS FOR FIRST AID

i. In all cases of head injuries, always keep the patient's head above the level of his/her body by keeping
some support under the neck.
If the patient has suffered snakebite, immediately tie with a handkerchief above the level of the bite and
take the patient to the medical department. Always keep the patient warm.
ANNEXURE-7
LIST OF EQUIPMENTS, MATERIALS, TOOLS AND TACKLES TO BE MAINTAINED AT
STATIONS
RECOMMENDED
Sr. No. EOUIPMENT/ TOOL DESCRIPTION REMARKS
QTY.
01 Spare key of valve enclosure and valve 2

operation wheel
02 Leak clamps of required size 2
03 Shovel 2
04 Spade
05 Pick axe 6
06 Tasla
8 LBS copper sledge hammer with
07
Handle
1
08 Lead metal 500 Gms.
09 Portable generator (5 to 10 KW)
1 station
10 Portable radio set (15 watts)
2 nos. base
11 Empty lube oil barrels 2
12 Buckets & mugs 5
13 Safety torches 01
14 Tool kit 1 box
No smoking & prohibited area display

5 nos. each
boards.
1 For cordoning the area
16 1 roll
(1) rope 100 meters length. 20 nos.
(2) Bamboos (1.5 mtrs. Length)
Fire Extinguishers
17 02
10 Kg capacity DCP type
ANNEXURE- 8
EMERGENCY CONTACT NO OF NEAR BY INDUSTRY
Sr. No. Organization Emergency contact no
ANNEXURE- 9
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF OUTSIDE AGENCIES & MUTUAL AID PARTNERS
IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF OUTSIDE AGENCIES
Sr. No FREE SERVICE AND MUTUAL AID PARTENERS CONTACT DETAILS
Sr. No DISTRICT AUTHORITIES & POLICE
Sr. No IMPORTANT HOSPITAL NUMBERS
ANNEXURE: 10
Telephone Nos. of Police Stations ((Independent ROW)
Sr. No Name of Village Police Station Telephone No. Fire Brigade
Telephone Nos. of Police Stations (Common ROW with ASPL)
Sr. No Name of Village Police Station Telephone No. Fire Brigade
ANNEXURE- 12
List of MSDS
Sr.No. Name of Chemicals
01 HSD
02 SKO
03 MS

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET OF HSD
1. CHEMICAL IDENTITY
Chemical Name: High Speed Diesel Chemical classification: Fuel

Synonyms: Gas Oil Trade Name: Diesel Oil
Formula: A Complete Mixture of hydrocarbon C.A.S. No. UN. No: 1202
Regulated Identification Shipping Name: Diesel oil Hazchem No.: 3 Z
Codes / Label: 30 Class 3. Flammable Liquid Hazardous Waste I. D No.:5
HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS C.A.S No.
2. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL DATA
Boiling Range: 110 to 4000C Physical state: Liquid @ 150C & 1 atm Appearance: yellow to oily brown
Vapour pressure: - 0.1 psi @ 380 C Odour: Characteristic
Freezing point: 0 - I 8°C Others: insoluble and floats in
water. Vapour Density: 3.0 to 5. 0 (Air=1)
Specific Gravity: 0.840 gm ml @ 15 0C pH: Not pertinent
3. FIRE AND FXPLOSION HAZARD DATA
Flammability: Yes LEL: 0.5 % Flash Point: > 32°C min (CC)
TDG Flammability: 3 UEL: 5.0 % Flash Point: > 350 C min (OC)
Auto ignition Temperature: 230 - 300°C

Explosion sensitivity to static Electricity: Stable
Hazardous Combustion Products: Acrid smoke and irrigated fumes of CO/ CO2
Hazardous Polymerization : Does not occur
Combustible Liquid: Yes, Explosive Material: No Cohesive Material: No
Flammable Material: Yes Oxidiser : No Others : No
Pyropheric Material: No Organic Peroxide: No
4. REACTIVITY DATA
Chemical Stability: Chemically Stable
FIRE Extinguishing Media: Foam DCP CO2.

Special Procedures : Keep the containers cool by spraying water if exposed to fire.
Unusual Hazards: Flashback may occur along vapour trail.
EXPOSURE First Aid Measures: A/a Antidotes/ Dosages: Not available
SPILL Steps to be taken: Shut off leaks without risk.

Contain leaking liquid on sand or earth
Prevent liquid from entering into sewers

Waste Disposal Method: Seal all the waste in vapour tight plastic bags for eventual disposal.
8. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION / REFERENCES
9. MANUFACTURERS / SUPPLIERS DATA: HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED
10. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation. Guarantee or warranties of any
kind are made as to its accuracy. Suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from them. It is upto the
end user to ensure that information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product
manufactured / handled or sold by him as the case ma› be and H.P.C.L. makes no warranties expressed or implied
in respect of adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET OF SKO
Chemical Name: Superior Kerosene oil Chemical classification: Fuel (paraffinic)
Synonyms : Jet Fuel. Coal oil Trade Name: Kerosene
Formula: Complex mixture of hydrocarbons C.A.S. No. 8008-20-6 U.N.No.: 1223
Regulated Identification Shipping flame: kerosene Hazchem No.: 3
Cable /Label: 30 class 3, Flammable Liquid Hazardous Waste I.D No.: 5
C.A.S No.
HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS
Kerosene 8008-20-6
Boiling Range: 150 to 3000 Physical state: Liquid @ 150C & I atm Appearance: Colorless to pale yellow liquid
Vapour pressure: 0.05 - 0.50 psi @ 38 0C Odour : Faint typical
Freezing point: -300C others: Soluble in Alcohol, acetone and either, Insoluble in water
Vapour Density: 4.5 (Air=1)
Specific Gravity: 0.800 (typ) @ 15.560C pH: Not pertinem
3. FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA
Flammability : Yes LEL: 0.7 % Flash Point: > 38 0 C

TDG Flammability: 3 UEL: 5.0 %
Auto ignition Temperature: 210 0C

Explosion sensitivity to impact: Stable
Explosion sensitivity to static Electricity: May explode
Hazardous Combustion Products: Acrid smoke and irritating fumes. oxides of sulfur
Hazardous Polymerization: Does not occur
Combustible Liquid: Yes, Explosive MateriaI: No Corrosive Material: No
Flammable Material: Yes Oxidiser: No Others: No :

REACTIVITY DATA
Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore Page No: 5.85 Green Circle, Inc.- Baroda
Chemical Stability: Chemical Stable.
Incompatibility with other material: Incompatible with strong oxidisers
Reactivity: Does not react with common materials but may react with oxidising agents
Hazardous Reaction products: Data not available
5. HEALTH HAZARD DATA
Routes of energy: Inhaltion /Ingestion / Skin Eye
Effect of exposure / : Inhalation :can cause unconsiousness which may go to coma . Stentorious breathing
Symptoms and bluish tint to the skin.
Ingestion : In mild form, intoxication resembles drunkenness. Sometime headache lack of appetite, dizziness, sleepiness,
indigtion, nausea, chemical pneumonotis, results if aspirated during ingestion or while vomiting can cause systemic effect
after repeated exposure.
Skin : Causes irritattion to the skin, prolonged or repeated contact results in dry scaly skin and development of dermatities.
Eye : acute irritation
Emergency Treatment : Remove victim to fresh air. give artificial respiration if required, remove contaminated clothing quickly,
do not include vomiting if ingested. keep victim warm and quiet. Olive oil or any other vegetable oil should be given orally to
retard absorption of Mineral Turpentine oil.
TWA: 33 ppm STEL: Not listed
PEL: Not listed Odour Threshold: Not listed
LD50: 28 gm/ Kg
NFPA Hazard signal Health: 1 Flammability: 3 Reactivity: 0 Special: Nil
6. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Personnel Protective Equipment: Avoid contact with liquid or vapour.

Use gum boots, gloves while handling the product.
Handling & Storage Precautions: Store in dry, cool, ventilated area away from heat and flame.
Keep away from oxidising agents
7. EMERGENCY AND FIRST AID MEASURES

FIRE Extinguishing Media: Foam / DCP/ CO2.
Special Procedures: keep the containers cool by spraying water if exposed to fire.
Unusual Hazards: Flashback may occur along vapour trail.
EXPOSURE First Aid Measures: A/a Antidotes / Dosages: Not available
SPILLS Steps to be Taken : Shut off leaks without risk.
Contain leaking liquid on sand or earth.
Prevent liquid from entering into sewers.
Waste Disposal Method : Seal all the waste in vapour tight plastic bags for eventual disposal.
9. MANUFACTURERS / SUPPLIERS DATA :HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED
10. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation, guarantee or
warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained
from them. It is upto the end user to ensure that information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant
to the product manufactured/ handled or sold by him as the case may be and H.P.C.L makes no warranties
expressed or implied in respect of adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET OF MS
Chemical Name: Motor Sprit Chemical classification: Fuel
Synonyms: Gasoline Trade Name: Petrol
Formula: A Complex Mixture of hydrocarbons C.A.S. No. 8006-61-9 U.N.No.: 1203
Regulated Identification Shipping Name: Gasoline Hazchem No.: 3 Y E
Codes/Label : 33/Class 3. Flammable Liquid Hazardous waste I.D No.: 5
HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS C.A.S No.
Motor Spirit 8006-61-9
Boiling Range : 300C to 2150C Physical State : Liquid@ 150C & I atm Apperance: Orange (Octane 87)
Red (Octane 93)
Vapour Pressure: @ 350C Odour : Aromatic Odour
Freezing point: -400C: 6 to 10psi @ 380C Other : Easily soluble in Alcohol Ether, Chloroform & Benzene
Vapour Density : 3.0 to 4.0 (Air=1) Solubility in water @ 300C Floats on water
Specific Gravity: 0.733 gm/l @ 15.60C pH (Water=1) : Not pertinent
. 3. FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA
Flammability: Yes LEL: 1.4 % Flash Point: -300C min (CC)

TDG Flammability: 3 UEL: 7.6 % Flash point: Data not available (OC)
Auto ignition Temperature: 390 0C

Explosion sensitivity to impact: Stable
Explosion sensitivity to static Electricity: May explode
Hazardous Combustion Products: CO/CO2/SO2/NOX
Hazardous Polymerization: Does not occur
Combustible Liquid: Yes, Explosive Material: No Corrosive Material: No
Flammable Material: Yes Oxidiser: No Others: No
4. 4.
REACTIVITY DATA
Chemical Stability: Chemical Stable.
Incompatibility with other material: Incompatible with strong oxidisers.
Reactivity: Does not react with common materials but may react with oxidising agents
11. HEALTH HAZARD DATA
Routes of energy: Inhaltion /Ingestion / Skin Eye
Effect of exposure / : Inhalation : Inhalation in very high concentration of vapour causes loss of unconsiousness, coma
Sympotoms and sudden death. In less severe cases causes hedache, nausea and mental confusion and depression may occur
: Ingestion : Ingestion causes irrition of gastro intestinal tract with vomiting colic and diarrhea
: Skin : Prolonged skin contact will dry an defat skin with dermatitis
: Eye : Contact with eye causes pain and slight transient corneal ephithelial disturbaxes
Emergency Treatment : If drenched with product remove soaked clothings immediately. Flush affected area with plenty of water
and then was with soap and water. If inhaled, remove the victim to fresh air. If not breathing, give artificial respiration. If breathing is
difficult, call physician. If swallowed, do not including vomiting. If eye is affected, flush with plent of water untill irriation subsides. Keep
patient warm and laying down. Give hot drinks like milky tea or coffee. Call physician or transport victim to hospital, If necessary. If
ingested, liquid paraffin, olive oil or any other vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption of gasoline. Gastric lavage and the
induction of vomiting are not advisable because of possibility of aspiration of gasoline. Gastric lavage and the induction of vomiting are
not advisable because of possibility of aspiration of gasoline and the subsequent development of chemical pneumenia.
TLV (ACGIH) : 300 ppm 900 mg/m3 STEL : 500 ppm 1500 mg/m3
PEL : 300 ppm 900 mg/m3 Odour Threshod : 0.25 ppm 300 mg/m3
LD50 : Not Listed LD50 : Not Listed
6. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Personnel Protective Equipment: Hand gloves / Gas mask / PVC suit.
Handling & Storage Precautions:
 Avoid contact with liquid or Vapours use flameproof electrical equipment only.
 Stay upwind while gauging Sample handling Earth all equipment and pipelines properly.
 Do not wash clean hands with the product Store an enclosed vessel in a cool, well-ventilated area.
 Do not suck the product from heat & flame.
 Gas free the tank before entering cleaning No smoking or open flames.
 Change oi clothing promptly. Provide adequate ventilation at work site.
7. EMERGENCY AND FIRST AID MEASURES
 Fire Extinguishing Media: Foam / DCP/ CO2.

 Special Procedures: Keep the containers cool by spraying water if exposed to fire.
 Unusual Hazards: Flashback may occur along vapour trail.
EXPOSURE FIRST Aid Measures : A/a Antidotes / Dosages : Not avilable
SPILLS Steps to be taken: Eliminate oil sources of ignition:
Ventilate the area.
Stop leaks if no risk involved
Collect leaking product into closed container.
Contain/ absorb spillage in sand/ earth bund.
Use water spray to disperse / dilute the vapours, if necessary
Prevent run-off from entering into sewers.
Waste Disposal Method: Collect all the waste in vapour tight plastic bags for eventual disposal.
9. MANUFACTURERS / SUPPLIERS DATA: HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED

10. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation,
guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or
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RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT FOR AWA-SALAWAS PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINE

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD

SECON PVT. LTD.

Green Circle Inc.

WE EXPPESS OUR SINCERE THANKS TO MANAGEMENT & EMPLOYEES OF

For: GREEN CIRCLE, INC.

LEGAL DISCLAIMER & LIABILITY

Chapter No Contents Page No.

Chapter 1: Technology Profile

1.1 Description of Project 1.1

1.1.1 Justification with respect to Project Attributes 1.2

1.1.2 Justification with respect to Environmental Attributes 1.2

1.2 Proposed Pipeline Route 1.3

1.3 Selection of Route Criteria 1.10

1. 4 Pipeline Elements 1.10

1.5 Pipeline Design Parameters 1.10

1.5.1 Design Details 1.10

1 5.2 Operating Parameters: 1.11

1. 5.3 Pipeline Materials 1.11

1.5.4 Sectionalized Valve Stations 1.11

1.6 Main Phases of the Project 1.13

1.6.1 Construction Phase 1.13

1.6.2 Operational Phase 1.16

1.7 Pipeline Leak Detection System 1.17

1.8 Safety Provisions 1.18

1.9 9 Control & Maintenance 1.20

1.10 Aspects Likely to Cause Environmental Effects 1.20

1.1 1 Power Requirement 1.22

1.12 Workforce Arrangements 1.22

1.13 Abandonment ofOperations 1.2

Chapter 2: RA DMP - Introduction

2.1 Genesis of the Project 2.1

2.2 Location of the Project 2.3

2.3 Need for the Project 2.6

2.4 Economics of Transportation 2.7

2.4.1 Contribution to Economy of the Country 2.7

Environmental Friendliness 2.8

2.4.3 Advantages of Pipeline Project 2.8

2.5 Objective of the Study 2.9

2.6 Methodology of QRA Study 2.9

Disaster Management Plan 2.9

Chapter 3: RA DMP — MCA Analysis

3.1 Introduction 3.1

3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis 3.2

3.2 Hazard Identification 3.3

3.3 MCA Analysis 3.3

3.3.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxic Scenarios 3.5

3.3.1.1 Jet Fire 3.6

3.3.1.2 Flash Fire 3.6

3.3.1.3 Vapor Cloud Explosion 3.6

3.3.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit 3.7

Chapter No Contents Page No.

3.3.3 Model for Pressure Wave 3.9

3.3.4 Vulnerability Models 3.10

3.4 Computation of Damage Distances 3.11

Chapter 4: Risk Mitigation Measures

4.2 Pipeline Hazards 4.1

4.3 Pumps 4.3

4.4 General Recommendations 4.3

4.5 Electricity Hazard 4.4

4.6 Risks to Personnel 4.4

4.7 Training 4.4

Chapter 5: Disaster Management Plan