Corpus vs Ochoterena hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the

case submitted for decision.9

On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the
verified Complaint1 of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs. Macias) dated May 11,
In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions and
2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge, Regional
manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the counsel
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte, of bias,
of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the
partiality and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition
respondent judge.10 One was denied while the rest were ignored. As
of Civil Case No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage, entitled "Mariano
previously stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30,
Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias."
2001 without resolving the other motions and manifestations.

The antecedents follow.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent
On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of
judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias
marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias ("Mr.
and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint
Macias"), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11,
containing the above-cited facts before the Office of the Court Administrator
Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the respondent's court.2
(OCA).11 Also in the Complaint is her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte
On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued
directing the respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the
Summons to Mrs. Macias.3 However, the Summons was not served on Mrs.
subject case and imposing an administrative sanction against him.
Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.4
Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication.
Without waiting for the OCA's Indorsement, the respondent judge submitted
The respondent granted the motion in his Order5 dated March 7, 2001, with
his Comment/Answer12 on May 25, 2001.13
the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after
notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective
local weekly newspaper, "Tingog Peninsula," based in Dipolog City in its
because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have knowledge
March 11-17, 2001 issue.6
of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein.
Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons
and humiliate him had motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within
the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she
The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias' right to due process. He
set for hearing on April 20, 2001.7 However, instead of first acting upon the
argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to be heard but chose not
motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject
to give her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the trial despite
case on April 19, 2001, or one day before.
prior notice. Furthermore, he points out that the records of the case would
show that the proceedings was done in good faith and based on law and
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set
jurisprudence.
the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001.8 After the scheduled

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 1 | P a g e

Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may have
committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of judicial remedies
and not by resorting to the filing of an administrative action. He argues that
it is only after the Supreme Court finds that a judge had committed malice or
gross ignorance that he should be administratively sanctioned. Moreover,
respondent claims that a Petition14 dated May 11, 2001, containing similar
allegations as the instant complaint, was filed before the Court of Appeals, a
copy of which he received on May 21, 2001.
Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision15 is valid and prays for the
dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
In her Reply16 which she filed on July 19, 2001, Mrs. Macias admits having
filed a petition for certiorari17 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64733
entitled "Margie Corpus Macias v. Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena" on May 18,
2001.18
In addition, Mrs. Macias claims that the Court of Appeals decided the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in her favor on
July 13, 2001, finding respondent judge blatantly transgressing her right to
due process and ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure. She notes
that the Decision19 nullified the assailed proceedings and the Decision20
rendered by the respondent judge on May 15, 2001 in Civil Case No. S-695.21
And finally, Mrs. Macias stresses that the instant charge against respondent
judge may simply be verified by checking the records of the case.
On June 4, 2001, the respondent judge retired from the service. However,
pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated 22
October 2001, the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits, to answer for whatever
administrative sanction the Court may impose in relation to the instant
case.22
In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent
judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a
judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from
the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and
procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the
Court should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which
states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due
process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case
completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed
within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has
been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move
ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that the last pleading
was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case
for pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example of "railroading" or
"procedural short-cut." Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the
respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the
merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias' evidence ex-parte.
The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs.
Macias' Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias'
evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter,
considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias' filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In
holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had
acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 2 | P a g e
It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court,
even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period
therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a
hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default
proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.23
In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of
his investigation.24
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public
Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the
case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed
a Certification dated May 04, 200125 with the respondent judge's court,
stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General
during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining
the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he
had no objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory
requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor
whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made
by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the
case had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the
respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated
Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent
rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always
abreast with law and jurisprudence.26 When the law or procedure is so
elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance.27
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty
of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension
from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months
or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus,
dismissal or suspension from the service is no longer possible. Nonetheless, a
penalty of fine may still be imposed upon him considering that under the
Resolution of the First Division in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated October 22,
2001,28 the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever administrative sanction
the Court may impose upon him with regard to this case. Considering that
this is the first time the respondent judge will be meted a penalty,29 the Court
finds a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the
OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the
remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the
aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further
retention.
SO ORDERED.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 3 | P a g e
Castillo vs De Leon – Castillo
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No.
City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to
90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued
Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had
Quezon City, Branch 84.
become final and executory. 7
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid
the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand,
nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the
Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of
first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to
respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly
await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny
that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was
was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer
correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of
in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
nullity of the second marriage.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The
Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
dispositive portion reads:
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-
Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish
her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did
based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for
this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when
she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
the solemnizing officer belonged.5
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 4 | P a g e
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before
contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their
properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC
in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and
Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the
time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise
denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her
marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties
acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his
Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case,
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect
i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable
marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage
from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while
a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a
void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot
be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal
partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in
voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void
marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a
voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil
Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and
1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was
already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the
second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until
annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree
declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially
the same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon,
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 5 | P a g e
the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated
after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage
contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus
considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we
explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall
be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability
and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting
another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and
with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as
diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For
such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through
the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not
only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases
supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was
in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed
by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge
of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his
first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the
promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.
In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment
of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable
to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 6 | P a g e
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque
City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find
no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 7 | P a g e

Domingo vs CA be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time
he instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no
of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no
cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void.
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and
However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings
and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he
of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity
of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising
in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the
any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage
merits.1
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 8 | P a g e
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of
certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It
explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of
Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the
case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with
the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for
separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the
status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the
validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of
marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted
that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7
contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for
being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own
interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of
private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
occasions stating that:
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 9 | P a g e
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent
cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court
abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing
the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed
property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article
1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the
Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect.
No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision
be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 10 | P a g e
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed.
Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they
still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is
void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first
a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with
which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision
is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in
the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage
is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they
are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista
stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void?
Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the
same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that
they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked
only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not
solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 11 | P a g e
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void
ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court,
in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with
grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage
with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for
the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant
to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing
the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the
phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 12 | P a g e
remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall
be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would
be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive.
For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application
for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private
respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable
her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
"solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should
have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to
have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court
would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 13 | P a g e
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted
said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error
in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the following
instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a
party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or
defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 14 | P a g e
Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed
unaffected by the Family Code.

A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the
preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity)
and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born
before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law
deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).

In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant

per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the
absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage
settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be governed by
the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional
effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity
of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and
property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little
uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling
that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long
and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves
are concerned but also as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 15 | P a g e

Jarillo vs People
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July
21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in
Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the
crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage
with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only
discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and,
thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal
Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
(Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before
then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1,
pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew
in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused
Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 16 | P a g e
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as
the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their
children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that
assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2)
her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its
Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy
when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that
time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void
by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck
down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her
marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice
of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated
July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied
reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her
first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO
ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 17 | P a g e
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be
discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution
evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground
of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for
suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension,
while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the
Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for
all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop,
any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was
held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage."11
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 18 | P a g e
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision
mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty.
Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x
x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as
1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party
who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The
defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its
defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12
Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent
upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly
failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s
testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already
married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any
corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who
allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be
obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the
attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as
opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous
marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous
penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code
for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner
is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional,
which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of
six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to
10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10
years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void
ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of
which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 19 | P a g e
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8,
2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all
other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 20 | P a g e

Chan – Tan vs Tan
This is a petition for review1 of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution2 amending
the 30 March 2004 Decision3 and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution4 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-
45743. In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage
between petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated as part of the decision was the
31 July 2003 Partial Judgment5 approving the Compromise Agreement6 of
the parties. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the trial court granted to
respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to
respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed
respondent to stay in the family dwelling. In its 15 February 2005
Resolution, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the 28 December 2004 Resolution7 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution,8 which
in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17
May 2004 resolution.
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral
in Intramuros, Manila.9 They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was
born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the Philippines in
1993.10
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the
annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties
submitted to the court a compromise agreement, which we quote in full:
1. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and more particularly described in the Contract
to Sell, marked in open court as Exhibits "H" to "H-3" shall be considered as
part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor children namely,
Justin Tan born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan born on November 28,
1993. Copies of the Contract to Sell are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and
"B" and made integral parts hereof.
2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of
her own funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts
on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof directly with Megaworld
Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract amounts are fully paid.
Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate,
transact, pay and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties, Inc.,
in connection with the Contract to Sell marked as Annexes "A" and "B"
hereof.
The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City and located at Unit O, Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St.,
Quezon City shall be placed in co-ownership under the name of Susie Tan
(1/3), Justin Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan.
The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City and located at View Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to the exclusion of
Susie Tan.
The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse Tan
shall exclusively own blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under
the respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned
by the spouse whose name appears as the registered/account owner or
holder in the corporate records/stock transfer books, passbooks and/or the
one in possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits thereof, to the
exclusion of the other spouse.
Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and
under the name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively
owned by him only and all shares, accounts and properties registered
and/or in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be
exclusively owned by her only.
However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall execute
any and all documents transferring the shares of stocks registered in his
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 21 | P a g e
name in favor of Susie Tan, or Justin Tan/Russel Tan. A copy of the list of the
corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached as Annex
"C" and made an integral part hereof.
The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the
other spouse any and all original documents, papers, titles, contracts
registered in the name of the other spouse that are in their respective
possessions and/or safekeeping.
3. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the
Honorable Court, the existing property regime of the spouses shall be
dissolved and shall now be governed by "Complete Separation of Property".
Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors that will be
prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.
The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the
two (2) minor children shall stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B
Mariposa St., Quezon City.
The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children
every Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor children
shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street, Quezon City on or before 9:00
PM of every Sunday of each month.
The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children
in school/or in the house every Thursday of each month. The husband shall
ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said Thursdays.
During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the
children, the parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made
regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan.
Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the
love and affection between the children and the other party, or in the way
of a reasonable and proper companionship between them, either by
influencing the children against the other, or otherwise; nor shall they do
anything to estrange any of them from the other.
The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in
dealing with each other and shall not insult, malign or commit discourteous
acts against each other and shall endeavor to cause their other relatives to
act similarly.
4. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the
children on the following additional dates, provided that the same will not
impede or disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier School, the dates are as
follows:
a. Birthday of Jesse Tan
b. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins and uncles and
aunties
c. Father's Day
d. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan
e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on
such dates as when the children can stay with their father. Provided that if
the children stay with their father on Christmas Day from December 24th to
December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with their mother on
December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or vice versa.
The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children
and shall see to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same.
5. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as far
as practicable have one celebration.
Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have
the right to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours during
the day or the day immediately following/or after the birthday, if said visit
or birthday coincides with the school day.
6. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and
utilized for their High School and College education, in the event that the
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 22 | P a g e
Educational Plans are insufficient to cover their tuition, the Husband shall
shoulder the tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of books and
educational materials, uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses like
summer workshops which are taken in Xavier School, which will be paid
directly by Jesse Tan to the children's school when the same fall due. Jesse
Tan, if necessary, shall pay tutorial expenses, directly to the tutor
concerned.
The husband further undertake to pay ₱10,000.00/monthly support
pendente lite to be deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with
account no. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the 15th of
each month. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two (2)
sons every Sunday, the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of
the daily meals of the two (2) children in school.
7. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public
policy, public order and good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and
bind themselves to execute and sign any and all documents to give effect to
this Compromise Agreement.11
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment12 approving the
compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court
incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on
the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property
relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills
Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate
the amount of ₱11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the following
manner:
(a) ₱3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian
Hills on Lot 11, Block 2;
(b) ₱7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit
9H of the 8 Wack Wack Road Condominium project; and
(c) ₱533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. to cover the
marketing and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12,
Block 2.13
Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian
Hills to other interested buyers. It also appears from the records that
petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the
children. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner
brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without
prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the ₱8,000,000
remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would
prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to
respondent documents and titles in the latter's name.1avvphi1
Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent
custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in
the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration14 alleging
denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of the
negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the
children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country, together with her
children, due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the
pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling and womanizing ways.
She prayed for an increase in respondent's monthly support obligation in
the amount of ₱150,000.
Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,15 denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for
non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The trial court also denied petitioner's prayer for increase in monthly
support. The trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it upon herself
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 23 | P a g e
to enroll the children in another school without respondent's knowledge,
she should therefore defray the resulting increase in their expenses.
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss16 and a motion
for reconsideration17 of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she
was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the
circumstances in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the
petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order
be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo
ante the filing of the suit.
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,18 the trial court denied both the
motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It
held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had
become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary
period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28
December 2004 resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February
2005 resolution.19 The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality20 of
the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Trial Court's Rulings
The 30 March 2004 Decision21 declared the marriage between the parties
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial
Judgment22 approving the Compromise Agreement23 between the parties.
The 17 May 2004 Resolution24 amended the earlier partial judgment in
granting to respondent custody of the children, ordering petitioner to turn
over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowing
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15
February 2005 Resolution25 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the 28 December 2004 Resolution26 denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004
Resolution,27 which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and
the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite
the alleged denial of due process.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to
file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion
to amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and
the properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the
17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of respondent.
Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to
dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if
indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting
an obstacle to the preservation of the family.
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May
2004 resolution of the trial court are now final and executory and could no
longer be reviewed, modified, or vacated. Respondent alleges petitioner is
making a mockery of our justice system in disregarding our lawful processes.
Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at
the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioner's motion to
dismiss.
The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v.
Court of Appeals.28 In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition
for the annulment of her marriage on the ground of her husband's
psychological incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the nullity of the marriage and awarding custody of the children to private
respondent therein. No timely appeal was taken from the trial court's
judgment.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 24 | P a g e
We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final
and executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary
period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and
void for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due
process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and
rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private
respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it
was based solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent.
We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client
of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter's right to appeal is
not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.29
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal.30 Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court
received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the
doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in
petitioner's loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial
court's judgments.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she
may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence
of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records
show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings
below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of
negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in
pursuing the case was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned from her
counsel's manifestation dated 3 May 2004:
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity
proceedings, respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not
heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner have
failed.
Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an
intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.31
Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter
disinterest in the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among
others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other
recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on
the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this
Court crying denial of due process.
As for the applicability to petitioner's motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the Rule
on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be
allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might
warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an
answer. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all
possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that
judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose
or object of the law is an important factor to be considered.32 Further, the
letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision
applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the
annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may
warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the
provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not
apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of
voidable marriage.
Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of
the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 25 | P a g e
filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner's claim
that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the
preservation of the family is without basis.
Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the
annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the
plaintiff, to wit:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May
2004 Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15
February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be dismissed

by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of
the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being
filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x x x

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the

preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004,

the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial
court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either
party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no
longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.33
The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or
orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a
judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to
rest.34

Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 26 | P a g e

Lasanas vs People
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void
and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined
and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29,
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for
bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal Case
No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court
of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and
Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records
show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27,
1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious
ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.6
They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that
purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage
certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of
irreconcilable differences.9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa
Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta.
Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil
status of the accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint
alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in
securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital
breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him
to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting
the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged,
among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was
officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A"
and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo
City Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached
as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except
some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of
Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the
purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment
by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated
by the defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the
defendant at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment
made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to
Iloilo City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw
several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the marriage
contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a
false affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to
Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life
rocked with marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without love,
but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he
not follow her;
xxxx
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 27 | P a g e
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the
plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy,
neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which
psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the
petitioner to live separately from defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was
formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20,
1998 in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel
Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo
and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to
Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its
judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for
annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and
Socorro valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the
defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is
valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his
wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of
₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with
counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family
Code and every month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in
Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married
Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage.19
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 28 | P a g e
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied
in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity
before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this
purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage
was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family
Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal
liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when
this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza
doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family
Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 29 | P a g e
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the
RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the
absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the
solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he
had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied
in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity
before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this
purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage
was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family
Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal
liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when
this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 30 | P a g e
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza
doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family
Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements
attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused
and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible
and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy
can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the
first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information
that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been
instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided
that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the
Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the
crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the
Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is
against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed.1âwphi1
The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the
second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially
declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 31 | P a g e
marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due
to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction.30 "What makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the
criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his
second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him
because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of
marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against
him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering
that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact,
the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that
his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was
he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may
not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to
allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is
prision mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the
medium period of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one
day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense,
which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence of two years and four months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 32 | P a g e
Brown vs Yambao
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He
alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942
to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged
in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl
that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release
from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later
executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint
prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the
children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified
to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in
default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and
directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to—
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not
a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result
of his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this
order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene in
the case in behalf of the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-
examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's
counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with
another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100
of the new Civil Code, providing:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot
be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action
had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.
since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945
but only filed action in 1945.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act
as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the
adultery.
The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his
marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal
acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting
officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there
is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state
which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that
he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private
citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of
married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by
preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in
pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law
Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate
for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the
inference that the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable
appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 33 | P a g e
regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously
the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it
bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100
of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were
proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would
not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of
error.
The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must
necessarily fail with them.

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation ordered.
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot
be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong
vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil, 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs.
Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the
Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may
indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully
justified or not.

The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action
was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which
was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new
Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1)
year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within
five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's
brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.

Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions
seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve
public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for
denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and
prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the
case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 34 | P a g e
Arroyo vs Arroyo
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the
bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a
few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife
in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her
husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to
induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she
had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel
treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for
affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court
gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from
her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and
directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum
of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff
thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this
court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the
conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his
continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every
line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly
untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are
chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended
their married life. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce
nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the resumption of
married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of
the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the
proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty
of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit
relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband
towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion
no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the
spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved
and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited
by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the
abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification
in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to
dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the
obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a
duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles
142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife
against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by
her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had
been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial
abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction,
compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs.
Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses,
including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation,
(Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of
both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto
separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with
grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that
provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife
unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become
impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through
the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the
support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when
the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity
is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also
appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State
of South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on
Persons Cases – Annulment to Marriage Settlement 35 | P a g e
any ground, the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have
provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to
continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more
than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where
it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked
by the wife's own improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan.
[S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597; Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the
English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the
husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the
following eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in a
proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a
divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this,
too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for
that crime. Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties
is admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? . . .
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted
where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or
menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to
legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state
undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not
that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of
either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other,
the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an
injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent
conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked.
Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice.
If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its
views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question
easily decided upon first impressions. Every body must feel a wish to sever
those who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together
with any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of
happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings, much
less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons
shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to
cohabit together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a
judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this
respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true
wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of
mankind. For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to
dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great
severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that the
general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together, except for a very few
reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation
that yoke which they know cannot shake off; they become good husbands
and good wives form the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for
necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In
this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be
sacrificed to the greater and more general good. (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag.
Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-
complaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be
granted.
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint
conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to
forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and
cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character
and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial
decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal
rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is
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entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the
precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in
unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for
contempt, in case she should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present
writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction
whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may
be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience
of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it that court
would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of contempt in case
of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by
the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs.
Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as
that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent
to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be
obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the
Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured,
and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of
an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife
to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in
her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the
ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp.
1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and
control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to
that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration
that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her
duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the
original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de
Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient
cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is
absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to
costs of either instance. So ordered.
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