Descartes: Meditation Six

1. In this Meditation Descartes offers:

(a) a proof that the external world exists independently of his own mind,
(b) two arguments to show that the mind is distinct from the body,
(c) a sophisticated strategy for avoiding error.
For an outline of (a), look in my “Introductory Notes on Descartes” (also see Meditations,
the entire paragraph on p.52, where the proof can be found). In these notes I will discuss (b),
along with other relevant background. I will also discuss Descartes’s strategy for avoiding
error in Meditation Four, along with (c) the more sophisticated strategy he offers in the
concluding paragraph of Meditation Six.

Mind-Body Dualism

2. It is commonsense and obvious that we have minds and bodies. If anyone were to say that
we had only minds, but no bodies, or only bodies, but no minds, hardly anyone will believe
him. Likewise, Descartes held that we have bodies and minds. But it is Descartes’
definitions of “body” and “mind” which is interesting, namely:
Mind = that which thinks, or a thinking substance.
(“a thinking, non-extended thing”)
Body = that which takes up space, an extended substance.
(“an extended, non-thinking thing”)
By “thinking” is meant believing, doubting, reasoning, wishing, desiring, imagining,
having visual sensations, sensations of touch, hearing, smell and taste, feeling pain, etc.
By “extension” is meant having length, width, height. Take the table before you. It is
several feet long, several feet wide, and several feet high, i.e., it is extended in three-
dimensional space. In other words, bodies take up space, occupy spatial positions, and they
can also move from one position to another.

3. According to Descartes, mind and body are two entirely separate kinds of substances: mind
by definition cannot be matter, and vice versa. This view is called substance dualism, the
view that there are two different kinds of substance, mind and body. We can contrast this
view with two forms of substance monism, namely idealism and materialism (a.k.a.
physicalism). Idealism claims that there are no material bodies, and that only thoughts and
the minds thinking them exist. Materialism claims that all thinking is done by bodies, and
that there are no minds existing separately from bodies (i.e., brains).

4. Now, there is some initial plausibility to substance dualism, and the distinction Descartes
makes between mind and body. Though it makes perfect sense to ask about the size of this or
that body, and to say that this body is moving or at rest, it is nonsense to ask how large your
idea is, or how fast it is moving.

5. The problem with Descartes’s substance dualism comes from his view that mind and body
interact. This latter view is known as Cartesian interactionism.

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 Taken by itself, Cartesian interactionism is a very plausible view. It is clear that the body
acts on the mind, causing it to have sensations of touch, pain, etc., and to perceive objects
such as tables and chairs. And it is also clear that the mind also acts on the body: by an act of
will I can raise my hand, take hold of this marker and start writing on the board.
But the problem arises when we combine substance dualism with Cartesian
interactionism. It is mysterious how two entirely different kinds of substance can interact.
According to Descartes’ definitions of mind and body, mind cannot occupy a position in
space. So we cannot say that the mind has motion, or that it can come into contact with
matter. This is because having motion is to travel from one position to another position in
space, and coming into contact is to touch one another in space.
Now, we can see how one billiard ball can cause another to move. It travels from one
part of the table to another part, comes into contact with another ball, displacing that ball
from its position and communicating motion to it. But mind, by definition, cannot occupy a
position in space, and hence it cannot come into contact, move or displace any physical thing
from its position in space, for instance my arm from here to there or the neuron cells in my
brain.
In short, the problem is, how can something which cannot occupy space, come into
contact with something in space? How can something which cannot itself move, move
something else? Even if we feel no doubt that there is mutual interaction between mind and
body, it is mysterious exactly how it is possible on Descartes’s view that mind is non-
extended and body is non-thinking substance

Three Arguments to Prove that Mind is Distinct from Body

6. Descartes provides three arguments in support of his substance dualism, i.e., the view that
mind is a substance that is separate and distinct from the body. These three arguments are:
(a) Dubitability Argument (found in Meditation Two; discussed in Notes 7~9 below),
(b) Divisibility Argument (found in Meditation Six, p.56; discussed in Note 10 below),
(c) Conceivability Argument (found in Meditation Six, p.51, discussed in Note 11
below).
Below I will explain each argument and point out weaknesses in each one.

7. Dubitability Argument. Descartes’s first argument, presented in Meditation Two, is based on

the idea that we can doubt whether the body exists, but we cannot doubt that the mind which
doubts exists:
(1) I can doubt that my body exists.
(2) I cannot doubt that my mind exists.
(3) So, body and mind are two different things.
Premiss (1) is supported by the skeptical arguments mentioned in Meditation One, namely
the Dream Argument and the Evil Genius Hypothesis. Premiss (2) is supported by
Descartes’s Cogito Argument in Meditation Two. The inference from Premisses (1) and (2)
to Conclusion (3) is supported by Leibniz’s Law, also known as the Indiscernibility of
Identicals. According to Leibniz’s Law, one and the same thing must be exactly similar, it
cannot have dissimilar features. Since the mind and body have different features (the

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 existence of one cannot be doubted, but the existence of the other can be doubted), they must
be different things in accordance with Leibniz’s Law.
The problem with the above argument lies in the inference: it is a fallacious inference
based on a misapplication of Leibniz’s Law. Let me first state Leibniz’s Law in more exact
terms, and then explain the fallacious inference, known as the Masked Man Fallacy.

8. Leibniz’s Law (Indiscernibility of Identicals) states that:

(a) If x = y, then whatever is true of x is true of y,
Which is logically equivalent to (its contrapositive, namely):
(b) If something true of x is not true of y, then x ≠ y.
To restate Leibniz’s Law in yet other words: (a) anything has the very same properties that it
does have, and (b) if the very same property is present in one case but absent in another, we
can infer that there are two different things involved in each case.
For example, taking the property being the U.S. president in the year 2006, which is true
of George W. Bush but not of Bill Clinton, we may infer that they are different people. Or,
take the property being 50 minutes long. Your religion lecture is 50 minutes long but your
philosophy lecture is not, so they must be different lectures.
Along the same lines, Descartes in the Dubitability Argument is taking the property being
dubitable, which is present in the case of the body, but absent in the case of the mind, and
inferring that mind and body must be different.

9. The Masked Man Fallacy. But it is important to note that there are exceptional cases where
Leibniz’s Law does not apply. Namely, it does not apply to cases where mental attitudes
towards objects, like knowing, believing, doubting, desiring, fearing, etc., are involved.
Consider the following argument:
(1) I know who my father is.
(2) I don’t know who the masked man is.
(3) So, the masked man is not my father.
But the argument is a fallacy: the truth of all the premisses does not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion. For instance, if my father is wearing the mask, then of course (2) will be true,
because I cannot see the face of the masked man. But in that case the conclusion will be
false, since my father is wearing the mask. Here’s another fallacious argument:
(1) I cannot doubt that Mark Twain wrote Huck Finn.
(2) I can doubt that Samuel Clemens wrote Huck Finn.
(3) So, Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens.
But since “Mark Twain” is a nom de guerre that Samuel Clemens used in his literary works,
the conclusion is false even if the premisses are true. Likewise:
(1) I cannot doubt that the Morning Star = Morning Star.
(2) I can doubt that the Evening Star = the Morning Star.
(3) So, the Morning Star is not the Evening Star.
Here the premisses can be true. Since the Morning Star is the brightest heavenly body in the
morning, and the Evening Star is the brightest heavenly body in the evening, we may doubt

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 that they are one and the same heavenly body. But astronomers have discovered that the
Morning Star and the Evening Star are one and the same heavenly body, i.e., Venus. So the
conclusion is false.
In sum, when you apply Leibniz’s Law to cases where mental attitudes towards objects
are involved, you are in danger of committing the Masked Man Fallacy. Descartes’s
Dubitability Argument does commit this fallacy. But to his credit, Descartes was well aware
of this problem,1 and thus presents the Divisibility Argument which avoids this fallacy.

10. Divisibility Argument. Here is Descartes’s second argument for substance dualism:
(1) The body is a divisible thing.
(2) The mind is an indivisible thing.
(3) So, body and mind are two different things.
As in the Dubitability Argument, the inference from the premisses to the conclusion appeals
to Leibniz’s Law. But unlike the Dubitability Argument, the inference is unproblematic: it
does not commit the Masked Man Fallacy.
The weakness in the Divisibility Argument lies elsewhere, in Premiss (2), which is
controversial. Sure, the body is a divisible thing because it has parts. But why isn’t the mind
divisible, why can’t the ideas we have be parts of the mind? In support of (2), Descartes
argues that we cannot discern any parts within ourselves when we examine our minds.
According to him, the faculties of will, feeling, understanding, etc. cannot be called its parts
because it is one and the same mind that wills, feels and understands.
There are a couple of problems here. First, Descartes seems to be moving illicitly from
the fact that the mind is a single thing to the conclusion that it is a simple thing. That’s not
warranted because a single thing can be a complex thing—it can have parts. Secondly,
introspection seems to reveal that our minds consist of diverse mental processes at any given
time, which is precisely what David Hume found when he inspected his own mind. Why
can’t this multiplicity of mental processes be the divisible parts of the mind?

11. Conceivability Argument. This is the central argument for establishing that mind and body
are distinct. It is central because it relies upon Descartes’s prior proof (the Trademark
Argument) that God exists, and what Descartes takes this proof to show (i.e., that whatever
we clearly and distinctly understand is true). According to Michael Hooker’s reconstruction
of the argument, it runs as follows.
(1) If I can clearly and distinctly conceive something, then it is possible.
(2) Whatever I clearly and distinctly conceive as separate, can be separated.
(3) I clearly and distinctly conceive the mind as separate from body.
(4) Therefore, mind is separate from body.
Now Premiss (1)—i.e., the move from conceivability to possibility—is questionable.
Descartes justifies it by appeal to God: God is benevolent, so he won’t deceive us about
whatever we clearly and distinct conceive, and he is all-powerful, so he can create whatever
we clearly and distinctly conceive. The existence of God as well as His perfect wisdom,
benevolence and power have already been established via the Trademark Argument.
1
See Meditations, “Preface to the Reader”, p.7, i.e., the paragraph that begins with the words “The first is that, from
the fact that the human mind, when turned in on itself, does not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking
thing, it does not follow that its nature or essence consists only in its being a thinking thing….”

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 But take away this appeal to God. Is it true that conceivability entails possibility—that
when we can conceive something (as clear and distinct, or in other words, as self-evidently
true), then it is possible? Yes, in the case of logical and mathematical truths. For instance, if
I can conceive that 2 + 2 = 4, it is possible, and if I cannot conceive that 2 + 2 = 5, then it is
impossible.
However, there are plenty of cases outside of logic and mathematics where conceivability
does not entail possibility: these are mostly cases where scientists discover a necessary truth
about the world. Take water, for instance. According to the laws of physics and chemistry, it
is impossible for water not to be H2O. Prior to the discovery that water is H2O, a scientist
might have found it clearly and distinctly conceivable that water was something else, say
XYZ. But he would have been wrong. Just because someone can conceive that water is
XYZ, does not mean that it is physically possible for water to be XYZ. It’s physically
impossible for water to be anything else but H2O. In the same way, even though Descartes
could conceive of himself existing without a body, it may be physically impossible for him to
exist without a body.

Strategies for Avoiding Error

12. Descartes offers two strategies for avoiding error, one in Meditation Four, and the other in
Meditation Six. Although Descartes has eliminated the possibility of systematic deception or
error by proving the existence of a non-deceiving God, this leaves room for sporadic
mistakes we make through careless judgment. In Meditations Four and Six, Descartes shows
that we ourselves are the sources of these errors, and that we can avoid these mistakes if we
are careful enough.

13. The simple strategy: “I should never judge anything that I do not clearly and distinctly
understand” (p.41). So we should suspend judgment with respect to things we don’t clearly
and distinctly understand, and this means most things outside of logic, mathematics and
geometry. Since we don’t clearly and distinctly understand anything we perceive through the
senses, this means that we should suspend judgment about all the information we receive
through our five senses of sight, touch, etc., and the internal sensations of pain and pleasure.

14. The more sophisticated strategy: With respect to perceptual information about material
objects, we should cross-check the information with several different senses, with the
testimonies of competent experts or authorities, and verify the information with our own
memories if relevant memories are available. The fallibility of the senses is due to
insufficient information. We can approach near certainty in our perceptual beliefs if we
cross-check our information with as many sources of evidence as we can access, and are
aware of everything relevant to the issue at hand.
We can also rule out the possibility that we are dreaming. For dreams are not as coherent
as waking life—e.g., a dream does not pick up from where you left off in the last dream, and
even within a dream there is inconsistency. But waking life is systematically interrelated in a
way that dreams are not, and again we can verify this by cross-checking with various sources
of evidence, and by using our memory.