Tan v.
Trocio 191 SCRA 764 Cabatania v ca
Facts:
April 1971 – when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her which begot a son, Jewel Didn‘t
immediately tell the police since Trocio was thereatening to have her alien husband and to
tell authrorities that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational
school Nov 1979 – Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. Trocio Trocio denied
allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her and her family‘s cases and said she was
only doing this because he declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get
the extra. Feb 13 1986 – since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc, Provincial fiscal of
Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held Trocio administratively liable.
ISSUE:
WON Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct
HELD:
NO, there is lack of evidence After incident, she still asked him to be the lawyer for her cases
such as a robbery case and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned down the school The
fear that her alien husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear since she
said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened. Keeping her peace for 8
years could be construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct. Testimony of
household help that they heard her cries for help is negated by fact that she said it happened
in school premises. How could the help have been there then? INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SHOW IT WAS HIS SON: (1) unusual closeness as testified by her household help (2) pictures
of Jewel and Trocio together = not enough ground to establish paternity Presumption is
Jewel is the child of the alien husband since he was born on 1972 when husband and
Felicidad were living together.
GR No. 124814
October 21, 2004
ISSUE:
Florencia, a married househelp had sexual intercourse with Camelo Cabatania and allegedly
had a child from him named Camelo Regodos. Can the court compel petitioner Camelo
Cabatania to acknowledge Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter?
APPLICABLE LAW:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
RULING:
The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (Article 167 of the Family Code)
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
ARBOLARIO v CA
(G.R. No. 129163; April 22, 2003; J. Panganiban)
FACTS:
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan,
had 5 children. Everyone mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by
her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio Colinco
predeceased his three daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed
Colinco. The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their union was
blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster
and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca
Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe
Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’)
were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda
(first child), by virtue of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship
was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her
interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and
Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take
possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a
‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they
adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half
(1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irene’s) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2).
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and
Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by
respondent spouses (‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense
that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to
1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot from the
deceased lessor sometime in September 1978.
On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and
Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the case) filed another case ‘[f]or Cancellation
of Title with Damages’. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the ‘Declaration
of Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by the Colincos was defective and thus
voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they
succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and,
as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot.
(Relevant)
ISSUE:
(1) WoN Arbolarios are illegitimate children
HELD:
(1) YES, they are illegitimate.** There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners
that Juan Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just
because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore
his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to
establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. Since they failed to prove the fact (or even
the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas;
hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or
the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.
NOTES:
• LOWER COURT RULINGS:
o RTC: Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion
Arbolario, while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces. The Colincos could not inherit
from her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters (CC, Article 1009). Their 1987
Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew
all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the
other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a portion of the
disputed lot.
o CA: Arbolarios are illegitimate. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the
Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father
or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot
conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half-
brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.
• **(other reasons for illegitimacy, seemed less important): A review of the 1951
Declaration reveals that the year of Catalina’s death was intercalated. The first two numbers
(1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it
look like a “0.” Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological
progression in the heirs’ years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if
Catalina had indeed died in 1903, why then was her name written after Agueda’s and not
before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires an official translation. We
cannot readily accept the English translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did
not agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole
document.
• OTHER ISSUES IN THE CASE:
o WoN CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the testimony that the
Salhays had purchased the portion of the lot they had been occupying since 1970; SC says
NO, though the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their Brief, respondents (as
petitioners in the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale
o WoN CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since respondents did not raise
the issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot; SC says
NO, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property
and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere
married in 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991,
however, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married private respondent, the latter
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that
Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and
annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held
that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of
Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa
was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes that
Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot
impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is strictly personal to the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from
the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The petition was denied.
Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
FACTS:
A complaint for recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodgin, represented by her mother and guardian Jinky Diaz against Rogelio Ong
before the RTC. As alleged by Jinky in her complaint, She and Rogelio met at Tarlac City and
their friendship developed into love. At this time however, Jinky was married to a foreign
national, Hasegawa Katsuo.
On 1994-1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together in Capitol Garden, Tarlac City
which produced Joanne Rodjin Diaz who was born on Feb 1998. Rogelio brought Jinky to the
hospital and also took the mother and child home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital
bills and the baptismal expenses and finally provided for all the minor’s needs- recognizing
her as his.
However, on September 1998, Rogelio abandoned the mother and child, stopped supporting
the minor and falsely alleged that he is not the father of the child.
After summons were served against Rogelio, he failed to file any responsive pleadings despit
repeated motions for extensions prompting the court to declare him in default and allowed
Joanne to present evidence ex parte and granted the reliefs prayed for.
Rogelio then filed a motion to lift the order of default and was granted by the court. Rogelio
then filed a motion for new trial and was also granted.
The RTC then ruled that Joanne was the Illegitimate child of Rogelio in view of Joanne’s
subsisting marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo and ordered Rogelio to pay support in favor of
Joanne.
Rogelio filed an appeal with the CA. however, during the pendency of the appeal, Rogelio
died and was substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. Subsequently, the CA GRANTED the
petition and ordered the case to be REMANDED to the RTC for the ISSUANCE of an order
directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis.
The estate now files this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case for DNA testing despite Rogelio’s death.
HELD:
NO. Petition DENIED.
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. — The appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate
the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his
DNA. As defined above, the term “biological sample” means any organic material originating
from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing.
This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may
be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Dizon Liyao vs. Liyao
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001 GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline
and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died
intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and
Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of
the spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to inherit
from him
RULING:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid
marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also identified Danilo
de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,of the Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable.
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda
Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to
be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such
child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon
maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more
than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the
other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were
legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate
of the deceased.
HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be
impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the
latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Tison vs CA
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora
Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero
adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews
and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed
property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent
contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since
the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the
same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely
objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Dizon
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline
and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died
intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and
Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of
the spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to inherit
from him
RULING:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid
marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also identified Danilo
de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,of the Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the
latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
DE JESUS vs. DE JESUS

G.R. No. 142877, 2 October 2001

FACTS:

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for “Partition with
Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of
Quezon City.

Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of
the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition,
would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of
merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners can impugn their own legitimacy.

HELD:

Petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The law established the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus which the law does not allow. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it
is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of
the husband can be rejected.

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in
lawful wedlock.
Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin
Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo.
Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from
the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of
Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was
legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was
changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage
contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC
of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local
Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on
account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action
are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the
petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioner prayed for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name
of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;

2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and,
for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy
of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should
be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:

May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?

Held:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and
rule on legitimacy and filiations.
People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483
FACTS:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still
needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she
expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security
men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-
appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then
brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but
her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and
unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the
kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the
examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the
urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and
"Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two
accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob
Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B," accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and
accused-appellant type "O."
ISSUE:
W/N Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto are guilty of the crime of rape?
HELD:
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the
victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that
the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the
father of the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19 :
Paternity ---- Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is.
Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations
of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-
paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of
the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as
have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a
son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where
they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his
parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and
was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration
of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition
of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition
dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband
and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
Eceta vs Eceta
GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. They had a son named Vicente.
The husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. However,
the deceased has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose grandmother was Rosalina,
the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough
to prove the filiation with the deceased.
HELD:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Constantino vs. Mendez
209 SCRA 18
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought
monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him
at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their
sexual contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set
aside by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. However, what was
tried before the trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of damages only. The
filiation or compusolry recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in issue. In fact both
agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalina’s granddaughter. The
deceased establishing acknowledgement of his paternity over Theresa nevertheless signed
the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter. Hence, the Court granted 1/8
share of the land to Theresa.
HELD:
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan
Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in
the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established
on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the
months of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not
alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

QUISMUNDO VS. WCC Open and Continuous Possession of Status of a Child.

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case are the wife and her children with the deceased. The petition is to
claim the death benefits of the deceased from the Worker’s Compensation Commission but
was originally denied given that the deceased as his illegitimate children did not acknowledge
the children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased, in accordance with the law, acknowledged the petitioners.

RULING AND APPLICATION: The petition was denied for lack of merit. The petitioners’
reliance to Article 238 was misplaced. The possession of status of a child does not in itself
constitute an acknowledgement; it is only a ground of a child to compel recognition by his
assumed parent. The provision provides the ground for compulsory recognition in an action
that may be brought by the child
LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. However, his sisters sued him for recovery
of 2/3 share of the land alleging that he had fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial
court decided in favor of his sisters.
Jose died intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint before the RTC for recovery of the 1/3
portion of said property which was in the possession of Ida C. Labagala (who claimed to be
Ida C. Santiago, the daughter of Jose).
The trial court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed
constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's
1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter.
When appealed, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the trial court. It took
into account that Ida was born of different parents, as indicated her birth certificate.
ISSUES:
1.WON respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and
possession.
2.WON petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with
respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
HELD:
The Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.
On Issue No. 1
Yes.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present respondents are asserting not
merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. Use of a
family name certainly does not establish pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him
through intestate succession.
On Issue No. 2
No.
The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time.
Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including
one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did
not pay any centavo for the property which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil
Code provides that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to
have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Even assuming that the
deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required
by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor, the acceptance of the donation should have
been made by her father or mother or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the
same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law accepted the donation for Ida.
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 143256
August 28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the
death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant.
Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989,
after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same
day, Generosa sold her share to Rodolfo’s son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the
transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo
and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K.
Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an
action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They
claimed that Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the
spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.
Ruling:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his
filiation. The only public document he could show was the Application for Recognition of
Back Pay Rights under Act No. 897. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was
not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he
enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and
continuously until they died. Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually attached to
the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents. However, it
must be noted that possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
His baptismal certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws
of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful
when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan,
Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism
on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also
constitute proof of filiation.
G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN SANTOS
Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS: Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they
took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the
possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of
her parents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of
intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward
Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as
confirmed by an NSO representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary
teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service, as
supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court
found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which
was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of
her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of
the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child
was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was
recorded in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.
It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the
valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to
what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to
prove her filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as
supported by secondary evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative
parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school
paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial
benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by
Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary
evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of
birth certificate.
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172
because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of
filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to
actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.
In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is
not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the
Family Code.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is
a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of
facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the
name of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating
testimony of the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself did not offer
any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s birth.
With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent
is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.
CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by petitioner with the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City
against Consuelo David for the purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from
using the surname Tolentino.
Respondent filed her answer admitting she has been using and continues to use the surname
Tolentino.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
Hence, this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is usurpation when a divorced woman continues to use the surname of
her former husband.

HELD:

There is no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname in this case so that the mere
use of the surname Tolentino by the Private respondent cannot be said to have injured the
petitioner’s rights

The following are the elements of usurpation of a name: 1) there is an actual use of another’s
name by the defendant; 2) the use is unauthorized; and 3) the use of another’s name is to
designate personality or Identify a person”. None of these elements exists in the case at bar
and neither is there a claim by the petitioner that the private respondent impersonated her.

The Supreme Court find it just and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no
actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for
injunctive relief.