People vs. Ricohermoso
His intention was to forestall
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-
law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal
Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso.
Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso
cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his
share of palay harvest and added that she should
be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his
land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect
the palay anytime.
Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin,
Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house
and asked him about the palay, to which the latter
answered defiantly that he will not give him the
palay, whatever happens. Geminiano
remonstrated and that point (as if by
prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his
bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got
an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same
time and place, Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law
Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito.
They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which
point Marianito passed out. When he regained
consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he
carried beforehand was gone and that his father
was mortally wounded.
The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing
in their version of the case.
Issue:
W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the
justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater
evil or injury
Held:
No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying
circumstance is erroneous because his act in
preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso
and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this
case, was designed to insure the killing of
Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the
assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of
greater evil or injury.
any interference in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The
trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones
leves, from an attempted murder charge with
respect to Marianito de Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.
(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal,
thus, in effect, accepted the prosecution’s version
of the case and trial court’s finding of guilt.)
People vs. Norma Hernandez
FACTS:
Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting
appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after
months of courtship, appellant finally accepted
Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to
bring his parents over her home so that they
could talk about their marriage.
When Vivencio and his parents went to her
house, they brought chickens and goats and they
agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas,
shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the
uncle’s roof.
While the celebration was going on, appellant
was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his
parents waited but she never showed up thus
causing them great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was
really courting her but that she wasn’t really in
love with him. Her parents tried to persuade her
to accept the proposal and that she only accepted
it out of obedience to her parents and the uncle’s
insistence.
Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home,
she already counselled them not to bring the
chickens and that they should not regret whatever
may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t
honestly in love with Vivencio and so she decided
to leave home as last recourse to prevent the
marriage.
Appellant’s parents also corroborated her
testimony.
RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed
because she purposely and deliberately fled to
prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she
appealed.
HELD:
Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted
the appellant.
RATIO:
Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander
hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act
of the appellant changing her mind. She was
merely exercising her right not to give her consent
the marriage after mature consideration.
Furthermore, there were no strained relations
existing between the complainant & appellant
before the incident. There always existed good
relations between them for they were neighbours
so it cannot be sustained that appellant was
motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately
frustrating the marriage.
Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her
previous commitment to marry and it would be
utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by
deed simply because she desisted in continuing
with the marriage. If she would be liable then that
would be tantamount to compelling her to go into
a marriage without her free consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil
of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11
par.4, RPC)
People vs. Delima
Facts:
Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail. Some
days afterwards, policeman Felipe Delima found
him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a
pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance,
and demanded his surrender. Napilon answered
with a stroke of his lance. Delima dodged, it, and
to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the
bullet did not hit him. Napilon ran away, without
parting with his weapon. Delima went after him
and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him. Delima was tried and convicted for
homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal
and the accessory penalties.
Held:
The killing was done in the performance of a duty.
The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service
of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which
compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means, which, although it proved to be
fatal, was justified by the circumstances. (People
vs. Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, December 22,
1922)
People vs. Lagata
FACTS:
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard
of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6
prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano,
Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol
plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery
to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they were
called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing
so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to
go look for him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering
gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the
2nd one. They were already assembled by the 1st
shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot.
He said he ran away because he was afraid that
he might be shot again and that his companions
were also probably scared and that is why they
ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that
Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so
Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the
mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote
plantation and found footprints and called on
Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When
Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass and that
he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata
fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria
told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata
told them to assemble. Once they were
assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot
Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw
Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also
could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received
good treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital
& Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president,
verified the gunshot wound and that the death of
Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his
gun because the prisoners were running far from
him when he already ordered them to stop. He
said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner
escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he
would be discharged from duty like the others.
He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking
up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work.
HELD:
Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for
homicide and serious physical injuries.
Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating
circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance. (Art.11 par.5, RPC)
RATIO:
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason
to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that
Tipace was bent on committing any act of
aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running
towards and around him. How could anyone
intending to escape run towards and around the
very guard one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in
the performance of his duties, the circumstances
show that there was no necessity for him to fire
directly against the prisoners as to wound them
seriously and even kill one of them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners
not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY
would authorize them to fire against them.
Mamangun vs. People
FACTS:
At about 8 PM, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, a certain Liberty Contreras was heard
shouting “Magnanakaw… Magnanakaw.”
Several residents responded and chased the
suspect who entered Abacan’s house and
proceeded to the rooftop.
Policemen (Andres Legaspi, Eugenio Aminas,
Rufino Mamangun, Sandiego San Gabriel,
Carlito Cruz & Hobert Diaz) were dispatched who
went to the rooftop of house where the suspect
was allegedly hiding.
3 policemen including Mamangun each armed
with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop.
They saw a man whom they thought was the
robbery suspect and that instance, Mamangun,
who was walking ahead of the group, fired his
handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned
out to be Gener Contreras who was not the
robbery suspect. Contreras died from the
gunshot wound.
According to Ayson, lone eyewitness for
prosecution, Mamangun pointed his .45 cal.
Pistol at the man who instantly exclaimed, “Hindi
ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied,
“Anong hindi ako?” Before Ayson could say
anything, Mamangun already shot Contreras.
Mamangun however said that the person raised
a stainless steel pipe towards his head but he
was able to evade the attack. This prompted him
to shoot the person on the left arm. It was only at
that point that the man told them, “hindi ako, hindi
ako.”
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner with
homicide attended by an incomplete justifying
circumstance of the petitioner having acted in the
performance of his duty as a policeman, and also
the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Petitioner appealed, insisting that the shooting
was justified because he was repelling Contreras’
unlawful attack on his person, as Contreras was
about to strike him with a steel pipe.
HELD:
The Court is not persuaded and denied the
petition. The decision of Sandiganbayan is
affirmed.
RATIO:
The justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty
may be invoked only after the defense
successfully proves that:
The accused acted in the performance of a duty;
and
The injury inflicted or offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance
or lawful exercise of such duty.
The first requisite is present. However, proof that
the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was
a necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty as a policeman is
essential to exempt him from criminal liability.
There was no reason to shoot Contreras because
he was already unarmed and shouted that it
wasn’t him before petitioner fatally shot him.
Petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him
with a steel pipe is intriguing for it was only when
a lead pipe was recovered from the scene that
petitioner remembered Contreras trying to hit
him. Such vital information could not have
escaped petitioner’s mind.
In the absence of the equally necessary justifying
circumstance that the injury be the NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCE of the due performance of such
duty, there can only be INCOMPLETE
JUSTIFICATION, a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
There was no rational necessity for the killing of
Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a
warning shot instead of immediately directing the
shot against Contreras.
People vs Dagani
G.R.no. 153675 August 16,2006
Facts:
This is a murder case filed against Otello
Sanitano and Rolando Dagani for the killing of
Ernesto Javier. At about 4:45 in the afternoon of
September 11, 1989, a group composed of
Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran (Miran),
and two other individuals had been drinking at the
canteen located inside the compound of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M.
Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden,
appellants, who were security officers of the PNR
and covered by the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, entered the canteen and
approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved
Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair.
Dagani then held Javier while Santiano shot
Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter. The
RTC ruled that Otello Santiano and Rolando
Dagani are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and punished under Art.
248, RPC, with the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Appellants
invoked the justifying circumstances of self-
defense and lawful performance of official duty as
PNR security officers. They also argued that the
prosecution failed to establish treachery and
conspiracy.
Issues:
1. Wether or not the lower erred in not
appreciating self-defense on the part of the
accused
2. Wether or not it was a performance of
lawful duty
3. wether or not there was a conspiracy
Held:
1. The defense was unable to prove that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of
Javier. They were unable to present evidence
that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent
shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and
no bullets were recovered from the scene of the
incident. Javier also tested negative for
gunpowder residue. Moreover, the trial court
found appellant Dagani’s account of the incident
to be incredible and self-serving. In sum, the
defense presented a bare claim of self-defense
without any proof of the existence of its requisites.
2. The defense failed to prove that the
security officers were in fact on duty at the time
they were at the canteen. The trial court gave
weight to the fact that the appellants were unable
to submit their daily time records to show that
they were on duty at the time. Appellants’
assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour
duty was belied by PNR Security Investigator
Rolando Marinay’s testimony that PNR security
officers work in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m.
to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
3. The Supreme Court cannot agree with
the findings of the courts a quo that the appellants
were in conspiracy simply because there is no
evidence presented to show that the appellants
planned to kill Javier.
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is
modified. Appellant Otello Santiano is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide. Appellant
Rolando Dagani is hereby acquitted.
People vs. Beronilla
L – 4445 | February 28, 1955 | J. JBL Reyes
Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior
Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino
Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from
the judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted
them of murder for the execution of Arsenio
Borjal, the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the
outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding
the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death
threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel
Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold,
regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the
Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra.
Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla
received a memorandum which authorized him to
appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons
accused of treason, espionage and aiding or
abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra,
to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed
under custody and tried and sentenced to death
by the jury based on various complaints made by
the residents. Beronilla reported this to Col.
Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only
compliment you for your impartial but
independent way of handling the whole case.”
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the
executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the
murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel
Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which
granted amnesty to persons who committed acts
in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were granted
amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted
on the grounds that the crime was made on
purely personal motives and that the crime was
committed after the expiration of time limit for
amnesty proclamation.
Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are
covered by justifying circumstances for
obedience to lawful order of superior
Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their
superior officers, which as military subordinates,
they could not question and obeyed in good faith
without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of
the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of
Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of
superiors. Additionally, it could not be established
that Beronilla received the radiogram from
Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander,
which called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s
conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known
the violation, he would not have dared to report it
to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does
not show malice on their part because of the
conduct of the trial, defense through counsel
given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on
doubts of illegality and death sentence review
sent to the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be established. The
maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea
(Crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have
denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla
Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of
contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra.
Even if the dates were contradictory, the court
should have found for the Beronila, et al because
if there are “any reasonable doubt as to whether
a given case falls within the (amnesty)
proclamation should be resolved in favor of the
accused.”

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena
over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC),
pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of
then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena
received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum
dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and
white such verbal instruction. In obedience to
President Marcos’ verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo
G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release
of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three
(3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first
withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a
letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao
requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA
the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a
manager’s check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at
the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier
of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money
after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The
P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same
day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez
did not issue any receipt for the money received.
Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another
P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third
and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-
signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s
check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena
requested him to do the counting of the P5
Million. After the counting, the money was loaded
in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go
with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the
P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for
all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The
receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and
Peralta were charged for malversation of funds,
while Dabao remained at large. One of the
justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part
in the questioning of a defense witness and of the
accused themselves; the volume of the questions
asked were more the combined questions of the
counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and
Peralta filed separate petitions for review,
appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12
October 19990 and the Resolution of 20
December 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime
of malversation.
Held:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of
the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum.
The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the
President himself, the highest official of the land.
It carries with it the presumption that it was
regularly issued. And on its face, the
memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes
the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact,
coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution
constrains one to act swiftly without question.
Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively
took part in the questioning of a defense witness
and of the accused themselves. The questions of
the court were in the nature of cross examinations
characteristic of confrontation, probing and
insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have
raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless
no impediment for the court to consider such
matter as additional basis for a reversal since the
settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the
whole case open to review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors
as may be found in the judgment appealed from
whether they are made the subject of
assignments of error or not.
People v. Taneo (CASE DIGEST)
FACTS:
Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his
parent’s house. In January 1932, a fiesta was
being celebrated, and visitors were entertained in
the house including Fred Tanner and Luis
Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo,
went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got
up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting
his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in
the abdomen. Taneo attacked Tanner and
Malinao and tried to attack his father after which
he wounded himself. Potenciano’s wife who was
then seven months pregnant, died five days later
as a result of her wound, and also the foetus
which was asphyxiated in the mother’s womb.
Taneo was charged with parricide. From this
sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before
the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique
Collantes and Valentin Abadilla. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had severe stomachache. The
defendant states that when he fell asleep, he
dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him
with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason
of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that
his enemies were inviting him to come down, he
armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At
the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to
him that she was wounded. Then he fancied
seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation
wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to
multiply around him, he attacked everybody that
came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only
did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute
with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for
assaulting them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taneo is criminally liable.
RULING:
No. The Court concluded that the defendant
acted while in a dream. His acts were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.
The Court took the special circumstances of the
case, in which the victim was the defendant’s own
wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
consideration the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking
Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself
invited as may be inferred from the evidence
presented, the Court found not only a lack of
motive for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is
also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of a hallucination and not in his right
mind.
The Court found that the defendant is not
criminally liable for the offense with which he is
charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in
the Government insane asylum, whence he shall
not be released until the director thereof finds that
his liberty would no longer constitute a menace.
People vs. Bonoan
Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of
murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife,
which caused his death three days afterwards. An
arraignment was then called, but the defense
objected on the ground that the defendant was
mentally deranged and was at the time confined
at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several months
of summons for doctors, production of the
defendant’s complete record of mental condition
from the hospital and defendant’s admission to
the hospital for personal observation, assistant
alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the
court that Bonoan may be discharged for being a
“recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found
Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower
court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered
dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did
not show any kind of abnormality, that the
defense did not establish the defendant’s insanity
and finding accused guilty.
Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused
guilty
Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at
the time he perpetrated the crime, which
consequently exempts him from criminal liability,
and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro
Hospital or other hospital for the insane. This
ruling was based on the following evidence:
Uncontradicted evidence that accused was
confined in the insane department of San Lazaro
Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox
long before the commission of the offense and
recurrence of ailments were not entirely lacking
of scientific foundation
Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified
from legal responsibility because they have no
control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms
similar to manic depression psychosis
Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom
leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to
act according to Dr. Francisco
Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on
the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the
police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
Defendant suffered from manic depressive
psychosis according to Dr. Joson
Dissenting (Justices Imperial, Diaz and
Concepcion):
The dissenting opinions pose that the accused
committed the crime when he was sane, or at
least, during a lucid interval.
The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity;
no positive evidence of accused mental state was
established
Based on expert testimonies, accused was cured
of dementia praecox and later manic depressive
psychosis
Based on observance of arresting officer Damaso
Arnoco, corrobating statement of Benjamin Cruz,
and other witnesses, accused appear sane at the
time immediately after commission
There is a motive of aggression on part of
accused is real and positive fact: deceased’s
failure to pay borrowed money
People vs. Puno
Facts:
At about two o’ clock in the afternoon of
September 8, 1970, defendant Ernesto Puno
(Puno), 27, entered a bedroom in the house of his
neighbor, Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72. On
seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted
her and shouted profanities at her, accusing her
of witchcraft. He then repeatedly slapped her and
stuck her several times on the head with a
hammer until she died. The assault was
witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz (Hilaria), 23, and
Lina Pajes (Lina), 27. de La Cruz was with Aling
Kikay inside the bedroom while Lina was in the
adjoining room. Both witnesses t estified that
Puno’s eyes were reddish and that he looked
baleful and menacing. After the killing, Puno went
to the adjoining room of Lina where Hilaria had
taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, Puno
confessed to the killing and threatened them not
to tell the police or else he would hunt them down.
He then fled to his parents’ house and then to his
second cousin’s house. Lina, disregarding
Puno’s threat, notified the police of the killing after
she was certain Puno had left. Corporal Daniel B.
Cruz (Cruz) answered the call. Cruz found the
lifeless body of Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed
all bloodied. He took down
statements from Hilaria and Lina at the police
station. Both witnesses pointed to Puno as the
killer. Puno’s father surrendered him to the police
and two policemen brought him to the
National Mental Hospital on September 10, 2970.
The defendant was charged with murder in the
Municipal Trial Court and he waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. On October
21, 1970, Puno was indicted for murder in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig. Alleged in the
information as aggravating circumstances were
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex. Five months after the killing,
Puno pretended that he did not remember having
killed Aling Kikay. He also said that people
involved in witchcraft (such as “mangkukulams,”
as he put it) must be killed.
Zenaida Gabriel, Puno’s wife; Aida Gabriel,
Puno’s sister-in-law; and Teotimo Puno, Puno’s
cousin; all testified to the fact that Puno’s eyes
were reddish and that he acted bizarrely on three
different occasions. The defense presented three
psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that
Puno was insane when he killed
Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that
Puno acted with discernment because
according to Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the
Psychiatry section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes
Memorial Hospital, Puno was an outpatient who
could very well live with society, although he was
afflicted with “schizophrenic reaction”. Sev eral
other doctors attested to this.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or
knew that the killing of Aling Kikay was wrong and
that he would be punished for it, as shown by the
threats which he made to Hilaria and Lina. The
trial court also concluded that if Puno was a
homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he
would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact
that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he
really disposed of her because he thought he was
a witch. The trial court convicted Puno of murder
and sentenced him to death and ordered
him to pay the heirs of the victim.
Issue:
Whether Puno was legally insane and thus
exempt from the conviction of murder on
the ground of insanity as stated in a rticle 12 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No. Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code states
that insanity means that the accused
must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime. Puno was not
legally insane when he killed the
hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the
findings of the psychiatrists reveal
that on the tragic occasion he was not completely
deprived of reason and freedom of
will.
Ruling:
Death penalty is set aside. The accused is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity
imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
People vs. Rafanan
FACTS: Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only
14 years old when hired as a househelper by the
mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio
Rafaran and his family lived with his mother in the
same house. Policarpio was married and has
children. One evening, the mother of the accused
called complainant to help him close the door.
When the complainant went near him, he pulled
her inside the store and raped her despite her
resistance. After that, he warned the complainant
not to tell anyone about it or he will kill her. The
next day, the family of the accused knew what
happened. Appellant claimed that he is suffering
from schizophrenia when he inflicted violent
intentions to Estelita. Trial court suspended the
tria; and ordered his confinement to National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong. After 2 years,
he was reported to be behaved and in improved
condition and in mental condition to stand court in
trial. Trial of case resumed.
ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to
relieve him from criminal liability
HELD: No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility
must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason
or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition.
People vs. Madarang
Facts:
Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing
his wife, causing her death. Appellant alleges he
was in a state of insanity and claims he had no
recollection of the stabbing incident.He insists
that he was deprived of intelligence , making his
act involuntary.His psychiatric evaluation
revealed he was suffering from schizophrenia but
after two years in the National Center for Mental
Health his condition improved thus, he was
released.
Held:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a
more stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting as it is required that there must be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act,i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he
acted without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of the
will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability.The issue of insanity is a
question of fact.The state or condition of a man’s
mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior.Establishing one’s insanity requires
testimony of an expert witness, such as a
psychiatrist.The proof must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commisssion of
the offense with which he is charged.None of the
witnesses declared that he exhibited any of the
symptoms associated with schizophrenia
immediately before or simultaneous with the
stabbing incident.Also schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of
distinguishing right from wrong.
People vs. Robios
Facts:
Melencio Robios was found guilty with the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion and was sentenced of death. May 31,
1995, he was accused of killing his pregnant wife.
March 25, 1995 Lorenzo Robios, son of Melencio
heard his parents quarreling and saw Melencio
stab her mom Lorenza with an 8-inch double
bladed knife on the right shoulder. On the same
day, Benjamin, brother of Lorenza reported that
Melencio has also killed their uncle. Benjamin
knowing what Melencio did to her sister, went to
her sister’s house and when he was 150m away,
saw Melencio and the latter shouted “Its good you
would see how your sister would die.” Benjamin
sought the help of the police.
SPO1 saw Melencio embracing her wife uttering
the words “I will kill myself, I will kill myself”.
Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing
upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared
to be dead. Appellant dropped the knife which
was taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to
resist the people who held him but was
overpowered. The police, with the help of the
barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet
with a plastic rope. However, before he was
pulled away from the body of his wife and
restrained by the police, appellant admitted to
Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a
barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife,
showing him the bloodstained knife.
Special report showed that Lorenza Robios was
six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab
wounds on the different parts of her body and that
the appellant was under the influence of alcohol
and also stabbed himself.
Melencio admitted that she killed his wife but wish
to be exempted of his criminal liability invoking
insanity. His son testified that Melencio saw
someone in their house that wanted to kill him. A
nurse said that Melencio “isolated himself, laging
nakatingin sa malayo, rarely talked, just stared at
her and murmured alone”. A detention prisoner
witnessed the appellant usually refusing to
respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes,
he stayed in his cell even if they were required to
fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony. And
another prisoner said that accused sometimes
was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on
space and without companion, laughing and
sometimes crying. And Melencio said that he did
not know that he was charged for the crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not
remember when he was informed by his children
that he killed his wife. He could not believe that
he killed his wife
Issue:
1. Can he be exempted on the grounds of
insanity?
2. What is the proper penalty for him?
Held:
1. Testimonies from both prosecution and
defense witnesses show no substantial evidence
that appellant was completely deprived of reason
or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal
killing of his wife. The fact that appellant admitted
to responding law enforcers how he had just killed
his wife may have been a manifestation of
repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of
a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of
his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and
immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his
claim that he had no knowledge of what he had
just done and he was not insane during the
commission of the crime.
2. Since appellant was convicted of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should
be that for the graver offense which is parricide
and punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.
People vs. Opuran
FACTS:
On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan,
Samar, Anacito Opuran, herein accused, stabbed
Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench. At 7:45
pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was
walking on the national highway of Catbalogan,
Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged from
where he was hiding and stabbed Patrimonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can use the exempting
circumstance of insanity as a defense.
RULING:
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at
the précised moment of the commission of the
act. The accused failed to prove that he was
insane at the precise moment of commission or
immediately before said act. Thus, insanity is not
attendant in the case at bar.
Verdadero vs. People
Facts:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his
father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station.
Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went
there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan
belt of their irrigation pump.[7]After a
confrontation with Verdadero at the police station,
the three men made their way home on a tricycle
but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended
to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded
towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie
stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store,
Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after
he was alerted by the shouts of
Ronnie.[8]Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left
side of the latter's upper back with the use of a
Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper
back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried
to help his father but Verdadero attempted to
attack him as well. He defended himself using a
small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the
chest.
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF
THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Ruling:
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero
raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had
suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under
Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane
person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the
latter had acted during a lucid interval. The
defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved for there is a presumption that the acts
penalized by law are voluntary.[18]In the case at
bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999,
Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was
diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003;
(4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward
sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in
and out of psychiatric care from the time of his
first confinement in 1999 until the stabbing
incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.Thus, it is
without question that he was suffering from
schizophrenia and the only thing left to be
ascertained is whether he should be absolved
from responsibility in killing Romeo because of
his mental state.
Principles:
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions.[19] A showing that
an accused is suffering from a mental disorder,
however, does not automatically exonerate him
from the consequences of his act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.
People vs. Genosa
Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15,
1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the
appellant, she did not provoke her husband when
she got home that night and it was her husband
who began the provocation. The appellant said
she was frightened that her husband would hurt
her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage
she had tried to leave her husband at least five
times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. The appellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards
her that night was because he was crazy about
his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant,
after being interviewed by specialist, has been
shown to be suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-
defense admitted the killing of her husband. She
was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the
husband was attacked while asleep.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-
defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense
failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a)
Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force
in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable –
not necessarily immediate and actual – grave
harm to the accused based on the history of
violence perpetuated by the former against the
latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery
as an aggravating circumstance because the
quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must
have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s
aggression
People vs. Doquena
FACTS:
Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarag (‘Epi’) were
playing volleyball in their school. Valentin (‘Val’),
a 7th grade pupil, joined them, but he hit Juan
with the ball in the stomach. Juan chased,
slapped, and punched Val on the face. Juan
returned to Epi and played, and Val took a knife.
Val stabbed Juan to death.Val is one of the
brightest in school and always obtained excellent
remarks.Thus, the trial court is convinced that Val
committed the act with discernment.
ISSUE:Whether or not Val committed the act with
discernment?
RULING:Yes. Discernment pertains to mental
capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong. Such capacity should be
determined by taking into consideration all the
facts, circumstances, appearance, attitude,
comportment and behavior of the minor.
Ortega vs. People
FACTS:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused
was only 13 years old, while the victim AAA was
6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner
raped her three times on three different occasions
in 1996. The lower courts convicted him of rape
with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case
was pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No.
9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006, was enacted amending the age of criminal
irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years
old. Said law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the
time of the promulgation of judgment, the
accused already reached the age of majority. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that
petitioner is not exempt from criminal liability
because he is not anymore a child as defined by
R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that the
retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if
the child-accused is still below 18 years old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in
the crime alleged by reason of minority
HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal
liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or
voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability
arises. Hence, while there is a crime committed,
no criminal liability attaches.
By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years
old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the alleged rape. The first
paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly
provides that, a child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. The
Court gives retroactive application insofar as it
favors the persons guilty of a felony. While the
law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability,
however, he is not exempt from civil liability. For
this reason, petitioner and/or his parents are
liable to pay AAA civil indemnity.
People vs. Mantalaba
Facts:
Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was
selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two
informations was filed against Mantalaba which
was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not
guilty.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to
death and fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2)
for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was
penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1
day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision
mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.
Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in
convicting him and that there was no evidence of
actual sale between him and the poser-buyer
during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that
the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not
established.
Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug
trafficking and possession.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing
the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefore. From the above testimony of the
prosecution witness, it was well established that
the elements have been satisfactorily met. The
seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as
the marked money used, were also satisfactorily
presented. The testimony was also clear as to the
manner in which the buy-bust operation was
conducted.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust
team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there
is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-
compliance will not render an accused arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.
As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during
the buy-bust operation but was of legal age
during the promulgation of the decision. It must
be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the
promulgation of the RTC's decision against
Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the
time of the promulgation of the judgment.
However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia,
suspension of sentence can still be applied but
NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of
judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now
21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence
is already moot and academic.
But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated
Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating
circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying
the rules stated above, the proper penalty should
be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua,
which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
there being no other mitigating circumstance nor
aggravating circumstance.
US vs. Tanedo
Facts:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this
year, the accused, with the intention of killing
Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild
chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with
premeditation shot him in the breast with a
shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed him.
After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo
ran back to his workers and asked one,
Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body,
which they did by putting it amidst the tall cogon
grass, and later burying in an old well.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a
chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken
feathers were found at the scene of the crime.
Prior to the trial, the accused denied all
knowledge of the crime, but later confessed
during the trial. The CFI of Tarlac found the
accused guilty of homicide, having invited the
deceased into the forest and intentionally
shooting him in the chest.
So far as can be ascertained, there was no
enmity and no unpleasant relations between
them. There appears to have been no motive
whatever for the commission of the crime. The
only possible reason that the accused could have
for killing the deceased would be found in the fact
of a sudden quarrel between them during the
hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that
the chicken and the man were shot at the same
time, there having been only one shot fired.
Hence, the decision was appealed.
Issue: W/N the court is correct in ruling that there
is criminal liability. NO
Held:
If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in
the performance of a lawful act executed with due
care and without intention of doing harm, there is
no criminal liability. In this case there is absolutely
no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
accused. Neither is there any question that he
was engaged in the commission of a lawful act
when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause
the death of the deceased. The only thing in the
case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a
defense, the accused is not required to prove
such a defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, because there is a denial of intentional
killing, and the burden is upon the State to show
that it was intentional.
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an
important issue in a prosecution for homicide,
which must be submitted to the jury. And since a
plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent
which constitutes an essential element in criminal
homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be
negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus the judgment is reversed.
People vs. Castillo
FACTS:
1. In the evening of 5 November 1993, the
accused-appellant came home drunk and angry.
2. His father-in-law (Guillermo) tried to
subdue him but to no avail which caused the
former to leave the house.
3. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him
take out his sling and arrow.
4. Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was
heard crying and screaming.
5. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was
seen carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out
of the house and was later taken to the hospital
but to no avail.
6. Cause of death was the cut jugular vein
caused by a fatal weapon which could have been
a “pointed instrument like a nail.”
7. Appellant was charged with parricide for
allegedly shooting his wife with a dart from a
rubber sling, hitting her at the neck and causing
her instantaneous death.
8. In his defense, the accused said that he
had no intention of killing his wife and that he was
practicing the use of the weapon when his wife
was accidentally hit by the arrow.
9. However, the trial court nonetheless
found him guilty on the ground that the evidence
showed that the infliction of the fatal injury upon
his wife was preceded by a quarrel between her
and the appellant, thus negating the latter’s
defense.
10. The same was affirmed on appeal.
11. In the present petition, the appellant
contends that assuming that he was the one who
killed his wife the same was accidental and not
intentional.
ISSUE: Is the exempting circumstance of
accident applicable in the instant case?
HELD:
1. No. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, provides: ART. 12. Circumstances
which exempt from criminal liability. — The
following are exempt from criminal liability: Any
person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
2. "Accident" is an affirmative defense
which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence. The defense
miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof.
The essential requisites for this exempting
circumstance, are:
i. A person is performing a lawful act;
ii. With due care;
iii. He causes an injury to another by mere
accident;
iv. Without fault or intention of causing it.
3. By no stretch of imagination could
playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be
considered as performing a "lawful act."
4. Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's
defense of accident must be struck down
because he was performing an unlawful act
during the incident.
5. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant
disappeared while his wife was in the hospital is
unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife.
6. Accused was found guilty of the crime of
Parricide wherein the court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Retubado
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the
appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a
cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin
and his father were having dinner, it exploded.
The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon,
Jr. The matter was brought to the attention of the
barangay captain who conducted an
investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon,
Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however,
was bent on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr.
Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o.
Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was
confronted by Jesus when the former was on his
way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the
latter pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a
canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house.
His wife, Norberta Caon was in the balcony of
their house, above the porch waiting for him to
arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already
asleep. Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he
was being followed. Jesus told Emmanuel that he
just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but
Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his son was
already asleep. Norberta went down from the
balcony and placed her hand on her husbands
shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out
a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the
floor as the appellant walked away from the
scene. Emmanuel was brought to the Tuburan
District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter.
Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to
surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim.
Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed
that he was merely performing a lawful act with
due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable
for the victims death. He testified that when he
insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son,
Emmanuel went to his room and emerged
therefrom holding a handgun. Jesus grabbed
Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled for the gun but
eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees. Jesus
pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s
forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus
then rushed to his house to change clothes. He
placed the gun on the dining table. When he went
back to the dining room his sister told him that
their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown
it into the sea.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a
lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held
criminally liable for the victims death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No!
Homicide only
Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin.
Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the
phrase. The justification refers to a situation of
grave peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o
imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse
juridical rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to
life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and
property (la vida, la integridad corporal, el pudor,
el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to
another. It is indispensable that the state of
necessity must not be brought about by the
intentional provocation of the party invoking the
same.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying
circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of the
RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and
killing the victim, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the prosecution.
Whether the accused acted under a state of
necessity is a question
of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of
the trial court that the appellant was the
provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the
author of a deliberate and malicious act of
shooting the victim at close range on the
forehead. The court came to this conclusion
based on:
1. Norberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant
informed the police authorities that he killed the
victim in a state of necessity and that his brother,
Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot
and kill the victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to
qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate
treachery, two (2) conditions must be present,
namely, (a) the employment of the means of
execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and
(b) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to
adduce an iota of evidence to support the
confluence of the abovementioned conditions.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Pomoy vs. People
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the
appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a
cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin
and his father were having dinner, it exploded.
The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon,
Jr. The matter was brought to the attention of the
barangay captain who conducted an
investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon,
Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however,
was bent on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr.
Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o.
Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was
confronted by Jesus when the former was on his
way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the
latter pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a
canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house.
His wife, Norberta Caon was in the balcony of
their house, above the porch waiting for him to
arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already
asleep. Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he
was being followed. Jesus told Emmanuel that he
just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but
Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his son was
already asleep. Norberta went down from the
balcony and placed her hand on her husbands
shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out
a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the
floor as the appellant walked away from the
scene. Emmanuel was brought to the Tuburan
District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter.
Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to
surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim.
Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed
that he was merely performing a lawful act with
due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable
for the victims death. He testified that when he
insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son,
Emmanuel went to his room and emerged
therefrom holding a handgun. Jesus grabbed
Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled for the gun but
eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees. Jesus
pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s
forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus
then rushed to his house to change clothes. He
placed the gun on the dining table. When he went
back to the dining room his sister told him that
their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown
it into the sea.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a
lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held
criminally liable for the victims death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No!
Homicide only
Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin.
Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the
phrase. The justification refers to a situation of
grave peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o
imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse
juridical rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to
life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and
property (la vida, la integridad corporal, el pudor,
el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to
another. It is indispensable that the state of
necessity must not be brought about by the
intentional provocation of the party invoking the
same.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying
circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of the
RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and
killing the victim, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the prosecution.
Whether the accused acted under a state of
necessity is a question
of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of
the trial court that the appellant was the
provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the
author of a deliberate and malicious act of
shooting the victim at close range on the
forehead. The court came to this conclusion
based on:
1. Norberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant
informed the police authorities that he killed the
victim in a state of necessity and that his brother,
Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot
and kill the victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to
qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate
treachery, two (2) conditions must be present,
namely, (a) the employment of the means of
execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and
(b) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to
adduce an iota of evidence to support the
confluence of the abovementioned conditions.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender
US vs. Caballeros
FACTS:
The defendants have been sentenced by the CFI
of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio
mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime
of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers
,because, without having taken part in the said
crime as principals or as accomplices, they took
part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in
order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this
sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although
he confessed to having assisted in the burial of
the corpses, it appears that he did so because he
was compelled to do so by the murderers of the
four teachers. And not only does the defendant
affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only
eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who,
by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This
witness says he was present when the Americans
were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a
member of the group who killed the Americans,
but the he was in a banana plantation on his
property gathering some bananas; that when he
heard the shots he began to run; that he was,
however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the
leaders of the band; that the latter called to him
and striking him with the butts of their guns they
forced him to bury the corpses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants are criminally liable.
RULING:
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person
who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless,
under such circumstances when he executed the
acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio
Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part
in any way in the execution of the crime with
which he has been charged; there is conclusive
proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one
of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro
Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros,
did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the
occurrence when the burial took place. The
confession of his supposed liability and guilt,
made before an official of the division of
information of the Constabulary, Enrique
Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a
witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto
Baculi was the only one of the defendants who
made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears
besides, from the statements of another witness
for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Caballeros was made through the
promise made to him and to the other defendants
that nothing would be done to them. Confessions
which do not appear to have been made freely
and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof
on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the
authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction
and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by
the Penal Code and therefore that can not render
the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and
with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we
acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs
de oficio in both instances.
People vs. Loreno
Facts:
Barangay Captain Elias Monge, his family &
Francisco Fabie, their farm helper were home
preparing for the barrio dance when Loreno & a
man in a dark sweater came by their house,
saying there was a letter from the chief (hepe).
Elias let them in & when they read the letter, it
said that they were NPA. They were made to lie
on the ground while other men went in the house.
The alleged NPA members robbed the family of
several belongings. Moreover, the man in the
dark sweater raped the 2 daughters of Elias,
Cristina & Monica. Elias, Cristina, Monica & Fabie
positively identified Loreno as 1 of the robbers.
Fabie also identified Marantal.
Issue: WON Loreno and Marantal are exempted
from criminal liability under the defenses of Article
12(5) and (6)
Held: No. Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and
Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury. They admitted that they were in
the house of Elias that night but they were only
forced by a man wearing black sweater and his
five companions who claimed to be members of
the NPA, with the threat that if they did not obey,
appellants and their families would be killed. This
was found untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he
does not act with freedom. The force must be
irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument
who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. The compulsion must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.
Loreno and Marantal had admitted their
participation in the commission of the crimes of
robbery and rape against Elias and is family.
Facts inconsistent with the appellants’ defense
were established: (a) having been armed with a
firearm, (b) Loreno positioning himself near the
post of the balcony without prior instructions, (c)
Loreno furnishing the rattan to tie the victims, and
(d) Loreno pointing his gun to the other victims
when Monica was being raped. Furthermore,
Loreno brought Beata, Elias’s wife to the different
rooms to open the trunks and closets, without the
threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater.
And lastly, Loreno tried to molest Cristina after
being raped by the man in dark sweater.
When Marantal kicked Fabie when the latter saw
his face, it was due to the fact the Fabie had
recognized him & the blows which he gave to
Fabie who was still tied was a warning not to
report his presence & participation in the crime.
Furthermore, there was no showing that Jimmy
Marantal raised a voice of protest nor did an act
to prevent the commission of the crimes. All these
demonstrated the voluntary participation & the
conspiracy of the appellants. Not only was their
defense untenable, but the facts show that that
there was conspiracy.
People vs. Del Rosario
Facts: Barangay Captain Elias Monge, his family
& Francisco Fabie, their farm helper were home
preparing for the barrio dance when Loreno & a
man in a dark sweater came by their house,
saying there was a letter from the chief (hepe).
Elias let them in & when they read the letter, it
said that they were NPA. They were made to lie
on the ground while other men went in the house.
The alleged NPA members robbed the family of
several belongings. Moreover, the man in the
dark sweater raped the 2 daughters of Elias,
Cristina & Monica. Elias, Cristina, Monica & Fabie
positively identified Loreno as 1 of the robbers.
Fabie also identified Marantal.
Issue: WON Loreno and Marantal are exempted
from criminal liability under the defenses of Article
12(5) and (6)
Held: No. Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and
Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury. They admitted that they were in
the house of Elias that night but they were only
forced by a man wearing black sweater and his
five companions who claimed to be members of
the NPA, with the threat that if they did not obey,
appellants and their families would be killed. This
was found untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he
does not act with freedom. The force must be
irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument
who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. The compulsion must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.
Loreno and Marantal had admitted their
participation in the commission of the crimes of
robbery and rape against Elias and is family.
Facts inconsistent with the appellants’ defense
were established: (a) having been armed with a
firearm, (b) Loreno positioning himself near the
post of the balcony without prior instructions, (c)
Loreno furnishing the rattan to tie the victims, and
(d) Loreno pointing his gun to the other victims
when Monica was being raped. Furthermore,
Loreno brought Beata, Elias’s wife to the different
rooms to open the trunks and closets, without the
threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater.
And lastly, Loreno tried to molest Cristina after
being raped by the man in dark sweater.
When Marantal kicked Fabie when the latter saw
his face, it was due to the fact the Fabie had
recognized him & the blows which he gave to
Fabie who was still tied was a warning not to
report his presence & participation in the crime.
Furthermore, there was no showing that Jimmy
Marantal raised a voice of protest nor did an act
to prevent the commission of the crimes. All these
demonstrated the voluntary participation & the
conspiracy of the appellants. Not only was their
defense untenable, but the facts show that that
there was conspiracy.
People vs. Bandian

FACTS:
At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936,
Valentine Aguilar, the apellant’s neighbor, saw
the appellant go to the thicket about four or five
brazas from her house, apparently to respond to
a call of nature because it was there that the
people of the place used to go for that purpose. A
few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge
from the thicket with her clothes stained with
blood both in front and back, stagerring and
visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that
she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her back to her house and placed her in
her bed.
Aguilar asked what had happened to her. The
appellant answered that she was very dizzy.
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby
to be there and help. He asked Comcom to take
bamboo leaves to stop the hemhorrage of the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five
brazas when he saw the body of newborn baby
near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before.
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter told
him to bring the body to the appellant’s house.
Upon being asked whether the baby was hers or
not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno went to the appellant’s house and
found her still lying in bed still bleeding. In his
opinion, the physician declared that the appellant
gave birth in her house, and afterwhich, she threw
the child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor from her husband,
because the child was not his but with another
man with whom she had previously has amorous
relations. Nepomuceno testified that the
appellant admitted killing her child.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed by appellant?
RULING:
The evidence certainly does not show that the
appellant , in causing her child’s death in one way
or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did
so willfully, consciously, or imprudently. She had
no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to
death, because her affair with a former lover, Kirol
took place three years before the incident. The
husband of the appellant testified at the trial
affirming the belief that the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable must be committed willfully and
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
Even in cases where said crimes are committed
through mere imprudence, the person who
commits them, under said circumstances, must
be in the full enjoyment of his mental facilities, or
must be conscious of his acts, in order that he
may be held liable.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person
who acts under the circumstances in which the
appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a
child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other cause than
that she was overcome by severe dizziness and
extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her
part, she should not be blamed therefor because
it all happened by mere accident, from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (Art. 12, subsection 4, RPC).
Taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant
was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the
thicket and that she later failed to take her child
therefrom, having been so prevented by reason
of causes entirely independent of her will, and it
appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of
the crime of which she had bee accused and
convicted.
People vs. Doria
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta
Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4,
in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.
Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from two civilian informants
(CI) that one “Jun” who was later identified to be
Florencio Doria was engaged in illegal drug
activities and decided to entrap and arrest “Jun”
in a buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation”Jun” took out from
his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it
to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in
the arrest. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the
marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun” revealed
that he left the money at the house of his
associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao)
“Jun” led the police team to “Neneth’s” house.
The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house
open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the
woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked
“Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over “Neneth’s” house. Standing by the
door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s
flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its
contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
“sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused,
PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and
took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained 10 bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
The prosecution story was denied by accused-
appellants.
Gaddao testified that inside her house were her
co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.
They asked her about a box on top of the table.
This was the first time she saw the box. The box
was closed and tied with a piece of green straw.
The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything
about the box and its contents.
She denied the charge against her and Doria and
the allegation that marked bills were found in her
person.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.
ISSUES:
(1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;
(2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her
person and house, and the admissibility of the
pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
RULING:
The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section
5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
x x x.”
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person
may be arrested without a warrant if he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria
was caught in the act of committing an offense.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the
police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant.
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the
search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills
are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure
without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may
be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances:(1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao
was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and
the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the
warrants were not necessary because the arrest
was made in “hot pursuit” and the search was an
incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant
Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-
handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule
113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary
to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from
the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.”
In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be
justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
“Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon “probable cause” which means an
“actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely
on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however,
declared in his direct examination that appellant
Doria named his co-accused in response to his
(PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked
money was. Appellant Doria did not point to
appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the
marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant
Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the
money in her house,
with or without her knowledge, with or without any
conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria’s
word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable
grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing. If there is no showing that the person
who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his
own right, knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
2.
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of
her person and home and the subsequent seizure
of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This
brings us to the question of whether the trial court
correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant
and may be introduced in evidence.
The “plain view” doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in
a position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object
itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package
is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It
must be immediately apparent to the police that
the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at
appellant Gaddao’s house because they were led
there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents
testified that they had no information on appellant
Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led
them to her. Standing by the door of appellant
Gaddao’s house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of
the interior of said house. Two and a half meters
away was the dining table and underneath it was
a carton box. The box was partially open and
revealed something wrapped in plastic.
He did not know exactly what the box contained
that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3
Manlangit that the content of the box was
marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view
and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the
Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and
should have been excluded and never
considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos
of marijuana was found in the house of accused-
appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that
she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, what is material is the submission of proof
that the sale took place between the poseur-
buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation
of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in
court.The prosecution has clearly established the
fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he
received, accused-appellant Doria sold and
delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer.
The prosecution, however, has failed to prove
that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with
accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao is
acquitted.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales vs.
People
Facts:
Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly
appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate
estate of her deceased mother Manolita
Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-
affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law,
William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged
that the said accused feloniously induced
Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and
herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a
special power of attorney (in the pretense of
presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which
authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and
disposition of the latter’s properties. In relation to
this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the
case.
As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the
accused here applies Art 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. He cites that he falls under the
enumeration of those relatives who shall be
exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a
relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the
crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further
counters that the same law makes no distinction
that the relationship may not be invoked in case
of death of spouse at the time the crime was
allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his
spouse Zenaida Carungcong Sato though
dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not
on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and
son-law relationship between Sato and his wife’s
mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed
from the protective mantle of Art 332.
Issues:
Whether or not the death of William’s wife and
Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida, extinguished the
relationship by affinity between William and
Manolita.
Whether or not William should be exempt from
criminal liability for reason of his relationship to
Manolita.
Held:
No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving
spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.
No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under
the said provision, the State condones the
criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act
of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute
the offender for the said crimes but leaves the
private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly
limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of
the provision shows that it applies exclusively to
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any
of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through
falsification.
Sato, the accused, could not avail of the
beneficial application of ART 332 considering that
the crime he committed falls under the nature of
a complex crime which is the crime estafa
through falsification of public document and does
not anymore concern private relations of family
members. He then can be held criminally liable.
People vs. Jaurigue
Facts. Victim Amado was courting Avelina. In one
occasion, while Avelina’s cousing washed the
latter’s hankerchief, Amado stole it. Amado
proposed her love to Avelina. Avelina refused.
Amado grabbed her, kissed her, and touched her
chest. To this, Avelina slapped him, threw fist
blows, and kicked him. Avelina told her mother
the next day. Her mother gave her a fan knife for
protection.
Not long after, Amado intruded in Avelina’s house
while she was asleep. He kissed her hand which
woke her up. She screamed for help, he hid under
the bed. Her parents arrive in the room. He
apologized.
Days after, Avelina and her family attended
services in the Seventh Day Adventists chapel.
Avelina’s father got there first, Avelina followed
and sat on one of the benches. Amado saw
Avelina, sat beside her and put his hand in her
right thigh. Avelina tried to get her knife with right
hand. Amado held her right hand to stop her.
Avelina quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado in the neck.
Amado staggered. Avelina’s father saw Amado
bleeding. Her father asked why she did it, she
said she could not endure it anymore. CFI found
Avelina guilty of homicide wit the aggravating
circumstance of having committed the act in a
place of worship, inter alia. Avelina appealed.
Issue. Is the AC of offending a place of worship
applicable? -No
Ratio. While it is true that the crime occurred in a
chapel, this does not necessarily denote the
attachment of said AC. As per law, for a proper
appreciation of AC of having committed the crime
in a place of worship, there should be
premeditation that the offender intended to do it
in the place of worship. As the facts show, Avelina
did not plan to kill Amado nor to kill him in a
chapel. Avelina had in her case the fan knife just
for protection whenever and wherever she might
need it. It just so happened that Amado provoked
her in the chapel and that was where Avelina
could not bear it anymore. With this in mind, the
present court ruled that the lower court erred in
assigning the AC in its judgment against Avelina.
People vs. Narvaez
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of
murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer
and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968,
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that
would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a
nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group
and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot
Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who
was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle
with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the
time of the shooting, the civil case was still
pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting
of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At
time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and
ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June
25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from
the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after
letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his
person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was
guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for
moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting
defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and
chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on
the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the
victim but rather on his rights to property. On the
first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights,
the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code
recognizing the right of owners to close and fence
their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in
the position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the
victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-
appellant although he acted in defence of his
rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if
the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC
enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there
was unlawful aggression towards appellant's
property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6
months and he should have left him in peace
before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of
the Civil Code also provides that possession may
not be acquired through force or intimidation;
while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has
the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to
prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person
defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is
credited with the special mitigating circumstance
of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6)
RPC. These mitigating circumstances are:
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation
(read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2
counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the
deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately
chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct
evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art.
249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary
imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil
indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned
for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made
the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of damage caused,
indemnification of consequential damages and
costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted
only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465
is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect
pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/
mitigating circumstances and extenuating
circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty
is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary
imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages.
Appellant has already been detained 14 years so
his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can
only be invoked when coupled with form of attack
on person defending property. In the case at bar,
this was not so. Appellant should then be
sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he
has served more than that, he should be
released.
People vs. Ulep
Facts: Macario Ulep, accused, elbowed her wife
on her breast, upon being drunk and uttering
indecent words. Subsequently, the victim
vomited and then went to bed. The accused then
left for the fields and upon returning home, found
his wife dead. He immediately reported this death
to their barrio captain. Medical reports show that
the victim’s cause of death is due to cardiac arrest
and primary shock.
Issue: WON the accused is criminally liable for
the death of his wife.
Held: Yes. Even though a blow with the fist or a
kick does not cause any external wound, it may
easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the
victim may have been previously affected by
some internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist
or foot accelerated death, he who caused such
acceleration is responsible for the death as the
result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
There is that clear and categorical showing that
on the appellant fell the blame for these in human
acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic
death.
Though, the appellant presented a witness to
prove that sometime,his wife was pinned down by
a sack of rice and the side portion of a bullcart
and was attended to by a town quack doctor
called an arbularyo. This witness said that two (2)
ribs on each side of the chest were fractured,
without stating which particular ribs were so
affected. However, it was being held that even if
the victim is suffering from an internal ailment,
liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow
delivered by the accused —
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is
criminal liability.
Apropos to all these is that time-respected
doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by
a person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended."
Guillermo vs. People
Facts: Noel Guillermo, Arnaldo Socias, and
Joemar Palma was charged for the killing of
Winnie Alon, of the 3, only Guillermo, was found
guilty of Homicide with the special or privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete
justification, and sentenced to 6 years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, with indemnity of P50,000.
Appellant contends that self-defense should have
been appreciated.
ISSUE: WON self-defense should be
appreciated.
HELD: Yes. Self-defense must be appreciated as
Alon was about to attack Guillermo with a broken
bottle when Guillermo realized he had a knife.
Guillermo had attacked Alon in self-defense,
albeit the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel it was not found as he stabbed
Alon 3 times. There was also a disproportionate
difference between an actual blade and a broken
beer bottle. All this would lead to an incomplete
self-defense, which is a mitigating circumstance
only, and not a justifying one. His sentence is
modified accordingly.
People vs. Ural
FACTS:
- Alberio went to the municipal building
and saw Ural, a policeman inside the jail where
he was boxing prisoner Napola (who was
imprisoned for being drunk). When Napola fell to
the ground he U kicked him and poured some
liquid on N and then ignited N’s body.
- Dr. Luzonia Bakil who treated the victim,
said that he sustained 2nd degree burns on the
arms, neck, left side of the face and one half of
the body including the back. She also testified
that without any medical intervention, the burns
would have caused death
- Napola died on Aug 25 1966. Death
certificate indicated burn as the cause of death.
- During the trial, the prosecutors failed to
present the detention prisoners who saw the
burning of Napola as witnesses as well as the
wife of the deceased
- Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of
murder, was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
was ordered to pay for costs
ISSUE: Whether the evidence of the prosecution
was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: TC did not err in convicting Ural for
murder.
- Ural had his own version of the story.
According to him he heard a scream for help from
Napola whose shirt was in flames when found by
him, he removed the shirt, but did not summon
the doctor because he thought that the burns
were not serious.
o SC: this statement cannot prevail over
the testimony of Alberio
o This statement does not prove that he
was not the one who burned Napola, at most this
could only mean that he was alarmed by the
consequences of his evil act
- Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as
a witness, saying that he was not listed as a
prosecution witness and that he was convicted of
murder in the past
o Wouldn’t preclude him from being a
credible witness.
o Since there was no police investigation
(accused a police officer), the investigation that
ensued was done by a special counsel of the
fiscal’s office. A possible explanation of alberio
not being listed at first.
o The statements of the witnesses for the
defense were not inconsistent with that of
Alberio’s.
Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in
Alberio’s testimony.
- The present case is covered by article 4
(par.1-result greater than what was intended).
o Aggravating circumstance: art 14(1).
o TC erred in not appreciating the
Mitigating circumstance “that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed”
No intent to kill but only to maltreat the
drunk napola who might have been making a
nuisance of himself
He realized the fearful consequence of
his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure
medical treatment at the municipal dispensary
- Since the mitigating circumstance offset
the aggravating circumstance, TC correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which
is the medium period of the penalty for murder.
DECISION: TC decision AFFIRMED.
People vs. Gonzales
FACTS: After their vehicles almost collided with
each other, Andres and Appellant had an
altercation. Thereafter, Andres went back inside
to his car when he was blocked by the appellant’s
son who said, "Anong problema mo sa erpat ko."
Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he
immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the
driver’s seat, closed the door, and partially
opened the car window just wide enough to talk
back to appellant’s son, Dino. In the meantime,
appellant, thinking that Andres was going to get
something from his car, took a gun. However, he
was pushed by his daughter-in-law which made
him lost his balance and accidentally fired the gun
hitting Andres’ wife, and two sons.Appellant was
charged and convicted of Murder, Double
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder in the
RTC.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that
judgment be rendered exempting him from
criminal and civil liabilities contending that he had
no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his
wife nor the children. He lost his balance when
his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him
backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel
Andres but the appellant tried to free his right
hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery
attendant in the crime.
RULING: No. Treachery under par.16 of Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the
deliberate employment of means, methods or
forms in the execution of a crime against persons
which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the intended victim might
raise. For treachery to be appreciated two
elements must concur: 1) the employment of
means of execution that would insure the safety
of the accused from retaliatory acts of the
intended victim and leaving the latter without an
opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means
employed were deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender.8
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-
General that the shooting was not attended by
treachery and accordingly the crime committed
for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and
not murder.
People vs. Pagal
Facts. Guan had in his employ Pagal and
Torcelino. Guan supposedly maltreated Pagal
and Torcelino during their employment. Pagal
and Torcelino sought to rob Guan, but Guan
would not open the kaha de yero. Because of
Guan’s resistance, the two resorted to violence,
stabbed Guan with an icepick, and clubbed him
with an iron pipe. The beating later caused
Guan’s death. The two got approximately P1,000
from the event.
Informations were filed against Pagal and
Torcelino of Guan’s death. The two, in their police
statements confessed to the crime. Thereafter, a
criminal case was filed against them for the crime
of robbery with homicide with the aggravating
circumstance of lack of respect for aged, among
others.
Upon arraignment, Pagal and Torcelino, through
their counsel sought to plead guilty provided that
they be able to prove the existence of the
mitigating circumstances (MC) of sufficient
provocation and acted on impulse which
produced passion obfuscation. The lower court
allowed them. They pleaded guilty and explained
their case. But the court was not convinced and
later found Pagal and Torcelino guilty of robbery
with homicide and sentenced them to death
penalty.
Pagal files a petition in the present court.
Issue. Was lower court correct in AC of disrespect
of age? -No
Ratio. No because the said AC applies only when
the crime committed is against persons. The
present court found that the lower court’s
attaching of AC on account of disrespect of age
is mistaken. Said AC attaches only when the
crime is against persons. The crime at hand,
robbery with homicide, is a crime against
property. Their being incongruent, the AC of
disrespect of age is not applicable to this case.
Urbano vs. People
Facts:
Information filed before the RTC, petitioner was
charged with Homicide... at around 8:00 p.m., the
victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at
the compound of the Lingayen Water District
(LIWAD)
, having just arrived from a picnic in the nearby
town, where... they drunk beer in a restaurant.
While inside the compound, the two had a heated
altercation in the course of which Tomelden
hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting,
petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has
the penchant of insulting petitioner.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of
blows. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch,"
as described by... eyewitness... on Tomelden's
face, which made Tomelden topple down.
Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on
the ground had their companions not caught him
and prevented the fall. The blow, however,
caused Tomelden's nose to bleed and rendered
him... unconscious.
Upon arriving home Tomelden informed his wife,
Rosario,... of the fight the previous night and of
his having been rendered unconscious. He
complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear.
The attending doctors observed the patient to be
in a state of drowsiness and frequent vomiting.
attending physician,... diagnosed Tomelden
suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling
to consider cerebral hemorrhage."
Tomelden died... to "cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."...
defense presented petitioner who denied having
any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension,
for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was
the cause of the latter's death.
RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
as charged
CA rendered a decision, affirming the conviction
of petitioner
Petitioner next contends that the mitigating
circumstances of no intention to commit so grave
a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of
the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner's
favor.
petitioner testified
At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered
goat's meat and... drank beer. When it was time
to depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform
Tomelden, then seated in another table, to
prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner,
telling the latter he had no business stopping him
from further drinking as he was paying for his
share of the bill.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden
allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him,
calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his
employment as Navarro's tricycle driver.
Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the
victim in retaliation, landing that lucky punch in
the course of parrying the latter's blows.
Issues:
Erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner.
Ruling:
petition is partly meritorious.
we agree with petitioner.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as
follows:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.--The following
are mitigating circumstances:
When the law speaks of provocation either as a
mitigating circumstance, the reference is to an
unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone;...
it is not... enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying;... the provocation
must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act... and should immediately precede
the act.
In the instant case, Tomelden's insulting remarks
directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient
provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they
were having beer
Petitioner... was the one provoked and
challenged to a fist fight.
It is abundantly clear from the above transcript
that the provocation came from Tomelden. In fact,
petitioner, being very much smaller in height and
heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight.
But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued,
suddenly ending when... petitioner's lucky punch
found its mark.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that
petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be
appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may
be presumed from the fact of the death of the
victim, this mitigating factor may still be...
considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant
Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being
very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to
parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able,
during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch... that
ended the fight.
A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the
challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner
was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden
died from that lucky punch, an eventuality that
could have possibly been averted... had he had
the financial means to get the proper medical
attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance
of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed" must also be appreciated in favor
of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide.
That... petitioner landed a lucky punch at
Tomelden's face while their co-workers were
trying to separate them is a compelling indicium
that he never intended so grave a wrong as to kill
the victim.
People vs. Benito
FACTS: Benito was a former employee of the
Civil Service Commission at its main office and
was assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative
Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to Nov.
1965 when he was suspended for
"DISHONESTY" After two months, he was
reinstated but was criminally charged for
QUALIFIED THEFT, MALVERSATION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION
OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively
charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating in his
dismissal from the Civil Service on February
1966. October 21, 1965 the victim Moncayo, as
an administrative officer, reported to the
Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito
admitted having malversed an amount between
P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination
fee stamps. At eleven o'clock in the morning of
December 12, 1969 Moncayo, allegedly made
upon seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil
Service Commission near the canteen:
"Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw."; or,
as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi ko alam
na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng
magnanakaw." At about 5:25 p.m. of that same
day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect shot the victim
eight (8) times on the head and different parts of
the body at closer range which consequently
caused the latter's death on the spot inside his
car. Benito contends that there’s mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense
since Moncayo insulted him when he remarked
that a thief was loitering in the premises of the
Civil Service Commission. NOTE: Benito was
later on acquitted of the crime that Moncayo
alleged he had committed.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. W/N the defamatory remark by the victim may
give rise to the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a wrong? NO.
OSG said that the defamatory remark was not
specifically directed at Benito. SC said that even
assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at
Benito, Benito "had more than sufficient time to
suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever
did resent it.” The six-hour interval between the
alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo
against Benito and the assassination was more
than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his
serenity. But instead of using that time to regain
his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating
Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally
ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the
victim had left the office. He acted with treachery
and evident premeditation in perpetrating the
cold-blooded murder. Also, SC said that the facts
of the case strongly suggest that what really
impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not
the latter's alleged defamatory remark but the
refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to
favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to
vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but
mainly to chastise Moncayo for having exposed
the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed
by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change
his report. Because according also to Benito’s
testimony, he saw Moncayo three hours later
after the remark or at two o'clock in the afternoon
and inquired from him about his case and
Moncayo said that he had already submitted his
report and he could not do anything more about
Benito's case
DISPOSITION: SC denied his petition.
Bacabac vs. People
Facts: Bacabac’s failure to assist the victims after
the shooting reinforces this Court’s appreciation
of community of design between him and his co-
accused to harm the victims. Following a heated
argument in a dance hall which resulted in a
brawl, Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), and Edzel
Talanquines (Edzel), herein referred to as
Talanquines brothers, proceeded to confront their
enemies armed with guns. They were
accompanied by Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin (Jesus). In the dance
hall, they encountered Hernani Quidato and
Eduardo Selibio. After a physical confrontation,
The Talanquines brothers shot Quidato and
Selibio. Quidato and Selibio later died from their
wounds. The Talanquines brothers, together with
Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and
Jesus Delfin was charged and found guilty of the
crime of Murder. Ricardo Bacabac (Bacabac)
appealed his conviction, contending that he
cannot be deemed to be in conspiracy with the
other accused because he was not the one who
pulled the trigger. He also alleged that even if he
was convicted of Murder, in gratis argumenti, the
correctness of the pronouncement of guilt should
have been attended by the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense, in the same manner as the other
accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is conspiracy among
Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and
Jesus Delfin in the murder of the victims.
HELD:
Bacabac‘s failure to assist the victims after the
shooting reinforces this Court’s appreciation of
community of design between him and his co-
accused to harm the victims. What is decisive in
treachery is that “the attack was executed in such
a manner as to make it impossible for the victim
to retaliate.” In the case at bar, petitioner, a
policeman, and his co-accused were armed with
two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The victim and
his companions were not armed. The attack was
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was
already kneeling in surrender when he was shot
the second time. Clearly, the victim and his
companion Eduardo had no chance to defend
themselves or retaliate. Conspiracy presupposes
the existence of evident premeditation does not
necessarily imply that the converse ─ that evident
premeditation presupposes the existence of a
conspiracy ─ is true. In any event, a link between
conspiracy and evident premeditation is
presumed only where the conspiracy is directly
established and not where conspiracy is only
implied, as in the present case.
US vs. Hicks
FACTS:
• For 5 years, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-
American, and his mistress Agustina Sola, a
Christian Moro woman, were illicitly living
together. However, Sola quitted living with Hicks.
• A few days later, she contracted a new
relationship with Corporal Wallace Current,
another negro, who then went to live with her in
the house of her brother-in-law.
• One evening, Hicks, with soldier Lloyd
Nickens, went to the said house. He shooked
hands and started conversing with Current. But,
Current told Hicks that Sola did not want to live
with Hicks anymore, which promted Hicks to pull
out his revolver and fired at Sola who was close
by in the sala. The bullet hit the left side of her
breast.
• Hicks gave himself up to the police even
before the police received the information of the
killing.
• He pleaded not guilty. His defense was
that when he fell backward when Current seized
him, his revolver wen off hitting the deceased.
The trial court convicted him with the crime of
murder with the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON Hicks can avail of himself of the
mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation when he killed Sola, his former
mistress? NO
RULING:
• The only causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control
are such which originate from legitimate feelings,
not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and
immoral passions.
• Likewise, the crime was committed with
the presence of treachery (alevosia), as Sola was
unexpectedly fired at close range while she was
unarmed and unprepared at a time she was just
listening to a conversation.
• The presence of other aggravating
circumstances, such as premeditation and the
fact that the crime was committed in the dwelling
of the deceased. Premeditation was proven when
Hicks asked a leave to be absent from work and
that he was carrying a loaded revolver when he
had lunch that day. It was also testified that Hicks
was heard that the time of Sola had come.
DISPOSITION: The decision of the trial court is
affirmed.
NOTES:
This should be compared with People v. Dela
Cruz, wherein the accused killed his querida
when he saw her sleeping with his acquaintance.
In the latter case, the SC held that there was the
mitigating circumstance of passion of
obfuscation. While in this case, the SC did not
grant the same mitigating circumstance.
US vs. Dela Cruz
People vs. Gelaver
Facts: Eduardo Gelaver was charged with
parricide for the killing of his wife Victoira by
multiple stab wounds at the latter’s residence.
Husband and wife were already living separately
at the time of the killing.
The accused interposes the exempting
circumstance embodied in Art. 247 of the RPC
(Death Under Exceptional Circumstances). He
claimed that he only knew her wife’s residence
when her daughter told him the night before that
she (the wife) was living in front of the church).
And so, he went there with the intention of
repairing the marriage only to find her wife having
sex with her paramour (the accused says that he
doesn’t know the paramour’s name) upon his
(Eduardo’s) arrival. And it was then that the
paramour took a knife from the headboard and
tried to stab Eduardo but Eduardo was able to
wrest the knife from the paramour. And when he
tried to stab the paramour, he was able to duck
whereby the stab wounds intended for the lover
fell on his wife. The paramour, the accused
claims, was able to get dressed and ran outside
the house to avoid his wrath.
Nevertheless, he was still found guilty by
the RTC of parricide.
Issue:
Should Eduardo be granted the
exceptional circumstance under Art. 247 of the
RPC?
Decision:
In order to appreciate Art. 247 of the
RPC, the accused must be able to prove that: 1)
he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise
having sex with a lover; 2) as a result of the rage,
the accused kills or inflicts physical injuries to the
spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused
never consented to the carnal acts done by the
spouse.
Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasn’t
able to establish the existence of the aforesaid
circumstances. His version of how things went
down were too full of inconsistencies. First off, he
stabbed his wife several times which is not
consistent with an accidental killing (because he
claimed he was aiming for the lover). Another was
that he claimed that the paramour was able to
GET DRESSED while under attack. And another
was that even his daughter testified that she did
not tell her father anything about her mother’s
residence or whereabouts as even she did not
know where her mother was staying.
So the guilty verdict is sustained.
People vs. Bello
Facts:
Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Guillermo was a 54 year old widower, and Alicia’s
senior by 30 years. Prior to Alicia’s employment
at Maring’s Place, the couple led a ‘blissful’ life.
Due to poverty, Alicia became an
entertainer/public hostess at the said bar, and
Guillermo used to watch her there everyday; very
much smitten by her beauty[1].
However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter
the Gumaca theater with a man, and surprised
the man caressing her inside the movie house.
Guillermo dragged her outside.

Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place
to ask Alicia for money, but the owner, Maring
(who was fantastically creative enough to name
the bar after him), told him to go home and to
leave Alicia alone because he was an old invalid.
He proceeded to walk home empty handed, but
upon passing Bonifacio Street, he came across
the Marasigan brothers who mocked him with the
above stated remark. The self-loathing Guillermo
proceeded to Paty’s place and downed give
glasses of Tuba.
By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned
to Maring’s Place and did then and there stab
Alicia several times. Realizing what he had done,
he ran to Gumarca and surrendered to the police
there. He was found guilty by the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City of murder attended by
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
alevosia, and abuse of confidence and
ungratefulness; The penalty for which is death;
thus the automatic review of the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the victim should be given the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of passion
or obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the
victim being merely a common-law marriage?
HELD:
Yes. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on
the part of the offender must arise from legitimate
and moral sentiments. Since common-law
marriages are considered unlawful in the
Philippines, Obfuscation, when relationship is
illegitimate, cannot be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance.
To answer this question, we must first
differentiate the circumstances of this case with
that of U.S. v Hicks. In the said case, the
common-law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her
relations with the American, and contracted new
relations with a certain corporal. Mr. Hicks shot
his ex-common-law-wife when she refused to go
home with him and resume their relationship.
Since they were not married, she was entitled to
do so. What she did – cruel as it may be – was
legal in the eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation
were not appreciated in such a case, since:
The common-law wife had a right to leave her
common-law husband, as they were not united in
holy matrimony. He had no right to compel her to
go with him. Remember that the first requirement
of passion or obfuscation is that there be an
unlawful act, sufficient to produce diminution of
self-control or the exercise of will power.
Returning now to the case at hand, what
Guillermo was asking from Alicia was that she (1)
quit her job as a hostess; an ill-reputed profession
corroborated by her promiscuous relations with
other men, and (2) resume her job as a hostess.
The Supreme Court held that Alicia’s flat out
refusal was an exhibition of immorality itself. A
monogamous illegitimate relationship is definitely
of higher standing than illicit relationship for the
sake of gain – or gainful promiscuity as the court
put it.
This, coupled with the cruel words against him
were enough to constitute passion and
obfuscation in the old soul. Thus, he is entitled to
a mitigating circumstance.
[1] It should be noted too that fortunately, the
couple did not have a child.
People vs. Amaguin
Facts:
Brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso Amaguin were
charged with the murder of the Oro brothers
Pacifico and Diosdado.
Hernando Oro testified that their eldest brother
Pacifico invited him and his brothers Diosdado
and Danilo, brother-in-law Rafael Candelaria,
and cousin Sergio Argonzo to Pacifico’s house for
a small gathering to celebrate the town’s fiesta.
When they were on their way home, they were
accompanied by Pacifico to the plaza to get a
ride. Celso called Pacifico, “Pare, come here.”
Pacifico replied, "Pare, not yet because I have to
conduct my guests first." Thereafter, Celso
immediately charged towards Pacifico with a
butcher knife. Gildo, Celso’s brother, shot Danilo
with a slingshot, and stabbed Diosdado with a
knife. Then the eldest brother Willie appeared
with a handgun and shot at Pacifico, Diosdado
and at the fleeing Danilo. Diosdado, kneeling and
begging for his life but Willie shot him dead.
Pacifico did not sustain a fatal gunshot but still
died from the stab wounds (15 stabs, 5 fatals).
Rafael managed to run and rode a taxi towards
the hospital.
It took both Willie and Gildo a week before turning
themselves in voluntarily to the police authorities,
while Celso is still at large and remains a fugitive
Issue: W/N the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender can be appreciated in favor
of the Willie and Gildo.
Ruling: Yes.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance, the following elements
must be present:
1. the offender has not been actually
arrested;
2. the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and
3. the surrender must be voluntary.
All these requisites appear to have attended their
surrender. While it may have taken both Willie
and Gildo a week before turning themselves in,
the fact is, they voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities before arrest could be effected.
No treachery was proved because even if a
frontal attack may still consist of treachery,
attacking a group of 6 man without any idea if they
were armed because they exposed themselves to
danger. Treachery is present when the offender
performed means tending directly and specially to
insure the execution of the crime without risk to
themselves arising from the defense which the
offended parties might make
Celso and Gildo was proved to have acted in
conspiracy because of the unity of their acts.
On the other hand Willie was prosecuted for his
individual acts only, which are:
1. Shooting Diosdado who was kneeling
begging for his life (Homicide)
2. Shooting Pacifico but not fatally
(frustrated homicide)
3. Both with abuse of superior strength,
which is an aggravating circumstance.
Willie was sentenced of:
1. Homicide - (6) years, (2) months and (1)
day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to
(14) years, (8) months and (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum
2. Frustrated Homicide - (6) months and
(20) days of prision correccional minimum as
minimum, to (8) years, (4) months and (10) days
of prision mayor as maximum,
3. to be served successively
4. already appreciating the aggravating
circumstance
5. Already appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender
• GIldo was sentenced of (2) separate
crimes of HOMICIDE
1. (6) years (2) months and (1) day of
prision mayor minimum as minimum, to (12)
years, (6) months and (10) days of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum, for each
homicide
2. to be served successively
3. Already appreciating mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender
People vs. Dela Cruz
Canta vs. People
Petitioner Exuperancio Canta was found guilty of
violating P.D. No. 533 or Anti-Cattle Rustling Law
of 1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven
(11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum for stealing a cow from Narciso
Gabriel. The facts are as follows:
Persecution’s contention:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister
Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon
its birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained
under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime.
Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody
of the animal to three persons in different
persons. Agapay, one of the caretakers, took the
cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in
Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his
hut. However, when he came back for it, he found
the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to
the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that
petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the
animal.
Two of the other caretakers went to recover the
animal from petitioner's wife, but they were
informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to
petitioner’s father. Thereafter, the two went to the
father of the petitioner’s house. On their way, they
met petitioner who told them that if Narciso was
the owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to
his father's house, where Maria recognized the
cow. As petitioner's father was not in the house,
petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call
them the next day so that they could talk the
matter over with his father. However, petitioner
never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel
reported the matter to the police of Malitbog,
Southern Leyte. 6 As a result, Narciso and
petitioner Exuperancio were called to an
investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow
but claimed that it was his and that it was lost
before. He presented two certificates of
ownership as evidence.
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership
signed by the municipal treasurer describing the
cow as a two-year old female. On the reverse
side of the illustrates the physical features of the
cow. All four caretakers of the cow identified the
cow as the same one they had taken care of,
based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex and
its color.
Petitioner’s defense:
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired
the animal under an agreement which he had with
Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take
care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in
consideration for which petitioner would get a calf
if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner
claimed that the cow in question was his share
and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This
cow, however, was lost on December 2, 1985.
Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police.
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle
Meno told him that he had seen the cow under
the care of Gardenio Agapay. Thereafter, he went
to Agapay’s place to see whether the cow would
suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner
took it with him and brought it, together with the
mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta.
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle, and a statement executed by
Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurer's office, to
the effect that he issued a Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of
petitioner Exuperancio Canta.
Trial Court Ruling:
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was,
however, denied by the municipal treasurer who
stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the
municipality. On the other hand, Telen testified
that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but,
at the instance of petitioner, Telen antedated it to
February 27, 1985.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court ruled in
favor of Narciso, and that Canta stole the cow.
They further ruled that the theft was done with
strategy and stealth considering that it was made
at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his
shelter-hut forty (40) meters away.
The CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
The defense contends that the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal
intent in taking the disputed cow. Petitioner
further claims good faith and honest belief in
taking the cow.
Issue: W/N Canta is guilty for violation of PD 533.
Ruling: Yes.
P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as . . .
the taking away by any means, methods or
scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser,
of any of the abovementioned animals whether or
not for profit or gain, or whether committed with
or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements
concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done without the
consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by
any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is
with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is
accomplished with or without violence or
intimidation against person or force upon things.
These requisites are present in this case. First,
there is no question that the cow belongs to
Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that
in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in
the honest belief that it was the cow which he had
lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of
the owner, took the cow from the custody of the
caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that
he knew all along that the latter was holding the
animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner
falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the
taking to make it appear that he owned the cow
in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted "means,
methods, or schemes" to deprive Narciso of his
possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent
to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things attended the
commission of the crime.
HOWEVER, the decision of the Court of Appeals
should be modified in two respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous
to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of
voluntary surrender has the following elements:
(1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(2) the offender surrenders to a person in
authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the
surrender is voluntary.
(Circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender)
In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta
had not actually been arrested. In fact, no
complaint had yet been filed against him when he
surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has
been repeatedly held that for surrender to be
voluntary, there must be an intent to submit
oneself unconditionally to the authorities,
showing an intention to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that his search and capture
would require. 27 In petitioner's case, he
voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of
Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the
custody of the authorities and thus saved them
the trouble of having to recover the cow from him.
This circumstance can be considered analogous
to voluntary surrender and should be considered
in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner
guilty of violation of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law
of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty
of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
The trial court apparently considered P. D. No.
533 as a special law and applied §1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that
"if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same."
However, P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The
penalty for its violation is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties prescribed
in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that
the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense
of theft of large cattle.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no
aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case
should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to
Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty,
the minimum of which is within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium,
and the maximum of which is prision mayor in its
maximum period