1
ART. 45 CAUSES FOR ANNULMENT
[G.R. No. L-3561. May 23, 1951.]
CESAR REYES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. AGRIPINO ZABALLERO, ET AL., Respondents-
Appellees.
Jesus G. Barrera for Petitioner.
Teodoro Zaballero and Exequiel Zaballero, Jr. for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. OBLIGATIONS; DURESS OR INTIMIDATION, WHAT CONSTITUTES. — According to the
Civil Code, there is duress or intimidation when one of the contracting parties is inspired
by a rational and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his
person or property, or to the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants.
2. ID.; CREDITOR ACCEPTING GRUDGINGLY OR RELUCTANTLY; PRESUMPTION OF
VOLUNTARINESS OF ONE’S ACTS. — Mere reluctance does not detract from the
voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a distinction between a case where a person gives his
consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in
reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against
his will under a pressure which he cannot resist.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
During the Japanese occupation the creditor of a prewar debt reluctantly received
Japanese military notes tendered in full payment of his credit. After liberation he sued for
recovery of the debt, contending that his acceptance of the money was invalidated by
duress. This is that suit, coming from the Court of Appeals wherein the payment was held
valid and the debt fully discharged.
The creditor-appellant has submitted a brief vigorously ascribing error to the court’s
holding: (1) that the facts and circumstances of the case are not sufficient to constitute the
duress that would invalidate the payment made by the debtor and (2) that the discharge
in full with Japanese military notes of the pre-war obligation calling for payments in ten
yearly installments in Philippine money or its equivalent in U. S. currency, at the option of
the creditor, was properly made.
The case is adequately related by the Court of Appeals as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable
in advance, made by the plaintiff-appellee, Dr. Cesar Reyes, to the defendants-appellants
Zaballero on October 1, 1942. The defendants-appellants secured the payment with a first
mortgage on 10 parcels of land, situated in the municipality of Lucena, Quezon Province,
more particularly described in the Deed of Mortgage Exhibit A, appearing on pages 6-16
in the Record of Appeals. Paragraph 2 of said Deed of Mortgage is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘2. Los deudores hipotecarios se obligan a pagar el capital dentro del termino de diez (10)
años contados desde esta fecha, mediante amortizaciones anuales de SEISCIENTOS
CINCUENTA PESOS (P650) en moneda filipina o su equivalente en moneda de los EE. UU.
de America a opcion del acreedor hipotecario, y satisfacer los intereses convenidos . . . .’
"The installments due for 1942 and 1943, totalling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were
paid in Japanese Military Scrip and the payments were unreservedly accepted. On
November 30, 1944, defendant- appellant Exequiel Zaballero offered to pay the third
installments and its interest which fell due in October of the same year; but plaintiff-
appellee refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and unjust that the payment
be made in Japanese military notes which had considerably devaluated, and that he had
an option according to the contract to have the payment made in Philippine or United
States currency. After some discussion, and as plaintiff-appellee remained adamant in hie
refusal, Defendant-Appellant Exequiel Zaballero announced that the next day, December 1,
1944 he would tender the whole balance of P5,812; which he did by way of complete
satisfaction of the entire indebtedness. Plaintiff-appellee, acting upon advice given by his
attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for guidance in his plight, received the
money and executed on December 1, 1944, the notarial deed of release of the real estate
mortgage (Exh. B, Rec. App., pp. 16-19) which was registered in the following day at the
office of the Register of Deeds. On the same day, December 1, 1944, that he received
payment, the mortgagee, now plaintiff-appellee, executed an affidavit in secret, without
defendants’ knowledge, before Notary Public Alfredo Bonus (who also ratified the deed of
release) stating that he had accepted under protest and "obligado por las circunstancias
actuales", the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of P612, and that he had
deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors in the Philippine National Bank in Lucena,
as trustee for the said amount. It is uncontroverted that the deposit was made in a special
account which remains untouched to this day."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the point of duress that Court makes the finding,

"The Lower Court also found that the plaintiff-appellee accepted the payment tendered by
defendants-appellants because of the menacing attitude of the latter. This finding is not
sustained by the preponderance of evidence and there is no proof that the plaintiff creditor
was threatened into accepting the payment, except the latter’s own testimony that the
debtor told him that he ought to know that the Japanese disliked non-acceptance of their
money.
"This averment, however, was denied by the appellant Exequiel Zaballero, who made the
payment, and it is significant that in his affidavit of protest (Exh. C) the appellee creditor
made no mention whatever of any threat on the part of the defendant, merely stating that
he was ’obligado por las circunstancias actuales’ . . . .
"The testimony of the Notary fails to show that any threat had been made to secure the
assent of the appellee. That duress was required is indeed questionable, since the debtor
could have judicially consigned the money if the creditor persisted in refusing it. In other
words, the appellee decided to accept the payment reluctantly but voluntarily, in the
expectation that he could adopt nullifying measures that would preserve his rights and
not because of any undue influence exercised by another person . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The appellate court declared, in short, that Cesar Reyes received the money on December
1, 1944 without any duress, without any protest, albeit reluctantly, executed the notarial
document of release of the mortgage and immediately thereafter: (a) swore to an affidavit,
in secret, without the debtors’ knowledge, declaring that "compelled by the present
circumstances" he had accepted the payment under protest, and (b) deposited the amount
in the Philippine National Bank in a special account, as trustee.
Under the facts above related we do not see how the payment may be invalidated on the
ground of duress. The finding of the Court of Appeals on such factual issue is final. And
from the facts declared by it we cannot, as a question of law, conclude that there was
duress.
According to the Civil Code, there is duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well- grounded fear of suffering an imminent and
serious injury to his person or property, or to the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants. (Art. 1267, Civil Code.)
Describing how or why he was afraid to reject the tendered payment, appellant testified
that after he had declined to receive payment, "the debtors told him that he ought to know
that the Japanese disliked non-acceptance of their money" and that, as he remained
adamant, the appellees induced Attorney Bonus to counsel appellant to accept the
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payment reminding him of "antecedents" — other cases that had reached the Provincial
Fiscal’s office of persons who refused to accept the Japanese military notes.
However the Court of Appeals discredited appellant’s testimony on the first point. And as
to the alleged advice by Attorney Bonus the Court of Appeals said nothing about it, and we
are not free to look into the record to uncover new facts contradicting those found by the
appellate court.
Appellant’s statement in the affidavit that he received the money "obligado por las
circunstancias actuales" besides being self-serving and not binding upon the adverse
party, is too indefinite to justify a finding of duress, for it may refer to the circumstance
that Japanese "fiat" money was then the current money and that payments of debts were
then being made with it despite its very depreciated valuation.
As it is, the important thing is that the creditor, Cesar Reyes received the money, and
executed the release. What he did afterwards without the knowledge or consent of the
debtors is entirely of no consequence. For that matter, he could have burned the Japanese
notes, or thrown them into the sea, without in the least obliterating the legal effect of his
receipt of the money.
Had the creditor interposed a downright refusal, the debtors could have made a valid
consignment of the money and thus get a discharge. The creditor should not therefore, by
means of the secret protest do indirectly what he could not do directly. At this juncture we
are confronted with appellant’s argument that the consignation could not discharge the
whole indebtedness, especially in so far as the installments not yet due, because the debtor
had no right to accelerate payment. There is indeed something to that contention. The
creditor was entitled to interest upon the other annual installments and yet the Usury Law
prohibits collection of interest in advance for more than one year. 1 However that issue
not having been raised in the lower court, the debtors had no opportunity to prove that
the term had been established for their exclusive benefit. Anyway the equitable
consideration should not be overlooked that if the creditor had rejected the money, it
could have been utilized by the debtors for other valuable or useful purposes. The money
kept by the creditor is now utterly valueless.
We have to admit that the creditor accepted the money grudgingly or reluctantly. But this
court has already ruled that mere reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of
one’s acts.
"There must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a person gives his
consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in
reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against
his will under a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and

independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when
he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely
when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity
with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law . . ." (Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil.,
789.)
Concurring with the Court of Appeals, as we must, on the finding that the payment was
voluntarily accepted, we deem it unnecessary to go into the alleged option of the creditor
to select United States currency, because such voluntary acceptance was in effect a waiver
of the option. Besides, our recent ruling in Tambunting de Legarda v. Desbarats Miailhe,
etc., (88 Phil., 637) sufficiently answers appellant’s argument premised on such option.
The appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
109 Phil 273
FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage
with Remedios Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow
the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. He also claimed that the condition
of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. The wife was
summoned and served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file an answer. The
court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. Defendant did
not submit herself to the examination and the court entered a decree annulling the
marriage. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds that
the defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that
she had not been physically examined because she refused to be examined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage
in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and
seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference
on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
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evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy,
bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with
any offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
“Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption
is in favor of potency.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.
Ruling: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
ART. 48 DUTY OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY RE: AVOIDANCE OF COLLUSION
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
FACTS:
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due
to the series of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited
drugs, cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child
support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank debts without the
respondent consent, respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the
ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation.
Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his evidence.
Counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding the
custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.
Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The trial court
denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered
a prosecuting officer to intervene.
RULING:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional
cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another
remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which
had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code
which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the
prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor upon
the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when
he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-
appearance.
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action
alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal
clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and
not by collusion.
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The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed
between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed
or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
ART. 58 COOLING OFF PERIOD
Pacete vs Carriaga Jr.
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion,
as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of
property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979.
Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding,
particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by
the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which
the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings
held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and
Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not

collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under
Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off”
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored
by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no
defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
ART. 63 EFFECTS OF LEGAL SEPARATION
ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
G.R. No. L-18008 | 1962-10-30
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No.
433) a petition which reads:
1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years
prior to the date of the filing of this petition;
2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married
Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on
January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs.
Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from
her; that the said partial decision is now final;
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3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from
Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now.
4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she
be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to
wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had,
she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same
violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not
sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article
372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from
her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal
separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for
change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to
allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.
The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife
should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all
concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name
from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal,
her maiden name, giving as reason or cause therefor her being legally separated from the
husband Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to live together for
many years.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But
from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied
upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her
husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the
least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the
specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women
legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the
fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our
opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to
hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions
of Article 372.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the
petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes
upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been
adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is
hereby set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered
ART. 68 OBLIGATIONS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
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POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789 and G.R. No. 139808 | 2000-05-12
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,1 or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.2
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of
his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge
awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.4 It is issued when
one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over
another person.5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio6 is to reverse the decision7 of the Court of Appeals and
its resolution8 dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio9 is to annul that portion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband
and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in
Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55);
Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and
Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead
of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potenciano's health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to
the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio
did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents11 refused
petitioner's demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City.
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After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner's manifestation,
respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of
Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorio's
staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio's
wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors
thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof;
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein
petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,13 or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary.14 It is devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom.15
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.16
 8

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.17 [The illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.18
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition
for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not
consistent with the finding of subject's sanity.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact
that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same
shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
his liberty. visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.

The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the
administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman's free choice.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was
of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of
the court.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No
costs.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case,
the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court
which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not
be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of
his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional
right.

ARTICLE 70: SUPPORT FROM IN-LAWS
ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
G.R. No. L-4089 | 1909-01-12
EN BANC
DECISION
TORRES, J.:
On the 23d of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician-residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th
of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants,
situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore,
and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escano, it was found necessary, on
account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was
performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the after birth, in which service he was
occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the
patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him
was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason there for;
that for said reason he prayed that judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief
that might be deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegations therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that,
if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay there
was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the
defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
9
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer,
directing the defendants, on the 23d of January, 1907, to amend their answer. In
compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended
answer, denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and
requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court
below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former
complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against
the defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in
addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law; the
motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the
declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded he professional
services of the plaintiff he eliminated therefrom, for the reason that, according to the
evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied, and to the decision the
defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact acknowledged by the defendants, that the plaintiff, by virtue
of having been sent for by the former, attended as physician and rendered professional
services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious
childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his
fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and
mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code
or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts
have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with
their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.).
If every obligation consists in giving, doing, or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when
either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is
under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order
that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is
jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses,
including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability
originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established
between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay
the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-
in-law of the defendants during her childbirth is the husband of the patient and not her
father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it w as not the husband
who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment
of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger to which the life
of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was
urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife with the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by
the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the
plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against
the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in
such an emergency.
From the foregoing it, may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an
action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff
and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly,
because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house.
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal
provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into
between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of
Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support
10
wherein a person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established
the rule that the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but
as the liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be upheld.
(Decision of May 11 1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the
furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the
other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the
plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to
pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the
judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the
defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical
operation.
Therefore, in view of the considerations hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
ARTICLE 87: PROHIBITION ON DONATION
CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-28771 | 1971-03-31
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to
decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to
the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living
maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was
void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made
at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's stand. Hence
this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet
the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v.
Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that

year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion
reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully
the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff's
complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically
raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that
defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was
made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts
which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective
counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the
property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter
vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the
donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the
common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now
deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That
the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff
claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the
deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon'" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned
out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made
between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix
Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became
spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
11
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; 'porque no se engañen despojandose
el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur' of the
Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection
for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger
that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out
by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.' So long
as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any
other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the
Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot
be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such
irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with
benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is
ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the
spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission
may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied
by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que
informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus
disposiciones.'' 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his

widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint
with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff
and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is
remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
ARTICLE 94: OBLIGATIONS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. vs Court of Appeals (1998)
G.R. No. 118305 | 1998-02-12
Subject
Liability of Conjugal Partnership for Debts of One Spouse
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3 Million credit line loan from Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation. As added security, Alfredo Ching, Executive
Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM's indebtedness.
When PBM defaulted on the loan, Ayala filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
Alfredo Ching. The court declared PBM and Alfrdo Ching jointly and severally liable to
Ayala. Pending appeal, Ayala obtained a writ of execution upon posting the requisite bond.
The Sheriff then served upon the Spouses Ching a notice of sheriff sale on three of their
conjugal properties. The spouses Ching applied for injunction to enjoin the auction sale
alleging that the conjugal partnership cannot be made answerable since the loan did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The trial (injunction) court granted the TRO to stop the auction sale. However, the Court
of Appeals enjoined the TRO of the trial court, thus, allowing the auction sale to take place.
Ayala, as the only bidder, obtained the conjugal properties.
Meanwhile, the trial (injunction) court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on
execution null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision that the conjugal
partnership was not liable for the debts of PBM.
12
Hence, this petition. Petitioners aver that for the conjugal partnership to be held liable, all
that is required is that the transaction should be one which normally would produce
benefit to the partnership, regardless of whether or not actual benefit accrued.
Held:
Liability of Conjugal Partnership for Debts of One Spouse
1. The Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses must
be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited.
2. We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms
"redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of"
on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and
Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the
benefit of." On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment
of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family." As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
3. The rules may be summarized as follows:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received
the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to
the conjugal partnership.
 13

4. Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Signing
as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. Signing as a surety is
not embarking in a business.

5. Ayala should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's acting as surety
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The debt is clearly a corporate debt
and Ayala’s right of recourse against the husband as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
family.

Benefit contemplated under the law

6. In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we underscored

the requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . . . of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that such
obligations are productive of some benefit to the family."

7. The husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from PBM only because said husband
is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the 'benefits'
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The 'benefits' contemplated by
the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived directly from the use of
the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM
itself, not by the husband or his family. The alleged benefit, if any, continuously harped by
respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.