Week 3 quiz answers

1. Resolve whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly
revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March
26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
Answer:

the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix,
expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.
In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in
that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620,
promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba"
on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the
property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had
ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being
an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular
case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not
necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in
the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also
that

it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only
cause for the execution of Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618
and L-5620).

If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor
was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be
concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.

True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property
"even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed
out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract" can not
be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a
testator's subsequent alienation were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at
the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the same thing
could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on account of physical or
mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one made
through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real intent,3
and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the
anterior bequest.

2. Petitioner contends (1) that the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his
criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will;
Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of judgments.

SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. — The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special
proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or
Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows.

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or
the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person Provided, That the probate of
a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate
will. It says.

SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass either the
real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive
as to its due execution. (Emphasis ours.)

(In Manahan vs. Manahan 58 Phil., 448, 451), we held:

. . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be
impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding. Sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure; Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs.
Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393;
Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil, 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil.,
105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Jocsoy vs. Vano, 8
Phil., 119.

In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said.

The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive
as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. (Emphasis ours.)

As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure aforequoted, was taken
almost bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State relative to
the effect of the probate of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction. The Vermont statute as
to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will reads as follows.
SEC. 2356. No will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the
probate court, or by appeal in the county or supreme court; and the probate of a will of real or personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (Vermont Statutes, p. 451.)

Said the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Missionary Society vs. Eells (68 Vt., 497, 504): "The
probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as
to its due execution against the whole world. (Vt. St., sec. 2336; Fosters Exrs. vs. Dickerson, 64 Vt., 233.)"

The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by Publication as
a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is
granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. This court held in
the case of Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil., 938):

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.

Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all
such persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after said
proceeding is binding against the whole world.

In Everrett vs. Wing (103 Vt., 488, 492), the Supreme Court of Vermont held.

In this State the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem being in form and substance upon the will itself
to determine its validity. The judgment determines the status of the instrument, whether it is or is not
the will of the testator. When the proper steps required by law have been taken the judgment is binding
upon everybody, and makes the instrument as to all the world just what the judgment declares it to be.
(Woodruff vs. Taylor, 20 Vt., 65, 73; Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713, 715; Missionary Society vs. Eells, 68
Vt., 497, 504; 35 Atl., 463.) The proceedings before the probate court are statutory and are not
governed by common law rules as to parties or causes of action. (Holdrige vs. Holdriges Estate, 53 Vt.,
546, 550; Purdy vs. Estate of Purdy, 67 Vt. 50, 55; 30 Atl., 695.) No process is issued against anyone in
such proceedings, but all persons interested in determining the state or conditions of the instrument are
constructively notified by the publication of notice as required by G. L. 3219. (Woodruff vs. Taylor,
supra; In re Warners Estate 98 Vt., 254; 271; 127 Atl., 362.)

Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an incontrovertible presumption in
favor of judgments declared by it to be conclusive.

SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. — The following presumptions or deductions, which the law
expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive.

3. petitioner moved to strike out the oppositors' pleadings on two grounds, namely:

1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the
probate of the last will and testament of the testators; and
2. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid
testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.

- It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua,
et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)
-
- The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the
court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention
in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)
-
- Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the order appealed from is interlocutory. We deferred action on the motion
until after the brief of both parties had been filed. The motion, although now practically
academic in view of our resolution of the main issue involved, must be denied, since the order
of the lower court striking out appellants' opposition to the probate of the will on the ground
that they have no personality to intervene in the case, was final and therefore appealable order
insofar as they were concerned.

4. In Balanay v. Martinez, resolve whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality,
and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have
been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). 1äwphï1.ñët

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order
of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation
of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where
some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can
be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to
law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143,
Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is
contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code

5. The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and make the
order in question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides the testator
neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after
notice by the course so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a
warrant issued by the court and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.udge
of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and make the order in
question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides the testator neglects
without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by
the course so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued
by the court and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.

It is our opinion that this provision can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where administration
proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require
that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by
the court under this section appropriate.

The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, is an ordinary
criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is a special statutory offense and is
properly prosecuted upon complaint or information as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact
that this penal provision is contained in the Code of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to
enforce the penalty a civil proceeding in any sense. The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code
of Procedure is evidently a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section
628; and it is in our opinion not permissible in a prosecution under the last mentioned section to
superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment
prescribed in section 629.

I may further be observed that one grace difficulty in applying the remedy provided in section 629 in a
prosecution under section 628 is that to enforce the production of the will b the accused at such trial
would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be
conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint; and it seems probable
that this would constitute an infringement of that provision of law which says that in a criminal action
the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself. (See Gen. Orders No. 58, sec. 15.)

From what has been said it follows that the order of commitment made by the lower court remanding
the accused to jail should be vacated and if subsidiary imprisonment should be imposed for insolvency
the defendant shall, under the provisions of Act No. 2557, be credited with the time during which he
was confined in pursuance of the order of the lower court, With this modification the judgment of the
court below should be affirmed with costs against the appellant.

6. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, xx take the stand that the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk
of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the
case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became
vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could,
motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules
of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is delivered
to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix
a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof,
and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous
to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate
in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any
abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.

7 The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging,
the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because
the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. Was the
oppositor correct?

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does
not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes
when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will
of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so
far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with
the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid
the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in
excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to
intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.