People v Gacott
Respondent judge questions the competence of the
Second Division of this Court to administratively
discipline him. Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does
not create a constitutional issue as to require the referral
of this case, or at least the disciplinary aspect thereof, to
the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter merely
involves a clarification of the misconception of
respondent judge thereon, presumably because of his
unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this
Court, some of them being on internal procedure. Be that
as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware
of the submissions of respondent judge on this point
through the copies of the motions which he furnished
them, and he insistently harps on constitutional grounds
therein, the Court en banc resolved to accept this aspect
of the case from the Second Division.
Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his
order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a
quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of
P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent
Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for
reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental
motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995. The
error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the
case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2
and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish
the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed
more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming
that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D.
No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere
perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately
apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2
was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1
Issue:
Whether en banc should be the one disciplining him
Ruling:
The motion for reconsideration is denied. retired Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion pointed out the equivalent
provision in the 1973 Constitution, hereinbefore quoted,
which merely referred to the "Court," without
qualification. It was accordingly explained and agreed
that insofar as the power to discipline is concerned, the
qualification was not intended to make a difference, as a
reference to the Court by itself necessarily means the
Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc"
there because all internal procedural and administrative
matters, as well as ceremonial functions, are always
decided by or conducted in the Court en banc.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of
Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two
situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a
declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and
the determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein
intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should
be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would
result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation
contemplated therein and is intentionally separated
from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand
that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative
case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full
Court itself.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon
and participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in
the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the
penalty of reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional
injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters
pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, and
the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en
banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members
PEOPLE VS FREDIE LIZADA
FACTS: In August 1998, the petitioner did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
violence and intimidation Analia Orillosa, his
stepdaughter, by embracing, kissing, and touching her
private parts. He then proceeded with carnal knowedge
to remove her skirt and panty and placed himself on top
of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. This
allegation was repeated four times in a different
occasions.
However, medical examination revealed that Analia’s
hymen was intact, and the other parts of her vagina was
not injured due to an insertion of average-sized adult
Filipino male organ in full erection.
The testimony of Rossel, Analia’s sister, also proved that
no insertion of penis happened because the petitioner
stopped after he saw her.
Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of
qualified rape under four separate information. RTC
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged against him and sentenced to Death Penalty in
each and every case as provided for in the seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, petitioner averred in his brief that the as useful references and even as precedents in the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable resolution of future controversies.
doubt and that the testimony of Rossel was not taken In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the
into consideration in the decision requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the
contends that the decision of the trial court is null and testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of
void as it failed to comply with the requirements of accused-appellant on direct and cross examinations and
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of
Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the
amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty
of facts in its decision. The trial court merely summarized of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death,
the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and on each count.
those of accused-appellant and his witnesses, and
forthwith set forth the decretal portion of said decision. MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
The trial court even failed to state in said decision the FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
penalty of death on him.
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
adduce the requisite quantum of evidence that he raped
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
the private complainant precisely on September 15,
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal
1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical
interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it
findings of Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen of the
that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
private complainant was intact and its orifice so small as
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
to preclude complete penetration by an average size
taxpayer and as a lawyer.
adult Filipino male organ in full erection without
He posits that 19 and 25 (particularly)
producing any genital injury.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of
SUPREME COURT: The purpose of the provision is to
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
inform the parties and the person reading the decision
on how it was reached by the court after consideration
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No.
of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of
9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the
the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the
Constitution, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a
reading of the decision of the trial court that they were
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
responsible judge.15 More substantial reasons for the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
requirement are:
(Emphasis supplied)
For one thing, the losing party must be given an
opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted,
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional
he may elevate what he may consider its errors for
Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise,
review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No.
party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict
9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC
in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a
which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control
useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full
of either the executive or legislative departments of
exposition of the facts and the law on which they are
government; that only the COMELEC itself can
based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court,
promulgate rules and regulations which may be
will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve
changed or revised only by the majority of its members;
and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC
violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to
review the same via the petition of any interested party,
including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC
submitted its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner
that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent
COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said
Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
providing for the independence of the constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its
power to formulate rules and regulations has been
upheld in Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr. 42 where this Court
held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules
and regulations is implicit in its power to implement
regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C 43 of the
Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting
that as an independent constitutional body, it may not
be subject to interference by any government
instrumentality and that only this Court may review
COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of
discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision,
vis-à-vis its rule-making power, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. —
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall
authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3)
countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following
conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed
and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established
identification system that would preclude multiple or
proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed
ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign
service establishments concerned are adequate and
well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be
allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1,
Article IX-A mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory
statement that the constitutional challenge must fail
and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25
are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that
there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on
Legislative Department that would as much as imply
that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and
administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the
principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and
expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally
enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its
authority to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19,
25 and portions of Section 17.1 are unconstitutional.
Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question
raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on
the role of Congress through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis-à-vis the independence
of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. — A
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby
created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators
designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman
of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven
(7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and
the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have
the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation
of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate
Rules. — The Commission shall issue the necessary rules
and regulations to effectively implement the provisions
of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall
be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is
no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor
and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is
geared towards possible amendments or revision of the
law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its
legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation
functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following
functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR)
promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and
(b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1],
the voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May 2004 elections and in any country determined
by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the
Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC shall be
"independent."cralaw virtua1aw library
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution
providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC,
the Court has held that" [w]hatever may be the nature
of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the
fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to
be independent from the other departments of the
Government." 44 In an earlier case, the Court
elucidated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It
is intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions,
it should not be hampered with restrictions that would
be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this
court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created — free, orderly and honest elections. We may
not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a
practical matter, and political questions must be dealt
with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure
theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its
fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex
political questions. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has no general powers of supervision over
COMELEC which is an independent body “except those
specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings. 46 In the same
vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election
laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of
the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its
rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has
empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules
and regulations to effectively implement the provisions
of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this
Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure
in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law –
the legislature grants an administrative agency the
authority to craft the rules and regulations
implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of
the administrative expertise of that agency in its
particular field of operation. 47 Once a law is enacted
and approved, the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The legislative function
may spring back to Congress relative to the same law
only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and
revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review,
revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of
its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with
no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section
19 stating that" [t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of
the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that" [i]t
shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions,
arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested
by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the
subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first
sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the
Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more
than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and
the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the
second paragraph of the same section are
unconstitutional as they require review and approval of
voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections.
Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to
approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by
mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC
pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1
of R.A. No. 9189. 48 Otherwise, Congress would
overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court
agreed to adopt the separate opinion of Justice Reynato
S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the
unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A.
No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and
the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The
following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID
for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph
of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: “only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;”
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section
19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and Regulations
shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval;" and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of
Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission" of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the
Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the
power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for President and Vice-President which is
lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
SECRETARY GLORIA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Title : HON. R. GLORIA VS COURT OF
APPEALS
Citation : G.R. No. 131012
April 21, 1999
Ponente : MENDOZA, J
Facts : reassignment in question is definitely violative of the
Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools
Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon
recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria,
Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the
Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to
fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory
injuction enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of
Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the
case is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.
Issues : preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the
presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is
violative of his security of tenure.
Held : those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez,
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the
simple reason that the petition is directed against
petitioners and not against the President. The
questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the
President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be
questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the
finding of the respondent court that the reassignment
of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The
same can be inferred from the Memorandum of
Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the
effect that the reassignment of private respondent will
"best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education." It can
thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than
temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert
in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said
Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a
permanent replacement is found as no period is
specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on
the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent
with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in
Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and
constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service.
The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports
vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs.
COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of
personnel is permissible even without the employee’s
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a
lure him away from his permanent position, or designed
to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent
the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of
31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private
respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of
tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST
cannot be countenanced.
LIPINID VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This
is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.
The Facts:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the
Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal
Supervisor at the Manila International Container
Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was
protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent
Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier
representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on
May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the
Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He
contended that he should be designated terminal
supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view
of his preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case,
the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It is thus
obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79)
have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and
Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that
Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be
appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice
protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo
respectively who may be considered for appointment to
any position commensurate and suitable to their
qualifications, and that the Commission be notified
within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
Decision:
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of
Appeals,[2] this Court said:
The only function of
the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature,
according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil ServiceLaw, and
when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other
legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has
no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Luego finally points out that the
recognition by the Commission that both the appointee
and the protestant are qualified for the position in
controversy renders it functus officio in the case and
prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm
the validity of the former's appointment; it has no
authority to revoke the appointment simply because it
considers another employee to be better qualified for
that would constitute an encroachment on the
discretion vested in the appointing authority.
The determination of who among several
candidates for a vacant position has the
best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of
the Department Head or appointing authority and
not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job
in an office calls for both formal and informal
qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age,
number of academic units in a certain course,
seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are
such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit,
courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the
future, and best interests of the service. Given the
demands of a certain job, who can do it best should
be left to the Head of the Office concerned provided
the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.
The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Head of Office in this
regard
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this
Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment
may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the
selection itself of the appointee - taking into account
the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract
qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative
of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed
only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a
political question that the Civil Service Commission has
no power to review under the Constitution and the
applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
of the respondent Civil ServiceCommission dated
February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and
October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990,
is made PERMANENT. No costs.
BAYTAN VS COMELEC
23. Baytan vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003
FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan
and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the
May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected
Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone
II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No.
83-A of Barangay 18.
requires that all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the
COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration
shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows that
the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in
division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en
banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
powers.

Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the
jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners
proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and
registered anew.
Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former
COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson
requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous
registration.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution to prosecute cases of violations
of election laws. The prosecution of election law
violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs
administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can
directly approve the recommendation of its Law
Department to file the criminal information for double
registration against petitioners in the instant case. There
is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the
criminal information be first decided by any of the
divisions of the COMELEC.

In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of

Petitioners’ Voters Registration Records were forwarded
to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V.
Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, subsequently,
recommended filing an information for double
registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed
Ravanzo’s resolution. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en
banc.
the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in administrative
cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is
determining whether probable cause exists to charge
petitioners for violation of the provision of the Election
Code prohibiting double registration.

ISSUE:
1. WON COMELEC acted with GAD when it
recommended the prosecution of the
petitioners despite lack of intent and substantial
compliance with cancellation of double
registration?
2. WON COMELEC has to refer this case to its
divisions first?

HELD: No on both counts.

Double Registration is malum prohibitum, lack of intent

is inconsequential. They also just sent their letter after
the election officer had already reported their act.
Petitioners’ defenses of good faith and substantial
compliance are best used for the trial proper and not the
preliminary investigation.

The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is

subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly