MIRASOL VS.
DPWH, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional Law – Police
Power)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an
administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the
toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for
failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of
motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the
toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and
that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and
traffic considerations.
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the
use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.
HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is
subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the
state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation.
It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose
unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures
designed to ensure public safety.
MIRASOL V. DPWH - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
MIRASOL V. DPWH G.R. No. 158793 June
8, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory
judgment with application for temporary restraining order and
injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Act 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act)
which was enacted in 1957.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH
issued on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the
Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access
facilities.
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001
wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
aforesaid administrative issuances.
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road)
toll Expressway under DO 215.
RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for
preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash
bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied.
DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with
engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited
access facilities (toll ways).
Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the
petitioners and respondents were required to file their
Memoranda.
The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring
invalid DO 123.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
ISSUE:
Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?
Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA
2000.
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the
RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the
petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on
the issues.
The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits
of the case that would trigger res judicata.
A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination
of the issues, it being a provisional remedy.
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s
rules and regulation issued under them unduly expanded the
power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts
like redesigning curbings or central dividing sections.
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical
structure of toll ways and not to determine “who or what can be
qualifies as toll ways user”.
The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the
DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as
limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer
and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative
to transportation, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot
derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing
limited access facilities.
The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does
not possess in the first place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then
Department of Public Works and Communications had issued
AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of
Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and
the eventual devolution of its powers to the DOTC.
Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of
law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and
constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality
rested on the party assailing it, more so when police power was
at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The
Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose
unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to
use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and
the uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access
facilities.
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle
in traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to access the
tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in
which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using
the tollway, was a subject that could validly be limited by
regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary,
this privilege was heavily regulated.