Abadilla vs.

Tabiliran
AM No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995

FACTS:

 Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.
 With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela.

 Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on
deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla
be registered as “legitimate” by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed
registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew
these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.

 The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966
when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However,
as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and
1975).

ISSUE: WON the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

HELD:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they were
born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity
of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.
 RENATO LAZATIN vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS,

FACTS:
ISSUE:

W/N Renato has established his status as an adopted child?

HELD:

CERVANTES v. FAJARDO
 BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while
on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in
the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor
of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for
the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee,
while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal
or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include
the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of
the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s
sole remaining beneficiary.

ORIBELLO v. CA

FACTS:

 Toribio was twice married. His first wife was Emilia. On September 10, 1981, Toribio's marriage
to Emilia was dissolved pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California, County of
Sacramento, U.S.A.
 On March 10, 1982, Toribio married appellee before the municipal mayor of Agoo, La Union. He
died intestate on August 18, 1993.
 Instituted on May 27, 1997 by Rcmedios Oribello xxx, represented by her natural father Alfredo
Selga xxx, against appellee, the action was anchored on the theory that appellant is an adopted
daughter of Toribio per decision dated March 26, 1974 xxx of the then Court of First Instance x x
x of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) in Sp. Proc. No. R-94 x x x granting the petition of Toribio and
Emilia, who were childless, for adoption of appellant, then eight years old.
 Denying that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio, appellee averred in her answer that the
decree of adoption was fraudulently secured by Alfredo; that the proceedings in the first adoption
case and the decree of adoption are void ab initio; that Toribio could not have filed the first
adoption case in Occidental Mindoro because he was a resident of Agoo, La Union throughout
his life; that the Toribio referred to in the first adoption case and appellee's husband, Toribio, are
two different persons; that the birth certificate of appellant was simulated; that appellant never
lived with nor submitted herself to the parental authority and care of Toribio even after appellee's
marriage to him; that Alfredo's fraudulent scheme was shown by his filing of another petition for
adoption in 1983 in the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro (Branch 45), docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. R-274 xxx, which was archived per order of said court dated December 18, 1986.
 RTC Rendered a decision Dismissed
 CA annul and SET ASIDE the decision and REMANDED to the lower court

ISSUE:
 MICHELLE LIM

In re Lim
G.R. No. 168992-93, 21 May 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in
December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband
and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case
spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall”
signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will
not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and
physical character and well-being.

SEC. 7.Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees
parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has
been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter:Provided, further, That
the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts:

 Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of
3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She
alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children
by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for
their adoption.
 A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
 However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue:

WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological
mother.

Held:

No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love
and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Republic v. Toledano

Facts:

 A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by spouses Alvin A. Clouse and
Evelyn A. Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of Evelyn who has been under their care and custody for quite a time.

 Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter became a
naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

 Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a widow, due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

 Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

 Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption and
decreeing that said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the Court gives
the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Also, it dissolves parental
authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental authority to the spouses and
makes him their legal heir.

 Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a Petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the lower court, contending that it erred in granting the petition for adoption because
spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt under Philippine law.

 Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the filing of petition for adoption.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
2. Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is mandatory.

Ruling:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family Code of the Philippines”,
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen .
Secondly, Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Lastly,
when spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino citizen.
She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a US citizen.

Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209.
She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.

Today, this case is applicable only insofar as the mandatory nature of a joint adoption by husband and
wife is concerned. As to the qualification or non-qualification of an alien adopter, RA 8552 (enacted on
February 25, 1998) is applicable.

TAMARGO v. CA

Facts:
 On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint
for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the
tragic incident.

 In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The
petition was granted in November 1982 that is after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

 Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for
adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the
petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo’s petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

Held:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: “Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences
provided by law.”

LAHOM v. SIBULO

FACTS:

 A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own.

 In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.

 Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that,
despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.

 Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted
from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).

 These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of
adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972.

 When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552
also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided
that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919
of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was
filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no
longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five
year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.

The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate
or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any
time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime,
and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.