Castillo v Castillo G.R. No.

189607, April 18, 2016

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent
opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that
Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage
is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the
first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage
to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage.
In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since
it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of
the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
CASE DIGEST: VENTURA VS. SPOUSES
ABUDA
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES PAULINO and

EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr.
who was married to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein
petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she
had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also
married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous
wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while

the remaining portion was purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas
Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had small business
establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban
was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When
Leonora, petitioners mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a
petition for annulment of the sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or
interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can
claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and
respondents.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were
not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision,
applying Article 148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest

over the subject properties
HELD: No. CA decision sustained

Civil Law -in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties
acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on
the actual contribution of the parties

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to
the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the
assailed decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be
considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation
of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that
the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the
parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of
legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The
phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and
does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.The evidence on record also
shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration
of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not
intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation,
which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the
name of Esteban.
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, GR No. 213972, 2018-02-05
Facts:
On February 28, 1990, private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of
Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa
(Fe1isa). The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan,
Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).
On March 3, 1997, during the trial of the case, Romualdo died.
Consequently, on July 6, 1998, a Motion for Substitution... was filed by the decedent's wife,
Felisa, and their children Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa, Recto Lastimosa (Recto),
Rizalina Ramirez (Rizalina), Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino Lastimosa (Heirs ofLastimosa).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision,... declaring the Heirs of
Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering the
Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof.
The Heirs of Lastimosa did not file an appeal against the trial court's ruling.
The CA refused to give credence to the contention that the Heirs of Nivera are at fault for
failing to implead Felicitas as a party defendant in the action for recovery of ownership.
Rather, the failure to include Felicitas in the proceedings was due to the fault of the Heirs of
Lastimosa, who neglected to include her (Felicitas) in their Motion to Substitute. The CA
further ratiocinated that since the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the original
defendants Romualdo and Felisa, the outcome of the case is binding on all their heirs or
any such persons claiming rights under them
Issues:
whether the CA erred in ordering the execution of the Decision dated March 16, 2004.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that a judgment that is final and executory is
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except when the
judgment is void, or to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. In the same
vein, the decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case, regardless of any
claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final
and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.
Accordingly, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory
judgment, or quash it, or stay its implementation
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that in as early as March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch
55 of Alaminos, Pangasinan rendered a Decision in the case for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages, ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the subject properties
and surrender them to the Heirs of Nivera. There is no dispute that this ruling of the RTC
had become final and executory. Pursuant thereto, the lower court issued a Writ of
Execution and Demolition.
Additionally, as an heir of the original defendants in the action for recovery of ownership,
Felicitas is bound by the decision rendered against her predecessors-in-interest. Thus,
there is nothing that exempts her from the enforcement of the Writ ofExecution.In another
attempt to thwart the execution of the RTC's final and executory judgment, Felicitas claims
that the execution cannot proceed, as the subject property is her family home and is
therefore exempt from execution.Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.[34]
It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family
home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a
final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely
allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old
Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that
the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries
must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas
cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient
evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must
be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family
home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family,
(iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of
the family, and (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php
200,000.00 in rural areas.
A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation, Felicitas
adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is
indeed her family home.
Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family
home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and
executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch
55 must perforce be given effect.
Principles:
The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family home
is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final
and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and
proven.
Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de Batocael
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-
A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January
1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼
of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of
him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila
Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the
store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could
enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for
her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila
who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided
with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura
testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public
streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos”
where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila
who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made
in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the
deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor
was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation
is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit
and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption
of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
 ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143286 April 12, 2000

Facts:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight
children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared under
his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust for his
co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leon’s death in 1972,
private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar had
been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971. In
July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of petitioners, his children, who
thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their respective pro- indiviso shares.

Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with
annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended that
Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The RTC
declared that private respondents’ action had been barred by res judicata and that petitioners are the
“legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to them.

Issue:
Whether or not laches apply against the minor’s property that was held in trust.

Ruling:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents
Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to
file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they
believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they
became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle’s actions, they
filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot be applied here.
They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioner’s assertion.

Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law
between Felipe’s children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon’s fraudulent
titling of Felipe’s 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust.