People v.

Gacott

FACTS

Failure to read the text of the cited LOI no. 2 (abolishing the Anti-Dummy Board) of the Prosecution, the
order of the respondent dismissing the criminal case was annuled by the Supreme Court. Respondent
was sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000 for gross ignorance of law. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and begged with humility that the spreading of the decision on his personal
records be reconsidered. He also filed for supplemental motion for reconsideration and were furnishe
by him to the Chief Justice, Judicial Bar Council, SolGen, DOJ Sec, OMB, among others.

ISSUE:

Whether the Second Division of the SC has competence to administratively disciplne respondent judge?

HELD:

YES.The first clause of Section 11 of Article VIII which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power
and the determination of the procedure by the Court en banc. To require the entire Court to deliberate
upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court,
especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require
action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a
systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court
or the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three,
five, or seven members.

Yet, although as thus demonstrated in "Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," only cases involving dismissal of judges of
lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a
thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when
the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both,
that the administrative matter may be decided in division.
people v. rosie cuaresma

gr no 67787, apr 18 1989

FACTS:

Rosie Cuaresma was being charged of oral defamation by According to Lumacao, Cuaresma dishonored
her by accusing her as the paramour of her husband, Victor Cuaresma. Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash
the case in violation of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge denied the motion to
quash. The judge also required the fiscal to file with the Court the verified compalin of the offended
party with 10 days. 3 months later, Cuaresma filed another motion to quash alleging that the offense
had prescribed. the filing of the original information had not interrupted the running of the period of
prescription of the crime and the prescriptive period had lapsed long prior to the submission of the
corrective complaint. Respondent Judge dismissed the case and the fiscal's motion for reconsideration
was belatedly filed and was denied for lack of merit and for being filed out of time.

ISSUE:

whether or not the filing of a complaint in the office of the fiscal interrupted the period of prescription
of the offense charged and is correctible by certiorari.

the remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or officer exercising judicial functions or of any
judge which are claimed to be "without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion." It does not lie for the correction of errors of judgment which may be brought about only by
appeal.Not every error in procedure, or every erroneous conclusion of law or of fact of serious nature, is
correctible by certiorari, appeal being the appropriate remedy, except where the error constitutes grave
abuse of discretion, i.e., "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The error here committed by His Honor obviously does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS:

Petitioners pray for the declaration of EO 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”
as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, Senate Committees
conducted an investigation in aid of legislation which call for the attendance of officials and employees
of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in GOCCs, the AFP, and the
PNP in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said
officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464 valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must be kept confidential
in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why
it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may
be exempted from this power -- the President.