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(1) Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159270, August 22, 2005

Facts:
Pampanga Sugar (PASUDECO) is in the business of transporting sugar cane from Pampanga. Many roads became
impassable due to the Pinatubo eruption. As such, Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and PASUDECO entered into a MOA
wherein the latter was allowed to enter and pass through NLEX provided it should comply with its safety measures such
as putting a sign saying ―Caution: Convoy Ahead.‖ Also, it was stipulated that accidents and damages to toll facilities
shall be PASUDECO‘s responsibility. Said MOA was approved by PNCC.

At 2:30am, a PNCC security supervisor were patrolling KM 72 when they saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle of the
road. To warn motorists, they placed lit cans with diesel oil on the road and lane dividers. They contacted PASUDECO to
clean up the mess. Later, 5 PASUDECO men arrived to clear up the highway. They, however, left a few flattened
sugarcanes scattered on the road. Since most of the sugarcane had been cleared, the PNCC security supervisor thought
there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As such, they removed the warning devices.

At about 6:30 a.m, Arnaiz, with Latagan & Generalao, was driving along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour with
on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother‘s first death anniversary. Their vehicle ran over the scattered
sugarcane and flew out of control and turned turtle several times.

Consequently, a complaint for damages was filed against PNCC and PASUDECO on the ground of negligence to which the
RTC granted. PNCC‘s appeal was also denied by the CA. CA held that PASUDECO and PNCC are solidarily liable.

Issue: Is PNCC liable?

Held: YES. PNCC & PASUDECO are SOLIDARILY LIABLE. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

PNCC failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane
dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. Moreover, they
cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since Latagan was not a party thereto. Both
defendants, PASUDECO and PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC was in charge of the maintenance of the expressway and
its obligation cannot be destroyed by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. Moreover, the MOA refers to
accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the
NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.

PASUDECO‘s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the
emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan‘s
injuries.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently
of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible
to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though
his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tortfeasor.

Negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. It is no defense
to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. Where several
causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result. They are each liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. With PASUDECO‘s and the petitioner‘s
successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable under Article 2194.

Anent respondent Arnaiz‘s negligence in driving his car, such was only contributory, and considered the same in
mitigating the award of damages. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.
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(2) Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009

Facts: The present case arose from the filing of a BP 22 case by respondent Datuin (OIC of the Accounts Receivables
Department of Sansio Philippines) against petitioner Gregorio and Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing for
delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing. Gregorio
was subsequently indicted for 3 counts of violation of BP 22.

Gregorio was detained eventually. She was able to secure temporary liberty when her husband posted bail. Thereafter,
Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the
bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, as
certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature
was patently and radically different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.

The MeTC granted the motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. During the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin
submitted an Affidavit of Desistance, stating among others that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced
checks subject of prosecution. The cases were eventually dismissed.

Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the RTC for damages suffered due to the filing
of the BP 22 Cases by Sansio and Datuin. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint,
being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint. The RTC ruled in favor of Gregorio. The CA
reversed.

Issue: Whether the civil suit filed by Gregorio is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosectution.

Held: QUASI DELICT. A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio‘s complaint for damages readily shows that she filed a civil
suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered to them
insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that respondents never gave her the
opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint.

Gregorio claimed damages for the EMBARRASSMENT and HUMILIATION she suffered when she was suddenly arrested at
her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in
Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and 2180 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite
alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her
complaint.

Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorio‘s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on QUASI-
DELICT under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26, rather than on malicious prosecution.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he
must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4)
that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.

On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases
of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights:
(1) right to personal dignity;
(2) right to personal security;
(3) right to family relations;
(4) right to social intercourse;
(5) right to privacy; and
(6) right to peace of mind.

A scrutiny of Gregorio‘s civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article
2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio‘s rights to personal dignity, personal security,
privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the REQUISITE DILIGENCE
IN DETERMINING THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks.
This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the
charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for 3 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. She suffered embarrassment
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and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her
tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and
offices in the public service. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its VICARIOUS LIABILITY, as employer, arising
from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio‘s complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an action
to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled
by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint.

Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on quasi-delict.
She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.

(3) American Express International, Inc. vs Noel Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, October 14, 2005

Facts: AMEX is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers which the latter uses to purchase goods
and services at accredited merchants worldwide. Nila Cordero, wife of respondent was one such holder. An extension
card was also issued to her husband, Noel Cordero.

Sometime after, respondent together with his wife and relatives went on a holiday trip to HK. During the trip, they went
to Watsons Chemist Shop. Noel bought some goods and handed to the sales clerk his AMEX extension card. The sales
clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the AMEX Office in Hong Kong. Its representative said he wants to
talk to respondent in order to verify the latter‘s identity, pursuant to the procedure observed under the ―Inspect
Airwarn Support System‖ (IASS). However, respondent refused.

Due to respondents‘ refusal, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the counter and informed
respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent‘s AMEX card in half with a pair of
scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was done in front
of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using
her own AMEX card.

Nilda called up AMEX‘s office in Hong Kong where it was learned through the Senior Authorized that a person in HK
attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondent‘s card. The HK AMEX Office called up respondent
and after determining that he was in Manila and not in HK, placed his card under the IASS (a system used by AMEX to
protect both the company and its cardholders from fraudulent use of their charge cards; once a card suspected of
unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the
holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved; otherwise
the card is revoked or confiscated.).

Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against AMEX. The RTC ruled in favor of Cordero. Petitioner
appealed.

Issue: Whether or not AMEX is liable to Cordero for the humiliation suffered by the latter.

Held: NO. Respondent anchors his cause of action on Article 2176. In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may
arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an
action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be
said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause
is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that
indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to AMEX‘s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no
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negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to AMEX. If at all, the cause of respondent‘s humiliation and
embarrassment was his refusal to talk to AMEX‘s representative.

There was testimony to that effect which showed that when Watson Company called AMEX for authorization, AMEX
representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused to talk to any representative of AMEX. AMEX could
not prove then that he is really the real card holder.

Additionally, according to the terms of the Cardmember Agreement, AMEX can revoke respondent‘s card without
notice. Again the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to AMEX‘s representative
and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. Clearly, there was no negligence on the part of the AMEX.

(4) Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918)

Facts: Canco, a clerk of the defendant, was on his way home via train. As the train was about to stop in the station
where Cangco usually deboards, Cangco, alighted from the train as he and other passengers always did. Unfortunately,
due to the fact that it was nighttime and that the station was dimly lighted, Cangco was not able to see that there was a
sack of melons on the platform. Thus, he landed on said melons and slipped. He was drawn under the train and his arm
was injured so severely that it had to be amputated. Cangco sued defendant for damages due to negligence of servants
& employees in placing the sack of melons which obstructed the passenger‘s egress.

Held: Manila Railroad is liable under the old civil code. It is implied from the contract of carriage of the defendant the
duty to carry him safely and provide him with a safe means to come in and out o the train. Being contractual, that duty
was direct and immediate. Its nonperformance cannot be excused due to the fault of defandant‘s employees. Also, no
contributory negligence can be attributed to Cangco because, as a public carrier, he had the right to assume that the
platform was clear. Cangco was also very familiar with the place. As such, there can be no uncertainty in his mind that
what he was about to do was indeed unsafe.

(5) Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)

Facts: Respondent bought First Class tickets from petitioner‘s agent (PAL) for a trip from Manila to Lourdes. Upon
confirmation of said tickets, he flew first class to the first 2 legs of the trip (HK, BKK). However, in Bangkok, after being
seated, the manager of the petitioner asked him to transfer to the Tourist Class in lieu of another passenger (―white
man‖). Reluctantly, he did. Respondent sued petitioner for damages on the ground of wrongful expulsion to which the
Trial Court & the CA granted and awarded him moral (25k), exemplary (10k), and attorney‘s fees (10k). Petitioner
appealed contending that its contract with the passenger was subject for confirmation.

Held: Air France is liable. The facts and circumstances of the cases make it reasonable for respondent to be awarded said
damages. Neither the captain nor any employee of the petitioner intervened. There was also no evidence presented that
the white man had a prior right/reservation. Respondent is entitled to said First Class seat. The manager‘s arbitrary act
made respondent suffer humiliation. Said manager acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, public policy
(Art. 21 CC). Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier‘s
employees with respect and kindness. Petitioner‘s contract is attended by a public duty and a violation of which is
considered a quasi delict wherein damages may be awarded.