Bufhartz vs.

Switzerland

This case dealt with Swiss laws that allowed women to use their maiden name before the family
name of their spouse but prohibited men from doing the same. The applicant, Mr. Burghartz, who
took his wife’s family name when they married was not allowed to use his own surname before it.
The Court concluded that although not set out in Article 8, one’s name, as a means of personal
identification and of linking to a family, none the less concerns one’s private and family life and
that allowing women but not men to keep their surnames when they married was a violation of
Article 8 together with Article 14 (discrimination based on sex).

Pretty vs. UK

Facts
Diane Pretty was suffering from motor neurone disease and was paralysed from the neck down, had little decipherable
speech and was fed by a tube.[1] It is not a crime to commit suicide under English law, but the applicant was prevented by
her disease from taking such a step without assistance. It is however a crime to assist another to commit suicide (section
2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961).[2]
Pretty wanted her husband to provide her with assistance in suicide. Because giving this assistance would expose the
husband to liability, the Director of Public Prosecutions was asked to agree not to prosecute her husband. This request
was refused, as was Pretty's appeal before the Law Lords.[3]

Judgment
In a unanimous judgment, the Court, composed of seven judges, has found Pretty's application under articles 2, 3, 8, 9
and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights admissible, but found no violation of the Convention.
Significant conclusions include that no right to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public
authority, can be derived from Article 2 of the Convention.[4] As concerns Pretty's right to respect for private life under
Article 8, the Court considered that the interference in this case might be justified as “necessary in a democratic society”
for the protection of the rights of others.[5]

Piandiong vs. The Philippines

Death penalty case. State

The Committee reiterates its conclusion that the State committed a grave breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the
alleged victims to death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication

Kosiek v. Germany

28 August 1986 The applicant alleged that his political activities had been the main reason for his failure to secure an appointment as
a lecturer. The European Court of Human Rights held that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the
European Convention on Human Rights. It found that, in refusing the applicant’s access to the civil service, the responsible Ministry of
the Land took account of his opinions and activities merely in order to determine whether he had proved himself during his
probationary period and whether he possessed one of the necessary personal qualifications for the post in question.

Johnston vs. Ireland

In Ireland, divorce is unconstitutional. Since the enactment of the constitution in 1937, Irish law has rejected any efforts to dissolve
the unity of marriage. In Johnston v. Ireland, Roy Johnston and his new family' challenged the Irish ban on divorce in the European
Court of Human Rights, claiming Irish law violated their rights to found a family, enjoy their privacy, practice their religion, and be free
from discrimination. The European Court of Human Rights rejected the Johnstons' claim that the Irish legal system violated the
European Convention on Human rights. Nevertheless, the court granted their daughter some relief. The court ordered Ireland to
equalize the legal treatment of all children under Irish law, regardless of the marital status of the child's parents. This holding was a
partial remedy for theJohnstons' daughter Nessa,2 and did nothing to aid her parents.

5. Finding for Nessa, the Child Despite its decision against the first and second applicants, the court found in favor of the Williams-
Johnstons' daughter, Nessa. Citing the legal impediments to an illegitimate child leading a normal family life, the court found that Irish
law violated the article 8 guarantee of her right to respect of her family life. 17 2 The court stressed that Marckx implied "an obligation
for the State to act in a manner calculated to allow these family ties to develop normally."'17 3 The court directed Ireland to equalize
legal treatment of all children.

Nicaragua vs. United States

Respect for human rights - Right of States to choose political system, ideology and alliances.
ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention

The solution of these problems must be found in the special characteristics of the Genocide Convention. The origins and character of
that Convention, the objects pursued by the General Assembly and the contracting parties, the relations which exist between the
provisions of the Convention, inter se, and between those provisions and these objects, furnish elements of interpretation of the will
of the General Assembly and the parties. The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to
condemn and punish genocide as "a crime under international law" involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups,
a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to
the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolution 96 (1) of the General Assembly, December 11th 1946). The first consequence
arising from this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations
as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second consequence is the universa1 character both of the
condemnation of genocide and of the CO-operation required "in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge" (Preamble
to the Convention). The Genocide Convention was therefore intended by the General Assembly and by the contracting parties to be
definitely universal in scope. It was in fact approved on December gth, 1948, by a resolution which was unanimously adopted by fifty-
six States. The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian
and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its
object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most
elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely
have, one and au, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the
convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by
virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of al1 its provisions. The foregoing considerations, when applied
to the question of reservations, and more particularly to the effects of objections to reservations, lead to the following conclusions.
The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States which
adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States
would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles
which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation should
produce such a result. But even less could the contracting parties have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour
of a vain desire to secure as many participants as possible. The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of
making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose
of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the
appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it
must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation. Any other view would lead either to the
acceptance of reservations which frustrate the purposes which the General Assembly and the contracting parties had in mind, or to
recognition that the parties to the Convention have the power of excluding from it the author of a reservation, even a minor one,
which may be quite compatible with those purposes. It has nevertheless been argued that any State entitled to become a party to the
Genocide Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by virtue of its sovereignty. The Court cannot share this view.
It is obvious that so extreme an application of the idea of State sovereignty could lead to a complete disregard of the object and
purpose of the Convention. Continental Shelf Case

These cases concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf of the North Sea as between Denmark and the
Federal Republic of Germany, and as between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, and were submitted
to the Court by Special Agreement. The Parties asked the Court to state the principles and rules of international
law applicable, and undertook thereafter to carry out the delimitations on that basis. By an Order of 26 April
1968 the Court, having found Denmark and the Netherlands to be in the same interest, joined the proceedings
in the two cases. In its Judgment, delivered on 20 February 1969, the Court found that the boundary lines in
question were to be drawn by agreement between the Parties and in accordance with equitable principles in
such a way as to leave to each Party those areas of the continental shelf which constituted the natural
prolongation of its land territory under the sea, and it indicated certain factors to be taken into consideration
for that purpose. The Court rejected the contention that the delimitations in question had to be carried out in
accordance with the principle of equidistance as defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf. The Court took account of the fact that the Federal Republic had not ratified that Convention, and held
that the equidistance principle was not inherent in the basic concept of continental shelf rights, and that this
principle was not a rule of customary international law.
Corfu Channel Case

In the present case both evidence of the Albanian Government’s attitude (its intention to keep a close watch on its territorial waters,
its protest against the passage of the British fleet but not the laying of mines, its failure to notify shipping of the existence of mines)
and the fact that mine-laying would have been visible to a normal lookout on the Albanian coast, lead the Court to conclude that the
laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of Albania. The Court then considers Albania’s
obligations in light of this knowledge: The obligations resulting for Albania from this knowledge are not disputed between the Parties.
Counsel for the Albanian Government expressly recognized that [translation] “if Albania had been informed of the operation before
the incidents of October 22nd, and in time to warn the British vessels and shipping in general of the existence of mines in the Corfu
Channel, her responsibility would be involved.. . .". The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying,
for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British
warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of
1907, No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war ; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication ; and
every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States. In fact, Albania
neither notified the existence of the minefield, nor warned the British warships of the danger they were approaching. (The Court goes
on to consider whether Albania would have had sufficient time to notify shipping of the existence of mines, and finds that, even if the
mines had been laid at the last possible moment, in the night of October 21st -22nd, the Albanian authorities could still have warned
ships approaching the danger zone. There was an interval of two hours between when the British ships were reported by a look-out
post and the time of the first explosion. No warning was given, and the Court held that the omission involve international responsibility
for the explosions, and the damage and loss of human life to which they gave rise.)

ICJ Advisory Opinion on Genocide Convention

US vs. Iran

At the same time the Court finds itself obliged to stress the cumulative effect of Iran's breaches of its obligations when taken together.
A marked escalation of these breaches can be seen to have occurred in the transition from the failure on the part of the Iranian
authorities to oppose the armed attack by the militants on 4 November 1979 and their seizure of the Embassy premises and staff, to
the almost irnmediate endorsement by those authonties of the situation thus created, and then to their maintaining deliberately for
many months the occupation of the Embassy and detention of its staff by a group of armed militants acting on behalf of the State for
the purpose of forcing the United States to bow to certain demands. Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to
subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But what has
above al1 to be emphasized is the extent and seriousness of the conflict between the conduct of the Iranian State and its obligations
under the whole corpus of the international rules of which diplomatic and consular law is comprised, rules the fundamental character
of which the Court must here again strongly affirm. In its Order of 15 December 1979, the Court made a point of stressing that the
obligations laid on States by the two Vienna Conventions are of cardinal importance for the maintenance of good relations between
States in the interdependent world of today. "There is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States",
the Court there said, "than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout hstory nations of al1 creeds and
cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose." The institution of diplomacy, the Court continued, has proved to be
"an instrument essential for effective CO-operation in the international community, and for enabling States, irrespective of their
diffenng constitutional and social systems, to achieve mutual understanding and to resolve their differences by peaceful means" (I.
C.J. Reports 1979, p. 19).

Portugal vs. Australia (East Timor)

Right of peoples to self-determination as right erga omnes and essentialprinciple of contemporary international law - Difference
between erga omnes character of a norm and rule of consent to jurisdiction.

1. On 22 February 1991, the Ambassador to the Netherlands of the Portuguese Republic (hereinafter referred to as
"Portugal") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia
(hereinafter referred to as "Australia") concerning "certain activities of Australia with respect to East Timor". According to
the Application Australia had, by its conduct, "failed to observe . . . the obligation to respect the duties and powers of
[Portugal as] the administering Power [of East Timor] . . . and . . . the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination
and the related rights". In consequence, according to the Application, Australia had "incurred international responsibility
vis-à-vis both the people of East Timor and Portugal". As the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application refers to
the declarations by which the two States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of its Statute.
2. (1) To adjudge and declare that, first, the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination, to territorial integrity and
unity and to permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources and, secondly, the duties, powers and rights of
Portugal as the administering Power of the Territory of East Timor are opposable to Australia, which is under an obligation
not to disregard them, but to respect them.