JURISDICTION

Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company

G.R. No. 196795 March 07, 2018

FACTS:

In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it administered to
Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease and were leased for five
(5) years. All their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of
stipulations, which included a provision for lease renewals every five (5) years upon the parties' mutual
agreement. Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises.
However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore Construction's
non-conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine-
Spanish architecture in the area. Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism
before the Manila RTC. Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where they affirmed
the validity of the two (2) lease contracts but terminated the one (over Revellin de Recoletos). The
Compromise Agreement retained the five (5)-year period of the existing lease contracts and stated only
certain areas that may be occupied by Offshore Construction. During the lease period, Offshore
Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand letters. Intramuros
tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction would pay its arrears. As of July
31, 2004, these arrears allegedly totaled P6,762,153.70. Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment. The
MTC granted Offshore’s motion and dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. First, it pointed
out that there were two (2) pending cases at the time Intramuros filed its complaint: one for specific
performance filed by Offshore Construction against Intramuros, and another for interpleader against
Offshore Construction and Intramuros filed by 4H Intramuros, Inc. (4H Intramuros), which claimed to be a
group of respondent's tenants. The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the cause of action in Intramuros'
complaint was similar with those in the specific performance and interpleader cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Intramuros Administration committed forum shopping when it filed its ejectment
complaint despite the pending cases for specific performance and interpleader.

HELD: The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping
exist. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of
res judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.
As observed by the Metropolitan Trial Court, there is an identity of parties in the specific performance and
interpleader cases, and the Complaint for Ejectment. However, there is no identity of asserted rights or
reliefs prayed for, and a judgment in any of the three (3) cases will not amount to res judicata in the two
others. A final judgment in the specific performance case will not affect the outcome of the ejectment
case. As pointed out by petitioner, respondent's right to possess the leased premises is founded initially
on the Contracts of Lease and, upon their expiration, on petitioner's tolerance in hopes of payment of
outstanding arrears. The July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance
case cannot be the source of respondent's continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there that
the offsetting was only for respondent's outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment
compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation under this agreement will not give new life to the
expired Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner's unlawful detainer complaint.
RULE 7

POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. REY

G.R. No. 190203 November 07, 2016

FACTS: Powerhouse hired herein respondent employees as operators for its foreign principal, Catcher
Technical Co. Ltd./Catcher Industrial Co. Ltd. (Catcher), based in Taiwan, each for the duration of two
years commencing upon their arrival at the jobsite. They were deployed on June 2, 2000. Sometime in
February 2001, Catcher informed respondent employees that they would be reducing their working days
due to low orders and financial difficulties. The respondent employees were repatriated to the Philippines
on March 11, 2001. Respondent employees then filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against
Powerhouse and Catcher before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which were later consolidated upon their motion.
They alleged that on March 2, 2001, Catcher informed them that they would all be repatriated due to low
orders of Catcher. Initially, they refused to be repatriated but they eventually gave in because Catcher
stopped providing them food and they had to live by the donations/dole outs from sympathetic friends and
the church. Furthermore, during their employment with Catcher, the amount of NT$10,000.00 was
unjustifiably deducted every month for eight to nine months from their individual salaries. On the other
hand, Powerhouse maintained that respondent employees voluntarily gave up their jobs following their
rejection of Catcher's proposal to reduce their working days. It contended that before their repatriation,
each of the respondents accepted payments by way of settlement, with the assistance of Labor Attache
Romulo Salud. During the proceedings before the LA, Powerhouse moved to implead JEJ International
Manpower Services (JEJ) as respondent on account of the alleged transfer to the latter of Catcher's
accreditation. JEJ submitted its position paper, arguing that the supposed transfer of accreditation to it did
not affect the joint and solidary liability of Powerhouse in favor of respondent employees. It averred that
any contract between JEJ and Powerhouse could not be enforced in the case as it involved no employer-
employee relationship and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: WON Powerhouse is liable for the monetary claims

HELD: YES. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several.This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly
and solidarity liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such
liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.
RULE 18

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEREZ

G.R. No. 142556 February 5, 2003

FACTS:

The prosecution alleges that, on January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang,
Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia Ponseca(victim) was walking along Sulok on her way to her house
in Sitio Camiling when appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her. Appellant introduced himself as
Johnny and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. Still in shock, Mayia fell
down. At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them. Thereafter, the appellant raped the victim. The
accused-appellant after being arrested was charged for the crime of rape. During pre-trial the prosecution
and defense stipulated on the following facts:

1. The identity of the accused;

2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;

3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;

4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a medico-legal
certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.

The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit A, and
the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit B. As a defense, appellant avers during
the incident, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa which was about thirty meters from
the fishpond. After trial, the trial Court convicted him for the crime of statutory rape. Hence, this automatic
review.

In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains that the
death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by
independent evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was duly marked during the
pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayia’s minority must
not only be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt
during the trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation during the pre-trial on the victim’s age is binding on the accused?

HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that, during the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia’s birth
certificate as Exhibit A. The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence which included Exhibit A, a
certified true copy of Mayia’s birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit A without any objection from
the defense. The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of
facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful
defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial
conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course
of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. Moreover, Mayia
herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15, 1998, which was about
twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-
examination that she was 8 years old last May 23. Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23,
1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on January
17, 1997, the day the crime took place. The Court ruled that the prosecution has indisputably proven that
Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped her. Thus, the trial court was correct in
imposing the death penalty on appellant. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
against a child below seven (7) years old. Mayia was six (6) years and seven (7) months old when
appellant raped her.
RULE 38

ESCUETA v. LIM

G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007

Facts:

Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with preliminary
injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order] from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio and the
heirs of Baloloy. As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots have
already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving
said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to
Escueta has raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s title. In their separate amended answers,
petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. The Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial.
Upon motion of respondent, the trial court declared the Baloloys in default. They then filed a motion to lift
the order declaring them in default, which was denied by the trial court in an order. Consequently,
respondent was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial
decision. The judgment is rendered in favor of [respondent] and against [petitioners, heirs] of Luz R.
Baloloy. Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the
partial decision on April 5, 1994. On July 4, 1994, the Baloloys, through their new counsel, filed a petition
for relief from judgment which was denied by the trial court for being filed out of time.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond the reglementary period?

Held: Yes. The 60-day period for filing a petition for annulment of judgment is reckoned from the time the
party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read
the same. Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states: SEC 3. TIME FOR FILING PETITION;
CONTENTS AND VERIFICATION - a petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule
must be verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not mroe that 6 months after such judgment or final order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense as the case may be. There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore
the effects of the above rule. the 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of
the order, judgment, or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same. The evidence on
record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the former counsel of record
of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June 23, 1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time,
said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The reckoning of the 60-day period therefore is the
date when the said counsel of record received a copy of the partial decision which was on April 5, 1994.
The petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4, 1994 which means that 90 days have
already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60-day period. Moreover, the records further show that the
Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13, 1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards
which bear the numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy. The Baloloys, apparently in
an attempt to cure the lapse of the aforesaid reglementary period to file a petition for relief from judgment,
included in its petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994 and June 29, 1994. The first Order denied
Baloloys’ motion to fix the period within which plaintiffs-appellants pay the balance of the purchase price.
The second Order refers to the grant of partial execution, i.e. on the aspect of damages. These Orders
are only consequences of the partial decision subject of the petition for relief, and thus, cannot be
considered in the determination of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for relief.
RULE 110

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 127663 March 11, 1999

FACTS: Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction promulgated by
the Regional Trial Court sentencing him to death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing him to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua
for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition (Presidential Decree No. 1866). The
information alleges that the accused shot Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and Sandra
Montano, which caused their deaths, and seriously injured William Montano and Randy Tibule. The trial
court convicted the accused of the crimes charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of an unlicensed firearm can be considered as a special aggravating
circumstance.

HELD: No. The use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also
under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four
reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294
is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be
given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law. Criminal Case No.
U-8747 involving Presidential Decree No. 1866 is hereby DISMISSED.
RULE 117

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DUMLAO

G.R. No. 168918 March 2, 2009

FACTS: An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao, La’o and
others with violation of the Section 3(g) of R.A. no. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
information alleged that the respondent-members of the Board of Trustees of GSIS entered into a
contract of lease-purchase with respondent La’o, a private person whereby GSIS agreed to sell to La’o, a
GSIS-acquired property consisting of a land and building known as the Government Counsel Centre for
P2 Million on an instalment basis with annual interest and amortization and grant La’o the right to sub-
lease the ground floor during the period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the
yearly amortization causing gross disadvantage to the government. During arraignment, Dumlao pleaded
not guilty, and as agreed by prosecution and respondents, a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of
Exhibits was submitted to the court. The Joint Stipulation admitted additional facts: (1) 3 members of the
Board, Dumlao being one of them, signed the Minutes; (2) 7 members of the Board were present during
the board meeting; and (3) the documentary evidence of was authentic and duly executed. It was further
decided for the pre-trial to be terminated limiting the course of the subsequent trial to “matters not
disposed of... unless modified by the court.” Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He stated that the prosecution’s main thrust against him
was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. He argued that the
Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board. Since the signatures of fellow respondents did
not appear in the minutes of the meeting, these people did not participate in the Lease-Purchase
Agreement. There was no quorum of the board; thus no resolution approving the Agreement. Since the
resolution was not approved, he was innocent. He added that the person liable was Atty. Javellana who
actually executed the contract. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Dumlao. It found that the minutes shows
that the Board failed to approve the Lease-Purchase Agreement in question. As evidenced by the Joint
Stipulation, of the 7 members, only 3 signed. It did not validly pass a resolution because at least a
majority of 4 votes were required. Therefore prosecution had no cause of action against Dumlao. Hence,
this petition for certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON insufficiency of evidence is a ground for Motion to Dismiss

HELD: No. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss/Quash are limited to those enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of
the RRCP. The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that
the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. The ground raised by Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense. And after examining the information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao.
Therefore, the motion to quash should not have been granted. It can also be gathered from the resolution
of the Sandiganbayan that it did not consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion. From the
reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency of
evidence. According to Sec. 3, Rule 117 of RRCP, insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a
Motion to Quash. It is only a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case as
provided in Sec. 23, Rule 119 of RRCP on demurrer to evidence. In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan
dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution
the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It
deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s culpability. It
was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it
not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not
raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
RULE 122-125

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANANSALA

G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013

FACTS: On October 18, 1994 the PNP-Olongapo City conducted a test-buy operation against
Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied
for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC-Olongapo City to authorize the search for and seizure of
prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City. SPO4 Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by the Barangay
Chairman conducted the search of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. the next day. The search
yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team
recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of PhP 655.00 that
included the two marked PhP 50.00 bills used during the test buy. All the seized articles were inventoried,
and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect, along with his father, Jose Manansala, and
Barangay Captain Manalang. The certification listed the following seized articles: 1) one kilo, more or
less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves; 2) rolling paper; 3) money amounting to PhP 655.00 SPO4
Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned over the
seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of October 20, 1994, the
seized articles were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga
for qualitative examination. The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report with findings on
qualitative examination that the specimen gave POSITIVE result for marijuana. Manansala pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, First Asst. City Prosecutor Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an amended
information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4
of R.A. No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. But the RTC
did not act on the motion. Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters
earlier summarized. In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a
frame-up stating that military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without any
warrant, and brought him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay
Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and then detained him when he refused
to admit the sale and possession of marijuana. They turned down his request to be brought to a hospital
for the treatment of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he
could not identify his captors and whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized
in court when the latter testified at the trial. The RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The crime
charged in the information was a violation of Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, which provides: But instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted
him for a violation of Section 8 of the same law. On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible
errors committed by the RTC that the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in
violation of Section 4. The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing,
falling under the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly knowingly
selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of
the team who is alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was not
presented as a witness, hence, the testimony of SPO4 Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance
conducted prior to the application of the search warrant, a member of the team acting as poseur buyer
was able to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay. However, the fact
that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find marijuana leaves in the
custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the search warrant
and has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, without controversion but the
denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the weakest defense, the trial court was convinced that accused
is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is
necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged
with. In light of these circumstances, the RTC has no option that to find accused guilty and liable for the
crime proved. Since the date of the commission of the crime as proved is October 19, 1994, the
provisions of R.A. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will find application. On
intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction and affirmed with modification the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 necessarily
includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof under Section 8 of the same law

HELD: Yes. Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller
thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale must
be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In this case, the trial court correctly held that
the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused was indeed guilty of the offense
of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same. While no
conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the
established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the
seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or
included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this
case, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused were
the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, we find that the court a quo
committed no reversible error in convicting the accused- appellant of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Again, it should be
stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 necessarily
includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the records, it has been sufficiently proven
beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045
grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of the positive
testimony of the prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is indubitable that a
crime had in fact been committed and that accused-appellant was the author of the same. It is as
prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if
the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by
or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some
future dealings or use by the accused. The elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, are as follows: (1)
the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug. Although not epressly stated, delivery is given stress, which implies
prior possession of the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure
and identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non. It being
established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.