JAMIA MILLIA

ISLAMIA

FACULTY OF LAW
LAND LAWS ASSIGNMENT
On

“CONTROL OF EVICTION OF
TENANT AND SUMMARY
TRIAL”

Submitted to: Submitted by:

PROF. KAHKASHAN Y.DANYAL MS. SHAHISTA KHAN

FACULTY OF LAW BA.L.L.B (H), IXth sem

JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA Sec.- B, Roll no. 29

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
At the outset, I would like to thank my seminar teacher, Dr. Kahkashan Y. Danyal, for being

a guiding force throughout the course of this submission and being instrumental in the

successful completion of this project report without which my efforts would have been in

vain.

I am thankful to the Librarians, Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia for helping me in

collecting the relevant material for my project report.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my friends and family for their constant review

and honest remarks.

SHAHISTA KHAN

B.A.LL.B (Hons) 9th Semester

5th Year

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................3

TENANT UNDER DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT,1958......................................................6

Previous History of the Definition.......................................................................................6

Current Definition................................................................................................................7

CONTROL OF EVICTION OF TENANTS...........................................................................12

Section 14(1) (a).................................................................................................................. 12

Section 14(1) (b).................................................................................................................. 12

Section 14(1) (c).................................................................................................................. 13

Section 14(1) (d).................................................................................................................. 13

Section 14(1) (e).................................................................................................................. 14

Section 14(1) (f)...................................................................................................................15

Section 14(1) (g).................................................................................................................. 16

Section 14(1) (h).................................................................................................................. 16

Section 14(1) (i)...................................................................................................................16

Section 14(1) (j)...................................................................................................................17

Section 14(1) (k).................................................................................................................. 17

SUMMARY PROCEDURE....................................................................................................19

Object...................................................................................................................................19

Procedure............................................................................................................................. 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................22

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 INTRODUCTION

According to the Murphy’s Law of Economic Policy states that “Economists have the least
influence on policy where they know the most and are most agreed; they have the most
influence on policy where they know the least and disagree most vehemently”.1 While most
economists agree that rent controls are bad, nothing of note has been done towards
deregulating rents, especially in India. Also, the sheer diversity of rent control laws existing
in various states and countries, coupled with phenomenal economic diversity makes it very
difficult to generalize the argument across borders, and thus makes the task of policy makers
that much more difficult.

Rent control legislations are prime example of social legislation. They try to strike a just
balance between the rights of the landlords and the requirements of the tenants. Such
legislations prevent the landlords from taking the extreme steps of evicting the tenants
merely upon technicalities or skilful grounds. These legislations are enacted to prevent the
vulnerable class called the ‘tenants’ from the clutches of the landlords, who often to thrive
on the predicament of the tenants arising due to the scarcity of the premises. Due to the
scarcity, the landlords often exploit the tenants for their unjust gains/enrichment and also
subject the tenants to un-called for litigation; in answer to the emergent situations prevailing,
the legislators intervene to protect the tenants from the harassment and exploitation of the
landlords, thereby enacting the necessary rent control legislations.

No doubt, the rent control legislations are intended to preserve the social environment and
are purposed to promote social justice, but at the same time, some safeguards should also be
given to the landlords as well. In the case of E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (D) by LRs and
Ors,2 it was held that the provisions of the rent control legislations are not to be interpreted
with a hyper-technical approach, which indirectly causes frustration of the mischief. Though
the rent control legislations normally intend to benefit the tenant, but still, the tenant also has
a duty to strictly comply with the statutory provisions of the concerned rent control

A Rent Affair, Paul Krugman, The Unofficial Paul Krugman <http://www.pkarchive.org/column/6700.html>

1

2003 (1) SCC 123

2

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legislations; if a tenant does not comply with the statutory provisions strictly, then, the tenant
should not be allowed to avail/reap the benefit available to him albeit the concerned rent
control legislation; hence, equitable considerations have no place in such matters.

In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal,3 ,a seven judge bench of the Supreme Court of
India, held that, giving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is
not necessary as far as eviction against the tenants under any state rent control legislation is
concerned. In order to get a decree for eviction against the tenant, the notice is not necessary.
The tenant continues to be a tenant even thereafter, that post the serving of the eviction
notice. The landlord is under a duty to make out a case from the grounds mentioned under
the concerned rent control legislation, and it shall be sufficient to have the eviction thereafter.
The real purpose of the notice of eviction is to terminate the contract as so subsisting
between the landlord and the tenant; eviction however, is not permissible under the relevant
state rent control legislation until and unless, specific ground for eviction of the tenant as so
provided under the concerned state rent control legislation is not made out.

The first rent control measure in Delhi came after the outbreak of the Second World War in
1939, under the Defense of India Rules. This was restricted to New Delhi and the Notified
Area, Civil Station. In 1942, the provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941
were made applicable to the remaining areas of Delhi. It was soon realized that the provision
of the Punjab Act were insufficient for a city like Delhi and thus, it was supplemented by
another Order under the Defense of India Rules in 1944. After the war, another
comprehensive legislation was passed for all parts of Delhi by the name of The Delhi and
Ajmer Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947. In 1952, it was repealed by The Delhi and Ajmer
Rent Control Act, which substituted it and ceased the application of rent Acts of other states
to certain parts of Delhi.

Another attempt was made in 1958 to plug certain loopholes of the 1952 act. In the same
year, the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act was passed which sought to protect

3
AIR 1979 SC 1745

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the interest of the slum dwellers. The next comprehensive enactment on rent control in Delhi
was passed in 1958 and came into force on February 9, 1959. This is the current legislation
of rent control in Delhi and it extends to the areas included within the New Delhi Municipal
Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board, together with the urban areas of the Municipal
Corporation of the Urban Areas in Delhi.

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 TENANT UNDER DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958

Previous history of the definition:

The Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act defined tenant as meaning a person who
took on rent an premises for his own occupation, or for the Occupation of an person
dependent on him but did not include a collector of rent or any any midleman who took or
had taken any premises on lease with a view to subletting them to other persons. The purpose
of occupation might have been residential or commercial but the definition itself excluded
any question of assignment of the lease or subletting the whole or a portion of the premises.
This definition was also to be read in the light of S.9(1) which laid down that
‘notwithstanding’ anything in any contract, no Court shall pass any decree in favour of a
landlord or make any order in favour of a landlord whether in execution of a decree or
otherwise, evicting any tenant whether or not the contract of tenancy had been terminated,
unless it is satisfied..."

Reading the two provisions together it was reasonably clear that the expression tenant though,
not so expressly stated in the definition, was in the context of S.9 intended to include a
tenant whose tenancy had been terminated. S.9(1) therefore made it clear that a person
against whom a decree for eviction had already been passed before the commencement of the
Act but who was still in possession on its commencement, was entitled to protection as a
tenant. A person who had been dispossessed or had surrendered possession otherwise than in
execution of a decree could not have the benefit of the section. Obviously 8. 9(1) did not
apply to the case of a decree passed after the commencement of the Act in accordance with
its provisions. It would thus show that the definition 1n the Act, though in general terms, was
not the same as it is under the Transfer of Property Act or’ general law, primarily for one
reason that a tenant remained a tenant whether or not the period of the tenancy had
terminated. This expression in itself was again quite vague taking it doubtful whether
termination of a tenancy on forfeiture or by service of a notice to quit were covered. On this
interpretation only tenancies or a specified period would be affected. However, a larger
interpretation was laced on the expression and all cases of ex-tenants who had continued to
main on the premises inspite of the termination of their lease were held entitled to protection.

The definition of 'tenant’ in Act 38 of 1952 which repealed the previous one s as under:

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 ”Tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises
and includes sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant under the
provisions of any law before the commencement of this Act.”

The original definition in the present Act was as follows:

’Tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent would be payable
and includes a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination
of his tenancy but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree to:
eviction has been made”.

Current definition:

Section 2(l) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 lays down the definition of the term ‘tenant’.
The present clause (l) was substituted for the old one by S. 2(2) of the Delhi Rent Control
(Amendment)Act, 1976, with retrospective effect from the date of commencement of the
principal Act.

Sec 2: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-

"tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises
is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes-

(i) a sub-tenant;

(ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy; and

(iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the
termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and to this clause, such
of the aforesaid person’s-

(a) spouse,

(b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them,

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(c) parents,

(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, as had been ordinarily living
in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of his
death, but does not include,-

any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made, except where such
decree or order for eviction is liable to be re-opened under the proviso of section 3 of the
Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976 (18 of 1976);

(B) any person to whom a license, as defined by section 52 of the Indian Easements Act,
1882 (5 of 1882), has been granted.

Explanation1. - The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in
possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows:-

(a) firstly, his surviving spouse;

(b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving
spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family up to the
date of his death;

(c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them, did
not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the
date of his death; and

(d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, if there is no
surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents of the deceased person, or if such surviving
spouse, son, daughter or parents, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a
member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death.

Explanation II. - If the person, who acquires, by succession, the right to continue in
possession after the termination of the tenancy, was not financially dependent on the
deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a
limited period of one year; and on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is
earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession after the termination of the
tenancy shall become extinguished.

Explanation III.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that, -

(a) where, by reason of Explanation II, the right of any successor to continue in possession
after the termination of the tenancy becomes extinguished, such extinguished shall not affect
the right of any other succession of the same category to continue in possession after the
termination of the tenancy; but if there is no other successor of the same category, the right
to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall not, on such

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extinguishment, pass on to any other successor, specified in any lower category or
categories, as the case may be;

(b) the right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after
the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such
successor, develop on any of his heirs];

According to Section 2(l) of the 1958 Act, a person paying or on whose behalf the rent is
paid is considered as a ‘tenant’. This definition is also an inclusive definition, as for example,
it includes within its periphery a ‘sub-tenant’ also; even a person continuing in possession
after the termination of tenancy along with his legal representatives is deemed to be a tenant,
despite the fact that the contract or the relationship as was so subsisting has been terminated;
these individuals who continue to occupy the premises despite the severance of the landlord-
tenant relationship as was previously subsisting are called as the ‘statutory tenants’. There
are two legal concepts that emerge from this, that is, the concept of “tenant by holding over”
and the concept of “tenant at sufferance”.

In the case of R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh,4 the Supreme Court of India
held that, a tenant at sufferance is the one who comes into the possession of the land under a
lawful title, but who continues to hold the possession wrongfully even after the termination
of the term or the expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore,
the one who wrongfully continues in the possession of the premises even after the extinction
of the lawful title. There is in fact little difference between tenant at sufferance and a
trespasser. In Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act,5 the position of tenancy at sufferance has
been stated thus: “A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in
possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest
which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by
implication of law when the person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues
in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled
(that is, the landlord). A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord
and tenant.” At page 769, it is stated, regarding the right of a tenant by holding over thus:
“The act of holding over, after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a
tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remains in possession after the determination of the term,
4
AIR 1996 SC 140
5
Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act, 7th Edition, at p.633

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the common law rule is that he is a tenant at sufferance. The expression “holding over” is
used in the sense of retaining the possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant
continuing in possession after the determination of the lease without the consent of the
landlord, and a tenant doing so with the landlord’s consent. The former is called tenancy by
sufferance in the language of the English Law and the latter class is called tenancy by
holding over or tenancy at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a
better position than the one occupying the premises without such a consent; the tenancy at
sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the
relationship of landlord and tenant is not established until the rent is paid and accepted, the
assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy
creates a new tenancy.”

Tenancy is not created by payment of rent or by estoppel or by waiver: That in a tenancy, the
payment of rent is an important factor, but mere payment of rent does not create a tenancy.
In the case of Satjit Singh v. Skipper Towers (P) Ltd.,6 it was held that estoppel or waiver
does not create a relationship, since tenancy is a contract there has to be consensus ad idem
(meeting of the minds) and unless it is shown that there was meeting of the minds, it cannot
be deduced that there was a landlord-tenant relationship. In the above case it was
categorically held that, by a unilateral action of the tenant of surrendering his right of
tenancy in favour of a third-party by delivering the possession of the tenanted premises to the
said third party, no new tenancy is created which may legally bind the landlord. By mere
acceptance of rent for the tenanted premises from the said third party, no new tenancy is
created which may legally bind the landlord. Similarly, by mere acceptance of rent for the
tenanted premises tendered by the tenant in the name of a third party, a new tenancy in
favour of the third party cannot be taken to have been created. Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, holds that there has to be an offer and a definite consent or in other
words a bilateral contract; this question of binding bilateral contract between the parties, in
fact, has to be decided according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

In the case of Inmacs Ltd. v. Prema Sinha & Ors,7 it was held as follows:

6
79 (1999) DLT 521
7
RFA No. 341/2007, High Court of Delhi (Decided on: 26.09.2008)

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1. Expiry of lease by efflux of time results in the determination of the relationship between
the lessor and the lessee and since the lease expires under the contract by the efflux of
time thus, no notice of determination of the lease is required.

2. A person who enters upon the property of another without authority of law is a
trespasser. It could be argued that the very next moment after the period of lease stands
expired the act of entering upon property by the tenant is an act of trespass. But the law
says-“no”. A lessee who continues in possession after expiry of the lease, without the
consent of the lessor or without any agreement between the parties or in disagreement
with the lessor, is treated in law as a tenant by sufferance. But where the lessor consents
to the continued possession of lessee on the same terms and conditions as per the
original lease a tenancy by holding over comes into operation.

3. The words “accepts rent or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession” in Section
116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contemplates that from the side of the lessee
there should be an offer to take a new lease and on the side of the lessor there must be a
definite consent to the continuation of possession. In other words there must be a
bilateral contract.

4. Such bilateral contract could be express or implied. Thus, mere continuance of

possession after the expiry or determination of the lease is not enough to entitle the
tenant to establish tenancy by holding over.

5. There is no statutorily prescribed proforma of a notice envisaged by Section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As long as the notice can be reasonably understood by a
person of ordinary prudence that his tenancy has been determined and he is required to
vacate the tenanted premises at the end of the tenancy month, the notice is fine.

6. When a contract of tenancy gets determined by efflux of time, generally, the new
relationship that ensues between the parties is that of a tenancy on a month to month
basis.

In the case of, Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury,8 it was held that if the landlord accepts
the rent from the sub-tenant, it does not create a subtenancy.

8
AIR 1988 SC 852.

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 CONTROL OF EVICTION OF TENANT

Section 14 lays down notwithstanding anything to the contrary to any law or contract, no
order of eviction can be passed except on the grounds mentioned under this Section. These
words give the primacy to rent control law against other laws and the contract itself. A word
‘only’ has been used in Section 14 which makes these grounds as exhaustive but, no doubt, a
landlord can have one or more grounds at the same time to get an eviction. Section 14 puts
various riders before passing the orders of eviction. In simple words, an eviction order shall
follow only if there are grounds mentioned under the Act. If the case is not covered under
any of the grounds, no order of eviction shall follow.

SECTION 14(1) (A)

The law does not provide the form of notice or its content, it is just that it must come from a
proper quarter i.e. the landlord or his counsel.

In Raghunath v. Anant Narayan9, apex court held that mere fact that the amount given in
the notice was incorrect was no ground for holding that the notice was bad and the suit was
not maintainable. Since the amount due is within the special knowledge of the tenant, it does
not make such difference and the tenant is under a duty to pay or deposit as per Section 27 of
the General Clauses Act.

SECTION 14(1) (B)

The sub-letting is not an act forbidden or prohibited by law. The tenant may sub-let the
premises depending upon the contract between him and the landlord. It is only the absence of
writing of the consent of landlord which makes sub-letting a ground for eviction. The
expression “sub-let, assigned or parted with possession”, no doubt, are different concepts but
in all, there is a transfer of legal possession of the premises to the persons other than the
tenants.

In Associated Hotels of India v. Ranjit Singh10, it was held that the initial burden of sub-
letting is on the landlord but once it is discharged, the onus shifts on the tenant.

9
1966 SC
10
AIR 1968 SC 933.

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In the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Anguri Devi11, it was held that merely by the presence of
third party the court cannot assume sub-tenancy.

A three-judge Bench, in the case of Krishnawati v. Hansraj12, has laid down that if a wife
allows her husband to continue the business from the premises then it would amount to sub-
letting.

In Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam13, it was held that merely because a tenant has entered
into a partnership he cannot be held to sub-let if the use and the control is still with the tenant
but if it is apparent that the tenancy has been divided or the possession has been distributed,
it would amount to sub-letting.

SECTION 14(1) (C)

By this Section there is an embargo in a sense on a tenant no to use the premises for any
other purpose otherwise than for which he was authorised under the agreement. In this
Section, there is a change of user from residential to commercial or vice-versa. The change
of the user should also be of such a nature that is causing a public nuisance or damages the
property or is detrimental to the landlord.

In Pushpa Devi v. Om Prakash, it was laid down that for having eviction under Section
14(1)(c) a notice should also be given to the tenant requiring him to stop the misuser and the
period of one month should have elapsed from the notice.

SECTION 14(1) (D)

This clause is attracted if the premises are let-out for residential purpose only and the period
of 6 months should be a continuous period.

In Kapil Bhargav v. S.C. Aggarwal14, the court held that if the sub-tenant is in possession it
would not mean that the tenant is in possession.

In Baldev Sahay Bangia v. R.C. Bhasin15, the court defined and laid down the term ‘family’
with a wider meaning. It has included not only the head of the family but also all the

11
AIR 1984 SC 1447.
12
AIR 1974 SC 280.
13
(2004) 4 SCC 794.
14
AIR 2001 SC 3334.
15
AIR 1982 SC 1091.

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members, the descendants and the ascendants from a common ancestor who are living
together in the same house.

SECTION 14(1) (E)

The fiction and the mischief of this Section has undergone drastic changes in the recent past.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs vs. Union of
India & Anr.16 has shown that how a judicial over-reach could and should take place, so as
to bring the law in conformity with the demand of the society. It is also a prime example that
sometimes the judiciary should bring out the legislative aspect if the legislators have turned a
complete blind eye due to vote-bank politics.

In Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs vs. Union of India & Anr.17, it was held that “Section
14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the
Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and
non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for
occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the
latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes
only.”

The Supreme Court further opined that “Ends of justice will be met by striking down the
discriminatory portion of Section 14(1) (e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as
under:

“The premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member
of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose
benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably
suitable accommodation.”

In the recent judgment of Delhi High Court in Aero Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. Mohan Singh and
Anr.18, Hon’ble Justice Manmohan Singh while adjudicating issue pertaining to bonafide
requirement of premises under the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 opined that,
“it is not permissible for the tenant to raise such issues pertaining to the age of the landlord,
his experience and financial status. These issues are not much relevant for the purpose of

16
2008 (5) SCC 287.
17
Ibid.
18
Judgment dated 02.01.2014.

14 | P a g e
deciding the application for leave to defend in the eviction petition if it is established prima
facie that the requirement of the landlord is genuine and bonafide and no triable issues are
raised by the tenant.”

In Dev Raj Bajaj v. R.K. Khanna19, it was observed that “Where a landlord or his wife were
unable to climb the stairs due to old age ailments and wanted to shift to the ground floor,
such a need of the landlord was bonafide. A landlord can ask for ground floor for his
convenience and comfort of his health.”

In Kuldip Mahajan v. Krishna Uppal and Ors.20, this Court has observed that “Where
landlady filed a petition on the ground of bona fide requirement as she and her husband are
of old age and landlady’s intention was to shift residence for better medical treatment of her
husband, no malafide was attributed and it was held that a period afflicted by Arthritis would
not find it convenient to reside on first floor when ground floor is also owned by her.”

In Balwant Singh Chowdhary & Anr. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.21, it was
held that “It is not necessary for the landlord to plead and prove the specific business he
wants to set up, if the landlord wanted the premises for business purposes.”

In Gurcharan Lal Kumar v. Srimati Satyawati & Ors.22, it was observed that “Merely
because the exact nature of business has not been described would not take away their
bonafide need to carry out a business (when admittedly both the sons are dependent upon
petitioner for this need). It was observed that if the business need is not disclosed this would
not wipe away the bonafide need of the landlord as has been pressed under Section 14(1) (e)
of the DRCA,1958.”

SECTION 14(1) (F)

Under this clause the necessity of making repairs of the premises is made a ground of
eviction, if the same cannot be carried out without the vacation of the tenant from the
premises. The reason for repairs is that the building has become unsafe or unfit for human
habitation. The Act only considers the public interest, safety and well-being of the persons
and not the financial or commercial aspects involved in the repairs or reconstruction of the
building as provided in some of the Rent Control Acts.
19
1996 RLR 125.
20
97 (2002) DLT 619.
21
2004 (1) RCR 487.
22
RC. Rev. No. 285/2012 and C.M. No.11263/2012 dated 25th April, 2013

15 | P a g e
To invoke this Section, the landlord must prove that:

1.The premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation.

2.He bonafide requires the same for carrying out repairs.
3.Such repairs cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated.

SECTION 14(1) (G)

It provides that the landlord is entitled to recover possession of the demised premises if it is
proved that the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for the purposes of building or
re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations which cannot be carried
out without the premises being vacated. Thus, two requirements of this Section are:

1.The premises are required bonafide by the landlord for the purposes of building or re-
building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations.
2.The court must be satisfied that the specified work cannot be carried out without the
premises being vacated.

SECTION 14(1) (H)

The policy intended under this Section was that the landlords should also have their
legitimate interests safeguarded. When the tenant is no more the vulnerable class or the
person in need, then he should not get the benefit under the Act. In the case of Ganpat Ram
v. Gayatri Devi23 court held that the object of this clause is to protect or restrict the statutory
protection with regard to only one tenancy. If the tenant acquires another accommodation, he
uses his protection under the Act.

The limitation period for Section 14(1) (h) is 12 years from the day of knowledge that the
tenant has acquired an alternative accommodation.

SECTION 14(1) (I)

Generally, there are 2 kinds of tenancies:

i.Ordinary tenancy
ii.Service tenancy

23
AIR 1997 SC 2016.

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Service tenancy means that the tenant is occupying the premises because of the fact that he is
in service or employment of the landlord. The essential ingredients of this Section are:

1.A lessor-lessee relationship.

2.Lessee in service of the lessor.
3.Cessation of service.

In the case of Madhubala v. Shri Ram Scientific & Industrial Research Foundation24, it
was held that Controller only has to see whether the service of the employee has been validly
terminated or not. He might not wait for the final orders if the Labour Court.

SECTION 14(1) (J)

This Section talks about that if a tenant has caused or permitted to cause substantial damage
or impairment, then he is liable to be evicted from the premises. Here the damage may be by
the tenant himself or by any third party and the tenant has not stopped the third party. The
words ‘materially’ or ‘impairment’ are very important. It means the diminishing of the
quality or strength of the premises or the construction which is of such a nature that
decreases the value or utility of the building.

Also in the case of Suraj Prakash Chopra v. Baij Nath Dhawan25, following points have
been laid down:

i.The onus to prove the substantial damage is on the landlord.

ii.He has to prove that the construction was made by the tenant or any other person and
tenant has not stopped the person.
iii.Landlord has to prove by cogent evidence that the damage is substantial and for this an
expert can also be examined.
iv.Every construction generally does not impair the utility.
v.The impairment has to be seen from the point of landlord and not the tenant.

SECTION 14(1) (K)

While creating leases, certain authorities like government, DDA, or MCD imposes certain
conditions upon the person who has been allotted the premises. Legislature has enacted this

24
98 (2002) DLT 399.
25
103 (2003) DLT 645.

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Section to curb the unauthorised use of this premise and also to enable the superior lessor to
take back the leased land.

In the case of, Kamla Marwah v. Kapur Fabrics,26 it was held that, if premises were let by
the landlord to the tenant for a purpose which was in contravention of the terms of the
principal lease deed subsisting between the paramount lessor (that is, the concerned public
authority) and the landlord (that is, the lessee) under the provisions of the concerned statute
(The Delhi Development Act, 1957), then the tenant using the tenanted premises contrary to
the terms of the 33 principal lease deed subsisting between the paramount lessor and the
landlord cannot claim estoppel based on the tenancy agreement subsisting between the tenant
and the landlord, as there can be no estoppel in law against the provisions of a statute, thus,
eviction of tenant can be sought relying upon terms of the principal lease deed,
notwithstanding the terms contained in the tenancy agreement.

Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

Section 14-A to Section 14-D, are somewhat exceptions to Section 14 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. Under Section 14, there has to be a trial, and that too in a strict sense of
the term, and the landlord has to prove thereby that specific ground has been made out to
procure the eviction of the tenant. However, Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the 1958 Act,
postulate a right in favour of the landlord, which stands accrued and fortified in his favour
due to the fact that the landlord is falling within the periphery of the words “certain persons”
as regards Section 14-A; “members of armed forces” as regards Section 14-B; “Central
Government and Delhi Administration employees” as regards Section 14-C; and “widow” as
regards Section 14-D of the 1958 Act. As regards Section 14-A to Section 14-D, “certain
persons”; “members of armed forces”; “Central Government and Delhi Administration
employees”; and “widow”, connote special types of landlords. Thus, by virtue of Section 14-
A to Section 14-D of the 34 1958 Act, a special class of landlords have been created, who
have been conferred with the rights in the nature of availing immediate possession, only by
proving that they belong to the aforesaid specified special class of landlords postulated under
Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the 1958 Act, and they have a bona-fide requirement

26
1993 (1) RCR (Rent) 97

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 SUMMARY PROCEDURE

The Legislature with the intent to provide quick and simple procedure for deciding the
petitions on the ground of bonafide requirement and also under Sections 14A, 14B, 14C or
14D introduced Section 25B by way of 1976 Amendment.

OBJECT

A glance at the provisions of Chapter III A shows that the policy and purpose of the
legislature in enacting section 25A, 25B and 25C is to introduce a swift and expeditious
procedure for trial where the landlord’s application for eviction is found on the ground of
bona fide requirement. Such cases could not be decided under the old procedure as from the
order of the Controller first appeal lay to the Tribunal under sec. 38 and a second appeal lay
to the High Court on a substantial question of law under sec. 39 of the Act. This meant delay.
The legislature was impatient with “law’s delays” and has therefore devised a shortened
procedure of a speedy trial cutting out the right of first and second appeals altogether and
substituting in its place the remedy of revision to the High Court.

PROCEDURE

Section 25B(1) provides that the procedure specified in this section are to be followed in
eviction petition under Sections 14(1)(e), 14A, 14B, 14C or 14D.

Section 25B (2) provides that the Controller to issue summons in the form specified in Third
Schedule.

Section 25B(3)(a) provided for service of summons and lays down that the tenant can be
saved summons by registered post and by publication in newspaper in addition to and
simultaneously with the ordinary mode of services.

Section 25B (3)(b) (Deemed services) provides as to that when an acknowledgment

purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received by the Controller or an
endorsement by the postal employee is received that the tenant or his agent has refused to
receive summons, the Controller may declare that there has been a valid service of summons.

Section 25B (4) provides as to that a tenant cannot contest unless he files an affidavit which
discloses defence within 15 days of service of summons. In default of his appearance in

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pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in
the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant
shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid.

Section 25B(5) provides that if the affidavit by tenant discloses defence, then the Controller
shall give to the tenant leave to defend contest the application on the ground specified in
Section 14(1)€ or Section 14A.

Section 25B (6) says that hearing shall commence as early as possible.

Section 25B (7) mandates Controller to adopt and follow the practice and procedure of Small
Causes Court.

As per Section 25B (8) there is no provision of appeal. However, High Court has the power
of revision.

Under Section 25B (9) Rent Controller has the power of review.

In the case of Precision Steel Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan27, the SC held that Section 25B
is narrower than Order 37, CPC and this must be liberally construed and properly applied in
the prescribed manners. SC made the following observations:

1.On combined reading of Section 14(1) (e), Section 25B(1) and (4), it emerges that
unless tenant obtains the leave to defend, he is deemed to have admitted the averment
made by landlord.
2.After filing of affidavit by tenant, the jurisdiction of Controller is confined to
considering affidavit of tenant and rejoinder affidavit of landlord, if any.
3.If affidavit of tenant disclosed any defence, it is obligatory upon the Controller to grant
leave whether it is proved later or not, is immaterial. The stages of proof are yet to
come.
4.This is a harsh procedure and weighed against the tenant.

Section 25B is mandatory and if no application for leave to defend is filed it is obligatory for
the Rent Controller to accept the statements made by the owner landlord and order eviction.

27
AIR 1982 SC 1518.

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In the case of, Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) through LRs,28 it was held that, there
can be no condonation of delay, not even of 1 (one) day, beyond the prescribed statutory
period of 15 days in filing of the leave to defend application, and if the leave to defend
application is not filed within the statutory period of 15 days, then the bona-fide necessity of
the landlord as averred vide the eviction petition has to be decreed in view of the provision
contained in Section 25-B (4) of the 1958 Act, which necessarily speak of “deemed
admissions”. Once the leave to defend application is not filed within the statutory period of
15 days then- the said leave to defend application cannot be considered, since, there can be
no condonation of delay in filing of the leave to defend application.

28
(2010) 2 SCC 15

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES/REPORTS

1. Dev Satvik, Rent Control Laws in India A Critical Analysis, NIUA WP 06-04
2. Ojha, Shraddha, Protection against eviction and fixation of fair rent, available at :
http://legalservicesindia.com/article/print.php?art_id=510
3. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, available at:
http://www.delhihighcourt.nic.in/library/acts_bills_rules_regulations/The%20delhi%20r
ent%20control%20act%201958[1].pdf
4. THE DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958: CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE
1958 ACT, available at:file:///C:/Users/Shahista/Downloads/SSRN-id2849727.pdf

ONLINE ARTICLES/E-JOURNALS/ WEBSITES

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html#box%201
http://www.pkarchive.org/column/6700.html
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html#box%201
http://www.pkarchive.org/column/6700.html
www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/cae/RentControl.PD

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