The Learning Organization

Understanding the influence of organizational culture and group dynamics on

organizational change and learning
Colleen Lucas Theresa Kline
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Colleen Lucas Theresa Kline, (2008),"Understanding the influence of organizational culture and group
dynamics on organizational change and learning", The Learning Organization, Vol. 15 Iss 3 pp. 277 - 287
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Organizational
Understanding the influence of culture
organizational culture and group
dynamics on organizational
277
change and learning
Colleen Lucas
Calgary Health Region, Calgary, Canada, and
Theresa Kline
University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada
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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between organizational
culture, group dynamics, and organizational learning in the context of organizational change.
Design/methodology/approach – A case study was used to examine cultural and group level
factors that potentially influence groups’ learning in the context of organizational change.
Findings – Major themes that emerged as influencing organizational change and learning were a
culture of mistrust, changing psychological contracts, differing occupational cultures, power
differential between groups, and leadership.
Practical implications – When initiating change efforts, an organization needs to assess and
understand what aspects of the culture can be facilitators or hindrances and what aspects of the group
structures the organization can use to facilitate learning.
Originality/value – This study extends research in the area of group and organizational learning by
identifying group and cultural phenomena that, when manifested, had significant influence on group
members’ response to organizational change and their capacity to learn. In particular, this study
highlights the need to be aware of the characteristics unique to the organization and its culture.
Keywords Learning organizations, Group dynamics, Organizational change, Organizational culture
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
This study was conducted to answer the question, “how do aspects of organizational
culture and group dynamics influence group learning?” A case study investigated the
relationships between organizational culture, group dynamics, and organizational
learning in the context of organizational change. The extant literature highlights the
importance of learning during organizational change. Further, characteristics of an
organization’s culture, and groups within that culture, can influence how individuals
and work groups experience and make sense of organizational change initiatives and
how that subsequently influences their learning. Organizational change that alters the
existing values within a culture and differentially affects groups within the
organization can expect resistance (Trader-Leigh, 2002).
Researchers have acknowledged the importance of organizational culture and its The Learning Organization
Vol. 15 No. 3, 2008
relationship to organizational learning (Cook and Yanow, 1993; Popper and Lipshitz, pp. 277-287
1998; Schein, 1993, 1996; Yanow, 2000) as well as the notion that group dynamics can q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0969-6474
influence organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Wastell, 1999). However, little DOI 10.1108/09696470810868882
 TLO empirical research has examined the characteristics inherent in organizational cultures
15,3 that subsequently influence the learning process.
Schein (1992, 1993) notes the importance of organizational culture in understanding
how organizational learning occurs. He argues that basic assumptions (i.e. the
taken-for-granted, shared, tacit ways of perceiving, thinking and reacting) are powerful
and stable forces operating in organizations. As organizations attempt to cope with an
278 environment that is changing at an ever-increasing rate, they struggle with the changes
required (Schein, 1992). New methods of solving problems or learning often do not get
integrated or institutionalized by the organization. Organizations display “learning
disabilities” or “defensive routines” that hinder the learning and development required.
Driver (2003) found that groups often had difficulty learning. They often did not
capitalize on cognitive diversity and had difficulty developing a group identity and
cohesion; thus they were unable to manage member contributions effectively.
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Edmondson (1997, 2002) found that the most salient factor influencing team learning
was psychological safety (a climate in which group members believe that they can
speak openly about mistakes without fear of negative repercussions).
The findings from these studies can be understood within the systems theory
perspective insofar as systems are made up of a series of subsystems with boundaries
separating them. As a group learns and develops it must contend with a number of
boundaries that, if addressed effectively, allows the individuals to work effectively as a
group. For example, an open boundary facilitates the acquisition of new information,
taking risks, and being open for change; a closed boundary allows the group to
reconsolidate (MacKenzie, 1997). It is through the permeability of boundaries, or the
opening and closing of boundaries, that groups are able to change and learn. Thus, the
groups in Driver’s (2003) study that were not cohesive and had trouble developing a
group identity may have been unable to develop a sufficiently strong external
boundary to allow the group to consolidate. Alternatively, the boundaries between
individual members could have been too rigid or impenetrable to take in new or diverse
information. In Edmondson’s (1997, 2002) studies, the group members expressed a
feeling of psychological safety, resulting in permeable boundaries that allowed for
risk-taking, change, and learning to occur within those groups experiencing that
emotion. This is consistent with studies showing emotion as having a powerful
boundary-opening effect in human interaction (MacKenzie, 1990, 1997).

Methodology
A descriptive case study was conducted using observations, semi-structured interviews
with groups and individuals, and reviewing field notes and documents. Groups directly
involved with and affected by an organizational change initiative were observed in their
work environment and interviewed about how the change affected their group’s
functioning, how change was handled within the organization, and what their group
learned from going through the organizational change. Information on critical events in
the organization’s history was also gathered through interviews and document review.

Background of the case study

The municipality studied was historically served by a volunteer fire department; the
volunteers responded to all emergency calls, fire and medical. As the population grew,
demand increased for an ambulance service with fully trained medical personnel.
 Initially volunteer firefighters, trained as emergency medical technicians or Organizational
paramedics, filled these roles. However, to deal with the steadily increasing call culture
volume, full-time paramedics were hired. With the hiring of the full time emergency
medical services (EMS) personnel, the department shifted from one group offering an
integrated service to two distinct groups offering segregated services. Management
later re-introduced the integrated service model, which involved cross training
personnel so that they could respond to both fire and medical emergencies. At the time 279
the research was conducted, all of the EMS personnel had received some cross training
on fire fighting. Approximately 50 percent of the group was fully competent and
capable of responding to fire calls. However, little cross training in handling emergency
medical calls had occurred with the firefighters. After interviewing the groups, it
became clear that although many of the EMS personnel perceived that they were
integrated with the fire group, the fire officers did not agree.
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Participants
Three distinctive groups worked within the protective services department of a
growing municipality and were interviewed. The three groups were management, fire
officer, and EMS. The management group ranged in age from 38 to 55 years and
consisted of the director of the department, the fire chief, the EMS manager, and an
administrative support person. Their experience with this department ranged from
three years to 20 years (M ¼ 8 years) and their time with this particular group was one
year. Although the fire chief and the EMS manager considered themselves part of the
management group, they also considered themselves part of their respective functional
groups.
The fire officer group consisted of eight male firefighters, ranging in age from 27 to
42 years. The length of time the members had been with this organization ranged from
six to 15 years (M ¼ 9:7 years) and members had been part of the officer group from
nine months to 10 years (M ¼ 4:8 years). The fire officer was a volunteer position with
this department and all the firefighters were also employed full time in other careers.
The EMS group consisted of six males and two females. Their ages ranged from 25
to 41 years. The length of time these people had been with the organization ranged
from two to 13 years (M ¼ 7:1 years). The EMS positions were all full time positions.

Data collection
To increase the trustworthiness of the data collected and the probability that the
subsequent interpretation was credible, data were collected from multiple sources; and
multiple methods were used to collect the data (field notes, interviews, and document
review) as suggested by qualitative researchers (e.g. Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Data analyses
All interviews were audio-taped and then transcribed. Data analyses involved
reviewing the transcripts and documentation, coding the text into emerging themes,
and engaging in the constant comparative method suggested by Glaser (1965). Chunks
of text or different phrases were compared to see what was the same or different about
them. This process highlighted the different properties within a theme or category and
“filled” the category out.
 TLO Themes or categories were also constantly compared and contrasted so those
15,3 interrelated themes could be merged under a more descriptive overarching theme.
Strauss and Corbin (1998) refer to this process as selective coding, an integrative process
of establishing overarching themes by selecting the “core categories”, relating these to
other categories, and verifying those relationships. For example, categories describing
the different relationships between the groups were linked together to form an
280 overarching category that described a specific artifact of the culture in this department.
To establish the credibility and trustworthiness of the research findings the use of
member checking (giving the interpretations and conclusions back to the participants of
the research and allowing them to react to them) was employed (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
Several themes emerged as highly relevant to the learning that occurred within the
groups. Specifically, trust, psychological contracts, occupational cultures, leadership,
and group processes emerged as factors potentially influencing the groups’ learning.
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Each of these themes will be discussed in turn.

Results
Trust and organizational learning
Trust emerged as a dominant theme within the culture that influenced the groups’
learning to change. Trust is defined as the “belief that relinquishing some degree of
control over a situation to one or more others will not lead to personal loss or harm”
(Edmondson, 1999, p. 158). Edmondson differentiated between trust in competence and
trust in intentions. He argued that both are important in producing significant
organizational learning and change. Varying levels of trust were seen within and
between the groups in the current study. Within the fire officer and EMS groups, there
were high levels of trust in competence. Although trust in competence was important
for these groups to perform effectively at the scene of a fire or a medical response, the
organizational change required that trust in intentions also become part of the culture.
Critical events in the history of the department had led to a culture of mistrust. The
department started out as an integrated service where all emergency services were
provided by fully trained and active firefighters. Over the course of time and as the
result of administrative decisions two distinct groups emerged: fire and EMS. Previous
attempts to integrate the two groups resulted in some cross-training occurring, but no
opportunities were provided to gain experience. Thus, the groups continued to provide
services in their own areas. Over time the groups became wary of any new attempts to
combine the two services into a fully integrated department.
Both firefighter and EMS personnel experienced events in which they perceived the
municipality took advantage of their contributions and that their contributions were
not valued. For example, fire officers asked the town administration for a small
honorarium when the firefighters responded to fire calls, a token action which would
demonstrate that the town appreciated the commitment of the firefighters and also
raise the department above the level of “just a volunteer fire department”. The town
administration initially refused the request and the fire chief lashed out at the
firefighters for wanting to be paid for volunteer work. These events left the firefighters
feeling undervalued and unappreciated. The municipality also attempted to remove the
full-time EMS positions and return to a volunteer system. The full-time EMS personnel
were successful in blocking the municipality’s efforts but this contributed to the basic
underlying assumption that management could not be trusted.
 Psychological contracts and organizational learning Organizational
Psychological contracts are based on social exchange theory (Aselage and Eisenberger, culture
2003; Blau, 1964), which maintains that people enter into relationships with others to
maximize their benefits. Psychological contracts refer to the expectations that the
employee and the organization have regarding the particular obligation each owes the
other (Rousseau, 1989, 1995; Schein, 1965). Organizational groups form psychological
contracts with the organization and also with each other that become part of the 281
organizational culture. Thus they become key determinants of group members’
attitudes and behaviors in the workplace (Schein, 1965).
A significant cultural artifact observed in this study was the psychological
contracts that existed between the groups. New psychological contracts to improve the
effectiveness of the department called for increased commitment on the part of the
personnel and also produced potential barriers to learning. This was most apparent
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with the firefighters. Not only were the firefighters being asked to integrate the EMS
personnel into the fire department, they had also recently changed from volunteer to
part-time status receiving employee benefits as well as a small wage ($1.75 Cnd/hour)
when they were on call. However, in return, management asked the firefighters to
commit more time to departmental duties:
We’re also changing from, what we used to call volunteer firefighters, we’re not volunteer,
we’re part time. And that’s a hard one too. We’re making expectations of them as part time
employees. So that coupled with integration of fire EMS at the same time, I think, has been,
it’s been hard on some people. And maybe sometimes even bogged things down because
they’re trying to get their head around being combined, and they’re also trying to get their
head around being a part time staff instead of volunteer (Fire Officer).
Similarly, on the EMS side, psychological contract negotiations were occurring. Two
EMS staff members were hired when the two groups were separate and there was no
expectation that they would cross-train. Management now expected that all EMS staff
would cross-train, representing a change for these two staff members. EMS personnel
who had full-time jobs in that area were now being asked to respond to fire calls when
off duty:
For my partner or for a couple of people that joined here when it was separated, it’s going to
be a bigger change for them. Those are ideas that they hadn’t really thought about when they
accepted the job. They accepted the job as a paramedic, not a paramedic firefighter. So now
there’s some issues there. And for most people it’s been some excitement. Something new or
something added. But for the other people, if you’re full-time, that don’t live in town and can’t
participate fully in the whole . . . in the whole process, I guess, there’s some limitations there
because they’re not there all the time for the majority of calls or seen here often. Their
involvement is perceived to be limited and because of that, they may be treated differently by
other people in the department (Paramedic).
If the psychological contracts were successfully renegotiated in this department, the
move to an integrated department could progress. The fact that the fire and the EMS
groups had different psychological contracts created additional barriers to
organizational learning and change. The disparate contracts experienced by these
groups influenced how they perceived the integrated model and these perceptions
influenced their actions. For example, the majority of the cross-training was fire
training and as a result the EMS personnel perceived that they were the only ones in
 TLO the department that were truly integrated. They alleged that the firefighters were not
15,3 fulfilling their obligations to become trained and the management group was not
putting processes in place to ensure that the fire personnel were cross-trained:
It’s part of our expectations. There are no such expectations put on the fire personnel . . . At
least, if we could see that it’s, like I’ve long said, as training officer on EMS side, I said to [fire
chief], you need to hire minimum EMR and tell your guys, the department’s changing, and
282 you need to be a minimum EMR. It takes like a month to get your EMR. It’s a very basic EMS
level. But that should be a minimum standard. And it just doesn’t happen. Because there’s old
boys that, whether they’re officers or not, or whether they’re just people who have been
around a long time, that don’t want to do their EMR . . . That’s what I mean by it sort of, it’s
yes we’re integrated, but to be honest, the only people who are really integrated are the
full-time staff. That’s it, because we’re expected to do both (Paramedic).
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Occupational cultures and organizational learning

What also emerged in this case study was the existence of two distinct subcultures or
professional cultures – firefighter and EMS. The underlying assumptions and beliefs
inherent in these occupational cultures influenced their interactions and their ability to
merge together as one group. The firefighter culture is paramilitaristic (e.g. hierarchical
structure of captains and lieutenants and clear lines of authority). This structure
includes a strong organizational ideology that discourages questioning of traditional
arrangements (Blau and Meyer, 1971). This culture was in direct contrast to the EMS
culture, which encouraged questioning and displayed a flat structure with little
hierarchy.
Although the occupational cultures were distinct, there were some similarities
observed as well. Both occupations exhibited characteristics of a “hero” culture. The
groups consisted of individuals that approach situations where the average person
would try to escape. Although these commonalties should have brought these groups
together, there was competition between the groups, reflected in their ongoing efforts
to position their group as superior to the other:
It comes from things like, like competition almost, it’s like two sports teams playing the same
game. We’re all here to serve the people and help them, get them through whatever trouble
they’re in. But it’s which team can win, and which is the better team, and if we could just get
that energy channeled into being together sort of thing then the whole team would carry on
and be one big team as opposed to them and us. And we are breaking that down slowly,
slowly (Fire Officer).
The medical field and fire field continuously clash because you’ve got two different concepts
on whose the best, is the easiest way of putting it. We save lives, no you don’t, you can’t save
lives until we bring them to you, that type of thing. That’s continuous. So integration’s a very
hard thing to get through (Fire Officer).
Another characteristic of the “hero” culture is a sense of urgency; the need to “fix
something and fix it now.” Unfortunately a change, such as the one initiated, takes
time. The negative effect of this clash was observed most strongly in the EMS group.
Specifically, those members who were fully cross-trained and going out on fire calls
regularly were the ones that voiced frustration with the process. Some of these
members also felt that the frustration was leading to apathy and less commitment and
could eventually lead to personnel departures.
 Tradition, another aspect of the firefighter occupational culture, was perceived by Organizational
many as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, tradition contributed to role clarity, culture
allowing the firefighters to come together as a team at a fire scene and perform their
duties effectively. On the other hand, it was perceived as contributing to rigidity and
resistance to change. This was in direct contrast to the EMS culture’s values of being
independent thinkers, which led to questioning routines and procedures on a regular
basis. 283
Very different structure, very different. And [EMS Manager] wants us to think on our own.
We make decisions on our own. Third car call comes in, like for instance, there were two calls
that came in right away and me, without discussing it with any management or officer,
decided on my own which one was worse and I pulled myself off one to go to the other. You
can’t do that on the fire side. So you know, [EMS Manager] wants that, that’s good, that’s
good to have us think on our own and think fast and make decisions and stuff. And you just,
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that doesn’t work on the fire side. And like I said that’s where it comes from the hundred
years of tradition unimpeded by progress. They do it, and we say, why do you do it this way?
That’s because that’s the way we do it. Well, it would make sense to do it another way. Yeah,
well that’s not the way we do it. Okay (Paramedic).
The firefighters also used tradition as a defense against change. The fire officers spoke
of the firefighting tradition as an external entity, one that they had no control over.
This allowed them to position themselves such that they personally believed in the
organizational change and wanted it to occur; it was the “tradition” that was creating
the barrier, not them:
Cross-training or integration as a whole, it’s a good idea. It’s a good concept, but again it’s
that 20 years of tradition. You try and break down that cement wall and it’s tough to do (Fire
Officer).
Those are the old firefighter ideals and they’re the ones that are most vocal about, you know,
if we had our druthers, fire’s fire, EMS is EMS. Don’t cross the line (Fire Officer).

Leadership and organizational learning

Leadership emerged as an important factor at different levels of the system. Within the
interim management group, the strong leadership displayed by the director was
instrumental in getting the fire chief and the EMS manager committed to the
organizational change. The director was able to convey a vision of what the integrated
model would look like and he earned their respect by treating them as equal partners in
the process:
Sometimes he was the cheerleader. Sometimes he was the fellow that brought us together and,
you know, sort of set the time lines and got us working together. You know, weeding through
some of the bullshit stuff that we were dealing with and sort of trying to get us on track. So I
think he played a number of roles (Fire Chief).
Although the director was influential in the management group, the fire officers and
the EMS staff did not perceive him as an important factor. An underlying value within
both the fire and the EMS culture was that they respected and accepted leaders who
were part of their profession. Because the director had no fire or EMS training or
experience, he was considered an outsider. Thus, the director could only influence the
groups indirectly through the fire chief and the EMS manager:
 TLO I honestly think that he has nothing to do with the change as a whole. It’s all within this
building, where the change will take place. And, again, you’ve got that unique group, you
15,3 don’t listen to outsiders. We’re very close minded. You can have a firefighter come in, that’s
not on our department, say this is the way you do things and this is the way it works. And
everyone will go [b.s.]. It’s not the way it works, this is the way it works. This is the way we
do it. This is the way it’s done. So every thing that happens for integration is going to stay
within this department, within this building (Fire Officer).
284
The underlying value of these cultures to accept leaders who were part of their
profession carried over to the group leaders and was manifested in the group norms
regarding how one became accepted into the group. For example, the firefighters would
not accept the EMS manager until he had earned their respect, which meant completing
the fire training and progressing through the same indoctrination as everyone else.
Both groups accepted the deputy fire chief because of his extensive background in
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both areas. He had experience managing an integrated department and brought that
experience to this department. He shared his knowledge with the groups. A
conversation with the director six months after hiring the deputy fire chief suggested
that he was a major facilitator in moving the groups forward to an integrated model.
The deputy fire chief offered a clear vision of what this department could look like
within an integrated services model. He was committed to the model and he
communicated that commitment through his actions; he managed the department as an
integrated department. This finding aligns with previous research (Schein, 1992) that
found that transformational leader behavior, which the deputy fire chief displayed in
this case (i.e. role modeling, communicating a vision, fostering a common goal), can
reduce group members’ cynicism about organizational change.
Further, due to the groups’ underlying distrust of management, they believed only
what they saw; they saw by the deputy fire chief’s language and actions that an
integrated department was possible. In contrast, the fire chief and the EMS manager
conveyed, through their language and actions, that the groups were distinct. They
managed the department as a segregated department and did not demonstrate, to their
respective groups, the perception that this change was positive and/or possible. This
finding supports previous research (i.e. Tierney, 1999) that found that a leader’s
perception of a change-conducive climate has a positive influence on a group’s
perception.
This case illustrates that although leadership plays an important role in initiating
and facilitating learning, there are other factors in the culture and the system that
influence leaders’ ability and actions. Schein (1992) notes that leaders have a significant
influence on maintaining and changing the organizational culture. This case study
suggests that because leaders cannot escape the culture of which they are members it
may be very difficult for them to facilitate change.

Discussion
Group processes and organizational learning
This case study revealed inter-group dynamics and group level phenomena that
hindered the groups’ learning and development. The three groups presented as very
cohesive groups. However, the management and the fire officer groups’ cohesion was
developed and maintained by an “us-them” attitude. This is a common means of
establishing group cohesion (Sherif, 1951), strengthening the external boundary that
 helps develop a sense of “groupness”. However, too rigid an external boundary can Organizational
hinder group learning as it may not allow for new information to be assessed and for culture
change to occur (MacKenzie, 1997). This phenomenon was observed with the fire
officers. One fire officer revealed that they were a very “close-minded” group and
acceptance to the fire officer group was a gradual process – no outsiders were
immediately allowed into the group.
This proved to be a significant hindrance in developing an integrated department as 285
the fire officer group actively resisted any new ideas from outside the group. What
made this especially significant and interesting for the change and learning research is
that every single fire officer interviewed expressed the view that he was in full
agreement with the integrated model. It was the “tradition” or the old school that made
it hard to integrate. One officer said it best, “You try and break down that cement wall
and it’s tough to do.” The officer could have been referring to the cement wall in the
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building that divided the fire trucks from the ambulances as it served as an appropriate
metaphor for the external boundary that this group erected around itself.
Member status also emerged as a factor that influenced group learning. Higher
status members are more influential than people with lower status (Levine and
Moreland, 1990) and so can shape group learning through the strong social influence
they exert on other members within the group. That is, although the group members
create and share meaning regarding their experience, the more powerful members of
the group can influence how the others interpret events. In this case, the senior,
longer-tenured fire officers possessed a higher status within the fire officer group due
to their rank and time with the group. Their influence on junior and senior firefighters
hindered the group’s learning in two ways. First, these members experienced the
historical events that led to the culture of mistrust in the department; they passed this
piece of organizational memory on to the junior firefighters. Secondly, the more senior
members may have been more steeped in the firefighting tradition and culture; a
culture that assumes that fire and EMS should remain separate.
Group status also emerged as an issue. The EMS as a group enjoyed higher status
and thus more power than the fire officer group because of its full-time status and also
the services offered by EMS were perceived as more valuable than the services offered
by the firefighters. The fire officers perceived that the status and subsequent influence
the EMS group enjoyed was at their expense. For example, EMS personnel were at the
fire hall 24 hours a day, seven days a week. As the EMS group expanded they required
more physical space, which took away from the firefighters’ space. Many fire officers
perceived that this encroachment was paralleled in the context of the change; as EMS
personnel became more trained and experienced in the fire side, they would move into
officer positions and take away from the fire officers’ status. As a defense against the
threat to self-esteem, the fire officer group actively resisted the change initiative.

Limitations
A potential limitation to this study is the use of a single case study. Although single
cases are not as strong a base for generalizing to a population of cases as other research
designs, “people can learn much that is general from a single case” (Stake, 1995, p. 85).
Another potential limitation of this study is the use of individual interview data to
infer group level phenomena. Although groups were observed, interviews were the
primary source of data for the interpretations. The interviews provided insights on
 TLO group level phenomena by illustrating how members created similar meaning
15,3 depending on their group membership, which was supported by group level
observation and historical documentation.

Contributions and conclusions

The purpose of this research was to deepen the understanding of the potential
286 influence of organizational culture and group dynamics on organizational change and
learning. This study extends research in the area of group and organizational learning
by identifying group and cultural phenomena that, when manifested, had significant
influence on group members’ response to organizational change and their capacity to
learn. In particular, this study highlights the need to be aware of the characteristics
unique to the organization and its culture. When initiating change efforts, an
organization needs to assess and understand what aspects of the culture can be
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facilitators or hindrances and what aspects of the group structures the organization
can use to facilitate learning. Scholars have written about the values inherent in a
learning culture; however, little research has been conducted on how these values are
manifested within an organization. This study revealed some interesting and
unexpected manifestations, such as the patterns of interaction between groups and the
psychological contracts, which could be traced back to underlying values.

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