G.R. No. 127182.

December 5, 2001
HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P. GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON. RAMON P.
ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and SECRETARY RAFAEL M. ALUNAN, III,
Department of Interior and Local Government, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACOB F.
MONTESA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is private respondents motion for reconsideration of the January 22, 2001 Decision of the Court,
which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38664 and reinstated
Resolution Nos. 953268 and 955201 of the Civil Service Commission.
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private respondents appointment on August 28, 1986,
as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case
of Achacoso v. Macaraig, 1 we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES)
eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for
the CES position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his
right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on September 26, 1990, 2 where the nature of
private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government,
was first contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v.
Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. The pertinent portion thereof reads -
The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable to petitioner Montesa. Petitioner was
appointed on August 28, 1996 by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution. He was extended a
permanent appointment by then Minister Pimentel and subsequently confirmed as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission. He is a first grade civil service eligible (RA 1080) the appropriate eligibility for the
position at that time and a member of the Philippine bar.
There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment
of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime
in August 1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department,
as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO
eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appointment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is
that of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the
position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on
security of tenure and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed
upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing
Minute Resolution of the Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of judgment
set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the nature of
private respondents appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, it can no longer be contoverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. 4cräläwvirtualibräry
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that
this is not the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle of res judicata has been set
aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and
jurisprudence. 5cräläwvirtualibräry
In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private respondent who was appointed in 1986
pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, though not a CES eligible, possessed all the requirements for the
position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, since a CES eligibility was
not, at that time, a requirement for the same position.
A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part of the law of
the land by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a
requirement for a position embraced in the CES. Thus:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by the
President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be
made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to
assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint
any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently
take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class
until he qualifies in such examination.
In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down the requirements for
membership in the CES, to wit:
a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the requirements for membership in the CES. Except
as otherwise provided by law, no person shall be admitted into the CES without having satisfactorily
completed the program;
b) Admission into CESDP shall be limited to incumbents of positions falling within the CES duly nominated
by their Department Heads;
c) Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the incumbent-participant shall be enrolled in the roster of
CES eligibles and shall be qualified for appointment by the President to the appropriate rank in the CES upon
recommendation of the Board. He may then be assigned to any position in the CES by the President.
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution. A CES
eligibility was an existing and operative requirement at the time of private respondents appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were the said law and circular inconsistent with the Freedom
Constitution as to render them modified or superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the
appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently acquire the needed
eligibility.
It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the questioned appointment was made on October 16, 1987,
before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO examination was given in 1990, as in
the present case. Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility is required for a CES position,
such that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility shall be temporary. Evidently, a CES
eligibility has always been one of the requirements for a position embraced in the CES. The Court finds no
reason to make an exception in the instant controversy.
Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina Bacal, 6 we ruled that security of tenure in the CES
is acquired with respect to rank and not to position. Hence, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility
is not a requirement in the case of private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment
of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of the same
rank or salary, 7 justify his transfer to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Article VIII
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
People vs. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172
In 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in Ora Centro and Ora Este, both in
Bantay, Ilocos Sur. The prosecutors charged 17 men, together with 82 other unidentified persons, with the
crime of arson, at the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Gutierrez to transfer the
criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, “in the interest of justice and pursuant to RA 5179, as
implemented by AO258 and 274.”The prosecution invoked the Administrative Orders, since the witnesses
refused to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered:

 about 82 of the armed men are still unidentified and at large

 one of the accused, Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province, son of the
Congressman for the First District of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor

 the promotion and confirmation of Judge Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First
Instance was actively supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent
Crisologo
The accused vigorously opposed such transfer.The respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the
ground that Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or
command it, to transfer the cases in question, and denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.The
prosecution resorted to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and mandamus, so the cases may be tried
either at La Union or Baguio City.
Issues:
1. Whether the Secretary of Justice has the power to determine what court should hear specific cases
2. Whether the Supreme Court could transfer the trial to another place
3. Whether the circumstances warrant a transfer of the trial to another place
Decision:Judge Gutierrez was correct in regarding the Administrative Orders as merely directory rather than
mandatory, but he erred in denying that the circumstances justified the transfer.
1. The Secretary of Justice has no power to determine what court should hear specific cases.Any such
powertrenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; it would
endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be a means of predetermining
the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration’s
preferences.
2. Judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributesreasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. The courts “can by appropriate means do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of
government.” One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of
cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. Hence, the
Supreme Courtpossesses inherent power and jurisdiction to transfer the trial and disposition of a case
from one court to another. [Note: this case occurred before the 1987 Constitution]
 3. In this case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of the criminal cases
to another place in the interest of truth and justice.The fear expressed by the witnesses cannot be
considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the circumstances. Such refusal
necessitates transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the State is to be given a fair
chance to present its side of the case
The requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in question with
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were committed. The holding
of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction.
Secondary Notes:
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site cannot be made, because it is a long-
standing rule of criminal procedure that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction
where the crime is committed.
U.S. vs. Cunanan: the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-
defined territory and they cannot take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense committed outside of
that limited territory.
Beltran vs. Ramos: the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents was “not to… cause [the defendant]
great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.”
Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but
logical that the court should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies,
and to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial
justice.The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. It is just a means to an end.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).

SYNOPSIS
For respondent’s stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
the latter’s constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the
removal of respondent’s name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of
the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay
membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an
invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an
administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise
of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as
a regulatory measure designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that
the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X,
Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that
the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-
Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized
Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation
by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.

2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW
NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
The expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The Congress
in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in
the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES
REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law," (Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER’S

CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he
is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. —
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer s public responsibilities.

9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE
SUPREME COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.

10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional
nor illegal, and a lawyer’s stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment
and striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the
IBP, which reads:

". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member’s name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary
of the Chapter concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon’s
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent’s pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule,
which reads:

"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys."
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
‘Integrated Bar of the Philippines,’ composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."

The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, Et Al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.

". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is ‘perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable’ . . ."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were
prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article
X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively."

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act
of Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate,
indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which
the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It
has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to
protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power
will not be misused or prostituted. . ."

The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to
remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338 September 5, 1997
[Formerly OCA IPI-95-21-RTJ]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with
violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her decision
in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon."
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of private
document. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision
sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him. The accused and his counsel
were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns
went to the court to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right, complainant
filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his light to submit a more
elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on
May 12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainant's counsel was told that the decision had not yet been
finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an "Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence
and to Dismiss" the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion, complainant was served a
copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to
Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one
year and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation
of Art. VIII, §14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and §15 of the same Art. VIII, which
provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three months from the date of their
submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and including therein, as additional
penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full
decision of the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the motions for
reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by voluntarily inhibiting herself from further
consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. The case was
eventually assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the reading of the
dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of
preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation. Respondent judge states
that after the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo
(Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The
court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of
the decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of personal
problems which contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2)
stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the Social
Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January to December 1993 she had to dispose
of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and land registration
cases as well as special proceedings filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in the mornings
and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through some personal tragedies. She lost her niece,
Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was followed by
the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondent's care for the past
eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993, respondent's father died of diabetes, renal failure,
pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who single-handedly brought them in and out of the
hospital because all her able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from
diabetes and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to
December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondent's family suffered
financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding
the charge of violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called attention to the written decision of
respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late, nonetheless states the facts and law on which it
is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be without basis in view of the
absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondent's
failure to furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time after its
promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administration believes that Judge Lopez should be given
admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, §15(1) of the Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-
four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for
decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April
22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion of complainant's liability, had already
been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the
fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision
furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
§1. Judgment defined. — The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the
accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by law on the accused.
§2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
§. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense,
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the
judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this
was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant, it is
obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. VIII, §15 of
the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was
to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took
respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do so. Respondent claims that she
was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the Court
to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision.
At all events, she could have applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of
judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a "sin perjuicio" judgment, which is a
judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final
judgment.1 That is why, in answer to complainant's charge that the dispositive portion of the judgment read to
him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power
to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge
states, because the decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the
case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.2 Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22,
1993 was a "sin perjuicio" judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon
which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of
rendering "sin perjuicio" judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation
that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered.3 This Court has expressed approval of
the practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last
moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent leakage,4 but that refers to the preparation of
their decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision. There would be
no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of respondent's failure to
furnish him with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight months is without basis. It appears that
despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992 the parties were required
to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any, was not such "vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay"5 as to justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is that the
reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of
judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to
appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of the decision in
order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion for
reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of Lands v. Sanz,6 complainant's period to
appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the
judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the
anxiety to refute a conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judge's culpability. Except for this incident, respondent's
record of public service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor,
and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for
more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first time she is
required to answer an administrative complaint against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was
brought about by factors not within her control, to wit, lack of stenographers and unusually big number of
cases; and her personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both her parents, financial reverses of the
family, and poor health as a result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,7 a joint decision in two criminal cases was rendered by respondent judge on
February 24, 1978, six months and eight days from submission of the case, and a copy was delivered to
complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition of the decision. Two complaints were filed
for violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower courts within
three months and for violation of complainant's right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in
deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled the records. As to the delay in furnishing
complainant with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his clerk who did not think
complainant was entitled to receive the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the delay in that
case was even less excusable than the difficulties experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in
respondent's family, her own poor state of health, financial reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of
work done within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her liability. The Court believes that a
similar penalty would be appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same
acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.