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Qualitative damage assessment as a part of the RBI (Risk-Based Inspection)

process

Conference Paper · October 2014

DOI: 10.13140/2.1.3795.8401

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 Qualitative damage assessment as a part of the
RBI (Risk-Based Inspection) process

A. Jovanovic (1), J. M.. Bareiss (2), J. Peters (3). S. Husta (1),

(1) Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies, (2) EnBW, (3) TÜV Rheinland South Africa

40th MPA-Seminar
October 6 and 7, 2014 in Stuttgart
Abstract
This paper describes the factors considered in the process of Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) on
the level of qualitative analysis of pressurized components in large fossil-fuel fired power
plants. The overall procedure is described and its application on a selected power plant
examples shown. The advantages/disadvantages of the approach are discussed and the
conclusion related to the applicability of the approach made. Finally the link of the approach to
the new EU standard FprEN and the German VGB Standard VGB-S-506 (“Condition
monitoring and inspection of components of steam boiler plants, pressure vessel installations
and high-pressure water and steam pipes”) is discussed.

1 Introduction
The acceptance of risk and risk-based approaches in inspection, maintenance and
management in power and process plants has increased nowadays. Technical risk has
become economic, public relation and political issue. Who invests both risk management and
in risk mitigation or reduction, expects an economically and otherwise measurable benefit. This
paradigm means in the practice that it is important to know and manage the risk, to not only
reduce or eliminate it “by all means”. In the particular area of the existing often very aged plant
(power/process) the risk-based approaches play a special role.
The approaches to risk propose solutions requiring to:
• assess risk/cost (statically, i.e. for one given set of conditions)
• establish the “distance” between the current level of risk/cost and the limit one,
and
• propose/introduce measures for risk/cost reduction.
In the case that the measures have been successful, the plant can be kept in operation for
longer time. Much of the consideration in this classical approach is devoted actually only to the
internal plant costs, e.g. those of maintenance. Therefore, the main issue appears to be finding
of the right balance between gain/profit obtained by risk-reduction measures (e.g. life
extension, higher availability and similar), and cost of the risk reduction measures. In the
conditions of the liberalized market, the above approach is not sufficient, because it does not
take into account the fluctuation of market prices. Therefore, the new market-oriented
approaches advocate on-line dynamic analysis of the price cost ratio.
Including risk considerations into the daily practice of maintenance was not a straightforward
and easy process. In order to come to its current state, the practice has passed through a
number of phases, which can be described as
• corrective (“repair upon failure”) maintenance
• scheduled (“time-based”) maintenance and
• risk-informed inspection and condition-based maintenance, leading nowadays to
concepts known as reliability-centered maintenance (RCM), risk-based inspection
(RBI) and similar concepts.
These risk-aware solutions mean that it is necessary to move away from the traditional
(officially prescribed) and time based practices, and to adopt strategies based on the condition
state of the component and related risk. Thus, the overall safety, reliability and economy of the
plant can be improved and the resources optimally used by ensuring that inspection is focused
onto the critical components. Two elements of risk have to be assessed separately: probability
(likelihood) of occurrence and nature of consequences. To derive the probability, a detailed
knowledge of the continuing degradation mechanisms, which can affect each item of
equipment, is required. This must be based on a thorough evaluation of the component itself
(“condition assessment”), its operating conditions and the process in the plant. Similarly,
assessment of the consequence requires a full understanding of the mode of failure and its
consequent effect.
The interest for assessing risks in aged plants can be different. For instance, it is often the lack
of other options available – e.g., lack of free space and/or time for building completely new
ones. The need to use the existing infrastructures, networks and plants as reserve or fallback
position during the introduction of new technologies – e.g., in the case of renewable
technologies requiring “reserve” supply in the stand-by, is a common reason, too.
Aged infrastructure and plants often need to operate beyond their design lifetime or in
combination with other heterogeneous systems. An example of the latter could be the use of
aged plants in energy systems as a “smart” reserve for the renewables. The effective agreed
strategies to address aging issues are yet to be developed and consistently applied.

2 Current risk-based approaches

Certain sectors of industry, particularly the refining and petrochemicals sectors, but nowadays
increasingly also general process, power, paper and steel industry, set the inspection priorities
on the basis of the specific risk of failure. The incentives for the above trend can be found
primarily in the potential benefits, which the improved targeting and timing of inspections offer
to the industry. The main benefits are:
• improvement of the plant safety and reliability, and
• cost savings by eliminating ineffective inspection, extending inspection intervals
and greater plant availability.
Concentration of the inspection and maintenance effort onto the right items of the plant,
including timely identification and repair or replacement of deteriorating equipment, on one
side, and avoiding unnecessary inspection and maintenance actions are the key practical
actions leading to the realization of the above-mentioned desirable benefits.
Safety limits are usually imposed by law (e. g. radiation related ones in nuclear power plants,
or pollutant emissions in chemical plants) – it means that if the risk of certain averse event in
the plant must be kept below the limit, otherwise the plant will be shut down. Economic limits
(e. g. in conventional thermal power plants) mean that the additional cost due to experienced
and/or potential damage (increasing e. g. the insurance costs) will burden the operation so
much that the plant will have to be shut down as non-profitable. In the case that the measures
have been successful, the plant can be kept in operation for longer time (Figure 1). For
example in the case of a power plant only boiler and piping maintenance cost over the lifetime
of the plant can reach the level of the 10% of the capital cost for the whole plant. Therefore,
the main issue appears to be finding of the right balance between
• gain/profit obtained by risk-reduction measures (e. g. life extension, higher
availability and similar), and
• cost of the risk reduction measures.
Software systems supporting current approaches (Figure 2) are nowadays widely used and
calculations of the consequences made, but it often remains transparent what assumptions
were made and details are frequently hidden in the “black box”. The same often applies to
data coming into the RBI/RBLM system from other software systems (e.g. monitoring
systems, plant databases, etc.) – these data are often not visible for the analyst. Old plants
are often utilities’ favorites – economic pressure to increase the plant life can be huge and
possible benefits, but assessing risks of old plants, often to be assessed by the engineers
younger than the plant, in the lack of reliable, even basic, data, can be a huge problem.
Assessing risks of a plant built on the “globalized” market – multiple and combined vendors,
suppliers or subcontractors “disappearing” in mergers and acquisition, language barriers, use
of web (imposing often additional challenges to the confidentiality of sensitive data) can
become an insurmountable problem for the assessor.
Safety risk

Cost of real and/or possible damage safety

limits
limits of
economical
operation
Introduction of risk
reduction measures!

Introduction of risk
reduction measures! time

Figure 1: Time-dependency of cost, safety and risk

Plant systems
Interface 1
(e.g. CAD)

Business
Monitoring Intelligent
Interface 2 Interface USER
systems (e.g.
SAP) Module

Other RCM, RBI and

similar systems Interface 3

RBI / RBLM
System

Level I www

Level II LAN/VB+Data server

(Level III if available/done) LAN/VB+Data server

Figure 2: Example of configuration of different database systems involved

in RBI/RBLM analysis
Current approaches, e.g. those proposed by API ([7], [9], [10]), or VGB ([3], [2]), can be applied
in situations less favorable in terms of available data (e.g. aged power or process plants) and/or
requiring the risk assessment on an more “gradual” and “adjustable” scale. That allows refining
the assessment as soon as the new knowledge/data become available. The proposed way of
performing the PoF is, thus, always “semi-quantitative” in a different way in each particular
case of analysis, depending on the needs of the analysis and available resources. The
screening, as the simplest way of analysis and the fully quantitative (detailed) analysis, as the
most complex way of analysis, are therefore, only the two extremes of the same methodology
for PoF assessment. Furthermore, when an analysis is started at one level, e.g. on the low
predominantly screening level, it can be extended towards a more quantitative or detailed
analysis when needed, with no repetition of steps and with full re-use of the results available
from the previous phase. Such approach is fully in agreement with the RIMAP approach
proposed in the basic document CWA 15740:2008 [1], and the supporting ones [4]).

3 Need to have alternative agreed and/or certified approaches

The considerations of most of the current approaches are focused on damage as the main
cause of structural failure. The CWA 15740 and the future EN based on it explicitly include
also other possible causes, e.g. those related to operation, thus involving maintenance. The
most important parameter of damage analysis is the damage rate (for “trendable” damage
mechanisms only, obviously), thus, this chapter gives guidance for assessing the probability
of failure (PoF) of an item, which is subjected to a continuous degradation mechanism and
systematic inspection program. It should be noted that this is not the result of the PoF
assessment: given a failure of a certain type, there is not a one to one correspondence
between the probability of occurrence of a failure and the probability of having a certain harm
of a given intensity.
Legislation with regard to Pressure Equipment

OHAS-Act 85, 1993 NNR-Act 47, 1999

Pressure Equipment Regulation Regulation for Nuclear Safety and

(PER) Regulatory Practice (RSRP)

SANS 347 SANS 10227 RD0018 / RD0034

Health-and Safety Standards (HSS) Conformity to HSS and Regulation

...ASME, EN, API, CWA, SABS,… ...Accreditation, Certification, Categorization…
→ Appendix in SANS 347 →ISO 17020 / 17021 / 17024 / 17025

Figure 3. Example of the inclusion into national regulation (SANS

347:2012) [14]: Place of the CWA 15740:2008 in the overall system is
mentioned as “CWA”
The development of the CWA since it has been approved in 2008 has been marked by the
following major developments of the methods:
• Creation of the respective VGB Guideline (nowadays VGB Standard VGB-S-506)
for German power plants
• Inclusion in to the national regulation of some countries and including the
certification requirements – like in South Africa (Figure 3)
• Development of the concept involving
o economic analysis and includes aspect related to NPV (net present value)
and CAPEX/OPEX (capital/operational expenditure),
o further development of the concept of CWA 15740:2008 towards a European
standard (EN), and
o embedding the concept in the overall concept of aging management.
Risk based inspection and maintenance management requires experienced personnel at all
levels as well as appropriate routines for the execution of the work. Current relevant standards
do not set fully comprehensive formal requirements for the qualifications of people that perform
inspection and maintenance planning, even if the execution of inspection and maintenance
activities is partly regulated through qualification schemes, such as e.g., ISO standards such
as 17020 [11], 17025 [12], and European standard EN 473 (International Standard ISO 9712,
since 12-2012) requirements [13]. RBIM planning requires a multidisciplinary team with
engineering competency within:
• Inspection and maintenance
• Specific equipment disciplines (e.g. materials, corrosion, electrical, fixed and
rotating equipment)
• Safety and health issues
• Plant operation and process
• Reliability and risk assessment

Figure 4 Elements of the equipment modification factor FE (API) [8]

4 Need for more qualitative approaches

At the time when the approaches such as [1], [2], [7] or [9] were developed, the emphasis was
largely on the idea to use the quantitative approaches and calculate the risks using, e.g.,
quantitative factors and numbers. E.g. determining the PoF using generic statistical data from
a component behavior database are re-examined and adjusted for the given item according to
the equation below and Figure 4
Frequency adjusted = Frequency generic ⋅ FE ⋅ FM
The failure probability (likelihood) is calculated based on modelling of influencing factors, e.g.
corrosion, fatigue, fracture toughness, extreme loads, etc., and including reliability of input
data, especially data coming from inspections. The approach as such is often reaching the
limits of its applicability when confronted with large number of components for which the data
are not available and the time available for analysis limited. For instance, in a large utility
company, with say 40,000 MWe of installed power, the number of components needing the
RBI analysis can go in hundreds of thousands. In a practical example taken here, the amount
of installed power is distributed over 14 large power stations with approx. 80 units and over
4,000 components in each unit, ending up to be over 300,000 components (internal pressure
over 50kPa). Performing detailed quantitative analysis for such a large number of
components can be a challenge. Possible solution can be recurring to the more qualitative
approach, and in such a case, e.g. for power plants, it is important to structure the
quantitative analysis as much as possible. New EN standard being developed within the
CEN TC 319 Maintenance has provided an extension exactly in that sense (Table 1).

Based on the principle as those in Table 1 one can evaluate also the other factors, such as:
• Estimated Rate of Degradation (relative to required service period)
• Operating Conditions
• Likelihood of Mal-operation
• Industry experience
• Prior repairs/damage
• Typical start -up rate/loading rate
• Adequacy of inspection techniques
• Calculated rate of degradation
• Water/steam chemistry
• Mechanical fatigue
• Thermal fatigue
• Local mechanical over-stressing
• Local hot spots
• Nominal operating temperature
• Corrosion susceptibility
• Frequency of temperature excursions
• Severity of temperature excursions
• Design concerns
• Repair cost
• Business
• Failure type
• Estimated area affected by failure
• No. of people in area
• Lost MW-hours
• Repair cost as a consequence factor.
 Table 1: Example of assessment of damage susceptibility
Questionnaire H&S factors influence consequence
CoF

Very High
Very Low

Medium

High
Low
Damage statistics, failure statistics
Q1.1 Shows no evidence of failure * **
Q1.2 Isolated cases only (internal or external
statistics)
Q1.3 Damage after occurring in similar components
(internally or externally)
Q1.4 Damage regularly occurs on similar
components
Q1.5 Statistics not available
Damage related to design, material, or assembly
Q2.1 Not expected * **
Q2.2 Not expected under known operating
conditions and design
Q2.3 Could rise under known operating conditions
and design
Q2.4 Increased damage could rise due to known
operating conditions and design
Damage caused by operating conditions, including process fluids
Q3.1 Not expected * **
Q3.2 Not expected under known operating
conditions and design
Q3.3 Could rise under known operating conditions
and design
Q3.4 Increased damage could rise due to known
operating conditions and design
Health & Safety
Q4.1 None possible
Q4.2 None expected
Q4.3 Minor or negligible effects
Q4.4 Minor injuries with non-productive time losses
Q4.5 Major injury, fatality possible
* Long operating experience
** Short operating experience
 Table 2: Example of probability and consequence factors for qualitative
analysis
Risk Analysis – Screening level Risk Analysis – Detailed level
Probability Assessment Criteria Probability Assessment Criteria
Factors Factors
Age (since High: Less than 50k Age (since Very Low: 30k to 99k hours
installed) hours or more than 150k installed) Low: 100k to 149k hours
hour of operation Medium: 150k to 199k hours
Low: Between 50k and High: 200k to 250k hours
150k hours of operation Very High: <30k or >250k
hours
Material High: Known Total Starts Very Low: <10
issues Low: Not known per year Low: 10 to 49
Medium: 50 to 99
High: 100 to 200
Very High: >200
Last High: >6 years Material Very Low: No
inspection Low: <6 years issues Medium: Possible
High: Yes
Damage/ High: Yes Repairs / Very Low: No repairs
Degradation Low: No Damage Medium: Possible repairs
Present High: Knows repairs
Consequenc Assessment Criteria Consequen Assessment Criteria
e Factors ce Factors
Failure type High: Burst Failure type Very Low: Pin hole leak
Low: Leak Low: Minor: Leak
Medium: Medium leak
High: Major leak
Very High: Burst
Safety High: Likely fatalities Estimated Very Low: 5m diameter
Low: Unlikely fatalities Area Low: 6-10 m diameter
affected by Medium: 11-20m diameter
Failure High: 21-40m diameter
Very High: over 40m
diameter
Health High: Major implications No. of Very Low: 1
Low: Minor or No people in Low: 2-3
implications Area Medium: 4-5
High: 6-7
Very High: >8
Environment High: Major Impact Time in Very Low: Up to 1 hour
Low: Minor or No impact Area Low: 1-2 hours
Medium: 3-4 hours
High: 5-6 hours
Very High: >6 hours

5 Application
5.1 Case data
According to the Code of Rules on Technical Requirements for the Design, Manufacture and
Conformity Assessment of Pressure Equipment (Official Gazette of RS, number 87/2011,
75/2013), the conclusions of the report of inspections carried out in 2013 on boiler (factory nr.
3635) - report nr. 130404-2/1 IT PED Inspect, and Control Report nr.131030-1-I003, dated
28.08.2014, the owner/operator of the equipment is obliged to provide a risk analysis of the
equipment in agreement with the provisions of ISO 31000 [6] and the applicable standards of
risk management, in order to determine the periodicity, type and scope of future inspections
more accurately. In the example presented here, RBI Level 1 and Level 2 risk assessment for
a set of pressurized components of an industry boiler (Table 3) is considered. The analysis is
based on recent and historical inspection reports and inputs from the plant personnel and it
suggests the type and scope of future inspections, and possible mitigation measures, in the
case of high risk components, if any are identified during the assessment.
Table 3: General technical information of the boiler
Manufacturer John Thompson Water Boiler LTD, England
Factory number 3635
Year of manufacture 1966
Type Steam watertube boiler/generator
Class II
Boiler group IV according to JUS M.E2.002:1991.
Category IV according to the pressure vessel
inspection Regulations (Official Gazette of RS
nr.87/2011, 75/2013)
MAWP 38 bar
Test pressure 51 bar
Nominal steam temperature at boiler 390oC
exit
Fuel Fuel Oil
Upper and lower drum material of BS 1501-161 Gr.28A
construction
Downcomer, economizer and screen BS 3059/3 (Č.1204)
tube material of construction
The assessed components of the boiler are listed below. The listed components are due for
inspection within a maximum of one year of operation, as stated in the conclusions of the June
2014 compilation of inspection reports.
Component / Pressure Vessel Description and/or identification number
Lower Drum Boiler mud drum.
Upper Drum Boiler steam drum.
Economizer Upper, middle and lower economizer tube
bundles.
Superheater1 Boiler superheater tube bundle.
Furnace Boiler furnace tubes.
On the basis of all available data of operational history provided by the customer, the following
observations relevant to providing the final appraisal of the useful life can be given:
1. Due to the age of the boiler (the boiler was first placed into operational service in
1968) and the frequent problems with tube leaks/bursts in the convective
evaporator, at the request of the inspectorate for pressure vessels the maximum
allowable pressure and the operating pressure have been lowered several times
since 1994. As a result, the outlet steam pressure has been limited to 40 bar for a
number of years.
2. The first case of repairs on the rolled tube-drum connections occurred in 1994.
3. The first case of convective evaporator tube leaks/breaks occurred in 1997.
Repairs were carried out by plugging the leaking tubes in both drums. The following
methods were applied during repairs carried out on tube openings, screen tubes
and drums: replacement of tube plugs, re-welding of existing plugs and seal
welding of rolled tube-drum joints.
 4. Based on the available documentation provided by the customer, it was not clear
whether the vulnerable locations on the drum shells, in the vicinity of tube
openings, contained micro or macro cracks prior to the plugging and seal welding
repairs carried out in the period of 1997-2004.
5. In certain areas on the shells, in the vicinity of unplugged, plugged and re-plugged
tubes, repairs were carried out on more than one occasion in the period of 1997-
2004.
Based on the chronological review of all plugged tubes and repaired zones/tubes of both
drums, ending with the overhaul carried out during the outage in June-August 2008, the
following conclusions can be drawn:
6. The practice of plugging the tubes of the convective evaporator has been ongoing
since the first plugging in 1997. At the current moment 66(68) tubes out of 770(792
including downcomer tubes) have been plugged, which represents ~8.6% (~8.3%)
of all tubes.
7. The number of plugged tubes on the left side of the boiler is significantly larger
(>67%) than on the right side.
8. The number of plugged tubes/openings in individual elements and rows is very
uneven and very large in some cases:
• Row 13 contains 15 plugged tubes out of 36 (41.67%)
• Element 17 contains 10 plugged tubes while element 18 contains 8
plugged tubes, which represents 45.5% and 36.4% respectively.
9. If the distribution of plugged tubes in row 13, and their density by elements is
observed, it can be noted that these areas on the shells of both drums are similar
to a non-continuous weld at a location not foreseen by design, and therefore
represent a significant macro-scale wakening of both drums. In a similar fashion,
plugged tubes in elements 17, 18 and 19, at either side of the central circ-weld,
represent a non-continuous expansion of the central circ-weld and significantly
influence the integrity of both drums.
10. During the overhaul carried out in June 2004, the first large repair of the bottom
drum was carried out, in the so called “large repair zone”. The work included the
repair of a through-wall crack on the central circular weld between (row/element):
10/18 and 10/19. A number of tubes were plugged in a wider zone around the
through-wall crack. Repairs of already plugged tubes were carried out by grinding
and re-welding, due to the appearance of a number of starform cracks around the
openings. All repairs on the lower drum carried out in 2004 were performed by, and
in accordance to the technology of the operator.
11. During the overhaul carried out in 2005, the presence of branching macro-cracks
was again detected in the area of the “large repair zone” on the lower drum. Cracks
were detected on the central circular weld between openings (row/element) 10/18
and 10/19, as well as in a new zone, the so called “small repair zone”. In addition
to this, starform cracks were detected at roughly the same locations as in 2004, as
well as the presence of shallow surface micro-cracks in the vicinity of plugged
openings.
12. During the overhaul carried out in 2006, a detailed examination of all vulnerable
zones of both drums was carried out, especially the small and large repair zones
on the lower drum. Deep cracks (up to 35mm) were again detected between
openings (row/element) 13/19 and 14/18 in the “large repair zone”, in the repair
weld. The repair weld was created by a high-alloy electrode during the overhaul in
2004. Extremely high hardness values were measured in the repair zone (337-358
HB).
A high-alloy electrode was again used to repair the crack. Cracks were detected and ground-
out in the “small repair zone”, around plugged opening 13/18. A large number of cracks in the
vicinity of plugged openings was detected on the upper drum, mostly in two zones: a zone
corresponding to the “large repair zone” on the bottom drum, in the vicinity of the central
circular weld and a zone in the vicinity of opening (row/element): 3/27.
13. Testing conducted during the overhaul in 2007 did not indicate the presence of
cracks in the large and small repair zones, but a crack was detected on the plug
weld at opening 14/7. The existing plug was replaced. Rolled tube-drum
connections were seal welded at openings 16/6 on the lower and 14/7 on the upper
drums.

5.2 Level 1 risk assessment

The screening or Level 1 analysis of the components of the boiler was carried out in the
respective software tools:
• The iRIS-Petro qualitative Level 1 risk analysis allows for the rapid screening of
components/units, providing a basis for prioritizing a risk-based inspection
program, and requires less detailed input information about the facility. Level 1 data
is input into categorical dropdown selection fields which determine parameters
such as: representative fluid, inventory, toxic percentage, business interruption,
initial fluid state, operating pressure and temperature, financial consequences,
potential damage mechanism, previous inspection date, etc.
• The DNV Orbit qualitative Level 1 screening analysis is very similar to the iRIS-
Petro one, and consequently it was used as a control tool, to verify the validity of
the results given by iRIS-Petro. Basic design and operational data, fluid state and
potential damage mechanisms determine the risk ranking, similarly to iRIS-Petro
(but with somewhat fewer options/input parameters).
• iRIS-Power is a custom software tool developed specifically for use in power
industries. This tool employs a qualitative method for both screening and
intermediate level analysis. Components/systems are analyzed selecting the
values of a series of probability and consequence influencing factors. The
screening level contains fewer criteria, and the value of each criterion can be
defined either as High or Low. The resulting scores are then related to a generic
failure frequency (GFF), in order to obtain the relative PoF, CoF and risk. The Level
1 screening matrix differs from the 5X5 matrices in iRIS-Petro and Orbit, and is in
some ways more conservative, and is divided into three primary areas (green,
yellow, red). If the determined PoF and CoF of a component/system lies in the
green area, the risk is at an acceptably low level and no other assessment is
required. If it resides in the yellow (medium risk) area, the component should be
assessed in Level2, and if it resides in the red (high risk) area, the component must
go on to Level 2 assessment.

5.3 Evaluation of screening level results

The results obtained in iRIS-Petro are shown in Table 4 and Figure 5 below. All of the
components have fallen into the medium risk category.
 Figure 5: iRIS-Petro Level 1 risk matrix of boiler components with
associated risk levels
Table 4: Boiler components and associated Level 1 risks in iRIS-Petro

The results obtained in DNV Orbit are shown in Table 5 and Figure 6 below. The results are
very consistent with the results obtained in iRIS-Petro, as shown in the comparison of individual
component results below.

Figure 6: DNV Orbit Level 1 risk matrix results presented in a matrix of

boiler components with associated risk levels
Table 5: Boiler components and associated Level 1 risks in DNV Orbit

iRIS-Petro and DNV orbit consider all of the individual consequences and present a Level 1
risk rank with the highest consequence driver (Safety, Business/Financial or Environment).
iRIS-Power considers the safety and business consequences separately, and presents plots
of both, on Level 1 and Level2. The Level 1 results of iRIS-Power (Figure 7, Figure 8 and Table
6) tend to be more conservative, regarding the large pressure vessels (upper and lower drum),
in comparison to the previous two tools. The risk ranking results of boiler tubing, on the other
hand tend to be lower than those given by iRIS-Petro and DNV. Both of these results are in
line with the authors’ expectations.

Figure 7: iRIS-Power Level 1 safety risk matrix of boiler components

Figure 8: iRIS-Power Level 1 business risk matrix of boiler components

Individual component results, obtained in all three tools are presented below (Figure 9). The
comparison was performed primarily in order to benchmark the results obtained in iRIS-Petro,
mainly against results obtained in DNV Orbit. The results obtained are very comparable –
individual component scores are always the same consequence category, and in adjacent
likelihood areas. iRIS-Petro allows for more detailed data input in the screening level, allowing
for more variables and potential damage mechanisms in comparison to DNV, which may in
part account for the differing PoF scores. iRIS-Power tends to be more conservative with
regards to the large, critical components, so its results were taken as the basis for determining
the selection of components for level 2 analysis. The matrices of iRIS-Petro and Orbit are very
similar, with the DNV one tending to be slightly less conservative (region B3 is classified as
low risk).
 Table 6: Boiler components and associated Level 1 safety and business
risks in iRIS-Power

4 ⊕ ⊗
♦ iRIS-Petro
• DNV
3 • ⊕ iRIS-Power Safety
⊗ iRIS-Power Business
2 ♦

A B C D E

Figure 9: Screening level risk scores of the lower drum, as calculated in

three software tools

5.4 Level 2 risk assessment

The screening or Level 1 assessment is generally followed by a detailed assessment for
components which fulfill the criteria of medium to high risk from Level 1 assessment. The Level
1 analysis scores were compared, and the upper and lower drums were selected for more
detailed assessment, based on the results obtained in the software tools. The boiler tubing
was in indicated as low-medium risk in most cases, and was not assessed on a more detailed
level. The intermediate level results for all assessed components are plotted in the matrices of
each software tool below. Individual results summarized for each component in the respective
tools are given below.
The results obtained in iRIS-Petro are shown in Table 7 and Figure 10 below. The upper and
lower drum have fallen into the very high risk category, on the basis of the potential damage
mechanism inputs provided, which include moderate to severe caustic cracking, fatigue,
corrosion fatigue and thermal fatigue.
The detailed results obtained in DNV Orbit are shown below (Figure 11). The results obtained
for the upper and lower drums are very consistent with the results obtained in iRIS-Petro, when
inputs are provided in a similar fashion, providing a good basis for the validation of results
obtained in iRIS-Petro.
 Figure 10: iRIS-Petro detailed level assessment risk matrix of the boiler
components with associated risk levels
Table 7: Boiler upper and lower drum and associated risks in iRIS-Petro

Figure 11: DNV Orbit detailed assessment risk matrix results of boiler components
The results obtained in iRIS-Power are shown in Figure 12, Figure 13 and Table 8 below. Level
2 results for the upper and lower drums, regarding safety and business consequence, are
shown. Each damage mechanism, considered possibly active for the specific component, is
assigned with an estimated Generic Failure Frequency (GFF). Note that some of the points
overlap, such that a point can represent several cases.
In order to obtain a total risk score (bow tie), associated with every damage mechanism and
scenario for one particular component on Level 2, the following procedure is implemented:
1. The risk of each individual damage mechanism (n) and failure scenario for a
particular component are calculated as:
= ×
2. The total risk is obtained as a sum of all individual risks:

=
 3. By default, it is assumed that the total risk score consists of the product of a PoF,
and the maximum CoF score (CoFMAX) of every individual damage mechanism
scenario. This PoF is obtained as a product of the division of the total risk by the
maximum CoF:

The resulting total risk or bow tie point is plotted on the risk matrix as P(PoFTOT, CoFMAX). The
total risk score must be greater than any individual risk score. The principle of the calculation
can also be described by the following diagram:

Boiler upper
and lower
drums: all
damage
mechanisms

Figure 12: iRIS-Power Level 2 safety risk matrix of boiler upper and lower
drums (all damage mechanisms shown)

Boiler upper
and lower
drums: all
damage
mechanisms

Figure 13: iRIS-Power Level 2 business risk matrix of boiler upper and
lower drums (all damage mechanisms shown)
Table 8: Boiler upper and lower drum individual damage mechanisms
and associated risks in iRIS-Power
The safety and business bowtie results obtained in iRIS-Power are shown in matrices in Figure
14 and Figure 15.

6 Summary and conclusions

There is a common agreement that a successfully implemented RBI should lead to a number
of benefits such as avoiding unnecessary redundancy in inspection programs, avoiding
unnecessary conservatism in inspection intervals (skip the complete inspection for certain
components during a given overhaul), shortening the overhaul times, etc. A “successful RBI
application” is, however, not an easy task. The example shows how much data, modeling,
software tools, and similar is needed, especially for the detailed analysis, including risk maps,
situation before and after the inspection, Paretto diagram, showing the critical components,
the contribution of which is the most significant and inspection optimization diagram for
different scenarios (examples in Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18, respectively).
 Figure 14: iRIS-Power Level 2 safety risk matrix of boiler components
(bowtie results)

Figure 15: iRIS-Power Level 2 business risk matrix of boiler components

(bowtie results)
Consequently, much of the effort in large past and current efforts / projects is being invested
in finding the optimal procedures and best practices for performing RBI analysis in the most
optimal way. The above optimization includes also finding the best value for the price. Although
the initial applications of the RBI are usually very cost-intensive. Up to several million Euros
may be needed for introduction of the risk-based methods and approaches (usually including
the software, too) in a large company and up to several hundreds of thousands of Euros could
be the cost for the first full-scale application on one plant. Nevertheless, the cost of analysis
tends to go down. The paper confirms that:
1. The importance of aligning and agreeing qualitative approaches, such as those
anchored in the new EN standard should be emphasized;
2. The example provided in the paper (boiler) has confirmed the consistency and the
“power” of qualitative approaches, at least on Levels 1 and 2 of the analysis (Figure 9);
3. The difference between the safety and business rankings (Figure 7 and Figure 8, and
Figure 12 to Figure 15) should be stressed, as one of the main elements of the RBI-
related decision-making.
 Probability

Consequences

Figure 16: Risk map including the cost-benefit and before-after analysis

Figure 17: Pareto diagram showing components mostly contributing to risk

Figure 18: Optimizing the scope of inspection based on RBI results

7 Acknowledgements
The authors express their gratitude to the partners of the RiskNIS and EskomRBI projects of
Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies GmbH, as well as to the WG12 (RBIF) of the CEN
TC319 Committee for their constant and precious support of the RBI-related activities
presented in this paper. In particular, the authors gratefully acknowledge the support of Mr. S.
Eremic (NIS), Ms. J. Popovic (NIS), Mr. P. Auerkari (VTT) and Prof. K. Maile (MPA), Mr. S.
Singh (Eskom). Special thanks should also be given to NIS a.d. and Eskom Holdings SOC
Limited.
 References
[1] CEN CWA 15740:2008 Risk-Based Inspection and Maintenance Procedures for
European Industry, CEN EU 2008 (Chair A. Jovanovic)
[2] VGB-Standard Condition Monitoring and Inspection of Components of Steam Boiler
Plants, Pressure Vessel Installations and High-Pressure Water and Steam Pipes VGB-
Standard- S-506-R-00;2012-03.EN Second edition (published 2012) (Formerly VGB-R
506e), VGB PowerTech e.V.
[3] Empfehlung zur Einführung Risikobasierter Instandhaltung VGB –
KRAFTWERKSTECHNIK GmbH, 2004, ArtNr.:M130, existing English version:
Recommendation for the introduction of Risk based maintenance ArtNr.:M130e
[4] Jovanovic, A. (2008). EU RBI Guide document CEN CWA 15740:2008, API RBI
European Workshop, Milan, Italy (The Equity Engineering Group, Inc., USA), October
27-31, 2008
[5] Jovanovic, A., Auerkari, P., Brear, J. M. (2001). Introducing risk-related issues into
power plant component life assessment based on inspection and monitoring results,
and code calculations. V International Conference, Porvo, June 2001
[6] ISO 31000:2009 Risk management - Principles and guidelines on implementation.
[7] API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580:2009 Risk-based Inspection
[8] API PUBLICATION 581:2000 Risk-Based Inspection Base Resource Document
[9] API RP581: 2008 Risk-Based Inspection Technology
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[11] N ISO/IEC 17020 (ISO/IEC 17020) – “General criteria for the operation of various
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[12] EN ISO/IEC 17025 (ISO/IEC 17025) – “General requirements for the competence of
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[13] EN473 – “Non destructive testing - Qualification and Certification of NDT personnel –
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equipment”, South African Bureau of Standards (SABS)

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