Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 86774 August 21, 1991
ENEDINA PRESLEY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Alejandro dela Rosa for petitioner.
J. Vicente G. Sison for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 28, 1988 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the defendants are enjoined permanently from using the property in
question as a pan de salstore or from using it for any other commercial purposes; the
defendants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P3,803.55
with legal interest from February 9, 1981 until the said sum is fully paid and the
defendants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P4,500.00 as
and for attorney's fees. (Rollo, p. 30)
The facts as stated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was filed
by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against Teofilo
Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-
appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision
that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial
purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA amounting to
P3,803.55.
The Almendrases were at the time of the filing of the action the registered owners of a
house and lot located at 102 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila. As
such registered owners, they were members of plaintiff BAVA pursuant to the Deed
Restrictions annotated in their title (TCT No. 73616) over the property in question and
defendant Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de
Sal Store' located in the same address.
At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati
Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions (Exh. "C") was already annotated in
their title (Exh. "B") providing (among others) 'that the lot must be used only for
residential purpose' (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2").
When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it sent a letter to
the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store (Exh. "D").
Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified
as a purely residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and registered
in the name of BAVA.
It has likewise been established that the Almendrases had not paid the BAVA
membership dues and assessments which amounted to P3,802.55 as of November 3,
1980. Teofilo Almendras contended that there was no written contract between him
and appellee BAVA. Only a consensual contract existed between the parties whereby
Almendras regularly pays his dues and assessments to BAVA for such services as
security, garbage collection and maintenance and repair of Jupiter Street. However,
when the services were withdrawn by appellee BAVA, there was no more reason for the
latter to demand payment of such dues and assessments. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
After due hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision in favor of BAVA
which was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
On January 20, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Consequently, the petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court raising the
following issues, to wit:
A
THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RECENT CONSOLIDATED DECISION EN BANC OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
PROMULGATED DECEMBER 22,1988 IN RE SANGALANG, BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
INC. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND AYALA CORPORATION G.R. NO. 71169;
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC. v. TENORIO, ET AL.-G.R. NO. 74376; BEL-AIR AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROMUALDEZ, ET AL G.R. NO.
76394; BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND FILLEY, ET AL.-
G.R. NO. 78182; BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MONCAL, ET AL.-G.R. NO. 82281, WHICH CONSOLIDATED DECISION APPLIES ON ALL
FOURS IN THE CASE AT BAR IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
B
THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY
LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE ALMENDRASES TO PAY THE ALLEGED UNPAID
ASSOCIATION DUES IS PATENTLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS.
C
THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY
LIABLE TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS. (Rollo, p.
11-12)
During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley died on
January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V.
Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson.
The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt with in the consolidated
cases decided by this Court promulgated on December 22, 1988 entitled Sangalang, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Ayala Corporation, G.R. No. 71169; Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Rosario de Jesus Tenorio
and Cecilia Gonzalvez, G.R. No. 74376; Bel-Air v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo and
Buena Romualdez, G.R. No. 76394; BAVA v. Court of Appeals, Dolors Filley and J. Romero
Associates, G.R. No. 78182; and BAVA v. Court of Appeals, Violeta Moncal and Majal
Development Corp., G.R. No. 82281. (168 SCRA 634 [1988])
Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on
November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court. It was
however, aware of the pending case as it made mention of the several cases brought to
court by BAVA against the aforesaid commercial establishments.
The petitioner in the instant case is similarly situated as the private respondents in G.R.
Nos. 74376; 76394; 78182 and 82281 who converted their residential homes to
commercial establishments; hence, BAVA filed suits against them to enforce the Deeds
of Restrictions annotated in their titles which provide among others, "that the lot must
be used only for residential purposes."
The Court in the Sangalang case, however, held:
xxx xxx xxx
... In the Sangalang case, we absolve the Ayala Corporation primarily owing to our
finding that is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public. Insofar as
these petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only
because of the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive easements based
on the 'deed restrictions' but chiefly because the National Government itself, through
the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into a 'high density
commercial (C-3) zone,' (See rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 117) pursuant to its Ordinance
No. 81-01 Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the
said deed restrictions. (p. 667; Emphasis supplied)
In the instant petition, BAVA assails the Court's decision in the Sangalang case, more
specifically the Court's interpretation of Ordinance No. 81-01 passed by the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC) on March 14, 1981. It avers that due to the multitude of
issues raised and the numerous pleadings filed by the different contending parties, the
Court was misled and unfortunately erred in concluding that Jupiter Street was
reclassified as a "high density commercial (C-3) zone" when in fact, it is still considered
as a "(R-1) residential zone."
If indeed private respondent's observations were accurate, the Court will certainly not
hesitate to correct the situation and the case at bar would be the proper occasion to do
so. We have carefully examined the pleadings but have found no reason to reconsider
the Sangalang doctrine. In assailing the Court's decision, the private respondent has
come out with mere assertions and allegations. It failed to present any proofs or
convincing arguments to substantiate its claim that Jupiter Street is still classified as a
residential zone. (See Filinvest v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 664 [1990]) No new zoning
re-classification, ordinance, certification to the effect or jurisprudence for that matter
was brought to the attention of this Court which would necessarily compel us to take a
second look at the Sangalang Case. The Court can not reverse a precedent and rule
favorably for the private respondent on the strength of mere inferences.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the
Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions
of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered
into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the
petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said
conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile
with the legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati
Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).
We reiterate the Court's pronouncements in the Sangalang case which are quite clear:
It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein
in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned,
certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the
overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may
determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees
sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil
Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot be raised
as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and
enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. .
. (p. 667)
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-
01.1âwphi1 The records indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and
stores have already sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no reason why the
petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de sal store.
Thus, in accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the respondent court's
decision has to be reversed.
With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55,
the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic after petitioner Presley
purchased the property subject of lease from the Almendrases and settled all
association dues.
Likewise, the demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual
basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court
dated November 28, 1988 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private
respondent is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals1 erred in
reversing the trial court which had rendered summary judgment; and (2) whether or not
it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger.
We rule for the petitioner on both counts.
It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private
respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the
parties thereto reserved as an easement of way:
. . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or
less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this
being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per
regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meterwide
portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City
Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro Manila
Governor. (p. 3, Record).2
As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as
follows:
Entry No. 7712/T-5000 –– CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY –– It is hereby made of
record that a construction of private alley has been undertaken on the lot covered by
this title from Concepcion Street to the interior of the aforesaid property with the plan
and specification duly approved by the City Engineer subject to the following conditions
to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least three (3) meters in width; (2) That the
alley shall not be closed so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the
alley shall be open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private alley
has been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide same with concrete
canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the maintenance and upkeep of
the alley shall be at the expense of the registered owner; (6) That the alley shall remain
open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the
owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use
the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not
act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the
vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other conditions
set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa, Not. Pub. of
Manila.3
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring
estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent
constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to
open the gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds
that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person
of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former
owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid
any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a
"temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination of the
case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff.4 (the
petitioner herein).
Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above defenses.
On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the court a
quo ruled on the same as follows:
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the merit (sic)
and hereby resolve (sic) to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. (pp. 15-
107, Record).5
On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the temporary
mandatory injunction, that had been issued against the defendant, and for the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit.
The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.
(Summary Judgment, p. 6).6
The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition
for the cancellation of the annotation in question. The court granted cancellation, for
which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the respondent Court of Appeals
which ordered the restoration of the annotation "without prejudice [to] the final
outcome of7 the private respondent's own appeal (subject of this petition).
In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary
judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary judgment was
improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up by the
private respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to
the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not
impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired
title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very
deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the
property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties
was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.
As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition.
There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale executed
between the private respondent and the seller, had been constituted on the private
respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as
follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions
whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has
been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes
for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use
thereof. . ."8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across the alley was in defiance of
these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude of way.
The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in denying
injunctive relief on appeal, the respondent Appellate Court committed an error of
judgment and law.
It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent is the
owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established and that an
easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the easement or any
part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the private respondent
respect the easement already existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that
the private respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it has failed to observe the
limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same
There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or not an
easement exists on the property, and as we indicated, we are convinced that an
easement exists.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the
petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-
way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively
belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.10 Although
they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not,
however, be alienated11 from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.12
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the
main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement
precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate,
specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion
thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS,
more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring
estates. . ."13 and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the
private owner a discount on account of the easement, thus:
WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto agreed to adjust the
purchase price from THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THREE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,503,240.00)14
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over
the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not
acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus
prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open
to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that
no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private
respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of
the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person.15 Merger then, as
can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal
servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real
servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or
more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak
of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate,17 in this case, the
public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner
relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless
the owner conveys the property in favor of the public –– if that is possible –– no genuine
merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary judgment, and
insofar as the respondent Court of Appeals held that it (the trial court) was in error, the
Court of Appeals is in error.
Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where there is no
genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts appear undisputed
based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record.18 In one case,
this Court upheld a decision of the trial court rendered by summary judgment on a claim
for money to which the defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed
to produce receipts.19We held that under the circumstances, the defense was not
genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In another case, we
rejected the claim of acquisitive prescription over registered property and found it
likewise to be sham, and sustained consequently, a summary judgment rendered
because the title challenged was covered by a Torrens Certificate and under the law,
Torrens titles are imprescriptible.20
We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary judgment rendered
thereon, on the ground that from the records, the plaintiffs were clearly guilty of laches
having failed to act until after twenty-seven years.21 We likewise allowed summary
judgment and rejected contentions of economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding
payment under a contract for the reason that the contract imposed liability under any
and all conditions.22
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham
one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally
preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender
any genuine issue on a material fact and can not militate against the petitioner's clear
cause of action.
As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of the ritual of
a trial where, from existing records,23 the facts have been established, and trial would be
futile.
What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent –– and
consequently, the challenged holding of the respondent Court of Appeals as well –– is
the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in its CA-G.R. No.
13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it nullified the cancellation
of the easement annotated at the back of the private respondent's certificate of title
ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case No. 273. As the petitioner now in fact insists, the
Court of Appeals' judgment, which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated
December 14, 1988, in G.R. No. 83540, is at least, the law of the case between the
parties, as "law of the case" is known in law, e.g.:
xxx xxx xxx
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21
C.J.S. 330) (Emphasis supplied).
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or
succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all
matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the
case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein. (5
C.J.S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite
determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse
to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such determination and
remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the
court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate
court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of
the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming
himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77). (Emphasis supplied.)
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as
the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly
treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case
bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of
them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87). (Emphasis supplied.)24
CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to determine
the rights of the parties regarding the easement, subject of the controversy in this case,
although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation" it may have, at a glance,
suggested a different cause of action.
And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CA-G.R. No.
13421 as the law of the case, after all, it was the one that initiated the cancellation
proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that precipitated that appeal.
In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to
preempt the injunction decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the
private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, as we have described the term:
The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal titans (they
would contend even more spiritedly in the "larger" world of politics) to whom present
scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who, because of the paths they have taken,
have shaped history itself; after all, and coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed
that an easement has been constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case.
Rather, the question is whether it is still existing or whether it has been extinguished. As
we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the private
respondent can not bar the public, by erecting an obstruction on the alley, from its use.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its
counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be punished for
contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum
shopping.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a

party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection
with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending,
as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. 25

to which contempt is a penalty.26

As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private respondent found
an unfriendly court and it can not be made to profit from its act of malpractice by
permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its applicability as the law of the case.

As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the will of the
owner.

In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo,27 this Court, speaking
through Justice Claro Recto, declared that a personal servitude (also a right of way in
that case) is established by the mere "act"28 of the landowner, and is not "contractual in
the nature,"29 and a third party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the
personality to claim its benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel
maintained that a personal or voluntary servitude does require a contract and that
"[t]he act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute an
offer . . . "30 and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence no
contract."31
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.
Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari1 seek to overturn the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 054562 which reversed and set aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as the order
of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its
aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for
nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real
property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein.3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses
Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation
in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of
land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an
area of 964 square meters, more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that
the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100)
years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such
condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property
would revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive
period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose
administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of
Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of
the property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C.
Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on
November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision. 4
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion
to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs
therein, have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of
the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the
cause of action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the
complaint does not state a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and
the petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by
private respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing
the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on (a)
whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale)
has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of
contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with
it the dismissal of the main action for reconveyance of real property.6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet
prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants' complaint is SET
ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
lower court for further proceedings. No Costs.7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separate
motions for reconsideration which were denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated February 6, 1987,8 hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents
has already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he
donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply
with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his
action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may
be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's
heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of
a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of
donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property
donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration
revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the
condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of
the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the donation
judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself
declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee
contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation to have the
donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be violated,
then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and void"would not appear in the
deed of donation.9
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial
action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it
may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.10 It called
attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its
cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the
injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. 11 It reiterated the doctrine
that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting
the power of cancellation.12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we
see no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case.
Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivosshall be governed by the
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III,
Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the
matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express
provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said
resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently
in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present
controversy is consequently justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic
reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition
was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.13 It was held therein
that said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to
rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court, and
that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the
conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a
judicial declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was an
onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the rules on
contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also subject to the same rules because
of its provision on automatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition,
from parity of reasons said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not
the rescission was proper.14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation
and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on
prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said
Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory
of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that
the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action
to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years.15 It is our view that Article 764
was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of
conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on
the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be
dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that
private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners
of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should
not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the
deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the
rights arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed
of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue
restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is
an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order
to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered
applicable by analogy.1âwphi1Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or
testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part
of the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20) years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve,
in the main, the devolution of property by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case
of donations, being an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of
prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual
intent of either the donor or testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is
or must be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative policy
expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the
alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation
and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be
considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory
paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the
deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the
deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action,
the case for private respondents must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation
was not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but
such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving
the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of
the land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed
of d donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the
motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set
aside by respondent court, both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent
court interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While
the issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably
related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are grounded on
and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at
a just decision of the case:16 Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related
to an error properly assigned,17 or upon which the determination of the question
properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.18
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court
for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on
the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as
where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.19 The
aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to the
matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XX, Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines For his part, the defendant testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's
SUPREME COURT niece, whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as
Manila they had no children of their own. He and his wife lived with the couple in their house
on the residential lot and helped Domingo with the cultivation of the farm. Domingo
FIRST DIVISION Melad signed in 1941 a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and
in 1943 another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the
G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988 understanding that the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon
his death. 6 Danguilan presented three other witnesses 7 to corroborate his statements
FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner,
and to prove that he had been living in the land since his marriage to Isidra and had
vs.
remained in possession thereof after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. Two of said
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted by her husband, JOSE
witnesses declared that neither the plaintiff nor her mother lived in the land with
TAGACAY, respondents.
Domingo Melad. 8
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for petitioner.
The decision of the trial court was based mainly on the issue of possession. Weighing
the evidence presented by the parties, the judge 9 held that the defendant was more
Teodoro B. Mallonga for private respondent.
believable and that the plaintiff's evidence was "unpersuasive and unconvincing." It was
held that the plaintiff's own declaration that she moved out of the property in 1946 and
left it in the possession of the defendant was contradictory to her claim of ownership.
CRUZ, J.: She was also inconsistent when she testified first that the defendant was her tenant and
later in rebuttal that he was her administrator. The decision concluded that where there
The subject of this dispute is the two lots owned by Domingo Melad which is claimed by was doubt as to the ownership of the property, the presumption was in favor of the one
both the petitioner and the respondent. The trial court believed the petitioner but the actually occupying the same, which in this case was the defendant. 10
respondent court, on appeal, upheld the respondent. The case is now before us for a
resolution of the issues once and for all. The review by the respondent court 11 of this decision was manifestly less than
thorough. For the most part it merely affirmed the factual findings of the trial court
On January 29, 1962, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the then except for an irrelevant modification, and it was only toward the end that it went to and
Court of First Instance of Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which resolved what it considered the lone decisive issue.
she claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being
unlawfully withheld by the defendant. 1 In his answer, the petitioner denied the The respondent court held that Exhibits 2-b and 3-a, by virtue of which Domingo Melad
allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in had conveyed the two parcels of land to the petitioner, were null and void. The reason
open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad was that they were donations of real property and as such should have been effected
in 1941 and 1943. 2 The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was refiled in through a public instrument. It then set aside the appealed decision and declared the
1967. 3 respondents the true and lawful owners of the disputed property.

At the trial, the plaintiff presented a deed of sale dated December 4, 1943, purportedly The said exhibits read as follows:
signed by Domingo Melad and duly notarized, which conveyed the said properties to her
for the sum of P80.00. 4 She said the amount was earned by her mother as a worker at EXHIBIT 2-b is quoted as follows: 12
the Tabacalera factory. She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Domingo Melad,
I, DOMINGO MELAD, of legal age, married, do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of
with whom she and her mother were living when he died in 1945. She moved out of the
my giving to Felix Danguilan, my agricultural land located at Barrio Fugu-Macusi,
farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and asked permission to
Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, Philippine Islands; that this land is registered under
cultivate the land and to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would deliver
my name; that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to whom I will
part of the harvest from the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. The
deliver this land except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that
deliveries having stopped, she then consulted the municipal judge who advised her to
I will die and also for all other things needed and necessary for me, he will be
file the complaint against Danguilan. The plaintiff 's mother, her only other witness,
responsible because of this land I am giving to him; that it is true that I have nieces and
corroborated this testimony. 5
nephews but they are not living with us and there is no one to whom I will give my land
except to Felix Danguilan for he lives with me and this is the length—175 m. and the
width is 150 m.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign my name below and also those present in the
execution of this receipt this 14th day of September 1941.
Penablanca Cagayan, September 14, 1941.
(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD
WITNESSES:
1. (T.M.) ISIDRO MELAD
2. (SGD.) FELIX DANGUILAN
3. (T.M.) ILLEGIBLE
EXHIBIT 3-a is quoted as follows: 13
I, DOMINGO MELAD, a resident of Centro, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, do hereby
swear and declare the truth that I have delivered my residential lot at Centro,
Penablanca, Cagayan, to Felix Danguilan, my son-in-law because I have no child; that I
have thought of giving him my land because he will be the one to take care of
SHELTERING me or bury me when I die and this is why I have thought of executing this
document; that the boundaries of this lot is—on the east, Cresencio Danguilan; on the
north, Arellano Street; on the south by Pastor Lagundi and on the west, Pablo Pelagio
and the area of this lot is 35 meters going south; width and length beginning west to
east is 40 meters.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I hereby sign this receipt this 18th day of December 1943.
(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD
WITNESSES:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
(SGD.) DANIEL ARAO
It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did
intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends.
We do not think, however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly
donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to the
petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life
and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil
Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument.
The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De
Mesa, 14 where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable
consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the
expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor Placida Manalo,
a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in his own
behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine whether or not
said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a
contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although
not recorded in a public instrument.
The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of
the lands donated and the services for which they were being exchanged, the two
transactions should be considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights, hence,
they should have been effected through a public instrument and not mere private
writings. However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that the
values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.
On the other hand, both the trial court and the respondent court have affirmed the
factual allegation that the petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged
for his burial in accordance with the condition imposed by the donor. It is alleged and
not denied that he died when he was almost one hundred years old, 15 which would
mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by himself and so provided for the
donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume that
there was a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction
an onerous donation.
Regarding the private respondent's claim that she had purchased the properties by
virtue of a deed of sale, the respondent court had only the following to say: "Exhibit 'E'
taken together with the documentary and oral evidence shows that the preponderance
of evidence is in favor of the appellants." This was, we think, a rather superficial way of
resolving such a basic and important issue.
The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only three years old
and the consideration was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her
earnings as a wage worker in a factory. 16 This was itself a suspicious circumstance, one
may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was after
all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made out in favor of Apolonia Melad
although she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname, before that
instrument was signed and in fact even after she got married. 17The averment was also
made that the contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death in
1945. 18It was also alleged that even after the supposed execution of the said contract,
the respondent considered Domingo Melad the owner of the properties and that she
had never occupied the same. 19
Considering these serious challenges, the appellate court could have devoted a little
more time to examining Exhibit "E" and the circumstances surrounding its execution
before pronouncing its validity in the manner described above. While it is true that the
due execution of a public instrument is presumed, the presumption is disputable and
will yield to contradictory evidence, which in this case was not refuted.
At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the
private respondent did not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed
waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she
did have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own
sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. 20 Her
claim that the petitioner was her tenant (later changed to administrator) was
disbelieved by the trial court, and properly so, for its inconsistency. In short, she failed
to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties
to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
As was held in Garchitorena v. Almeda: 21
Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership
does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity and
Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a public document does not
constitute sufficient delivery where the property involved is in the actual and adverse
possession of third persons (Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil. 404; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil.
134), it becomes incontestable that even if included in the contract, the ownership of
the property in dispute did not pass thereby to Mariano Garchitorena. Not having
become the owner for lack of delivery, Mariano Garchitorena cannot presume to
recover the property from its present possessors. His action, therefore, is not one of
revindicacion, but one against his vendor for specific performance of the sale to him.
In the aforecited case of Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 22 Justice Mapa declared for
the Court:
Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a fundamental principle in all matters of contracts and a
well- known doctrine of law that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum
transferuntur". In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article
609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are acquired and
transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of
certain contracts, by tradition". And as the logical application of this disposition article
1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the
time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall not acquire a real right" (and
the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been delivered to him."
In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a
necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the
same by virtue of a contract. As Manresa states in his Commentaries on the Civil Code,
volume 10, pages 339 and 340: "Our law does not admit the doctrine of the transfer of
property by mere consent but limits the effect of the agreement to the due execution of
the contract. ... The ownership, the property right, is only derived from the delivery of a
thing ... "
As for the argument that symbolic delivery was effected through the deed of sale, which
was a public instrument, the Court has held:
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is
considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the
vendee." (Civil Code, art. 1462). It is true that the same article declares that the
execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect
of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing
sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is
not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The
thing sold must be placed in his control.When there is no impediment whatever to
prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the
vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But
if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through
another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality—the delivery has not been
effected. 23
There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in
actual possession of the litigated properties. Even if the respective claims of the parties
were both to be discarded as being inherently weak, the decision should still incline in
favor of the petitioner pursuant to the doctrine announced in Santos & Espinosa v.
Estejada 24 where the Court announced:
If the claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment must be for the
defendant, for the latter being in possession is presumed to be the owner, and cannot
be obliged to show or prove a better right.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and that of the trial
court REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE
LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed that of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City directing petitioner to reconvey to private respondents the property donated to it
by their predecessor-in-interest.
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a member of the Board
of Trustees of the Central Philippine College (now Central Philippine University [CPU]),
executed a deed of donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of land identified as Lot No.
3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A was issued in the name of the donee CPU with
the following annotations copied from the deed of donation —
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and
use of a medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in any way
encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college shall be
under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from the
land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of a building
thereon.1
On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed
an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging
that since 1939 up to the time the action was filed the latter had not complied with the
conditions of the donation. Private respondents also argued that petitioner had in fact
negotiated with the National Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated
property with another land owned by the latter.
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action
had prescribed; that it did not violate any of the conditions in the deed of donation
because it never used the donated property for any other purpose than that for which it
was intended; and, that it did not sell, transfer or convey it to any third party.
On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the conditions
of the donation and declared it null and void. The court a quo further directed petitioner
to execute a deed of the reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of the donor,
namely, private respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June 1993 ruled that the
annotations at the back of petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory conditions
breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation
revocable.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition mandated petitioner to
utilize the donated property for the establishment of a medical school, the donor did
not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a period was
fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner could not be considered as having
failed to comply with its part of the bargain. Thus, the appellate court rendered its
decision reversing the appealed decision and remanding the case to the court of origin
for the determination of the time within which petitioner should comply with the first
condition annotated in the certificate of title.
Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that the quoted
annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner are onerous obligations and resolutory
conditions of the donation which must be fulfilled non-compliance of which would
render the donation revocable; (b) in holding that the issue of prescription does not
deserve "disquisition;" and, (c) in remanding the case to the trial court for the fixing of
the period within which petitioner would establish a medical college.2
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in
the deed of donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to
conclude that his donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration
which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes
a burden equivalent to the value of the donation. A gift of land to the City of Manila
requiring the latter to erect schools, construct a children's playground and open streets
on the land was considered an onerous donation.3 Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez
donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an obligation upon the
latter to establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous
consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as
well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the
happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates
land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the
condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a
resolutory one.4 It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed
before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become the
owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition.5 If there was no
fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case,
the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired
under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is
unavailing.
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the land
donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall
be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the
condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled
depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute
acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation
were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private
respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation. 6
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the
donation and recovery of the property donated cannot be specifically determined in the
instant case. A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not
done, or that which should not have been done is done.7 In cases where there is no
special provision for such computation, recourse must be had to the rule that the period
must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could have been
instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting
point for the computation of the period. In this case, the starting point begins with the
expiration of a reasonable period and opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been
charged upon it by the donor.
The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the necessary
buildings and improvements on the property cannot be quantified in a specific number
of years because of the presence of several factors and circumstances involved in the
erection of an educational institution, such as government laws and regulations
pertaining to education, building requirements and property restrictions which are
beyond the control of the donee.
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it
can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the
Civil Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because
the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed
the period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.8
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of
circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50)
years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But,
unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality
and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits. 9 Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the
obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period
of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission
claimed.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one,
doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved
in favor of the least transmission of rights and interests. 10Records are clear and facts are
undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of
the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner
has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and
equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes,
revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the
heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 34, of 31 May 1991 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 18 June 1993 is
accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, petitioner is directed to reconvey to private
respondents Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.