Rule 118- Pre-trial
August 14, 1987 wherein the accused informed the court that she has a title, a building
G.R. No. L-80778 June 20, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and SEGUNDINA ROSARIO y
SEMBRANO, respondents.
U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioner University of the Philippines.
Candido G. Del Rosario & Associates for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare null and void the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated October 27, 1987 in Criminal Case No.
051672 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Segundina Rosario y Sembrano," the issues
raised are (1) whether or not double jeopardy attaches in the event of a judgment of
acquittal of the accused without a trial on the merits; and (2) whether or not the complainant
or private offended party in a criminal case can file a special civil action for certiorari
questioning the validity of said judgment of acquittal without the intervention of the Solicitor
General.
On June 2, 1987 an information for violation of P.D. No. 772 was filed by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city
against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among others, as follows:
That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for sometime prior thereto and persisting
up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the University of
the Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said
property, by then and there construct his/her house therein for residential purposes, without
the consent and against the will of the said offended party.
1
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and a pre-trial conference was held on
permit and survey plan covering the subject land. The trial court then issued an order on the
same day that reads as follows:
Considering that the accused has a title, building permit and a survey plan on the subject
land, the Court instructs both parties to submit their respective proffer of documentary
exhibits together with their positions as to whether this case will be heard or dismissed.
The private prosecutor presented a position paper showing that the said property belongs to
the University of the Philippines (U.P.) as shown by TCT No. 9462 covering about 493
hectares at Diliman, Quezon City which includes the area in question; that a plan was
submitted of the entire area; that the ownership of the so-called U.P. campus under TCT
No. 9462 has been sustained by several decisions of the Supreme Court; that the supposed
title of the accused, TCT No. 5762 has been cancelled by TCT No. 126671 in the name of
Bughay Construction and Development Corporation; that granting the accused had a title
thereto, the issue is whether or not the property described in the title is at Pook Amorsolo,
U.P. Campus which is adjacent to Bo. Kruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, Quezon City; that the alleged
title of the accused shows that the property is situated in Bo. Gulod, Municipality of Marikina,
Province of Rizal; that this is also shown in the tax declaration presented by her; that in fact
the accused paid the corresponding real estate tax at Marikina; and that the criminal case
should proceed as it has been shown that the area on which the accused made the
construction belongs to the U.P. without the knowledge and consent of the latter and in
violation of P.D. No. 772.
On the other hand, the accused submitted a proffer of exhibits with a manifestation tending
to show that the accused applied for a building permit to construct on the lot; that the lot is
covered by a title in the name of the accused; that a copy of the building permit was also
submitted for which the accused paid for the fee; that the relocation plan of the land and the
field notes were also submitted; and that she informed U.P. of her claim and asked them not
to intrude into her property.
An opposition thereto was filed by U.P. stating that the proffer of exhibits is irregular and
without basis as in fact the evidence was not marked in the pre-trial; that the proffer of
exhibits is not covered by Rule 118, Sections 1 and 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure; that what is allowed only in Section 2 thereof is the marking of the exhibits for
Identification purposes of documentary evidence; that the manifestation submitting the case
for resolution has no legal basis; and thus it is prayed that the proffer of exhibits and
manifestation be denied for being irregular or not pursuant to the rules.
On October 27, 1978, the questioned decision was rendered by the respondent judge
acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de oficio. Hence, the herein
petition for certiorari filed by the counsel for the private offended party, U.P., in behalf of the
People of the Philippines. The petition seeks to render null and void the aforesaid decision
for want of due process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the
merits.
The petition is impressed with merit. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provide as follows:
SECTION 1. Pre-trial: when proper.-To expedite the trial, where the accused and counsel
agree, the court shall conduct a pretrial conference on the matters enumerated in Section 2
hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects.-The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for Identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
SEC. 3. Pre-trial order.-After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the
parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action during
the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that in criminal cases a pre-trial may be held by the
trial court only where the accused and his counsel agree. Such pre-trial shall cover plea
bargaining, stipulation of facts, marking for Identification of evidence of the parties, waiver of
objections to admissibility of evidence and such other matters as may promote a fair and
expeditious trial. After the pre-trial, the trial court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked, and thereafter the trial on the merits shall
proceed which shall be limited to matters not disposed of during the pre-trial.
In this case, a pre-trial was held wherein the accused alleged that she has a title covering
the property in question. The respondent judge thus required the parties to submit their
proffer of documentary exhibits and their position paper as to whether or not the case would
be heard or dismissed. Under the aforestated provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particulary Section 2 thereof, what is specified is the marking for identification of evidence
for the parties and the waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence. A proffer of exhibits
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or evidence is not among those enumerated. Such proffer of evidence or more specifically
in offer of evidence is generally made at the time a party closes the presentation of his
evidence in which case the adverse party is given the opportunity to object thereto and the
court rules on the same. When evidence proposed to be presented is rejected by the court a
proffer of evidence is usually made stating its nature and purpose had it been admitted.
Assuming that such proffer of evidence, as directed by the respondent judge, may be made
at the pre-trial in a criminal case, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to object
to the admissibility. In this case, the prosecution filed its opposition to the proffer of its
exhibits stating that it is not authorized under section 1 and 2 of Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure; that the documentary evidence were not presented for marking at
the pre-trial; and that the manifestation submitting the case for the resolution with the proffer
of exhibits has no legal basis. In it position paper, U.P. also pointed out that the alleged title
of the accused covers property in Marikina and not in U.P. Campus, Quezon City wherein
the accused built her structure. The trial court did not even rule on the admissibility of the
exhibits of the accused.
The respondent judge despite the conflicting positions of the parties and the objection of the
U.P. to the resolution of the case without a trial on the merits, nevertheless rendered a
decision acquitting the accused by making the following disquisition:
With all the documents of the prosecution and the defense on record, it may now be asked:
MAY THE ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER 772?
Prosecution of the accused is anchored on the postulate that accused built a structure over
land belonging to the University of the Philippines and titled in the name of the latter.
Documents presented by the defense established that accused has a title over the land on
which she built the structure; that she has a building permit for the structure; that she paid
the corresponding fees for the building permit; that she has a relocation plan with supporting
data of field notes and lot data computation (Exhs. "1", "2", "2-A", "3", "4", "5", "5-A," "6-B",
"5-B-1", "5-B-2", and "5-B-3").
Actually, there is now a collision between the claim of the prosecution and the defense on
rights of ownership to the land in question. It may be noted that both land titles are torrens
titles.
Under these well established facts, it cannot be stated with certainty that the accused built
her structure illegally. If somehow it is discernible that it is more the inadequacy of details in
the states evidence that makes it difficult for us to arrive at definite conclusions rather than,
perhaps, the actual facts themselves, still we cannot pin responsibility on appellant (sic).
That moral conviction that may serve as basis of a finding of guilt in criminal cases is only
that and which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive of any
other consideration. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it is, even
more, our constitutional duty to acquit him." So, said the Supreme Court in People vs.
Maisug, 27 SCRA 753. The same holds true to the instant case. The scanty and/or
inadequate evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain conviction.
It may be added that the torrens title of accused over the property on which she built her
structure cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of her title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose (Magay vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA
456). The same doctrine has been reiterated in Director of Lands vs. CFI of Misamis
Oriental, Br. 1, No. L-58823, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 392).
This Court finds that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the aforestated decision without affording the prosecution the opportunity to have
its day in court. The issue before the Court is whether or not the accused built the structure
on the land belonging to U.P. At the pre-trial, U.P. presented its title and plan showing that
the accused built a structure within its property. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and
manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land. However, as stressed by
U.P., the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City and said
title could not cover the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where
the structure of accused was built. This issue cannot be determined by a mere examination
of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. A trial on the merits should be
undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place where the structure was built by
the accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The conclusion of the trial court that the
accused did not build her structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is
without any factual or legal basis. Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the
questioned decision as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply
demonstrates that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution to
establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of due process.
The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the
accused in a criminal case.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. There is
double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or information; 2) filed before a
competent court; 3) to which defendant had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously
been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.
In this case, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
The decision that was rendered in disregard of such imperative is void for lack of
3
jurisdiction. It was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a
decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is the mandate of
the rules. Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in this case.
The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special
civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be
answered in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in
the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name
of said complainant.
In this case, the Solicitor General upheld the right of U.P. to file the petition as an aggrieved
party. Inasmuch as the prosecution was deprived of due process, the questioned decision
of the respondent judge acquitting the accused is null and void as it was rendered in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the respondent
judge dated October 27, 1987 is set aside and declared null and void. The respondent judge
is hereby directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, and thereafter, to
decide the same on the basis of the evidence adduced, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of Section 23
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, " which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his
possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance,
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea
of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
4
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of
the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by
the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in
a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of
the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in
paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23
of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the
proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule
118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to
plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules
of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial
conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of
the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is
thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is
disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for
accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as
held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the
Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent
 application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the
law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis
for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as
unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before
this judicial station.
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated July 26,
2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We grant the petition.
5
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends
that the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the
grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2)
the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3)
the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a
petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for
failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is
within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions,
We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions
despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In
discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not
shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with
far-reaching implications.
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have
broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our
young citizens. At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign
against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the
protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because
of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and
convicted." Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its
direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the
all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers
and users.
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires,
the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.
 x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of
procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v.
Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justice, then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced
the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
6
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its
independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor
as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to
this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of
this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the
power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII
provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the
Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the
law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines.
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5
of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
7
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is,
by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its
rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more
independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to
delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack
of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5),
Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme
Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. - The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under
Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon.
Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) - The first paragraph of Section
14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule
58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted
its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
8
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the
Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1,
1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and
of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the
1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was
amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during
pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and
other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during
pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to
said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall,
after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
9
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited
to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or
modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional
system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on
provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused. Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time
limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the
deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of
either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof
or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the
control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is
hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
10
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of
time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not
take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right
may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused
to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies
the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme
Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal
cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice. Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in
which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct
even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition,
it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are
ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of
a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a
prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks
posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of
the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the
chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the
offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an
existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction
of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to
a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes
a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to
be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to
be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
11
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by
trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers
to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not
any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The
reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely
simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis
the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the
decision whether to prosecute. "
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to
allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea
of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a
matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when
the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial
stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after
the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on
which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea
of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon
as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves
the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the
interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on the motion must disclose
the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of
the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper
and irregular.
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any
future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against
plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia.
In my view, the prohibition found in Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
not only because it contravenes the rule-making power of this Court, it also constitutes
"cruel, degrading, [and] inhuman" punishment for the accused.
It is the declared policy of the law "to provide effective mechanisms or measures to
re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous
drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation." The aim is
to rehabilitate, not punish, those drug offenders.
12
When an accused pleads to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fundamental rights
guaranteed to an accused. It is essentially a choice that only the accused can make, as a
way to acknowledge his or her guilt and as atonement for that guilt.
The reality is that most "drug-pushers" that come before the courts are found with less that
0.1 gram of illegal drugs. While some of these accused will be charged with both selling and
possession, most of them will have to suffer the penalty of selling, that is, life
imprisonment. They will be sentenced to life imprisonment for evidence amounting to "only
about 2.5% of the weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0
grams)."
As we have observed in People v. Holgado:
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No.
9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions
involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have
been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small
retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law
enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to
focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations.
Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an
accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a
dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more
challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess
cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.
The application of the mandatory penalty of life imprisonment, as practiced, appear to have
a disproportionate impact on those who are poor and those caught with very miniscule
quantities of drugs. A disproportionate impact in practice of a seemingly neutral penal law,
in my view, will amount to an unusual punishment considering that drugs affect all economic
classes.
Plea-bargaining does not necessarily mean that the accused will automatically be
sentenced to the lesser offense.1âwphi1 The plea is subject to the acceptance of the
prosecution and is only allowed by discretion of the court. What is essential is that the
choice exists. Preventing the accused from pleading to the lesser offense of possession is a
cruel, degrading, and unusual punishment for those who genuinely accept the
consequences of their actions and seek to be rehabilitated. It will not advance the policy of
the law to punish offenders with penalties not commensurate with the offense and to hinder
their reintegration into society.
Having said all these, I am reserving judgment for an appropriate case where the issue is
whether life imprisonment is by itself cruel for those caught trading miniscule amounts of
illegal drugs.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

13
G.R. No. L-30205 March 15, 1982
UNITED GENERAL INDUSTRIES, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE PALER and JOSE DE LA RAMA, defendants-appellants
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX, in Civil
Case No. 60418, United General Industries, Inc. vs. Jose Paler and Jose de la Rama. Since
the appeal death with a question of law only, We reproduce the decision which reads as
follows:
When this case was called for pre-trial today, neither the defendants, nor their counsel
appeared, notwithstanding the fact that said defendants were notified of the pre-trial. Upon
motion of the plaintiff, said defendants were declared in default. Likewise, upon motion of
counsel for the plaintiff, this case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on January 20, 1962, the defendant, Jose Paler and his
wife Purificacion Paler, purchased from the plaintiff (1) Zenith 23" TV set with serial No.
3493594 on installment basis; that to secure the payment of the purchase price, the
defendant, Jose Paler and his wife executed in favor of the plaintiff a promissory note in the
amount of P2,690.00; that, to consider the guarantee the payment of the aforementioned
promissory on defendant Jose Paler and his wife constituted a chattel mortgage over the
above- described television set in favor of the plaintiff which mortgage was duly registered
in the chattel mortgage registry; that by virtue of the violation by defendant Jose Paler and
his wife of the terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage, the plaintiff filed a criminal
action against the above-named persons for estafa under Art. 319 of the Revised Penal
Code with the City Fiscal's Office of Pasay City; that to settle extra-judicially the criminal
case aforementioned against the defendant, Jose Paler and his wife, the said defendant
Jose Paler and his co-defendant, Jose de la Rama, executed in favor of plaintiff a
promissory note dated April 11, 1964 in the amount of P3,083.58 (exhibit A); and that;
notwithstanding repeated demands, said defendants have failed to pay plaintiff the sum of
P3,083.58 with 1% interest per month from April 11, 1964 until full payment is made,
pursuant to the terms of the promissory note marked Exhibit A.
In their answer, the defendants admit the fact that they executed a promissory note dated
April 11, 1964 in favor of plaintiff in the amount of P3,083.58, with 12% interest per annum.
They further admit the fact that said obligation has not been paid the plaintiff
notwithstanding repeated demands made.
14
Considering the admissions of the defendants in their answer, judgment on the pleadings,
as prayed for may, therefore, be rendered.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, sentencing said defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P3,083.58, with
12% interest thereon per annum from the date the complaint was filed on October 14, 1965
until full payment is made and attorney's fees in the sum of P250.00. With costs against the
defendants. (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-22.)
The appellants, Paler and de la Rama, claim in their appeal that the complaint should have
been dismissed because "the obligation sought to be enforced by plaintiff-appellee against
defendants-appellants arose or was incurred in consideration for the compounding of a
crime." Obviously, the appellants are referring to the portion of the decision which states: " ...
the plaintiff filed a criminal action against the above-named persons (Jose Paler and his
wife) for estafa under Art. 319 of the Revised Penal Code with the City Fiscal's Office of
Pasay City; that to settle extra-judicially the criminal case aforementioned against the
defendant, Jose Paler and his wife, the said defendant Jose Paler and his co-defendant,
Jose de la Rama, executed in favor of plaintiff a promissory note dated April 11, 1964 in the
amount of P3,083.58 (Exhibit A)."
There is some merit in this contention. In Arroyo vs. Berwin, 36 Phil. 386 (1917), it was held
that an agreement to stifle the prosecution of a crime is manifestly contrary to public policy
and due administration of justice and will not be enforced in a court of law. See
also Monterey vs. Gomez, et al., 104 Phil. 1059 (1958).
Under the law and jurisprudence, there can be no recovery against Jose de la Rama who
incidentally appears to have been an accommodation signer only of the promissory note
which is vitiated by the illegality of the cause.
But it is different with Jose Paler who bought a television set from the appellee, did not pay
for it and even sold the set without the written consent of the mortgagee which accordingly
brought about the filing of the estafa case. He has an obligation to the appellee
independently of the promissory note which was co-signed by Jose de la Rama. For Paler
to escape payment of a just obligation will result in an untrust enrichment at the expense of
another. This we cannot in conscience allow.
Article 19 of the Civil Code mandates "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." And Article 2208 of the same Code states that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, can be recovered "Where the defendant
acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim." (Par. 5.) Here Paler wilfully refused to pay a debt which he clearly
ought to have paid. He has even imposed a burden on this Court by filing an unnecessary
and frivolous appeal. The award of P250.00 in favor of the appellee who had to file a printed
brief is manifestly inadequate.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is modified to excluding Jose de la Rama
therefrom and increasing the award for attorney's fees to P1,000.00; it is affirmed in all other
respects. Triple costs.

SO ORDERED.

15
RULE 119- Trial
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA,
JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated August 15, 2001 and its Resolution dated March 12,
2002. The CA decision set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25,
2000 granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra’s (Concepcion’s) motion to take
deposition, and dated November 3, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration of
respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B.
Bonje.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information
dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The
case, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-52248, arose from the falsification of a deed of
real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed
her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on
vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper
gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in
Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil
Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should
16
first be resolved. On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcion’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA
seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the appellate court to date.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s
deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak
physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcion’s deposition
be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. The respondents’ motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated
that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the
situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age. After several motions for change
of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on March 9,
2001 at her residence.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a special
civil action for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.
On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision favorable to the respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and November 3, 2000
orders of the court a quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition that may have been
taken on the authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents’ petition by not
impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter
provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before
the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before
the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly
committed grave abuse of discretion.
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the
CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the
same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The
appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because
the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal
procedure.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES
TO THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES" IN A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL CASE A
QUO CONSTITUTES A WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was
obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the
People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition.
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable
party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to
comply.
In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in
the interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of
the People of the Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was
given the opportunity to refute the respondents’ arguments.
17
Instructive is the Court’s pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration
of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure
to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other
words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become
the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in
the performance of their obvious duty.
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite the
procedural defect.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant
case, we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused
may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their
counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to
support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the
judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to
the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule
119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that
a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition exempt her from
the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls
for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule
119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same
provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if
the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her
deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus
required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is
pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcion’s motion and in actually
taking her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the
negative. The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court
of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be
made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the
previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in
good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of
superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a
18
witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the case is pending."
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall
be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners’ contention,
there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such
requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court
and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not
introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules)
qualifications not contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room
for interpretation. There is only room for application.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil
procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules
of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true
that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the
instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking
his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition
is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention.
More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness’ deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true
when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to prove its
case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such,
calls for a strict construction of the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

19
G.R. No. L-19243 February 29, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUENAVENTURA MARIANO Y TABAQUIN, defendant-appellant.
Subido, Morabe and Associates for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
From an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila defendant Buenaventura Mariano y
Tabaquin has taken this appeal, which is before us only question of law being raised
therein.
Said defendant is charged in said court with having illegally engaged, in the City of Manila,
and without the authority required therefore, in the business of carrying, conveying or
transmitting letters or packages for monetary consideration in places where the government
has provided means for the carriage of mails. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Thereafter the case was set for hearing, which was postponed several times on
motion of the defendant. Eventually, it was set for trial on June 7, 1961, but, four (4) days
prior thereto, defendant moved for the appointment of assessors. The lower court denied
this motion upon the ground: (1) that the appointment of assessors is discretionary for the
court which, under the circumstances, felt should be exercised adversely to the accused;
and (2) that the motion had merely a dilatory purpose. Hence this appeal.
The Solicitor General assails defendant's right to appeal from the order complained of, the
same being interlocutory (People vs. Sampoli, 51 Off. Gaz., 263). The objection is well
taken. In view of the interlocutory nature of said order, the proper remedy against the same
would have been for the defendants to apply for a writ of certiorari and mandamus.
Nevertheless, we deem it fit to dispose of the issue raised by defendant herein in order that
if could no longer be reiterated in the future, should the decision of the trial court on the
merits of the case be unfavorable to him.
Defendant maintains that the lower court had the mandatory duty to appoint assessors upon
the filing of his aforesaid motion. Upon the other hand, in overruling this contention, the
lower court relied upon section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) providing
that "either party to an action may apply for assessors to sit at the trial" and section 49 of the
Charter of the City of Manila (Republic Act No. 409), pursuant to which
20
... The aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the municipal court, or the
Court of First Instance, within the city, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure. ....
and held that the verb "may" used in both provisions "does not in any way imply a duty on
the part of the court to grant the petition." It, likewise, cited, in support of this conclusion, a
passage in our decision in Primicias vs. Ocampo (49 Off. Gaz., 2230) declaring that the
respondent Judge therein had "acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner (therein)
his right to the aid of assessors in the trial ...."
The view thus taken by his Honor, the trial Judge, is incompatible with the rule laid down
and consistently applied by this Court in several cases. In Berbari vs. Concepcion (40 Phil.
3220, 322, and 324), this Court said:
Said section 154 in its relation with section 2477 provides a specie of jury trial for the
defendants in criminal and civil cases in the city of Manila, when a demand therefor is made
by the defendant. By the terms of said section assessors are only appointed when one or
both of the parties shall apply therefor in writing to the judge. The parties may therefore
waive their right to assessors, and if they do not demand the appointment, they of course
waive their right thereto. The necessity or advisability of having assessors is left to the
discretion of the parties. Either or both may exercise the right to have assessors appointed.
But when the demand is made, for the appointment of assessors in the form prescribed by
the law, has the judge any discretion to deny it? Said section (154) provides that "upon the
filing of such application the judge shall direct that the assessors be provided."
It would be difficult to draw a law in which the terms could be made more mandatory. We
are of the opinion that when the Legislature said that the court shall direct etc., it did not
intent that the judge might, could or should appoint; that the Legislature, considering the
purpose of the law, meant exactly what it said — that the judge upon proper
application shall appoint.
xxx xxx xxx
... From all the foregoing our conclusions are: 1. That the provisions of section 154 of Act No.
190 in relation with Section 2477 of Act No. 2711 relating to the appointment of assessors is
mandatory; ....
In Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison (56 Phil. 344, 349) it was held:
... The respondents could not be deprived of a substantial right granted them by law.
According to section 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the assessors thus appointed shall
after qualifying sit at the hearing and advise the justice of the peace in the determination of
all questions of facts as well as of law, and in case of their dissent as to the merits of the
action, they are required by law to certify in writing their dissent, giving the reason therefor,
and such dissent shall be taken into account by the Court of First Instance in case of appeal.
All these provisions necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors
is not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the
spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a
substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings. ....
And in Primicias vs. Ocampo (49 Off. Gaz., 2230). the language used was:
... we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are
still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of section 49
of Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion that the respondent Judge acted with
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the
two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
It is thus clear that, whereas the party in a criminal case in the City of Manila may, in his
discretion, move or not for the appointment of assessors, once the motion to this effect has
been filed, "the appointment of assessors is mandatory."
excused counsel for this non-appearance. The trial was set for June 7, 1961. On June 3,
1961, the defense filed his original motion for the appointment of assessors.
We are fully in accord with this view. Indeed, defendant has not even tried to explain why it
took him over eight (8) months since his arraignment, on September 26, 1960, and almost
seven (7) months since the case was first set for trial (on November 14, 1960), to ask for the
appointment of assessors. It is also, noteworthy that the issues of fact, under the
information filed against the defendant, are limited to: (1) whether he had engaged in
activities analogous to the carriage of mail, as alleged in said information; and (2) whether
he had the requisite authority therefor. Obviously, the determination of these issues does
not depend materially, upon the appreciation or credibility of testimonial evidence, for which
the services of assessors may be of substantial assistance in the administration of justice.
This circumstance and the delay in moving for the appointment of assessors, after several
postponements of the hearing upon defendants request, indicates clearly that his purposes
in filing the motion was purely dialatory. Its denial by the lower court did not amount,
therefore, to an abuse of discretion warranting our intervention for, "the request for the
appointment of assessors should be made at the earliest convenient time so as not to
hinder or delay the trial or to unnecessarily inconvenience the progress of the work of the
court" (Berbari vs. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 320, 323), which would have been the necessary
effect of said motion, had it been granted.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendant. It is
This notwithstanding, the order appealed from should not be disturbed, insofar as it denies
so ordered.
defendant's motion for as stated in said order:

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
On the other hand, the Court feels that the insistence of the defense to have assessors
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
appointed is merely part of the dilatory tactics employed by the defense. This case was filed
on August 11, 1960. When the case was called for the arraignment of the defendant, the
defense sought and obtained a postponement on the ground that it had sought the
reinvestigation of the case. Finally, the defendant was arraigned on September 26, 1960.
On November 14, 1960, the date set for trial, the defendant moved for postponement on the
ground that his original counsel had withdrawn and that he needed time to secure the
services of another counsel. This was granted in an order dated November 18, 1960. The
hearing was set for January 4, 1961. On January 3, 1961, the defense filed a motion for
permission to withdraw his original plea of not guilty to enable him to file a motion to quash.
The Court granted the defense permission to file the said motion which was in fact filed on
January 9, 1961. On the same date, the Court denied the motion to quash and the case was
set for hearing on March 6, 1961. On March 3, 1961, the defense, alleging that they had to
file several briefs and memoranda, moved for the postponement of the hearing. The
defense counsel, however, taking for granted perhaps, that the Court would grant their
motion to postpone, failed to appear on March 6, 1961, whereupon the Court ordered them
to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. On March 16, 1961, the Court

21
 The Solicitor General contends in this Court that the order should be revoked, because it
does not appear that the provincial fiscal had been officially notified of the actual date of
hearing.

The records of the case now before us demonstrate how incomplete and informal the
G.R. No. L-836 March 30, 1950 proceedings were—obviously due to the emergency caused by the war. We find therein that
the fiscal never asserted in writing that he had not been notified. On the other hand the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, judge says that said officer "failed to appear in court this morning without any reason" which
vs. fairly implies that the fiscal had been notified, notice being a fundamental requirement which
ANACLETO MAGDANG, JOSE CADUNGON and AMPARO must be presumed to have been complied with.
SUMUGAT, defendants-appellees.
In situation similar to the one asserted here by the prosecution, the fiscal or the party
Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for affected should first make representations in the court below (in a motion for
appellant. reconsideration or new trial) as to the alleged non-receipt of notice, so that the trial judge
may have an opportunity to make an official statement on the point or see to it that the
BENGZON, J.: records are completed.

In December, 1942, the defendants-appellees were charged with malicious mischief in the
justice of the peace court of Culasi, Antique. The complaint alleged that they had plowed
land planted with mongo thereby damaging the owner in the sum of fifteen pesos. They
asserted the right to cultivate the land. Found guilty by the justice of the peace, they
appealed to the court of first instance.
Considering that the question involves a petty offense possibly mixed up with a civil
litigation, we see no justification in letting it clutter court records for a long time, especially in
the absence of a clear case.
The order of dismissal is affirmed. So ordered.

There the trial was postponed several times. On March 10, 1944, the case was called for Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.
hearing. The provincial fiscal was absent. Counsel for defendants moved for dismissal.
Whereupon the judge made this order:

The record of this case shows that the information filed by the Acting Provincial Fiscal is
dated October 25, 1943, and that the original complaint in the court below was filed on
December 31, 1942. this case, therefore, has been pending in court for quite a long period
of time, and the hearing of this case has been postponed a number of times. The Acting
Provincial Fiscal has failed to appear in court this morning without any reason, but the
accused have signified their readiness to have an immediate trial of the case. Their counsel
verbally moved for the dismissal of the case, for the reason that they have come to the court
a number of times, and that the case should be heard with the least possible delay. Finding
their motion justified, the case is hereby dismissed, with costs de oficio.

The fiscal filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 1944.

22
G.R. No. 2792 May 23, 1950
ROMEO JACA, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL BLANCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, respondent.
Rodrigo J. Harder for petitioner.
The respondent Judge and Eleuterio J. Gustillo for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
Romeo Jaca was accused before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of triple homicide
through reckless imprudence. After arraignment the case was called for trial at 8:06 in the
morning of February 3, 1949, and counsel for the accused entered his appearance. The
accused was present. But as nobody appeared for the prosecution, the court then and there
dismissed the case without prejudice. Four minutes later counsel for the private prosecution
arrived, followed a little later by the City Fiscal together with the witnesses for the
prosecution, and explained to the court that their tardiness was due to the fact that the
chauffeur of the jeep in which they were riding was detained by a policeman for driving on
the wrong side of the street. Satisfied with the explanation, the respondent judge set aside
the order of dismissal and reset the case for trial on the following morning, February 4, 1949.
On the date counsel for the accused asked for the postponement of the trial until February
16, and the respondent judge granted the request. In the meantime, that is to say, on
February 5, 1949, counsel for the accused moved for the reconsideration of the order of the
court setting aside its order of dismissal and reinstating the case, on the ground that the
court had exceeded its jurisdiction in so doing.
That motion having been denied, the accused filed the present petition for certiorari,
contending that by setting aside its order of dismissal and reinstating the case, the
respondent judge placed him in double jeopardy inasmuch as he had been arraigned and
the dismissal of the case was without his express consent.
The accused petitioner relies upon section 9 of the Rule 113, which reads as follows:
SEC. 9 Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. — When a defendant shall have
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed, or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
23
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
We at the dismissal contemplated in the abovequoted section of the rule is definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal without prejudice
the present case. In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, we find no
reason why the court may not, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case
provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it before the order becomes final or to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense. If the accused should deem
such conditional or provisional dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him because he has
been deprived of his right to speedy trial, as for instance where the case has dragged on for
an unreasonable long time without his fault, he could and should object to such dismissal
and insist that the case be heard and decided on the merits. Upon such objection and
insistence of the accused, if the prosecution does not present its evidence and if its failure
to do so is unjustified, the court should dismiss the case for the failure to prosecute. Such
dismissal would come under the purview of Section 9, Rule 113.
In the present case the information was filed on or after October 12, 1948; the accused, who
was at liberty on bail, was arraigned on January 15, 1949, when the case was first set for
trial; but the trial did not take place then because the respondent judge was in Manila, and
although the private prosecutor appeared with his witnesses, neither the accused nor his
attorney appeared. At the request of the private prosecutor the case was reset for trial on
February 3, 1949, when the fiscal and the private prosecutor with their witnesses appeared
four minutes after the case had been called. Both the accused and his attorney were
present when the respondent judge dictated the order of dismissal without prejudice, but
interposed no objection thereto. Under the circumstances we find no violation of any
constitutional right of the accused by the respondent judge in reconsidering his previous
order of dismissal a few minutes after it was dictated and in reinstating the case against
accused. The accused had been neither previously convicted nor acquitted, nor had the
case against him been definitely dismissed since the dismissal was without prejudice. Had
the respondent judge refused to vacate the order of dismissal under the circumstances, we
think he would have committed a grave miscarriage of justice.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12761 June 29, 1959
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DR. CLARO ROBLES, defendant-appellee.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Elias C. Desembrana for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On March 2, 1950, Claro Robles with others were charged before the Justice of the Peace
of Court of Tiaong, Quezon, with a violation of Article 199, paragraphs (b) and (c), of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 235, which charge was amended
on March 8, 1950. After the corresponding preliminary investigation, the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Quezon, where a formal investigation was filed by
the Fiscal against them involving in the same charged. Robles with some of his co-accused
pleaded not guilty (Case No. 10711).
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1950. The hearing was not held on said date but
was transferred to other dates either at the instance of appellee on the ground of illness, or
upon motion of the Fiscal because of the absence of his important witnesses who were
mostly members of the Philippine Constabulary, until it was finally set on November 15,
1950. On this later date, the Fiscal moved for provisional dismissal on the ground that in
spite of his efforts his witnesses could not appear to prove the allegations of the information,
and as the accused gave their conformity to it, the case was provisionally dismissed.
On January 10, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal filed a new information against the same
accused which is practically a reproduction of the original charge (Case No. 11605). After
the corresponding preliminary investigation, which was conducted only after suffering
several postponements, the arrest of Robles and his co-accused was ordered, who in due
time put up a bail bond for their temporary release. They were arraigned on June 16, 1952,
and pleaded not guilty, the court setting the hearing for July 28 and 29, 1952. As some of
the accused have not been apprehended, the Court, upon motion of the defense, ordered
the postponement of the trial until such time as all the other accused shall have been
apprehended. The case was again set for hearing on February 4, 1953, and was reset for
February 9 and 10, 1953, but when February 9 came, the Fiscal could not go to the trial
because of the absence of some of his witnesses, and so he informed the Court that he has
no alternative than to ask for postponement. Because of the alleged reason, the Court again
postponed the trial "for the last time, with the warning that when this case is set anew for
trial, it will not entertain any petition for further postponement of the trial".
24
When the case was called for hearing on March 19, 1953 the Fiscal again moved for
postponement because of the absence of his witnesses. The motion was vigorously
opposed by counsel for appellee, adverting to the fact that this case has been postponed
many times for the reason that the prosecution could not go to trial because of the absence
of its witnesses with the result that the case had been pending for more than three (3) years
since it was originally instituted, and considering that the accused have already suffered
long enough "from mental anguish, wounded feelings, social shock and besmirched
reputation" and are entitled under the Constitution to a speedy trial, counsel moved that the
case be definitely dismissed, with costs de oficio. The Court denied the motion for
postponement, but on March 28, 1953, dismissed the case on the ground "that the
prosecution has had ample time and opportunity to prepare for trial and to prosecute this
case, and that it would be unfair and unjust to hold indefinitely the defendants to the offense
charged herein until the prosecution is in a position to enter trial."
Three years after the dismissal of the second charge, or on February 21, 1956, the
Provincial Fiscal filed another information for the same offense only against Claro Robles,
his other co-accused in the previous cases not having been included in this third charge.
The third information was referred to the Justice of the Peace of Court of Lucena for
preliminary investigation. On June 5, 1956, Robles through counsel, filed a motion to quash
on the ground that he had already been placed in jeopardy. The Provincial fiscal filed his
reply contending that there was no double jeopardy because the dismissal of the first
charge was provisional in character and that of the second charge was granted on motion of
the accused himself. The Justice of the Peace Court denied the motion to quash and set the
case for preliminary investigation on July 28, 1956. Then the accused filed a supplementary
motion to quash, to which the Fiscal filed a reply. To this reply the defendants put up an
answer. After a series of replies and rejoinders to the pleadings of both parties, the Justice
of the Peace Court denied the supplementary motion to quash for lack of merit, and
thereupon conducted the required preliminary investigation conducted by it in view of a writ
of injunction issued by the Court of First Instance disputing its jurisdiction to act thereon.
And on August 23, 1956, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the case
alleging as ground that the accused can no longer be prosecuted for the reason that he has
already been placed twice in jeopardy. It is against this order that the Provincial Fiscal
interposed the present appeal.
While the order of the trial court subject of the present appeal does not clearly indicate the
reason why appellee would be placed twice in jeopardy if the present charge be prosecuted
to its termination, it may be gathered from the record that the basis of the finding of double
jeopardy is the dismissal of the second charge which was granted upon motion of appellee
invoking his right to a speedy trial under the Constitution. The Court considered such order
of dismissal as an acquittal on the merits that would bar the filing of another information for
the same offenses.
Because of its importance in the determination of the merits of this case, we will quote
hereunder the order of dismissal issued in Criminal Case No. 11065:
When this case was called for trial on March 19, 1953 at 9:30 a.m., none of the witnesses
for the prosecution, who are all members of the A.F.P. or P.C., appeared despite due notice
upon them through the Office of the Provincial Commander, P.C., at Camp Wilhelm, Lucena,
Quezon, and for which reason, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Santiago O. Tañada, who
appeared for the prosecution, moved for postponement of trial. Counsel for the defense
vigorously opposed further postponement of trial on the ground that this case has been
pending trial for three years, and that in the meantime the defendants have undergone
mental suffering on account of this criminal action against them, that the trial of this case
has been postponed time and again on petition of the prosecution; and that this case had
already been once provisionally dismissed for failure of the prosecution to be ready for trial,
and for which reason the defense moved for the dismissal of the case.
In open court, the motion for postponement of hearing was denied, but the Court reserved
its resolution on the motion of the defense to dismiss the case.
A perusal of the record of this case, discloses that this case was instituted and originally
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10711 of this Court on May 12, 1950, at the instance of the
P.C. at Lucena, Quezon, but it was ordered provisionally dismissed on November 15, 1950,
on motion of the prosecution; that it was revived only on January 10, 1952, upon the filing
directly with this Court of the present criminal action after the lapse of more than one year
since its provisional dismissal; that when this case was set and called for trial was again
postponed on petition of the prosecution on the ground that the prosecution was not dully
prepared for trial, and for the further reason that the remaining thirty-four defendants were
still at large, which postponement of trial was granted by the Court in its order of February 9,
1953, in order to afford the prosecution another opportunity to be fully prepared for trial, with
a warning, however, that the Court will not entertain any petition for further postponement of
trial.
Counsel for the defense vigorously opposed further postponement of trial on the ground that
this case has been pending for three years, and that in the meantime the defendants have
undergone mental suffering on account of this criminal action against them; that the trial of
this case has been postponed of time and again on petition of the prosecution; and that this
case had already been once provisionally dismissed for failure of the prosecution to be
ready for trial.
Wherefore, the Court, finding that the prosecution has had ample time and opportunity to
prepare for trial and to prosecute this case, and that it would be unfair and unjust to hold
indefinitely the defendants to the offense charged herein until the prosecution is in a
25
position to enter trial, hereby orders the dismissal of this case with respect to the defendants
Claro Robles, Eduardo Ambat, Eladio Vinal, Fortunato Alcairo, Pedro Umali, Filomeno
Jaurigue, Santiago Paras, Maria Quijano, and Anselmo Somajestad, and the cancellation of
the bail filed for their provisional liberty, with proportional cost de oficio.
It would appear, as trial court has said, that this case was instituted originally on May 12,
1950, but was provisionally dismissed on November 10, 1950, on motion of the prosecution;
that it was revived on January 10, 1952, upon filing of another information for the same
offense after a lapse of more than 1 year since its provisional dismissal; that when this case
was set and called for trial on February 9, 1953, the trial was again postponed on petition of
the prosecution on the ground that it was not prepared for trial and because some of the
co-accused of appellee were still at large, which postponement was granted in order to
afford the prosecution another opportunity to prepare for trial with the warning that the court
will not entertain any other petition for postponement.
It would likewise appear that the defense vigorously objected to further postponement on
the ground that this case has been pending for three years and that in the meantime the
defendants, including appellee, have undergone mental anguish because of the pendency
of this case, and that the trial had been postponed time and again on petition of the
prosecution, the opposition of counsel being predicated on the right of the defendant to a
speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution. And on the basis of these facts and the reasons
advanced by the defendant, the Court dismissed the case with costs de oficio.
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the provisional in character but
no one which is tantamount to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense.
There is a close parallelism between the instant case and that of People vs. Tacneng , et al.,
G.R. No. L-12082, which was decided by this Court only on April 30,1059. In that case, the
accused was charged with homicide before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. They
pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for hearing.
When the hearing came, the fiscal asked for postponement alleging that he was not able to
contact his witnesses, which was granted. When the case was again called for hearing, the
Fiscal moved for another postponement alleging that his witnesses could not be found, and
the hearing was again postponed. But when the third hearing came and the Fiscal asked for
another postponement, the accused vigorously objected to the postponement, invoking his
Constitutional right to a speedy trial. Considering that the case had been postponed twice
and the whereabouts of the witnesses for the prosecution could not be ascertained, while
on the other hand the accused were entitled to a speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.
However, one year and three months thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal filed another
information for murder against the same defendants, with the only difference that the mayor
of the place was included as co-accused. When the case came up for hearing, the
defendants moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court
entertained the motion and on appeal this Court rendered a confirmatory decision.

In holding that the dismissal of the previous case under the circumstances then prevailing
was tantamount to an acquittal of the defendants, this Court said: "Evidently, the order of
dismissal in Criminal Case No. 1793 was based on the right of the appellees to a speedy
trial, and the same was only issued because the records shows that at the time said case
was called for hearing for the third time on April 21, 1954, the Fiscal wanted to secure
another postponement, and for that reason he manifested that he was not ready to go into
trial on account of the absence of the witnesses, especially that of his principal witness
Mauro Hernaez whose appearance was uncertain as his whereabouts were then unknown.
But since the absence of witnesses was the very same reason why the two postponements
had been granted, the herein appellees protested and objected a third postponement and
moved for the dismissal of the case, and the Court, believing that further postponement
would be unreasonable and unfair to herein appellees who had the right to be tried promptly,
dismissed the case in order to maintain inviolate their constitutional right to a speedy trial."

And making a resume of the case, this court concluded: " . . . when criminal case No. 1793
was called for hearing for the third time and the fiscal was not ready to enter into trial due to
the absence of his witnesses, the herein appellee had the right to object to any further
postponement and to ask for the dismissal of the case by reason for their constitutional right
to a speedy trial; and if pursuant to that objection and petition for dismissal amounted to an
acquittal of the herein appellees which can be invoked as they did, in a second prosecution
for the same offenses."

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked our ruling in the case of People
vs. Salico, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 1765-1776, reiterated in People vs. Romero, 89 Phil., 672;
49 Off. Gaz., (11) 4851, to the effect that dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not without the
express consent of the defendant, which ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its
appeal; but said ruling is not now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in
subsequent cases wherein we sustained the theory of double jeopardy despite the fact that
the dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs..

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur.

26
G.R. Nos. L-31261-2-3-4-5 April 20, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO, DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAVITE, BRANCH III, TIBURCIO SANTERO, and EPIFANIA ILANO, respondents.
Cavite Provincial Fiscal Narciso D. Salcedo and Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Candido
P. Villanueva for petitioner.
Gregorio M. Familar for respondents.
Judge Alfredo Catolico in his own behalf.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Original action of certiorari to declare null and void the order of respondent judge dismissing
five criminal cases of estafa against private respondents, on the ground that he could no
longer continue trying the cases nor adjudicate them since the interested parties failed to
secure a written authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court authorizing the
adjournment of the trial thereof beyond the three-month period provided in Rule 22, section
3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The undisputed facts, as recited in the petition, show that the five criminal cases were filed
on July 5, 1966 with Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, presided since July,
1969 by respondent judge. After arraignment of private respondents and their not-guilty
pleas on December 20, 1967, the cases were tried jointly, although there were different
offended parties, because the evidence against the common accused was common to all
the said five cases. Hearings were set and held every month in 1968 from February to
August, 1968 with the prosecution resting its case on August 6, 1968. The defense a
presentation of its evidence on September 3, 1968 and trial continued on various scheduled
dates in October and November of 1968 and February, 1969. On no single occasion did the
prosecution ask for postponement of the trial but the respondents-accused obtained six
postponements. At the hearing scheduled on April 23, 1969, defense counsel obtained the
postponement thereof with the manifestation that at the next hearing, he would present
respondent-accused Epifania Ilano as their last witness and would thereafter rest their case.
The proceedings so far, as related above, were had in the trial court as presided by Judge
Jose B. Jimenez, who was thereafter appointed to the Court of First Instance of Manila and
assumed his new position on July 1, 1969. He was succeeded by respondent judge, who
took over as the new presiding judge of the said court. The cases were then calendared by
the clerk for trial on August 5, 1969 for continuation of the presentation of evidence for the
defense. Respondents-accused still secured their seventh postponement of trial, as their
27
defense counsel filed on August 4, 1969 a motion for withdrawal of his appearance on the
ground that he was leaving for abroad. On the same date, August 4, 1969, Atty. Gregorio M.
Familar their present defense counsel, filed an urgent motion for postponement of the
scheduled hearing to September, 1969 on the ground that his services had just been
retained and he had yet to obtain the transcripts of the previous hearings. Respondent
judge thus granted respondents used their seventh postponement and reset the
continuation of trial for September 8, 1969.
What next transpired is thus narrated by petitioner: "(T)hat when September 8, 1969,
however, came, the new defense counsel, Atty. Familar, instead of continuing with the
presentation of evidence for the defense as previously promised, did not do so, and neither
did respondent Judge ask him to present his witness. For as this new counsel must have
been already informed of the somewhat novel idea of respondent Judge of dismissing
cases whether civil or criminal after the lapse of 90 days period on the alleged ground that
he does not have power to try the same when no written authority from the Honorable Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court could be presented to him, taking advantage of the situation,
what he did was to call the attention of respondent Judge to the absence of such written
authority, and as he must have anticipated, it was even respondent Judge himself who
suggested to the same defense counsel the idea of filing a motion to dismiss on the said
ground. Hence, the defense counsel hurriedly prepared a brief motion, to dismiss putting
the ground suggested by respondent Judge . . .," Defense counsel, alleging that ". . . the
hearings of these cases had been postponed for more than 90 days and because of which,
we submit that this Honorable Court has no more authority or power to hear these cases
because there is nothing in the records that a written authority was granted to this Court by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to continue trying these cases," prayed for the
dismissal of the cases.
Upon receipt of the accused's motion to dismiss and without giving the fiscal a chance to file
an opposition thereto or even to comment thereon, and notwithstanding that it did not
contain a notice of hearing, respondent judge issued an order of dismissal on the very same
day, September 8, 1969, as follows:
Motion to dismiss this case was filed as of today by counsel for the defendants predicated
upon the fact that the same has been lagging in this Court since 1966 and the last hearing
was on November 20, 1968, where the interested parties failed to secure a written authority
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the new Presiding Judge to be able to
continue trying this case leading to the final adjudication thereof.
WHEREFORE, for the said reason stated in the motion and for lack of interest to prosecute
the same, this case is hereby ordered dismissed, without prejudice.
The provincial fiscal, on behalf of the prosecution filed in vain a written opposition to the
motion on the next day on the ground that the provisions of Rule 22, section 3 were merely
directory so that even if adjournments lasted for more than three months, the same could
not nullify the proceedings already had.
The copy of respondent judge's order of dismissal dated September 8, 1969 was not served
on the prosecution until September 22, 1969. On the following day, the fiscal filed the
People's motion for reconsideration reiterating that Rule 22, petition 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court (formerly Rule 31, section 4) had already been held by this Court in Barrueco vs.
Abeto to be merely directory, a violation of which would not nullify a judicial proceeding and
that the additional ground of "lack of interest to prosecute the (case)" adduced motu
proprio by respondent judge had no basis in the record whatsoever, the prosecution having
rested its case since August 6, 1968 or long before respondent judge took over the trial
court as presiding judge thereof in July, 1969. At any rate, the fiscal informed respondent
judge that he had already requested of the Chief Justice the written authority mentioned by
the judge. Upon being assured that such authority was forthcoming, respondent judge
postponed hearing of the People's motion for reconsideration from September 29, 1969, as
originally set, to October 17, 1969.
Such written authorization of the Chief Justice, signed by the Clerk of Court expressly "By
authority of the Chief Justice" was duly issued and presented by the fiscal to respondent
judge. At the hearing of October 17, 1969, respondent judge issued in open court his denial
thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In a letter dated October 10, 1969, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court informs the
Presiding Judge that he is extending authority to continue hearing and trying until finished
all criminal cases pending in Branch III of the Cavite Court of First Instance irrespective of
the number of years of dormancy under Sec. 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court .
This authority, although it suffers somehow regarding its potential for indeed it is not one
extended by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as required by Rule 22 but by a mere
clerk of court of the Supreme Court which is not envisioned in the express wording of Rule
22 of Rules of Court adopted by the same Supreme Court, still it covers this particular
criminal case. The only difference is that in this case even if the new Presiding Judge was
given such an authority to continue with the case, it appears in the record that there is no
such case to be continued anymore in the sense that by virtue of the order of dismissal
dictated in open Court as of September 8, 1969, this same presiding Judge may not have
the power to reconsider said order for indeed, the benefits involved in the said order
accrued in favor of the said accused as of that very moment when the order was dictated in
28
open Court and not from the day the office of the Provincial Fiscal received a written copy
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the present petition filed on behalf of the People assailing the respondent judge's
orders of dismissal and denial of the motion for reconsideration, for having been issued
"arbitrarily, capriciously, whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or in excess of jurisdiction."
At petitioner's instance, the Court issued on December 4, 1969 a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction commanding respondent judge to reinstate the five criminal cases for
further proceedings.
Respondents, through defense counsel, filed their answer in due course, wherein they
made no denial of the facts of the case as stated above nor any counter-averments, but
contended that "the dismissal (order) was valid and proper and pursuant to the accused's
constitutional right to speedy trial" and that "although the dismissal was 'without prejudice,'
its legal effect constitutes an acquittal and a further reopening would constitute double
jeopardy."
At the hearing of the cases at bar on January 26, 1970, petitioner duly appeared through the
fiscal but in view of the non-appearance of counsel for respondents, the Court gave both
parties a period for the filing of simultaneous memoranda in lieu of oral argument. The case
was thereafter submitted for decision with the filing of petitioner's memorandum,
respondents having failed to file their memorandum.
The Court finds the petition well taken.
1. Respondent judge grossly abused his discretion in dismissing the five criminal cases
below on the ground that since they had been pending since 1966 and no written authority
to adjourn trial for more than three months had been received from the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, he no longer had authority or power to continue the trial nor to render
judgment thereon, by virtue of the provisions of Rule 22, section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said Rule provides:
SEC. 3. Adjournments and postponements.— A court may adjourn a trial from day to day,
and to any stated time, as the expeditious and convenient transaction of business may
require, but shall have no power to adjourn a trial for a longer period than one month for
each adjournment, nor more than three months in all, except when authorized in writing by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
In so dismissing the cases below, respondent judge utterly disregarded this Court's ruling
in Barrueco, supra, on an identical provision in the original Rules of Court (Rule 31, section
4 thereof) — assuming the applicability of the cited Rule to criminal cases, infra — that the
Rule's provisions were "merely directory, a violation of which will not nullify a judicial
proceeding.
Indeed, the Rule could not but be directory rather than mandatory in character, for it could
not have been possibly intended to divest without sanction of law the trial courts of their
jurisdiction and authority to try and decide cases within their competent jurisdiction, as
conferred by statute. The Rule was designed as a salutary guideline to help expedite the
trial of cases if as the expeditious and convenient transaction of business may require" by
directing that trial courts should not "adjourn a trial for a longer period than one month for
each adjournment nor more than three months in all, except when authorized in writing by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court." But the Court did realize in promulgating the Rules
that the exigencies and limitations of time and human effort and complexities of cases in the
face of increasing court dockets would not allow strict adherence to the ideal and that the
trial of cases, particularly complicated ones, might in fact take years to terminate. Hence, it
directed also in section 6 of the same Rule for the holding of annual conferences "at the end
of one year from the day the trial proper has commenced, and every year thereafter, if the
trial has not been terminated" where "the judge shall call the parties and their counsel to a
conference to device ways and means of terminating the trial." Withal, as emphasized by
the late Justice Laurel in Barrueco, judges should not willfully disregard or recklessly violate
such directory provisions of the Rules of Court for that "would constitute a breach or neglect
of duty which may subject them to corresponding administrative action."
2. Here, respondent judge had no basis to invoke the directory provisions of the cited Rule
and its administrative sanctions, for he had but assumed the position of new presiding judge
of his court. The prosecution had long rested its case since August 6, 1968. All that was
needed to terminate the trial was the presentation of the defense's last witness as
undertaken by them at the postponed hearing of April 23, 1969. Respondent judge, after his
assumption of his post in July, 1969, had granted respondents-accused a postponement —
the seventh postponement secured by them, that of the hearing set for August 5, 1969 — in
order to give time to their new counsel to study the records of the case. All that was left for
respondent judge to do at the hearing of September 8, 1969, as reset by him, was to call for
the testimony of the last defense witness and thereafter declare the cases submitted for
decision. In case such witness was not available and there was valid ground therefor, he
could grant still another postponement; if there was no valid reason for the witness' absence,
he could have declared the trial terminated and the cases submitted for decision.
But for respondent judge instead to have order the dismissal of the cases on the utterly
untenable ground of his loss of authority and power to continue the trail and to render
judgment was indeed arbitrary and whimsical — in the words of the People's counsel, "it
29
was the first time that we ever encountered such an incident, where several criminal cases
had been dismissed at such a very late stage and after the complainants had exerted so
much efforts in coming to and from the Court and the Government had already incurred
considerable expenses prosecuting said criminal cases from the time the cases were
preliminary investigated up to the time that the trial thereof had reached such concluding
phase."
3. If respondent judge had felt that the written authority of the Chief Justice was essential
and imperative for him to continue trying the cases below and to decide them, it was as
much incumbent upon him as the "guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those of
the people at large" — as upon the parties — to have requested and secured such authority
in the interest of the administration of justice. At the very least, he should have given the
fiscal an opportunity to be heard on the accused's dismissal motion and to secure the
written authority, instead of instantly and precipitously granting the dismissal
motion ex-parte.
4. The Court finds incomprehensible the additional ground of "lack of interest to prosecute
the (cases) " adduced motu proprio by respondent judge for his dismissal order. For the
records show exactly the contrary, the prosecution having diligently prosecuted and rested
its case since August 6, 1968, almost a year before respondent judge assumed his position
as new presiding judge of the trial court in July, 1969. Equally incomprehensible is
respondent judge's adoption in his dismissal order of respondents accused's false assertion
in their motion for dismissal that the cases had "been lagging in this Court since 1966 and
the last hearing was on November 20, 1968" when the records show that whatever delay
there may have been was attributable solely to the defense, who had secured all seven
postponements granted in the said cases and that all that was lacking to terminate the
hearings was the presentation of their last witness, as undertaken by them. These facts of
record stand undisputed by respondents.
The dismissal order was therefore invalid and a nullity within the context of the doctrine
of People vs. Gomez, where the Court held that " (A) purely capricious dismissal of an
information, as herein involved, moreover, deprives the State of fair opportunity to
prosecute and convict. It denies the prosecution its day in court. Accordingly, it is a
dismissal without due process and, therefore, null and void. A dismissal invalid for lack of a
fundamental prerequisite, such as due process, will not constitute a proper basis for the
claim of double jeopardy."
5. Furthermore, the Court now holds that the applicable rule on adjournments and
postponements in criminal cases, such as the cases at bar, is found not in Rule 22, section
3 which is the rule provided for civil actions and proceedings, but in Rule 119, section 2,
which provides as follows:
SEC. 2. Continuance or Postponement of the trial. — The court on the application of either
party or on its own motion, may in its discretion for good cause postpone the trial of the case
for such period, of time as the ends of justice and the right of the defendant to a speedy trial
require.
Thus, a leading authority on criminal procedure "noted that while in a civil action, the court
has no power to adjourn trial 'for a longer period than one month for each adjournment nor
more than three months in all, except when authorized in writing by the Chief Justice', no
such limitation exists with regard to continuance of trials of criminal actions. The only
limitation expressed by the aforesaid provision is that the postponement of the trial of a
criminal case must be for 'good cause' shown and for such period of the time as 'the ends of
justice and the right of the defendant to a speedy trial require.'" While it was further noted
that "the rule does not grant the court 'for good cause.'" The greater flexibility of the rule on
postponements in criminal actions was obviously based on the criterion in the early case
of U.S. vs. Ramirez that the trial court is in criminal proceedings "the guardian of the rights
of the accused as well as those of the people at large, and should not unduly force him to
trial, nor for light causes jeopardize the rights or interests of the public" and that "the
discretion which the trial court exercises must be judicial and not arbitrary" — consistent
with the ends of justice and the granting of sufficient time and opportunity to both
prosecution and defense to present their witnesses and the right of the accused to a speedy
trial.
6. Respondent judge further compounded his gross abuse of discretion, when having
ordered the dismissal of the cases "without prejudice" upon motion of respondents-accused
— solely on his alleged lack of authority to continue with the cases in the absence of the
written authority of the Chief Justice, under Rule 22, section 3 wrongly invoked and
inapplicable to criminal actions as above pointed out, — he denied the People's motion for
reconsideration notwithstanding the written authority submitted by the fiscal, this time ruling
that "there is nothing to continue anymore because this case (sic) was ordered dismissed
as of September 8, 1969 and may not be reconsidered anymore," because "the benefits
involved in the said order accrued in favor of the said accused as of that very moment when
the order was dictated in open court."
This volte-face of respondent judge was taken motu proprio, citing the inapplicable 1961
case of Lagunilla vs. Reyes where the Court held that a dismissal of the criminal case
against therein petitioner because of the apparent lack of interest of the complainant to
prosecute the case, "made unconditionally and without reservation, after plea of not guilty,
and apparently predicated on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial, is, . . .
equivalent to an acquittal," and could no longer be recalled for correction or reconsideration.
The factual setting of Lagunilla has no parallel whatsoever in the cases at bar.
Respondents-accused had not set up the defense of jeopardy in the cases below and there
30
is no record or showing of their having objected, to respondent judge's consideration of the
People's motion for reconsideration. As a matter of fact, their bail bonds for their provisional
liberty were not ordered cancelled by respondent judge and technically they are still in the
custody and jurisdiction of respondent judge's court with their bondsmen as their jailors.
Respondents-accused having obtained upon their motion the dismissal of the cases below,
not on the merits but on the sole ground of alleged lack of authority of respondent judge to
continue with the cases in the absence of written authority from the Chief Justice, are
deemed to have given their express consent to the dismissal "without prejudice" and to
have waived their right to plead jeopardy. This is the teaching and doctrine of People vs.
Obsania, where Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, speaking for the Court in a unanimous
decision, extensively reviewed the jurisprudence on jeopardy and restated this prevailing
rule.
7. In Obsania, supra, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of
double jeopardy as first enunciated by the late Justice Pedro Tuason in People vs.
Acierto to the effect that "when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from
asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy."
Justice Tuason's pronouncements therein aptly fit the cases at bar. "A party will not be
allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would
result in brazen deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles
of right dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court [the trial court, in the cases at
[bar] that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to tell the
court to which he has been turned over [this Court in the present action] that the first has
committed error in yielding to his plea."
The Court likewise therein reaffirmed the case of People vs. Casiano where the now Chief
Justice stated that "the rule of estoppel applied in the Acierto case should be maintained,
because:
1. It is basically and fundamentally sound and just.
2. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethic's, which demand good faith of the
higher order in the practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory
inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are
not barred on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter
of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S. 861863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced
it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position
that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon."
Similarly, the Court therein reiterated the admonition in People v. Archilla, that the accused
"cannot be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the trial court to
commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words, appellee
cannot adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul with the doctrine of
estoppel."
8. Respondents-accused's other contention that the dismissal order should be upheld
pursuant to their constitutional right to speedy trial has no basis in fact nor in law. Such right
was not asserted by them below as in fact they could not assert it, for the prosecution had
long rested its case since August 6, 1968 and any and all delays entailed in the termination
of the trial were exclusively of their own doing. Lacking any factual basis, they cannot claim
in law that they have been denied their right to speedy trial.
9. Respondent judge's capricious dismissal of cases in his court in Cavite, based on his own
unique appreciation of the provisions of Rule 22, section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court to
the effect "that upon the lapse of three months from the first day of trial on the merits, the
trial judge lost control of the same, and may not continue trying the same [when there is no
written authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court] for the only thing possible to
be done is to dismiss the case," notwithstanding his awareness of this Court's contrary
ruling in Barrueco, supra, was already noted by the Court in Barrera vs. Barrera decided on
July 31, 1970. In said case, where respondent judge was held in contempt of this Court and
reprimanded, he was reminded of his duty to apply the law as interpreted by this Court "as
the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy" and of the great mischief and prejudice to the
administration of justice, and unnecessary inconvenience, delay and expenses to litigants,
that would be needlessly caused, should judges of lower courts dispose of cases in
accordance with their personal views contrary to the final authoritative pronouncements of
this Court. The Court has noted that the inconsistency of respondent judge's present
posture that he loses control of a case upon the lapse of three months from the first day of
trial on the merits and has only to dismiss the case was brought out at the contempt hearing
in said case when he admitted that he did not follow such a course of action in the other trial
31
courts presided by him, viz, the Courts of First Instance of Misamis Occidental and of Ilocos
Norte, prior to his appointment to the Cavite court.
10. In the same case of Barrera, this Court, per Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, already
found respondent judge in contempt for recklessly "hurling the baseless allegation that the
Clerk of this Court was permitted to exercise an authority which appertained to the Chief
Justice. He did speak with all the valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from such an
indefensible stand in the face of his being informed that what the Clerk did was solely in
accordance with what was previously decided by this Court, which certainly will not tolerate,
anybody else, much less a subordinate, to speak and act for itself. This gross disrespect
shown to this Court has no justification."
In his present order of denial of the People's motion for reconsideration, respondent judge
committed the same reckless act of making it appear in his Order that it was the Clerk of this
Court who "informs the presiding judge that he is extending authority to continue hearing
and trying, until finished all criminal cases pending . . .," notwithstanding that the Clerk of
this Court signed the communication expressly "By authority of the Chief Justice."
Such action of respondent judge, aside from being grossly disrespectful of the Court,
exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of the time-honored usage of the Court that
minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court as well as official actions of the
Chief Justice, upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the interested
parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With
the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax the time
and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the prejudice of the
administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could be released only
upon their own signatures. The situation is analogous to administrative decisions signed by
the Executive Secretary "by authority of the President," which decisions are given full faith
and credit by our courts as decisions of the President, "unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive."
11. In view of the rash and improper actuations of respondent judge, which could have
resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice, the Court has resolved that this matter be
brought to the attention of the Secretary of Justice for the initiation of appropriate
administrative action, as the facts and circumstances warrant. This is in fact the third case
involving respondent Judge that has thus been resolved to be officially brought to the
Secretary's attention the two others being the contempt proceedings in Barrera vs.
Barrera, supra, and the prohibition proceedings in Queto vs. Catolico.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is granted and respondent judge's orders dated
September 8, 1969 and October 17, 1969 are declared null and void and without legal effect.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is made permanent, and respondent judge is
ordered to continue and terminate the trial in the five reinstated criminal cases and
thereafter render judgment thereon in accordance with law. With costs against private
respondents.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, in
accordance with paragraph 11 hereof. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

32
81 Phil. 543 in this regard runs counter to the thesis. That is, with or vrithout reservation made by the
defense, said trial courts have been and are allowing the defense to present evidence after
PEOPLE v. MORO MAMACOL a motion to dismiss has been denied.

PERFECTO, J.:
The attorney de oficio for appellant, who was sentenced by the lower court to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000.00 and to pay the
costs, for the killing of Dagodob in the early morning of October 16, 1946, in Ramitan,
Malabang, Lanao, raises three questions:
1) That at the last hearing at Iligan on July 16, 1947, according to the record, appellant
was not present as he was still in Dansalan, and this is a reversible error as, according
to Section 1 (a) of Rule 111, the accused is entitled to be present at every stage of the
proceeding and when the crime charged is a capital one, such right cannot be waived.
2) That the lower court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence after denying
a motion for dismissal made when the prosecution rested, without Reserving the right
to present said evidence in the event the motion is denied.
3) That the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to convict appellant.The first
question is based on the fact that whether the accused was present or not at the
hearing which took place at Iligan on July 16, 1947 the records appear blank. The
controversy centers on whether, that blankness must be interpreted as that the
accused was not present or it should be supplied by the presumption that the official
duty to have the accused present at the trial has been complied with. It is not
necessary, however, to decide this question in view of the result we have arrived at in
deciding the last two questions.
We are of opinion that the procedure which has been practiced and is generally practiced in
trial courts for a long number of years, is based on sound reason. There are criminal cases
in which because of the insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution, the presentation of
defense's evidence will only entail waste of time. Where the motion to dismiss is denied,
there is no harm to the interest of the administration of justice to allow defendant to present
evidence, while to bar him to present said evidence, which might show his innocence, may
lead to a miscarriage of justice. We rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss made by an
accused, with or without reservation to present his evidence, will not impair his right to
present it. The substantial rights of an accused should not be impaired because of his
counsel's anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted. The need of applying the rule
appears to be more emphatic in a case like this where life or death or perpetual
inprisonment of the accused are at stake.
Upon the last question we hold, after going over the evidence presented by the prosecution,
that the testimonies of Apuntok Mamangcas and Payocan Moro, the two witnesses for the
prosecution, are enough to give the latter a prima facie, case.
The appealed decision is set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the lover court to
allow the accused to present evidence and for further proceedings.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

On the second question, due to the silence of the Rules on the matter, the Solicitor General
urges us to erase whatever doubts may exist regarding the matter and to set a precedent
for the future guidance of judges and lawyers among whom the question has caused so
much confusion.

The thesis of the Solicitor General is that whether the accused reserves or fails to reserve
his right to adduce evidence in making a motion to dismiss, if the motion is denied, he can
no longer do so, having elected to stand or fall on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution, and the court should decide the case on the evidence submitted and the only
question to be resolved on appeal is whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction or not.

While maintaining this thesis, the Solicitor General has given an evidence of fairness when
he states honestly that the ordinary and common-day procedure adopted by the trial courts
33
G.R. No. L-43406 January 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELECIO TORRES ET AL., defendants.
MELECIO TORRES, FIDEL GERVASIO, NICOLAS CHAVEZ, ENGRACIO VARONA and
MACARIO GARILLO, appellants.
Florentino T. Ocampo for appellants.
Miranda and De la Rosa for appellant Chavez.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The appellants, Melecio Torres, Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona, and
Macario Garillo, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Cavite with the crime of
forcible abduction with physical injuries. After due trial, they were found guilty: and Melecio
Torres, as the principal culprit, was sentenced to suffer not less than eight years of prision
mayor and not more than twelve years one day of reclusion temporal, while Fidel Gervasio,
Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona and Macario Garillo, were each sentenced to suffer less
than and one day of prision mayor. In assessing the penalty to be imposed, the court took
into consideration the aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed in the
nighttime and by a hand.
The facts which led to the filing of the information against the appellants are fully set forth in
the decision of the trial court, and it would be a work of supererogation.
Most of the errors assigned both in the brief for the appellant Nicolas Chavez and in that for
the other appellants, relate to the correctness of the findings of fact made by the trial court.
It is contended that "the court a quo erred in not finding as it is a fact that the accused
Melecio Torres had amorous relations with the alleged offended party, Dalisay Bonifacio,
previous to the 8th of November 1934." It is also contended that "the court a quo erred in
not finding it as a fact that the accused Melecio Torres and the complainant Dalisay
Bonifacio, on November 6, 1934 agreed to elope on the 8th of November, 1934, and
consequently, that what happened was in reality a fake abduction." No evidence was
adduced in support of these contention except the testimony of Melecio Torres himself the
truth of which was challenged by Dalisay Bonifacio denied having sustained amorous
relations with Melecio Torres. She also denied having agreed to elope with him. The
circumstance which the girl was carried away by Melecio Torres and his co-accused were
such as to preclude the conclusion that it was done with her consent If there was really an
agreement between Melecio Torres and Dalisay Bonifacio to elope, it is inconceivable why
34
they did not select a more auspicious occasion to carry out their plan. It is likewise
inconceivable why Melecio Torres had to secure the assistance of four other men.
Torres' co-accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution, and
their participation in the commission of the crime was duly established. The testimony of
these witnesses is clear and convincing, while the witnesses for the defense have incurred
in serious contradictions. No motive whether was shown on the part of the prosecution
witnesses that might have induced them the testify falsely, while the evidence for the
defense comes mostly from interested sources.
Counsel for the appellant Nicolas Chavez contend that the lower court erred in not granting
the latter a separate trial. The record shows that the application for a separate trial was
made after two witnesses for the prosecution had already testified. The application came
too late; it should have been made before the commencement of the trial. (U.S. vs. Morales,
8 Phil., 300.)
That there was conspiracy to abduct Dalisay Bonifacio and that Nicholas Chavez not only
had knowledge of, but took part in the conspiracy, the evidence leaves no room for a
reasonable doubt. We find no merit in the contention that Nicholas Chavez had no
knowledge of the unchaste designs of Melecio Torres.
One of the points stressed by counsel for appellant Melecio Torres and others relates to the
testimony of Drs. Pablo Anzures, Pedro Matias, and Sancho Rillo concerning the virginity of
the complaining witness. Apart from the fact that the virginity of the offended
abduction ,medical authorities are by no means agreed that a woman is not a virgin merely
because the hymen is not present. It is claimed by some authorities, upon the basis of
clinical observations, that the hymen is not always present. it is state of undoubted virginity;
that sometimes it is torn away in childhood due to various causes. We are not inclined to
consider the virginity of the complaining witnesses as a determining factor in this case.
The crime committed by the appellants is that defined in article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized reclusion temporal. In fixing the penalty two aggravating circumstances
should be taken into consideration: Namely; (1) that the crime was committed in the
nighttime, and (2) by a band. In the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the penalty
prescribed should be imposed in its maximum period, or from seventeen years, four months
and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Melecio Torres is hereby sentenced to suffer is not less than
eight years of prision mayor and not more than seventeen years, four months and one day
of reclusion temporal. Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona, and Macario
Garillo, are each sentenced to suffer not less than six years and one day of prision mayor,
and not more that seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal.
Modified as above indicated, the judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

Hull, Vickers, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

35
G.R. No. L-46329-30 April 10, 1979
JAMES JOSEPH, MIGUEL ROMULO, ANTONIO SANTAMARIA, RAMON IGNACIO
MORAN, EUGENIO LOPEZ III, and JAIME CLAPAROLS, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as Judge presiding over the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Metro Manila, HON. EMMANUEL G. PEÑA, as Acting
District State Prosecutor And the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Estanislao A. Fernandez for petitioners James Joseph and Antonio Santamaria.
Francis Moran and Angel A. Sison for petitioner Ramon Ignacio Moran.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner Jaime Claparols, Jr.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner Eugenio Lopez III.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or
petition for habeas corpus seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that writs of prohibition issue commanding
respondents to desist from further prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-1750-51 of
the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Metro Manila of certiorari annulling the orders of
February 7 and 28, 1977 and June 10, 1977 of respondent judge in said criminal cases
denying petitioners' demurrers to the evidence and motion for separate trial of each
accused, and of mandamus commanding respondents to render a judgment of acquittal of
petitioners from the said criminal charges. Or, at the very least, they respectfully pray that
the lower court be ordered to grant each petitioner separate trials. In the alternative, they
also pray for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus which extends to the continued restraint
on petitioner's liberty when petitioners are entitled to acquittal from the criminal charges by
force of their constitutional rights.
Immediately, they respectfully apply for the issue ex-parte of a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents judge and fiscal to desist from continuing with the trial and
proceedings of the aforesaid criminal cases, followed by such writ of preliminary injunction
to the same tenor and effect, petitioners offering a bond executed to the parties enjoined in
an amount, to be fixed by the Court, to the effect that petitioners will pay to such parties all
damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally
decide that petitioners were not entitled thereto.
They pray for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
36
Manila, June 14, 1977.
As prayed for, the respondents were "RESTRAINED from continuing with the trial of
Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VII-1750-51 which are pending before the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District at Pasig, Metro Manila, and from further proceeding with the case
until further orders from this Court."
The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran,
Eugenio Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols Jr., were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the crime
of multiple rape in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 20380 but upon transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, the same
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-1750-Rizal.
The petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged with
another offense of multiple rape by the same complainant before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20381 but upon transfer to the
Circuit Criminal Court, the same was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal.
Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. A joint
trial on the merits of both cases of all the accused was commenced and the prosecution
presented its evidence.
After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the petitioner
Claparols, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss dated November 19, 1976; the petitioner Lopez filed
a motion to acquit dated November 19, 1976; the petitioners Romulo, Santamaria and
Joseph filed a motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976; and the petitioner Moran filed a
motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976.
The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, then heard the oral arguments of the movants
in amplification of their formal motions to dismiss/acquit and the oral arguments of the
prosecution in support of their opposition thereto.
The respondent judge denied the motions in an order dated February 7, 1977 which reads:
After a thorough perusal of the records and considering the allegations of the issues raised
and arguments adduced in the Motion to Acquit and/or Dismiss filed by the respective
counsels of the accused, together with the opposition thereto; and considering further the
exhaustive oral argument of the parties which lasted for almost eight (8) hours, the Motion
to Dismiss and/or Acquit is hereby Denied.
WHEREFORE, let the hearing on the presentation of evidence for the defense be set on
February 9, 1977 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 7, 1977.
(Sgd.) ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ
Judge
The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the order denying the Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit was likewise denied by the respondent Judge in an order dated February 28,
1977 on the ground that "the issues raised and arguments adduced in the Motion for
Reconsideration together with the opposition thereto were the same grounds adduced in
the Motion to Dismiss and/or Acquit were virtually covered by the extensive arguments of
both parties ..."
Thereafter, the petitioners, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran, Eugenio Lopez III
and Jaime Claparols Jr. filed a motion dated June 7, 1977 asking for separate trial for each
accused on the ground that:
... The defenses of the accused are individual and separate from each other, because —
(a) Technically, none of the accused need defend himself against charges which allegedly
occurred before they respectively arrived at the Romulo house.
(b) At the Romulo home. no evidence in fact was presented that any of the accused
participated in the rape committed by any one of them.
(c) They should not therefore be prejudiced by any evidence presented by such of the other
accused on those charges allegedly committed before their respective arrivals at the
Romulo home and in which they are not even said to have participated.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 10, 1977. The said petitioners'
verbal motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was denied.
The respondent Judge then reset the joint trial of the two cases for reception of the
evidence for the defense on September 22, 24, 27 and 29, 1977. The trial did not proceed in
view of the restraining order issued by this Court pursuant to its resolution of June 21, 1977.
37
The petitioners assail the order of the respondent judge denying their Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit on the following grounds:
Respondent judge had consistently and invariably denied in all criminal cases heard by him
demurrers to the evidence (motions to dismiss after close of the evidence of the prosecution
on the ground that it did not amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt) on the opinion that
the Rules of Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases
prohibited it. This opinion denies petitioners their following rights under the Constitution, i.e.,
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved ...' and 'no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.' Therefore, the
continued prosecution of petitioners without a just resolution of their demurrers to evidence
should be prohibit. The denial of constitutional rights is reviewable on habeas
corpus proceedings at the very least.
The submission that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to be
presumed innocent and the right against self-incrimination by the denial of their Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit by the respondent Judge has no merit. The respondent Judge made a
thorough perusal of the records of the cases and considered the exhaustive arguments of
the parties which lasted for almost eight (8) hours before resolving the Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit. The motion for reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to
Dismiss/Acquit was denied because said motion contained the same grounds adduced in
petitioners' Motions to Dismiss/Acquit. There is no showing that the respondent Judge
denied the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit allegedly because of his opinion that the Rules of
Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases prohibited it.
The petitioners are not precluded from presenting their evidence. In fact, the continuation of
the hearing of both cases was set on September 22, 24, 27 and 29, 1977 for the reception
of the evidence for the defense.
It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. However, after the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional
presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so amply and persuasively
demonstrated.
The respondent Judge did not disregard any constitutional right of the petitioners. Said
respondent Judge is presumed to have considered the evidence adduced by the
prosecution when he denied the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners.
The Court cannot decide in this special civil action whether or not the evidence adduced by
the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners. It is
now petitioners' duty to neutralize the evidence of the State in order to maintain the
presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they are charged.
In the absence of a clear knowing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse
of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not annul an interlocutory order
denying a motion to dismiss a criminal case. Appeal is the proper remedy of the, petitioners
in order to have the findings of fact of the respondent judge reviewed by a superior court.
The petitioners' application for separate trial is meritorious. Section 8, Rule 119, Revised
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8. Trial of joint defendants. — When two or more defendants are jointly charged with
any offense they shall be tried jointly unless the court. n its discretion upon motion of the
fiscal or any defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the court y order
that one or more defendants be each separately tried, or may order that several defendants
be jointly tried in another trials, or may order that each defendant be separately tried.
The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may be made.
As a matter of law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendant are jointly
barged with an offense is discretionary with the trial court.
Considering the established circumstances, the cause of the State would not be
jeopardized by the granting of separate trials to the accused. Inasmuch as the petitioners
are said with capital offenses, great care should be taken the evidence of one should not
prejudice the others. It appears they have different defenses which may be antagonist to
each other. in the interest of justice, this Court a separate trial may be granted even after f
the prosecution as finished presenting its evidence in chief. It is understood, however, that
the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain in the record as evidence against al the
petitioners. It is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce all over again its evidence in
chief in each separate trial of the accused. In the separate trial of the accused, only the
accused presenting evidence has to be present.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of
the petitioners are hereby affirmed and the petition to prohibit the continuation of the trial of
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-17-00-Rizal and Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal and to
compel the respondent judge to acquit the petitioners is denied. The petition for habeas
corpus is also denied.
However, the order dated June 10, 1977 denying petitioners' motion for lifting of
consolidation of trial and/or separate trial is set aside and the petition for separate trial for
each accused. is hereby granted. The evidence to be adduced by each accused-petitioner
38
should not be considered as evidence against the other accused-petitioners. Only the
accused presenting evidence is obliged to attend the trial. The prosecution does not have
adduce all over again its evidence in chief which shall be considered against all the
petitioners, without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence in
each separate trial.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Castro C.J. and Aquino, J., took no part.
Fernando, J., took no part, one of the counsel Attorney Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother in law.
Barredo, J., reserves his vote.
Melencio-Herrera, J., inhibiting herself for personal reasons.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. This is a special civil action for prohibition certiorari and mandamus
and/or petition for habeas corpus seeking inter alia the setting aside of respondent judge's
orders denying petitioners' demurrers to the evidence presented by the prosecution and
asking this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to respondent judge for a directed verdict of
acquittal. Hence, the denial or dismissal of the petition simply means that the Court has
found petitioners not to be entitled to the relief prayed for. (cf. Rule 65, section 8). It does
not mean an affirmance of the correctness of the questioned orders denying petitioners'
demurrer and motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, for
to cite one case, that of the accused Lopez, it does appear that even the complainant
admits that he did not participate at all in any alleged act of rape and he would be entitled to
a dismissal of the case upon submittal of the prosecution's case.
The denial or dismissal of the petition simply means as stated in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Fernandez that the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not overrule in a
special civil action the trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for failure
or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence since it cannot review in such special civil
action the prosecution's evidence and decide here and now in advance that it has or has not
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners-accused. The orderly
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the accused to present their evidence after
which the trial court will on the basis of the evidence presented before it by both the
prosecution and the defense render its judgment of conviction or acquittal If the verdict be
one of acquittal the case ends there. If it be a verdict of conviction, then appeal is the proper
remedy — and such appeal in order to have a review of the trial court's findings of fact lies
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

I concur in the granting of separate trials for the petitioners-accused, as alternatively prayed
for in the petition, for the reasons stated in the main opinion.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. This is a special civil action for prohibition certiorari and mandamus
and/or petition for habeas corpus seeking inter alia the setting aside of respondent judge's
orders denying petitioners' demurrers to the evidence presented by the prosecution and
asking this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to respondent judge for a directed verdict of
acquittal. Hence, the denial or dismissal of the petition simply means that the Court has
found petitioners not to be entitled to the relief prayed for. (cf. Rule 65, section 8). It does
not mean an affirmance of the correctness of the questioned orders denying petitioners'
demurrer and motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, for
to cite one case, that of the accused Lopez, it does appear that even the complainant
admits that he did not participate at all in any alleged act of rape and he would be entitled to
a dismissal of the case upon submittal of the prosecution's case.

The denial or dismissal of the petition simply means as stated in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Fernandez that the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not overrule in a
special civil action the trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for failure
or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence since it cannot review in such special civil
action the prosecution's evidence and decide here and now in advance that it has or has not
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners-accused. The orderly
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the accused to present their evidence after
which the trial court will on the basis of the evidence presented before it by both the
prosecution and the defense render its judgment of conviction or acquittal If the verdict be
one of acquittal the case ends there. If it be a verdict of conviction, then appeal is the proper
remedy — and such appeal in order to have a review of the trial court's findings of fact lies
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

I concur in the granting of separate trials for the petitioners-accused, as alternatively prayed
for in the petition, for the reasons stated in the main opinion.

39
People vs. Tanso, 105 Phil 1289, April 30, 1959

40
G.R. No. L-20146 September 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VIRGILIO OPLADO and VISITACION FERNANDEZ GUYOT, defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Regino Hermosisima for defendant-appellee Virgilio Oplado.
Visitacion Fernandez Guyot in her own behalf, as defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In a complaint filed on November 26, 1958, before the Municipal Court of Cebu City, Virgilio
Oplado and Visitacion Fernandez Guyot were charged by the latter's husband with the
crime of adultery allegedly committed during the month of June, 1958 and for some time
subsequent thereto.
Thereafter, the same complaint was reproduced in an amended information filed by an
Assistant Fiscal of Cebu City before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In view of the
failure of the prosecution to arrest Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, the trial of the case had to
be repeatedly postponed, although the prosecution had always been ready to proceed with
the trial with respect to the co-accused Virgilio Oplado. Finally, when the case was again
called for trial on March 5, 1962, and still Visitacion Fernandez Guyot was at large for as yet
she had not been apprehended, the Court a quo, upon motion of co-accused Virgilio Oplado,
over the objection of the prosecution, ordered the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence,
the City Fiscal took the instant appeal claiming that the provisional dismissal of the case
was contrary to law considering that the prosecution, was ready, able and willing to proceed
with the trial with respect to accused Virgilio Oplado.
The only issue before us is whether the Court a quo erred in ordering the provisional
dismissal of the case due to the failure of the prosecution to arrest the accused Visitacion
Fernandez Guyot considering that both the prosecution and the accused Virgilio Oplado
were then ready for trial even in the absence of his co-accused. Stated in another way, the
question presented is whether one of the accused in a prosecution for adultery may be
separately tried in the absence of the other accused where both the prosecution and the
other accused are ready to go to trial. 1awphîl.nèt
It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that while the husband cannot institute a prosecution
for the crime of adultery without including therein both of the guilty parties if they are both
living, the statute does not require that both must necessarily be tried together. When the
complaint is filed by the offended husband against both of the guilty parties, the
41
proceedings then pass into the hands of the prosecuting officer, who may move for
dismissal of the complaint as to the paramour if he is certain that he cannot establish guilty
knowledge on the part of the man f the fact that the woman was married, and such dismissal
would not of itself require the Court to acquit the woman. Nor would the death of the woman
during the pendency of the action defeat the trial and conviction of the man. (U.S. vs. De la
Torre and Gregorio, 25 Phil. 36) Neither would the fact that the man had left the country and
could not be apprehended defeat the trial and conviction of the woman. And if both are
brought before the Court to be tried jointly and one of them claims a separate trial, which the
Court would have to grant (Sec.33, G. 0. No. 58), the acquittal of one would not necessarily
bar the prosecution and conviction of the other (U.S. vs. Topino and Guzman, 35 Phil. 901,
910).
And in a later case, it was stated that "there are numerous cases, after the complaint has
been properly presented, where one or the other of the alleged guilty parties in a criminal
action for adultery may be tried and sentenced separate from the co-defendant. For
example, where one of the parties died after the commencement of the action, or where the
man was ignorant of the fact that the woman was a married woman at the time of the
commission of the alleged criminal act." (U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289, 292) And so, the
Supreme Court declared that the lower court in that case did not commit an error in
requiring the paramour to proceed to trial alone in the absence of his co-defendant.
It is then clear that a defendant in an adultery case may be tried alone or separately from his
codefendant if the prosecution and the party available are ready for it. The only difference
between the old rule (Section 33, General Orders No. 58, as amended) and the present
(Section 8, Rule 115, Rules of Court) is that under the old law, a separate trial can be
demanded by a codefendant as of right and the Court had no authority to deny the petition
(U.S. vs. Remigio. 36 Phil. 719), while under the present rule it is discretionary upon the trial
Court to order a separate trial.
In the instant case, the order of the trial Court appealed from discloses that the adultery
case has been pending for more than three years, that is, since November 26, 1958, when
the case was filed, to March 5, 1962, when the case was called for trial, in view of the failure
of the prosecution to apprehend Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, and that at the hearing of
March 5, 1962, the other accused, Virgilio Oplado, manifested his readiness to enter to trial.
Nonetheless, the trial Court granted the motion of the accused Oplado for the provisional
dismissal of the case on the ground that he is entitled to a speedy trial, even if the
prosecution was likewise able and ready to try the case.
This is not only an error but an abuse of discretion, for the very right of accused Oplado to a
speedy trial demanded that the case against him be heard and prosecuted to a conclusion
without waiting for the arrest of his co-accused, there being no advantage to be derived
from the provisional dismissal of the case when trial could be held then and there without
further delay and in the interest of said co-acussed.

We have, therefore, no other alternative than to set aside the order of dismissal and remand
this case for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded
to the lower Court for further proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

42
G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch II, and JAIME CATUDAY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition by the State for certiorari to annul the joint decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, insofar as it acquits Jaime Catuday of the charge of light threat. The
ground alleged is that the case for light threat was never tried in the lower court.
On March 6, 1968, respondent Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of Makati, Rizal,
with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry Dioquino (Criminal Case No.
12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3, 1969, and while the light threat case was still
pending, he was charged in the same court, with a different offense, frustrated theft,
allegedly committed against the Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two separate decisions
rendered on September 10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of the two charges. He
appealed both decisions to the Court of First Instance.
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Provincial Fiscal filed two separate informations,
one for light threat (Criminal Case No. 20145) and the other for frustrated theft (Criminal
Case No. 20146). Both cases were assigned to Branch XI of said Court of First Instance.
The theft case was first set for hearing on December 16, 1969. The threat case was
originally set for hearing on December 22, 1969. On December 16, 1969, the court ordered
continuation of the trial of the theft case for January 14 and 21, 1970 (Annex A, Motion for
Reconsideration). On December 22, 1969, the court rescheduled the hearing of the threat
case for January 26, 1970. On January 14, 1970, the court reset for January 21, 1970 the
theft case hearing of that day (Annex C, Motion for Reconsideration). When January 21,
1970 came, the court rescheduled the theft case hearing for February 11 and 24, 1970
(Annex B, Motion for Reconsideration). On January 26, 1970, the scheduled threat case
hearing was rescheduled for February 11, 1970. This was the first time the two cases were
scheduled for hearing on the same day, February 11, 1970.
For the theft case, it was for continuation of trial; for the threat case, it was for start of the
trial. On said February 11, 1970, the court in two separate orders, directed that the threat
case be rescheduled for February 24, 1970 (Annex D, Motion for Reconsideration), and that
43
the trial of the theft case be continued also on February 24, 1970. (Annex E, Motion for
Reconsideration). On February 24, 1970, counsel de oficio for both cases failed to appear.
For the first time, the court issued a single order in the two cases (Annex E, Motion for
Reconsideration), directing arrest of said counsel "and to show cause why she should not
be punished for contempt"; and ordering that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for
March 25, 1970, at 8:30 in the morning."
On March 25, 1970, trial of the theft case continued. The threat case was not tried at all at
this or any subsequent trial. In the hearings after March 25, 1970, it was always the theft
case which was heard. Sometime in December 1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of
Branch XI, respondent District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft
case was then in the rebuttal stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, and upon
order of the court, the parties filed their respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and
submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973, respondent Judge rendered one
decision, acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of this decision reads thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, for lack of proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the accused JAIME CATUDAY not guilty in both cases and he is hereby
acquitted in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat as well as in Criminal Case No.
20146 for Frustrated Theft. The bonds for his provisional liberty in both cases are ordered
cancelled.
Notably, the decision also stated that "these (light threat case and frustrated theft case)
were tried jointly."
On September 6, 1973, the private prosecutor, with the conformity of the provincial fiscal,
filed the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of said decision insofar as Criminal Case
No. 20145 for light threat is concerned. On November 10, 1973, respondent judge denied
the motion, reiterating that there was joint hearing of the two criminal cases.
On December 13, 1973, the provincial fiscal filed the prosecution's second motion for
reconsideration, which was, however, denied on February 27, 1974.
On March 25, 1974, the provincial fiscal, together with the private prosecutor, filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari, proving that respondent Judge's decision be annulled for lack
of due process insofar as Criminal Case No. 20145 is concerned, and that record of this
case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. On April 17, 1974, the Court (Second
Division) issued a resolution to the effect that "considering the allegations contained, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petition for lack of merit."
On June 6, 1974, Provincial Fiscal Castillo filed his motion for reconsideration of said
Resolution, which motion was co-signed by the Private Prosecutors praying that this Court
reconsider and set aside said resolution, and that their petition for certiorari be given due
course.
While we fault the petitioner for having presented an unconvincing original petition which
induced this Court to dismiss the same in a minute resolution "for lack of merit," We now
have to commend Rizal Provincial Fiscal Castillo for his well-prepared and well-documented
motion for reconsideration which has persuaded Us to grant the same, notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of respondents, in view of the facts and the reasons that now follow,
which are also the facts and the reasons for our granting the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that the threat case was never tried in the lower court so the charge
therein should not have been dismissed on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that there was joint trial of the threat case and
the theft case, and since the prosecution failed to present evidence respecting the alleged
threat, the case was properly dismissed on the stated ground.
Thus the question of denial of due process to the State hinges on whether or not there was
really a joint trial of both the threat and the theft cases.
We have specific rules on joint trial in criminal cases. There is the rule that "when two or
more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried, jointly, unless the
court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trial." (Sec.
8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). As long as the condition therein is fulfilled, that is, two
or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, joint trial is automatic, without
need of a court order. The rule is inapplicable here because there is only one defendant in
the two cases.
Then there is the rule that "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which form
or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the discretion of
the court, be tried jointly." (Sec. 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). In contrast, this
second rule clearly requires a court order for a joint trial, since the court has discretion
whether or not to order the same.
Respondents here have not pointed to any court order for joint trial, as indeed there is none.
The order of February 24, 1970 (Annex E, Motion for Reconsideration), does not qualify as
such, even though it is the first court order which covers the two cases. Insofar as hearings
are concerned, all this court orders says is that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for
March 25, 1970." Note that the term "trial" is singular, and the court did not specify which
trial it intended to reschedule. All we can infer from this order is that the court intended to
44
have a common date of hearing for the two cases, as was true of the two hearings set for
February 11, 1970 and the two hearings scheduled for February 24, 1970, obviously a
concession to defense counsel who have previously asked that hearings of the two cases
be scheduled on the same day, so she would come to court on only the same day for the
two cases.
Furthermore, joint trial is not called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the accused in
the two cases is only one person, but there are two different complainants: Henry Dioquino,
in the threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods, Inc., in the theft case. The threat was
supposed to have been made on March 5, 1968; the theft was allegedly committed on
January 31, 1969, almost a year thereafter. Also, the charges are different. They do not
even belong to the same class of crimes. Light threat is a crime against personal liberty and
security; frustrated theft is a crime against property. So, We cannot say the charges are for
offenses founded on the same facts or form or are part of a series of offenses of the same
or similar character. Consequently, the court had no power to try them jointly.
Going to the matter of the captions in the pleadings, subpoenas, court orders, transcript of
stenographic notes, etc., it has been argued that since most of the captions include both
Criminal Case No. 20145 (light threat) and Criminal Case No. 20146 (frustrated theft), there
was joint trial of the cases, and the court properly treated the hearing as joint and acted
accordingly with respect to the two cases. It has been held, however, that a mistake in the
caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect,
for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the charging part that is the gist of the
accusation. It is almost the universal rule that the caption of a pleading is not controlling but
what is embodied therein. More, the office of a caption is to declare the purpose of the acts,
and if the matter mentioned in the caption is not contained in the body of the act, it is merely
surplusage, and does not affect the matters set forth in the act itself. Captions are purely
formal, and may be amended.
Despite the captions of some of the portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, an
examination thereof reveals that the light threat case was never tried at all.
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes expose clearly that what was
singularly tried was the theft case:
On Pages 8-13 of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken on January
27, 1971, the defense counsel asked the accused: têñ.£îhqwâ£
ATTY. BELISARIO:
Q. Were you able to bargain with the administration after the union won in the certification
election?.
ATTY. FUNK:
A. Immaterial, Your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
COURT:
Q. What is the materiality of that question? What is the connection of that question to this
case (of frustrated theft) in which the accused is charged? What is the connection of that
question to the case of theft? (Emphasis Supplied).
ATTY. BELISARIO:
Q. What important event happened after the certification election in connection with the
activities that has something to do with your crime of theft later on? (Page 10).
A. After the certification election wherein our union won, we made some bargaining with the
company. (page 11) .
When counsel was becoming persistent, the Court said:
COURT:
I have already ruled. You may appeal if you want to, when the time comes. That is why we
have the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
On Pages 16-18 of the transcript, March 10, 1971, when accused was asked by his counsel
where he was living or residing on January 31, 1969 when he was arrested for frustrated
theft of coffee items, Atty. Funk again objected to it as being immaterial, and he was
sustained by the Court. Said the Court: têñ.£îhqwâ£
COURT:
45
It has nothing to do with this case of theft. That may be good if you file a civil suit, maybe,
but in this crime of theft, that is immaterial."(underlining Mine)
On Page 17 of the transcript, March 10, 1971: têñ.£îhqwâ£
ATTY. BELISARIO:
Q. Is there a prescribed uniform in the COEI, Mr. Catuday?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Attorney, this has nothing to do with this crime of theft. As to the good purpose of the
accused, that is immaterial. (Emphasis Supplied)
On Page 23 of the transcript, June 17, 1970, where Edward Funk, witness for the
prosecution, under direct examination by Atty. Funk: têñ.£îhqwâ£
ATTY. FUNK:
A. I am showing to you a copy of this decision (in grave coercion cases filed by the coffee
firm against certain of its workers who joined the 1969 strike against it), will you go over the
same and tell us whether that is the decision in the cases aforementioned?
ATTY. BELISARIO:
Objection, your Honor, I think the crime of Grave Coercion is immaterial because we are
trying the case of theft....
In connection with this objection of the defense counsel, the respondent Judge did not make
any remark to correct the counsel to the effect that he was conducting, as he has claimed, a
joint trial of the two cases, instead of the theft case alone.
More, on Page 4 of the transcript, March 28, 1972, the following has been relevantly cited
by the prosecution, where defense counsel was questioning defense witness Alfredo Osias
in connection with the subject incident of frustrated theft being ascribed to
Catuday: têñ.£îhqwâ£
FISCAL ALCOBA: "Jurisdiction" is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing [Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L. ed. 914 (23A Words and Phrases, p. 121)]. A judgment is void
Q. May I interrupt the counsel? May we know if this witness is a common witness with for lack of due process, which is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction (Trimica, Inc. v.
respect to the light threat and frustrated theft? Polaris Marketing Corp., et al., L-29887, October 28, 1974.

ATTY. GERONIMO: (Defense counsel who replaced Atty. Belisario) In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering his judgment of acquittal of private
respondent JAIME CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat which was never
A. The other case is not being tried as yet. tried in the respondent Judge's court nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse
of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, this is so grave and patent
to justify the issuance of a writ of CERTIORARI (Lagman v. Dela Cruz, 40 SCRA 101). And,
Evidently, the State had been deprived of due process, which act was an abuse of in fine, this Court has, in these words, defined "grave abuse of discretion" as: "Such
discretion on the part of the herein respondent Judge, tantamount to excess or lack of capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment, as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law to lack
jurisdiction, rendering the judgment of acquittal of the accused Jaime Catuday, in Criminal of jurisdiction." (Palma and Ignacio v. O. & S., Inc., 17 SCRA 98). For such want of
Case No. 20145 for light threat, NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. jurisdiction, said JUDGMENT is NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. It is one rendered by a court
which had no power so to do; it is as though there had been no judgment or process; it is
It is quite clear in the record of this case, especially in the transcript of stenographic notes coram non judice (People v. Liscomg, 60 NY 559, 568, 569, Am. Rep. 211; 44 Words and
and in practically all the pleadings filed by the parties, that there was absolutely no trial or Phrases 592). IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court reconsiders and sets aside
hearing of Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat. For instance, in the aforementioned its resolution of April 17, 1974 dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari for lack of merit;
identical pleadings "Offer and Submission of Exhibits" filed by the parties at the final phase and We hereby sustain petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari and declare null and void
of the hearings, all the exhibits listed pertain to only one case, Criminal Case No. 20146 for the decision of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, dated July 20,
frustrated theft, which, in truth and in fact, was the only case actually tried to the finish, the 1973, insofar as it acquitted the private respondent Jaime Catuday, as accused, in Crim.
light threat case not even having reached first base as it was never called to trial nor the first Case No. 20145 for light threat and orders its reinstatement in the Court of First Instance of
witness therein ever been called to the stand. Same is true of the defense's "Motion for Rizal for the corresponding trial. No costs.
Cancellation of Hearing" and "Objection to Evidence," which both relate exclusively to the
offense of theft. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always
accorded this right to the prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly
annulled the offending court action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious
dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it
denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an
acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for
lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process, and, consequently, will not
constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial
court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen
the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the
offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when
no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby.

The imperative requirement of the due process guarantee or mandate would be ignored if
on the above considerations it is not given controlling force entitling the State to the remedy
being sought.
46
G.R. No. L-6273 December 27, 1957
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE HIDALGO y RESURRECCION and MAURA GOTENGCO y
SOLIMAN, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Querube C. Makalintal and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for
appellee.
Antonio Gonzales and Leodegario Alba for appellants.
ENDENCIA, J.:
Charged with and found guilty of arson on an inhabited building, with the aggravating
circumstances of premeditation and nighttime, without any mitigating circumstance to offset
the same, the accused spouses were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to
suffer reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay jointly and
severally indemnity in the sum of P11,870.47 as follows: P3,400 to the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., P3,475 to New Zealand Insurance Co., P1,895 to Malayan Insurance Co.,
P1,600 to South British Insurance Co., P1,500 to Pacific National Fire Insurance Co., plus
one-half of the costs. They appealed from this decision on the ground that the court erred—
1. In allowing the exclusion of Florencio Camilo from the complaint in order to make him a
state witness despite the opposition of the herein accused;
2. In not stating in its decision that the corpus delicti in the case at bar was not proven;
3. In not finding that since the testimony of the sole witness for the prosecution as regards
the guilt, of the accused James Uy, alias James Kay and Aw Ming, alias Taba, was not
credible, it should likewise be incredible as regards the herein appellants;
4. In not finding that the testimony or Florencio Camio comes from an impure source and
hence it should not prevail over the testimony of herein appellants; and
5. In not acquitting the herein appellants.
Upon careful examination of the record of the case, we find to be completely undisputed
and positively shown by the evidence on record the following facts: that in response to an
alarm, at about 7:40 on the evening of October 8,1950, Capt. Braulio Alonia, Chief of the
San Lazaro Fire Station, rushed with his men to the corner of Echague and Rizal Avenue,
47
City of Manila. Upon arriving at the place, they found on fire the second floor of the
appellant's building located in that corner. His men proceeded to quench the blaze and
succeeded in doing so in a few minutes. Soon after the fire had been put out, Capt. Alonia
inspected the second floor and found on the Echague wing thereof two broken glass jars,
ten unbroken glass jars containing gasoline, lines of toilet paper dipped in the gasoline
content of the jar and arranged in such a manner as to connect them to one another, and
eleven green tin covers, Exhibits B, B-1 to B-9; C, C-1 to C-10; D and I. Photographs of the
fire scene were taken by the photographers of the Police and Fire Department, (Exhibits F,
G, H, I, J, U and V), all of which clearly depict the burned area, the broken glass jars and the
arrangement on the floor of the unbroken glass jars which contained gasoline as well as the
connecting lines of tissue papers. In the course of investigation of the fire, Capt. Alonia
made a sketch from which the data appearing on Exhibit T were taken, and a glance at
these photographs and sketch will convince anyone but for the timely and efficient handling
of the fire by the firemen the entire building might have been burned because the ingenuous
device of connecting the gasoline-filled glass jars with tissue paper would have rapidly
spread the fire all over the Echague wing of the building and had the fire run its natural
course traces of its criminal inception and design would have been obliterated or its
detection made impossible by the resulting debris.
The building in question consists of two wings, one of which fronts Rizal Avenue and the
other Echague Street (Exhibit D). The appellant spouses were keeping a room in the
second floor at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Echague Street. The Echague wing was
occupied by the Republic Vocational School, owned by Dr. Felix Acevedo, and the Rizal
Avenue wing was rented out to various tenants. The stairs leading to the second floor were
located on Rizal Avenue and at the top of the said stairs there used to be a door, but this
was removed on orders of appellants sometime before the fire. Entering the second floor
from the said stairs, the appellants would turn right to reach their room and at the left side of
the door thereof. A corridor run thru the middle of the Echague wing. Along both sides of
said corridor were several rooms containing desks, tables, books, typewriters, a steel
cabinet and a sewing machine, and at the end of this corridor was a room with windows
opening on Estero Cegado and Echague Streets. The fire started in the above-described
corridor, about 5 or 6 meters from the door of the said room of the appellants (Exhibits D, M
and N). The first floor and undivided one-half of the second floor of the building were owned
by the appellant spouses who insured the entire building with four insurance companies
under their different policies for a total sum of P175,000 as follows:
People's Surety & Ins. Co.—
July 3, 1950 to P15,000.0 (Exh.
0 W-1).
July 3, 1951
September 15, 10,000.00 (Exh.
 1950 to W-2). May 15, 1950 to (Exh. BB
20,000.00
September 15, May 15, 1951 to BB-2)
1951

September 8, Total P175,000.

1950 to (Exh. 00
10,000.00
September W-3).
8,1951 Eight of these policies (Exhs. W-1, W-2, W-3, W-4, W-5, X, Z, and AA) with a total face
value of P135,000 were taken out in the name of the appellant spouses either jointly or
August 25, singly and six of these eight, with a total face value of P70,000 (Exh. W-2, W-3, W-4, W-5, Z,
(Exh.
1950 to August 20,000.00 and AA) were taken out about a month prior to October 8, 1950, the date when the fire
W-4).
25,1951 occurred.

August 25, The evidence further shows that the building in question suffered an estimated loss and
(Exh.
1950 to August 10,000.00 damage of P5,255, yet the appellants did not file the necessary claim for recovery of said
W-5).
25,1951 damage under their policies. It likewise appears that the reproduction costs in 1950 of
appellants' building was only P89,524.59 (Exhibit CC) and, notwithstanding the fact that the
Central Surety Company—
appellants do not own the entire building, for they own only the first floor and one-half of the
November 23, second floor, they secured, as stated above, 8 policies with a total face value of P135,000
and 6 of these 8 policies with a total face value of P70,000 were taken out just about a
1949 to (Exh. X to
50,000.00 month before the fire.
November 23, X-6).
1950
Due to the investigation conducted by Capt. Alonia immediately after the fire and further
June 19, 1956 investigation done by the Police authorities which strongly indicated that the burning of
to June 19, 20,000.00 (Exh. Y). appellant's building was intentional, on March 29, 1951 an information was filed against the
herein appellants Jose Hidalgo Resurreccion and Maura Gotengco y Soliman and Florencio
1951
Camilo, alias Lin Siu, Hong, alias Sy Hong, and John Doe, which later on was amended to
Alto Surety & Ins. Co.— include therein the accused James Uy, alias James Kay and Aw Ming, alias Taba. Before
the trial of the case, upon proper motion by the City Fiscal and despite opposition by the
September 26, herein appellants, Florencio Camilo was excluded from the information to be utilized as a
1950 to (Exh. Z to government witness, and thus Florencio Camilo was allowed to testify in the case.
15,000.00
September 26, Z-1).
1951 The record discloses that there is no direct evidence linking the herein appellants with the
crime at bar except the testimony of Florencio Camilo. Were his testimony to be held as
September 25, unworthy of credence, the appellants are perfectly entitled to acquittal; otherwise the
1950 to (Exh. AA decision appealed from should be upheld.
5,000.00
September 25, to AA-1).
1951 Camilo's testimony, as correctly summarized by the Solicitor General in his brief, is as
follows:
Manila Underwaters Ins. Co.—

48
Camilo testified that he and James Kay were friends since before the war, and that he had
known Aw Ming for about nine months (pp. 28-29, t.s.n.). On the evening of October 1, 1950,
at a massage clinic on Florentino Torres Street which these friends used to frequent, they
made an appointment to meet each other the afternoon of the next day at the Bataan Cafe
for the purpose of seeing Dr. Hidalgo about the burning of the latter's building (pp. 30,
258-260, t.s.n.). In that cafe, the three met at about 2:00 p.m. and thence proceeded to said
building, where in a room in the second floor Camilo met the Hidalgo spouses for the first
time (pp. 27, 31-32, t.s.n.). Inside the room Camilo saw two big dogs of foreign breed held in
leash, several chairs, and a bed (pp. 35-36, t.s.n.). After some haggling over the price for
the job of setting the building on fire, James Kay and Dr. Hidalgo agreed upon P16,000, of
which P15,000 was to be paid by the check and the balance of P1,000 in cash (pp. 37-39,
t.s.n.). Protesting lack of cash on the occasion, Dr. Hidalgo told the three to return on
October 4 and on that day Maura Gotengco drew checks against the Philippine Trust
Company, both payable to "cash" (pp. 40-43, 54, t.s.n.). One of these P.T.C. No. 837571
(Exhibit L), was for P12,000 and was postdated November 3, 1950; the other P.T.C. No.
837570, was for P3,000, but in the space for the date of issuance only the figure "10" and
the year "1950" were written (see Exhibit K). Enough space, however, was left between the
printed word "Manila" and the figure "10" for the insertion of the abbreviation of a month so
that if for instance the abbreviation "October" was written after word "Manila" and before the
figure "10", the check would appear as if it had been issued on October 10, 1950; or bar
could be placed after the figure "10" and any number from 1 to 31 written after it say "4", and
it would appear that it was issued on October 4, 1950. At first only the face of these checks
was signed by Gotengco, but James asked her to sign them also on the back, which she did,
and the said checks, having been thus endorsed, were then handed to James (pp. 44,
55-56, 121, t.s.n.). Fifty and one-hundred peso bills totalling P1,000 were then counted out
to James: and after he had pocketed both the checks and the cash (pp. 45, 242, t.s.n.), the
conspirators proceeded to discuss when and how the building was to be burned (p. 58,
t.s.n.). For the reason that on Sundays the Chinese stores are closed and there are
comparatively less people about, October 8, 1950, a Sunday, was chosen (pp. 60-61, t.s.n.).
It was also agreed upon that the building would be set on fire at 7:30 in the evening and that
gasoline in bottles would be used (pp. 58, 60, 63, t.s.n.). This matter having been settled, Dr.
Hidalgo, James Uy, Aw Ming, and Camilo inspected the premises to be set on fire, and a
place in the Republic Vocational School where there was a bookcase was selected for
starting the blaze (p. 67, t.s.n.).
While returning from Quiapo church the afternoon of the next day, October 5, 1950, Camilo
and his wife, Virginia de la Cruz, met their friend Johnny Uy and walked with him to the
massage clinic on Florentino Flores street where he was working. At the corner of the said
street and Ronquillo Street, Camilo was seen by James Uy and Aw Ming who were inside a
coffee shop. James called Camilo and as it turned out that James and Aw Ming were
quarreling about the possession of the checks, James wanting to retain them and Aw Ming
insisting on taking them from James, it was agreed that Camilo would hold the checks and
49
that about 9:00 o'clock that night both would come to the massage clinic on Florentino
waited until midnight but as neither showed up he started to go home. However, at the foot
of the stairs leading from the clinic, he was accosted by Det. Lt. Enrique Morales who
demanded the production of his alien certificate of registration; and as Camilo was taking
this from his wallet, Morales spied the checks and took them from him (pp. 76-78, t.s.n.).
The following morning, October 6, 1950, Camilo went to James Tailoring Shop on Echague
St. and reported to him the seizure of the checks (p. 247, t.s.n.). James said he would take
up the matter with Morales and then they sought out Dr. Hidalgo and his wife to inform them
also of the confiscation of the checks (pp. 80, 82, t.s.n.). Dr. Hidalgo told them not to worry,
saying that he would declare to the bank and that the checks had been lost, that another
checks would be issued, and that they should go ahead with their plans (pp. 82-85, t.s.n.).
However, James put off the purchase of the materials to be used for the burning because
on that day, October 6, 1950, his son was to be baptized and he even borrowed Camilo's
share of the cash (p. 158, t.s.n.).
On October 7, 1950, Camilo and Jesus went to Lt. Morales to ask for the return of the
checks and Morales returned to Camilo the check for P3,000 which Camilo forthwith
handed to James (p. 80, t.s.n.). Camilo then accompanied James to a store on Echague St.
and there the latter bought twelve (12) glass jars with green tin stoppers which they brought
to Aw Ming's house on Mayhaligue Street (pp. 85-86, t.s.n.) After lunch Camilo rode in a
jeep driven by James and in four (4) trips, they bought gasoline from four (4) different
stations along Taft Avenue in Pasay City. After each purchase, they returned to Aw Ming's
house on Mayhaligue where James siphoned the gasoline with a rubber tube from the tank
into a tin can and Aw Ming helped transfer the gasoline from said can into the twelve (12)
glass jars (pp. 88-97, t.s.n.).
About 7:00 in the evening of October 8, 1950, James and Aw Ming picked up Camilo at the
Bataan Cafe and the three drove in a jeep to the house of the Hidalgo spouses on the
corner of Rizal Avenue and Echague Street. Inside the jeep were the twelve (12) glass jars
filled with gasoline contained in two cartons and some rolls of toilet tissue paper wrapped in
Manila paper (pp. 99-100, t.s.n.). James parked the jeep in front of the appellant's building
and after calling Dr. Hidalgo, he (James) and Aw Ming carried the gasoline-filled jars to the
second floor while Hidalgo carried the bundle of toilet paper (pp. 102-103, t.s.n.). Soon
afterwards, James came down told Camilo to go up the building and parked the jeep
elsewhere. Camilo obeyed and in a few minutes James returned to join his companions
upstairs (p. 104, t.s.n.). James and Camilo unscrewed the jar covers and placed the jars
about the Echague wing, some under chairs and other near bookcases. The tissue paper
was unrolled and the end of lines thereof inserted in the jars to connect them to each other
(pp. 105-108, t.s.n.). One end of a length of tissue paper about 1 1/2 meters long was
inserted in one of the jars and on the other end thereof James stuck a candle about one
inch long and lighted it. Hidalgo then led out his two dogs, and Camilo, Aw Ming and James
followed him (pp. 112-113, 116, t.s.n.). Hidalgo placed the dogs in his yellow Cadillac
convertible and parked it in front of the then Bataan Theater at the foot of Sta. Cruz Bridge
(now McArthur Bridge). Aw Ming left, but Camilo and James, who was to relight the candle if
the building did not burn, stayed watching the building on the south sidewalk of Echague
Street. In about ten minutes, Camilo heard an explosion and the building started to burn (pp.
113-115, t.s.n.).
The foregoing testimony is assailed on the ground that it is incredible and contrary to the
ordinary course of events; that being the testimony of an accomplice, it comes from a
polluted source and therefore it should be received with caution; that it was not given
credence by the lower court with respect to appellants' coaccused James Uy and Aw Ming
who were acquitted and, therefore, it should not also been given weight with regard to the
herein appellants, for if Camilo's testimony as regards the guilt of James Uy and Aw Ming
was not credible, it should likewise unworthy of credence as regards the appellants' alleged
complicity in the crime at bar.
We find, however, that the lower court gave credence to the testimony of Florencio Camilo
with respect to the participation of the herein appellants in the burning of their building,
because it is corroborated by the fact that Maura Gotengco issued the checks testified to by
the witness, to wit: P3,000 (Exhibit K) and P12,000 (Exhibit L) and by the other fact, that the
spouses had heavily insured the building in question for P175,000 prior to the fire when the
insurable value thereof was only about P78,000 or P79,000. And upon careful scrutiny of
the evidence on record, we find these facts to be unrefuted for the spouses did really insure
the building in question for the amount mentioned above. and that Maura Gotengco, on
October 4, did really draw the aforesaid checks.
As to the over insurance of the building, it appears that the herein appellants never denied
having secured eight policies, on the building, with a total face value of P135,000 and that 6
of these policies, for a total value of P70,000, were taken out just about a month before the
fire. When the lower court, therefore, found the herein appellants guilty of the crime of arson
charged against them, it acted with sufficient evidence supporting its finding.
Appellants vigorously contend that the issuance of the checks by Maura Gotengco should
not be taken against them, for said checks were issued by Maura to help one Victor
Vickman who was allegedly a Philippine army undercoverman trying to locate a hidden
cache of firearms and ammunition worth P1,660,000. Appellants' claim that this Vickman
told them that a certain Bill Dean, representing the so-called sellers group, asked him to put
up a "goodwill money" in the sum of P15,000; that unless said sum of money could be
produced by Vickman, the latter would not be allowed to inspect the firearms; that Vickman
tried to get said amount from his superiors but in vain, and when Vickman happened to talk
to them (appellants), Maura issued a check to help said Vickman. Carefully considered,
appellant's explanation as to how the checks in question were issued clearly appears
50
unbelievable, firstly, because if Vickman really needed P15,000 to discover the cache of
firearms and ammunitions above-mentioned and he approached the army authorities to
secure said amount, it is difficult to believe that said amount, in cash or in check, would not
be given by his superiors to a subordinate like Vickman and thereby imperil the success of
an undertaking which demanded utmost secrecy; secondly, it is highly unbelievable that for
the purpose of discovering the cache of firearms and ammunitions which required utmost
secrecy, Vickman would ask help from the herein appellants whose intimacy with him has
not been approved.
Appellants strongly urge that since Camilo's testimony as regards to guilt of the accused
James Kay and Aw Ming was not given credence, it should likewise be held unworthy of
credence as regards the appellants. It is however a settled rule that the courts may believe
one part of the testimony of a witness and disbelieve another part. Courts are not required
to accept or reject the whole of the testimony of a particular witness. In the case at bar, the
lower court found that Camilo's concerning the accused James Uy and Aw Ming was not
corroborated and, except said testimony, there was nothing in the evidence presented by
the prosecution which would connect them with the perpetration of the crime charged
against them, this being the main reason for their acquittal. In other words, James Uy and
Aw Ming were acquitted on the insufficiency of evidence and not on finding that Camilo's
testimony was not worthy of credence.lawphi1.net
Appellants also claim that it is hard to believe Camilo's testimony to the effect that, after
Hidalgo had committed himself to pay P16,000 to his coconspirators to set fire on his
building, he would still help his accomplices in the preparation of the incendiary
paraphernalia, and even more incredible that after the seizure by Detective Lt. Morales of
the checks issued to his accomplices in payment for their help, he would still insist in
carrying out the plan to burn said building. But, as the Solicitor General pointed out—
All these alleged incredibilities are susceptible of rational explanation. Appellants were not
buying gasoline in 12 glass jars, rolls of tissue paper, and an inch-long candle, but the
know-how for the attainment of their objective, viz., the burning of the building so that they
might collect on their P135,000 policies. For such a stake, P16,000 certainly cannot be
considered an excessive price to pay. And after all, what appellants actually parted with was
only P1,000 before the fire, and it is not most unreasonable to suppose that the agreement
between James Kay and the appellants was to make encashment of the checks contingent
on a successful burning and recovery on the insurance policies, since the twelve-thousand-
peso check, Exhibit L, was postdated more than a month from the actual date of its
issuance, and the three-thousand-peso check, Exhibit K, was not completely dated, and
Maura did not have any deposit to back them up. There is nothing strange in the fact that
Hidalgo helped his accomplices arrange the tissue paper and jars. It was necessary that he
be in the building when the trio arrived to prevent their being stopped or questioned by the
other tenants of the second floor, and being there, it was all too natural for him to give a
hand. As to the confiscation of the checks, the appellants could not have been deterred
thereby from going ahead with the planned burning, because they could not have then
known that Camilo would turn state witness. It cannot be gainsaid that without Camilo's
testimony it would have been impossible to connect the appellants with the crime
notwithstanding that the checks were in the hands of the police authorities. This explain also
why the appellants did not mind using checks.".
Consequently, we hold the view that Camilo's testimony deserves credence, for it is not only
corroborated by the issuance of Maura Gotengco of the aforementioned checks (Exhibits K
and L), but also by the facts correctly indicated by the Solicitor General in his brief, to wit:
(1) The admitted fact that the appellants did declare on October 7, 1950, to a bank, the loss
of certain checks whose serial numbers included those of Exhibits K and L. (See Exhibit 11.)
It cannot just be pure coincidence that the Hidalgo spouses were, according to Camilo,
informed of the confiscation of the checks by Morales on October 6, 1950, and that Dr.
Hidalgo then told him and James Kay that he would declare to the bank that the checks had
been lost.
(2) The uncontradicted number and manner of arrangement of the glass jars which were
found in the premises of the Republic Vocational School immediately after the fire.
(3) The uncontradicted fact that the contents of said jars were indeed gasoline as found by
the MPD Chemist Ungson upon analysis thereof.
(4) The uncontradicted presence and arrangement of tissue paper in relation to the glass
jars in exactly the same manner described by Camilo.
(5) The admitted occupancy by Hidalgo spouses of a room on the second floor of the
building where the fire occurred, and the presence therein of dogs of foreign breed, some
chairs, and a bed.
(6) The undenied ownership by Dr. Hidalgo of a yellow Cadillac convertible.
(7) The admitted tenancy of the Rizal Avenue wing by various tenants.
(8) The admitted occupancy by Republic Vocational School of the Echague wing of the
building and the presence therein at the time of the fire of tables and bookcases among the
articles Camilo said he saw there.
51
Another contention of the appellants is that the court erred in not requiring the prosecution
to present proof in support of its motion for the discharge of Florencio Camilo before
allowing him to be a witness for the state. The contention is obviously untenable. Section 9,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, does not require presentation of proof before a motion for
exclusion of an accused to be witness for the state is granted. The law only requires that
hearing thereof be had and, in the case at bar, there has been such hearing, for as we held
in the case of U. S. vs. Abanzado et al., 37 Phil., 659.
It was not the intention of the legislator, by the enactment of Act No. 2709, to deprive the
prosecution and the state of the right to make use of participes criminis as witnesses,
but merely to regulate the exercise of that right by establishing the conditions under which it
may properly be exercised.
The act leaves the manner of the enforcement of these conditions in the sound judicial
discretion of the courts. If the court errs in the exercise of this discretion and discharges a
guilty person who should not have been set at liberty, the error, as a general rule, cannot be
cured any more than any other error can be cured which results in an acquittal of a guilty
defendant in a criminal action (U. S. vs. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416). But the commission of
such error does not have the effect of discharging from criminal liability the accused
persons who were not discharged that they might be used as witnesses.
Lastly, appellants urge that in the case at bar, no corpus delicti was proven. This contention
merits no consideration whatsoever, for in the present case there was a building burned and
its burning was the result of the wrongful and criminal act of some persons, among them,
the witness Camilo and the herein appellants. In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime
charged is complete where the evidence establishes (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire
because of criminal agency; and (2) the indemnity of the defendant as the one responsible
for the fire (Curtis, The Law of Arson p. 526, section 486).
Wherefore, finding no errors in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L.,
and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-18242 March 6, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO MARCELLANA, ET AL., defendants.
AGATON PAÑGANIBAN, appellant.
Eusebio F. Ramos for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
STATEMENT
The defendant Agaton Pañganiban was charged with others in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas with the crime of murder alleged to have been committed as follows:
That the said Simplicio Marcellana and the other four, who are the accused above named,
on or about the night of the 12th day of December, 1920, in the municipality of Taal,
Province of Batangas, Philippine Islands, with previous agreement between themselves,
with premeditation and treachery and in an uninhabited place, did wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault Jose Par with their respective steel arms and clubs, inflicting several
wounds in the different parts of the body, which caused the almost instantaneous death of
the aforesaid Jose Par.
Act committed within the jurisdiction of this Court and in violation of articles 403 of the Penal
Code.
Before the trial commenced the fiscal moved that the defendant Eleuterio Poco be
discharged, so that he could be used as a witness for the Government. The motion was
granted over the objection of the attorney for the defendant. At the conclusion of the
evidence on behalf of the prosecution and of the defendants Agaton Pañganiban, Simplicio
Marcellana and Candido Villanueva, the defendant Victorino Catapang offered to withdraw
his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, if the fiscal would amend his information so
as to charge the crime of homicide instead of murder. The court granted the motion. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court found the defendants Simplicio Marcellana, Victorino
Catapang, and Agaton Pañganiban guilty as principals and Candido Villanueva as an
accomplice of the crime of homicide, and sentenced the first three to twelve years and one
day of reclusion temporal, and the last to six years and one day of prision mayor, and all of
them to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, to
the accessories of the law, and each of them to pay one-fifth of the costs. From the
judgment the defendant Agaton Pañganiban alone appeals to this court, contending, first,
that the trial court erred in granting the petition of the fiscal to discharge Eleuterio Poco, so
52
that he could be used as a witness for the Government, and that the evidence was not
sufficient to convict this defendant of the crime of homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.
JOHNS, J.:
It is first contended that under the provisions of Act No. 2709, the trial court erred in
discharging Eleuterio Poco to use him as a witness for the prosecution. There is nothing in
the record which tends to show that at the time the order was made the court knew or had
reason to believe that Poco had been previously convicted of an illegal marriage. That fact
was developed on his cross-examination after the order was made, a fact of which the
defendant could not then take advantage.
Act No. 2709 was largely enacted for the use and guidance of the trial court.
We have no right to assume that the court had knowledge of the fact that Poco had
previously been convicted of the crime at the time the order was made. If that fact had been
called to the attention of the court before the order was made, another and different
question would be presented, and one of which the defendant might have a right to
complain.
The trial court who heard and saw the witness testify found as a fact that the defendant was
one of the principals in the commission of the crime.
The evidence is conclusive that, through a concerted action on the part of all of them, that
two of the defendants at night went to the home of the deceased where they found him lying
in bed, and induced him to go with them to the adjoining cemetery, for the ostensible
purpose of stealing some goats. That after going there and without any cause or
provocation, he was treacherously attacked by Victorino Catapang and the appellant
with bolos and clubs, who inflicted upon him twenty-one wounds, three of which were mortal.
Upon that point the testimony is conclusive. The defense is an alibi, but it is not sufficient to
overcome the direct and positive proof of the prosecution.
We agree with the fiscal that upon the facts shown the defendant is guilty of the crime of
murder, the penalty for which in this case would be seventeen years, four months and one
day of cadena temporal, but it appears from the record that during the trial the fiscal agreed
in open court that the crime charged in the information should be reduced to homicide, and
that at least two of the defendants who are equally guilty with the appellant were sentenced
by the lower court to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, and they have not
appealed.
All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

53
G.R. No. L-55533 July 31, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS* (Third Division), JOSE V. PEREZ, AMADEA C. PEREZ,
CIPRIANO LADINES and FLAVIA C. VALDENOR, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner People of the Philippines to set
aside the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, which
affirmed the order issued by the then City Court of Lucena, Branch II, denying the
prosecution's motion for the exclusion of Miguel Roncesvalles (co-accused of the private
respondents herein named) from the information in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may
testify therein as a state witness.
The amended information for violation of Section 22 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended,
charged that Miguel Roncesvalles, together with herein private respondents Jose V. Perez,
Amadea Consul Perez, Cipriano Ladines and Flavia C. Valdenor, "with intent to deceive,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and illegally make false statements and misrepresentation of material facts in the
application for agricultural loan signed by FLAVIA C. VALDENOR and in the other
supporting papers, calculated to produce semblance of compliance with the legal
requirements, making it appear that accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR is an eligible borrower
which misrepresentation or false statements of facts were considered as the credit factors in
the approval and the granting of the loan to accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR in the amount
of P30,000.00, by the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., ..."
All the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After the prosecution had already
presented seven witnesses, the state prosecutors filed a motion with the court, asking that
accused Roncesvalles be discharged from the information in order that he may be used as
a state witness against his co-defendants, alleging that Roncesvalles had not at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude; that he did not appear to be the
most guilty; that there was absolute necessity for his testimony; that there was no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed and that his
testimony could be substantially corroborated in its material points. The motion was set for
hearing and after the parties were heard, the trial court, issued the questioned order
denying the motion on the ground that, ". . . Miguel Roncesvalles cannot be said to be
the least guilty. He would be a principal by direct participation, or a co-principal if he acted
upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges," and that, "the prosecution having
54
presented all its witnesses, the Court, after going over their testimony, cannot see how
Roncesvalles' testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be corroborated."
Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with respondent appellate court praying for the annulment and setting aside of the
trial court's questioned orders. Respondent court sustained the trial court's ruling in its
decision, subject of the petition at bar and denied reconsideration thereof.
Hence, the People's petition, which complains that "the respondent court acted with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in sustaining the Order dated September
15, 1978 issued by the City Court of Lucena and in holding that the petitioner failed to show
that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Miguel Roncesvalles whose discharge
is requested. "
The Court finds merit in this petition and dispenses with the firing of memoranda or briefs in
the light of the facts and pleadings of record.
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court prescribes the conditions in order that one or
several accused may be used as witnesses against their co-accused, to wit: "(a) there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested; (b)
there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant; (c) the testimony of said defendant can
be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said defendant does not appear to be
the most guilty; and (e) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude."
While it is true that the court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions
prescribed by the rule exists, this grant of discretion is not a grant of arbitrary discretion, but
rather a sound judicial discretion to be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct
administration of justice.
The trial c•urt manifestly erred in denying the prosecution's motion to discharge accused
Roncesvalles or, the ground that he "cannot be said to be the least guilty." All that the law
requires, in order to discharge an accused and to use him as a state witness is that the
defendant whose exclusion is requested does not appear to be the most guilty, not
necessarily that he is the least guilty. The trial court's order itself shows that Roncesvalles
does not appear to be the most guilty since it acknowledged that "he would be a principal by
direct participation or a co-principal if he acted upon instruction of another as the
prosecution alleges."
The Rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as witness for the state
merely on the ground that he has committed a falsification himself, or that he had actually
committed the crime charged. The Rules say that it is necessary that the "said defendant
does not appear to be the most guilty from which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an
accused of the crime charged is no reason why he may not be excluded as witness for the
State. As a matter of fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his participation in a crime,
is a guaranty that if he will testify in court he will testify truthfully; so that even if an accused
actually participated in the offense charged in the information, he may still be made a
witness. Individuals who are candid enough to admit their guilt are expected to testify
truthfully and it is from that circumstance that all the facts involved shall be expected to be
truthfully disclosed by him.
The ground underlying the rule is not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished;
so an accused who is not the most guilty is allowed to testify against the most guilty in order
to achieve the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the more or most guilty and the
greatest number among the accused permitted to be convicted for the offense they have
committed. Experience, under English and American procedural methods, has shown that
without the aid of informers testifying against their co-participants in crime, many guilty
parties would escape, where the facts which would sustain a conviction are known to the
guilty parties themselves alone.
Respondent appellate court itself sustained the People's contention on this score, simply
stating that "respondent Court erred when it ruled that it could not grant the motion for the
discharge of Roncesvalles because it does not appear that he is the least guilty of the
accused. What Section 9, Rule 119 requires as one of the conditions for the discharge of
one of the accused to testify as a witness for the Government is that said 'defendant does
not appear to be the most guilty.' "
But respondent appellate court nevertheless sustained the questioned orders "since the
petition failed to show that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Roncesvalles".
The trial court had denied discharge on the ground that "the prosecution having presented
all its witnesses, the Court, after going over their testimony, can not see how Roncesvalles
testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be corroborated." This conjecture of the trial court
has no sound basis, as is readily shown by respondent appellate court's contrary evaluation
that "the most that petitioner could say was that the testimony of Roncesvalles would be
corroborative of the testimony of the witnesses already presented by the Government as
well as the documentary evidence presented during the hearing, among them, the Rural
Bank Examiner and NBI agents." Sufficient corroborative evidence exists of record.
The Court therefore overrules respondent court's finding that there is no absolute necessity
for the testimony of Roncesvalles. A careful examination of the records of the case supports
the prosecution's stand to discharge Roncesvalles in order that he may testify for the
55
government. The testimony of Roncesvalles is absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy
among the accused who are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in
defrauding the Lucena Rural Bank in the amount of P30,000.00 under the pretext of an
agricultural loan granted to accused Flavia N. Valdenor. Roncesvalles was the Assistant
Chief Inspector of the Lucena Rural Bank and he was the one who signed the investigation
report which contained false information as to the credit standing of accused Flavia N.
Valdenor. Nobody is in a better position to testify and prove the existence of conspiracy than
accused Roncesvalles, because he is an officer of the bank. There is ample basis for the
Solicitor General's submittal that "considering the foregoing circumstances and inasmuch
as the other accused cannot be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the
conviction of the accused would not be revealed unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to
testify for the State"; "unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify for the government,
there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense charged,
i.e., the role or participation of his co-accused in the preparation and accomplishment of the
falsified loan application and its supporting papers. The testimony of accused Roncesvalles
will prove conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime charged"; and "unless this
petition is given due course and granted, the accused in Criminal Case No. 0399 may be
acquitted and the State irretrievably prejudiced. Because of the Rule on double jeopardy,
the State has no other remedy except the instant petition."
It is noteworthy that these assertions appear to be based on solid ground for the
prosecutors presented their motion for discharge of Roncesvalles as a state witness only
after they had presented seven witnesses and could then show the absolute necessity for
his testimony in consonance with what was to be held by the Court in Flores vs
Sandiganbayan that the trial court should act on said discharge motion when the
prosecution has presented all its other evidence and it could then "fully determine whether
the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of the New Rules of Court, are fully
complied with."
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the
very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in
the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality
of a trial. In coming to his conclusion as to the 'necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is re. requested'; as to the 'availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence'; as to which of the accused is the 'most guilty'; and the like, the
judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and information furnished by the state
prosecutors.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's questioned
orders denying the discharge of Miguel Roncesvalles as a state witness is hereby SET
ASIDE. As prayed for, the trial court is ORDERED to allow the discharge of said accused
Miguel Roncesvalles from the information before it in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he
may testify therein as a state witness.

This decision is immediately executory.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

56
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which
denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be
utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition.
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the
Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a
free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original
certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of respondent
Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as
a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered
judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained
the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of
the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an
information for perjury was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy
Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
57
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. In this criminal case, respondent
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for
preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes' counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution recommending the criminal
prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed
co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case,
we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same
set of facts and the same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered
dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of
the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the recommendation of the Department
of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case
of double jeopardy for respondent herein . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging respondent
Paredes with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a
motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent court's resolution of
August 1, 1991 and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the
investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He
claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated
and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were annexed to
respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing
of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would
constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that
said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was
suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded
and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit
of Explanations and Rectifications, respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to
have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court
after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in
the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in
the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to
their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of
falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on
this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence
of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime.
As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case
theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony
or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between
the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution and, ostensibly to forestall any
further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public
documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, each of
which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in
the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge
of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor,
as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as
respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the
58
eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove
the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other
private respondents in their opposition to the prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer
relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and
after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding
the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as
client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore, the
testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is
privileged.
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, the controversy was
elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore
(1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state
witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence
thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have
been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer.
Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be
presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's
consent."
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these
cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep
aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to "any communication," without distinction or
qualification.
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no
particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his
attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the
client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means.
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing
relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the
subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that
said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the
motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents
were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of
secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the
criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes
intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his
attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on
alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis.
It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of
the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In
other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former
has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the
59
attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's
consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which
he seeks the lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the
cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and
client. (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness
are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of
Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were
later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now
pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications
thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of
falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for
purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is
well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of
an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed
out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not
be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by
a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only
lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of justice."
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel
from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst
travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
 II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether
respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal
prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived
at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this second aspect and
the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution in the
petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions
requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether
or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court
from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and
evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the
dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious administration
thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court.
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand
charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24,
1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public
documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly
in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each of the three
respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this
case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's discharge as state witness,
he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I
suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same
incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly,
for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged
as state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused.
While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly,
which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the effect of
making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they
are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense
and tried together are called joint defendants.
60
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having
been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and
became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different
causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single action.
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation "(w)hen two or more
persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense" was too broad and indefinite;
hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the
accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same manner in point of
commission and time. The word "joint" means "common to two or more," as "involving the
united activity of two or more," or "done or produced by two or more working together," or
"shared by or affecting two or more. Had it been intended that all the accused should
always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so with
facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all, the
purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the
rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be
imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness
is that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." not that he must be the least guilty as is
so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused
who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state
witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he
persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not
actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state
witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that
made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., two conspirators charged with five
others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state
witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information charging
him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most
guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to
open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just
as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not
the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or
nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to those of his
co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is imposable on
all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity articulated found expression
in People vs. Ocimar, et al., which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the
discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a
conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them
could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since
accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For,
despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify
the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which
resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt.
Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it
was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court in its
well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence
reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the
plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the
conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most
guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by
"most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be
considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration
of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge
of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual
participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated
61
in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for
the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it
cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to
be a witness for the government is clearly warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal
offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into
concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the
Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of
the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants
the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby
the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural
rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other
considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall
escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his
participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide
for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a
judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge
of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the
falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other
co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There
is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that
purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes
required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of
Explanation and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable
witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as
follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal;
Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the
letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del impunged resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by
Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the
certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ariño. SO ORDERED.

On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and
the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
witness.

This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to
determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be
emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and the disposition
taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the
sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after
the retirement of two members of its Second Division and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment dated
June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the
chairman and new members thereof declared:

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which
the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate
Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice
Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the
Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments
submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We
respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable
to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecution's motion to
discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable
Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof.

62
G.R. Nos. L-1642-44 January 29, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO MENDIOLA, FLORENTINO ZAPANTA and GREGORIO
REYES, defendants-appellants.
Camilo Formoso and Laurel, Sabido, Almario and Laurel for appellant Alejandro Mendiola.
Miguel Tolentino for appellants Gregorio Reyes and Florentino Zapanta.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Justina Rizal and Teofilo Ampil, spouse, had been quarreling because of the latter's
amorous relations with other women. During the Japanese occupation they were invited to
live with her brother Dr. Sisenando Rizal in Calamba. There were times during which he did
not sleep there. There were occasion on which husband and wife were not on speaking
terms. Justina went to the extene of complaining to her brothers and sisters against her
husband.
On March 31, 1946, her brother Taciano V. Rizal came from Calamba to Manila in a
weapons carrier, accompanied by appellants Alejandro Mendiola, Florentino Zapanta and
Gregorio Reyes, his townmates. In the evening of the same day, Taciano borrowed an
ambulance car from Arturo Gomez. Later, Taciano alone went to the house of his sister
Justina at 514 Aviles, Manila, and talked with her for a short time. On the same evening,
appellants passed the night together in the same sala in a house in Paco.
Early in the morning of the next day, Taciano and the three appellants for the ambulance of
Arturo Gomez and drove it to Teofilo's house in Aviles. Upon seeing Teofilo they forced him
to go with them in the ambulance. After sometime they were driving through Taft Avenue. At
about 7 o'clock in the morning, upon reaching the intersection of Libertad, Teofilo jumped
out of the car through the backdoor. Alejandro Mendiola shot him. After the shooting
Taciano and appellants scampered away. Teofilo was helped by traffic policeman Leonardo
Roxas, who took him to the Philippine general Hospital, where a few day later he died to
generalized peritonitis and hyphostatic pneumonia, secondary to gunshot wounds thorough
the abdomen, lacerating the omentum and transversing the colon.
Sometime later appellant Alejandro Mendiola was arrested and some time after him the
other two appellants rested and some time after him the other two appellants. Taciano V.
Rizal continues to be at large.
63
There cannot be any question as to the participation of the three appellants in the
commission of the crime on question, The three of them have testified about their joining
Taciano from Calamba until all of them boarded the Ambulance car with Teofilo, up the
corner of Taft Avenue and Libertad, where Teofilo was shot. They disagree, however, as to
who fired the fatal shot. Mendiola says it was Taciano who fired, while the other two
appellants say that it was Mendiola. We are convinced that the latter's version id the correct
one, although for the purposes of this case the effect would be the same whether the shot
was fired by Taciano or by Mendiola.
The circumstances of the case, as proved by the evidence, lead us to the conclusion that
each and everyone of appellants took part with Taciano V. Rizal in conspiracy to kidnap as
they did Teofilo Ampil and they are all equally responsible for his killing which was
perpetrated in accordance with the plan of the kidnapper. Once the kidnapping has been
decided, the authors necessarily had to entertain the killings as one of the means of
accomplishing the purpose of kidnapping.
The three appellants were correctly found by the trial court guilty as authors of the crime
found by the trial court guilty as authors o the crime of murdered. It sentenced then to death
and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Teofilo Ampil in the sum of P2,000 with
subsidiary.
With regard to appellants Gregorio Reyes and Florentino Zapanta, the principal penalty
must be changed to reclusion perpetua, insufficient votes having been cast to affirm the
appealed judgment, and there is even a minority opinion that they can be held as
accomplices.
The case with respect to Alejandro Mendiola calls fro the application of section 9 and 11 of
Rule 115 which read as follows:
SEC. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution. — When
two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competent
court, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, may direct any of them to be
discharged with the latter's consent that he may be a witness for the government when in
the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is
requested:.
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;.
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be that most guilty.
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
SEC. 11. Discharge of defendants operate as acquittal. — The order indicated in the two
preceding sections shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant discharged and shall be a
bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the defendant, in the case provided in
section 9 fails or refuses to testify against his co-defendant.
It appears that the original information for murder committed on the person of Teofilo Ampil
was filed on April 27, 1946, against Taciano V. Rizal alone. On October 30, 1946, an
amended information was filed including new defendants, among them Alejandro Mendiola.
On November 6, 1946, assistant city fiscal Engracio Abasolo filed a motion to discharge
defendant Alejandro Mendiola in order that he may be utilized as witness for the
prosecution, which motion was granted.
On December 26, 1946, another independent information was filed for the same murder
against Gregorio Reyes.
On January 31, 1947, a new information was filed for the same murder against Taciano V.
Rizal, Vicente Llamas and the three appellants, including Alejandro Mendiola.
On February 7, 1947 counsel moved to quash the new information against Alejandro
Mendiola in the ground that he has previously been acquitted of the offense charged. The
motion was denied and erroneously.
The Prosecution contends that appellant Mendiola is not entitled to the benefits of section
11 of Rule 115 on the following grounds:
1. Because Mendiola, upon developments subsequent to his discharge on November 6,
1946, appears to be one of the most guilty, for having fired the fatal shot, his discharge
having been based on the main proposition that by using him as a witness the prosecution
would be enabled to prove it case against the most guilty accused, and the prosecution no
longer wanted to avail, as it never availed, of his testimony to successfully prosecute the
real and most guilty culprits.
64
2. That the failure to testify mentioned in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115 comprehends
the failure due to the prosecution's omission or refusal to use the discharged accused as its
witness.
3. That the discharge, to operate as an acquittal under section 11 of Rule 115, must have
taken place after the discharged accused shall have been arraigned and shall have entered
his plea and after the trial of the case shall have actually begun, and Mendiola had not even
been arraigned when he was discharged on November 6, 1946.
The above three proposition announced by the prosecution are not supported either by law
or by reason.
The discharge contemplated in the clear text of section 9 of Rule 115 is the effected or
which can be effected a t any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to
the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. The clause "any time before they have
entered upon their defense," used in the section, is so clear as not to give rise to any
misunderstanding. The words "any time before" imply an indefinite period of time limited
only by the time set by a court's jurisdiction and the very nature of things, and that limit is set
at the moment of the filing of the information.
Before the discharge is ordered, the prosecution must show and the trial court must
ascertain that the five conditions fixed by section 9 of Rule 115 are complied with. But one
the discharge is ordered, any future development showing that any or all of the five
conditions have not actually been fulfilled, may not affect the legal consequences of the
discharge, as provided by section 11 of Rule 115. Any writing or unwitting error of the
prosecution in asking for the discharge and of the court in granting the petition no question
of jurisdiction being involved, cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal
provided by section 11 of Rule 115 and of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.
The exception in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115 against the defendant who "fails to
testify against his co-defendant" refers exclusively to a failure attributable to defendant's will
or fault. It is unfair to deprive defendant of an acquittal for a failure attributable to the
prosecution, and it would be an abhorrent legal policy to place defendant's fate at the mercy
of anyone who may handle the prosecution. The willingness or unwillingness of the
discharged defendant is the only test that should be taken into account to determine
whether or not he fails to testify against this co-defendant and, consequently, whether or not
he should be excluded from the benefits of the acquittal provided by section 11 of Rule 115.
In the present case, it is not disputed that Alejandro Mendiola had always been willing to
testify for the prosecution and upon the same facts bared to the prosecution for which the
latter, among other grounds, decided to move for his discharge from the information. As a
matter of fact, although testifying for himself, he reiterated substantially in open court what
he had testified before the officers for the prosecution. Under the circumstances and the law,
he is protected by the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
Accordingly, the appealed decision is modified and reversed in part, and appellant Gregorio
Reyes and Florencio Zapanta are sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of Teofilo Ampil in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the cost, and
appellants Alejandro Mendiola is acquitted and shall immediately be released upon
promulgation of this decision.
Moran, C.J., Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent from the decision of the majority in so far as if finds the appellants, Florentino
Zapanta and Gregorio Reyes guilty of murder as principals. There can be no doubt that
Taciano Rizal, still at large, planned to kidnap his brother-in-law, Teofilo Ampil; but I am not
convinced that appellants Zapanta and Reyes conspired with him. Indeed, it is admitted by
the trial court and the Solicitor General that there is no direct evidence of conspiracy. In all
probability, said appellants were as, testified to by them, invited by Taciano Rizal to leave
Calamba Laguna, for a sight-seeing trip to Manila. From the mere fact that Zapanta and
Reyes had been with Taciano Rizal from the time they left Calamba to the moment Teofilo
Ampil was shot by appellant Alejandro Mendiola while jumping out of the car in which he
was asked to ride by Taciano on Aviles Street, we cannot safely deduce that Zapanta and
Reyes had previous knowledge of Taciano's murderous designs. The prosecution has not
imputes to either Zapanta or Reyes any positive act that would tend to make them principal
under article 17 of the Revised Penal Code. Neither may guilty knowledge on the part of
Zapanta and Reyes be inferred from their failure to stop Alejandro Mendiola from shooting
Teofilo Ampil or to report the crime to the authorities, because they could not foresee that.
PABLO, M., concurrente y disidente:
Concurro con la opinion de la mayoria que absuelve a Alejandro Mendiola.
Disiento en cuanto condena a los acusados Gregorio Reyes y Florentino Zapanta.
65
He revisado las pruebas obrantes en autos y en ellas no hay el mas ligero indicio de que
dichos acusados hayan tenido participacion en el asesinato de Teofilo Ampil. Las
conclusiones de hecho de la mayoria son del tenor siguiente:
Early in the morning of the next day, Taciano and the three appellants got the ambulance of
Arturo Gomez and drove it to Teofilo's house in Aviles. Upon seeing Teofilo they forced him
to go with them in the ambulance. After sometime they were driving through Taft Avenue. At
about 7 o'clock in the morning, upon reaching the intersection of Libertad, Teofilo jumped
out of the car through the back door. Alejandro Mendiola shot him. After the shooting,
Taciano and appellants scampered away. Teofilo was helped by traffic policeman Leonardo
Roxas, who took him to the Philippine General Hospital, where a few days later he died due
to generalized peritonitis and hyphostatic pneumonia, secondary to gunshot wounds
through the abdomen, lacerating the omentum and transversing the colon.
En mi opinion, Taciano y Alejandro fueron los unicos autores del asesinato de Teofilo Ampil.
En la mañana del dia primero de Abril, Taciano acompañado por Alejandro, Florentino y
Gregorio, fue al lugar donde estaba la ambulancia de Arturo Gomez. Cuando Taciano vio a
Teofilo, le invito a que subiera a la ambulancia, y Alejandro a punta de su revolver le obligo
a Teofilo que se embarcara. Florentino y Gregorio no han hecho nada: solamente estaban
sentados dentro del coche. Cuando en la encrucijada de la avenida Taft y calle Libertad,
Teofilo se escapo, Alejandro le disparo dos tiros, uno de los cuales causo su muerte en el
hospital. Florentino y Gregorio no han tenido ninguna participacion ni en el secuestro de
Teofilo, ni en la parada del coche, ni en el disparo del revolver. Cuando oyeron el disparo,
echaron a correr. No hay ninguna prueba si hubo un acuerdo entre los cinco acusados (uno
de ellos es Vicente Llamas, que ya que absuelto por el Juzgado a quo) de lo que habian de
hacer en Manila. Por el contrario, segun la declaracion de los acusados Florentino y
Gregorio, habian seguido a Taciano en jeep porque fueron invitados para hacer un paseo
en Manila. No hay nada de extrano en que los dos acusdos hayan aceptado la invitacion de
Taciano: cualquiera, en aquellas circunstancias, hubiera obrado de la misma manera, para
tener oportunidad de ver los efectos que habia dejado el bombardeo de Manila. El mismo
ministerio fiscal admite en su alegato que no existe ninguna prueba sobre la conspiracion.
El delito de que fueron acusados los cuatro es el de asesinato. Taciano y Alejandro son los
verdaderos autores: el primero fue el que manejo la ambulancia en el secuestro, y el otro
fue el que amenaza con su revolver a Teofilo a subir al coche y fue el que le disparo el tiro
al echar a correr. Florentino y Gregorio no han hecho nada en el asesinato de Teofilo. Son
autores, segun el articulo 17 del Codigo Penal Revisado: "1º Los que toman parte directa
en la ejecucion del hecho; 2.º Los que fuerzan o inducen directamente a otros a ejecutarlo;
y 3.º Los que cooperan a la ejecucion del hecho por un acto sin el cual no se hubiera
efectuado."
Florentino y Gregorio no han cometido mingun acto sin el cual no se hubiera efectuado el
asesinato. Si existiera prueba de que hubo un plan o acuerdo entre los cuatro en secuestrar
yn matar o Teofilo, desde luego todos serian responsables de las consecuencias de su
acuerdo, aunque los dos, Florentino y Gregorio, no hubieran hecho nada. Su presencia en
la ambulancia no rine ni es incompatible con su defensa de que eran simples invitados para
pasearse en Manila. Pudiera suceder que entre Taciano y Alejandro haya habido acuerdo
de invitarles a los dos como simples compañeros, sin comunicarles su intencion criminal de
secuestrar a Teofilo y matarle si fuese necesario. Para que se les pueda considerar como
coautores es necesario que haya prueba de que hayan tomado parte con actos positivos
en la comision del delito o hayan inducido directamente a Taciano o Alejandro a cometerlo
o hayan cooperado en la comision del mismo por un acto sin el cual no se hubiera cometido
el delito. ¿Que acto han hecho Florentino y Gregorio? Ninguno. Vamos a suponer por un
momento que en aquel momento de la fuga de Teofilo no estuvieran presentes en la
ambulancia Florentino y Gregorio, ¿no se hubiera podido cometer el asesinato del mismo
modo? La ausencia de los dos no hubiera cambiado el tragico cuadro: los unicos actores
fueron Taciano y Alejandro. De manera que la presencia de Florentino y de Gregorio en el
momento de disparo del revolver a Teofilo no contribuyo en lo mas minimo en la realizacion
del delito. No pueden ser, por tanto, considerados como coautores Florentino y Gregorio.
Tampoco pueden ser complices porque no cooperaron en la ejecucion del hecho por actos
anteriores o simultaneos, pues el articulo 18 del Codigo Penal Revisado dice que: "Son
complices los que, no hallandose comprendidos en el articulo 17, cooperan a la ejecucion
del hecho por actosanteriores o simultaneos."
Tampoco pueden ser encubridores, porque el articulo 19 del Codigo Penal Revisado
dispone que: "Son encubridores los que, con conocimiento de la perpetracion del delito, sin
haber tenido participacion en el como autores ni complices, intervienen con posterioridad a
su ejecucion de alguno de los modos siguientes: 1.º Aprovechandose por si mismos o
auxiliando a los delincuentes para que se aprovechen de los efectos del delito; 2.º
Ocultando o inutilizando el cuerpo, los efectos o los instrumentos del delito para impedirsu
descubrimiento; 3.º Albergando, ocultando o proporcionando la fuga al autor del delito,
cuando el encubridor lo hace con abuso de funciones publicas o cuando aquel lo fuere de
traicion, parricidio, asesinato, atentado contra la vida del Jefe Ejecutivo, o reo
conocidamente habitual de otro delito."
Tampoco hay pruebas de que los dos acusados hayan proporcionado la fuga de Taciano y
Alejandro. Los autos demuestran que despues del disparo fatal los cuatro acusados se
fugaron a la desbandada: cada uno se escabullo lo mejor que pudo. Nadie ayudo a nadie.
La mera presencia de Gregorio y Florentino, pues, en la comision del delito no les hace
responsables ni como autores, ni complices, ni encubridores.
El Tribunal Supremo de España en su sentencia de 13 de Marzo de 1884 dijo que:
66
El presenciar un sujeto un asesinato cometido por su hermano en la persona de un comun
enemigo de ambos, con el cual tuvieron anteriormente lod dos ana cuestion, y el proferir
mientras se cometia el crimen algunas palabras amenazadores, sin que se sepa cuales
fuesen ni a quien se dirigian, no es suficiente para determinar la complicidad en el delito,
fundandose en que, si bien el procesado dio origen a la primera cuestion, y mas despues
acompaño al agresor y estuvo presento a la perpetracion del crimen, vertiendo algunas
palabras amenazadores, que no se dice cuales eran ni a quien se dirigian, a estos hechos
aislados, y sin otros antecedentes que los expliquen, no podia darseles, sin grave peligro
de error, grande importancia, ni suponer por ello participacion o cooperacion en el hecho
criminal, que es lo que determina legalmente la complicidad de un delito.
En el caso citado se puede logicamente suponer que el hermano que estaba presente en el
asesinato del "comun enemigo" y que profirio "algunas palabras amenazadoras" puede
haber ayudado con su actitud al asesino. Sin embargo, no son suficientes, segun el
Tribunal, tales datos para concluir que ayudo en la comision del delito. En el caso presente,
no hay ninguna prueba ni siquiera sobre la actitud que tuvieron los dos acusados Florentino
y Gregorio en el momento del secuestro y en el momento del disparo del revolver.
El Tribunal Supremo de Espana en su sentencia de 20 de Marzo de 1885, caso la de la
Audiencia, declarando que es "indispensable elemento de la responsabilidad del complice
que por actos anteriores o simultaneos ayude, facilite o proteja la ejecucion de los hechos
constitutivos del delito que otro realice," hechos que no aparecen probados.
Y en su sentencia de 25 de Junio de 1886, al revocar la condena, anuncio la siguiente
doctrina:
Considerando, en cuanto al recurso de Jose Martinez Atalaya, que la Sala sentenciadora
declara su responsabilidad en concepto y categoria de complice de los delitos despues de
reconocer que por su parte no realizo acto alguno para su comision, por el hecho unico de
haber contribuido a su realizacion con un acto simultaneo, con su presencia en el lugar
donde se cometieron: Considerando que la responsabilidad del complice se determina por
actos de ayuda y de auxilio, anteriores o simultaneos, prestados conscientemente al autor
del delito; y que no siendo de esta clase por si solo el mero hecho de presenciar la
comision de un delito, cuando no consta, y para los efectos de la casacion, cuando no
declara el Tribunal a quo que esta presencia tenga el objeto de alentar, siquiera al
delincuente principal o de aparentar o hacer en realidad mayor su fuerza ante las victimas,
no puede sostenerse la declarada de Martinez Atalaya unicamente por ese hecho, despues
de afirmar en absoluto que entre el y Juan Gomez no resultaba que existiera concierto
alguno.
Y por ultimo, este Tribunal en Estados Unidos contra Guevara, 2 Jur. Fil., 553, dijo:
La mera presencia en el tiempo y lugar de la comision del delito no es por si sola bastante
para constituir un acto simultaneo de cooperacion constitutiva de complicidad.

Cuando una o dos personas juntamente hieren y matan en una reyerta a uno de sus
adversarios, su compañero no se puede considerar como autor o complice, cuando no se
puede probar que ha habido una accion previamente concertada y que haya tenido por
objeto inferir la herida mortal, o que dicho companero tuviese alguna razon para creer que
habia de hacerse un ataque mortal contra el occiso. (Estados Unidos contra Manayao, 4
Jur. Fil., 297; veanse tambien: Estados Unidos contra Naquiraya, 14 Jur. Fil., 246 citando
Estados Unidos contra Empeinado, 9 Jur. fil., 631; Estados Unidos contra Dasal, 3 Jur. Fil.,
6.)

En mi opinion, los ods acusados, Florentino Zapanta y Gregorio Reyes, deben ser
absueltos.

FERIA, J., concurring:

I concur in this dissenting opinion.

67
G.R. No. L-62881 August 30, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUCIANO TAN, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Chipeco Fuggan & Associates for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In an Amended Information dated 10 February 1977, Ngo Sin, Luciano Tan, and three
others were charged with the crime of Theft of 300 pieces of second-hand rail valued at
P243,750.00, belonging to the Philippine National Railways, before the then Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch I I I (Criminal Case No. 719-SP).
On 10 July 1981, after the prosecution had already presented one witness, upon motion of
the prosecution, and after the parties were duly heard, the Trial Court ordered the discharge
from the Information of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State witness after satisfying itself that his
testimony could be substantially corroborated in its material points and that the other
conditions for discharge as set forth in Rule 119, Sec. 9 of the Rules of Court were present.
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan was denied by the Trial Court in its Order
of 11 February, 1982, reasoning inter alia:
... it is pointed out that the prosecuting Fiscal has failed to show the absolute necessity for
the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin. As pointed out by the prosecuting Fiscal Ngo Sin is the
only person who can directly Identify Luciano Tan as the person who instructed him get the
rails in San Pablo City, who gave him a certain amount of money to be used in the hiring of
trailers and to be given to certain persons in San Pablo City, as the person who gave to him
the necessary papers he presented in San Pablo City to effect the taking of the rails in
question, this as previously stated in the Motion to Discharge filed by the City Fiscal dated
February 20, 1981 particularly pars. 2 and 3 of said motion, and also Annex 'A' of said
motion. As contended by the City Fiscal without the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin the
prosecution cannot prove the participation of the accused Luciano Tan who appears to be
the mastermind in the unlawful taking of the rails from the PNR Compound at San Pablo
city.
Next, it is contended that lacking is the requirement that there is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of
defendant Ngo Sin. As correctly pointed out by the City Fiscal, except for the testimony of
68
defendant Ngo Sin there is no other direct evidence available for the prosecution to show
the positive and direct participation of Luciano Tan as narrated in Ngo Sin's affidavit
attached to the Motion to Discharge. Next, it is contended by defendant-movant that the
next condition, to wit, that the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin can be substantially co
rroborated in its material point has not been met in the discharge of the accused Ngo Sin.
As pointed out by the City Fiscal, this is not true. The testimony of Ngo Sin win be
corroborated by Leonides Manalo whose affidavit is submitted as Exh. 'A'— motion (at p.
382, rec.) who saw Luciano Tan deliver to Ngo Sin a certain sum of money and certain
papers. The testimony of Ngo Sin is also corroborated by the way bills or delivery receipts
marked Exhs. 'M' and 'N' made out to the name of Luciano Tan. As also stated in the City
Fiscal's Opposition to the motion for reconsideration, he has earlier pointed out in the
Petition for Discharge, particularly par. 8 thereof, that defendant Ngo Sin appears to be
merely an instrument in carrying out the asportation, with the bulk of responsibility resting
on the accused Luciano Tan. The City Fiscal in his opposition to the motion for was, has
discussed this at page 3 of the opposition.
Defendant-movant next argument is that the body of the crane was taken from 'the
possession of Ngo Sin (p. 4, Motion for Reconsideration). As contended by the City Fiscal,
while it is true that the physical possession of the subject rails was taken from the accused
Ngo Sin the latter explained that he was in possession of the rails upon instruction by
defendant Luciano Tan; that the papers were given to him. It is not true as alleged in the
motion for was, that the accused Ngo Sin did not point to defendant Luciano Tan until he
was interrogated by the San Pablo City Police (p. 4, Motion for Reconsideration). Lt.
Octavio Mabilangan of the PNR Security Force testified (Sess. Sept. 4, 1979) that upon
apprehension of Ngo Sin, the latter protested that he was merely 'utusan lamang koni
Luciano Tan and was simply told to go to San Pablo City; that Ngo Sin told him that the
delivery receipts and other papers were given to him by Luciano Tan.
The defendant-movant has reproduced in whole the testimony of Ngo Sin before the
Fiscal's Office (p. 4-12, Motion). As pointed out by the City Fiscal, a reading of his entire
testimony would readily show that defendant- movant Luciano Tan was his principal who
directed the accused Ngo Sin to go to San Pablo City to get the rails
Next, defendant-movant points out that the information alleges conspiracy and cites Sec. 27
of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As pointed out by the City Fiscal, the aforecited
provision of the Rules of Court is not applicable to the testimony of the discharged witness
in the person of defendant Ngo Sin to be given in open Court.
It is next argued that since the rails in question have already been sold to one Jose Chan,
the accused Luciano Tan has nothing more to do with the papers found in the possession of
the accused Ngo Sin (p. 14, Motion for Reconsideration). As pointed out by the City Fiscal,
this matter is immaterial for the purpose of present motion; it is a matter of defense.
On Certiorari, Luciano Tan challenged the validity of the aforesaid Orders before
respondent Appellate Court. In a Decision promulgated on 25 June 1982, said Court held
that "there was no despotic exercise of discretion by His Honor in issuing the challenged
orders" finding as justified his rationalizations above-quoted.
Upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan, respondent Court reversed its prior
Decision and nullified the Trial Court Orders discharging Ngo Sin to be a State witness,
rationalizing:
It appears that accused Ngo Sin can be the most guilty among the five accused for it was in
his possession that the missing rails in question were found. The contention that this was
per instruction of Luciano Tan is a matter of defense which could be better ventilated at the
trial proper, especially so when in addition to the rails, papers were likewise found in his
possession, in relation to those rails. The money paid for the hiring of trailers to effect the
transfer of the rails to certain persons in San Pablo City was given by Ngo Sin, who puts up
the defense again that the money came from Luciano Tan. This again being a matter of
defense to be better determined during the trial.
The weakness of the challenged Orders is that it jumps at the conclusion that Luciano Tan
'appears to be the mastermind in the unlawful taking of the rails from the PNR compound at
San Pablo City', which conclusion is quite premature, prejudges the merit of the case and
makes the pending trial even moot and academic.
Aggravating the situation of the five (5) accused in the case pending before the respondent
court and calling for extreme caution in excluding any accused is the allegation of the fiscal
in the information (Annex A) that in the commission of the offense accused were equally
charged of "conspiring, cooperating and mutually helping one another," without in any
manner qualifying g the degree of conspiracy of any one among the five (5) accused. This
means that the exclusion of one accused now at this stage can result in an act beneficial to
his own exclusive interest but prejudicial to the liberty of his four (4) other co-accused and
worse of all even to the interest of the State.
We are not convinced that there is an absolute necessity for the State to exclude the
particular accused in this case to prosecute successfully the case. The best interest of
justice would require the was, of our Decision and revoke and nullify the questioned Orders.
Reconsideration prayed for by petitioner having been denied, they have elevated the case
to us.
69
In this petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner People of the Philippines alleges that
respondent Court acted arbitrarily and/or committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
itself, submitting that:
... For no apparently justifiable nor cogent reason, respondent court abruptly executed an
about and against the facts of record, did, in effect, rule, that the trial court for all of its
observance of the requirements of law (including due notice, hearing and fun consideration
of the evidence), had committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the fiscal's motion to
discharge Ngo Sin to become State witness. This sudden reversal of a well-reasoned
decision is obviously despotic capricious, and arbitrary, and totally unjustifiable.
We resolved to give due course.
It is believed that the record justifies the discharge of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State
witness considering the absolute necessity of his testimony for the successful prosecution
of the criminal charge if it has to be established that the accused Luciano Tan had planned
and financed the theft. All conditions for discharge prescribed by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court have been met. The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining
those conditions. Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and
the considerations presented by the prosecuting officer.
... A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at
the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial
in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in
the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality
of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested,' as to the 'availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence;' as to which of the accused is the most guilty one; and the like, the
judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer. ...
It is also settled that the discharge of a co-defendant is a matter that lies within the sound
discretion of the Trial Court. The Court's is the exclusive responsibility to see that the
conditions prescribed by the Rules exist.
We see no compelling reason for respondent Appellate Court to have substituted its own
findings for those of the prosecution and the Trial Judge. We find no contrary evidence to
justify a reversal of the Trial Judge's conclusions, who was in a position to evaluate the
evidence already available, a like opportunity to assess the same not having been afforded
respondent Appellate Court.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Court's Resolution, dated 4 November 1982 reversing its own
prior Decision of 25 June 1982, as well as its Resolution of 17 December 1982 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Orders of the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, dated 10 July 1981 and 11
February 1982, in Criminal Case No. 719-SP, are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance is now directed to proceed with
the trial on the merits accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Relova, J., concurs in the result.
Vasquez, J., took no part.

70
G.R. No. L-57333-37 September 16, 1986
CECILIA C. BARRETTO and ROBERT SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondent.
Rodolfo M. Acob for petitioners.
YAP, J.:
Cecilia Barretto, Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano were charged in five separate
informations before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents. The five cases, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1812, 1813, 1814,
1815 and 1816, involved the amounts of P130.00, P100.00, P90.00, P100.00 and P100.00,
respectively, or a total of P520.00.
Except as to the particulars regarding the dates of the commission of the offenses and the
amounts involved, the information uniformly alleged that Cecilia C. Barretto, Chief of the
Project Compassion Office in the Province of Batangas, and Esperanza Casapao-Magadia
and Robert Soriano, both casual employees in said office, taking advantage of their public
positions, and in conspiracy with one another, committed the crime as follows, to wit:
... the accused Esperanza Casapao-Magadia upon the direction of accused Cecilia C.
Barretto prepared and accomplished the form of a document captioned as Time Book and
Payroll of the Project Compassion's Office, for the period covering ... ... by making it appear
thereon that one Leticia Austria y Serrano, a separated casual employee of the said Project
Compassion's Office, rendered actual services and worked for the said period and the
corresponding wages therefor was . . . ... Philippine Currency, the said accused after
preparing the aforesaid Time Book and Payroll upon order of accused Cecilia C. Barretto,
knowingly wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority from the said Leticia Austria
y Serrano, falsified, affixed and signed the signature of the latter, and accused Cecilia C.
Barretto, as Chief of the Project Compassion's Office, knowing fully well that the said Time
Book and Payroll concerning Leticia Austria y Serrano, a casual employee separated by her
is falsified, nonetheless signed and affixed her signature thereto, and thereafter that the two
accused, together with her co-accused Robert Soriano y Soriano, who knowing fully well
that the signature above the name of Leticia Austria is falsified and does not belong to
Leticia, acted and signed as a witness to the authenticity of the said signature, and all the
accused in the pursuit of their criminal design to defraud the national government conspiring
and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one another,
through Robert Soriano y Soriano, by virtue of and with the use of said falsified Time Book
and Payroll which was presented by accused Robert Soriano y Soriano, to the Office of the
71
Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, the entity then in custody of the funds, the amounts
of . . . ..., Philippine Currency, was released to the said Robert Soriano y Soriano,
purportedly as wages for the services of the said Leticia Austria y Serrano, as casual
employee of the Project Compassion's Office, when in truth and in fact she was already
separated from said office, and as such she did not work nor render services for the period
covered by Time Book and Payroll, nor did she sign her name in said Time Book and
Payroll, and thereafter, the said Robert Soriano y Soriano delivered the said amount to
accused Cecilia C. Barretto who misapplied and converted the aforesaid amount to her
personal use and benefit, thereby prejudicing and damaging the national government in the
amount of . . . ... , Philippine Currency, which offense was committed in relation to their
office.
The cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties. After the presentation of two
witnesses, the complainant and the paymaster, the prosecution asked for postponement.
The prosecution then filed a motion to discharge accused Esperanza Magadia to be utilized
as state witness. This motion was granted by the respondent court over petitioners'
objections. Trial was thereafter resumed, and the prosecution, after presenting Esperanza
Magadia as state witness, closed its case. The petitioners then took the witness stand, after
which the defense rested its case.
On June 11, 1981, the respondent court promulgated its decision convicting petitioners of
the crime charged in the five informations filed against them, sentencing Cecilia Barretto to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as maximum and to pay a fine of P3,500.00, for each of the aforementioned five (5)
cases, and to pay the costs; sentencing Robert Soriano to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500.00, for each of the aforementioned five (5)
cases, and to pay the costs; and ordering accused Cecilia Barretto and Robert Soriano,
jointly and severally, to pay the Provincial Government of Batangas the total sum of
P520.00, representing the amount of which the latter was defrauded in these cases.
The decision is now before this Court for review on appeal by certiorari.
In a resolution promulgated on November 20, 1984, we affirmed the judgment of conviction,
but modified the penalty meted out to petitioners to a total "not to exceed three-fold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed on each of them."
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, to which no objection was interposed by
the Solicitor General. We granted the motion, reconsidered our resolution of November 20,
1984, and gave due course to the petition.
Upon review of the evidence, we find that in arriving at its judgment convicting Barretto and
Soriano, the respondent court relied on the uncorroborated testimony of the
accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza Magadia. Section 9(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court requires, as one of the essential conditions for the discharge of an accused in order to
be utilized as state witness, that his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its
material points. The testimony of Magadia failed to meet this condition, and yet, the
respondent court believed her and utilized her testimony to convict the petitioners,
We have repeatedly cautioned trial courts in receiving and evaluating the testimony of a
discharged accused to subject such testimony to close scrutiny. In People vs.
Tabayoyong, we held that the testimony of a self- confessed accomplice or co-conspirator
imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without
corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or
participated in the commission of the crime; thus, it is required that the testimony be
substantially corroborated by other evidence in all its material points.
In the case at bar, the accused-turned-state witness Magadia admitted having falsified the
payroll, but tried to exculpate herself by shifting the responsibility to her co-accused. She
claimed that she merely acted upon the orders of Barretto who was her superior and whom
she could not refuse for fear that she would not renew her appointment. Magadia's
testimony on this point is not corroborated by any evidence. Not only that, there is evidence
in the records of this case showing that Barretto did not have the appointing power.
Barretto, as the person responsible for the scheme of falsifying the payrolls. The trial court
obviously failed to consider this.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are generally accorded great respect, and will
not be disturbed by the appellate court. However, in the case at bar, we are convinced that
the trial court overlooked material facts and circumstances in the appreciation of the
evidence which, properly considered, would affect the result of the case.
Judging from the acts done by Esperanza Magadia, she appears to be the most guilty. As
such, she has the strongest motive to point to petitioners as the guilty parties, in exchange
for her discharge and eventual acquittal. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that
petitioner Barretto, as head of the Project Compassion Office, would jeopardize her position
for the paltry amounts involved, totalling only P520.00.
Without the testimony of Magadia, the petitioners would certainly have been acquitted as
there would have been no evidence to link them to the commission of the offense. The
judgment of conviction was based on the sole testimony of the accused-turned-state
witness, Esperanza Magadia. Such testimony, coming from a polluted source, cannot be
the basis of a judgment of conviction, without being corroborated in its material points by
other evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court in Criminal Cases Nos. 1812 to 1816 is
REVERSED and set aside. Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED, and declared without
liability of whatever nature arising from the incidents of this case.
SO ORDERED.

Magadia likewise made it appear that Soriano received the salary pertaining to Austria and Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras
delivered the same to Barretto. This statement not only stands uncorroborated, but is pure and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
speculation on the part of Magadia. It is merely based on her observation that Austria used
to go inside the office of Barretto.

In giving credence to the testimony of Magadia, the respondent court capitalized on the fact
that her testimony at the trial was a mere repetition of her written declaration before the NBI
on February 8, 1979, or long before her discharge to become a state witness and therefore
"was not tailored to earn her discharge, but given in the interest of truth." What the court
failed to note in its decision was that Magadia gave two statements to the NBI. She gave an
earlier statement on January 30, 1979, in which she admitted having falsified the signatures
of Austria in the payrolls, but did not implicate Barretto. It is apparent that her later
statement was made in an effort to exculpate herself by pointing to her chief, Cecilia

72
G.R. No. L-55939 May 29, 1981
FLORITA SARDINIA-LINCO, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, FRANCISCO Ma.
GUERRERO, Senior State Counsel, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES *, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
GREGORIO BILOG, JR., AMADO MASICAMPO, FELINO CORTEZ, DOMINADOR
MATEO, TITO SANTOS, CONRADO TORRES, RICARDO MARAMOT and MEDARDO
HABAL, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Without prejudice to the filing of extended opinions, the Court has issued the following
resolutions:
I. On the cuestion previa of (a) whether the People of the Philippines should first be ordered
impleaded as petitioner (it having been noted that the petition at bar was filed only by
petitioners Linco and Guerrero in their official capacities as Assistant Provincial Fiscal and
Senior State Counsel, respectively, while the real party in interest is the People); and (b)
whether the Solicitor General on behalf of the People should be required to submit his
comment and position on the issues raised before the case can be finally acted upon and
decided, no majority could be reached with five Justices, namely, Barredo, Aquino,
Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., first, voting against such impleading of the People
and requiring of the Solicitor General's comment and three Justices, namely, Teehankee,
Makasiar, and Herrera, JJ., voting for such impleading and comment of the People as an
indispensable party and Chief Justice Fernando voting for such impleading without
comment. The Court, consequently, voted unanimously to ORDER that the People of the
Philippines be deemed impleaded as petitioner but to forego any comment on the part of the
Solicitor General.
II. On the merits of the petition the Court
(a) Resolved, by unanimous vote, to SET ASIDE respondent judge's questioned Order of
January 12, 1981 (Annex "FF" of the petition) giving the parties "thirty (30) days from receipt
of copy of (his) resolution on the admission of rebuttal evidence within which to submit their
simultaneous memoranda. Thereafter, with or without such memoranda, this case shall be
deemed submitted for decision" and to ORDER the reopening of the case pending before
respondent judge for further reception of the People's rebuttal evidence, giving the People a
73
period of thirty (30) days from the date first set for continuation of hearing within which to do
so;
(b) Resolved, by unanimous vote, to SET ASIDE respondent judge's questioned Order of
January 7, 1981 (Annex "EE" of the petition) finding petitioners Linco and Guerrero, "guilty
of contempt of (his) court" and sentencing them "to pay a fine of P100.00 each with warning
that "repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;" and
(c) Resolved, for lack of the necessary votes, to DENY the petition to set aside respondent
judge's Orders of December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981 (Annexes "W" and "DD" of the
petition) denying the motion for his inhibition and disqualification, with five Justices, namely,
Barredo, Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., voting against the petition for
disqualification and Chief Justice Fernando and Teehankee, Makasiar and
Herrera, JJ. voting for respondent judge's disqualification.
Justices Teehankee and Fernandez filed their respective memoranda-opinions on the
issues involved, which were taken into consideration in the Court's deliberations, as follows:
Justice Teehankee's memo-opinion
Antecedents: In Administrative Matter No. 4453-CFI, the Court's majority through its
resolution of December 28, 1979 upheld the order of Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda
denying the motion of Augusto Syjuco, Jr. for inhibition from further hearing the anti-graft
case against former Land Registration Commissioner Gregorio Bilog, Jr., et al., docketed as
Criminal Case No. 27743 of the Court of First Instance, Pasig, Rizal. Chief Justice
Fernando, Justice Melencio-Herrera and I dissented and voted to grant the Motion for
inhibition for the reasons stated in the Resolution, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex "A" for ready reference and for a full statement of the antecedents.
Chief Justice Fernando's vote is herewith reproduced for the Court's consideration: 'Chief
Justice Fernando voted to grant such motion consistently with the principle he has followed
invariably in a number of opinions penned by him that to avoid any suspicion as to the
absence of that desirable frame of mind expected of a judge, namely the cold neutrality of
an impartial arbiter, and considering the incidents that show the apparent lack of mutual
goodwill between petitioner Syjuco and respondent Judge, the latter's apparent willingness
to leave the disposition of the matter to the Court gives more than ample ground for his
inhibition and the reraffling of the case.
On my part, I urged the members of the Court to consider that under our broken line of
doctrinal jurisprudence, elementary due process which entitles every litigant to the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge demand s the inhibition of the judge. Where there
exist mutual mistrust, suspicion and hostility between the complainant and the judge, with
the complainant charging in open hearing before this Court that the judge offered him for
sale a land suspected of being covered by a void title and with the judge likewise charging
the complainant in open hearing with having hallucinations and having tried to bribe and
corrupt him, and acknowledging complainant's fear that 'the accused will be acquitted in my
court,' the judge should withdraw from the case. He has passed the buck to us and we must
tell him so.
Likewise, let it be recalled that the record before us shows that there is a strained
relationship between Syjuco and Judge Pineda and more, mutual hostility, mistrust and
prejudice, with Syjuco expressing open mistrust of the judge who offered him for sale a land
suspected of being covered by wrongfully issued titles and the judge openly charging
Syjuco of having hallucinations and trying to bribe him, and asserting that Syjuco "is full of
fear and suspicion in his mind" and fears that "the accused will finally be acquitted in my
court . . . Because he could not corrupt me, that is how he is hallucinating before this
Honorable Tribunal.' This makes it imperative for this Court to heed Judge Pineda's request
for guidance in the dispositive part of his order (stating that he is "amenable to whatever this
Honorable Supreme Court may decide on the matter") and accordingly, to declare that it is
in the best interests of justice, in accordance with our settled doctrines and jurisprudence,
that the case below be transferred and re-raffled among the other branches of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.
The land suspected of being covered by a void title therein referred to and purportedly
belonging to respondent judge's aunt (see transcript of hearing reproduced on pages 15 to
17 hereof) has now definitively and finally held by this Court to be covered by a fake claim
and title in Director of Lands vs. CA, L-45168, Resolution of September 25, 1979 and
Decision of January 27, 1981.
The present case. — At any rate, as a consequence of the attached Resolution, Judge
Pineda continued the trial and hearing of the case. But according to the petition, Judge
Pineda continued to show undue interest and partiality in the trial of the case, obviously
favoring the accused, which prompted the government prosecutors, Linco and Guerrero, to
file on August 25, 1980 before the respondent judge a motion for his disqualification and/or
inhibition of respondent judge.
At the hearing of August 27, 1980, the motion was ordered stricken off the record on the
flimsy ground that it was mistakenly captioned" Office of the Provincial Fiscal" instead of
"Court of First Instance." The next day, or on August 28, 1980, petitioners refiled their
Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition of respondent judge, this time properly
captioned.
74
Respondent Judge denied the motion for inhibition and continued with the trial of the case.
What precipitated the filing of this petition is, while the prosecution was still in the process of
presenting rebuttal evidence, respondent judge terminated the case and verbally ordered
petitioner Linco to submit memorandum on the case within ten (10) days although the
verbal order was modified in respondent judge's written order of January 12, 1981 by
requiring petitioners to submit their formal offer of rebuttal evidence within ten (10) days and
to submit their memorandum within thirty (30) days. Petitioners allege that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously closing the
case without allowing the State, represented by the herein petitioners, to finish or complete
its rebuttal evidence, a matter which, besides being contrary to law is an obvious display of
bias, hostility, and partiality. Petitioners pointed out that respondent judge committed error
of law and gravely abused his discretion in compelling petitioner Guerrero to be placed on
the witness stand and cross-examined in the hearing of their motion for inhibition and
finding them in contempt while denying their motion to hold counsel for accused Bilog in
contempt of court. They likewise reiterated their previous stand that respondent judge
committed error of law and grave abuse of discretion in refusing to inhibit himself from trying
the criminal case.
1. Petitioners allege that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to inhibit himself from trying Criminal Case No. 27743 against the private respondents.
In view of the antecedents clearly demonstrating the antagonism between the complainant
and respondent judge (Adm. Matter No. 4453 CFI) or at the very least, on the basis of the
evident lack of faith on the part of the complainant and prosecution with respect to the ability
of the respondent judge to dispense justice without bias or partiality, the respondent judge
should have voluntarily inhibited himself if only to restore the confidence of the complainant
and prosecution in particular and the public in general in the soundness of our judicial
system and the integrity and probity of those who sit in the bench.
Again, in view of the verbal clashes between the prosecution and the respondent judge and
the charges of partiality levelled by the prosecution, considering that 'however upright the
judge, and however free from the slightest inclination to do justice, there is peril of his
unconscious bias or prejudice' (Del Castillo vs. Javelona, 6 SCRA 146 cited in Ignacio vs.
Villaluz, 90 SCRA 16) engendered by the expressed antagonism or at the very least, a
demonstration of lack of confidence on the part of both the prosecution and its complaining
witness. Thus, in Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, We held that:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of
all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a
case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is
made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of
mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on
the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him
by a suitor or his counsel is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of
other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind
to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good
grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his
decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from
sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to
be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
Judges should not only be impartial, but should also appear impartial. (Fernandez vs.
Presbitero, 79 SCRA 61.) While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they
can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality (lbid). It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the
absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of
his being fair and just (Mateo Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).
It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 2 SCRA 249, Villapando vs. Quitain, 75 SCRA
24).
In Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124, We held that in the event that a judge may be unable to
discern for himself his inability to meet the test of the cold neutrality required of in this Court
has seen to it that he should disqualify himself.
2. While on its face, the obvious attempt of the respondent judge to terminate the
proceedings with apparent speed and dispatch should merit our approval and
commendation, his failure to accord the same consideration to other cases pending before
his sala including cases involving detention prisoners, must necessarily give rise to doubts
as to his reasons for pursuing this particular case with a vigor unknown in his sala. Where
the deportment of a judge leaves much to be desired, he should be disqualified. (Villapando
vs. Quitain, supra.)
75
3. The refusal of respondent judge to grant the prosecution ample opportunity to complete
its rebuttal evidence.
In the first place, postponements are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing
justice, and when substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not, manifest, it
is sound judicial discretion to allow them. (Rexwell Corporation vs. Canlas, 3 SCRA 875.) In
considering motions of postponement of trials or for new trials, two circumstances should be
taken into account by the court, namely (1) the merits of the case of the movant, and (2) the
reasonableness of the postponement or new trials (De Cases vs. Peyer 5 SCRA 1165;
Udan vs. Amon 23 SCRA 837).
In the second place, the right to speedy trial is not violated by granting a continuance on the
ground of the absence of material witnesses (Rexwell Corporation vs. Canlas, supra).
In the third place, there will have been no substantial injury or prejudice upon the accused
by a delay of one or two months considering that all the accused are out on bail. The
interests of justice and fair play will better be served if greater freedom and latitude is
allowed the parties to present, for the consideration and appreciation of the court, all their
evidence.
In any event, the State is likewise entitled to due process in criminal cases, thus We held in
the case of People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 and the later case of Silvestre vs. Military
Commission No. 21, S2 SCRA 10, that:
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the
opportunity to present its evidence in support of the Court has always accorded this right to
the prosecution here the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court
action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information
deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its
day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process,
and, therefore, null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite,
that is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of
double jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely
and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or
acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State
its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to
prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be
prejudiced thereby.
4. Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
compelling Fiscal Guerrero to take the witness stand and be cross-examined on his motion
for inhibition. Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure to be
followed in objecting to the competency of the judge in hearing a case, which must be
substantially followed (Joaquin vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 281). Objection to the competency of
the judge should be filed with him in writing and the judge shall determine his qualification
(Government of Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abelia, 49 Phil. 374) and thereupon proceed
with the trial or to withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question
of his disqualification. The judge is not allowed by the rules to receive evidence on the
motion for inhibition. Though not necessarily illegal or improper, it is not a usual procedure
in the conduct of trial to place a prosecutor on the witness stand and put pressure on the
prosecution which might be construed as indicative of personal bias or interest.
5. The hostility of respondent judge against petitioners is bolstered by the fact that, in his
order of January 7, 1981, he declared petitioners in contempt of court and fined P100.00
each because of alleged false manifestations made before the court.
It appears that petitioners were ordered by the respondent judge to submit to the court the
names of their rebuttal witnesses and the nature of their testimony. In their manifestation of
August 18, 1980, they refused on the ground that they did not want to divulge the names of
their witnesses because of their fear that the witnesses, who are employees of the Land
Registration Commission might be influenced by their former superiors, the accused. They
cited Acting land Registration Commissioner Federico B. Alfonso, Jr. who cautioned them to
exercise restraint and reminded them that the accused are capable of intimidating
witnesses.
Based on a letter of Acting Commissioner Alfonso, respondent judge in his January 7, 1981
Order (Annex 'EE') declared petitioners guilty of contempt of court for allegedly making
"false imputations as found by (his) court, thereby obstructing, delaying and fomenting
distrust "in the administration of justice." In fact, respondent judge plainly misinterpreted the
letter of Acting Commissioner Alfonso as a complete denial of the statement attributed to
him. Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that in his typewritten letter, Acting
Commissioner Alfonso added in his own handwriting the statement, "I do not pass judgment
on the capability or lack of capability of accused to intimidate witnesses" which is not a
denial that he did express the fear to the petitioners. "The act of respondent judge declaring
petitioners-prosecutors guilty of reprehensible and contemptuous . . . . gross misconduct' on
a contentious and insignificant matter manifests clear partiality and hostility against the
prosecution that require his disqualification, considering the antecedents as set forth above
and in Annex "A" hereof.
The Court's settled and uniform jurisprudence on the litigations right to the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge as an essential part of due process demand such disqualification - until
and unless the Court is to overthrow its long line of decisions which form part of the law of
the land.
76
The only drawback cited that it is better that the judge who tried the case, hand down the
decision, must yield to the law of the land. And it is refuted by the numerous cases decided
correctly by judges other than those who tried the same and saw and heard the witnesses,
more so, where as in this case, the main evidence consists of documentary evidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court should set aside the questioned orders and specifically
1. Order there opening of the case for further reception of the State's rebuttal evidence,
giving them a period of 90 days to do so, in order to afford them the opportunity to locate
missing witnesses;
2. Set aside the contempt order and lit the fine of P100.00 imposed upon each of
petitioners-prosecutors; and
3. Order the inhibition of respondent judge and the re-raffle of the case among the other
branches of the Rizal court of first instance upon due notice to and in the presence of the
parties and/or their counsels.
Annex "A" of justice Teehankee's memo-opinion
December 18, 1979
Administrative Matter No. 4453-CFI-Re: Order of Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, CFI,
Pasig, Branch XXI. – The Court voted to sustain the order of Executive Judge Gregorio G.
Pineda, denying for lack of merit the motion of Augusto Syjuco, Jr. for the inhibition of
Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda from further hearing Criminal Case No. 27743 entitled
"People vs. Gregorio Bilog, Jr., et al." Chief Justice Fernando and Justices Teehankee and
Melencio-Herrera voted to grant the motion for inhibition. Justices Felix V. Makasiar and
Felix Q. Antonio reserved their votes. Chief Justice Fernando voted to grant such motion
consistently with the principle he has followed invariably in a number of opinions penned by
him that to avoid any suspicion as to the absence of that desirable frame of mind expected
of a judge, namely, the cold neutrality of an impartial arbiter, and considering the incidents
that show the apparent lack of mutual goodwill between petitioner Syjuco and respondent
Judge, the latter's apparent willingness to leave the disposition of the matter to the Court
gives more than ample ground for his inhibition and the reraffing of the case. Justice
Teehankee, dissenting, voted to (a) direct the implementation by the Ministry of Justice the
President's order of January 12, 1979 to the case below to the sandiganbayan or to secure
a revocation of the same fifteen (15) days from notice hereof; and (b) in the event that
revocation is obtained within the said fifteen-day period, to that the case below be
transferred and re-raffled among other branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
excluding XXI presided by Judge Pineda and the Circuit Criminal Court l Rizal) upon due
notice to in the presence of the parties, complainant Syjuco, and/or their respective
counsels. Justice Melencio-Herrera concurred with the above dissent. Justice Teehankee's
separate opinion follows:
I dissent from the majority's resolution upholding Judge Gregorio C Pineda's Order denying
the motion for his inhibition in the anti- graft case pending in his court, for the following
reasons;
I. The President's January 12, 1979 direct order to the Ministry of Justice to transfer the
case to the Sandiganbayan should be implemented by said ministry It s pro tanto a
withdrawal of the general instruction that only all cases where there has been no
arrangement be so transferred, and its validity has not been challenged; and
II. Prescinding from the above, under our unbroken line of doctrinal jurisprudence,
elementary due process which entitles every litigant to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge demands the inhibition of the judge. Where there exist mutual mistrust, suspicion and
hostility between the complainant and the judge, with the complainant charging in open
hearing before this Court that the judge offered him for sale a land suspected of being
covered by a void title and with the judge likewise charging the complainant in open
hearing with having hallucinations and having tried to bribe and corrupt him, and
acknowledging complainant's fear that "the accused will be acquitted in my court," the judge
should withdraw from the case. He has passed the buck to us and we must tell him so.
This incident started on August 30, 1978 when three co-accused of former LRC
Commissioner Gregorio Bilog, Jr., namely, Amado Y. Masicampo, Dominador Mateo and
Conrado Torres, in a pending criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before Judge Onofre Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal who had
already held eight months of extensive hearings, had filed ex parte on their own behalf an
obviously pre- prepared petition of five (5) short paragraphs, stating that Judge Villaluz had
filed a leave of absence from August 20, 1978 to September 21, 1978 (the specific dates
were just fined in ink on the blank spaces provided in the petition, indicating that the
accused who were at-large already had a prepared petition for re- raffle ready for them
to come out of hiding and to file the same upon Judge Villaluz' going on leave of absence),
that they had not yet been arraigned, that their bail bonds had not been approved due to
Judge Villaluz' absence and they were liable to be arrested any time and that they invoked
their right to speedy trial, and prayed that the case be referred to the Executive Judge of the
CFI of Rizal for re-raffle.
The petition was included in the September 5, 1978 agenda of the Court en banc (with a
heavy load of 108 items), at which time there were only sixteen days left yet of Judge
Villaluz' leave of absence. Upon recommendation of the Court's then executive officer, now
77
deputy court administrator Arturo B. Buena (who was apparently misled by the
misrepresentations and was unaware that the reason for the movants' non-arraignment was
that they had gone into hiding and had evaded service of the warrants of arrest long issued
against them), the Court en banc in its session of September 5 granted the petition without
following the usual practice of requiring the prosecution's comment and thus the case was
re-raffled and redocketed as Criminal Case No. 27743 of the Pasig CFI presided by
Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda.
Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., as the authorized representative of the victimized party in the case,
complained about the transfer of the case from the circuit criminal court to the court of first
instance, and the President on January 12, 1979 in a directive to the Ministry of Justice
"ordered the transfer of all cases of corruption committed by public officials to the
Sandiganbayan. This shall include the case against former Com. Bilog."
Upon request of Deputy Minister of Justice Catalino Macaraig, Jr. in a letter dated January
30, 1979, the Court set for hearing and heard on April 3, 1979 Syjuco's complaint. In his
letter of March 20, 1979 filed in compliance with the Court's resolution of February 6, 1979,
Syjuco prayed for the return of the case to the circuit criminal court for the continuation of
trial or in the alternative for the transfer thereof to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the
President's order.
Stated briefly and in summary, the following were brought to light at the hearing of April 3,
1979:
— The Ministry of Justice has nothing to do with the transfer of cases from one branch to
another which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
— Syjuco expressed his "full and unqualified belief in the wisdom and integrity of the
Supreme Court" and averred that through their misrepresentations the three above-named
co-accused petitioners succeeded in misleading this Court into issuing its resolution of
September 5, granting the petition for the transfer of the case from the circuit criminal court
to the court of first instance.
— Syjuco expressed great suspicion as to the re-raffling of the case and its falling in the
sala of Judge Pineda, so much so that some Justices suggested that his remedy was to file
a motion for the inhibition of Judge Pineda and to state the reasons as he did in open court
why he did not have faith in the court of Judge Pineda" and "doubted his fairness," although
expressing that he had "enough ground for my fear but not enough for his disqualification."
(T.s.n., pp. 44-47).
— In answer to a question of Mr. Justice De Castro, Syjuco explained his misgivings as to
the whitewashing of the case against Bilog in the Ministry of Justice in this wise: Because of
Mr. Bilog's boast in the past that he is well covered in the Department of Justice, in the
same way that he has likewise boasted that in matters involving the Supreme Court his wife
is here. I have this statement dated January 23, 1978 from Mr. Gerardo Pios while admitting
that in law, suspicion is not evidence, although stating that "I say categorically that I can
substantiate to the President my fears and my belief. But I also likewise admit that I cannot
substantiate it before the courts." (T.s.n., pp. 51, 54).
— The mutual suspicion, mistrust and hostility between Syjuco and Judge Pineda may best
be appreciated from the transcript of the last part of the hearing wherein both of them
express their respective feelings against each other (with Judge Pineda charging in open
court that Syjuco, through his former counsel, had tried to bribe or corrupt him), as follows:
Justice Barredo [to Mr. Syjuco];
Anyway, when you say that you are confident that you can substantiate your charges before
the President while you cannot substantiate it before the Court, you mean to say that you
cannot substantiate it before us because you don't have the facts while the President will
agree with you even if you don't have the facts?
Mr. Syjuco:
No, Your Honor, because a court of law operates on the principle that unless a man is
proven guilty, he is considered innocent, I feel that the leadership of this country on the
other hand follows a different criterion, that criterion being that when there is any
question at all as to the person's integrity, he would not otherwise qualify for public office,
the standard being that he should be like Caesar's wife.
One last statement, Your Honor. — I do not believe that where the matter presently rests,
i.e., in the sala of Judge Pineda, the matter would get a fair hearing. Several months ago
I received an offer from Judge Pineda for the sale of a property. This was before this case
started. The basis of that offer was a court order that was expected to come out shortly for
the titling of a property. If that property would be titled, it would be offered to me. Again, I
wish to categorically point out that this in itself does not discredit the good Judge, but this is
one of the matter that create these fears in my mind and in my heart.
Justice Teehankee:
All right the time is getting late. If Judge Pineda wishes to make a response to that, we will
listen to him, to round this up.
78
Judge Pineda:
I would just like to point out that what Mr. Syjuco has just stated is not true. It was through
his lawyer, Fiscal Bernabe now, when they were investigating the first case they filed with
the CCC that I told Fiscal Bernabe that I have an aunt who has a land in that place. In the
event that a final decision will be in her favor, I think she would offer it to him. That's all. I did
not tell him that I have a land. Now, one reason for the fear of Mr. Syjuco that
the accused will finally be acquitted in my court is that his lawyer, my former assistant f in
Pasay, approached me while this case was being tried. Because he could not corrupt me,
that is how he is hallucinating before this Honorable Tribunal.
Justice Teehankee:
Are you saying that this former lawyer tried to corrupt you?
Judge Pineda:
It was said in a mild manner. He said that Mr. Syjuco has much money. But I said, I don't
give a damn. This is a case which I am going to try as I receive the evidence. 'That is the
reason why Mr. Syjuco now is full of far and suspicion in his mind.
Justice Teehankee:
All right, case submitted. (T.s.n., pp. 54-56, emphasis supplied).
Apparently in compliance with the suggestions made at the hearing, Syjuco did file in the
case below a motion for the inhibition of Judge Pineda from the case and on June 1, 1979,
Judge Pineda forwarded to this Court a copy f his order of May 30, 1979 declaring the
motion for inhibition to be "utterly groundless and without just and legal justification." In his
said order judge Pineda states that
Candor compels the admission that at first this Presiding Judge would have given in to the
temptation of inhibiting himself from trying this case if only to make manifest his
disinterestedness. On further reflection, so as not to frustrate the ends of justice, he ordered
a hearing on this motion to determine whether or not the allegations and the evidence
pressed meet the requirements of the Constitution and statutory commands of impartiality
(Art. IV, Section 19, Constitution of the Philippines; Rule 137, Rules of Court) and
jurisprudence.
After hearing, this Presiding Judge finds the Petitioner's motion for inhibition utterly charge of this case, and she said that she is about to close her evidence. So transfer of this
groundless and without just and legal justification such that to inhibit himself would, in case at this time to the Sandiganbayan might also raise issues of double jeopardy, perhaps.
consequence, amount to an abandonment of a sworn duty to administer speedy, fair and
impartial justice. ... Chief Justice Castro:

Without, however, denying the motion for his inhibition, Judge Pineda made the following Or propriety, honesty and so on.
disposition of the motion in the last paragraph of his order: (W)hile it is evident that the
motion for inhibition is utterly groundless, this Presiding Judge is, however, amenable to Justice Teehankee:
whatever the Honorable Supreme Court may decide on this matter." (Syjuco's counsel in
his comment on the order surmised correctly that the same should have been docketed
under AM 961-CC [wherein the petition of the three above-named co-accused Masicampo, And the said evidence before the CFI cannot be passed over to the Sandiganbayan The
et al., for the transfer and re-raffle of the case was granted and wherein some Justices had president has made an order to transfer all the cases involving corruption committed by
suggested precisely that Syjuco file the motion for inhibition] but peculiarly enough the order public officials to the Sandiganbayan.
of Judge Pineda was given another docket number as shown in the above title hereof.)
Deputy Minister Macaraig:
I. Before proceeding to deal with the question of Judge Pineda's inhibition, we should deal
with Syjuco's alternative prayer that the criminal case below be transferred to the We have done that in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, where there had been no
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive jurisdiction over anti-graft cases pursuant to the arraignment yet, as provided for by PD 1607.
President's directive of January 12, 1979.
Justice Makasiar:
At the April 3, 1979 hearing, it was brought out that the President's order to transfer the
case to the Sandiganbayan has not been implemented as follows: Did you bring that to the attention of the President?

Justice Teehankee: Deputy Minister Macaraig:

I just would like to ask Deputy Minister Macaraig whether this case has been transferred to Yes, I told Secretary Clave about that difficulty.
the Sandiganbayan?
Justice Makasiar:
Deputy Minister Macaraig:
Do you know if Secretary has brought that to the attention of the President?
No, Your Honor. The trial before Judge Pineda I understand, is proceeding.
Deputy Minister Macaraig
Justice Teehankee:
I don't know, Your Honor.
What about the directive of the President?
Justice Makasiar:
Deputy Minister Macaraig:
There might be need to amend the decree. (T.s.n. pp. 36-37).
The Sandiganbayan decree itself provides that only cases where there has been no
arraignment can be transferred to the Sandiganbayan. I was just talking t the Fiscal in
79
There appears to be no valid reason for not implementing the President's order to transfer
the case to the Sandiganbayan in the sane manner that this our Court had ordered in its
September 5 resolution the transfer of he very same case from the Circuit Criminal Court t
the Court of First Instance. The Sandiganbayan is composed of a division of at least three
judges which try aid hear the case and requires the affirmative vote of two judges in a
division for the promulgation of a judgment. The accused is favored, rather than prejudiced
or jeopardized b tie transfer of case from a single-judge court (the Court of First instance) to
a collegiate court (the Sandiganbayan).
The President's order to transfer the case to the Sandiganbayan which under the Court
majority ruling in Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (1975) has the force of the law of the
land under Art. XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution, is binding on all government
ministries, bureaus and offices, particularly the Ministry of Justice to which it was specifically
issued. It is pro tanto a withdrawal of the general instruction that only all cases where there
has been no arraignment be so transferred. Its validity has not been challenged and it must,
therefore, be implemented by the said Ministry of Justice, by having the prosecution so
move for its transfer (in the same manner it has done with previous transfers of cases from
the civil courts to the military tribunals). Needles to say, such implementation and transfer
would make the question of Judge Pineda's inhibition moot and academic.
II. Coming to the order of judge Pineda, assuming that the President's order to transfer the
case to the Sardiganbayan is not implemented, the record before us shows that there is a
strained relationship between Syjuco and Judge Pineda and more, mutual hostility;
mistrust and prejudice, with Syjuco expressing open mistrust of the judge who offered him
for sale a land suspected of being covered by wrongfully issued titles and the judge openly
charging Syjuco of having hallucinations and trying to bribe him, and asserting that Syjuco
"is full of fear and suspicion in his mind and fears that 'the accused will finally be acquitted in
my court . . . Because he could not corrupt me, that is how he is hallucinating before this
Honorable Tribunal." This makes it imperative for this Court to heed Judge Pineda's request
for guidance in the dispositive part of his order (stating that he is "amenable to whatever this
Honorable Supreme Court may decide on the matter") and accordingly, to declare that it is
in the best interests of justice, in accordance with our settled doctrines and jurisprudence,
that the case below be transferred and re-raffled among the other branches of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (excluding Judge Pineda's branch and the Circuit Criminal Court of
Rizal) upon due notice to and in the presence of the parties, including complainant Syjuco,
and/or their respective counsels.
We have said time and again that all suitors are 'entitled to nothing short of the cold
neutrality of an independent, wholly free, disinterested and impartial tribunal (Luque vs.
Kayanan, 29 SCRA 175-177).
80
In Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, we said that 'if after reflection, he (the judge) should
resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137,' and laid down the following appropriate
guidelines for judges to follow in the matter of their inhibition:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of
all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a
case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties,
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is
made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such
a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his
mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel is not altogether remote. He is a man,
subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and
caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel
is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved
therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent
the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should
resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis supplied).
Now Chief Justice Fernando has stressed that 'It is now beyond dispute that due process
cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as
found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on' equal footing. ln
the language of Justice Dizon: 'It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.' ... A judge then, to quote from the
latest decision in point, Geotina vs. Gonzales, penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be
at all times 'wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both
the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. (Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).
In Ignacio vs. Villaluz, L-37527-52, May 5, 1979, the Chief Justice again reiterated the
principle that "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence
of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being
fair and just." (lbid, 23.) It is traceable to Gutierrez vs. Santos (112 Phil 184), a 1961
decision, cited in the petition. As a matter of fact, in Umale five cases were relied upon in
support of the conclusion reached, starting from Del Castillo vs. Javelona (116 Phil 451
[1962]), likewise invoked by petitioner and referred to in the Comment, of the Solicitor
General. Such a doctrine has been consistently adhered to (Cf. Umale vs. Villaluz, L-237l0,
Sept. 10, 1969, 29 SCRA 688, and other cases cited), the latest case in point being Bautista
vs. Rebueno (L-46117, Feb. 22,1978, 81 SCRA 535)," remarking that 'it is difficult to
understand the reluctance of respondent judge to inhibit himself.'
Accordingly, I vote to (a) direct the implementation by the Ministry of Justice of the
President's order of January 12, 1979 to transfer the case below to the Sandiganbayan or to
secure a revocation on of the same within fifteen (15)days from notice hereof and(b)in the
event that such revocation is obtained within the said fifteen-day period to direct that the
case below be transferred and re-raffled among the other branches of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal t (excluding branch XXI presided by Judge Pinedas and the Circuit
Criminal Court of Rizal) upon due notice to and in the presence of the parties including
complaint Syjuro and/or their respective counsels.
Justice Fernandez meno-opinion
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction instituted by Florita Sardinia Linco and Francisco Ma. Guerrero, in their personal
ad official capacities as Assistant Fiscal of Rizal province and Senior State Counsel of the
Ministry of Justice, respectively, in representation of the state, seeking the following reliefs:
l. Seting aside ODERS of December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981 (Annexes "W" and "DD")
denying the motion to inhibit respondent Judge and the motion for the reconsideration
thereof and to order the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from proceeding wit Criminal
Case No. 27743; ordering the transfer of this case from he Court of First Instance of Rizal to
the Court of origin, the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal; ordering the reopening of the case o
accommodate presentation and completion of prosecution's evidence;
2. Setting aside the ORDER of December 9, 1980 (Annex "V") denying petitioners' motion
to withdraw or set aside the proceedings wherein petitioner GUERRERO was improperly
placed at the witness stand and to order the respondent judge to strike out said proceeding
from the records;
81
3. To set aside the ORDER, January 7, 1981 declaring petitioners in contempt of count and
sentencing them to pa a fine of P100 each; and to order Atty. EXEQUIEL CONSULTA in
contempt of court (Annex "EE");
4. Further praying for such other relief as they may he entitled in law and equity.
The petitioners contend that Judge Pineda committed the following errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELF PROM TRYING CRIMINAL CASE NO.
27743 AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION IN COMPELLING PETITIONER GUERRERO TO BE
CROSS-EXAMINED IN THE HEARING OF THE SUBJECT MOTION FOR INHIBITION.
III
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING MOTION TO HOLD ATTY. EXEQUIEL
CONSULTA IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DECLARING PETITIONERS IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' URGENT MOTION FOR
POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL ON JANUARY 12, 1981; FOR ORDERING TERMINATED
PROSECUTION'S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE; FOR GIVING PROSECUTION 10 DAYS
WITHIN WHICH TO SUBMIT FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE AND FOR
UNCONCIONABLY DECLARING THE CASE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION
THEREAFTER.
l. Respondent Judge did not commit any error of law nor grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to inhibit himself from trying Criminal Case No. 27743, there being no valid grounds
to warrant disqualification. Specific instances cited by the petitioners to prove that
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction are
not only unsupported by the records but are contrary to what appears therein. The issue of
"raffle" which was not raised in the lower court and, therefore, cannot be an issue in this
Petition, has already been decided by this Court in its resolution of December 18, 1979 in
AM No. 4453- CFI which sustained the Order of respondent Judge denying the motion of
Augusto Syjuco, Jr. to disqualify said judge on the ground, inter alia, that the raffle was
irregular.
2. Respondent Judge did not commit any error nor grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
cross-examination of petitioner Guerrero at the hearing of subject motion for inhibition. It
appears that said motion for disqualification was set for hearing at the instance of the
petitioners (pp. 4-5 of said Motion for Disqualification); in the hearing of said motion on
September 19, 1980, petitioner Guerrero presented evidence in narrative form and at the
next hearing on October 1, 1980, submitted himself to cross- examination by the defense
counsel without objection through 102 pages of the transcript of stenographic notes. (Annex
"P", pet.). It was only at the next hearing of October 6, 1980, for the continuation of said
cross-examination that he objected; but there' is nothing in the record that respondent judge
threatened him with contempt. The petitioner Guerrero not only made manifestations as a
prosecutor but actually testified as a witness. (Annex "P", petition). Hence, his
cross-examination by defense counsels for the oppositors was necessary and proper.
3. Respondent Judge did not err in declaring petitioners in contempt of court and in denying
the motion to hold Atty. Exequiel Consulta in contempt of court. Two motions for contempt
were filed against the petitioners: (a) one was filed by Atty. Consulta, counsel for accused
Bilog for having falsely represented in court that 'Acting Commissioner of Land Registration
Federico B. Alfonso, Jr. had expressed the belief that the accused Gregorio Bilog, Jr. is
capable of intimidating witnesses. Acting Commissioner Alfonso both in open court and in
his letter dated August 22, 1980 categorically denied the imputations attributed to him; (b)
the other motion was filed by accused Felino Cortez on the ground that they filed a Motion
for Disqualification dated August 28, 1980, of the respondent judge, alleging imputations of
partiality and bias on the part of the respondent judge, which the court in the Order dated
January 17, 1981 (Annex 'EE', petition) found to be false. The petitioners filed a motion for
contempt against Atty. Consulta for alleged distortion of the meaning of their allegation in
their Manifestation of August 18, 1980, which does not refer to Gregorio Bilog, Jr. alone but
to the 'accused' and to Bilog's well entrenched friends at the Land Registration Commission,
as capable of intimidating witnesses. (Motion to Hold Atty. Consulta in Contempt of Court;
Annex N petition). Respondent judge rendered the Order dated January 7, 1981 (Annex
"EE", Id.), finding petitioners guilty of contempt of court, sentencing each of them to pay a
fine of P100.00 with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
severely. The motion to hold Atty. Consulta in contempt was denied for lack of merit.
Accordingly to respondent judge, it is immaterial whether the imputation refers to Bilog
alone or to all the accused (including Bilog), the issue being the falsity of the prosecutors'
claim that Acting LRC Commissioner made such imputation.
82
4. Respondent Judge did not err in denying petitioners' urgent motion for postponement of
trial on January 12, 1981; for ordering terminated prosecution's rebuttal evidence for giving
prosecution 10 days within which to submit formal offer of evidence and for declaring the
case submitted for decision. On January 12, 1981, at the scheduled hearing, petitioner
Linco again asked for postponement on the ground that the last witness she was going to
present could not be located because lie bad resigned from the LRC and on the further
ground that they intended to appeal certain orders of the respondent Judge. Counsel for
Bilog vigorously objected to the motion for postponement and asked that since the
prosecution had no witness the rebuttal evidence be deemed terminated and the case
submitted for decision, which was granted, Undoubtedly trial courts have the power to
regulate the conduct of trials and direct their course; and may thus limit the number of
witnesses when in its opinion further testimony on the point would be merely cumulative.
Finally if, as petitioner Linco manifested in open court, that witness Ernesto del Rosario who
had already testified for the prosecution, was their last witness (TSN of Jan. 12, 1981
attached as Annex '16', Answer of Bilog), the Order terminating their rebuttal evidence could
not have prejudiced the prejudiced the prosecution's case, since the defense did not ask for
the striking out of the testimony of that witness for his failure to appear for additional
cross-examination.
Hence, I vote to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, as first above stated, the Court has ordered and rendered judgment (1)
that the People of the Philippines be deemed impleaded as petitioner; (2) that respondent
judge Order of January 12, 1961 (Annex "FF" of the petition) the case submitted for decision
upon the filing of memoranda be set aside and that the pending criminal case against
private respondents be reopened for further reception of the People's rebuttal evidence, for
which purpose the People are given a period of thirty (30) days counted from the date first
set for the purpose; and (3) that respondent judge's Order of January 7, 1981 (Annex "EE"
of the petition) sentencing petitioners Linco and Guerrero to a fine of P100.00 each for
contempt of court be set aside. For lack of necessary votes, as first above stated, the
petition to set aside respondent judge's Orders of December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981
(Annexes "W" and "DD" of the petition) denying the motion for his inhibition and
disqualification is denied.
Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Concepcion Jr., and Fernandez, JJ., are on leave.
83
G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF SILAY, ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO, JR. y
SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y
MAGALONA, respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
Ramirez and Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for petitioner.
Hilado, Hagad & Hilado as private prosecutors.
Benjamin Z. Yelo, Sr. for private respondent Romeo Millan.
Ciceron Severino and Emeterio Molato for other private respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review jointly filed by the City Fiscal of Silay City, Marcelino M. Paviera,
and the Law Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as private prosecutors, praying
that an order of the City Court of Silay dated December 19, 1975, issued by Judge
Reynaldo M. Alon, dismissing Criminal Case No. 7124-C entitled "People vs. Ernesto de la
Paz, et al." be set aside and that respondent court be directed to continue with the trial of
the aforementioned case. *
In compliance with Our Resolution of July 21, J976, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its comment on October 13, 1974, joining the Petitioner's prayer that the order of
respondent court of December 19, 1975, be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y
Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with
"falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code, alleged to have been committed as follows.
That sometime on January 4, 1974, at Hawaiian-Philippine Company, Silay City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Ernesto de la Paz, overseer
of Hda. Malisbog belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, and the other three accused, scalers
of Hawaiian-Philippine Company, with intent of gain and to cause damage by conniving,
cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane weight report card or "tarjeta", a private document
showing the weight of sugarcane belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, particularly those
loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686, 1743 and 1022 by increasing the total actual weight of
84
22.005 tons to 27.160 tons for said three cane cars, thereby causing damage to the central
and other cane planters of about 8.68 piculs of sugar valued in the total amount of P618.19,
to the damage and prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other sugarcane planters adhered
thereto in the aforestated amount of P618.19.
IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 2, ART. 172, R.P.C. (p. 14, rollo) Evidence was
presented by the prosecution showing that:
On January 4, 1974, accused Pacifico Senecio, Jr. Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who
were then scalers on duty that day at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars
Nos. 1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes belonging to Deogracias de la Paz. The
weight of the sugar canes were reflected on the weight report cards (H.P. Co. Lab. Form No.
1) or "tarjetas" showing that for car No. 1743 — 8.920 tons (Exhibit "B-1"), for Car No. 1686
— 8.970 tons (Exhibit "C-1") for car No. 1022 — 8.875 tons or a total weight of 26.765 tons.
However, they did not submit said "tarjetas" to the laboratory section, instead, they
substituted "tarjetas" showing a heavier weight for car No. 1743 — 10.515 tons (Exhibit "B"),
car No. 1686 — 10.525 tons (Exhibit "C") and car No. 1022 — 10.880 tons (Exhibit "D") with
a total of 27.160 tons or an additional of 5.155 tons. These were the "tarjetas" submitted to
the laboratory section. Exhibits "B-1", "C-1" and "D-1" were taken later by the prosecution
witness PC Sgt. Rogelio Sevilla from the wife of Pacifico Senecio, Jr. (pp. 15-16, rollo,
Order of December 19, 1975).
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents
moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was
not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion,
respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de
oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above
do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. Reasoning out his order, Judge Alon
said:
To be convicted under paragraph 2, Article 172, an accused should have committed one of
the eight acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171, R.P.C. Is the act of substituting
the "tarjetas" with higher cane weight for the ones with lower cane weight fall under one of
the acts enumerated. After going over the acts of falsification one by one and trying to
correlate the act of the accused with each of them, the Court finds that the said act could not
possibly be placed under any of them. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of
one is the exclusion of the other. Following this maxim, we cannot just include the act of
substitution as among those acts enumerated under Article 171. And, under the rule of
statutory construction, penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused. This
Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the accused have not committed the act of
falsification with which they are charmed. Obviously, it follows that there could be no use of
falsified document since there is no falsified document.
The imputed acts of the accused in making the substitution, if true, is repugnant to the
human sense of right and wrong. But, however reprehensible the act may be, it is not
punishable unless there is a showing that there is a law which defines and penalizes it as a
crime. Unless there be a particular provision in the Penal Code or Special Law that
punishes the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by its
commission. (U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599)
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, the motion is hereby granted and the case dismissed with costs de oficio ... (pp.
17-18, rollo)
In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error
committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of
evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents
in double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable
inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having
been made with their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy, citing various
cases in support thereof. (pp. 58-59, rollo, Comment of the Solicitor General)
We disagree with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
that the plea of double jeopardy is not available in the instant situation.
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused;
however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.
Thus, in People vs. Acosta, L-23657, October 29, 1968, this Court dismissed an appeal
taken by the People against an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte dismissing a criminal case upon motion of the accused after the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution as such appeal if allowed would place the accused in double
jeopardy. There the accused was charged with estafa by obtaining from Pedro Miguel a ring
valued at P16,500.00 and issuing a check for $5,000.00 in Payment thereof which turned
out later to be counterfeit to the damage and prejudice of said Pedro Miguel in the
aforementioned amount of P16,500.00. After the presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the evidence
showed that the ring belonged to somebody else, Banang Jaramillo, and not to Pedro
85
Miguel as alleged in the information and that the element of damage was absent. This
motion was opposed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal but notwithstanding said opposition,
the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Pedro Miguel was a mere agent of the
true owner of the ring and therefore not the real offended party. The Assistant Provincial
Fiscal appealed to this Court, but the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the
appeal on the ground that it would place the accused in double jeopardy, and the Court
agreed with the Solicitor General, stating that it cannot be seriously questioned that the trial
court had grievously erred in his conclusion and application of the law, and in dismissing
outright the case; however, the error cannot now be remedied by an appeal because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. (per Eugenio Angeles, J., 25 SCRA 823,826)
In the earlier case of Catilo vs. Hon. Abaya, May 14, 1954, petitioner Catilo was charged
with murder before the Court of First Instance of Batangas presided by respondent Judge.
Petitioner was arraigned and after the prosecution had rested its case petitioner moved for
the dismissal of the charge for insufficiency of evidence. This motion was granted by the
Judge and his order was promulgated in open court to the accused. Later in the day, Judge
Abaya set aside his order of dismissal motu proprio and scheduled the case for continuation
of the trial on specific dates. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the defense counsel
but because respondent Judge failed to take action, the accused filed an original action for
certiorari with this Court. In granting relief to petitioner Catilo, the Court, through Justice
Marcelino R. Montemayor, held:
From whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal Annex "A", the only conclusion
possible is that it amounted to an acquittal. Whether said acquittal was due to some
"misrepresentation of facts" as stated in the order of reconsideration, which alleged
misrepresentation is vigorously denied by the defendant-petitioner, or to a misapprehension
of the law or of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the fact is that it was a valid
order or judgment of acquittal, and thereafter the respondent Judge himself advised the
accused in open court that he was a free man and could not again be prosecuted for the
same offense.
The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section 5, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of dismissal, does not
extend to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case;
and the power of a court to modify a judgment or set it aside before it has become final or an
appeal has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers to a
judgment of conviction and does not and cannot include a judgment of acquittal.
In conclusion, we hold that to continue the criminal case against the petitioner after he had
already been acquitted would be putting him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. ... (94 Phil. 1017)
The cases cited by the Acting Solicitor General are not applicable to the situation now
before Us because the facts are different. In Co Te Hue vs. Judge Encarnacion , 94 Phil.
258, the case was dismissed provisionally with the express consent of the accused. The
same occurred in People vs. Togle, 105 Phil. 126 there was a provisional dismissal upon
express request of the counsel for the accused, In Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, it was
the accused who asked for the dismissal of the case because the private prosecutor was
not in court to present the prosecution's evidence and the Municipal Court of the City of
Iloilo dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the charge against the
accused. In People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672, the dismissal was made at the instance of
the accused because the prosecution was also not ready with its evidence. The case
of People vs. Belosillo, 9 SCRA 836, is not applicable either, because the order of dismissal
of the Information was made before arraignment, hence, the accused was not yet placed in
jeopardy of punishment for the offense charged.
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against
them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at
the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1)
a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the
complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the
accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a
plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was
erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not
charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation
was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in
certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the
company. The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of
falsification of a private document, the accused having made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties-
Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the
offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice
resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil,
1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.
86
In Nieto, the background of the case is as follows: On September 21, 1956, an Information
for homicide was filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against Gloria Nieto
who, upon arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but -notwithstanding that plea, the trial
judge acquitted her on the Page 254 ground that although the accused was a minor "over 9
and under 15 years old" the Information failed to allege that she acted with discernment.
Thereafter the prosecution filed another Information for the same offense stating therein
that the accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years" and alleging in express
terms that she acted with discernment. The defense filed a motion to quash this second
Information on grounds of double jeopardy, and the trial court already presided by another
Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this Court, granted the motion. The
prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In its Decision, the Court dismissed the
appeal and sustained the order of then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a
mistaken view taken by the trial judge who acquitted the accused Gloria Nieto despite her
plea of guilty there was a miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted and which leaves
the Court no choice bat to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for reasons of
double jeopardy.
We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the precipitate action taken by Judge Alon
in dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at that stage of the trial. A
thorough and searching study of the law, the allegations in the Information, and the
evidence adduced plus a more circumspect and reflective exercise of judgment, would have
prevented a failure of justice in the instant case. We exhort Judge Alon to take into serious
consideration what We have stated so as to avoid another miscarriage of justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of the People.
Without pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be entered in the personal file
of Judge Reynaldo Alon.
So Ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Concepcion, and Martin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-1553 October 25, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
Manuel A. Concordia for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Antonio A. Torres, for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant, Francisco
Concepcion, guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P10,000 and the costs. The appellant was found guilty of treason on three counts, namely:
The apprehension on December 7, 1944, in Cebu City, by the appellant (accompanied by
Japanese) of Basilio Severino. (Count 3.) The apprehension on December 3, 1944, in Cebu
City, by the appellant (accompanied by Japanese and Pablo Labra and Maximo Bate) of
Clemente Chica. (Count 5.) The apprehension on January 9, 1944, in Cebu City, by
appellant (accompanied by Manuel Cocon and a Japanese) of Gavino Moras. The evidence
for the prosecution shows that the three individuals were apprehended by the appellant or
at his instigation, due to their guerrilla connections.
The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant as having been committed by the lower
court has reference to its action in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of
appellant's Filipino citizenship after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had
moved for dismissal. This assignment is untenable, as the matter of reopening a case for
the reception of further evidence after either the prosecution or the defense has rested is
within the discretion of the trial court (23 C. J. S., par. 1056, pp. 464,465, 467).
Under the second, third and fourth assignments of error, counsel for the appellant argues
that the charges of which the appellant was convicted have not been approved in
accordance with the two-witness rule. Specifically it is contended that while prosecution
witness Agapito Severino testified that the appellant, with a Japanese interpreter, arrived at
their house and inquired if his brother Basilio Severino was at home, and said that the latter
was wanted at the military police headquarters for questioning, the other prosecution
witness Edgardo Severino did not corroborate witness Agapito in this respect. Neither did
the latter corroborate Edgardo as regards the fact that Basilio Severino was taking a bath
and as regards Basilio's statement that the appellant and his companions should wait.
There may not be corroboration between the two prosecution witnesses on the points
mentioned, but said witnesses are uniform in their testimony that Basilio Severino was
87
arrested on December 7, 1944. The latter important detail constitutes the overt act of
treason charged in count 3.
The same consideration may be said regarding the criticism of appellant's counsel that their
is lack of corroboration on some details between prosecution witnesses Melchor Ugayong
and Victoriano Cagitla, who, however, testified in unison on the overt act charged in count 5,
namely, the apprehension by appellant of Clemente Chica.
As to count 6, it is contended by counsel for the defense that the testimony of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution is merely to the effect that the appellant was waiting below the
house of Gavino Moras (who was arrested), and that it was appellant's Japanese
companions who came down from the house with said Gavino Moras. This argument is also
without merit, it having been established by at least two witnesses that the appellant and his
companions arrived at the house of Gavino at the same time, from which the conclusion is
inescapable that he actually in a way aided in the apprehension of Gavino
Moras. lawphi1.nêt
It is lastly pretended by counsel for appellant that the latter was an ex-USAFFE officer and
joined the Japanese under duress. There is nothing in the record which tends to indicate
that the appellant apprehended or aided in the arrest of his victims under actual and
imminent threats of death or bodily harm in case he should do otherwise. Upon the other
hand, the evidence shows that he willingly perpetrated the acts of treason of which he was
convicted by the lower court.
Counsel for the appellant has filed a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence tending to show that the appellant was merely a liaison officer between the
Provincial Government of Cebu and the Japanese Military Police; that three of the
prosecution witnesses are retracting, and that the appellant had saved some Filipinos
arrested by the Japanese. The first point is sought to be established by affidavits of two
Japanese war prisoners. These are not entitled to credit, as their affidavits were executed
after, the defeat of Japan in the last war, of which fact the Japanese affiants may be
assumed to be aware. Besides, the alleged civilian position of the appellant did not prevent
him from becoming a traitor to his country. Neither are the three retracting witnesses
entitled to credit, since their affidavits are obviously the result of an afterthought, and if they
could have lied during their testimony in court for some consideration or motive, they can
now by the same token commit another falsity. The alleged circumstance that the appellant
helped some of his countrymen arrested by the Japanese certainly does not exempt him
from criminal liability.
The appealed judgment, being in conformity with the facts and the law, is affirmed. So
ordered with costs.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., Mr. Justice G. Pablo voted for the affirmance.

88
G.R. No. 196685 December 14, 2011
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ABRAHAM CO and CHRISTINE CHAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 196685 is an appeal from the Decision promulgated on 20 December 2010 as well
as the Resolution promulgated on 27 April 2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 112769. The CA affirmed the 2 September 2009 Resolution of Branch 146 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 09-219. In turn, the RTC denied
the petition for annulment of the Orders of Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City (MeTC) in Criminal Case No. 332313.
The 16 October 2008 Order of the MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by
Abraham Co (Co) and Christine Chan (Chan) (collectively, respondents). The MeTC
dismissed Criminal Case No. 332313 for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and
competent evidence to rebut the presumption of innocence in favor of respondents. The 13
January 2009 Order of the MeTC denied for utter lack of merit the Motion for Inhibition and
Motion for Reconsideration of the 16 October 2008 Order.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts of the case as follows:
Petitioner-appellant Goodland Company, Inc. ("Goodland"), a corporation duly organized
and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. (192674) 114645 located at Pasong Tamo, Makati City containing an
area of 5,801 square meters, more or less (hereinafter "Makati property").
Goodland and Smartnet Philippines, Inc. ("Smartnet"), likewise a duly organized and
registered corporation, are part of the Guy Group of Companies, owned and controlled by
the family of Mr. Gilbert Guy.
89
Sometime in 2000, Goodland allowed the use of its Makati property, by way of
accommodation, as security to the loan facility of Smartnet with Asia United Bank (AUB). Mr.
Guy, Goodland’s Vice President, was allegedly made to sign a Real Estate Mortgage (REM)
document in blank. Upon signing the REM, Mr. Guy delivered the same to AUB together
with the original owner’s copy of the TCT covering the the Makati property.
Mr. Rafael Galvez, the Executive Officer of Goodland, who had custody of the title to the
Makati property, handed over the original of the said title to Mr. Guy, after being reassured
that it would be turned over to AUB along with a blank REM, and that it would serve as mere
comfort document and could be filled up only if and when AUB gets the conformity of both
Smartnet and Goodland.
About two (2) years thereafter, Goodland found out that the REM signed in blank by Mr.
Guy has been allegedly filled up or completed and annotated at the back of the title of the
Makati property. Goodland thus wrote a letter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
requesting for an investigation of the fraud committed by private respondents. The NBI, thru
a Letter-Report dated February 10, 2003, recommended the filing of criminal charges of
falsification against private respondents Abraham Co and Christine Chan, and Atty. Joel
Pelicano, the notary public who notarized the questioned REM.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Makati Prosecutor’s Office filed an
Information for Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code against private respondents Co and
Chan and Atty. Pelicano. The Information states:
That on or about the 29th day of February 2000, in the City of Makati, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Abraham Co and Christine
Chan who are private individuals and Joel T. Pelicano, a Notary Public, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Real Estate Mortgage, a public document, causing
it to appear, as it did appear, that Mr. Gilbert Guy, Vice President of Goodland Company,
Inc., participated in the preparation and execution of said Real Estate Mortgage whereby
complainant corporation mortgaged to Asia United Bank a real property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11645 and by then and there causing aforesaid Real Estate
Mortgage to be notarized by accused Atty. Joel Pelicano, who in fact notarized said
document on August 3, 2000 under Document No. 217, Page No. 44, Book No. XVII, Series
of 2000 of his Notarial Register, thus making it appear, that Gilbert Guy has acknowledged
the said Real Estate [Mortgage] before him, when in truth and in fact Gilbert Guy did not
appear nor acknowledge said document before Notary Public Joel T. Pelicano and
thereafter herein accused caused the aforesaid Real Estate [Mortgage] document to be
registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Makati City on March 8, 2001."
The case was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 332313. The prosecution presented the testimonies of (1) Rafael
Galvez, Executive Officer of Goodland, (2) Leo Alberto Pulido, Systems Manager of
Smartnet, (3) NBI Special Agent James Calleja, (4) Atty. Joel Pelicano, and (5) Atty. Alvin
Agustin Tan Ignacio, Corporate Secretary of Goodland.
After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case, herein private
respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with attached
Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to substantiate its claim that they
are guilty of the crime charged. Private respondents alleged that the prosecution failed to
establish the second and third elements of the crime as the prosecution was unable to
provide any proof that private respondents caused it to appear in a document that Mr.
Gilbert Guy participated in an act and that the prosecution failed to establish that Mr. Gilbert
Guy did not participate in said act. Thus, private respondents alleged that the prosecution’s
evidence itself showed that Mr. Gilbert Guy signed the REM, delivered the original transfer
certificates of title to AUB and that Mr. Guy was duly authorized by Goodland’s Board of
Directors to execute the REM. They likewise claimed that the prosecution failed to prove
that the REM was submitted as a comfort document as the testimonies of the witnesses
(referring to Galvez, Pulido, Calleja, Pelicano and Ignacio) proving this matter were hearsay
and lacked probative value. Also, the prosecution failed to present direct evidence showing
the involvement of private respondents in the alleged falsification of document.
The prosecution opposed the Demurrer to Evidence contending that it was able to prove
[that] Mr. Guy did not participate in the execution of the REM because Goodland did not
consent to the use of its Makati property to secure a loan and it has no outstanding credit for
any peso loan. The loan of Smartnet was not secured by any collateral. The REM shows
signs of falsification: Mr. Guy signed the REM in blank in the presence of Atty. Ignacio and
before the adoption of the board resolution authorizing the use of the subject property to
secure Smartnet’s credit; the REM filed in Pasig City is different from the one filed in the
Makati Register of Deeds; and the CTCs appearing in the REM (particularly of Mr. Gilbert
Guy) were issued in 2001 when the REM was executed on 2000. Atty. Pelicano also denies
having affixed his signature in the notarization.
The Metropolitan Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Order dated 16 October 2008, the MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence of
respondents. The MeTC enumerated the elements for the crime of Falsification of Public
Document by making it appear that a party participated in an act or proceeding when he/she
did not:
90
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;
2. That the offender caused it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any
act or proceeding;
3. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding;
4. The falsification was committed in a public or official document.
The MeTC found that although Goodland established the first and fourth elements, it failed
to prove the second and third elements of the crime. Goodland was unable to present
competent evidence that the Real Estate Mortgage was indeed falsified. Hence, Goodland
erred in relying on the presumption that the person in possession of the falsified document
is deemed the falsifier. Assuming that the Real Estate Mortgage is indeed falsified,
Goodland presented no competent evidence to show that the Real Estate Mortgage was
transmitted to any of the respondents. Guy’s affidavit stated that he delivered the Real
Estate Mortgage to Chan; however, the affidavit is merely hearsay as Guy never testified,
and the affidavit referred to properties in Laguna which are not the subject of the present
case.
The MeTC declared that the record shows that other than the fact that Co and Chan are
President and Vice President of Asia United Bank, no other evidence was presented by
Goodland to show that Co and Chan performed acts which amounted to falsification in the
execution of the questioned Real Estate Mortgage.
The MeTC found insufficient the testimonies of Mr. Pulido, Mr. Galvez, NBI Agent Calleja
and Atty. Ignacio to prove that Guy merely signed the Real Estate Mortgage as a comfort
document. None of the witnesses have any personal knowledge of the circumstances of the
discussions between Guy and Asia United Bank. Guy’s non-presentation as a witness
raised the disputable presumption that his testimony would have been adverse to
Goodland.
The dispositive portion of the MeTC’s Order states thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence of the accused is hereby
granted. The case is dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and
competent evidence to rebut the presumption of innocence of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Goodland moved to reconsider the MeTC’s 16 October 2008 Order. Goodland stated that
the MeTC made an error in concluding that Guy participated in the execution of the Real
Estate Mortgage, as well as in disregarding evidence of the spuriousness of the Real Estate
Mortgage.
The MeTC issued another Order on 13 January 2009, and resolved the Motion for Inhibition
and the Motion for Reconsideration of the 16 October 2008 Order. The MeTC denied the
Motion for Inhibition because Goodland failed to show evidence to prove bias or partiality on
the part of Judge Ronald B. Moreno. The MeTC likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following grounds: first, the dismissal of a criminal case due to a
granted demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal of the accused; second, no motion for
reconsideration is allowed to a granted demurrer to evidence; and third, the arguments
raised by Goodland in its Motion for Reconsideration have been thoroughly passed upon by
the MeTC in its 16 October 2008 Order.
Goodland filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the MeTC’s
16 October 2008 and 13 January 2009 Orders. The petition raised the following grounds:
A. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in readily dismissing Criminal Case No. 332313 after a piecemeal and
out-of-context citation of select pieces of prosecution evidence to the blind exclusion of the
rest in order to favor the accused with the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence.
B. Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent Judge, the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to warrant the denial of the Demurrer to Evidence by
accused-respondents.
C. Respondent Judge’s order dismissing Criminal Case No. 332313 for alleged insufficiency
of evidence was made in violation of the prosecution’s right to due process, hence null and
void.
Co and Chan opposed the Petition and stated that it is highly improper for the RTC to
re-examine the evidence on record and substitute its findings of fact to those of the MeTC.
They stated that there is no basis for the filing of the Petition.
The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling
On 2 September 2009, the RTC issued a Resolution denying the Petition. The RTC found
that Judge Moreno did not gravely abuse his discretion. Errors raised by Goodland can be
categorized as errors in judgment which cannot be corrected by a Petition for Certiorari
91
under Rule 65. The issues involved affect the wisdom of a decision; hence, they are beyond
the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Goodland filed an appeal before the CA and assigned one error to the RTC’s resolution:
The RTC gravely erred in ruling that the grounds for appellant’s petition for certiorari
assailing Judge Ronald B. Moreno’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 332313 in blind
disregard of material prosecution evidence pertained to mere errors of judgment and not
errors of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari. Co and Chan claimed that Goodland can no
longer file an appeal of RTC’s 2 September 2009 Resolution as the appeal violates their
right against double jeopardy. Moreover, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited
solely to the correction of defects of jurisdiction and does not include the review of facts and
evidence.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 20 December 2010, the CA affirmed the RTC’s resolution. In denying Goodland’s
appeal, the CA declared that the appeal is bereft of merit. The CA further stated:
Allowing Us to review the [MeTC’s] decision granting the demurrer of evidence as
enunciated in the case of San Vicente vs. People, and after a judicious examination of the
records of the case, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in granting the private respondents’
demurrer to evidence. Hence, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed, the
decision of the MeTC granting the demurrer to evidence may not be disturbed. There is
nothing whimsical or capricious in the exercise of public respondent’s judgment and the
granting of the demurrer was not done in an arbitrary and despotic manner, impelled by
passion or personal hostility. Assuming that there are errors committed by the public
respondent, this may only be error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction. However, this is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." For as long as the
court acted within its jurisdiction, an error of judgment that it may commit in the exercise
thereof is not correctible through the special civil action of certiorari.
The Issue
Goodland cited one ground for its petition against the CA’s decision: The CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 332313 against
respondents on demurrer to evidence in complete disregard of material prosecution
evidence which clearly establishes respondents’ criminal liability for falsification of public
documents.
The Court’s Ruling
We see no reason to overturn the ruling of the CA.
As petitioner, Goodland is aware that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45. However, Goodland insists that the present petition is meritorious
and that it may raise questions of fact and law because there is grave abuse of discretion
and the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Grave Abuse of Discretion
as a Ground for Reversal of an Acquittal
Insisting that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion, the prayers in the Petitions in
both the RTC and CA asked for the reversal of the respondents’ acquittal.
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
The CA made its decision after its careful examination of the records of the case. The CA
found that Guy signed the subject Real Estate Mortgage and was authorized by the Board
of Directors to do so, and none of Goodland’s witnesses have personal knowledge of the
circumstances of the discussions between Guy and Asia United Bank. Goodland, however,
failed to prove that (1) the subject Real Estate Mortgage was in blank at the time it was
submitted to Asia United Bank; (2) respondents filled-in the blanks in the Real Estate
Mortgage; and (3) Guy did not appear before the notary public. It was with reason, therefore,
that the CA declared that the evidence for Goodland failed miserably in meeting the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Grave abuse of discretion may not be attributed to a court simply because of its
alleged misappreciation of evidence.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 112769.
SO ORDERED.

It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order

reconsidering the dismissal of the case, nor can it be modified except to eliminate
something which is civil or administrative in nature. One exception to the rule is when the
prosecution is denied due process of law. Another exception is when the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer
to evidence. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodland’s prayer
is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double jeopardy.1avvphi1

However, the present case is replete with evidence to prove that the CA was correct in
denying Goodland’s certiorari on appeal. We emphasize that the Orders of the MeTC were
affirmed by the RTC, and affirmed yet again by the CA. We find no grave abuse of
discretion in the CA’s affirmation of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 332313.

We have explained "grave abuse of discretion" to mean thus:

An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of

discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.

92
G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION),
QUINTIN SALUDAGA Y BORDEOS, ARTHUS ADRIATICO Y ERUDA AND ROMEO DE
LUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this petition for certiorari to annul and set
aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution dated June 21, 2011, granting Quintin B. Saludaga,
Arthus E. Adriatico and Romeo De Luna's joint demurrer to evidence (demurrer) in Criminal
Case No. 28261.
The Antecedents
On March 30, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Visayas
charged Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga (Mayor Saludaga) and Revenue Collection Clerk
Arthus E. Adriatico (Adtriatico) of Lavezares, Northern Samar, together with Romeo De
Luna (De Luna), a private individual, for falsification of public documents penalized under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The accused (respondents) pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial, the parties submitted their joint stipulations, to wit:
JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS
That at the time material to this case, as alleged in
the information, accused Quintin Saludaga was a
public officer being then a [sic] Municipal Mayor of
1.
the Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and
1
Arthus Adriatico was then the Revenue Collection
Clerk of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the
abovementioned municipality.
That accused Romeo de Luna entered into a
Pakyaw Contract with the Municipality of
1. Lavezares, Northern Samar for the construction of
2 3 Units Shallow Well Hand pump on December 9,
1997 and the construction of 3 units Jetmatic
Shallow Well Hand pump on December 17, 1997.
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That from the time the Pakyaw Contract was
entered into by the Municipality of Lavezares and
1. accused Romeo de Luna and up to the completion
3 of said project in 1997, private
complainant Armando F. Chan was the Vice
Mayor of the said Municipality.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether or not Accused Quintin B. Saludaga,
Arthus E. Adriatico, and Romeo de Luna falsified
2.
the Official Receipt and the Mayor's Permit issued
1
in favor of Romeo de Luna, the subject of the
instant case.
The prosecution alleged that sometime in January 1999, Adriatico issued Official Receipt
No. 7921300-D (subject OR) dated August 27, 1997, to De Luna representing the latter's
payment (P200.00) for his mayor's permit to operate as a pakyaw contractor.
Conniving with Adriatico and De Luna, Mayor Saludaga allegedly issued and signed the
mayor's permit also sometime in January 1999. The mayor's permit allowed De Luna to
engage in business as a pakyaw contractor for the period August 27, 1997 to December
30, 1997.
The prosecution averred that Mayor Saludaga antedated the mayor's permit to confer on De
Luna the status of a bona fide pakyaw contractor when the contracts were executed on
December 9 and 17, 1997. Both Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico purportedly knew that De
Luna was not a licensed pakyaw contractor when they issued the mayor's permit and the
subject OR.
The prosecution further claimed that the provincial treasurer only issued the Official Receipt
Booklet containing the subject OR to the municipality in October 1998, and thus, it could not
have been used as an official receipt for a transaction completed in 1997.
Ultimately, the prosecution submitted that the respondents connived, confederated with,
and mutually helped one another in falsifying the subject OR and the mayor's permit to
make it appear that De Luna was a bona fide pakyaw contractor.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses during trial:
Armando F. Chan (Vice Mayor) - Chan took the stand to prove that the respondents
conspired with each other in falsifying the mayor's permit and the subject OR. He testified
that as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, he received from the Commission
on Audit (COA) a copy of the COA Audit Report for the calendar year 1998. The report
found that the municipality failed to conduct public bidding for several projects, which
included the pakyaw contracts entered into by De Luna and the municipality. As a
consequence, a committee was formed to investigate the alleged irregularities. The
committee later found that irregularities had indeed been committed. Thus, a complaint for
violation of the anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) was filed
against Mayor Saludaga, De Luna, and a certain SPO2 Negro.
In this regard, Chan testified that while the subject OR was issued only in 1999, it was dated
August 27, 1997, to make it appear that De Luna was a licensed contractor and to give a
semblance of legality to the award of the contracts. Finally, he claimed that Mayor Saludaga
used as evidence the falsified subject OR and the mayor's permit in the graft case filed
against him.
Bonifacio M. So (Provincial Treasurer) - So testified that he was the custodian of the booklet
which contained the subject OR and that he issued the said booklet to the municipality only
in October 1998.
Jose Y. Lim (Municipal Treasurer) - Lim testified that the booklet containing the subject OR
was issued to the municipality only in October 1998. He also claimed that De Luna was not
a contractor but an employee of the municipality hired by Mayor Saludaga.
Carlos G. Fornelos (COA Auditor) - Fornelos testified that he received a letter from the
municipal treasurer requesting a duplicate copy of the subject OR and that despite best
efforts, he could not locate the same.
The prosecution then rested its case and submitted its formal offer of evidence which the
Sandiganbayan admitted.
The respondents filed a joint motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on December 2,
2008. The Sandiganbayan granted the said motion; thus, on May 15, 2006, the respondents
filed the demurrer.
In praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence, the
respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. "Conspiracy, the
respondents asserted, cannot be presumed; it must be proved by positive and conclusive
evidence and shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.
The respondents further argued that even implied conspiracy was not proved because,
94
while conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence (for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime), it still cannot
be based on mere conjectures but must be established as fact.
Since conspiracy was not shown to exist, the respondents urged the Sandiganbayan to
evaluate the prosecution's evidence vis-a-vis their individual participation in the crime
alleged to have been committed. They denied their personal liability as follows:
Mayor Saludaga's Defense
Mayor Saludaga maintained that the prosecution failed to prove he had a hand in the
preparation and issuance of the subject OR; nor did he personally make the entries in the
mayor's permit. He insisted that all that could be inferred from the face of the mayor's permit
was that he signed it. In the absence of evidence that he knew the mayor's permit to be
spurious, Mayor Saludaga claimed that he could not be held guilty of knowingly making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
To support this theory, Mayor Saludaga invoked the case of Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan which supposedly held that when the infraction consists in the reliance in
good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary
responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be upheld.
The Arias doctrine held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why the head of office should
examine each of the documents he is supposed to sign.
Adriatico 's Defense
Adriatico argued that the prosecution failed to show that he signed or executed the subject
OR. He noted that even the prosecution's witness admitted that it was the name of a certain
A.L. Moncada, described in the subject OR as the Collecting Officer, that appeared on the
subject OR; and that neither Adriatico's nor any of his co-respondents' names or signatures
appeared thereon.
Adriatico also argued that assuming he executed the subject OR, the prosecution failed to
show that he willingly and knowingly made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts;
that the OR was dated August 27, 1997, and that it was received by the municipality only in
1998, do not exclude each other. Adriatico insisted that he did not necessarily make an
untruthful statement of facts when he antedated the subject OR there being the truth that
the payment received was for a past transaction.
De Luna's Defense
De Luna argued that the prosecution failed to prove he was not a bona fide
pakyaw contractor. He alleged that the falsified documents neither affirmed nor contradicted
his legal status as a bona fide pakyaw contractor. He reasoned that with or without the
subject OR and the mayor's permit, he was either a bona fide pakyaw contractor or not.
Moreover, De Luna emphasized that he did not sign nor execute the subject OR and the
mayor's permit and that any alleged falsification could not be attributed to him for failure of
the prosecution to prove conspiracy.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer. It held that in criminal prosecutions for offenses
under the RPC, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had
criminal intent to commit the offense charged.
In this regard, the prosecution failed to prove some of the elements of falsification of
documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC, namely: (1) the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his official position; and (3)
the offender falsifies a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. In
particular, the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution failed to prove the second and
third elements. The graft court resolved to grant the demurrer as follows:
First, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded by the prosecutions' evidence that Mayor
Saludaga had a hand in the preparation and issuance of the subject OR. Thus, he could not
have taken advantage of his position as Mayor and knowingly made untruthful narration of
facts.
Second, the Sandiganbayan is unconvinced that the subject OR was falsified despite
Adriatico's admission that he antedated it upon De Luna's request. It held that although
Adriatico prepared and issued the subject OR, he did not make untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; because the statements were not altogether false since there was some
recognizable truth in these.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan took the view that Adriatico did not necessarily make an
untruthful statement as to the date since it was a fact that the payment received was for a
previous transaction.
The Sandiganbayan also found that Adriatico acted in good faith when he issued the
subject OR for the payment of a past transaction in his belief that the municipality would
derive additional revenue therefrom.
95
Finally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution failed to prove that De Luna was not
a bona fide pakyaw contractor from August 27 to December 30, 1997, or during the time the
questioned pakyaw contracts were awarded. The graft court gave no weight to the
prosecution's evidence, i.e., the Time Book and Payroll covering the period September 15
to September 30, 1997, which purportedly proved that De Luna was a hired municipal
laborer and not a pakyaw contractor.
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, Saludaga,
Adriatico and De Luna, is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 28261 is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The Petition
The People impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Sandiganbayan when it granted the demurrer. The People disagree that the
prosecution failed to establish the respondents' guilt with moral certainty. Specifically, the
People refute the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove certain
elements of the falsification charged.
With respect to the element that the offenders must have taken advantage of their
official position, the People emphasized Adriatico's own admission that he antedated the
subject OR upon De Luna's request, a fact that the latter confirmed.
Such act, according to the People, already constitutes falsification of a public document and
thereby untruthful.
The People cite the case of Relucio v. Civil Service Commission, which laid down the
elements of falsification of public documents, to wit: (i) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (ii) the offender has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (iii) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and (iv) the perversions of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent to injure a third person.
As regards the element that the offender must have falsified a document by making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the People dispute the Sandiganbayan's
reasoning that the narration of facts be absolutely false to constitute falsification.
The People argue that the Sandiganbayan erred when it held that there can be no
conviction of falsification of public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with
good faith. Good faith does not apply in this case because Adriatico was not confronted with
a difficult question of law and he should have known better that it was illegal to issue an
antedated receipt.
Further, the People posit that Mayor Saludaga cannot invoke the Arias doctrine, maintaining
that Mayor Saludaga may be deemed a knowing participant in the conspiracy when he
affixed his signature despite the patent irregularities thereon.
In fine, the People insist that Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico took advantage of their
positions in falsifying the subject OR and mayor's permit; that the falsifications were
intended to evade their prosecution under the Anti-Corrupt and Practices Act; and that the
respondents' acts were so concerted it may be inferred that Mayor Saludaga, together with
his subordinate Adriatico and dummy De Luna, conspired to commit the crime.
The Respondents' Case
The respondents reiterate their arguments to support the demurrer. In summary, they argue
that the People failed to: (1) prove conspiracy, (2) show that Mayor Saludaga took
advantage of his official position to cause the falsification of the subject OR and the mayor's
permit, (3) show that Adriatico executed the subject OR, (4) adduce evidence that
antedating the subject OR is prohibited by law, (5) submit evidence that De Luna was not
a bona fide pakyaw contractor, and (6) prove that De Luna had any hand in the execution of
the subject OR and mayor's permit.
The respondents further argue that in a petition for certiorari, the Court does not reexamine
the trial or appellate court's appreciation of facts unless the evidence on record does not
support their findings or the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; and that the
jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for certiorari does not include a correction of the
Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the prosecution's evidence but is confined to the issue of
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it granted the respondents' demurrer.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
We stress at the outset that the People assail the Sandiganbayan's grant of demurrer
through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. To put our discussions in
96
proper perspective, a review of the nature and purpose of a petition for certiorari is in order.
Section 1 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require, x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]
A petition for certiorari is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Further, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence
defines "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.
The office of demurrer and
the effect of its grant
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused
with prior leave of court.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law to make out a case
or sustain the issue. The party filing the demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence. The Court's task is to ascertain if there is competent or sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of
guilt.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the dismissal order
may not be appealed as this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed through certiorari under Rule 65.
For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the
assailed judgment void.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
The People failed to overcome this burden.
Falsification and Conspiracy
In brief, the respondents allegedly committed falsification under paragraph 4, Article 171 of
the RPC, and that they connived, confederated with, and mutually helped one another in
committing the said crime.
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC provides:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. —
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x.
Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:
(1) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
(2) He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; and
(3) The facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
97
The prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer or employee had taken
advantage of his official position in making the falsification. The offender is considered to
have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of
the document which he falsifies.
Moreover, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a
public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Conspiracy
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be alleged as a mode of committing
a crime or as constitutive of the crime itself. It need not be shown by direct proof of an
agreement of the parties to commit the crime as it can be inferred from the acts of the
accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime.
More significant, conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, it is,
nonetheless, required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence by showing a series of
acts done by each of the accused in concert and in pursuance of a common unlawful
purpose.
Guided by the foregoing principles, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it granted the respondents' demurrer.
The People's evidence vis-a-vis
the Sandiganbayan's findings
The People submit that the Sandiganbayan exercised its judicial functions in arbitrary and
despotic manner because it completely disregarded the prosecution's evidence and ignored
settled jurisprudence.
We disagree with this contention.
A scrutiny of the assailed resolution shows that the Sandiganbayan thoroughly passed upon
the prosecution's testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence. Finding them insufficient
to support the charge vis-a-vis the elements of the crime, the graft court granted the
demurrer and dismissed the criminal case.
In a nutshell, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case because the prosecution failed to
prove some elements of the crime, namely: (i) that the offenders take advantage of their
official positions and (ii) that they falsify a document by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts.
The Sandiganbayan justified its grant of the demurrer as follows:
First, the Sandiganbayan was not convinced that Mayor Saludaga took advantage of his
official position to falsify the subject OR. It held that the prosecution's evidence failed to
establish that he was in any way involved in the execution and issuance of the subject OR.
Although Mayor Saludaga signed the mayor's permit, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it is the
issuance of the subject OR to support the mayor's permit which is crucial in determining his
culpability for the crime charged against him. As it was not shown that Mayor Saludaga had
any involvement in its issuance, he could not have taken advantage of his position as Mayor
and knowingly made untruthful narration of facts in the said document.
Second, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded that the subject OR was in fact falsified.
While Adriatico admitted that he issued the subject OR and that he antedated it to August
27, 1997, the Sandiganbayan held that such act does not constitute falsification. It held that
if the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth in them, the
crime of falsification is deemed not to have been committed. Adriatico did not necessarily
make an untruthful statement of fact as to the date, there being truth that the payment
received was for a past transaction.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution failed to prove that De Luna was not
a bona fide pakyaw contractor when the contracts were executed in December 1997. The
graft court did not give credence to the prosecution's evidence (i.e., Time Book and Payroll
for the period September 15 to September 30, 1997) that De Luna was a mere laborer
employed by the municipality. It also dismissed the insinuations made by the prosecution's
witnesses Chan and Lim that De Luna was not a qualified contractor, holding that they were
mere insinuations and nothing more.
To our mind, the foregoing disquisitions sufficiently counter the People's claim that the
Sandiganbayan completely ignored the prosecution's evidence and that it disregarded
settled jurisprudence.
On the contrary, we find that the Sandiganbayan, by examining the prosecution's evidence
vis-a-vis the elements of the crime, adequately laid the basis in resolving to grant the
98
demurrer. We do not see how this method of arriving at a decision or resolution can be
deemed a grave abuse of discretion. Simply put, we are not convinced that the
Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical manner when it granted
the respondents' demurrer.
This is not to say that the Sandiganbayan correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.
Our finding is limited to the issue of grave abuse of discretion; we do not rule on the legal
soundness of the Sandiganbayan resolution.
To reiterate, certiorari shall lie only when the respondent court gravely abuses its
discretion such as when it blatantly ignores facts or denies a party due
process. Certiorari does not correct errors of judgment.
Thus, even if the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to grave abuse of discretion.It is merely
an error of judgment which may no longer be appealed because it would place the
respondents in double jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, we found the Sandiganbayan to have erred in
applying certain provisions of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines when it
granted the accused's demurrer to evidence. Nonetheless, we held that even if the
Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law, the error committed
was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
We found therein that the People failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. In fine, we held that the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is
of such a nature that could no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.
In another case, after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we were of the
view that the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
However, we ruled that such error could not be corrected because double jeopardy had
already set in.
In sum, although the Sandiganbayan, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, may have erred in dismissing the criminal case, such error may no longer be
annulled or set aside because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy.
At any rate, even if we go beyond the function of certiorari and dissect the prosecution's
theory that the respondents conspired to commit the crime, we still sustain the
Sandiganbayan.

Three acts are undisputed: (1) Adriatico issued the antedated subject OR in 1999, (2) De
Luna requested Adriatico to antedate the OR, and (3) Mayor Saludaga signed in 1999 the
mayor's permit which allowed De Luna to engage as pakyaw contractor for the period
August 27 -December 30, 1997.

As a rule, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused. However, it is
required that said acts must clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent
or design to commit a crime.

The concurrence of will and common intent or design to commit a crime is not clearly
manifest in the present case. The charge of conspiracy simply does not hold water.

No convincing evidence was presented to show how the respondents conspired to commit
the crime. We find no credible proof that links or gives unifying purpose to the respondents'
individual acts. Without such proof, we cannot conclude with moral certainty that they
conspired, connived, and mutually helped one another to commit the crime. These acts, on
their own and nothing more, do not support the allegation of conspiracy.

As a final point, we note the People's suggestion that the Sandiganbayan, in granting the
demurrer, tried to exculpate Mayor Saludaga and thereby abetted the freeing of a corrupt
public official.49 While we recognize the prosecutors' efforts in bringing unscrupulous public
officials to justice, we find these comments unwarranted and unfair to the Sandiganbayan.
Besides, unfounded accusations such as these have no place in a pleading.

WHEREFORE, in the light of these findings and legal premises, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in the June 21, 2011 Sandiganbayan resolution granting the respondents' joint
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 28261 and therefore, accordingly, DISMISS the
petition.

SO ORDERED.

99
G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ROGER DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS,
RAYMOND DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, JAYSON MIRANDA Y NACPIL, ROLANDO
TALBAN Y MENDOZA, AND JOEL JACINTO Y CELESTINO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
For consideration is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to nullify the May 27, 2016 Decision and
January 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139255. The
challenged rulings affirmed the January 10, 2014 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 215 in Quezon City directing that the testimony of the deceased state witness Alfred
Mendiola (Mendiola) be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431.
The Facts
On January 13, 2011, Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted in Cubao,
Quezon City by a group of men later pinpointed as the respondents herein. Evangelista's
charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
In connection with the incident, Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan (Parulan) voluntarily
surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and executed extrajudicial confessions
identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez (Dominguez Brothers) as the
masterminds behind the killing. This led to the filing before the Quezon City RTC of an
Information against Mendiola and the respondents for Carnapping with Homicide under
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That on or about the 13 day of January 2011, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, and other persons who are at large and whose identities and
whereabouts are still to be determined, conspiring and confederating together and
helping each other, with intent to gain and to kill and by means of violence against and
intimidation of person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take and
carry away one (1) charcoal gray Toyota Land Cruiser model 2009 with Plate No.
NAI-316, Engine No. 1VD-0049539 and Chassis No. JTMHV05J804031334, worth
Php3,400,000.00, Philippine Currency, then driven by VENSON EVANGELISTA Y
100
VELARO and registered in the name of Future Trade International, Inc. but already sold
to Arsenio Evangelista per Deed of Sale dated December 13, 2010, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner.
That during the commission of the said offense, or by reason thereof, the said accused,
in conspiracy with one another and with intent to kill, carefully planned the execution of
their acts and with the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery,
and abuse of superior strength, cruelty, and by means of fire, attack (sic) and assaulted
VENSON EVANGELISTA Y VALERO (sic) by shooting him on the head, mutilated his
body, and set the same on fire thereby inflicting upon him fatal injuries which were the
proximate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
late VENSON EVANGELISTA Y VELARO.
Accused and their other unidentified cohorts committed the above attendant
circumstances in the killing of their victim because they deliberately planned the
commission of the offense consciously adopting the means and methods of attack
done suddenly and unexpectedly, taking advantage of their numbers and strength to
ensure its commission without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the
victim might make, accompanied by fraud, deceit, disguise, cruelty and by abuse of
superior strength by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the respondents, Rolando Taiban (Taiban) and Joel Jacinto (Jacinto) remained at large.
Only the Dominguez brothers and Miranda were apprehended. And during arraignment on
April 11, 2011, the three arrested respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense.
On June 27, 2011, a hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion that Mendiola be
discharged as an accused to become a state witness. On the said date, Mendiola gave his
testimony and was cross examined by the counsel for the defense. Nevertheless, the
defense manifested that the cross-examination was limited only to the incident of discharge,
and that their party reserved the right to a more lengthy cross examination during the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence in chief.
On September 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 215, before which Criminal Case No.
Q-11-168431 is pending, issued an Order granting the motion to discharge Mendiola as an
accused to become a state witness. The Order further states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the motion to
discharge accused ALFRED MENDIOLA y RAMOS from the Information to become a
state witness.
 Accordingly, his testimonies given on June 27, July 8 and July 11, 2011 and all the
evidence adduced in support of the discharge hereby form part of the trial of this case.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, by a surprise turn of events, Mendiola was found dead on May 6, 2012. The
RTC then required the parties to submit their respective position papers on whether or not
Mendiola's testimony during the discharge proceeding should be admitted as part of the
prosecution's evidence in chief despite his failure to testify during the trial proper prior to his
death.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 10, 2014, the RTC issued the assailed Order directing that the testimony of
Mendiola be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No.Q-11-168431. The decretal
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the testimony of ALFRED MENDIOLA y RAMOS given on June 27,
2011 for purposes of his discharge as a state witness is HEREBY ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF THE RECORD of this case. With respect to the documents and other
evidence authenticated by Mendiola as a discharge witness, this Court will rule upon
their admissibility when the same are formally offered in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
According to the trial court, Mendiola's testimony on June 27, 2011 was offered only for the
purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a state witness, and does
not yet constitute evidence in chief. Thus, the defense counsel limited his questions during
cross-examination to only those matters relating to Mendiola's qualifications to become a
state witness and expressly reserved the right to continue the cross-examination during trial
proper. As ratiocinated by the RTC:
There is no question that when Mendiola was cross-examined, such cross-examination
was limited by the purpose of the hearing, that is, whether the court would be satisfied
of the absolute necessity of his testimony; that "there is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution"; that his "testimony could be substantially
corroborated in its material points"; that he "does not appear to be the most guilty"; and
he "has not been convicted, at any time, of any offense involving moral turpitude". In
short, these are the purposes for the discharge hearings. x x x
101
The trial court likewise cited Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, noting that there is
a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a regular witness during trial proper to
secure his acquittal. Noncompliance with this requirement, according to the RTC, amounted
to the deprivation of respondents of their constitutional right to due process, and of their
right to confront the witnesses against them.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The issue was elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but
the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. It thus
dismissed the petition in its assailed May 27, 2016 Decision in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Orders dated 10 January 2014 and 1 December 2014 issued by public respondent
Judge Wildredo L. Maynigo in Criminal case no. Q-11-168431, pending before Branch
215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration therefrom through its January 18,
2017 Resolution. Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issue
The primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the testimony of Mendiola
should be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431.
Petitioner posits that the right afforded to an accused to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him is not an absolute right. Hence, when respondents failed to avail
themselves of the constitutional guarantee when Mendiola gave his testimony on June 27,
2011, they have effectively forfeited their right thereto.
The Court directed respondents to file their respective comments within fifteen (15) days
from notice. Respondent Jayson Miranda y Nacpil, in his Comment, argues that the
testimony of Mendiola was offered in the discharge proceeding for the limited purpose of
qualifying the latter as a state witness, and Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
requires for the state witness to be presented again during trial proper. Failure of the
prosecution to again offer the testimony of the state witness, as part of their
evidence-in-chief, unlawfully deprived the respondents of the opportunity to conduct a full
and exhaustive cross-examination. For even though Mendiola was cross-examined during
the discharge proceedings, respondents nevertheless intimated to the trial court that they
were reserving the right to propound further questions when Mendiola is again to take the
witness stand. Miranda adds that the respondents are just as without fault that Mendiola
died without completing his testimony.
Miranda adds that at the time Mendiola testified during the discharge proceedings, his
co-respondents Rolando M. Taiban (Taiban) and Joel C. Jacinto (Jacinto) were not yet
arrested. Thus, to allow the testimony of Mendiola to remain on record would be tantamount
to a denial of their right to cross-examine the witness against them.
On the other hand, it appears that Atty. Oscar Raro, the counsel of record for respondent
Roger Dominguez, failed to inform this Court that he has changed his office address.
Service upon counsel was therefore not actually effected. Nevertheless, We have held time
and again that notices to counsel should properly be sent to his or her address of record in
the absence of due notice to the court of a change of address. Thus, respondent Roger
Dominguez is deemed to have received the order to comment by fiction of law and has,
consequently, waived his right to counter the allegations in the petition after fifteen (15)
days from the date of his constructive receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Atty. Jose M. Cruz, who
represents Raymond Dominguez, has likewise not filed a Comment in behalf of his client
herein. The Court resolves, however, to dispense with the same.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his
testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible
Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. - When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after
requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied
that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
102
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of
the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (emphasis added)
The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will
only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state
witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for
discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically
deemed part of the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 and admissible in evidence
pursuant to the rule.
Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be. The
contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his possession of all
the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness. The argument of incompleteness
even contradicts respondent Miranda's own position since he does not contest here the
RTC's Order granting Mendiola's motion to be a state witness, only the admissibility of his
testimony following his demise.
Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it mandatory that
the state witness be presented during trial proper and that, otherwise, his failure to do so
would render his testimony inadmissible. On this point, Miranda, the RTC and the CA are
mistaken in their interpretation of the rule, which pertinently provides:
Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. - The order indicated in the
preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be
a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses
to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for the discharge. (emphasis added)
While respondent Miranda is correct that the motion hearing is different from the
presentation of evidence in chief, it is precisely because of this distinction and separability
that the validity of the discharge proceeding should remain untouched despite the
non-presentation of Mendiola during trial on the merits. True, the provision requires the
accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness. However,
noncompliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an
acquittal; it does not speak of any penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the
state witness during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. On the contrary, the
testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the discharge proceedings may be
admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to testify
in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge, militating
against the claim of inadmissibility.
To qualify as a state witness, the respondent must testify on the details of the
commission of the crime
That the testimony of Mendiola was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying him as a
state witness does not automatically render his statements as to the specifics on the
commission of the offense inadmissible. To recall, one of the requirements under Section
17, Rule 119 is to establish that the erstwhile respondent does not appear to be the most
guilty among him and his cohorts. Thus, it is quite understandable that, during the discharge
proceeding, Mendiola narrated in graphic detail his entire knowledge of the crime and the
extent of the participation of each of the accused, to wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, are you the same Alfred Mendiola[,] one of the persons being indicted
in this instant crime of Carnapping with Homicide?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Do you know the other accused in this case, Mr. Witness, namely, I will enumerate[:]
Roger Dominguez, Raymond Dominguez, Jayson Miranda[,] alias Soy, Rolando
Talban[,] a.k.a. Eduardo Fernandez[,] a.k.a. Rolly and one named alias Joel?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Why do you know them, Mr. Witness?
A: I've been with them[,] with the group that I joined which is carnapping.
Q: In the said carnapping group that you mentioned, Mr. Witness, what is your role?
A: I served as the buyer or as poseur buyer of the vehicle that we were supposed to
buy but actually we will carnap.
Q: What about the other named accused, No. 1 Roger and No. 2 Raymond, what are
their roles?
103
A: We treat them as our leader because they are the ones planning the operations,
they are the ones funding the operation, they are the ones providing us the money
every time we have the operation.
xxxx
Court: What was your last statement? Can you repeat[?]
A: They are the ones who [are] also giving us our salary or payment for ever[y]
successful operation.
Q: What about Jayson Miranda[,] alias Soy, what is his role in your group?
A: I came to know Jayson Miranda as the right hand of Roger Dominguez and he
serve[d] as my driver for four times wherein I was involved in carnapping.
Q: What about this Joel, what is his role, Mr. Witness?
A: Joel [was] introduced to me and will also be my companion who will pose as a
mechanic and will directly assist us if ever we are successful in test driving the said
vehicle.
xxxx
Q: What about Rolly or Rolando Taiban[,] also known as Eduardo Fernandez y Lopez,
what is his role in your group?
A: I was only introduced once to Rolly and I also know him as a member of the group
and he was assigned to help us on a certain operation.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you previously mentioned that you are a member of a group
headed by Dominguez brothers. How did your group operate or what was your modus
operandi?
A: The first time I met Roger Dominguez[,] he was able to tell me that theirs system of
carnapping is by poking. But after that[,] he narrated some more regarding other
systems of carnapping.
Q: And what are these other systems that were given to you or were relayed to you?
A: One strategy is they will look for sellers of vehicles through newspapers, magazines
and internet then they will get the contact numbers of the person selling the vehicle.
Q: And what did they do with the contact numbers given to them by the owners of the
vehicles?
A: Once contacted[,] they will schedule a meeting place of the poseur buyer and the
seller.
Q: And what else are the modus operandi of your group?
A: And if the seller agrees on the road test[,] that is the time the group of the poseur
buyer will poke and carnap the said vehicle.
Q: You continuously mentioned about, pagtutok, can you elaborate that, what, do you
mean [by] pagtutok?
A: In my experience[,] every time we are successful in convincing a seller[,] it will be
Joel who in the middle of the road testing will draw his gun and poke it to the seller.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you mentioned about this Toyota Land Cruiser, let's go to that,
when for the first time did you hear about this Toyota Land Cruiser?
A: The first time I heard them talking about this Toyota Land Cruiser was January 12
during night time.
Q: What year?
A: 2011, ma'am.
Q: And what did you hear about this Toyota Land Cruiser?
A: We were in Greenville Subdivision over dinner with Roger Dominguez, Ann, Katrina
Paula then Raymond Dominguez[,] together with Rolly[,] arrived.
Q: Who was the one who mentioned this Land Cruiser?
A: According to them[,] since it was night time when they say the vehicle[,] the owner
did not agree for them to road test the said vehicle.
Q: What else did Raymond Dominguez tell you?
A: After that when the owner did not agree for the road test[,] they went to a gasoline
station in Quezon City.
xxxx
Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: When Raymond Dominguez arrived[,] he gave me a number and asked me to
contact that said number claiming the owner was selling a Toyota Land Cruiser.
Q: How did Raymond Dominguez give to you that number, how?
A: From his cell phone[, ] he jotted down the number on a piece of paper[,] he gave it to
me and asked me to call it if the Toyota Land Cruiser is still for sale.
104
Q: Upon receiving the instructions of Raymond Dominguez[,] what did you do with that
number?
A: Before I dialed the number[,] I asked him what to tell the owner in case he answers
the call.
Q: What did Raymond Dominguez tell you?
A: I was asked to ask the owner if the Toyota Land Cruiser is still for sale and if yes[,]
then I should schedule a meeting.
xxxx
Q: During the telephone conversation with as you mentioned with Boy Evangelista[,]
what did you talk about?
A: He said that it's still available, it [is] still for sale.
Q: So what was your response, Mr. Witness?
A: I asked him where and when can I see the vehicle.
Q: What did Mr. Evangelista tell you?
A: He answered within the day, the vehicle is available.
Q: Mr. Witness, while you were talking to Mr. Boy Evangelista over the phone, where
[we]re Raymond, Roger, Jayson Miranda and the rest of the accused, where were they?
A: In the sala of the house in Greenville Subdivision, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: How did you end your transaction or your telephone conversation with Mr. Boy
Evangelista?
A: When I asked the person on the other line if I can see the vehicle within the day[,]
Raymond signaled me to schedule a meeting around three to four that afternoon.
xxxx
Q: x x x After you were able to set up a meeting with Mr. Boy Evangelista over the
telephone regarding the Land Cruiser, what happened thereafter?
A: He texted me the address where I can meet him.
Q: What were these instructions?
A: The first thing he told me was that he will be the first to leave the subdivision
onboard a white Expedition and that he instructed me to act as a poseur buyer and to
test drive the said vehicle since I will be giving it as a gift.
Q: What else did Raymond tell you?
A: He also told me that I will be with Jayson who will act as the driver of Pajero which
we will use in going to that place. And Joel was also with us to act as merchant and
Rolly will act as a back up for us in case the owner will agree to a road test.
Q: While Raymond was giving all these instructions to you, who were present at that
time?
A: Roger Dominguez, Ann, Napoleon Salamat, Rolly, Jayson Miranda alias Soy.
xxxx
Q: So when Raymond was giving you all these instructions and these persons [we]re
present, we [sic] first go to Roger[,] what was his reaction, what was his reply?
A: Roger told me "Hoy Bakla, kung hindi mo mapapapayag na i-road test yang
sasakyan na iyan wag mong pilitin ha."
xxxx
Q: So when Roger Dominguez made his statement[,] what happened thereafter?
A: Raymond answered[,] "[s]ige kung hindi mo kaya ako na ang bahala, pero hindi ako
aalis sa area na iyon na hindi ko tangay ang Toyota Land Cruiser".
Q: With all these statements, Mr. Witness, what happened thereafter?
A: Rolly just interrupted, "Boss, kung saka-sakaling mapapapayag natin ang may-ari ng
Toyota Land Cruiser na ipa-road test at kung sino man ang sasama itumba na natin
dahil baka makilala pa niyan pag pinakita ng QCPD yung picture gallery ng mga
carnappers dahil galing [sic] na tayo diyan noong gabing 'yon January 13."
xxxx
Q: So after you were already specifically assigned of [sic] your roles in the carnapping
of the Land Cruiser as well as to how to execute and realize this, how did you go about
this plan?
A: Raymond was the first one who left the subdivision onboard the said Ford Expedition.
Q: Would you recall what time was that?
A: Around 1:00 o'clock or past 1:00 o'clock.
Q: Of what date?
A: January 13, 2011.
105
Q: How about you, Mr. Witness, and the rest of the group[,] what time did you leave the
apartment?
A: After Raymond left[,] we prepared and we left the subdivision at around 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon onboard a green Pajero together with Jayson and Rolly.
Q: You mentioned that you were onboard this Pajero together with Jayson and Rolly,
but previously in your statement you said that Joel was also given a role by Raymond
Dominguez, so where was this Joel at that time?
A: We fetched Joel at SM, San Fernando, he alighted from [a] gray van before he
transferred to our vehicle.
Q: How about Roger[,] how come he did not come with your group?
A: Roger, Napoleon Salamat and Ann were left in the apartment but we were told [to]
give updates to them if we were able to convince the seller.
Q: You previously mentioned that you left the apartment at around 2:00 o'clock
onboard a green Pajero bound to Cubao, Quezon City, what time did you arrive at that
area?
A: Past 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon when we arrived at the area.
Q: What was this area again, Mr. Witness?
A: No. 47 Sgt. Catolos St., Cubao, Quezon City.
Q: So upon arriving at No. 47 Sgt. Catolos St., Cubao, Quezon City[,] what happened?
A: While we were at the front of the said residence[,] Jayson received a call from
Raymond.
xxxx
Q: So when you asked Jayson about the instructions, what did Jayson tell you?
A: According to him[,] he was instructed by Raymond to go around on the place and
look for a wider street wherein we can test drive the said vehicle.
Q: So what did you do with the instructions of Raymond Dominguez relayed to Jayson?
A: We went around the said area.
xxxx
Q: So after complying or following the instructions of Raymond of going around the
area and looking for wider roads[,] what happened next?
A: We went back at the front of the house.
 Q: So what was your counter reply?
Q: Why did you go back in front of the house? A: I asked how much. x x x
A: We were waiting for the go signal from Raymond for me to go down and check the
vehicle. [Q]: And how did you reply to such price quotation of 3.4 Million[?]
[A]: I asked if it is still negotiable. x x x
Q: What is this go signal, Mr. Witness?
A: He texted go. Q: While you were talking with this fair complexion, tall and long hair, where was Joel?
A: He was just checking the said vehicle, the tires and the engine.
Q: When you say nagtext siya, whom are you referring to?
A: Raymond Dominguez, ma'am. Q: After talking about the price, what else did you talk about regarding this vehicle?
A: Joel approached us and said the vehicle was okay and the long hair said if I buy it
xxxx then it is as if I bought a brand new.

Q: Upon these instructions[,] what did you do? xxxx

A: Joel and I alighted and Jayson, Rolly parked the vehicle.
Q: So upon alighting from this green Pajero together with Joel[,] what did you do?
A: After that[,] we pressed the door bell of the said house and then a small man, who
appeared to be the boy, open[ed] the gate for us.
Q: What did you tell this boy?
A: I immediately asked him the person of Boy Evangelista.
xxxx
Q: So what happened thereafter when you were ushered inside the area?
A: This boy, the small one, called someone a person with a long hair.
Q: Would you know who this person is?
A: No, ma'am, he just introduced himself as the son of Boy Evangelista and was tasked
to talk with me.
Q: After you were assured by this person with long hair and that it was recommended
to[o] by your mechanic Joel, what was your decision then about the vehicle?
A: I asked the long hair if we could roadtest the vehicle that he was selling.
Q: And what was his reply?
A: He said that they don't agree with road testing especially the father.
Q: And what was your response?
A: So on my part posting as a buyer[,] I answered in a sarcastic way, "[a]no ba naman
kayong nagbebenta ng sasakyan na ganyan 3.4 Million is 3.4 Million tapos hindi nyo
papayagang i-road test, maglalabas ako ng pera."
Q: And can you tell us what was the reaction of this person whom you were talking to
when you made the sarcastic words?
A: I noticed that he was irritated by my remark and he ordered the boy, the small one,
to get the key, cellphone and his wallet.

xxxx xxxx

Q: Okay, Mr. Witness, when you came face to face with this person whom you Q: And when this person whom you described boarded the vehicle, what were you
described as one tall person with fair complexion and with long hair, what did you talk doing then?
about? A: I was still at the garage and he was the one who signal us to board on said vehicle
A: I asked him if the Land Cruiser I was looking at in the garage was still for sale. and he said "let's go".

Q: What was his reply? Q: And where did you position yourself?
A: He said yes. A: I positioned myself at the back of the driver.

106
Q: How about Joel?
A: At the right passenger seat, ma'am, beside the driver.
Q: Upon boarding this vehicle, you, Joel, and this person that you described[,] where
did you go?
A: We went around the said area but the green Pajero was following us wherein Rolly
and Jayson Miranda alias Soy were there.
Q: Why do you say that this Pajero was following you then?
A: I know that they were following us because Rolly even uttered a joke "[s]inusundan
yata tayo ng father mo ah, ayan yung Pajerong green".
Q: Why did Joel made that statement as far as you know?
A: That's a part of our strategy because the long hair might be the person to notice that
someone is following us.
xxxx
Q: So after circling the road as you mentioned[,] what happened next?
A: When Joel noticed that we were near the house of the owner[,] he immediately
pulled out his gun and poked it to the person and asking [sic] to give him the vehicle.
Q: And what did this long hair do with that threat of Joel?
A: The long hair was able to stop the vehicle probably a house away from their house.
Q: And what was the reaction of this person whom you said was poked by a gun?
A: He raised his gun and said "[m]aawa na po kayo sa akin[,] may pamilya po ako."
xxxx
Q: And at that time, where was Joel and Rolly whom you previously said was following
the Land Cruiser?
A: Joel remained at the vehicle poking his gun while Rolly suddenly alighted from the
Pajero and boarded the Land Cruiser and sat on the driver seat and pushed the long
hair at the back portion of the said vehicle.
Q: After Rolly boarded the Land Cruiser and pushed this person with long hair at the
back[,] what happened next?
A: Rolly went inside the vehicle through the driver side and after pushing the long hair,
he also followed him, so we were all at the back, me the long hair and Rolly.
Q: While you were inside the vehicle[,] what were you doing at the time? A: While I was
107
seated at the back of the driver seat I was texting Roger and informing him that the
vehicle and the owner were already taken. And Rolly was trying to put up packaging
tape on the eyes and mouth of the long hair and also his hands were tied behind his
back with the packaging tape. After he was tied with packaging tape[,] he was asked to
lie facing down at the back and he was covered with a blanket which he took from his
back pack.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, while Rolly was doing this to the long hair whom you just
described[,] what was Joel doing?
A: Joel was the one driving the Land Cruiser away from the area.
xxxx
COURT. How about you[,] what were you doing then when Rolly was putting a
packaging tape to the long hair?
A: I was sending text messages to Roger that we were able to take the vehicle.
xxxx
Q: Now, from Cubao, Quezon City, where did you go, where did you proceed then?
A: After we passed through the NLEX, what happened was the green Pajero was
ahead of us and we were following it and the Expedition was following us.
Q: In that period of time that you were traveling[,] what happened inside the Land
Cruiser while you were with this long hair, Joel and Rolly, what happened?
A: Rolly took the wallet of the long hair and gave it to me and the cellphone was handed
to Joel, the necklace, bracelet and the money were taken by Rolly.
Q: You said that this wallet was handed to you by Rolly, what did you do with the wallet?
A: I opened the wallet and it contained Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) case [sic],
Driver's License and that is where I saw that the name of the long hair was Venson
Evangelista...
Q: From NLEX[,] where did you go thereafter?
A: Joel called someone, I don't know who among the Dominguez brothers he was
talking to, but he was given instruction that we should proceed to a safe house in
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
xxxx
Q: So what time did you arrive at [sic] Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Past 5:00, ma'am.
Q: Upon reaching that safe house[,] what happened there?
A: When we arrived there[,] Roger Dominguez was standing at the gate of the safe
house and a green Lancer car was parked there.
xxxx
Q: What happened to the safe house after you arrived and when you saw Roger and
Ann?
A: When I saw Roger and his girlfriend Ann, I alighted from the Land Cruiser.
xxxx
Q: What about Venson Evangelista, the long hair, where was he?
A: He was still with Rolly lying face down inside the vehicle.
xxxx
Q: So when you approached Roger Dominguez, what happened then?
A: He told me that Ann will bring me to SM San Fernando and to wait for his text or call
if ever he will fetch me.
xxxx
Q: So when you were given instructions by Roger[, ] what did you do thereafter?
A: When I was approaching the Lancer where Ann was there[,] Roger whistled at me.
Q: So when Roger whistled at you[,] what did you do?
A: I approached the brothers.
Q: And when you approached[,] what happened?
A: He ordered me to place used tires and a gallon of gasoline at the green Pajero.
xxxx
Q: And what vehicle did they use in fetching you at SM San Fernando?
A: The Land Cruiser we used before I was brought to SM San Fernando.
xxxx
108
Q: Would you know who is the owner of the vehicle, the Land Cruiser?
A: That was the vehicle that we took on that day from the long hair.
xxxx
Q: After you were fetched by Roger and Ann using that Land Cruiser[,] where did you
go?
A: We went to Kapalangan, Calumpit, Bulacan.
xxxx
Q: Upon arriving at the Greenville Subdivision[,] what did you observe?
A: We were the only ones who were there. After we alighted from the vehicle[,] Roger
immediately replaced the plate number of the vehicle with the plate number we took
from the person when we were at the Kalapangan.
xxxx
Q: Now we go back, Mr. Witness, to this long hair. Would you know, Mr. Witness, as to
what happened to the gagged and hog-tied long hair after you last saw him hours
earlier stay inside the Land Cruiser before you left for SM?
A: Roger Dominguez, Ann and I were having dinner already, Roger Dominguez
received a call from Jayson and the reason why I know it came from Soy [is] because
Roger answered "Soy".
Q: And what did you hear?
A: I heard that Roger Dominguez was asking Soy "[s]igurado kang patay na, sigurado
kang sunog na, sigurado kang hindi na makikita yan?"
xxxx
Q: So when Jayson Miranda informed you what is his present to you[,] what was his
response?
A: I asked him "kanino yan" and he said it's with the long hair and when I asked him the
whereabouts[,] he said "patay na, sunog na".
Q: What did he tell you as to how Venson Evangelista was killed? x x x
A: He narrated it, he said that he was first shot and his body was inserted inside two
used tires after that they poured gasoline and he was burned in a rice field somewhere
in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot subscribe to Miranda's postulation that the above narration is extraneous to the
purpose of qualifying Mendiola as a state witness. On the contrary, they were essential in
establishing that he is not the main perpetrator of the murder of Venson Evangelista,
rendering him eligible as a state witness under Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, even assuming arguendo that the foregoing details are not germane to the
purpose for which the testimony of Mendiola was offered, it was nevertheless incumbent
upon respondents to have timely objected against the line of questioning for irrelevance. As
prescribed by Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately
after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
Noteworthy is that Miranda never raised in his Comment that he and his co-respondents
have timely raised an objection when Mendiola delved into the particulars of the crime in his
testimony. They are, thus, precluded from belatedly questioning the relevance of the said
details.
Respondents had the opportunity to cross-examine Mendiola
What is more, embedded in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court is the guideline for
perpetuating the testimony of a deceased witness during criminal trial, viz:
RULE 115
Rights of Accused
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled to the following rights:
xxxx
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party
may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased,
out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (emphasis added)
109
Verily, the sole condition imposed for the utilization of the testimony of a deceased witness
is that the opposing party had the opportunity to cross-examine the same. In this regard,
respondents lament that they were deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Mendiola
upon his passing prior to being presented as a witness during trial proper. Hence, they
argue that Mendiola's testimony ought to be stricken off the records.
We are not persuaded.
One of the most basic rights of an accused person under our justice system is the right to
confront the witnesses against him face to face. Subsumed under this right of confrontation
is the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. And as the Court has
elucidated in People v. Seneris (Seneris), the right, though fundamental, may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the same. As the case
instructs:
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to
cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principles underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for
reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity
to cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record. (emphasis added, citations omitted)
Here, respondents have to realize that their option to not ask for a continuance and reserve
the right to continue with their line of questioning for trial proper instead carried inherent
risks, including their present predicament. Respondents ought to have been aware that their
decision would pave the way not only for the termination of the discharge proceedings, but
also for the eventual application of the last paragraph of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court should the RTC resolve to discharge Mendiola as a state witness, as it in fact did.
The assumption of the risk, to Our mind, amounted to a waiver of any objection as to the
admissibility of Mendiola's testimony during the discharge hearing.
Furthermore, Seneris elucidates that the testimony of the deceased prosecution witness
shall not be expunged from the records if the defense was able to conduct a rigorous and
extensive cross-examination prior to the witness' demise. As held:
Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of private respondent of the
deceased witness was extensive and already covered the subject matter of his
direct testimony as state witness relating to the essential elements of the crime
of parricide, and what remained for further cross-examination is the matter of price or
 reward allegedly paid by private respondent for the commission of the crime, which is
merely an aggravating circumstance and does not affect the existence of the offense
charged, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring as
entirely inadmissible the testimony of the state witness who died through no
fault of any of the parties before his cross-examination could be finished.
(emphasis added)
In the case at bar, the records disclose that Mendiola was cross examined at length for his
testimony by the counsels of Miranda and the Dominguez brothers. More, such
cross-examination already covered the details of the commission of the offense, to wit:
ATTY. PEREZ for JAYSON MIRANDA
Q: You admitted in your Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 20, 2011 that before the
alleged carnapping and slaying of Mr. Venson Evangelista, you called Mr. Boy
Evangelista over the cellphone, did you recall saying this, Mr. Witness? x x x
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, it is a fact that you arranged in [sic] meeting with the Evangelistas before the
alleged carjacking and slaying of Mr. Venson Evangelista?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: And when Venson Evangelista told you that the Land Cruiser is still available, you
asked him if you could road test the vehicle, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And is it not a fact, that Mr. Venson Evangelista initially refused to have the vehicle
road tested, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this is now the point, Mr. Witness, when you uttered the following remarks: "3.4
million yang sasakyang binibenta mo, hindi mo ipaparoad test", do you recall saying
that?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: If not for your remark, the remark which I have said a while ago, Venson Evangelista
would not have agreed to the road test?
A: That was the reason why I went there and it was my job to convince the owner to
110
have the vehicle road tested so, I have to do my part, sir.
xxxx
Q: It was when you are about to go back to the residence of Mr. Venson Evangelista, it
was at that point when Joel allegedly poked his gun against a [sic] person of Mr.
Venson Evangelista, do you recall saying this?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, after allegedly seizing the vehicle and the person of Mr. Venson Evangelista,
you proceeded to Mabida, Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: During the 50-minute travel, never did it occur to you to object to the alleged plan to
kill Mr. Venson Evangelista?
A: When I first saw that the victim was being half-tied [sic] and placed packaging tape
on his mouth and hands and eyes, I was not able to say a word because as far as I
know, I was hired only to sell total wrecked, flooded and carnapped vehicles and I
never thought that I would be part of the group that would kill, sir.
ATTY. OSCAR RARO for the Dominguez Brothers
Q: Now what time did you arrive at Sgt. Catolos Street, 3:00 o'clock?
A: Around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.
Q: And how long did it take you to convince Venson to road test the vehicle?
A: 10 to 20 minutes, sir.
Q: And after that you went around that place, twice and then you proceeded to NLEX?
A: After convincing him, we directly go out to road test the vehicle twice and go around
the area of Sgt. Catolos Street in Cubao then after which we stopped near their house
then we proceeded directly to NLEX[,] sir.
xxxx
Q: What time did you arrive at Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Almost 6:00 in the evening, sir.
xxxx
 Q: You stated on page 17 of the transcript of stenographic notes on June 27, 2011 that
the Dominguez brothers are the ones planning the operation and funding it, you stated
that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But aside from your statement, do you have any other proof or witness that can
corroborate this?
A: Probably what I can say is that the things that I saw, I had experienced and the
orders that I have received from them, that's the reason why I am saying that they are
the ones funding and planning all these things because all the orders that I followed
came from the two (2) brothers, sir.
cross-examination of the deceased witness during the discharge hearing.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May 27,
2016 Decision and January 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
139255 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of Alfred Mendiola in
Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215 in
Quezon City is hereby REINSTATED. With respect to the documents and other evidence
authenticated by Mendiola during the discharge proceeding, the RTC shall rule upon their
admissibility when the same are formally offered in evidence.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

Q: And you also stated and I was fascinated by this story on your direct that before you
leave for SM, you were ask[ed] to find used tires and a gallon of gasoline and load it at
the green pajero while at Mabalacat?
A: I did not say that I was asked to look for used tires because there are so many
scattered tires in that safe house. I was just asked to pick up used tires and get one (1)
gallon of gasoline and bring them inside the green pajero, sir.

Q: How many people were there at the time you were ask[ed] to bring these tires to the
green pajero?
A: Me, Raymond Dominguez and Roger Dominguez were there. Ann was inside the
gray lancer. Inside the land cruiser were Joel, Rolly and the long hair who was covered
with a blanket and Jayson Miranda was inside the pajero while I was loading the said
items, sir.

COURT: But you were the only one who loaded the two (2) used tires and a gallon of
gasoline inside the vehicle?
A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: Without anybody helped [sic] you?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Respondents' reservation for trial proper of the right to further cross examine Mendiola did
not diminish the sufficiency of the opportunity that they were given to confront the adverse
witnesses. Notwithstanding the said reservation, Mendiola's testimonies and admissions as
regards the particulars of the crime already formed part of the records of the case when the
RTC granted his motion to be declared a state witness. Respondents' constitutional rights
were not violated since the fair hearing envisaged by criminal due process had been
complied with when the counsels for the respondents conducted a rigorous and exhaustive

111
G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017
JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION)
AND ERINEO S. MALIKSI, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the February 2, 2015 and
March 20, 2015 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0432, which dismissed the case filed by Juanito Victor C. Remulla (Remulla)
against respondent Erineo S. Maliksi (Maliksi) for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On August 12, 2005, Remulla filed a criminal complaint against Maliksi before the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. He alleged
that Maliksi, as governor of Cavite, caused the purchase of certain medical supplies from
Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation in November 2002 without conducting any public
bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to it. On December 15, 2005,
Maliksi filed his counter-affidavit.
The Ombudsman Ruling
After almost nine (9) years, in a resolution, dated August 27, 2014, the Ombudsman found
probable cause against Maliksi for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Maliksi filed his motion for reconsideration, arguing that there was no probable cause and
that there was a violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. In its order, dated
October 22, 2014, the Ombudsman denied the said motion for reconsideration.
In November 2014, the Ombudsman filed an information for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019 against Maliksi before the Sandiganbayan. Maliksi then filed his Motion to
Dismiss, dated November 20, 2014, alleging that the finding of probable cause against him
was null and void, and that his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case was
violated. According to him, the 9-year delay in the proceedings caused him undue prejudice.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
In its February 2, 2015 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan found that Maliksi's right to a speedy
disposition of his case was violated. Thus, it dismissed the case against him. It stated that
the explanation provided by the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor
112
(OSP), was insufficient to justify its 9-year delay in the resolution of Maliksi's case. The
Sandiganbayan noted that the interval was caused by the delay in the routing or
transmission of the records of the case, which was unacceptable. Citing Coscolluela v.
Sandiganbayan, (Coscolluela), it wrote that it was inconsequential to determine whether an
accused had followed up on his case because it was not his duty to do so. The
Sandiganbayan opined that it was the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the
resolution of the case within a reasonable time.
On February 12, 2015, the OSP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing that the
delay in the preliminary investigation was neither whimsical nor capricious, considering that
Maliksi did not complain on the delay.
In its assailed resolution, dated March 20, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
partial reconsideration. It reiterated that the fact-finding of the case, which lasted for three (3)
years, and the preliminary investigation, which lasted for six (6) years, were due to
mechanical routing and avoidable delay. The Sandiganbayan found that such delays were
unnecessary and unacceptable. It also echoed Coscolluela that it was not the duty of the
respondent in a preliminary investigation to follow up on the prosecution of his case.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT.
Remulla argues that the Sandiganbayan should not have dismissed the case as there was
a finding of probable cause; that there was no violation of Maliksi's right to a speedy
disposition of his case because he did not promptly assert his right; that mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient to invoke inordinate delay; that in Tilendo v.
Ombudsman (Tilendo), there must be an active assertion of the right to a speedy disposition
of cases before the Ombudsman; and that Coscolluela is inapplicable because the
petitioner therein was completely unaware of his pending case.
In his Comment, Maliksi countered that the petition was defective because it was filed by
Remulla, a private party. He underscored that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
or, in certain instances, the OSP, may bring or defend actions for or on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. Maliksi also pointed out that the delay of nine (9) years in the
preliminary investigation of his case was clearly an inordinate delay. He cited the cases
of Tatad v. Tanodbayan and People v. Sandiganbayan, where even delays of even shorter
period of years were considered violations of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
Finally, Maliksi argued that the petition was a violation of his constitutional right against
double jeopardy because a dismissal of criminal case due to the right to speedy disposition
of a case is tantamount to an acquittal.
In his Reply, Remulla averred that he had the legal standing to file this subject petition as a
taxpayer or a citizen because public funds were illegally disbursed. He contended that the
length of delay was not the only factor that must be considered in determining inordinate
delay. Remulla invoked the cases of Guerrero v. CA (Guerrero), Bernat v.
Sandiganbayan (Bernat) and Tello v. People (Tello), where the failure of the accused to
assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case was deemed a waiver for such right. He
pointed out that Maliksi knew that there was a pending case against him but he never
asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case during the preliminary investigation.
Finally, Remulla claimed that there was no violation of the right against double jeopardy as
the dismissal of Maliksi's case was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman, through the OSP, argued that Court must provide a
definitive ruling on the concept of inordinate delay because the current model was still in a
state of perpetual flux. It opined that Coscolluela was inapplicable in the present case as
Maliksi was aware of the pending case against him before the Ombudsman. The OSP also
emphasized that the Sandiganbayan merely dismissed the case against Maliksi by
considering the sole factor of length of delay. It cited the case of Barker v. Wingo, where the
defendant's assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial was one of the factors
to be considered in an inquiry whether there was deprivation of such right. The OSP echoed
the argument of Remulla that an accused who does not take any step whatsoever to
accelerate the disposition of the case was deemed to have slept on his right and have given
acquiesces to the supervening delays.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The petition was filed by a private party
Procedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced by a complaint or an
information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control, of a public prosecutor. In
appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals (CA) and before this Court, the OSG
is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. In certain instances, the OSP represented the People,
when it involved criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The present case challenges the dismissal of a criminal case due to the violation of the right
to speedy disposition of cases. The petition filed before this Court was initiated by Remulla
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in his capacity as a private complainant without the intervention of either the OSG or the
OSP. Although he claims that he has legal standing as a taxpayer, the present case is
criminal in nature and the People is the real party in interest. Remulla captioned his petition
as "People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Erineo S.
Maliksi" but it is clear that he does not represent the People.
Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf such as when there is a denial of due process, or where the
dismissal of the case is capricious shall certiorari lie. As will be discussed later, Remulla
failed to qualify in any of these exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, he has no legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against Maliksi on the ground of
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative concept
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a
case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.
More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo was promulgated,
this Court, in Martin v. Ver, began adopting the "balancing test" to determine whether a
defendant's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of cases has been violated. As
this test necessarily compels the courts to approach such cases on an ad hoc basis, the
conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to
wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or
non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. None of
these elements, however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and
must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. These factors have no
talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in.a difficult and sensitive balancing process.
In this case, Remulla argues that the cases of Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello dictate
that it is mandatory for a respondent or accused to actively assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case before it may be dismissed on the said ground. He insists that Maliksi
failed to follow up on his case during the preliminary investigation, hence, he cannot invoke
his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Further, he avers that the doctrine
in Coscolluela, where the Court held that there was no need for the respondent to follow up
his case, is not controlling and it is only applicable when the respondent is completely
unaware of the preliminary investigation against him.
To resolve these issues, the first set of cases cited by Remulla must be examined to
determine whether it is mandatory for a respondent or accused to assert his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. Also, the case of Coscolluela and its related cases must be
evaluated whether the respondent or accused has the obligation to follow up his case.
Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello cases
In Tilendo, the petitioner therein invoked his right to a speedy disposition of his case
because the preliminary investigation by the NBI lasted for three (3) years before it filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman. In denying his petition, the Court held that there was no
unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage only began
after the NBI filed its complaint against Tilendo. Even assuming there was delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation, Tilendo did not do anything to accelerate the
disposition of his case.
In Guerrero, the last pleading before the Court of First Instance was filed on December 21,
1979. The case was later re-assigned to two other judges, and on March 14, 1990, the last
judge found out that the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) was incomplete and ordered
the parties to have the same completed. The petitioner therein filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Court ruled that there was
no such violation because it was only after the new judge reset the retaking of the
testimonies that the petitioner asserted his right. It was also held that a judge could hardly
be faulted for the delay because he could not have rendered the decision without the TSN.
The Court observed that the conduct of the case could have a different dimension had the
petitioner made some overt act to assert his right.
Later, in Bernat, the criminal case against the petitioner therein was submitted for resolution
before the Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1994. It was reassigned to Justice Ma. Cristina G.
Cortez-Estrada upon her assumption of office on November 3, 1998; and sometime in 2002,
she found out that some of the TSN were missing. Thus, the parties were ordered to attend
a conference to discuss the matter. Instead of attending the conference, the petitioner
therein filed a motion asserting his right to a speedy trial. In dismissing his argument, the
Court cited the case of Guerrero where the TSN were also lost and the judge had to retake
the testimonies. It noted that the petitioner failed to assert his rights. The Court also
reiterated the ruling in Guerrero that the case could have taken a different dimension had
the petitioner actively asserted his right to a speedy trial.
Similarly, Tello echoed the doctrine in Bernat because the petitioner therein did not take
any step to accelerate the disposition of his case. He only invoked his right to speedy trial
after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting him for malversation of public
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funds.
Coscolluela and its related cases
In Coscolluela, the petitioners therein were investigated for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. In a resolution, dated March 27, 2003, the assigned graft investigator found
probable cause against the petitioners. The Ombudsman, however, only approved the said
resolution on May 21, 2009 and filed the information on June 19, 2009. The petitioners
sought to dismiss the case as the delay of six (6) years violated their right to a speedy
disposition of their case. In upholding the position of the petitioners, the Court ruled that
there was unjustified delay in the preliminary investigation of the case. The Ombudsman
could not give a sufficient justification why it took six (6) years before it approved the
resolution of the graft investigator. The Court also held that it was not the petitioners' duty to
follow up on the prosecution of their case. The petitioners therein were not informed of the
ongoing preliminary investigation against them.
Coscolluela relied on the case of Duterte v. Sandiganbayan (Duterte) to justify that there
was no requirement to follow up a case. In the said case, the petitioners were required to file
a comment, instead of a counter-affidavit. The preliminary investigation was delayed for four
(4) years. They could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were
completely unaware that the investigation was still ongoing. The Court also noted therein
that the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel reason which
could justify the 4-year delay in terminating its investigation and the incident did not involve
complicated factual and legal issues.
Earlier, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan (Cervantes), a complaint for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 was filed before the Tanodbayan. On October 16, 1986, the petitioner
therein filed an affidavit to answer the allegations against him. On May 18, 1992, or after
almost six (6) years, an information was filed by the OSP with the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The Court upheld his right
because the OSP's explanation that no political motivation appeared to have tainted the
prosecution of the case was insufficient reason to excuse the inordinate delay. It was also
ruled therein that "[i]t is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as
mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes
directly attributable to him."
More recently, in People v. Sandiganbayan (People), a complaint was filed against the
private respondents therein on December 28, 1994 before the Ombudsman. The last
counter-affidavit was filed by the private respondents on March 11, 1996. On July 10, 1996,
the special prosecution officer issued a memorandum recommending the filing of violation
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman. Instead of
filing the information, however, the case was subjected to several "thorough review and
reevaluation." It was only on October 6, 2009 that the criminal informations were filed before
the Sandiganbayan. Eventually, the private respondents implored their right to speedy
disposition of their case.
It was held therein that there was inordinate delay of twelve (12) years from the time that the
last counter-affidavit was filed until the informations were lodged before the court. The
explanation of the OSP that the case was subjected to a painstaking review and that the
Ombudsman had to transfer to its new building Were not given credence by the Court. It
emphasized that the Ombudsman simply failed to timely exercise its discretion as to
whether or not to file criminal cases against the private respondents. The Court did not
sustain the OSP's argument that the respondents must be blamed for not taking any step
whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. Citing Cervantes, the Court
reiterated that it was the duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case
regardless of the fact that the accused did not object to the delay.
Finally, in Inocentes v. People (Inocentes), a complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) was
filed before the Ombudsman against the petitioner therein. Following the denial of his
motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2005, the prosecution filed the informations
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Tarlac City. On March 14, 2006, however, the
Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the informations. From this point, it took almost six
(6) years, or only on May 2, 2012, before the informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The Court opined that there was inordinate delay in the disposition of the
petitioner's case because it took six (6) years before his case and the records thereof was
transferred from the RTC to the Sandiganbayan. The argument of the OSP that the
petitioner had no right to complain about the delay because he failed to seasonably invoke
his right was not upheld by the Court. It reiterated the doctrine of Coscolluela that it was not
the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.
Harmonizing the two sets of cases
The first set of cases shows that the criminal cases were not dismissed because of the
non-assertion of the accused of their right to a speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial.
Other factors in the balancing test were also considered by the Court, particularly, the
reason for the delay in the proceedings and the prejudice caused by the delay.
In Guerrero and Bernat, it was held that the delay was acceptable because there was a
necessity to retake the testimonies of the witnesses due to the lost TSN. The courts could
not have adjudicated the case without the TSN. On the other hand, in Tilendo, the Court
accepted the explanation of the OSP that there was no inordinate delay because the NBFs
inquiry was not part of the preliminary investigation. Hence, as the length of delay in these
cases were properly justified by the prosecution and the accused therein failed to take steps
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to accelerate their cases, the Court found that the there was no prejudice caused, which
would warrant the assertion of their right to a speedy disposition of cases.
In the second set of cases, the lengthy delay in the proceeding against the accused therein
was not satisfactorily explained. In Cervantes, the prosecution provided a lackluster excuse
that there was no inordinate delay because the case was not politically motivated, in People,
the filing of the case in court was drastically delayed because it was subjected to
unnecessary reviews, and the Ombudsman basically failed to decide whether to file the
case or not. In Inocentes, there was an unwarranted delay in the filing of the case due to the
lethargic transfer of the records from the RTC to the Sandiganbayan. Finally, in Coscolluela,
the Ombudsman could not give an explanation why the preliminary investigation was
delayed for six years.
Essentially, the Court found in those cases that the State miserably failed to give an
acceptable reason for the extensive delay. Due to the manifest prejudice caused to the
accused therein, the Court no longer gave weighty consideration to their lack of objection
during the period of delay. It was emphasized in those cases that it was the duty of the
prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless if the accused failed to object
to the delay.
Based on the foregoing, there is no conflict between the first and the second set of cases. In
the first set, the Court did not solely rely on the failure of the accused to assert his right;
rather, the proper explanation on the delay and the lack of prejudice to the accused were
also considered therein. In the same manner, the Court in the second set of cases took into
account several factors in sustaining the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases, such as the length of delay, the failure of the prosecution to justify the period of delay,
and the prejudice caused to the accused. The utter failure of the prosecution to explain the
delay of the proceedings outweighed the lack of follow ups from the accused.
Accordingly, both sets of cases only show that "[a] balancing test of applying societal
interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis." To reiterate, none of the factors in the balancing test is
either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together
with other relevant circumstances. Corpus v. Sandiganbayan thoroughly explained how the
factors of the balancing test should be weighed, particularly the prejudiced caused by the
delay, to wit:
xxx Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that
the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to
limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious
is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
 skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the
accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his
liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for
such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the
trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the
State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical
advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the
heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less
heavily against the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the factors for granting a continuance. [Emphases
supplied]
Remulla argues that the assertion or non-assertion of the right to a speedy disposition of
cases determines whether the court must dismiss the case for inordinate delay or continue
the proceedings. Such argument, however, fails to persuade. It must be emphasized that
the balancing test is a relative and flexible concept. The factors therein must be weighed
according to the different facts and circumstances of each case. The courts' are given wide
judicial discretion in analyzing the context of the case, bearing in mind the prejudice caused
by the delay both to the accused and the State.
In addition, there is no constitutional or legal provision which states that it is mandatory for
the accused to follow up his case before his right to its speedy disposition can be
recognized. To rule otherwise would promote judicial, legislation where the Court would
provide a compulsory requisite .not specified by the constitutional provision. It simply cannot
be done, thus, the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test must be upheld.
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Likewise, contrary to the argument of the OSP, the U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo, from
which the balancing test originated, recognizes that a respondent in a criminal case has no
compulsory obligation to follow up on his case. It was held therein that "[a] defendant has ho
duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the
trial is consistent with due process."
Finally, Remulla argues that the doctrine in Coscolluela - that the accused has no duty to
follow up on the prosecution of their case - only applies to cases where the accused is
unaware of the preliminary investigation. A review of related and subsequent cases,
however, validates the said doctrine that it is applicable even if the accused was fully
informed and had participated in the investigation. In Cervantes, the petitioner filed his
affidavit before the Tanodbayan to answer the allegations against him. In People, the
respondents therein were able to file their counter-affidavit with the Ombudsman.
In Inocentes, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman. In all
these cases, the accused were completely informed of the preliminary investigation against
them and they were able to participate in the proceedings before the delays were incurred.
In spite of this, the Court applied the doctrine in Coscolluela because it was the
Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the proceedings within the bounds of reasonable
timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.
In fine, it has been settled that the factors in the balancing test must be given different
consideration and weight based on the factual circumstances of each case. Applying such
principle in this case, the Court can now determine whether or not the Ombudsman
committed inordinate delay and violated Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The Ombudsman failed to justify the delay in the proceedings
As indicated in the resolution, dated February 2, 2015, of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP
gave the following explanation regarding the delay in the proceedings against Maliksi as
follows:
In justifying the length of time that it took the OMB to resolve the case, the prosecution
meticulously explains that three different cases were filed against the accused, two of
which were from the complaint of Juan (sic) Victor C. Remulla for Violation of the
Anti-Graft Law and for Grave Misconduct, which was received by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on August 7, 2005 (Remulla complaints). The third case
was through the Feedback Report of PCSO Fund Allocation Department Manager
Teresita Brazil regarding the "Approved Financial Assistance of P10M to province of
Cavite c/o Gov. Ayong Maliksi," which was transmitted to the Ombudsman Central
Office in 2005 (PCSO complaint). This was allegedly assigned for fact-finding
investigation in July 3, 2006 under CPL-C-05-0188. Upon completion of the
 investigation, the complete record of the third case was said to have been forwarded to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on September 26, 2008 for
consolidation with the two cases initiated by complainant Remulla.
Since the complete records of the Remulla cases, including the proposed Resolution
and Decision, had already been submitted to the Ombudsman Proper for approval on
January 9, 2007, through the Central Record Division, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon sent a Memorandum dated October 24, 2008 to the Ombudsman requesting
that the third PCSO case be incorporated with the two Remulla cases already resolved.
This Memorandum Request was allegedly received by the Ombudsman Proper
on June 4, 2009 and approved by then Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. On April
6, 2010, the Chief Administrative Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon forwarded the complete record of the third PCSO case to the Chief of the Central
Records Division for incorporation with the two Remulla cases.
Continuing to the recital of events, the prosecution states that the cases against the
accused were resolved by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon as early as
2007 and were forwarded in the same year to the Ombudsman Proper for final
approval. Unfortunately, final action on the Resolution was allegedly overtaken by
disruptive incidents and political events like the 2010 hostage-taking at the Quirino
Grandstand and the impeachment of Ombudsman Gutierrez that led to her resignation
in April 2011. [Emphases supplied]
The length of delay in the proceedings of Maliksi's case must first be determined. In People
v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that inordinate delay should be computed from the time of
the fact-finding investigation until the completion of the preliminary investigation by the
Ombudsman. The Court expounded that "[t]he guarantee of speedy disposition under
Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile
if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding
investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the
speedy disposition of their cases had been violated."
Applying the foregoing rule, the delay in Maliksi's case started from the fact-finding
investigation of the Ombudsman when he filed his counter-affidavit in Remulla cases on
December 15, 2005 until the completion of the PCSO case on October 24, 2008, or a span
of three (3) years. At that point, the preliminary investigation began, until it was terminated
on August 27, 2014 and the information was filed before the court.in November 2014, or a
period of six (6) years. Thus, the Sandiganbayan observed that the delay incurred in the
proceedings lasted for a total period of nine (9) years. Even if the Court excludes the
fact-finding stage of three (3) years, there was still six (6) years of inordinate delay.
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As to the reason for the delay, the Court is of the view that the explanation provided by the
OSP fails to justify the delay of six (6) years in the resolution of the case against Maliksi
because, first, there was a delay in the approval of the Remulla complaints by the
Ombudsman. These complaints were filed in 2005 and Maliksi filed his counter-affidavit in
the same year, on December 15, 2005. According to the OSP, the proposed resolution and
decision for the Remulla cases were submitted to the Ombudsman as early as January 9,
2007 for approval. The resolution and decision, however, remained unacted by the
Ombudsman so much so that it was only after one (1) year and nine (9) months that the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon was able to send a memorandum, dated October 24, 2008,
for their consolidation with the PCSO case. No explanation for the Ombudsman's inaction
on the Remulla cases was advanced by the OSP.
Second, while the memorandum for consolidation of the Remulla and PCSO cases was
dated October 24, 2008, it was only received by the Ombudsman on June 4, 2009.
Evidently, the mere routing or transfer of the memorandum from the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon to the Ombudsman took almost eight (8) months. Then Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved the memorandum for consolidation on an unspecified date,
Third, notwithstanding the approval of' the consolidation by the Ombudsman, it was only on
April 6, 2010 when the Chief Administrative Officer of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
forwarded the complete record of the third PCSO case to the Chief of the Central Records
Division. As the approval of the memorandum on consolidation was undated, the
Sandiganbayan assumed that the cause of delay was either the Ombudsman's belated
approval or the Chief Administrative Officer of the Deputy Ombudsman's delay in the
transmittal of the case records. In either case, a delay of ten (10) months for the
implementation of a memorandum for consolidation is unacceptable.
Noticeably, the transfer of these memoranda and records are ministerial in nature and does
not require the exercise of discretion. Thus, the Court is baffled on how these routine acts
could take so long to be accomplished, As properly observed by the Sandiganbayan,
routine matters could have been exercised at a faster pace in order to avoid unnecessary
delay that expectedly bears heavily on litigants.
Fourth, from the time that the consolidation of the Remulla and PCSO cases were approved
on April 6, 2010, it took four (4) years, or until July 8, 2014, before the joint resolution finding
probable cause against Maliksi was issued by the Ombudsman. There is a void of account
as to what exactly happened to the case during this 4-year period. Even more baffling was
that although the cases were consolidated, the information filed in November 2014 only
involved the Remulla case.
Lastly, the OSP sought the understanding of the Sandiganbayan and explained that the
resolution of the consolidated cases was overtaken by disruptive events such as the 2010
hostage-taking at the Quirino Grandstand and the impeachment complaint against the
Ombudsman Gutierrez. These excuses, however, could hardly be considered as enough
reason to warrant the delay in the proceedings. Obviously, these events have no direct
relation to the Remulla and PCSO cases to affect their speedy resolution. The functions of
the Ombudsman under the Constitution are not suspended by the occurrence of unrelated
events to its mandate, whether political or not. Moreover, to sustain the argument of the
OSP would set a perilous precedent as the delayed cases pending before the Ombudsman
from 2010 to 2014 can simply be overlooked by citing these occasions.
Based on the foregoing, the explanation provided by the OSP falls short of the reasonable
justification to authorize delay in the proceedings. It was downright unnecessary to prolong
the proceedings for a period of nine (9) years. To summarize, the initial delay began when
the Ombudsman did not act with dispatch on the approval or disapproval of the proposed
resolution and decision in the Remulla. Due to its delay, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
was able to send a memorandum for consolidation with the PCSO case. The mere routing
or transfer of the memorandum to the Ombudsman incurred eight (8) months of delay. Then,
when the memorandum was approved, it took ten (10) months before the records could be
transferred from the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the Ombudsman. Finally, for a period
of four (4) years, the consolidated cases sat at the Ombudsman. As the OSP did not submit
an explanation as to the status of the case in that 4-year period, the Court can only conduct
guesswork on the cause of its delay.
Had the Ombudsman immediately approved or disapproved the proposed resolution and
decision submitted to its office on January 9, 2007, then the case would have been promptly
acted upon. If filed before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution and the defense could have
timely presented their case. Instead, the Ombudsman chose inaction which led to a chain of
delays lasting until July 8, 2014. After the lapse of nine (9) years of being kept in the dark,
Maliksi could not have had the opportunity to timely present, his case in court due to the
extensive delay in the preliminary investigation. Certainly, this protracted period of
uncertainty over his criminal case caused him prejudice, living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and even, hostility.
Further, in light of the circumstances of this case, the Court does not give great weight to
Maliksi's lack of objection over the delay because the OSP miserably failed to defend the
Ombudsman's inaction. The prosecution could not give an acceptable reason to justify the
9-year interval before the case was filed in court. The proceedings were marred by the
delay in the mechanical transfer of documents and records. No steps were taken by the
Ombudsman to ensure that the preliminary investigation would be resolved in a timely
manner. Clearly, the failure of the prosecution to justify the 9-year interval before the case
was filed in court far outweighs Maliksi's own inaction over the delay. As articulated
in Coscolluela, Duterte, Cervantes, People, and Inocentes, the Court reiterates that it is the
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duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless of whether or not
the accused objects to the delay.
Likewise, Remulla's argument that the Sandiganbayan only took into account the length of
delay in the proceedings deserves scant consideration. Aside from the length of delay, the
anti-graft court thoroughly discussed the Ombudsman's failure to give a suitable reason for
the delay and the prejudice it had caused to Maliksi. The latter's lack of follow up with his
case was not given much weight because of the prosecution's manifest failure to justify the
protracted lull in the proceedings. The Sandiganbayan, after properly taking into
consideration all the relevant factors in the balancing test and gave different weight on each
factor based on the particular circumstances of this case, came to a conclusion that the
Ombudsman committed inordinate delay. The case underwent the intricate and difficult
balancing test before Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case was sustained. Thus,
the Court rules that the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal case against Maliksi.
To conclude, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the underlying principle of the
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases in the landmark case of Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan:
xxx Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner's constitutional rights. xxx
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of
a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation.
But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected for
now, until man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 2, 2015 and March 20, 2015
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Second Division in SB-14-CRM-0432 are AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018 The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AMADO "JAKE" P. These three consolidated cases originated from complaints for nine counts of libel on
MACASAET, ENRIQUE P. ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS REYES account of nine interrelated newspaper articles which appeared in the
(DECEASED),Respondents. newspapers Malaya and Abante where statements allegedly derogatory to then Governor
Casimiro "Ito" M. Ynares, Jr. (Ynares) and former Undersecretary of the Department of
G.R. No. 196720, March 05, 2018 Interior and Local Government Atty. Narciso "Jun" Y. Santiago, Jr. (Santiago) were written
by Amado "Jake" Macasaet (Macasaet). Ynares filed the two counts of libel while Santiago
AMADO "JAKE" P. MACASAET, ENRIQUE P. ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS filed the other seven counts of libel.
REYES (DECEASED), Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NARCISO
"JUN" Y. SANTIAGO, JR., Respondents. Of the nine counts of libel, probable causes for libel were found in relation to the April 21,
1999 issue of Malaya with respect to the article entitled "Santiago's gambling habits" and
G.R. No. 197324, March 05, 2018 the March 1, 1999 issue of Malaya regarding the article entitled "NCA-UCAP FEUD:
Walang trabaho, personalan lang." Both articles were written by Macasaet. The libel
AMADO "JAKE" P. MACASAET, ENRIQUE P. ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS complaint involving the newspaper Abante was dismissed.
REYES (DECEASED), Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CASIMIRO
"ITO" YNARES, Respondents. Thus, separate Informations for the two counts of libel were filed against
Macasaet, Malaya's Publisher, Chairman and writer, Enrique P. Romualdez
(Romualdez), Malaya's Executive Editor, and Joy P. Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), Malaya's
DECISION
Editor (collectively, the accused). The present cases revolve around these two libel cases.
CAGUIOA, J.: Pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated October 14, 2013, the cases were considered
closed and terminated as to Delos Reyes who died on May 3, 2013 per Notice of
Before the Court are three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari (Petitions) under Death dated June 17, 2013, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The October
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing: 14, 2013 Resolution became final and executory on December 13, 2013.

1. In G.R. No. 196094, the Decision dated October 19, 2010 (October 2010 Decision) of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113449, granting the petition, nullifying the
Orders dated November 3, 2009 and January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 37 (RTC Manila, Br. 37) in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 and dismissing the
Information for libel as well as the CA Resolution dated March 8, 2011 denying the Office of
the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration;
According to Malaya, "Amado 'Jake' P. Macasaet peacefully was brought home by his
Creator at 8:35 am, January 7, 2018 surrounded by his family." To date, however, no notice
of his death has been filed with the Court.
The deaths of Delos Reyes and Macasaet notwithstanding, these Petitions have not been
mooted because there remains an accused, Romualdez.

2. In G.R. No. 196720, the CA Decision dated February 10, 2011 (February 2011 Decision) G.R. No. 196720 (first petition)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 110224, denying the petition and affirming the Orders dated February 19,
2009 and June 1, 2009 of the RTC Manila, Br. 37 in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 as well The assailed CA February 2011 Decision in the first petition summarizes the facts as
as the CA Resolution dated April 28, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration; and follows:

3. In G.R. No. 197324, the CA Decision dated January 26, 2011 (January 2011 Decision) in xxx Macasaet is the Publisher and Chairman of Malaya, a newspaper of general
CA-G.R. SP No. 110010, denying the petition and affirming the Orders dated November 20, circulation while xxx Romualdez and xxx [D]elos Reyes are the Executive Editor and
2008 and May 5, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 (RTC Manila, Br. 36) Editor, respectively, of said publication.
in Criminal Case No. 08-263272 as well as the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2011 denying
the motion for reconsideration.
119
On April 27, 1999, xxx Santiago, who was then the Secretary-General of the National
Cockers Association (NCA), filed an Affidavit-Complaint against [the accused],
accusing them of publishing an allegedly libelous article entitled, "Santiago's gambling
habits." The relevant portion of the complaint states:
"3. In the April 21, 1999 issue of Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation,
[accused], conspiring and confederating with one another, caused to be
published a libelous article entitled [']Santiago's gambling habits['], a
photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A ".
4. The above article imputes defamatory statements against me in that I
allegedly have a vice or defect, particularly, that I have a serious gambling
habit which is widely known, xxx."
The affidavit-complaint was filed in Pasig City, where the article was allegedly first
printed and published, xxx Macasaet filed his counter-affidavit stating, among others,
that venue was improperly laid since xxx Santiago was a resident of Quezon City and
Malaya was published in Manila.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal issued a Consolidated [Review]
Resolution, dated September 28, 2007, ruling in this wise:
"As earlier stated, venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions. Hence, the
Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal does not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance over all these complaints for libel. This office may assume
jurisdiction over a libel case only when the established venue is within the
Province of Rizal.
WHEREFORE, for want of jurisdiction by reason of improper venue, we have
no authority to resolve these cases on their merits. Consequently, we hereby
dismiss the same without prejudice. Therefore, let the records of these
cases be forwarded to the Office of the Pasig City Prosecutor for further
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED, Pasig City, September 28, 2007." (Underscoring supplied)
Sometime in January 2008, [the accused] received a subpoena from the Department of
Justice (DOJ), dated January 29, 2008, pertinent to the complaint for libel. Pursuant
thereto, [the accused] submitted their Memorandum, dated April 25, 2008, alleging
mainly that the subject articles involved matters of public interest and that no malice
attended its publication.
120
On July 9, 2008, the DOJ issue a Consolidated Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find probable cause for libel
covered by I.S. No.s (sic) 99-00959 (07-10-12640); and 99-01511 (07-10-12645)
against respondents Amado "Jake" Macasaet, Enrique P. Romualdez and
Joy De Los Reyes and the charges for libel covered by I.S. Nos. 99-01412
(07-10-12643); 99-01413 (07-10-12644); 99-00960 (07-10-12641); 99-00960-A;
00-01713 (07-10-12647); 99-01512 (07-10-12646); 99-01081 (07-10-12642)
against all respondents be DISMISSED for want of merit.
SO ORDERED. Manila City, July 9, 2008."
Resultantly, on July 9, 2008, an Information for libel was filed against [the accused
before the RTC Manila, Br. 37 and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-263273],
thus:
"That on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, as publisher/writer, executive
editor and editor, respectively of Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila
City defamed private complainant Narciso Y. Santiago, Jr., did then and
there knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by writing and
publishing an article in the Malaya which states that [']Now that Narciso
"Jun" Santiago has been appointed undersecretary of local government, it
would be interesting to examine his statement of assets and liabilities which
is presumed to be joint with that of his wife, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago.
If Jun continues his cockfights- and there is no reason he should not, inspite
(sic) of is (sic) being a public official-the public is entitled to know how much
money he bets on one rooster. If it turns out that the bet is not in proportion
to his net asset, questions should be raised. Of course, Jun can always
place his entry in the derby circuit in a friend's name. That way, it will appear
he is not betting at all. But who, in cockfighting, was born yesterday as far as
Jun Santiago is concerned? Hardly anybody. They all know him['] which is a
libelous statement and to the prejudice of private complainant."
CONTRARY TO LAW."
[The accused] subsequently filed before [the RTC Manila, Br. 37] a motion to dismiss,
dated November 26, 2008, stating that their right to the speedy disposition of their
cases was violated, considering that almost ten years had lapsed without any
resolution of their cases under preliminary investigation. The motion was denied in the
assailed Order, dated February 19, 2009, thus:

"In any event, accused have voluntarily agreed to be arraigned on January 29,
2009 (Macasaet and Romualdez) and February 17, 2009 (Delos Reyes). Such
consent amounts to a waiver of their right to raise the issue of any alleged
unreasonable delay in the disposition of their case during the preliminary
investigation.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
[The accused] filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied for lack of
merit in the second assailed Order, dated June 1, 2009.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTC Manila, Br. 37 Orders dated February 19, 2009 and June
1, 2009. The CA rendered the February 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The Orders,
dated February 19, 2009 and June 1, 2009, issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated April 28, 2011.
Hence, the first petition, which was filed on May 19, 2011.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment on September 2, 2011. Santiago
filed his Comment/Opposition on August 13, 2013. The accused filed a Reply on September
26, 2013.
G.R. No. 196094 (second petition)
The filing of the second petition on May 3, 2011 antedated that of the first petition. However,
the second petition arose from an incident before the RTC Manila, Br. 37 that occurred after
the incident that precipitated the first petition.
After the denial of the accused's motion to dismiss dated November 26, 2008 based on the
121
ground that the filing of the Information dated July 9, 2008 violated their constitutionally
guaranteed right to speedy disposition of their cases, the accused filed before RTC Manila,
Br. 37 another Motion to Dismiss dated September 24, 2009 on the ground that the said
court has no criminal jurisdiction over the case.
RTC Manila, Br. 37, in denying the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit, reasoned out in its
Order dated November 3, 2009 that:
xxx [T]he Information in the case at bar categorically stated the address of Malaya at
Port Area, Manila. While it is the position of [the] accused that this allegation is
insufficient, it must be stressed that this was followed by the phrase, "did then and
there xxx by writing, and publishing an article in the Malaya xxx." This shows that the
alleged libelous article was first published in Manila particularly at the address of
Malaya stated in the Information.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in the Order dated
January 29, 2010. The accused filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA
and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113449. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Comment on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
The CA rendered its October 2010 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 3,
2009 and January 29, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
are NULLIFIED and the Information for libel is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the CA Resolution dated
March 8, 2011.
Hence, the second petition.
The accused filed their Comment on August 3, 2011.
G.R. No. 197324 (third petition)
The CA January 2011 Decision summarizes the facts in the third petition in this wise:
xxx Macasaet xxx is the publisher and also a writer of Malaya, a newspaper of general
circulation, xxx Romualdez xxx and xxx [D]elos Reyes xxx, on the other hand, are
Malaya's Executive Editor and Editor, respectively.
In its 1 March 1999 issue, Malaya caused to be published an article written by
Macasaet, entitled "NCA-UCAP Feud: Walang trabaho, personalan lang," which
tackled the alleged brewing feud between the National Cockers Association (NCA) and
a group organized by its former members, called the United Cockers Association of the
Philippines (UCAP). The article depicted xxx Santiago xxx, husband of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, xxx Ynares xxx and Jorge Araneta of the Araneta Coliseum as the
key players involved in the dirty campaign to undermine the operations of the UCAP.
Also in said article, Macasaet claimed that Ynares had pressured Pasig Mayor Vicente
Eusebio to cancel UCAP's permit to use its Pasig Square Garden for its cock derbies. It
was claimed that Ynares had bluntly told said mayor that UCAP's permit should be
cancelled; otherwise, the city will not be allowed to dump its garbage in Antipole
Macasaet further insinuated that Ynares will apply the same threat on all municipalities
in Rizal.
Aggrieved by the content of said article, xxx Ynares immediately filed an
Affidavit-Complaint dated 16 March 1999 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal. Nine (9) other criminal complaints were subsequently filed by xxx Ynares and
Santiago, all in connection with the series of subsequent articles that was (sic) also
written by Macasaet regarding said NCA-UCAP dispute.
In his Counter-Affidavit filed on 12 April 1999, xxx Macasaet argued that the 1 March
1999 Malaya article has been a fair and true report based not only on the conversations
he personally had with the complainant but also on personal verification and interview
conducted by him with a reliable source. Claiming that the assailed article is qualifiedly
privileged and considering further the absence of malice on his part, the instant libel
complaint should be dismissed.
In a Consolidated Review Resolution of 28 September 2007, the instant libel complaint
and the other complaints filed by xxx Ynares and Santiago were dismissed by the
Provincial Prosecutor, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction by reason of improper
venue.
On 29 January 2008, [the accused] were summoned and required to appear before the
[DOJ] in relation to the previously dismissed complaints. As directed, the parties filed
their respective Memoranda covering all nine (9) complaints.
On 9 July 2008, the DOJ issued a Consolidated Resolution finding probable cause to
indict [the accused] for libel on two (2) out of the nine (9) complaints. Pursuant to said
Consolidated Resolution, an Information was filed before the [RTC Manila, Br. 36]
against [the accused] for libel committed as follows:
122
"That on March 1, 1999, in Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor,
respectively of Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila City defamed private
complainant Casimiro A. Ynares, Jr., did then and there, knowingly, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by writing and publishing an article in the Malaya, which
states that [']To the surprise and chagrin of UCAP members but to the joy of NCA,
it turned out that Rizal Gov. Casimiro "Ito" Ynares, president of the NCA,
pressured Eusebio to cancel permit['] which is a libelous statement and to the
prejudice of private complainant.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
[The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-263272.] Accordingly, [the accused]
were arraigned on 6 October 2008.
On 7 October 2008, [the accused] filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the filing
of the present Information, after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the filing of
the libel complaints, violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy
disposition of cases.
In the now assailed Order of 20 November 2008, the [RTC Manila, Br. 36], in denying
[the accused's] motion to dismiss, opined that the [accused] should have moved for the
dismissal of the case and espoused violation of their right to speedy disposition of
cases when the same was still pending before the Provincial Prosecutor or the DOJ. It
was further ruled that said ground should have been raised by petitioners in a motion to
quash before arraignment, and not by way of a motion to dismiss.
Dissatisfied by the said pronouncement, [the accused] moved for its reconsideration,
which was denied by [RTC Manila, Br. 36] in its Order dated 5 May 2009.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of [RTC Manila, Br. 361 judge, [the accused filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari].
The CA rendered the January 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated June 16, 2011.
Hence, the third petition, which was filed on July 7, 2011. Ynares filed a
Comment/Opposition on August 18, 2011. The OSG filed a Comment on September 19,
2011. The accused filed a Consolidated Reply on November 10, 2011.
Issues
There are two principal issues in the three cases:
In the second petition (G.R. No. 196094), whether
(1 the Information is sufficient in form and substance
) to charge Macasaet and Romualdez with the
crime of libel; and
In the first and third petitions (G.R. Nos. 196720
and 197324), whether the cases filed against
(2
Macasaet and Romualdez should be dismissed
)
because their right to a speedy disposition of the
cases has been violated.
The Court's Ruling
G.R. No. 196094
There is merit in the second petition.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where
the criminal action is filed or vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where
the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not
apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions for which have
been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in
this chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or
by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which
cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint expressly filed by the offended party. (As amended by R.A. No. 1289, June
15, 1955 and R.A. No. 4363, June 19, 1965.)

As to the persons who may be liable for libel and the venue of the libel case, Article 360 of In Agbayani v. Sayo, a case about the venue of a criminal action for written
the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC), provides: defamation or libel, the amendment of Article 360 of the RPC was explained, viz.:

ART. 360. Persons responsible. - Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions
for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or
exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before Article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be

123
 instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed xxx. Under that rule, the criminal action is
transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place.
xxxx
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific
rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts. (Explanatory Note for the bill
which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp.
424-5; xx x).
The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel were also restated in Agbayani, thus:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense.
In the present case, the venue is apparently the place where the alleged defamatory article
in Malaya was printed and first published.
The CA's ruling that the criminal action for libel was filed with the wrong venue was founded
on the following:
124
Ostensibly, the Information only shows that the article was written and published in
Malaya which has an address in Port Area, Manila. There is no allegation of
the situs where the article was printed and first published. It is fatally defective because
it failed to specify whether the address of Malaya, is the same place where the article
was printed and first published. We must emphasize that the address of the publisher is
not necessarily the place of publication. The address would generally refer to the name
or description of a place of residence, business, etc., where a person may be found or
communicated with. It may include the business address, billing address, mailing
address or the residence address of an entity or establishment. To be sure, it is not
identical with the place of publication. While it is possible that the address of Malaya is
the same place where it conducts its business of publication, We cannot presume such
identity without transgression to the basic principle that penal laws are strictly
interpreted against the State and liberally construed in favor of the accused.
Presumption will be disfavored when it collides against the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent. Thus, without stating more, We find the allegations
in the Information insufficient to confer the RTC of Manila with jurisdiction over the
case.
The Court in Bonifacio v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 made the following
clarification in case the basis of the venue of the libel criminal action is the place where the
libel was printed and first published:
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by
the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must
allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or
business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
harass. (Emphasis supplied)
Admittedly, the Information under scrutiny, without using the phrase "printed and first
published," merely states:
That on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor, respectively of
Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila City defamed private complainant Narciso Y.
Santiago, Jr., did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
writing and publishing an article in the Malaya xxx.
The Information does not specifically indicate that Port Area, Manila is the editorial or
business office of Malaya, following the formulation in Bonifacio. And, it cannot be
presumed as the CA further claims that the "address of Malaya is the same place where it
conducts its business of publication."
The Court disagrees with the CA; it finds the Information sufficient.
Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor
defamed Santiago on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and publishing an article in
the Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila. To the Court, it is clear that Port Area, Manila
is where the defamatory article was written and published because that is the address
of Malaya, an unquestionably printed newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the
Information did not expressly state "first published" is of no moment because the word
"published" does not exclude the first publication.
In turn, the accused do not deny that Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business offices
of Malaya and interestingly, they did not raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 08-263272 despite the fact that the Information filed before RTC Manila,
Br. 36 is similarly worded as the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed before
RTC Manila, Br. 37 as to the address of Malaya being at Port Area, Manila City and the
non-inclusion of the phrase "printed and first published."
According to Bonifacio, "the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory
article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers." The Information in
question complies with the Bonifacio directive because it alleges with particularity Port Area,
Manila as the place where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published as
evidenced or supported by the records of the case. The Information need not parrot the
provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase "printed and first
published." If there is no dispute that the place of publication indicated in the Information,
which is Manila in the present case, is the place where the alleged defamatory article was
"printed and first published," then the law is substantially complied with. After all, the filing of
the Information before an RTC of the City of Manila would, borrowing the phraseology
of Bonifacio, forestall any inclination to harass the accused. Besides, it is incumbent upon
the accused to show that Port Area, Manila is not the business or editorial office of Malaya
in the face of evidence in the records of the case that it is so.
The DOJ Consolidated Resolution in its summary of the pertinent facts stated that:
"Records also show that Malaya is published by the People's Independent Media, Inc., with
editorial and business offices at Port Area, Manila xxx." The Consolidated Review
Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal dated September 28, 2007 which initially
dismissed the nine libel complaints of Santiago and Ynares for lack of jurisdiction indicated
the venue where the complaints should be filed, viz.:
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In the case of complainant Santiago, Jr., his libel complaints should be filed either in
Manila, where the libelous matters appearing in ABANTE and MALAYA were first
printed and published, or in the place where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. However, the records do not show Pasig City as to
(sic) the actual residence of complainant Santiago, Jr. at the time of the commission of
the offense charged, except to say that he held office at No. 3 West Fourth St., West
Triangle, Quezon City. And even if we consider this address as his actual place of
residence, or his office address as a public official, which he did not state in his
complaints, still, the filing of these complaints before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
of Rizal violates the rule on venue as provided for in Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Thus, the CA erred in dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 and
nullifying the Orders dated November 3, 2009 and January 29, 2010 of the RTC Manila, Br.
37, denying the accused's motion to dismiss.
G.R. Nos. 196720 and 197324
The first and third petitions are also meritorious.
The accused posit that the CA erred in affirming the RTC ruling that, even though the delay
was not disputed or the reason for it was not explained by the Prosecution, the accused's
right to speedy trial was not violated, and that the accused are deemed to have waived their
right to speedy disposition of their cases for failing to plead such defense during the
preliminary investigation.
Indeed, the Constitution guarantees in the Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 14(2) that: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused xxx shall enjoy the right xxx to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial xxx" and in Article III, Section 16 that: "All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Congress has also enacted in February 12, 1998 Republic Act No. (RA) 8493, otherwise
known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." For its part, the Court promulgated Circular No.
38-98 on August 11, 1998 for the purpose of implementing the provisions of RA 8493. The
provisions of the Circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The right to speedy disposition of the accused's case is explained in Caballes v. CA, thus:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given
to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;
hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
xxxx
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of
the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to
trial; and to limit the [possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the
accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his
liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.
Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
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reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications
invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it
is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage
over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case
load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against
the State.
The right to speedy disposition of one's case, similar to the right to speedy trial, may be
waived. The Court in Nepomuceno v. The Secretary of National Defense observed that the
right to speedy trial as any other constitutionally or statutory conferred right, except when
otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. Therefore, it must be
asserted. The assertion of such right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
whether the accused is being deprived thereof such that the failure to claim the right will
make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a speedy trial. The accused's failure to
timely question the delay would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the
right to question the same. Also, his silence may amount to laches.
To recall, the Affidavit-Complaint which triggered the filing of the Information in the first
petition was filed by Santiago on April 27, 1999 before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
Macasaet filed his Counter-Affidavit on May 24, 1999. On the other hand, the
Affidavit-Complaint that triggered the filing of the Information in the third petition was filed by
Ynares on March 16, 1999. Macasaet filed his Counter-Affidavit on April 12, 1999. The
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal dismissed without prejudice the complaints on September 28,
2007, or more than eight years from the filing of the complaints. On January 29, 2008,
the DOJ issued Summons requiring accused to appear before the said office in relation to
the complaints for libel. On July 9, 2008, the DOJ issued a Consolidated Resolution finding
probable cause for both. On August 21, 2008, two separate Informations for libel were filed
against the accused. One was docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-263272 and raffled to
RTC Manila, Br. 36. And the other was docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-263273 and
raffled to RTC Manila, Br. 37.
In the first criminal case, the accused were arraigned on October 6, 2008 and they filed their
motion to dismiss grounded on their right to speedy disposition of their case on October 7,
2008 while in the second criminal case, they filed their motion to dismiss based on same
ground on November 26, 2008.
Given such backdrop, in both the CA January 2011 Decision (assailed in the third petition)
and the CA February 2011 Decision (assailed in the first petition), the CA uniformly applied
the principle of laches or implied acquiescence in construing the silence of the accused or
their inaction to object to the delay and/or failure to seasonably raise the right to speedy
disposition of their cases as waiver thereof.
The CA invoked Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, which cited the Court's ruling in Guerrero v.
CA, in justifying that the failure of the accused to seasonably raise the right to speedy trial
precludes them from relying on the alleged violation of such right as a ground to dismiss the
case and that by not asserting such right at the earliest possible opportunity they are
deemed to have slept on their right. The CA likewise relied on Dela Peña v.
Sandiganbayan, cited in Valencia, as its justification in construing the silence of the
accused and the absence of any signs or overt acts of asserting their right to a speedy
disposition of their cases in the nine years from the filing of the complaint to the filing of the
Information and their arraignment as waiver of their right, and their inaction on and lack of
objection to the delay can be perceived as implied acquiescence by them.
The Court disagrees with the CA. The CA failed to consider the other factors that must be
present before the right to speedy case determination may be considered to have been
waived. The CA did not consider the length of delay and the reason for the delay. The
length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. In these cases, it must be
recalled that in a Consolidated Review Resolution dated September 28, 2007 of the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor, the complaints filed by Ynares and Santiago were dismissed, without
prejudice, for want of jurisdiction by reason of improper venue. It took the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor more than eight years from the filing of the complaints to dismiss without
prejudice the complaints. The issue on venue in libel cases is neither a novel nor difficult
one. The more than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a
rather routine issue is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Under the
circumstances, it cannot be said "that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice."
second petition has merit is rendered superfluous. The dismissal of the Information for libel
by the CA in the second petition is maintained but on a different ground — the denial of the
right of the accused to speedy disposition of their case. Thus, the second petition is denied
on that ground.
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
(1) the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 196094 is hereby DENIED, the Court of
Appeals' Decision dated October 19, 2010 and Resolution dated March 8, 2011 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 113449 are MODIFIED insofar as the ground for dismissal of the Information for
libel in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
37 is concerned;
(2) the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 196720 is hereby GRANTED, the Court
of Appeals' Decision dated February 10, 2011 and Resolution dated April 28, 2011 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110224 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No.
08-263273 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37 is DISMISSED; and
(3) the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 197324 is hereby GRANTED, the Court
of Appeals' Decision dated January 26, 2011 and Resolution dated June 16, 2011 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110010 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No.
08-263272 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, the silence of the accused during such period could not be viewed as an
unequivocal act of waiver of their right to speedy determination of their cases. That the
accused could have filed a motion for early resolution of their cases is immaterial. The more
than eight years delay the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor incurred before issuing his resolution
of the complaints is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice and such delay could
only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner.

All told, the CA erroneously denied the accused's petitions questioning the denial by the
RTC Manila, Br. 36 and Br. 37 of their motions to dismiss based on their right to speedy
disposition of their cases.

Since the dismissal of the complaints against the accused is warranted because of the
violation of their right to speedy disposition of their cases, the Court's finding that the

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