J. Bernabe Case Digests Remedial Law

CASES OF JUSTICE PERLAS-
BERNABE
REMEDIAL LAW
REMEDIAL LAW
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Substantive law vs. remedial law
B. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court
C. Principle of judicial hierarchy
D. Doctrine of non-interference/judicial stability
TERESITA TAN, Petitioner, -versus- JOVENCIO F. CINCO, SIMON LORI HOLDINGS, INC.,
PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, FORTUNATO G. PE, RAYMUNDO G. PE, JOSE
REVILLA REYES, JR., AND DEPUTY SHERIFF ROMMEL IGNACIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213054, FIRST DIVISION, June 15, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The various branches of the regional trial courts of a province or city, having as they do the same or
equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
The Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it
emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been
dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify
the levy and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a
coordinate and co-equal court.
FACTS:
Respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc., Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose
Revilla Reyes, Jr. extended a loan to one Dante Tan in the amount of P50,000,000.00. The loan was
facilitated by PentaCapital Investment Corporation and was secured by Dante's shares in Best World
Resources Corporation. When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he
proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI, the
individual lenders, and PentaCapital.
However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared,
leaving his obligations unpaid. Hence, respondents filed an action for sum of money against him
before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Dante to pay respondents. In
order to enforce the writ, Sheriff Ignacio levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 126981 registered in Dante's name. An auction sale was then conducted. Consequently, Dante
sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit executed by his wife, petitioner Teresita Tan
attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject
property lapsed without redemption having been made; hence, a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was
issued in favor of respondents.
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Dante filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that the subject property was a family home and therefore,
exempt from execution, and that being a conjugal property, it cannot be made to answer for his
personal obligations without any showing that it had redounded to the benefit of the family. Teresita
– Dante's wife – filed before the Paranaque RTC a complaint against respondents, respondent Sheriff
Ignacio, and the Register of Deeds, for the nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the
certificate of sale issued in favor of respondents.
RTC reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and
the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents. The CA granted the petition and directed the RTC to
allow respondents' Notice of Appeal. Citing the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, it found that the affirmance of the RTC's assailed
issuances would allow Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was
already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take cognizance
of the controversy, on the basis of technicality.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the nullification
case filed by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the
Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents. (YES)
RULING:
The various branches of the regional trial courts of a province or city, having as they do the same or
equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
The Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it
emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have
been dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to
nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a
coordinate and co-equal court. In fact, the Parañaque RTC was already on the right track when it
initially dismissed the nullification case. However, it changed its stance and reconsidered its
disposition upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration, thereby committing reversible error. To
reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the execution of a
judgment was valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and
issued the writ of execution.
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ELDEFONSO G. DEL ROSARIO AND JOSEFINO R. ORTIZ, Petitioners, -versus- CRISTINA
OCAMPO-FERRER, Respondent.
The Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having the same
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments.
In the case at bar, the Court notes that in performing a levy on and subsequent auction sale of the
property covered by TCT No. 30480, Sheriff Ortiz was merely enforcing the writ of execution issued by
the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275 pursuant to its ruling in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088. Since said writ of
execution emanated from the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275, its enforcement cannot be assailed in a co-
equal court such as the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198, as it would violate the doctrine of judicial stability or
noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court.
FACTS:
Ocampo-Ferrer obtained a loan in the amount of P850,000.00 from Del Rosario, secured by a parcel
of land situated in, Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-165897. After Ocampo-Ferrer defaulted on said
loan, Del Rosario filed a complaint for sum of money against her before the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas City. Ocampo-Ferrer and Del Rosario entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby
Ocampo-Ferrer bound herself to pay Del Rosario the amount of P1,200,000.00 on or before June 19,
2005, and that upon receipt of payment, Del Rosario shall return the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-165897. Accordingly, the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275 issued an Order adopting and approving the
said Agreement as the Decision in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088.
Despite the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer still failed to comply with her obligation, thus, compelling Del
Rosario to move for execution. After the issuance of the Writ of Execution, petitioner Sheriff Ortiz of
RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275 issued a Demand/Notice to Pay to Ocampo-Ferrer, which the latter failed to
act upon. This prompted Sheriff Ortiz to levy Ocampo-Ferrer's parcel of land located in Las Piñas,
covered by TCT No. 30480, and to schedule the public auction of said land. At the auction sale, Del
Rosario came out as the sole and highest bidder, and consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued in
his favor. Ocampo-Ferrer filed a complaint before the RTC-Las Piñas, Branch 198 seeking the
annulment of the sheriff’s sale, as well as payment of damages.
Petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against them. They likewise averred that: (a) the
complaint was barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088 and that Ocampo-Ferrer never
challenged the same; and (b) the subject matter of Civil Case No. LP-07-0037 is not within the
jurisdiction of RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 as it is a coequal court of RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275.
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RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 dismissed the case for lack of merit and ordered Del Rosario to return the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-165897 to Ocampo-Ferrer. The CA reversed and set aside the
ruling of the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly held that the levy and consequent sale of the property covered by TCT No.
30480 is null and void. (NO)
RULING:
The Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having the same
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments.
In the case at bar, the Court notes that in performing a levy on and subsequent auction sale of the
property covered by TCT No. 30480, Sheriff Ortiz was merely enforcing the writ of execution issued
by the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275 pursuant to its ruling in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088. Since said writ of
execution emanated from the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 275, its enforcement cannot be assailed in a co-equal
court such as the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198, as it would violate the doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court. Unfortunately, Ocampo-Ferrer
still chose to assail the enforcement of said writ by filing a case before the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198.
Worse, the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 – and even the CA on appeal – chose to resolve the case on the
merits instead of simply dismissing the same in deference to the aforesaid doctrine.
II. JURISDICTION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner, -versus- ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192975, SECOND DIVISION, November 12, 2012. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined
from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and
the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer
to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same. Here, the material averments, as well as the character
of the relief prayed for by petitioners in the complaint before the RTC, show that their action is one for
cancellation of titles and reversion, not for annulment of judgment of the RTC. Hence, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court on annulment of judgment finds no application in the instant case.
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FACTS:
Petitioner Republic filed a complaint before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, for cancellation of titles
and reversion against respondent RCAM and several others. The complaint alleged that RCAM
appears as the registered owner of 8 parcels, to Lot Nos. 43 to 50, of land with a total area of 39,790
square meters situated in Panghulo, Obando, Bulacan under OCT No. 588 supposedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan. OCT No. 588 allegedly emanated from Decree No. 57486 by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office pursuant to a decision of Land Registration Case in favor of
RCAM. A reading, however, of the said decision reveals that it only refers to Lot Nos. 495, 496, 497,
498 and 638 and not to Lot Nos. 43 to 50. In 1934, RCAM sold the said 8 parcels of land to the other
named defendants in the complaint resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. 588 and issuance of TCT
in the names of the corresponding transferees. Subsequently, the Lands Management Bureau
conducted an investigation and ascertained that the subject lots are identical to the lots with a total
area of 22,703 sqm. These parcels of land were certified by the Bureau of Forest Development as
falling within the unclassified lands of the public domain and it was only on May 8, 1984 that they
were declared alienable and disposable with no public land application/land patent.
Petitioner Republic received a copy of a motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-
intervention filed by the Samahang Kabuhayang San Lorenzo KKK, Inc., occupants of the subject
property, which was subsequently granted by the RTC. During the course of the pre-trial, RCAM filed
a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint. It alleged that the action
for reversion of title was essentially one for annulment of judgment of the then CFI of Bulacan, acting
as a Land Registration Court, hence, beyond the competence of the RTC to act upon.
RTC denied RCAM's motion to dismiss for being premature. CA held that while reversion suits are
allowed under the law, the same should be instituted before the CA because the RTC cannot nullify a
decision rendered by a co-equal land registration court.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action filed by the Republic. (YES)
RULING:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors
of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
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amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action
are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the
complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same. In the present case, the
material averments, as well as the character of the relief prayed for by petitioners in the complaint
before the RTC, show that their action is one for cancellation of titles and reversion, not for annulment
of judgment of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Lot Nos. 43 to 50, the parcels of land subject
matter of the action, were not the subject of the CFI's judgment in the relevant prior land registration
case. Hence, petitioners pray that the certificates of title of RCAM be cancelled which will not
necessitate the annulment of said judgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment of
judgment finds no application in the instant case.
The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of
judgment of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and
reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein" and where the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion excess
of jurisdiction can be attributed to the RTC in denying RCAM's motion to dismiss.
A. Classification of jurisdiction
1. Original vs. appellate
2. General vs. special
3. Exclusive vs. concurrent
B. Doctrines of hierarchy of courts and continuity of jurisdiction
C. Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts
JOSE U. PUA and BENJAMIN HANBEN U. PUA, Petitioner, -versus- CITIBANK, N.A., Respondent.
G.R. No. 180064, SECOND DIVISION, September 16, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
However, it is apparent that the SRC provisions governing criminal suits are separate and distinct from
those which pertain to civil suits. Cases which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations of the
requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58,
59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts. Therefore, the civil
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suits falling under the SRC are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and
hence, need not be first filed before the SEC.
FACTS:
Chingyee Yau, Vice-President of Citibank Hongkong offered and sold to Jose and Benjamin Pua
numerous securities issued by various public limited companies established in Jersey, Channel
Islands. The offer, sale, and signing of the subscription agreements of said securities were all made
and perfected at Citibank Binondo in the presence of its officers and employees. Later on, Jose and
Benjamin discovered that the securities sold to them were not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and that the terms and conditions covering the subscription were not
likewise submitted to the SEC for evaluation, approval, and registration. Asserting that respondent’s
actions are in violation of RA 8799, or the "Securities Regulation Code" (SRC), they filed a Complaint
before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money with damages against
Citibank.
For its part, Citibank filed a motion to dismiss alleging, inter alia, that the complaint should be
dismissed outright for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It pointed out that the merits
of the case would largely depend on the issue of whether or not there was a violation of the SRC, in
particular, whether or not there was a sale of unregistered securities. In this regard, Citibank
contended that the SRC conferred upon the SEC jurisdiction to investigate compliance with its
provisions and thus, the complaint should be first filed with the SEC and not directly before the RTC.
Jose and Benjamin opposed Citibank’s motion to dismiss, maintaining that the RTC has jurisdiction
over their complaint. They asserted that Section 63 of the SRC expressly provides that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all suits to recover damages pursuant to Sections 56 to 61
of the same law.
ISSUE:
Whether Jose and Benjamin’s action falls within the primary jurisdiction of the RTC. (YES)
RULING:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation
Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC.
However, it is apparent that the SRC provisions governing criminal suits are separate and distinct
from those which pertain to civil suits. Cases which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations
of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections
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56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts. It is a
well-settled rule in statutory construction that the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which
has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or
mandatory. Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar import is found in its
sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that criminal cases arising from
violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed
before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction. All told,
Jose and Benjamin's filing of a civil suit against Citibank for purported violations of the SRC was
properly filed directly before the RTC.
D. Aspects of jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction over the parties
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO,

HEIRS OF LOURDES S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE
BILAG, Petitioners, -versus- ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-
AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189950, FIRST DIVISION, April 24, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it, considering that any act that it performs
without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects.
In a catena of cases, and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271,28 it was expressly
declared that all orders and decisions issued by the CFI of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the
proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands within
the Baguio Town site Reservation are null and void and without force and effect.
In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as petitioners' assertion
to that effect was not seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the 159,496-
square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan – which includes the
subject lands – to Iloc Bilag is covered by the blanket nullification provided under PD 1271, and
consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to
conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the public domain as well.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore
correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no
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jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is
admittedly still part of the public domain.
FACTS:
A Complaint for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction filed by Estela Ay-Ay, Andres
Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio ApAp, John Napoleon A. Ramirez, Jr., and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez
(respondents) against Bernadette S. Bilag, Erlinda Bilag Santillan, Dixon Bilag, Reynaldo B. Suello,
Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia Bilag-Hanaoka, and Heirs of Nellie Bilag (petitioners).
Essentially, respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, sold to them
separately various portions of a 159,496-square meter parcel of land situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio
City (subject lands), and that they registered the corresponding Deeds of Sale with the Register of
Deeds of Baguio City.
According to respondents, Iloc Bilag not only acknowledged full payment and guaranteed that his
heirs, successors-in-interest, and executors are to be bound by such sales, but he also caused the
subject lands to be removed from the Ancestral Land Claims. Respondents further alleged that they
have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976 when they were delivered to them
and that they have already introduced various improvements thereon. Despite the foregoing,
petitioners refused to honor the foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the subject lands.
Worse, they continued to harass respondents, and even threatened to demolish their improvements
and dispossess them thereof. Hence, they filed the instant complaint to quiet their respective titles
over the subject lands and remove the cloud cast upon their ownership as a result of petitioners'
refusal to recognize the sales.
For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata. Anent the first ground, petitioners averred that the
subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which
were long classified as lands of the public domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
as it is the Land Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands) which is vested with the
authority to determine issues of ownership over unregistered public lands.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title over the subject lands. (NO)
RULING:
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority
to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the
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consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action." Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it, considering that any act that it performs
without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects.
Notably, such parcel of land forms part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, was
awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, as
evidenced by a Decision 26 dated April 22, 1968 promulgated by the then-CFI of Baguio City.
In a catena of cases, and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271,28 it was expressly
declared that all orders and decisions issued by the CFI of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the
proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands
within the Baguio Town site Reservation are null and void and without force and effect.
In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as petitioners'
assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3
of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan –
which includes the subject lands – to Iloc Bilag is covered by the blanket nullification provided under
PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view of the foregoing, it is only
reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the public
domain as well.
Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then petitioners
correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their ownership.
Thus, the RTC correctly recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents'
action for quieting of title.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in
dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to
determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly
still part of the public domain.
To reiterate, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any
binding legal effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied
upon by petitioners in this case.
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES and FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES , Petitioners, vs. GJH LAND,
INC. (formerly known as S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG a.k.a. STEVE JANG, SANG RAK
KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, and ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondents
G.R. NO. 202664, EN BANC, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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The Supreme Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is, an incident related to the exercise of
jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had
already acquired. In this case, the rroneous raffling of the commercial case to a regular branch is of no
moment. . In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be
dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing
as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated
Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e. , Branch 256.
FACTS:
On August 4, 2011, Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D.Gonzales (petitioners) filed a
Complaint for Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)-
Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages against GJH
Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and
Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II (respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale
of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010.
Essentially, petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them
in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the
corporation's stockholders, hence, their plea for injunction.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special
Commercial Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order, and later,
in an Order dated August 24, 2011, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
After filing their respective answers to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra-
corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court of
Muntinlupa City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 26 granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It
found that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out that the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special
Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot lawfully exercise
jurisdiction on the matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, it
dismissed the case.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that that they filed the case with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276 by
raffle. As the raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences of
the wrong assignment of the case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of P235,825.00
that would be for naught if the dismissal is upheld. However, the same motion was dismissed. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE
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Whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING
YES. In this case, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office
of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of
such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature
of the action. Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, i.e. Branch
276, instead of being assigned to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is Branch 256 . This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e.,
"Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages," which, however,
contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that clearly make out an
intra-corporate dispute.
The Supreme Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is, an incident related to the exercise
of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had
already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to
be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the
only designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e. , Branch 256.
3. Jurisdiction over the issues

4. Jurisdiction over the res or the property in litigation
E. Jurisdiction vs. exercise of jurisdiction
F. Jurisdiction vs. venue
G. Jurisdiction over cases covered by Barangay Conciliation, Small Claims Cases, and
cases covered by Summary Procedure
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, -versus- EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her
husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200804, SECOND DIVISION, January 22, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an
available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional
Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC
which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the
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said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must
be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
FACTS:
AL Ang Network filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from Mondejar her unpaid water bills. The MTCC rendered
a Decision holding that since AL Ang Network was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience by the
NWRB only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge Mondejar the agreed flat rate of of ₱75.00 per
month prior thereto. Thus, with the total payments made by Mondejar for the same period, she
should be considered to have fully paid AL Ang Network.
The MTCC disregarded AL Ang Network’s reliance on the HLURB’s Decision as source of its authority
to impose new water consumption rates in the absence that AL Ang Network complied with the
directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners and
the subsequent approval of HLURB.
Aggrieved, AL Ang Network filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the RTC ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC. RTC dismissed the petition for
certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of
small claims cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing AL Ang’s recourse under Rule 65 assailing the propriety of the
MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case. (YES)
RULING:
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same
day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a
copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and
the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
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In this case, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC). To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a
party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the
issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the
Court. This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari
before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred
in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case
No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. General provisions (Rule 1)
B. Cause of action (Rule 2)
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON,
WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, Petitioners, -versus- GAUDIOSO
PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. “GAUDIOSO E. YPON,” AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 198680, SECOND DIVISION, July 08, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before
it. Here, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of the relevant civil case was altogether proper.
FACTS:
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation
of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras
Ricaforte a.k.a. “Gaudioso E. Ypon” (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. In their complaint,
they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving
behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to
their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
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In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of
his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted
by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
RTC found that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed
that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,this did not mean that they could
already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno
and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and
(d) a passport.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
cause of action. (NO)
RULING:
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on
its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that
they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of
a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC,
in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership
and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession
and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. The Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
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must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state
a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there
lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246. Petition is denied. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent
proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant
therewith.
JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, Petitioner, -versus- ERINEO S. MALIKSI, in his capacity as

Governor of the Province of Cavite, RENATO A. IGNACIO, in his capacity as Provincial Legal
Officer of the Province of Cavite, MARIETTA O’HARA DE VILLA, HEIRS OF HIGINO DE VILLA,
GOLDENROD, INC., SONYA G. MATHAY, and ELEUTERO M. PASCUAL, Respondents.
Jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance.
In this case, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not
preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgmentAs observed in Mamba v. Lara,
the Court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases where serious legal issues were raised
or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a
taxpayer need not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its validity, or to seek the annulment
of the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a
right to question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.
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FACTS:
Marietta O’Hara de Villa, ceded, through a deed of donation a portion of their property in favor of the
Province of Cavite. Cavite Governor Maliksi issued Executive Order No. 004 authorizing the creation
of a committee which recommended the terms and conditions for the proper settlement of the
expropriation case of the remaining portion of the de Villa’s property. The committee report included
that the subject property will be reverted to Goldenrod which include a fenced stadium, one-half of
the Trece Martires Cemetery, the forest park; a residential area, and some stalls; in turn, Goldenrod
will construct a commercial/business center, an art/historical museum, and an educational
institution within five years from the signing of the compromise agreement, among others. This was
approved by the RTC and ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Trece Martires City.
Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and as then Vice-Governor and, hence, Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite, filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the CA, arguing that the subject compromise is grossly disadvantageous to the government
because: (a) the agreed price for the subject property was excessive as compared to its value at the
time of taking; (b) the government stands to lose prime lots; and (c) it nullifies/amends the deed of
donation. Moreover, Maliksi entered into the subject compromise without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and sans any certification on the availability of
funds as required by law.
CA rendered a Resolution dismissing Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgment based on the
following grounds: (a) there was yet no disbursement of public funds at the time of its filing; thus, it
cannot be considered as a taxpayer's suit; and (b) Remulla was not a real party in interest to question
the propriety of the subject compromise as he was not a signatory thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA properly denied Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgment due to his lack of legal
standing. (NO)
RULING:
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this
case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise
judgment. As such, Remulla – being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite – has the legal
standing to file the petition for annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been
dismissed on said ground.
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Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not
preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood,
the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which may be relaxed by the
Court if the circumstances so warrant. As observed in Mamba v. Lara, the Court did not hesitate to
give standing to taxpayers in cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public
expenditures of millions of pesos were involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer need
not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its validity, or to seek the annulment of the same
on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a right to
question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.
C. Parties to civil actions (Rule 3)
JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, Petitioner, -versus- ERINEO S. MALIKSI, in his capacity as

Governor of the Province of Cavite, RENATO A. IGNACIO, in his capacity as Provincial Legal
Officer of the Province of Cavite, MARIETTA O’HARA DE VILLA, HEIRS OF HIGINO DE VILLA,
GOLDENROD, INC., SONYA G. MATHAY, and ELEUTERO M. PASCUAL, Respondents.
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance.
In this case, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not
preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. As observed in Mamba v.
Lara, the Court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases where serious legal issues were
raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved. Indeed, for as long as taxes are
involved, the people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.
FACTS:
Marietta O’Hara de Villa, ceded, through a deed of donation a portion of their property in favor of the
Province of Cavite. Cavite Governor Maliksi issued Executive Order No. 004 authorizing the creation
of a committee which recommended the terms and conditions for the proper settlement of the
expropriation case of the remaining portion of the de Villa’s property. The committee report included
that the subject property will be reverted to Goldenrod which include a fenced stadium, one-half of
the Trece Martires Cemetery, the forest park; a residential area, and some stalls; in turn, Goldenrod
will construct a commercial/business center, an art/historical museum, and an educational
institution within five years from the signing of the compromise agreement, among others. This was
approved by the RTC and ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Trece Martires City.
Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and as then Vice-Governor and, hence, Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite, filed a petition for annulment of judgment
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before the CA, arguing that the subject compromise is grossly disadvantageous to the government
because: (a) the agreed price for the subject property was excessive as compared to its value at the
time of taking; (b) the government stands to lose prime lots; and (c) it nullifies/amends the deed of
donation. Moreover, Maliksi entered into the subject compromise without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and sans any certification on the availability of
funds as required by law.
CA rendered a Resolution dismissing Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgment based on the
following grounds: (a) there was yet no disbursement of public funds at the time of its filing; thus, it
cannot be considered as a taxpayer's suit; and (b) Remulla was not a real party in interest to question
the propriety of the subject compromise as he was not a signatory thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA properly denied Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgment due to his lack of legal
standing. (NO)
RULING:
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this
case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise
judgment. As such, Remulla – being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite – has the legal
standing to file the petition for annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been
dismissed on said ground.
Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not
preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood,
the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which may be relaxed by the
Court if the circumstances so warrant. As observed in Mamba v. Lara, the Court did not hesitate to
give standing to taxpayers in cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public
expenditures of millions of pesos were involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer need
not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its validity, or to seek the annulment of the same
on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a right to
question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA

ROSA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201644, FIRST DIVISION, September 24, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an action,
considering that said party may still be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
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initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential – as it is
jurisdictional – that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders
judgment. This is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
In this case, respondents’ certiorari petition that sought the dismissal of the criminal cases against them
should not have been resolved by the CA, without the People, as represented by the OSG, having first been
impleaded. This stems from the recognition that the People is an indispensable party to the proceedings.
FACTS:
Seven Informations were filed before the RTC against various accused, including Go and Dela Rosa,
charging them of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly defrauding
Orient Commercial Banking Corporation. After numerous postponements, respondents were finally
arraigned and trial on the merits then ensued.
However, the trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation of hearings
caused mainly by the prosecution, resulting in its inability to finish its presentation of evidence
despite the lapse of almost five (5) years. This prompted respondents to file a Motion to Dismiss for
failure to prosecute and for violation of their right to speedy trial claiming that the prosecution was
afforded all the opportunity to complete and terminate its case, but still to no avail.
The RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the respondents’ right to speedy trial was violated
as they were compelled to wait for five (5) years without the prosecution completing its presentation
of evidence due to its neglect.
Dissatisfied, the prosecution moved for reconsideration, which was granted by the RTC in the interest
of justice, thus resulting in the reinstatement of the criminal cases against respondents. This time, it
was the respondents who moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the RTC.
This prompted them to file a petition for certiorari before the CA. A copy of said petition was served,
however, only on the private complainant PDIC, and not the People of the Philippines (the People),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as it was not even impleaded as party to the case. In
a Decision, the CA, without first ordering the respondents to implead the People, annulled and set
aside the assailed orders of the RTC, and consequently dismissed the criminal cases against
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the criminal cases against respondents were properly dismissed by the CA on certiorari,
without the People, as represented by the OSG, having been impleaded. (NO)
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RULING:
Respondents’ certiorari petition that sought the dismissal of the criminal cases against them should
not have been resolved by the CA, without the People, as represented by the OSG, having first been
impleaded. This stems from the recognition that the People is an indispensable party to the
proceedings.
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential – as
it is jurisdictional – that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court
renders judgment. This is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an

action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties
is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction,
which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In this case, it is evident that the CA proceeded to render judgment, i.e., the September 28, 2011
Decision and April 17, 2012 Resolution, without an indispensable party, i.e., the People, having been
imp leaded. Thus, in light of the foregoing discussion, these issuances should be set aside, and the
case be remanded to the said court. Consequently, the CA is directed to (a) reinstate respondents'
certiorari petition, and (b) order said respondents to implead the People as a party to the proceedings
and thereby furnish its counsel, the OSG, a copy of the aforementioned pleading. That being said,
there would be no need to touch on the other issues herein raised.
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C.

DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, -versus- CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA
LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, MAUDE NOBLEZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196750, FIRST DIVISION, March 11, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter
of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus,
the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
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FACTS:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-Delgado
Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot 133-B-1-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T- 12255 (subject land). During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with
Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the
second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3)
illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr.
and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord.
Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo,
Jr. and Neobel.
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation
of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo
sold their respective interests over the subject land to Santiago for a consideration of 447,695.66, as
embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November
22, 1989 (subject document), which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell
their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband,
Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). On December 22, 1989, the same parties executed a Supplemental
Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid consideration, only
109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of 337,887.73
upon the partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255
cancelled and the subject document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to
surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition
the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition
and for receivership.
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an
action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because: (a) Santiago did
not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset
of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.
The RTC ordered the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the one hand, and Ceruleo,
Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and, consequently,
the cancellation of TCT No. T- 12255 and the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate in favor
of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. The RTC found
that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has
the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC held that Santiago did not validly
acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority
to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon. On reconsideration, the RTC ordered
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Santiago to comply with the provisions of the Supplemental Contract dated December 22, 1989 by
paying the amount of 337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.
Dissatisfied, the respondents appealed to the CA which set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently,
dismissed Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition. It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s
children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-
inclusion as defendants in Santiago’s complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal.
Aggrieved, the heirs of Santiago moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied. hence, this
petition instituted by herein petitioner, Ma. Elena R. Divinagracia, as administratrix of Santiago’s
estate.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead Felcon’s siblings
and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children. (NO)
RULING:
Although Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable parties to the
case, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
The heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant – have vested
rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action
for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s
interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives.
Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his
wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest
should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid
heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void,
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an
interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without
the joinder of the said parties. However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on
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account of Santiago’s failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. The Court
definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is
to implead them and not to dismiss the case.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 191667, SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, April 22, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter
of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable."
FACTS:
The instant case arose from the 2 subject loans entered into by the Municipality with LBP in order to
finance the Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza (Public Plaza). Through Resolution Nos. 68-
2005 and 139-2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality authorized its then-Mayor Eufranio
Eriguel to enter into a P4,000,000.00-loan with LBP, the proceeds of which were used to construct
10 kiosks at the Public Plaza. Around a year later, the SB issued Resolution Nos. 58-2006 and 128-
2006, this time authorizing Mayor Eriguel to obtain a P28,000,000.00-loan from LBP for the
construction of a commercial center named "Agoo People's Center" within the premises of the Public
Plaza. In order to secure the Subject Loans, the Municipality used as collateral, among others, a
2,323.75-square meter lot situated at the south eastern portion of the Public Plaza.
However, a group of residents, led by respondent Eduardo M. Cacayuran, opposed the redevelopment
of the Public Plaza, as well as the funding therefor thru the Subject Loans, claiming that these were
"highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton
desecration of the [Public Plaza]." Further, Cacayuran requested the municipal officers to furnish him
with the various documents relating to the Public Plaza's redevelopment, which, however, went
unheeded. Thus, Cacayuran, invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a complaint against LBP and various
officers of the Municipality, including Mayor Eriguel (but excluding the Municipality itself as party-
defendant), assailing the validity of the aforesaid loan agreements and praying that the
commercialization of the Public Plaza be enjoined.
Initially, the municipal officers moved for the outright dismissal of the complaint, which was denied,
thus constraining them to file their respective answers. For its part, LBP asserted that Cacayuran did
not have any cause of action since he was not privy to the loan agreements entered into by LBP and
the Municipality.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the Agoo People's Center was completed.
Later on, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007 declaring the area where
such building stood as patrimonial property of the Municipality.
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The RTC declared the Subject Loans null and void, finding that the resolutions approving the
procurement of the same were passed in a highly irregular manner and thus, ultra vires. As such, it
pronounced that the Municipality was not bound by the Subject Loans and that the municipal officers
should, instead, be held personally liable for the same. Further, it ruled that since the Plaza Lot is a
property for public use, it cannot be used as collateral for the Subject Loans.
Aggrieved, LBP and the municipal officers appealed to the CA. However, the appeal of the municipal
officers was deemed abandoned and dismissed for their failure to file an appellants' brief despite due
notice. Thus, only LBP's appeal was given due course by the CA which modified the ruling of the RTC,
excluding then-Vice Mayor Antonio Eslao from personal liability arising from the Subject Loans.
It held that: (a) Cacayuran had locus standi to file the instant complaint, considering that he is a
resident of the Municipality and the issue at hand involved public interest of transcendental
importance; (b) Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 138-2005, 58-2006, 126-2006 were invalidly passed due
to non-compliance with certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC); (c) the Plaza Lot is property of public dominion, and thus, cannot
be used as collateral; and (d) the procurement of the Subject Loans were ultra vires acts for having
been entered into without proper authority and that the collaterals used therefor constituted
improper disbursement of public funds.
Dissatisfied, LBP elevated this matter to the Supreme Court through a petition for review
on certiorari..
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality should be deemed as an indispensable party to the instant case, and
thus, be ordered impleaded herein. (YES)
RULING:
“An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable." Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.”
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the failure to implead any indispensable party to a suit does
not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian,
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Sr. the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that Cacayuran's complaint against LBP and the
municipal officers primarily prays that the commercialization of the Public Plaza be enjoined and
also, that the Subject Loans be declared null and void for having been unlawfully entered into by the
said officers. However, Cacayuran failed to implead in his complaint the Municipality, a real party-in-
interest41 and an indispensable party that stands to be directly affected by any judicial resolution on
the case, considering that: (a) the contracting parties to the Subject Loans are LBP and the
Municipality; and (b) the Municipality owns the Public Plaza as well as the improvements constructed
thereon, including the Agoo People's Center.
WESTMONT BANK (now UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.*), Petitioner, -versus- FUNAI
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, et. al., Respondent.
CARMELO V. CACHERO, Petitioner, -versus- UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. and/or
WESTMONT BANK, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175733 & 180162, FIRST DIVISION, July 8, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular
action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be
raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1997, Funai Philippines Corporation (Funai) and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco
(Sps. Yutingco) obtained loans from Westmont Bank (Westmont), now United Overseas Bank Phils.,
secured by several promissory notes with different maturity dates.
However, Funai and Sps. Yutingco (original defendants) defaulted in the payment of the said loan
obligations when they fell due and ignored Westmont’s demands for payment. Hence, Westmont filed
a complaint for sum of money, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before
the RTC.
After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the original
defendants. Furthermore, in another Order, the RTC directed the attachment of properties appearing
under the name of other persons but which were under the control of the original defendants. In view
of the foregoing directives, Sheriff Duncan and Sheriff Cachero levied and seized the properties.
Westmont filed an Amended Complaint impleading as additional defendants, Panamax Corporation

(Panamax), Pepito Ngo as the acting President of Panamax, Aimee R. Alba, Richard N. Yu, Annabelle
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Baesa, Nenita Resane and Maria Ortiz (additional defendants), and praying that they be declared as
mere alter egos, conduits, dummies, or nominees of Sps. Yutingco to defraud their creditors.
On the other hand, the additional defendants moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (a) the
complaint stated no cause of action against them considering the lack of legal tie or vinculum juris
with Westmont; and (b) they were not parties-in-interest in the case absent any proof linking them
to the transaction between Westmont and the original defendants.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action against the additional
defendants. The additional defendants then filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Accordingly,
the RTC issued a writ of execution, directing Sheriff Duncan and Sheriff Cachero to cause the
immediate return of the wrongfully seized items to the additional defendants. However, Westmont
refused to release the seized items, hence, the RTC issued another Execution Order, enjoining
Westmont to comply with the order of execution, otherwise, a break-open order shall be issued.
Due to Westmont’s continued refusal to release the seized items, the RTC issued a Break-Open Order
to enforce the writ. However, the following day, the CA issued a TRO enjoining the Sheriffs from
enforcing the writ of execution. The CA process server duly served a copy of the TRO to the RTC Clerk
of Court at around 2:30 p.m. and informed Sheriff Cachero thereof over the phone. Notwithstanding,
the latter proceeded with the implementation of the writ of execution.
At around 3:00 p.m., Westmont’s representative who was able to secure a facsimile copy of the TRO
showed the same to Sheriff Cachero who merely ignored it. At around 4:15 p.m., Obrence arrived at
the site and served on Sheriff Cachero a duplicate original copy of the TRO.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the additional defendants should be considered as necessary parties to the case.
(NO)
2. Whether Sheriff Cachero is guilty of indirect contempt in implementing the writ of execution
and the Break-Open Order despite the want of proper, timely, and adequate notice of the TRO.
(YES)
RULING:
1. The additional defendants are not necessary parties to the case.

There was no cause of action as to the additional defendants. Failure to state a cause of action and
lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the
insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis
for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of
the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for
lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the
basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
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"A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the 3 essential elements
of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action."
Judicious examinations of Westmont’s Complaints readily show their failure to sufficiently state a
cause of action as the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an action
against the additional defendants for the collection of the amount due. In imputing liability to the
additional defendants, Westmont merely alleged: “Panamax, Ngo, Alba, Yu, Baesa, Resane and Ortiz
are impleaded herein for being mere alter egos, conduits, dummies or nominees of defendants
Spouses Yutingco to defraud creditors, including Westmont.”
The aforecited allegations partake of the nature of mere conclusions of law, unsupported by a
particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such inferences or conclusions were
arrived at as to bring the controversy within the trial court’s jurisdiction. There is no explanation or
narration of facts that would disclose why the additional defendants are mere alter egos, conduits,
dummies or nominees of the original defendants to defraud creditors, contrary to the requirement
of Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated
with particularity, thus, rendering the allegation of fraud simply an unfounded conclusion of law. It
must be pointed out that, in the absence of specific averments, the complaint presents no basis upon
which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer and must,
perforce, be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, as what the RTC did.
It bears to stress that "while the facts alleged in the complaint are hypothetically admitted by the
defendant, who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, it
must, nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and
material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as well as inferences fairly deductible therefrom." Verily,
the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint "does not admit the truth
of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor
mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of
fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and
irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally
impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or
by a document referred to; nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments."
2. Sheriff Cachero is guilty of indirect contempt in implementing the writ of execution

and the Break-Open Order despite the want of proper, timely, and adequate notice of
the TRO.
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Sheriff Cachero failed to exercise circumspection in the enforcement of the writ of execution, given
the information that a TRO had already been issued by the CA enjoining him from implementing the
same. This clearly evinces an intention to defy the TRO.
It is well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-
bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant in the
exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of execution
promptly, they are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention which
careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon
whom the execution of a judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior.
Anything less is unacceptable because in serving the court’s writs and processes and in implementing
the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of
the administration of justice.
Being an officer of the court, should have exercised prudence by verifying whether there was really
a TRO issued so as to avoid committing an act that would result in the thwarting of this Court’s order.
Settled is the rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction
clearly informing him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from that time to desist from
what he is restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be punished for a violation thereof, even
though it may not have served, or may have been served on him defectively."
ANDY ANG, Petitioner, -versus- SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P. TORRALBA, SUSANA

LOBERANES, CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO, and PEDRITO P. AZARCON, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, GALILEO P. TORRALBA, Respondents
G.R. No. 208928, FIRST DIVISION, July 8, 2015,PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The rule on real parties in interest has 2 requirements: (a) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be
the real party in interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
“Interest” means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity. One having no material interest cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
FACTS:
Pedrito N. PaGunio, Editha P. Yaba, and herein respondents filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages against petitioner involving a 98,851 square meter parcel of
land originally registered to Felicisima Udiaan.
Respondents alleged that they are the grandchildren and successors-in-interest of Udiaan who died
and left the subject land as inheritance. However, an impostor falsely representing herself as Udiaan
sold the subject land to petitioner. Respondents then informed petitioner that he did not validly
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acquire the subject land since Udiaan could not have validly sold it to them considering that she was
already dead for more than 20 years when the sale occurred. Return was demanded but to no avail.
In his Answer, petitioner claimed that he bought the subject land from a person representing herself
as Udiaan who showed a community tax certificate as proof of identity and has in her possession the
land’s original certificate of title. However, he was prevented from entering the subject land by Heirs
of Gaccion and in order to buy peace, he had to "buy" the subject land anew from the said heirs.
The RTC ruled in petitioner's favor. While respondents claimed to be Udiaan's successors-in-interest,
there is no evidence proving their successional rights. As such, the RTC concluded that respondents
are not the real parties in interest, warranting the dismissal of their complaint.
The CA agreed with the RTC considering that, as mere grandchildren, they have no successional rights
to Udiaan's estate. Respondents could only succeed from said estate by right of representation if their
mother, who is one of Udiaan's children, predeceased Udiaan. Such fact was not established. This
notwithstanding, the CA nullified the Deed of Absolute Sale between the petitioner and “Udiaan” and
distributed the subject land to Heirs of Gaccion and to children of Udiaan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly declared the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and distributed
portions of the subject land despite ruling that respondents are not real parties in interest. (NO)
RULING:
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the definition of a real party in interest. The rule on
real parties in interest has 2 requirements: (a) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real
party in interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
“Interest” means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity. One having no material interest cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any
right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one
to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it
within certain bounds, pursuant to public policy.
In the instant case, respondents claim to be the successors-in-interest just because they are Udiaan's
grandchildren. Under the law, however, respondents will only be deemed to have a material interest
over the estate Udiaan if the right of representation provided under Article 970 in relation to Article
982 of the Civil Code is available to them. However, nothing in the records would show that the right
of representation is available to respondents. As such, they are not real parties in interest to the
instant case.
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Having established that respondents are not the real parties in interest to the instant suit, the proper
course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the RTC's dismissal of their complaint. It therefore
erred in proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues of the case and in declaring the nullity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale and in awarding portions of the subject land to various non-parties to the
case, such as the Heirs of Gaccion and Udiaan's children. Basic is the rule that no relief can be
extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a case.
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOVEN L. NGO, as represented by OSCAR J.

GARCIA, respondent.
G.R. No. 214934, FIRST DIVISION, April 12, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the
pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his
death. In this case, the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs.
FACTS:
On February 17, 1994, petitioner Pacific Rehouse Corporation (petitioner) entered into a Deed of
Conditional Sale with Benjamin G. Bautista (Bautista) for the purchase of a 52,341-square meter
parcel of land located in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-800
issued by the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite (subject property), for a total consideration
of P7,327,740.00. Under the contract, petitioner was to make a down payment of P2,198,322.00 upon
its execution, with the balance to be paid upon completion by Bautista of the pertinent documents
necessary for the transfer of the said property.
However, despite receipt of payment in the total amount of P6,598,322.00 and repeated offers to pay
the balance in full, Bautista failed and refused to comply with his obligation to execute the
corresponding deed of absolute sale and deliver the certificate of title of the subject property, and
even sold the property to another buyer. Hence, on April 30, 2008, petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Bautista, docketed as Civil Case No. 2031-08, praying for
the delivery of a deed of transfer and other documents necessary to transfer the title in its favor, as
well as the Owner's Copy of TCT No. T-800.
After the parties had filed their respective responsive pleadings, the case was set for pre-trial.
However, before the same could proceed, Bautista's counsel filed a Manifestation and Notice of Death
informing the RTC that Bautista had died on February 14, 2009. Thus, in an Order dated May 19,
2009, the RTC directed Bautista's counsel to substitute the latter's heirs and/or representatives in
the action pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, said counsel failed to
comply due to lack of personal knowledge of the identities of the heirs of Bautista and their respective
residences.
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On the other hand, petitioner manifested that it had located Bautista's surviving spouse, Rosita
Bautista, and as a result, was directed to amend the complaint to implead her as such. For failure of
petitioner to comply with the foregoing directive, however, the RTC issued an Order dated February
23, 2010 dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order dated September 20, 2010
setting aside its earlier Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08. However, it held in abeyance the
proceedings in said case until petitioner procures the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the estate of Bautista pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
The CA gave due course to the petition only with respect to the assailed April 7, 2011 Omnibus Order
which ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 2031-08 and LRC Case No. 1117-09 and dismissed
the petition as to the four (4) other assailed orders of the RTC due to procedural lapses. Nevertheless,
the CA ruled in favor of respondent and accordingly, set aside the April 7, 2011 Omnibus Order of the
RTC and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2031-08. The CA held that the complaint for specific
performance and damages in Civil Case No. 2031-08 was an action in personam since its object was
to compel Bautista to perform his obligations under the Deed of Conditional Sale and hence, rendered
him pecuniarily liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Civil Case No. 2031-08 in view of Bautista's death.
RULING:
YES. Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court governs the rule on substitution in case of death of any
of the parties to a pending suit. It reads in full:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified
time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and
the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
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Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the
pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his
death. As early as in Bonilla v. Barcena,[58] the Court has settled that if the claim in an action affects
property and property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-litigant, viz.:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in
the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental. x x x.
In the instant case, although the CA correctly pointed out that Civil Case No. 2031-08 involves a
complaint for specific performance and damages, a closer perusal of petitioner's complaint reveals
that it actually prays for, inter alia, the delivery of ownership of the subject land through Bautista's
execution of a deed of sale and the turnover of TCT No. T-800 in its favor. This shows that the primary
objective and nature of Civil Case No. 2031-08 is to recover the subject property itself and thus, is
deemed to be a real action.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES RAMON and ANNABELLE

SABADO, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 224204, SECOND DIVISION, August 30, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In Regner v. Logarta, the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether or not one is an
indispensable party, viz.:
An indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also
has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest
or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable
party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one
who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a
person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between
him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the
action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his
presence will avoid multiple litigation.
Guided by the foregoing parameters and as will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in holding that
HTPMI is an indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondents.
In this case, under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights to petitioner under the Contract
to Sell, save for the right of ownership. HTPMI's assignment of rights to petitioner must be deemed to
include the rights to collect payments from respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to cancel
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or rescind the Contract to Sell, and resultantly, recover actual possession over the subject property. In
view of such, the Court ruled that petitioner had the right to institute the instant suit against
respondents.
FACTS:
Haus Talk Project Managers, Inc. (HTPMI) (predecessor of Petitioner) and respondents entered into
a Contract to Sell, whereby HTPMI agreed to sell a real property to respondents. The parties agreed
that failure to pay any installment within the stipulated period of time shall mean forfeiture of the
downpayment and any other payments made in connection thereto, as well as the cancellation and
rescission of the Contract to Sell. Thereafter, HTPMI executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of
petitioner assigning, among others, its rights and interests as seller in the Contract to Sell with
respondents, including the right to collect payments and execute any act or deed necessary to enforce
compliance therewith.
Petitioner cancelled the Contract to sell due to the respondent’s failure to pay their outstanding
obligations. Consequently, it demanded the respondents to vacate the subject property, but to no
avail. Thus, petitioner was constrained to file the Complaint for ejectment or unlawful detainer before
the MTC. Respondents argued that the present petitioner is not the real party in interest to institute
such complaint, since ownership over the subject property remained with HTPMI. They expounded
that under the Deed of Assignment, only the rights and interests pertaining to the receivables under
the Contract to Sell were assigned/transferred to petitioner and not the ownership or the right to the
possession of the subject property.
MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to vacate the property. By virtue of the
Deed of Assignment, petitioner was subrogated to the rights of HTPMI under the Contract to Sell and,
hence, is a real party in interest entitled to institute the instant suit against respondents for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Contract to Sell. This was affirmed by the RTC. The CA
reversed and remanded the case to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein. Since legal title to
the subject property was retained by HTPMI pursuant to the provisions of the Deed of Assignment,
the latter is not only a real party in interest, but also an indispensable party which should have been
impleaded as a plaintiff thereon and without which no final determination can be had in the present
case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that HTPMI is an indispensable party to petitioner’s ejectment
suit against respondents and, thus, must be impleaded therein.
RULING
NO. The CA erred in holding that HTPMI is an indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by
petitioner against respondents.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a
suit. Case law defines an indispensable party as "one whose interest will be affected by the court's
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. Thus, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
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In Regner v. Logarta, the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether or not one is an
indispensable party, viz.:
An indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy,
but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between
the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also,
a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject
matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable
party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
Guided by the foregoing parameters and as will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in holding that
HTPMI is an indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondents.
In this case, under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights to petitioner under the Contract
to Sell, save for the right of ownership. HTPMI's assignment of rights to petitioner must be deemed
to include the rights to collect payments from respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to
cancel or rescind the Contract to Sell, and resultantly, recover actual possession over the subject
property. In view of such, the Court ruled that petitioner had the right to institute the instant suit
against respondents.
The Court cannot subscribe to the CA’s conclusion that since HTPMI retained ownership over the
subject property pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an indispensable party to the case. Here,
the only issue is who between the litigating parties has the better right to possess de facto the subject
property. Thus, HTMPI’s interest in the subject property, is completely separable from petitioner's
rights under the Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and
resultantly, the recovery of actual possession of the subject property by virtue of this case. Hence, the
courts can certainly proceed to determine who between petitioner and respondents have a better
right to the possession of the subject property and complete relief can be had even without HTPMI's
participation.
D. Venue (Rule 4)
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by its President,

JANET C. LEY, Petitioner, -versus- MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business under the name
and style "LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA SEASIDE, Respondents.
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In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v Tecson, the Court held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid
and binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent;
(b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present.
In this case, the terms of the lease contract clearly shows the parties’ intention to limit the place where
actions or cases arising from a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be
instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the specification of the
locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed. Notably, the fact that this stipulation
generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City,
to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail
the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject
to stipulation of the parties. Hence, the said stipulation should not be construed as a stipulation on
jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits venue.
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that it leased a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land from Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC). Later, it subleased the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to
respondent for a term of ten (10) years. Respondent allegedly failed to pay the rent due, and despite
demands, refused to settle his obligations. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for Collection of Sum
of Money and Damages against Respondent, before the Valenzuela-RTC. Respondent, in his Answer
with Third-Party Complaint, countered that he religiously paid rent to petitioner until PNCC
demanded that the rent be paid directly to it, in view of the petitioner's eviction from the subject
property by virtue of a court order. Thus, he remitted the rentals to PNCC. Respondent further
pointed out that the venue was improperly laid since Section 21 of the lease contract provides that
all actions or cases filed in connection with such contract shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City,
exclusive of all others. Hence, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner argued that Section 21 is not a stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction
which is void. This is because such stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the MTC, of jurisdiction over
cases which, under the law, are within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for
unlawful detainer. Petitioner further posited that respondent had already submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the Valenzuela-RTC and had waived any objections on venue, since he sought
affirmative reliefs from the said court when he asked several times for additional time to file his
responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims against petitioner, and impleaded PNCC as a third-party
defendant.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. Section 21 of the lease contract
between petitioner and respondent is void insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the RTC of Pasay
City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over the case is with the Metropolitan Trial Courts.
However, with respect to the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the stipulation validly limits the
venue to the RTC of Pasay City. Since, petitioner's complaint is one for collection of sum of money in
an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, petitioner should have filed the case with the
RTC of Pasay City.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid
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RULING
NO. Under Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie
with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of
the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said
actions in a certain exclusive venue. The Court said that written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by
law. However, in such a case, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of such qualifying words, the stipulation should be deemed merely as an
agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v Tecson, the Court held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid
and binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent;
(b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the
suit. After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present.
In this case, the terms of the lease contract clearly shows the parties’ intention to limit the place
where actions or cases arising from a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease
may be instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the
specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.
Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind
shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that the
same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is fundamental
that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties. Hence, the said
stipulation should not be construed as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one which merely
limits venue.
In this case, the petitioners’ action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Since the lease
contract already provided that all actions or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed with
the RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC's
exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and
filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. By filing the complaint with the Valenzuala-RTC, the
same is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to the
refiling in the proper court.
E. Pleadings
1. Kinds (Rule 6)
2. Parts of a pleading (Rule 7)
WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION AND/OR WILLIAM GO QUE, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF

APPEALS AND DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, AND JUN ANDALES,
Respondents.
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Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification
against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The important purposes behind these requirements
cannot be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation.
In this case, proper justification is especially called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to
the signatures of the remaining private respondents. It is undisputed that the Verification/Certification
against Forum Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari was not accompanied with a valid
affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did
not indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' competent evidence of identities.
Evidently, not being documents of identification issued by an official agency, the photocopies of the IDs
of private respondents do not constitute competent evidence of their identities under Section 12 (a), Rule
II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions before it as compliance with its Resolution
requiring anew the submission of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA
patently and grossly ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things
considered, the proper course of action was for it to dismiss the petition.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal against petitioner William Go Que
Construction and/or William Go Que before the National Labor Relations Commission claiming that
they were hired as steelmen on various dates, and were regular employees of petitioner until their
illegal dismissal. For his part, petitioner averred that private respondents were hired as project
employees, and were informed of the specific period or phase of construction wherein their services
were needed.
The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have illegally dismissed private respondents, and declared
them to be regular employees entitled to reinstatement to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights and backwages. The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling, holding that private
respondents were validly dismissed as they stole from petitioner. The CA granted private
respondents' motion but noted that the Affidavit of Service and the Verification/Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping contained a defective jurat.
The CA required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping with a properly accomplished jurat indicating competent evidence of their identities. The
CA held that the photocopies of the IDs submitted by Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui, as well as their
Joint-Affidavit attesting to the identity of Andales who was unable to submit his ID, served as
competent evidence of private respondents' identities and cured the defect in the Affidavit of Service,
and Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
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ISSUE:
Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the petition
for certiorari before it on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping. (YES)
RULING:
It is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum Shopping attached to the petition
for certiorari was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was
because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the pertinent details regarding the
affiants' competent evidence of identities. Evidently, not being documents of identification issued by
an official agency, the photocopies of the IDs of private respondents do not constitute competent
evidence of their identities under Section 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification
against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The important purposes behind these
requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying their
relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially called for in light of the serious allegations of
forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private respondents. Thus, by simply treating the
insufficient submissions before it as compliance with its Resolution requiring anew the submission
of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored
settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the proper
course of action was for it to dismiss the petition.
LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ, Petitioner, -versus- NORMA VILLEGAS AND ANY PERSON ACTING IN
HER BEHALF INCLUDING HER FAMILY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200191, SECOND DIVISION, August 20, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
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Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of
the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum
shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
FACTS:
Lourdes C. Fernandez and her sister, Cecilia Siapno filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the MTCC
Dagupan against respondent Norma Villegas, seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land
situated in Guilig Street, Dagupan City.
The MTCC ruled against the respondent. On appeal, the RTC granted respondents’ prayer and
ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint. Aggrieved, plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC prompting the filing of the CA petition.
In response to plaintiffs’ CA petition, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the grounds
that Cecilia failed to personally verify the petition.
In a Resolution, the CA granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal, holding that the verification
and certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition was defective since it was signed
only by Lourdes, one of the plaintiffs in the case, in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
which requires all the plaintiffs to sign the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition due to a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition. (YES)
RULING:
The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to non-compliance with the requirements
on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping, viz.:
1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
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3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike

in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special
circumstances or compelling reasons.”
5. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature
of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.
6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by
his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign,
he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.
Applying these guidelines to the case at bar, particularly, those stated in paragraphs 3 and 5, the Court
finds that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the CA petition due to a defective
verification and certification against forum shopping.
It is undisputed that Lourdes is not only a resident of the subject property but is a co-owner thereof
together with her co-plaintiff/sister, Cecilia. As such, she is “one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the CA petition” and is therefore qualified to “sign the verification”
attached thereto in view of paragraph 3 of the above-said guidelines.
In fact, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action
for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate, both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs
in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as against
respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed before the CA indicated that they are the
petitioners therein and that the same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone signature of Lourdes
on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the rules.
Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject
of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of
forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
Besides, it is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
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requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and
correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the correction of the pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules, as in this case.
Following paragraph 5 of the guidelines as aforestated, there was also substantial compliance with
the certification against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that only Lourdes
signed the same.
It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances – as in this case where the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense –
the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping
may be relaxed.
Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on forum shopping are designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice; hence, it should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions on certification against forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules
under justifiable circumstances, as also in this case.
MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG, Petitioner -versus- PEAKHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, Respondents.
In Fontana Development Corporation v. Vukasinovic, the Court held that to determine whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping, it is essential to ask whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another or whether the following elements of litis pendentia are present: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and ( c) the identity
of the two (2) preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
A judicious perusal of the records reveals that there is no identity of causes of actions and reliefs prayed
for among the 4 cases filed by Galang. Similarly, the issues raised and determined in these cases likewise
differ. Given the above, the Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended Complaint in the
Annulment Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding which involves the same causes of
actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or agency at the time she filed the said Amended
Complaint, or anytime thereafter. In this light, there is no litis pendentia, as the cases essentially involve
different causes of actions, reliefs, and issues.
FACTS:
Galang filed a complaint for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure against
respondent Peakhold Finance Corporation (Peakhold) before the RTC of Caloocan City. The
complaint alleged that: (a) Galang is the registered owner of a 150-square meter (sq. m.) lot located
at Deparo, Caloocan City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327548 (subject lot); (b) the
subject lot was mortgaged to Peakhold without her knowledge and consent; (c) Peakhold foreclosed
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the subject lot, and eventually, acquired the same via an auction sale; and (d) as such, the mortgage
must be annulled as her signature in the mortgage document was forged/falsified.
While the Annulment Case was pending, Peakhold filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession (Ex-Parte Petition) over the subject lot, before the RTC of Caloocan City, to which Galang
filed her opposition. In a Decision, the court granted Peakhold's Ex-Parte Petition, noted Galang's
opposition, and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Peakhold. Initially, Galang
filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review before the CA. Further, Galang filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment (Petition for Relief Case) contending that the Ex-Parte Petition is
not summary in nature and should have been threshed out in an adversarial proceeding, as it
essentially deals with the validity of the subject deed. After filing the Petition for Relief Case, Galang
manifested that he is withdrawing the filing of the intended petition for review before the CA, which
was granted.
Peakhold, filed a Motion to Dismiss and sought the dismissal of the Petition for Relief Case on the
ground of forum shopping. The RTC granted the said motion, holding that Galang deliberately failed
to mention in her Petition for Relief from Judgment that she likewise filed a petition for review before
the CA, which had not been effectively withdrawn at the time the Petition for Relief Case was filed.
With the subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration, Galang elevated the matter to the CA
via a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
During the pendency of the Certiorari Case, the Annulment Case was re-raffled. Considering the
implementation of the writ of possession, Galang was prompted to file a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint) incorporating her
additional prayer for reconveyance of the subject lot. In response, Peakhold moved to dismiss the
Annulment Case on the ground of, inter alia, forum shopping, since the Amended Complaint failed to
disclose that Galang has a pending Certiorari Case before the CA, as well as a complaint for qualified
theft (Criminal Complaint) against the President of Peakhold and a certain Jocelyn "Gigi" Cortina-
Donasco (Donasco) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City (OCP Caloocan).
Initially, the RTC denied Peakhold's motion to dismiss. It found that the causes of actions and reliefs
prayed for in the Annulment and Certiorari Cases are different from those in the Criminal Complaint.
It further held that, assuming that the Order dismissing the Petition for Relief Case is reversed, there
is still no violation of the rule against forum shopping, since the prayers/reliefs in the Annulment
Case are different from those in the Petition for Relief Case.
On reconsideration, the RTC found Galang guilty of forum shopping, considering that the Petition for
Relief Case, together with the Annulment and Certiorari Cases, all have a common cause of
action/relief - that is the reconveyance of the subject lot to Galang. Aggrieved, Galang moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. It held that Galang is guilty of forum shopping as she failed to
indicate the pendency of the Certiorari Case before the CA, as well as the Criminal Complaint before
the OCP Caloocan in her Amended Complaint in the Annulment Case. More significantly, it noticed
that there is identity of parties, rights asserted/causes of action, and reliefs prayed for among the
aforesaid cases. Dissatisfied, Galang sought reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Galang committed forum shopping when she failed to
declare the pending Certiorari Case and Criminal Complaint in her Amended Complaint in the
Annulment Case.
RULING:
YES. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another. It can be committed in three (3) ways: (1) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground
for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res Judicata).
Thus, to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is essential to ask
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another or whether the following
elements of litis pendentia are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and ( c) the identity of the two (2) preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
A judicious perusal of the records reveals that there is no identity of causes of actions and reliefs
prayed for among the said cases. As already adverted to, the Annulment Case seeks to nullify the
mortgage document executed in Peakhold's favor, as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings,
given that the alleged real estate mortgage covering the subject lot was void for having been executed
without Galang' s knowledge and consent. In the Petition for Relief Case, Galang sought to set aside
the exparte writ of possession, contending that the same should have been threshed out in an
adversarial proceeding, since it involves a fictitious deed of real estate mortgage, where the
mortgagor therein is supposedly an impostor of Galang; while the Certiorari Case sought to revive
the Petition for Relief Case which was dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. Finally, the
Criminal Complaint involves the determination of whether or not there is probable cause to indict
the President of Peakhold and Donasco for Qualified Theft.
Given the above, the Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended Complaint in the
Annulment Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding which involves the same causes
of actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or agency at the time she filed the said Amended
Complaint, or anytime thereafter. In this light, there is no litis pendentia, as the cases essentially
involve different causes of actions, reliefs, and issues. Thus, any judgment rendered in one will not
necessarily amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This holds true even if the
complaint in the Annulment Case was subsequently amended by Galang.
3. Manner of making allegations (Rule 8)
ROSEÑA FONTELAR OGAWA, Petitioner, -versus- ELIZABETH GACHE MENIGISHI, Respondent.
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G.R. No. 193089, THIRD DIVISION, July 9, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in, or attached to the
corresponding pleading, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be party
to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original is refused. Here,
what is apparent is a mere written and signed acknowledgment that money was received. There are no
terms and conditions found therein from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot
be considered an actionable document upon which an action or defense may be founded.
FACTS:
Petitioner Roseñ a Fontelar Ogawa and respondent Elizabeth Gache Menigishi were childhood friends
and former residents of Sorsogon City. On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money before the RTC against respondent, alleging that the latter borrowed from her the money but
because she was unable to pay, respondent offered to sell her building and its improvements in
Sorsogon City to petitioner for a consideration of P1.5M with the agreement that her outstanding
loans with petitioner be deducted from the purchase price and the balance payable in installments.
As partial payment for the properties, petitioner remitted payments to the respondent. Having paid
huge amounts and in order to protect her proprietary rights, petitioner then demanded for the
execution of the corresponding deed of sale, but respondent backed out from the deal and reneged
on her obligations.
Respondent specifically denied her indebtedness to petitioner and claimed that it was the latter who
owed her 1M yen or P500k, as evidenced by a receipt. In partial payment of her indebtedness,
petitioner, thus, remitted the amounts of P150k and P250k to respondent, leaving a balance of P100k.
While she admitted offering her property for sale to petitioner, respondent explained that the sale
did not materialize as petitioner failed to produce the stipulated down payment.
RTC finds that respondent was indeed indebted to petitioner in the amounts of P400,772.90. CA
affrmed the RTC's awards in favor of petitioner and sustained the denial of respondent's
counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether the disputed receipt sufficiently established respondent's counterclaim that petitioner
owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen. (NO)
RULING:
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A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money or good was delivered or
received. The receipt upon which respondent relies to support her counterclaim, sufficiently satisfies
this definition. However, while indubitably containing the signatures of both parties, a plain reading
of the contents negates any inference as to the nature of the transaction for which the 1M Yen was
received and who between the parties is the obligor and the obligee. What is apparent is a mere
written and signed acknowledgment that money was received. There are no terms and conditions
found therein from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot be considered an
actionable document upon which an action or defense may be founded. Consequently, there was no
need to deny its genuineness and due execution under oath in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure
Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon
a written instrument, copied in, or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided
in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets
forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when
the adverse party does not appear to be party to the instrument or when compliance
with an order for an inspection of the original is refused.
From the foregoing, it cannot be clearly ascertained who between the two signatories is the obligor
and obligee. Atty. Gerona's statement that the one who usually prepares the receipt is the obligor or
the creditor did not conclusively imply that petitioner owed respondent 1,000,000.00 Yen, or vice
versa. Hence, absent any other evidence to prove the transaction for which the receipt was issued,
the Court cannot consider receipt as evidence of a purported loan between petitioner and respondent
which the former categorically denied. It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who
asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the
defendant, by the quantum of evidence required by law, which in this case is preponderance of
evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence"
or "greater weight of credible evidence." From the evidence on record, it is clear that respondent
failed to prove her counterclaim by preponderance of evidence.
GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. and GEORGE C. GO, Petitioners, -versus- BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., substituted by PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE [SPV-
AMC], INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 187487, FIRST DIVISON, June 29, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
To deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, the defendant must
declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
It is further required that the defendant "sets forth what he claims to be the facts".
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If the answer fails to comply with the "specific denial under oath" requirement, the due
execution and genuineness of a document evidencing loan obligation are deemed admitted. The
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that (a) the party whose
signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another
for him and with his authority; (b) that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; (c) that the document was
delivered; and (d) that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense
relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or
that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were
unauthorized. The Court clarifies, however, that a party is not precluded from arguing against
it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, want of
consideration, mistake or imperfection in the writing, failure to express the true agreement of
the parties, or intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners Go Tong Electrical and its President, George
C. Go seeking that the latter be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of their loan
obligation in the aggregate amount of ₱87,086,398.71.
Respondent alleged that Go Tong Electrical was granted financial assistance by the then Bank
of South East Asia, the successor in interest of which is DBS Bank of the Philippines, Inc.
(DBS). Subsequently, Go Tong Electrical, represented by Go, among others, obtained a loan
from DBS for which a promissory note (PN) was executed. As additional security, Go
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement (CSA) covering all the obligations undertaken
by Go Tong Electrical. Upon default of petitioners, DBS and later, its successor-in-interest,
BPI Family Savings Bank, demanded payment from petitioners but to no avail, hence, the
present complaint.
In their Answer, petitioners merely stated that they "specifically deny" the allegations under
the complaint particularly the execution of the loan agreement, the PN, and the CSA for being
self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit respondent's purposes.
During trial, respondent presented its Account Officer handling petitioners' loan accounts,
as its witness. He attested to the existence of the loan obligation and identified a Statement
of Account which shows the amount due. However, he admitted that he had no knowledge
of how the PN was prepared, executed, and signed, nor did he witness its signing. On the
other hand, petitioners’ witness, Go Tong Electrical's Finance Officer, testified that Go Tong
Electrical was already able to pay its loan, albeit partially. However, she admitted that she
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does not know how much payments were made, nor does she have a rough estimate thereof,
as these were allegedly paid for in dollars.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The respondent's documentary evidence, the
authenticity of which is undisputed, showed the existence of petitioners' valid and
demandable obligation. On the other hand, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proving that they had already paid the same, even partially. The CA sustained the RTC’s
ruling. The CA noted that the petitioners in their answer did not deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the PN and CSA, hence, are deemed admitted under
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the PN and the CSA are deemed admitted for failure to deny their genuiness
and due execution under oath in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court and as such, affect their admissibality as evidence. (YES)
2. Whether Go Tong Electrical's Finance Officer’s testimony that Go Tong Electrical was
already able to pay its loan, albeit partially, can be appreciated. (NO)
RULING:
1. The PN and the CSA are deemed admitted for failure to deny their genuiness
and due execution.
A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of
the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA. The mere statement that they "specifically deny" the
pertinent allegations of the Complaint "for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended
to suit plaintiffs purposes" does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated
by law. A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant, i.e., a general
denial does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically". Neither does it become
so through a broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are "self-serving" or are
intended "to suit plaintiffs purposes". Moreover, a statement in the answer to the effect that
the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation does not raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary, such a plea is an admission of the
genuineness and due execution thereof since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground
not affecting either.
To deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, the defendant must
declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. It is further required that the defendant "sets forth what he claims to be the facts".
In the case at bar, all of such requirements are absent from the Answer.
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Consequently, with the answer failing to comply with the "specific denial under oath"
requirement, petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the
documents evidencing their loan obligation to respondent. The admission of the genuineness
and due execution of a document means that (a) the party whose signature it bears admits
that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; (b) that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in
the pleading of the party relying upon it; (c) that the document was delivered; and (d) that
any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which
it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the
signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized. The
Court clarifies, however, that a party is not precluded from arguing against it by evidence of
fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, want of consideration,
mistake or imperfection in the writing, failure to express the true agreement of the parties,
or intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
Accordingly, with petitioners' admission, the competence of the respondent's witness to

testify in order to authenticate the loan document is therefore of no moment. While Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that private documents be proved of their due
execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and
examination of witnesses to testify on this fact, there is no need for proof of execution and
authenticity when they are impliedly admitted.
2. Go Tong Electrical's Finance Officer’s testimony that Go Tong Electrical was

already able to pay its loan, albeit partially, cannot be appreciated.
The one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it rather than the other party, to
prove non-payment. He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of
trial, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty
or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, it must be noted that
when the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of non-payment is not
needed for it is actually presumed.
In the case at bar, while petitioners insisted that they had paid, albeit partially, their loan
obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was never established by petitioners.
Respondent's possession of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA, especially with their
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genuineness and due execution already having been admitted, cements its claim that the
obligation of petitioners has not been extinguished.
4. Effect of failure to plead (Rule 9)

5. Amended and supplemental pleadings (Rule 10)
6. When to file responsive pleadings (Rule 11)
F. Filing and service of pleadings, judgments, final orders, and resolutions
1. Rules on payment of docket fees; effect of non-payment
WOODROW B. CAMASO, Petitioner, -versus- TSM SHIPPING (PHILS), INC., UTKILEN, AND/OR
JONES TULOD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 223290, FIRST DIVISION, November 07, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA, such as a
petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the failure to
comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.
Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory
pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the
government.
Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail, a
Metrobank check under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was attached thereto to serve as
payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule
VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest
efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not
to defraud the government.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of
procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands the instant case to the CA for the
resolution of its substantial merits.
FACTS:
Camaso alleged that he signed a contract of employment with respondents TSM Shipping (Phils), Inc.,
Utkilen, artd Jones Tulod to work as a Second Mate on-board the vessel "M/V Golfstraum," for a
period of six (6) months and with basic monthly salary of US$1,178.00. On October 18, 2014, he
joined his vessel of assignment. Prior to said contract, Camaso claimed to have been working for
respondents for almost five (5) years and boarded eight (8) of their vessels.
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Sometime in November 2013, Camaso complained of a noticeable obstruction in his throat which he
described as akin to a "fishbone coupled [with] coughing. As Camaso was initially diagnosed with
tonsillar cancer, he was recommended for medical repatriation to undergo extensive treatment.
Upon repatriation to the Philippines, he reported at respondents' office and was referred to St. Luke's
Medical Center for testing. After a series of tests, it was confirmed that Camaso was indeed suffering
from tonsillar cancer. Consequently, he underwent eight (8) chemotherapy sessions and radiation
therapy for 35 cycles which were all paid for by respondents. Thereafter, respondents refused to
shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus, forcing the latter to pay for his treatment. Believing that
his sickness was work-related and that respondents remained silent on their obligation, Camaso filed
the instant complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and
hospital expenses, and other consequential damages before the NLRC. After efforts for an amicable
settlement between the parties failed, they were ordered to file their respective position papers.
The CA dismissed Camaso's petition "for non-payment of the required docketing fees as required
under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court."
Dissatisfied, Camaso filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that a check representing the
payment of the required docket fees was attached to a copy of his petition filed before the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for nonpayment of
docket fees. (NO)
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA, such as a
petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the failure
to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.
Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal
of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory
pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the
government.
Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail, a
Metrobank check under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was attached thereto to serve as
payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule
VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest
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efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not
to defraud the government.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of
procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands the instant case to the CA for the
resolution of its substantial merits.
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner, -versus- HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND
LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority
Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA,
as Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC, Respondents.
In Cabrera v. Francisco, the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether an action is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation or not:
“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts).”
A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that its main
purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation's bylaws, or at the time
when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with the corporation would
somehow be preserved. Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief
of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money.
The mere mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of
Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et
al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such
mention was merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting
interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was
completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be
recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of
their principal action. Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate
docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141.
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FACTS:
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin
Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority stockholders of
Alliance Select Foods International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of
Alliance's Board of Directors. As per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is
held every June 15. However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the
afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a
Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its
Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which was earlier
approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015.
As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such
postponement was made "to give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual
meeting, after taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance]." This prompted
Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) involving an intra-corporate controversy against Alliance, and its other Board members,
namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C.
Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board).
In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally claimed that the subscription to the new shares
through the SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders
of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting rights
proportionate to their existing shareholdings. Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the
declaration of nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015 indefinitely postponing the 2015
ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0. The Clerk of Court
of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which they paid
accordingly. Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint: (a) deleting its prayer to declare
null and void the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead,
prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and
as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et
al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20 Million, more
or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did
not mention such capital infusion in their prayers and, as such, were only made to pay the measly
sum of ₱8,860.00. On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained that they paid the correct filing
fees, considering that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim
on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on
the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to defraud the government.
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ISSUE:
Whether Harvest All, et al.'s action was one capable of pecuniary estimation. (NO)
RULING:
In Cabrera v. Francisco, the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether an action is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation or not:
“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts).”
A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that its main
purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation's bylaws, or at the
time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with the
corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus, Harvest All, et al. sought for the nullity of the
Alliance Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's
2015 ASM pending completion of subscription to the SR0.
Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015
ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of
Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s
action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim
ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was
merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as
minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If,
in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue
of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees
in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141. The matter is
therefore remanded to the R TC in order:
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a. to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in the amount of ₱8,860.00, as
initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-
04-SC;
b. if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.' s payment
of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment,
proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or
c. if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular
proceedings of the case with dispatch.
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND

LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority
Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA,
as Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE
LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select
Foods International, Inc., Petitioners, v. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ,
ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 224834, SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION, February 28, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Before the Court are various motions for reconsideration assailing the Decision dated March 15, 2017
of the Court which affirmed the Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, with modification, remanding COMM'L CASE NO.
15-234 to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) for further proceedings. In the said
motions, the movants similarly claim, inter alia, that supervening events have rendered COMM'L CASE
NO. 15-234 moot and academic.
Since the resolution of these issues is only a preliminary matter - and does not affect the merits of this
case - the Court deems it appropriate to let the RTC make the proper determination as to whether or
not the aforesaid supervening events had indeed rendered COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 moot and
academic. Besides, such determination will entail an examination and verification of the movants'
various claims and allegations, all of which are factual matters which are better threshed out before the
trial court.
FACTS:
Before the Court are various motions for reconsideration filed by Barbara Anne C. Migallos, George
E. SyCip, Erwin M. Elechicon, Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz and
Antonio C. Pacis, Jonathan Y. Dee, and Raymund K.H. See, assailing the Decision dated March 15, 2017
of the Court which affirmed the Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, with modification, remanding COMM'L CASE
NO. 15-234 to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) for further proceedings.
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In the said motions, the movants similarly claim, inter alia, that supervening events have rendered
COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 moot and academic.
In particular, they point out that:

(a) in COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 pending before the RTC, Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory
Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All,
et al.) prayed that the 2015 Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc. be held on the date set in the corporation's by-laws, i.e., before the completion of
the Stock Rights Offering (SRO); and
(b) the SRO, the 2015 ASM, and the 2016 ASM were all conducted and finished on October 28, 2015,
March 1, 2016, and June 28, 2016, respectively, absent any injunction or restraining order issued by
any court for the same. Hence, it would be futile and a waste of court resources to remand the case
to the RTC for further proceedings.
On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintain, among others, that the supervening events mentioned
by the movants did not render the instant case moot and academic, as they cannot be permitted to
render the same by their own positive actions.
At the outset, it must be reiterated that the only issues raised for the Court's resolution in its Decision
dated March 15, 2017 are:
(a) whether or not Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint, as the same should
have been based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO; and
(b) if Harvest All, et al. indeed paid insufficient filing fees, whether or not such act was made in good
faith and without any intent to defraud the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 through Harvest
All, et al.'s payment of correct docket fees?
RULING:
Since the resolution of these issues is only a preliminary matter - and does not affect the merits of
this case - the Court deems it appropriate to let the RTC make the proper determination as to whether
or not the aforesaid supervening events had indeed rendered COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 moot and
academic. Besides, such determination will entail an examination and verification of the movants'
various claims and allegations, all of which are factual matters which are better threshed out before
the trial court.
Finally, suffice it to say that the other issues raised in the aforesaid motions for reconsideration are
but mere reiterations of the grounds already evaluated and passed upon in the Assailed Decision. In
view of the foregoing, there is no cogent reason to warrant a modification or reversal of the same.
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2. Rule 13
ISIDRO QUEBRAL, ALBERTO ESQUILLO, RENANTE SALINSAN, JEROME MACANDOG, EDGARDO

GAYORGOR, JIM ROBERT PERFECTO, NOEL PERFECTO, DENNIS PAGAYON, AND HERCULANO
MACANDOG, Petitioners, -versus- ANGBUS CONSTRUCTION, INC. AND ANGELO BUSTAMANTE,
Respondents.
The Court previously ruled that if the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may be
accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and
the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are
presented. When the photocopy of a registry receipt bears an earlier date but is not authenticated, the
Court held that the later date stamped on the envelope shall be considered as the date of filing.
In the present case, the petitioners submitted these pieces of evidence to show the timeliness of their
appeal: (a) the registry receipt; (b) a copy of the envelope that contained the memorandum of appeal
and appeal fee; and (c) Laureta's certification. As the CA noted, all three documents indicate May 20,
2013 as the date of mailing at the POEA Post Office in Mandaluyong City. Considering that there is no
variance in the dates stated on these documents, there is no reason for the Court to mark another date
as the date of mailing.
Laureta's certification corroborates the date of filing specified in the registry receipt and on the
envelope. The Court recognizes that, ideally, the incumbent postmaster in the POEA Post Office
should be the one to certify the date of mailing based on the post office records, considering that
he or she is the person duly authorized to do so. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Laureta's
certification as the postmaster at the time of mailing, together with the pieces of evidence earlier
mentioned, constitutes substantial compliance with the authentication requirement.
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Angbus employed them as construction workers on various dates from 2008
to 2011. They claimed to be regular employees since they were engaged to perform tasks which are
necessary and desirable to the usual business of Angbus, and that they have rendered services to the
latter's construction business for several years already. They were, however, summarily dismissed
from work on June 28, 2012 and July 14, 2012 without any just or authorized cause and due process.
Thus, they filed consolidated cases for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment
of full backwages, salary differential, ECO LA, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, overtime
and holiday pay, including moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
For their part, respondents maintained that petitioners were first employed by Angelfe Management
and Consultancy (Angelfe) for a onetime project only. Two or three years after the completion of the
Angelfe project, they were then hired by Angbus, which is a separate and distinct business entity from
the former. Thus, petitioners were hired only for two project employment contracts – one each with
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Angelfe and Angbus. Respondents further stated that a long period of time between the first project
employment and the other intervened, which meant that petitioners were not re-hired repeatedly
and continuously.
In a Decision 12 dated December 26, 2013, the NLRC reversed the LA's ruling and declared that
petitioners were regular employees who were illegally dismissed on June 14, 2012; hence, they are
entitled to reinstatement and full backwages, including their other monetary claims. Angbus elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals.
On the timeliness of the appeal's filing, the CA ascribed no evidentiary value to Registry Receipt No.
2468 (registry receipt) due to the lack of an authenticating affidavit by the person who mailed it.
Petitioners presented the registry receipt to prove that they filed their memorandum of appeal
together with the appeal fee on the last day of the reglementary period on May 20, 2013. The CA
refused to give weight to Laureta's certification that the document covered by the registry return was
indeed mailed at the POEA Post Office on the said date. In so ruling, the CA explained that Laureta's
certification was issued without authority because it was issued only on February 17, 2014 when
Laureta was no longer assigned at the POEA Office. Thus, the NLRC erred in considering the registry
receipt as conclusive proof of petitioners' timely filing of their appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that petitioners' appeal before the NLRC was filed out of time. (YES)
RULING:
On the procedural aspect, the Court notes that the issue of the timeliness of the filing of the appeal is
a factual issue that requires a review of the evidence presented on when the appeal was actually filed.
Thus, it is generally not covered by a Rule 45 review. In this case, however, the conflicting findings of
the CA and the NLRC on this matter pave the way for the Court to review this factual issue even in a
Rule 45 review.
In this case, the CA held that the NLRC should not have given due course to petitioners' appeal for
being filed out of time. Although both the registry receipt and the date stamped on the envelope
showed that the date of posting was May 20, 2013 or the last day of the reglementary period, the CA
was not convinced that the appeal was actually mailed on that date at the POEA Post Office. The CA
held that petitioners should have submitted, together with the registry receipt, an authenticating
affidavit of the person who mailed the memorandum of appeal. It also refused to give credence to
Laureta's certification on the ground that it was issued without authority, having been issued only on
February 17, 2014 when Laureta was no longer assigned at the POEA Post Office. It therefore
concluded that the NLRC erred in considering the registry receipt as conclusive proof that May 20,
2013 is the date of filing the appeal. After reviewing the evidence on record, the Court disagrees with
the CA that the appeal was not timely filed.
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The Court previously ruled that if the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may
be accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and
the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are presented.
When the photocopy of a registry receipt bears an earlier date but is not authenticated, the Court
held that the later date stamped on the envelope shall be considered as the date of filing. In the
present case, the petitioners submitted these pieces of evidence to show the timeliness of their
appeal: (a) the registry receipt; (b) a copy of the envelope that contained the memorandum of appeal
and appeal fee; and (c) Laureta's certification. As the CA noted, all three documents indicate May 20,
2013 as the date of mailing at the POEA Post Office in Mandaluyong City. Considering that there is no
variance in the dates stated on these documents, there is no reason for the Court to mark another
date as the date of mailing.
Laureta's certification corroborates the date of filing specified in the registry receipt and on the
envelope. The Court recognizes that, ideally, the incumbent postmaster in the POEA Post Office
should be the one to certify the date of mailing based on the post office records, considering that he
or she is the person duly authorized to do so. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Laureta's certification
as the postmaster at the time of mailing, together with the pieces of evidence earlier mentioned,
constitutes substantial compliance with the authentication requirement.
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY

AND MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 204796, FIRST DIVISION, February 4, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and
independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition
of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition,
as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by
his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
FACTS:
The petitioner owns a parcel of land and a one-storey building erected thereon located at the comer
of Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 330668 (subject property). On January 9, 1991, the petitioner and the respondent entered
into a Contract of Lease, whereby the petitioner leased the subject property to the respondent for a
period of 20 years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011, for a monthly rental of ₱75,000.00,
subject to periodical increments. In turn, respondent sublet portions of the subject property to
Jollibee Foods Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises, represented by its proprietor, Andrew D.
Palangdao (Andrew).
Beginning June 2006, respondent failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks it had issued
by way of payments from June 2006 to December 2006 were all dishonored upon presentment. This
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prompted petitioner to send, through counsel, a letter dated July 23, 2007 demanding the payment
of the accrued rentals and terminating the January 9, 1991 Contract. Thereafter, it entered into
separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions of the subject property they
respectively occupy.
On December 14, 2009, a complaint for breach of contract with damages was filed by the respondent
against the petitioner, Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew and a certain Mary Palangdao before the RTC of
Pasig City. The respondent alleged that the act of defendants in entering into separate contracts,
despite the existence of the January 9, 1991 Contract, constitutes unlawful interference, for which
they must be held solidarily liable for damages. As such, the respondent prayed that the contracts
effected by the petitioner be declared invalid and illegal.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons was not served upon its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required
by the Rules of Court (Rules), but upon a certain Fernando Noyyo, a houseboy/gardener, at a
residence which is not the principal office of the petitioner; (b) lack of legal capacity to sue as a
juridical person on the part of the respondent, its certificate of registration having already been
revoked by the SEC as early as September 29, 2003; and (c) lack of cause of action, in the absence of
the requisite allegations of the ultimate facts constituting bad faith and malice on the part of the
defendants as would support the cause of action of "unlawful interference."
The respondent argued that improper service of summons is not a ground to dismiss its complaint.
It also insisted that it has legal capacity to sue and that its legal existence cannot be attacked except
in a quo warranto petition.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of summons
is not among the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules allowing for the dismissal
of a complaint. With regard to respondent’s legal capacity to sue, it cited Section 20 of the Corporation
Code, in relation to Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules, in ruling that Diamond's legal existence
can only be impugned in a quo warranto proceeding. The petitioner moved for reconsideration,
however, it was denied.
The matter was elevated to the CA via petition for certiorari taken under Rule 65 of the Rules. It was
dismissed by the CA on the following grounds: (a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of
service of the petition on Diamond pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules, and (b) non-
compliance with the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the
Rules. The CA also denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
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Whether Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.
(YES)
RULING:
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by petitioner before
the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts as well as
the affidavit of service and/or filing of the person who filed and served the petition via registered
mail on behalf of the petitioner. These imply that a copy of petitioner' s certiorari petition had been
served to the RTC as well as to the respondent through its address at "Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire
Tower, ADB Avenue comer Gamet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City," in compliance with Section 13,
Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46.
On this score, the Court notes that respondent declared the aforesaid address as its business
address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since
changed its address or had moved out. Hence, petitioner cannot be faulted for adopting the said
address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which merely entails service of the petition upon the
respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and
independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the
certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for
respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13
of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel, should not apply.
G. Summons
1. Nature and purpose of summons in relation to actions in personam, in rem,
and quasi in rem
2. Rule 14
CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY, IRENE
S. UY,ERICSON S. UY, JOHANNA S. UY, and JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners, -versus- CRISPULO
DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs PAULITA MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO, et. al.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 223610, FIRST DIVISION, July 24 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As held in Odiamar v. Valencia, the active participation of the party against whom the action was
brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After
all, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid service of
summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's authority.
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Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they were
nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the
amended complaint and actively participating in the case. In fact, one of the petitioners and Uy siblings,
Ericson, was presented as a witness for the defense. Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse RTC
ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the Court. It is settled that the active participation of
the party against whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from
later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil
cases is obtained either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the
court's authority as held in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
An action for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees involving a parcel of
land, filed by Crispulo Del Castillo (Crispulo) against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife, Conchita.
However, since Jaime had died six (6) years earlier in 1990, Crispulo amended his complaint and
impleaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as defendants. Meanwhile, Crispulo died during the
pendency of the action and hence, was substituted by his heirs Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, et.al.,
(respondents).
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision in respondents' favor, and
accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful owners; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title
as well as TCT; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and litigation costs as
well as attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the zonal value. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before
the CA, and subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for lack of merit. The ruling became
final and executory, thus, prompting the Court to issue an Entry of Judgment .
Respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, manifesting therein that the total zonal
value was ₱55,153,000.00. Hence, the attorney's fees, computed at 25% thereof. Accordingly, the RTC
granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. On December 13, 2010, a Writ of
Execution was issued, to which the sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment seeking to levy petitioners'
properties in an amount sufficient to cover for the ₱13,788,250.00 as attorney's fees and ₱20,000.00
each as moral damages and litigation costs.
Threatened by the Notice of Garnishment, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the writ
of execution be quashed and set aside, and that a hearing be conducted to re-compute the attorney's
fees. Petitioners maintained that the Writ of Execution is invalid because it altered the terms of the
RTC Decision which did not state that the zonal value mentioned therein referred to the zonal value
of the property at the time of execution.
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two (2) orders: (a) one granting petitioners' Omnibus Motion,
nullifying the Notice of Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine the proper computation of
the award for attorney's fees; and (b) another denying their motion to quash, since they never raised
such jurisdictional issue in the proceedings a quo.
In an Order dated May 17, 2012, the RTC: (a) pegged the attorney's fees at ₱3,387,970.00, using the
zonal value in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title Case was instituted, it being the computation
least onerous to petitioners; and (b) denied petitioners' Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the twin Orders dated December 9, 2011 and dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC was
correctly upheld.
RULING:
YES. At the outset, it is well to reiterate that petitioners are resisting compliance with the ruling in
the Quieting of Title Case, on the grounds that: (a) they were never served with summons in relation
thereto; and (b) they were merely impleaded as substitutes to Jaime therein, and as such,
respondents should have proceeded against his estate instead, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.
Anent petitioners' claim that they were never served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out
that in the Manifestation/Motion, petitioners, through their counsel, Atty. Trinidad, explicitly stated,
among others, that they "received the Summons with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint" and
that "the Answer earlier filed serves as the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint." Having
admitted the foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert otherwise. "It is settled that judicial
admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in
the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. They are legally
binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that they have been made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was actually made, neither of which was shown to exist in this
case."
Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they were
nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer to
the amended complaint and actively participating in the case. In fact, one of the petitioners and Uy
siblings, Ericson, was presented as a witness for the defense. Moreover, petitioners appealed the
adverse RTC ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the Court. It is settled that the active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the
court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said
party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his voluntary
submission to the court's authority.
As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on the records,
the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were
impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution of
parties takes place when the party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim
is not extinguished.
Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was
amended to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court provisions on substitution upon
the death of a party do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in
the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. In this regard,
petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any monetary
judgment or award must necessarily fail.
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In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy siblings may be held
answerable to the monetary awards in the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot
exceed whatever value they inherited from their late father, Jaime. For this purpose,
the RTC is tasked to ensure that the satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the
judgment in the Quieting of Title Case will not result in the payment by the Uy siblings
of an amount exceeding their inheritance from Jaime. After all, the other
party, i.e., respondents, shall not be unjustly prejudiced by the same since Jaime's
spouse, Conchita, is still alive and the rest of the monetary awards may be applied
against her, if need be.
H. Motions
1. In general (Rule 15)
2. Motion to dismiss (Rule 16)
GRACE PARK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND WOODLINK REALTY CORPORATION,

Petitioners, -versus- EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION, SECURITY BANKING
CORPORATION, represented by the Trustee and Attorney-in-Fact of EASTWEST BANKING
CORPORATION TRUST DIVISION, EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, in his capacity as the Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, EDRIC C. ESTRADA, in his capacity
as Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, Respondents.
G.R. No. 210606, FIRST DIVISION, July 27, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
What is important in determining whether forum shopping exists is the vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same
or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
Here, it cannot be said that there is an identity of parties between Civil Case No. 10-323 pending
before RTC-Makati and Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 pending before RTC-Malolos because the plaintiffs in
the former, herein Sherwyn, et al., represent substantially different interests from the plaintiffs in
the latter, herein petitioners. This is because in Civil Case No. 10-323, Sherwyn, et al.'s interest is to be
subrogated into the shoes of BDO as one of the creditors under the MTI; on the other hand, petitioners'
interest in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 is the enforcement of their rights as debtors to the MTI, i.e.,
ensuring that the foreclosure proceedings were in accord with the foreclosure provisions of the MTI.
FACTS:
An Amended Complaint for Injunction and Annulment of Foreclosure Sale was filed by petitioners
Grace Park International Corporation and Woodlink Realty against respondents Eastwest Banking
Corporation. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that: (a) they entered into a Mortgage Trust
Indenture with EBC, Allied, Security, and Banco De Oro Unibank with EBC acting as trustee (b) under
the MTI, BDO was the majority creditor with 58.04% ownership of the credit, with EBC, Allied, and
Security having 18.33%, 12.58%, and 11.05% ownership, respectively; (c) as collaterals, petitioners
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mortgaged eight (8) parcels of land, as well as the improvements found thereon, (d) under the MTI,
EBC, as trustee, cannot commence foreclosure proceedings on any or all parts of the collaterals
without the written instructions from the majority creditors; (e) during the pendency of the MTI,
BDO's majority share in the MTI was effectively paid for by Sherwyn, et al. (f) Sherwyn, et al. should
have been subrogated to BDO's majority interest in the MTI; (g) EBC refused to honor the
subrogation, causing Sherwyn, et al. to file an action for subrogation and injunction before the RTC
of Makati City; and (h) EBC commenced foreclosure proceedings without written instructions from
the majority creditors under the MTI, which by virtue of subrogation, should be Sherwyn, et al.
In their Answer and Motion to Dismiss, EBC, Allied, and Security contended that the complaint before
the RTC-Malolos should be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia. In
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioners insisted that the forum shopping and/or litis
pendentia are not attendant between Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 and Civil Case No. 10-323,
considering that there is no identity of parties and causes of action in both cases.
The RTC-Malolos dismissed Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 on the ground of forum shopping. It found
that several similarities existed between the complaint filed before it and that in Civil Case No. 10-
323 pending in the RTC-Makati. The CA upheld the RTC-Malolos's dismissal of Civil Case No. 543-M-
2010 on the ground of forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly upheld the dismissal of Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 pending before the RTC-
Malolos on the ground of forum shopping in the concept of litis pendentia. (NO)
RULING:
What is important in determining whether forum shopping exists is the vexation caused the courts
and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on
the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues.
Here, it cannot be said that there is an identity of parties between Civil Case No. 10-323 pending
before RTC-Makati and Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 pending before RTC-Malolos because the plaintiffs
in the former, herein Sherwyn, et al., represent substantially different interests from the plaintiffs in
the latter, herein petitioners. This is because in Civil Case No. 10-323, Sherwyn, et al.'s interest is to
be subrogated into the shoes of BDO as one of the creditors under the MTI; on the other hand,
petitioners' interest in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 is the enforcement of their rights as debtors to the
MTI, i.e., ensuring that the foreclosure proceedings were in accord with the foreclosure provisions of
the MTI.
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EDRON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and EDMER Y. LIM, Petitioners, -versus- THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, represented by GOVERNOR VICENTE T.
PIMENTEL, JR., Respondent.
It may be gleaned from Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that except for the defenses of: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d)
prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to
prevent a waiver thereof. Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically
excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer,
such defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying
upon the same in further proceedings.
In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent's Answer with Counterclaim
did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners' non-execution of the sworn statement pertained to
in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such matter was only raised in its
Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later after the Answer to support the ground relied upon
in the said Motion, which is failure to state a cause of action. However, it must be pointed out that the
Motion and the arguments supporting it can no longer be considered since it was filed out of time
as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that motions to dismiss should be filed
"[w]ithin the time for but before the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim."
More importantly, such matter/defense raised in the motion does not fall within the exceptions laid
down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already precluded from raising
such issue/defense.
FACTS:
A Complaint for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners Edron Construction
Corporation and Edmer Y. Lim (Lim; collectively, petitioners) against respondent before the RTC.
Petitioners alleged that they entered into 3 separate construction agreements with respondent for
the construction of the Leaming Resource Center of Tandag, Tandag Bus/Jeepney Terminal, and
Tandag Public Market. Petitioners claimed that despite their completion and respondent's
consequent acceptance of the works, the latter had yet to pay them despite numerous oral and
written demands.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent admitted the existence of the aforesaid construction
contracts. However, it nevertheless maintained, inter alia, that: (a) there is no unpaid balance; (b)
petitioners are in fact liable for underruns and defective works; (c) petitioners had already waived
or abandoned their right to collect any amount on the ground of prescription; and (d) petitioners are
guilty of non-observance of the specifications indicated in the construction contracts.
More than a year after the filing of its Answer, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. It argued that under Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction
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agreements, final payment to petitioners shall be made only after the submission of a sworn
statement attesting to the fact that all of the latter's obligations for labor and materials under the
contracts have been fully paid. In this regard, respondent contended that since petitioners have yet
to submit such sworn statement, then the latter do not have a cause of action against it.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners' complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. (NO)
RULING:
It may be gleaned from Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that except for the defenses of: (a) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d)
prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order
to prevent a waiver thereof. Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically
excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such
defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon
the same in further proceedings.
In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent's Answer with
Counterclaim did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners' non-execution of the sworn
statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such
matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later after the Answer to
support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is failure to state a cause of action. However,
it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments supporting it can no longer be considered
since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that motions
to dismiss should be filed "[w]ithin the time for but before the filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim." More importantly, such matter/ defense raised in the motion does not
fall within the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent
was already precluded from raising such issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a)
issuing an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said
issue/defense in its Decision.
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent

G.R. No. 201892, FIRST DIVISION, July 22, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Litis pendentia refers to that situation where there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis
pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata in the other. In the present case, creditor-mortgagee first instituted an action for
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judicial foreclosure. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy bars recourse to
the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt under the principle of litis
pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have
attained finality. In any case, the principle stays the same regardless of whether or not the decision in
the foreclosure case had attained finality.
FACTS:
Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan in the amount of
₱160,000.00 which loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. Rafael then
failed to settle his obligation upon maturity despite repeated demands. As such, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. RTC lmus
then ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the total amount of ₱229,200.00.
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's
obligation in the amount of ₱689,000.00. He paid ₱400,000.00 and executed a promissory note (PN)
for the balance. However, after learning of the decision, respondent refused to pay the amount in the
PN. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages (collection case).
In his answer, respondent claimed that petitioner has no cause of action against him. He has fully
settled Rafael's obligation and even committed a mistake by paying more than the amount due under
the loan.
The CA ruled for the dismissal of the collection case. It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds
application in the instant case considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were
filed as a consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan. Since res judicata only requires
substantial, not actual, identity of causes of action and/or issue, it ruled that the judgment in the
judicial foreclosure case is final and conclusive on the collection case.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed error in ruling for the dismissal of the collection case
RULING
NO. A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must
be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
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In the case at bar, the Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable. The records are
bereft of any indication that the decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality
evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case.
This notwithstanding, the Court holds that the collection case was barred, instead, by the principle of
litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action of
the 2 cases. Litis pendentia refers to that situation where there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis
pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action so that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided
for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons and also to avoid the costs and expenses
incident to numerous suits. This theory is founded on public policy. Consequently, a party will not be
permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause
must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping
by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. The true rule,
therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract which must,
thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts
for which a party may maintain separate suits.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a
single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt through the filing of a
personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy
is complete by itself.
In the present case, creditor-mortgagee first instituted an action for judicial foreclosure. In light of
the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a
personal action for collection of the same debt under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that
the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality. In any case,
the principle stays the same regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had
attained finality.
Moreover, it must be noted that while the collection case was anchored on the promissory note
executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate
and distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach.
Records are bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and
the execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation the contract of loan in the absence of
express agreement or any act of equal import. Further on the point, the fact that no foreclosure sale
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appears to have been conducted is of no moment because the remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the complaint there for.
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS, Petitioners, -versus- MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN and

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197380, FIRST DIVISION, October 8, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While the Amended Complaint does allege that petitioner was the registered owner of the subject
properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would show the basis of that assertion,
either through statements/documents tracing the root of petitioner’s title or copies of previous
certificates of title registered in her name. Hence, the Amended Complaint presented no sufficient
allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. Thus, said pleading should
be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC.
FACTS:
Eliza Zuñiga-Santos filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title before the RTC
against Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. The said
complaint was later amended on March 10, 2006 (Amended Complaint).
In her Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a) she was the registered owner
of three (3) parcels of land located in the Municipality of Montalban, Rizal; (b) she has a second
husband by the name of Lamberto C. Santos with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was
forced to take care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make
it appear that the latter was petitioner’s daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable documents, i.e.,
a Deed of Sale, Lamberto succeeded in transferring the subject properties in favor of and in the name
of Gran; (e) despite diligent efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located; and (f) she discovered that
the subject properties were transferred to Gran sometime in November 2005. Accordingly, petitioner
prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the subject properties and pay damages, including costs
of suit.
For her part, Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending, inter alia, that (a) the action filed by
petitioner had prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the
questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds; and (b) the Amended Complaint failed to state
a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified were not properly
identified nor the substance thereof set forth, thus, precluding the RTC from rendering a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer to surrender the subject properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint should be sustained. (YES)
RULING:
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Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular
action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be
raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule16 of the Rules
of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g)
of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included
as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not
prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause
of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for
dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence. The procedure
would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its
deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
A judicious examination of petitioner’s Amended Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently
state a cause of action. The allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an
action for nullification of the sale and recovery of the properties in controversy, hence, rendering the
same dismissible.
While the Amended Complaint does allege that petitioner was the registered owner of the subject
properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would show the basis of that
assertion, either through statements/documents tracing the root of petitioner’s title or copies of
previous certificates of title registered in her name.
Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint presented no sufficient
allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. Thus, said pleading
should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC.
In any event, the Court finds the Amended Complaint’s dismissal to be in order considering that
petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed.
ALDERSGATE COLLEGE INC., et al v. JUNIFEN F. GAUUAN et al
GR No. 192951 | Nov 14, 2012

A motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading in cases which involve an intra-corporate dispute.
____________________________________________________________________________
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case against the respondents before the SEC. When the SEC was reorganized
pursuant to R.A. 8799, the case was transferred to the RTC. A Pre-Trial Order was issued and
provided several issues such as whether the withdrawals and disbursements are in accordance with
the By-Laws; whether there was a complete, audited report and accounting of all the corporate funds;
whether respondents are liable to indemnify the school for all sums of money withdrawn and paid
for without the approval and counter-signature of the chairman; whether there was a demand of a
right of inspection and a refusal to allow inspection and which of the contending trustees and officers
are legally elected in accordance with the By-Laws. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint but such was denied. Respondents also sought the dismissal of the complaint in their
Answer-in-Intervention with Motion to Dismiss. RTC again brushed it aside. Then the respondents
again filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or to Dismiss Case. They claim that the incumbent members of
the Board of Trustees of petitioner had recently passed a resolution which sought the dismissal
and/or withdrawal of the case. RTC granted the motion on the basis of such Board of Trustees’
resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
HELD:
Yes. RTC should not have entertained the subject motion to dismiss
Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a motion
to dismiss is a prohibited pleading. As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion to
dismiss is undeniably a prohibited pleading.
3. Motion for bill of particulars (Rule 12)

I. Dismissal
1. Kinds
a. With prejudice vs. without prejudice
b. Dismissals which have an effect of an adjudication on the merits
2. Rule 17
DIANA YAP-CO, Petitioner, -versus-SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY and ESTER GO-UY, Respondents.

Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial,
or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order
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of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion.
This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the
court."
FACTS:
The respondent-spouses William T. Uy and Ester Go-Uy filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages against on Joseph Chung before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23, which rendered a judgment in favor of the former. With the said Decision becoming final
and executory, respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution thereof, which was
granted by the said court. Subsequently, respondents were the sole bidders of Chung’s property,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 267949, sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
The respondents issued a Final Deed of Sale, which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, after the lapse of the allowable period of redemption. However, they were unable to secure
their new title because one has already been issued in favor of herein petitioner Diana Yap-Co who
supposedly acquired the property through an execution sale conducted in implementation of a
judgment rendered in the case of "Spouses Henry Hatol and Isabelita Hatol v. Joseph Chung." This
prompted the respondents to file a Complaint for annulment of title and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against the
petitioner before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, alleging that the latter’s title over the subject property
was procured through fraud given that while respondents’ documentary requirements were
complete at the time of registration on June 17, 2009, the documents necessary for the registration
of petitioner’s title were secured only much later.
On its part, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the complaint allegedly stated no
cause of action. The RTC held that it cannot yet dwell on the issues raised in said motion and directed
petitioner to file her Answer instead. Consequently, the RTC issued the writ prayed for against the
sale or transfer of the property subject of the complaint, conditioned upon respondents’ posting of
an injunction bond in the amount of ₱3,792,760.20.
Both the motion for reconsideration and the petition for certiorari to set aside the injunctive writ
were denied by the appellate court. In the meantime, trial proceeded in due course. However, at the
initial presentation of their evidence, the respondents and their counsel, failed to appear in court.
The presiding judge gave them another chance to present evidence with a warning that failure to
appear at the next hearing would result in the dismissal of the case. Respondent Ester Go-Uy was able
to present her testimony on February 2, 2012 but respondents repeatedly asked the court for
continuance and, thereafter, failed to appear on the succeeding trial dates. Instead, a motion to pre-
mark their documentary exhibits was filed.
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Because of their repeated non-appearance in court, the RTC issued an Order directing Ester Go-Uy’s
testimony be stricken off the record of the case, denied their motion to pre-mark documentary
exhibits and dismissed the case.
An Omnibus Motion was filed by the respondents to set aside the dismissal of their case, which was
denied by the RTC. Thereafter, they elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari
with a prayer for an injunctive writ.
The CA granted the respondents’ petition and held that the failure of respondents’ counsel to attend
the court hearings and to notify his clients of said hearing dates to enable them to travel all the way
from Aurora, Isabela to Manila to attend the same, should not bind respondents because they appear
to have legitimate grievances in the action for annulment of title. To this end, the CA set aside the
rules of technicalities and ruled that the ends of justice will be better served through the conduct of
a full-blown trial in the main case to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties over the subject
property. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in reinstating Civil Case No. 09-122374 on considerations of equity,
notwithstanding the rule on failure to prosecute a case diligently under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court. (NO)
RULING:
The CA correctly ordered the reinstatement and full-blown trial of the case. Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the
action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the
court." However, the application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Court’s mind, warranted in this
case since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents’ counsel acted negligently in failing to attend
the scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to travel
all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. Respondents would be deprived
of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the RTC’s dismissal of the case – on a
procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their counsel
– is sustained. Considering that respondents appear to have legal and factual bases for their
grievance, it would better serve the higher interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’
conflicting claims to be resolved on the merits.
The Court takes note that the cited motion to dismiss was not premised on the respondents’ failure
to prosecute their case but on the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. A motion
to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency of the
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pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements
of a cause of action, namely: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. In this case, outright
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was improper because the subject complaint sufficiently
averred actual fraud on the part of petitioner in procuring her title to the subject property.
ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR., Petitioner, -versus- ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO AND
RITCHIE YERRO, Respondents.
The Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents’ right to speedy trial being a final order that
cannot be subject of reconsideration or an appeal. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that a dismissal
grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would
bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for estafa was filed by the petitioner against respondents Erwin Yerro, Erico
Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case No. CBU-51009. In the course of the
proceedings, the counsel on record, private prosecutor Atty. Norberto Luna, Jr., manifested that there
was an on-going settlement between petitioner and respondents, and that they would file the
necessary motion relative thereto. Thus, an Order was issued stating among others that, the
prosecution was given 10 days from said date to submit such motion and directed the prosecution to
furnish the accused’s (i.e., respondents’) counsel a copy of the same for their comment; after which,
the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Although a Compromise Agreement was reached between petitioner and respondents relative to the
civil aspect of the case, the prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the same and file the
necessary motion as manifested. As a result, the RTC issued a Dismissal Order dismissing the case for
failure of the prosecution to comply with the court’s directive, as well as to take any further step to
prosecute the case in view of the accused’s (i.e., respondents’) constitutional right to speedy trial.
On June 15, 2004, the petitioner, through a through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Bernarditto M.
Malabago, filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that he learned of the Dismissal Order only on
June 7, 2004, and that he believed in good faith that the case was merely archived in accordance with
the terms of the Compromise Agreement. Several hearings were conducted on petitioner’s pending
motions, including an amended motion for reconsideration and second amended motion for
reconsideration.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motions, holding that the dismissal, which was granted on failure to
prosecute, had long become final and executory and thus can no longer be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. On account thereof, the court already lost jurisdiction over the case. Nevertheless,
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the RTC held that an independent civil action may be instituted by the petitioner to collect the amount
stipulated under the Compromise Agreement. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal relative to the criminal aspect of the case but gave due
course to the notice of appeal with respect to the case’s civil aspect. Undeterred, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the August 3, 2005 Order denying petitioner’s notice of appeal with respect
to the criminal aspect of the case. In particular, he claimed that respondents were estopped from
invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial given that they had already mutually agreed under
the Compromise Agreement to provisionally dismiss the case until its full settlement.
The CA dismissed the certiorari petition holding that the dismissal of the criminal case for failure to
prosecute had long attained finality and thus can no longer be the subject of review. The CA held that
the lapse of two (2) years and nine (9) months from the time the case was dismissed on September
18, 2001 was enough for the RTC to deny due course to the appeal. In this relation, it did not give
merit to petitioner’s claim that he was unaware of the dismissal, observing that it was his duty to be
more vigilant in safeguarding his rights given that he himself is a lawyer, and adding too that he
cannot escape the consequences of his inaction when he failed to submit the Compromise Agreement
for the court’s approval. The CA further stated that since the remedy of appeal was lost through
petitioner’s own fault, the latter cannot seek refuge in a certiorari petition, which is not a substitute
for a lost appeal.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was once more denied, hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s ruling denying due course to petitioner’s notice of
appeal with respect to the criminal aspect of the case. (NO)
RULING:
The Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents’ right to speedy trial being a final order
that cannot be subject of reconsideration or an appeal. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that
a dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal
that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
While the remedy of certiorari may be availed of to challenge the judgment or order of
acquittal, petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under
its classic formulation, grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
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amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act
at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the RTC in dismissing the case for
denial of the respondents’ right to speedy trial. Aside from the lapse of 2 years and nine 9
months from the time the case was dismissed to the time petitioner sought for a reconsideration of
the same, it is also not disputed that it was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay. As culled from
the records, it was the private prosecutor who sought for a temporary suspension of the case during
the September 12, 2000 hearing with a manifestation that they would file the necessary motion
relative to the settlement. Despite having executed a Compromise Agreement – which this Court
notes was not notarized – petitioner and his counsel failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the same or
comply with the directive to submit the necessary motion. Even when the respondents reneged on
their obligation under the Compromise Agreement having failed to pay not only the first two (2)
installments, which was already a ground to revive the criminal case under paragraph 3 (d) thereof,
but rather all 36 monthly installments, still, petitioner and his counsel failed to lift a finger to
prosecute the case. Such inordinate and unjustified delay on the part of the prosecution clearly
prejudiced the respondents. Hence, there can be no gainsaying that their right to speedy trial had
been violated.
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner, -versus- CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 232189, SECOND DIVISION, March 7, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As explained by renowned remedial law expert, former Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his
treatise on the matter:
Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to which a
counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action
or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate
complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the
complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion
to dismiss.
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence
which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same
provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes
a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal. As may be clearly
inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest
his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Failing in
which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
FACTS:
On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent filed
her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated December 5, 2014.
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However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition.
In her comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
(alternatively, Section 2, Rule 17), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for
the court's independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply, averring that respondent's
counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a
manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which -
according to petitioner - was required under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular,
petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However,
respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence,
respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her desire to prosecute
her counterclaims in the same action.
The RTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw. Further, it declared respondent's counterclaim
"as remaining for independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner fifteen (15) days to file his
answer thereto. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Petitioner elevated the case to Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC, holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been filed
by the defendant before the service upon him of the petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for
independent adjudication before the same trial court.
RULING:
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims in the
event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiffs instance, viz.:
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the preceding section, a
complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded
by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same
action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without
prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.
As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this case - the rule is
that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that
"[i]nstead of an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal
of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the
complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute
his counterclaim in the same acton."
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However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action.
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence
which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same
provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who
interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may
be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is
required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to
obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid
period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
J. Pre-trial (Rule 18)

K. Intervention (Rule 19)
STA. RITA & CO., INC. and ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI, Petitioner, -versus- ANGELINE M.
GUECO, Respondents.
Complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and

a supplement of the principal action. In other words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches
on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its
concomitant dismissal.
In this case, Arlene's and the Heirs of Edgardo's complaint-in-intervention in the dismissed reformation
case had been effectively discharged since the principal complaint therein had already been terminated
with finality. Therefore, the dismissal of the main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted
in the dismissal of Arlene's and the Heirs of Edgardo's complaint-in-intervention lodged in the same
case.
FACTS:
On April 11, 2000, Gueco purchased four parcels of land from B. Sta. Rita through its then President,
Ben Sta. Rita, situated at Barangay San Juan de Mata, Tarlac City and covered by TCTs issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac, for the total consideration of P1,000,000.00.
In October 2001, Gueco filed a petition for the surrender of the subject titles against B. Sta. Rita, its
corporate secretary Edgardo Kanapi and the Tarlac RD. In their Answer, B. Sta. Rita and Edgardo
claimed that: (a) the sale transaction was a conditional sale of the subject properties for the total
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consideration of P25,000,000.00; (b) Gueco was the one who demanded that the subject deed
evidencing the sale transaction be captioned as a deed of absolute sale for the purpose of obtaining
funds to pay the required downpayment;(c) Gueco was only able to pay P1,565,000.00; and (d) B.
Sta. Rita continued in possession of the subject properties until Ben Sta. Rita's death in 2001, when
Gueco took possession thereof and appropriated the harvest.
On July 30, 2003, while the surrender of titles case was pending, Alfred Ramos Sta. Rita, Ariel Ramos
Sta. Rita, and Arnold Ramos Sta. Rita, as alleged heirs of the late Ben Sta. Rita and as shareholders of
B. Sta. Rita, for themselves, their co-heirs and on behalf of B. Sta. Rita, and by way of a derivative suit,
filed a complaint for reformation and rescission of contract and quieting of title against Gueco. The
Sta. Ritas alleged that the sale transaction was a conditional and not an absolute sale, for a
consideration of P25,000,000.00, of which Gueco paid only P1,000,000.00. They maintained that the
subject deed was executed only for the purpose of helping Gueco secure a loan with the bank to pay
the balance of the purchase price. Unfortunately, Gueco failed to obtain a loan and consequently failed
to settle the outstanding balance despite demands; hence, the possession of the subject properties as
well as the subject titles properly remained with B. Sta. Rita. Meanwhile, the Sta. Ritas moved to
intervene in the surrender of titles case, claiming similarity of the subject matter and parties, which
RTC granted.
On the other hand, Gueco, as defendant in the reformation case, moved to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds, among others: (a) that the Sta. Ritas failed to comply with a condition
precedent before resorting to a derivative suit, i.e., to show and allege in the complaint that the
officers of B. Sta. Rita refused to sue, are the ones being sued, or were the ones who held control of
the corporation; and (b) that the Sta. Ritas are not parties to the subject deed and therefore, had no
legal personality to seek its reformation or rescission.
Gueco's motion to dismiss and her motion for reconsideration therefrom were all denied, prompting
her to elevate the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On November 5, 2003, the surrender
of titles and the reformation cases were ordered consolidated before RTC.
On March 5, 2004, Arlene Sta. Rita Kanapi, wife of Edgardo, together with the latter's heirs moved for
leave to file their complaint-in-intervention in the reformation case, alleging that she is also a
stockholder and director of B. Sta. Rita and reiterated the allegations in the main complaint. On March
15, 2004, RTC admitted the complaint-in-intervention and proceeded to hear cases jointly.
On July 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision in the certiorari case, dismissing the reformation case
due to the Sta. Ritas' lack of legal personality to bring a derivative suit. Citing Section 5, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the CA found that while the Sta. Ritas
may be shareholders of B. Sta. Rita at the time of the institution of their complaint against Gueco, their
rights did not antedate nor coincide with the date of the questioned sale.
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Aggrieved, the Sta. Ritas filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thus they filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, RTC proceeded to hear the
surrender of titles case independently of the reformation case.
RTC rendered a joint decision rescinding the sale transaction. Gueco appealed the Joint Decision to
the CA, ascribing error on the part of RTC in rendering a joint decision despite a pending incident in
the reformation case among other grounds.
In the interim, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 25, 2006 in G.R. No. 165858, denying the
Sta. Ritas' petition for failure to prosecute, which denial became final and executory on June 16, 2006.
In fine, the reformation case had been dismissed with finality.
CA reversed and set aside the Joint Decision. It held that the final dismissal of the reformation case
left only the surrender of titles case for RTC to resolve. As rescission was one of the main issues raised
in the dismissed reformation case, it was reversible error on the part of the RTC to have rescinded
the sale transaction in favor of the Sta. Ritas. CA struck down the Joint Decision under the principles
of the law of the case and res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether the Heirs of Edgardo has legal personality to appeal the CA decision being merely
intervenors in the main case. (NO)
RULING:
It bears to stress that Arlene's and the Heirs of Edgardo's complaint-in-intervention in the dismissed
reformation case had been effectively discharged since the principal complaint therein had already
been terminated with finality. Clearly, their complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an
independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. In other
words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so
much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. Applying these
principles to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the main complaint in the
reformation case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of Arlene's and the Heirs of Edgardo's
complaint-in-intervention lodged in the same case.
Furthermore, records disclose that Arlene or the Heirs of Edgardo were not parties either as
defendants or intervenors in the surrender of titles case nor did they, in any manner, participate in
the proceedings of the same. It is a standing rule that no person shall be adversely affected by the
outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid
that Arlene and the Heirs of Edgardo cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of the surrender
of titles case and, as such, cannot therefore interpose an appeal therefrom.
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Thus, due to the above-stated incidents, the Court denies the instant petition for Arlene's and the
Heirs of Edgardo's lack of legal personality to appeal the CA Decision. To note, neither can Arlene file
the instant appeal on behalf of B. Sta. Rita since there lies no evidence on record to show that she had
been properly authorized by the said corporation to file the same. It is fundamental that the power
of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors and/or its duly
authorized officers and agents, which Arlene clearly is not. Consequently, for her lack of authority,
the appeal of Arlene on behalf of B. Sta. Rita must necessarily fail.
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, -versus- THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN,

QUEZON, Respondents.
Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action. Accordingly, an
intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly
maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax
assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack of jurisdiction
over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1999, the Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued 34 tax declarations on the
buildings and machinery comprising the Mauban Plant – a coal-fired electric generation facility
owned and operated by respondent Quezon Power (Philippines) Limited, Co. (QPL) – and thereby
assessed it for 500 Million, more or less, in realty taxes per annum.
QPL tendered to the Municipal Assessor the amount of ₱60,223,805.51 as first quarter installment of
the realty taxes on the plant, which the latter rejected. Hence, QPL filed a Complaint for Consignation
and Damages before the RTC against the Province of Quezon, the Municipal Assessor and Municipal
Treasurer of Mauban, Quezon, and the Provincial Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Quezon
(defendants. Albeit classified as a consignation and damages case, QPL essentially protested the
Municipal Assessor’s assessment for, among others, its lack of legal authority to make such
assessment and its supposed non-compliance with the prescribed valuation process.
Subsequently, Prumencio Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention and
Answer-in-Intervention, alleging, among others, that as a resident and taxpayer of Quezon Province,
he has an interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL. By way of counterclaim, he
prayed for the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees, anchoring the same on the "mindless
disturbance of the forest and marine environment whereon the power plant stands." Pulgar’s motion
was initially granted and his Answer-in Intervention was admitted.
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The RTC then rendered a decision dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a
payment of the tax assessed under protest. Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgar’s motion for
intervention since with the dismissal of the main case, the same had no leg to stand on.
ISSUE:
Whether Pulgar’s motion for intervention must be dismissed as a consequence of the dismissal of the
main case. (YES)
RULING:
Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action. Accordingly, an
intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, but
oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject
realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention. In other
words, the cessatiori of the principal litigation – on jurisdictional grounds at that – means that Pulgar
had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that intervention
is never an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose
is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely
to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the
opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests.
Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party.
Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of
intervention ceases.
AJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., Petitioner, -versus- JOSE D. TITO, Respondent.
CORNELIO MENDOZA AND PAULINA CRUZ, Petitioners-Intervenors, v. JOSE NAZAL AND
ROSITA NAZAL, Respondents-Intervenors.
Case law states that intervention is never an independent action but is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the placid
operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, who is claiming a
certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert
or protect such right or interests. In other words, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the
right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there
is nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently, the right of intervention ceases.
FACTS:
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Petitioner Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. was the judgment obligee in a case for rescission
of contract. In order to satisfy the judgment by default, the Sheriff levied upon the property of the
judgment obligor, Thomas D. Cort and sold the same at a public auction to Paulina Cruz. After the
redemption period had lapsed, Cruz secured a title in her name and, thereafter, sold the subject
property to Cornelio Mendoza.
Subsequently, Jose D. Tito filed with the same Court against Majestic a petition to declare the
proceedings and the Decision in the rescission case null and void. He contended that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of his predecessor-in-interest, Cort, who had passed away
almost five years prior to the filing of the rescission case. His standing to file the annulment case was
based on his purported ownership of the subject property, which he allegedly inherited from Cort by
way of a devise under his Last Will and Testament.
Prior to the institution of the annulment case, Tito had, however, already transmitted his interest
over the subject property to spouses Jose and Rosita Nazal prompting the latter to join him in the
proceedings as intervenors. The CFI allowed the intervention of Sps. Nazal in the annulment case.
Later, the RTC dismissed the annulment case with prejudice, and declared it closed and terminated
for failure of Tito and Sps. Nazal to prosecute their claim for an unexplained and unreasonable length
of time.
ISSUE:
Whether Sps. Nazal may be allowed to prosecute their claim against Majestic. (NO)
RULING:
Sps. Nazal, who were joined as intervenors in the proceedings, had already lost their right to
participate therein, in view of the RTC’s dismissal of the main action which was decreed pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, stemming from the failure of the putative plaintiff, Tito, to
diligently and expeditiously prosecute the same for an unjustified and unreasonable length of time.
Case law states that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the placid
operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, who is claiming a
certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could
assert or protect such right or interests. In other words, the right of an intervenor should only be in
aid of the right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has ceased
to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently, the right of intervention ceases.
It bears pointing out that, despite having been joined in the annulment case as intervenors, Sps. Nazal
should have actually been deemed as the case’s plaintiffs considering that Tito had already
transferred his interest over the disputed property to the former, even prior to the institution of the
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proceedings. Verily, where a transfer of interest was effected before the commencement of the suit –
as in this case – the transferee must necessarily be the plaintiff (or defendant, as the case may be) as
it is he who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Thus, on the supposition that they were the case’s plaintiffs, Sps. Nazal should bear the obligation
imputed by the RTC upon Tito to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the action within a
reasonable length of time. The RTC, however, pointed out that Sps. Nazal failed in this regard.
All told, whether one treats Sps. Nazal as mere intervenors or, properly speaking, as the plaintiffs in
the annulment case, the Court finds no cogent reason as to why the same should not be dismissed. In
fine, Sps. Nazal are precluded from prosecuting their claim against Majestic.
L. Subpoena (Rule 21)

M. Computation of time (Rule 22)
N. Modes of discovery
1. Depositions (Rules 23 and 24)
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO, AND JANE GO, Petitioners, -versus- THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
In the taking of the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending. Here, petitioners were charged for Other Deceits under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before
the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia must not be granted.
FACTS:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC of Manila for
Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioners allegedly defrauded
Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping by means of false and fraudulent
representations which they made to Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have installed and fixed in
the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone
chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials and executed a Deed of
Mortgage over such for a consideration in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. They
represented such deed as a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the petitioners knew that the
same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION
as early as September 1994, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY
LTD.
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The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on
September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The
private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that
he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
MeTC granted the motion. The Petitioners filed for a MR but the same was denied prompting the
petitioner to file petition for certiorari in the RTC. The RTC declared that the MeTC Orders to be null
and void. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether deposition-taking in civil case can apply suppletorily to the taking of depositions in criminal
cases. (NO)
RULING:
Although the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases, it is likewise true
that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find
no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially
in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet
the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method
of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes
the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in
lieu of direct court testimony. Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses — both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,
either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person
authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or
country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Since the conditional examination
of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending,
the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen
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Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia as nowhere in the said rule permits the
taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
There is a great deal of difference between the face-to-face confrontation in a public criminal trial in
the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside
the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo — it enables
the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness'
deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is
only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner
and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the
physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and
his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by
the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure
the accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at
the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination," it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal
trials.
2. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25)

3. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26)
4. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27)
5. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28)
6. Refusal to comply with modes of discovery (Rule 29)
O. Trial (Rule 30)
P. Consolidation or severance (Rule 31)
UNICAPITAL INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC. AND JAIME J. MARTINEZ, Petitioner -versus-
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING JR. and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG CITY, BRANCH 168, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175277 & 175285, SECOND DIVISION, September 11, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely
related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and
inexpensive determination of cases. However, if it would merely result in complications on the part of
the latter court or squander the resources or remedies already utilized, then consolidation is not proper.
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In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-
1418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain
unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield
conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code
provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages
suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. Therefore, the denial fo the motion
for consolidation is proper.
FACTS:
Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz obtained an P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital,
P12,000,000.00 of which was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the remaining P6,000,000.00 on August
1, 1997. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate Mortgage over a 42,443
square meter-parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of Dela Cruz. Prior to these
transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, was already interested to develop the
subject property into a residential subdivision. In this regard, PBI entered into a joint venture
agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm, URI. In view of the foregoing,
the loan and mortgage over the subject property was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real
Property and, after further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For
this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.
Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the subject property for a consideration
of P21,221,500.00 while PBI bought the remaining half for the price of P21,047,000.00. In this
relation, Dela Cruz caused TCT No. T-687599 to be divided into three separate titles as follows: (a)
TCT No. T-851861 for URI;[17] (b) TCT No. T-851862 for PBI;[18] and (c) TCT No. T-851863 which
was designated as a road lot. However, even before URI and PBI were able to have the titles
transferred to their names, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that
they are the lawful owners of the subject property as evidenced by TCT No. T-114708; that they did
not sell the subject property; and that Dela Cruz's title, i.e., TCT No. T-687599, thereto was a mere
forgery. Prompted by Teng and Yu's assertions, PBI conducted further investigations on the subject
property which later revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious origin. PBI and Unicapital
sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the purchase price
they had paid for the subject property.
From the above-stated incidents stemmed the consolidated cases.
Proceedings for The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285.
First. Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and later
amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief (Consing, Jr.'s complaint) before the RTC-Pasig City
against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager Mariano Martinez Dela Cruz and Does 1-
20, docketed as SCA No. 1759. Consing, Jr. claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made
upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the purchase price they had paid for the subject
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property constituted harassment and oppression which severely affected his personal and
professional life. He also averred that he was coerced to commit a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 as Unicapital and PBI, over threats of filing a case against him, kept on forcing him to issue a post-
dated check in the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge that he had no
funds for the same.
For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez filed separate Motions to Dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint
(Unicapital, et al.'s motion to dismiss) on the ground of failure to state a cause of action Moreover,
Unicapital, et al. posited that the RTC-Pasig City did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that
Consing, Jr. failed to pay the proper amount of docket fees. In the same vein, they maintained that the
RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction over their supposed violations of the Corporation Code and
Revised Securities Act, which, discounting its merits, should have been supposedly lodged with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, they pointed out that Consing, Jr.'s complaint suffers
from a defective verification and, thus, dismissible.
On September 14, 1999, the RTC-Pasig City denied motions to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.'s
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Unperturbed, Unicapital and PBI, et al. moved for reconsideration therefrom which was,
however, denied by the RTC-Pasig City in an Order dated February 15, 2001 for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss before the CA via a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64019 and 64451.
On October 20, 2005, the CA rendered a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint. At the outset, it ruled
that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment
will not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. In this regard, it considered that should there
be any deficiency in the payment of such fees, the same shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.
Dissatisfied, only Unicapital, et al. sought reconsideration therefrom but the same was denied by the
CA. Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073
On the other hand, on August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a complaint[ for sum of money with damages
against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC-Makati City seeking to recover (a) the amount of
P42,195,397.16, representing the value of their indebtedness based on the Promissory Notes.
PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the
RTC of Manila also predicated on the same set of facts as above narrated. PBI prayed that it be allowed
to recover the following: (a) P13,369,641.79, representing the total amount of installment payments
made as actual damages plus interests; (b) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) P200,000.00 as
moral damages; (d) attorney's fees; and (e) costs of suit. Civil Case No. 99-95381 was subsequently
consolidated with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.
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Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 99-1418 which was, however, denied by the RTC-
Makati City . Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with his own
initiated SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.
The RTC-Makati City dismissed Consing, Jr.'s motion for consolidation and, in so doing, ruled that the
cases sought to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of action and the reliefs sought for
by Consing, Jr. from the RTC-Pasig City will not bar Unicapital from pursuing its money claims against
him. Consing, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration therefrom was denied in an Order dated September 4,
2007. Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101355,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Makati City in refusing to consolidate Civil
Case No. 99-1418 with SCA No. 1759 in Pasig City.
The CA rendered a Decision sustaining the Orders dated July 16, 2007 and September 4, 2007 of the
RTC-Makati City which denied Consing, Jr.'s motion for consolidation. It held that consolidation is a
matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court which could be gleaned from the use of the
word "may" in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Considering that preliminary have already
been undertaken by the parties in Civil Case No. 99-1418 pending before the RTC-Makati City, its
consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City "would merely result in
complications in the work of the latter court or squander the resources or remedies already utilized
in the Makati case." Therefore, due to these reasons, the consolidation prayed for would be
impracticable and would only cause a procedural faux pas.
Undaunted, Consing, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom but was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated April 28, 2010. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
192073.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City's denial of Unicapital, et al.'s motion to
dismiss. (NO)
2. Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City's denial of Consing, Jr.'s motion for
consolidation. (NO)
RULING:
1. In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.'s complaint in SCA No. 1759 properly states a cause
of action since the allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19
and 26 of the Civil Code. The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the
court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency,
not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
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basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may
be presented by the defendants. Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from
an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the
complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is
properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court while
the latter is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It
is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.
Furthermore, Court equally finds that the causes of action in SCA No. 1759 were not as Unicapital,
et al. claim misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred that Unicapital and PBI, et al. violated certain
provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised Securities Act.
The rule is that a party's failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the
Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action on of which is wherer\ the causes of action are
between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.
Besides, even on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect
should not result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.'s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules
explicitly states that a "[m]isjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action"
and that "[a] misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court,
be severed and proceeded with separately.
Neither should Consing, Jr.'s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are
paid within a reasonable period.
2. It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve
the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in
a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose
of avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or more cases,
which otherwise could be disposed of in a single suit.
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In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No.
99-1418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu,
should remain unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of obligations and,
hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case
based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418
is a collection and damages suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes.
Likewise, as the CA correctly pointed out, the RTC-Makati City could not have been faulted in
retaining Civil Case No. 99-1418 in its dockets since pre-trial procedures have already been
undertaken therein and, thus, its consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig
City would merely result in complications on the part of the latter court or squander the
resources or remedies already utilized in Civil Case No. 99-1418. In this light, aside from the
perceived improbability of having conflicting decisions, the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and
Civil Case No. 99-1418 would, contrary to its objective, only delay the proceedings and entail
unnecessary costs.
Q. Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33)
NENITA GONZALES et al., Petitioners, -versus- MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY BUGAAY et al.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173008, THIRD DIVISION, February 22, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Being considered a motion to dismiss, a demurrer to evidence must be filed before the court renders its
judgment. Here, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision.
While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose
of receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial.
FACTS:
The deceased Spouses Ayad (Bartolome and Marcelina) had 5 children: Enrico, Encarnacion,
Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. Marcelina died in September 1950 followed by Bartolome
much later on February 17, 1964.
Enrico Encarnacion Consolacion Maximiano Mariano

Remained Died on April 8, Married to the late Died single Predeceased
single 1966 Imigdio Bugaay. and without his parents
issue on on
Survived by: Children: August 20, December
PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS 1986 1943
Gonzales Bugaay
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In the Complaint for Partition and Annulment of Documents with Damages filed by the petitioners
alleged that the only surviving children of the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and Consolacion, and that
during the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several agricultural as well as residential properties.
Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent documents covering all the properties
owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and respondents, completely disregarding their
rights. Thus, they prayed, among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate, the
nullification of the documents executed by Enrico, and the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents claimed that petitioners had long obtained their advance
inheritance from the estate of the Spouses Ayad, and that the properties sought to be partitioned are
now individually titled in respondents' names.
RTC– awarded 1/4 pro-indiviso share of the estate each to children as the heirs of the Spouses Ayad,
excluding Mariano who predeceased them. It also declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition executed by Enrico and respondents, as well as all other documents and muniments of title
in their names, as null and void. It also directed the parties to submit a project of partition within 30
days from finality of the Decision.
Respondents filed a MR and/or MNT from the said Decision. The RTC, issued an Order which reads:
"in the event that within a period of one (1) month from today, they have not yet settled the case, it
is understood that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for resolution
without any further hearing." Without resolving the foregoing motion, the RTC, noting the failure of
the parties to submit a project of partition, issued a writ of execution. Subsequently, the RTC,
discovered the pendency of the MR and/or MNT and set the same for hearing. The RTC granted
respondents' MR and/or MNT for the specific "purpose of receiving and offering for admission the
documents referred to by the respondents." However, instead of presenting the documents adverted
to, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence which the RTC, denied in the Order as well as
respondents' motion for reconsideration.
On March 23, 2006, the CA reversed and aside the Orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether it is proper to file a demurrer to evidence after a Decision had been rendered in the case.
(NO)
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RULING:
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is

presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is
that which pertains to the merits of the case. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in
a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof
to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must
clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment.
In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision.
While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole
purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As
respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion
should be deemed abandoned. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy
to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done.
R. Judgments and final orders
JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI

GR No. 174982 | September 10, 2012
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can
only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party
thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to
the litigation and not against innocent third parties.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Atlantic Merchandising, Inc. filed an action for revival of judgment against Zamboanga Alta
Consolidated, Inc. (ZACI) before the RTC of Zamboanga City. Accordingly, the RTC revived the
judgment and ordered ZACI to pay private respondent the amount of P673,536.54 representing its
principal obligation, interest, attorney's fees and costs, plus 12% legal interest per annum computed
from the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid. ZACI was likewise directed to
pay private respondent attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the unpaid amount as well as expenses
of litigation and costs.
A writ of execution was issued to enforce the decision but because it was returned unsatisfied,
private respondent sought the examination of ZACI's debtors, which included petitioners as its
stockholders. In the course of the proceedings, petitioners denied liability for any unpaid
subscriptions with ZACI and offered various documentary evidence to support their claim.
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The RTC noted that ZACI had folded up and ceased business operations as early as 1983, and
when inquiries regarding its paid-in capital were made in 1992, or almost ten (10) years later, no
changes were reflected in the company books.
Finding petitioners to be indebted to ZACI as its incorporators in the aggregate amount of

P750,000.00 by way of unpaid stock subscriptions on the basis of the records of the SEC, the RTC
ordered petitioners to settle their obligations to the capital stock of ZACI.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC Decision directing petitioners to pay private respondent the alleged unpaid
stock subscriptions to ZACI is tantamount to a denial of due process of law.
RULING
YES. Records show that petitioners merely became involved in this case when, upon failure
to execute the revived final judgment in its favor in Civil Case No. 3776, respondent sought to examine
the debtors of ZACI, the judgment obligor, which included petitioners on the allegation that they had
unpaid stock subscriptions to ZACI, as its incorporators and stockholders. During the proceedings,
petitioners vehemently denied any such liability or indebtedness.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the RTC should have directed respondent to institute a
separate action against petitioners for the purpose of recovering their alleged indebtedness to ZACI,
in accordance with Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another person claims the property. If
it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment obligor or
to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the debt,
the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment obligee to institute an
action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a
transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt within one hundred twenty (120) days
from notice of the order, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such
order may be modified or vacated at any time by the court which issued it, or the court in
which the action is brought, upon such terms as may be just.
It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,

and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment
can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party
thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party
to the litigation and not against innocent third parties.
Petitioners were total strangers to the civil case between ZACI and respondent, and to order
them to settle an obligation which they persistently denied would be tantamount to deprivation of
their property without due process of law. The only power of the RTC, in this case, is to make an order
authorizing respondent to sue in the proper court to recover an indebtedness in favor of ZACI. It has
no jurisdiction to summarily try the question of whether petitioners were truly indebted to ZACI
when such indebtedness is denied. On this note, it bears stressing that stock subscriptions are
considered a debt of the stockholder to the corporation.
1. Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34)

2. Summary judgments (Rule 35)
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SPS. ROLANDO D. SOLLER AND NENITA T. SOLLER v. HEIRS OF JEREMIAS ULAYAO
GR No. 175552 | July 18, 2012

Relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court
in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the
existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Spouses Soller are allegedly the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were purportedly in open, peaceful, and
continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner since time immemorial.
However, in February 1996, the original defendant, now-deceased Jeremias Ulayao, and all persons
claiming rights under him, allegedly by means of force, violence, stealth and intimidation, entered into the
possession of the land and, despite repeated demands to desist, constructed a house on the property. This
prompted petitioners to bring the matter before the barangay, but conciliation failed. Thus, petitioners instituted
a complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the MCTC of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.
In Jeremias' Answer, he denied petitioners' allegations and raised the special and affirmative defense
of acquisitive prescription, as he had purportedly been in long, continuous and adverse possession of the
property for more than thirty (30) years. Jeremias also claimed that when Paulina Lusterio, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, surreptitiously had the property registered in her name under a free patent, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) conducted an investigation, upon Jeremias'
protest, and found that it was the latter who was in actual occupation and possession of the property. The
CENRO thus recommended that the title issued in Paulina's name be revoked in order for the property to be
reverted back to the state. To further support his defense of acquisitive prescription, Jeremias claimed that his
house and other permanent improvements still exist on the property.
The MCTC rendered a Summary Judgment upon a finding that no genuine issue of fact had been
tendered by the answer. It held that petitioners' claim to the disputed property was issued in their names, which
is indefeasible and cannot be attacked collaterally.
ISSUE
Is there propriety of rendering a summary judgment?
RULING
NO. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court
finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Viajar v. Estenzo, the Court explained:
“Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts
appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there
be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of
them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
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Relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of
vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's
right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden
of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to
the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.”
In this case, records show that the original defendant, Jeremias, raised the special and affirmative
defense of acquisitive prescription in his answer, claiming that he was in open, continuous and notorious
possession or the disputed property as, in fact, his house and other permanent improvements are still existing
thereon. As succinctly explained by the CA in its assailed Decision, the defense of acquisitive prescription
inevitably involves the issue of actual, physical and material possession, which is always a question of fact. The
existence of this issue therefore necessitates, for its proper resolution, the presentation of competent and
relevant evidence, which can only be done in the course of a full-blown trial.
3. Rendition and entry of judgments and final orders (Rule 36)

S. Post-judgment remedies
1. Motion for new trial or reconsideration
a. Rule 37
HENRY L. SY, Petitioner, -versus- LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 202690, SECOND DIVISION, June 05, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Here, the procedural consequence of the one-day delay in the filing of the subject motion –
which, as a matter of course, should render the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision already final and
executory and hence, bar the instant petition – is incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for
expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered
under the name of Sy (subject property), which was intended to be used as a site for a multi-purpose
barangay hall, day-care center, playground and community activity center for the benefit of the
residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City. The requisite ordinance to undertake the
aforesaid expropriation namely, Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted on April 12, 1994.
On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code of 1991," the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office
of the Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its
tax declaration.
During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not question the City’s right to
expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue.
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On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco (Commissioner Ostaco), Engr. Victor Salinas
(Commissioner Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara (Commissioner Alcantara) as commissioners to
determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid by the City for the subject property.
Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara, in a Report dated February 11, 2008,
recommended the payment of P5,500.00 per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the filing of the
expropriation complaint, or on November 7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a
separate Report dated March 7, 2008, recommending the higher amount of P13,500.00 per sq. m. as
just compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Sy’s motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. (NO)
RULING:
At the outset, the Court observes that Sy’s motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and thus,
was properly dismissed by the CA. Records show that, as per the Postmaster’s Certification, the CA’s
January 20, 2012 Decision was received by Sy on January 26, 2012 and as such, any motion for
reconsideration therefrom should have been filed not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt, or on
February 10, 2012. However, Sy filed his motion for reconsideration (subject motion) a day late, or
on February 13, 2012, which thus, renders the CA decision final and executory.
In this regard, it is apt to mention that Sy’s counsel, Atty. Tranquilino F. Meris (Atty. Meris), claims
that his secretary’s inadvertent placing of the date January 27, 2012, instead of January 26, 2012, on
the Notice of Decision constitutes excusable negligence which should therefore, justify a relaxation
of the rules.
The assertion is untenable.
A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party
invoking such should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a
genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of care required is that which an
ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty rests on every
counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court
notices sent to him. Applying these principles, the Court cannot excuse Atty. Meris’ misstep based on
his proffered reasons. Evidently, the erroneous stamping of the Notice of Decision could have been
averted if only he had instituted a credible filing system in his office to account for oversights such as
that committed by his secretary. Indeed, ordinary prudence could have prevented such mistake.
Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons
in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes
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of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the above-discussed one-
day delay in the filing of the subject motion – which, as a matter of course, should render the CA’s
January 20, 2012 Decision already final and executory and hence, bar the instant petition – is
incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer. This is in line with the Court’s observation that
the amount of just compensation, the rate of legal interest, as well as the time of its accrual, were
incorrectly adjudged by both the RTC and the CA, contrary to existing jurisprudence. In this respect,
the Court deems it proper to relax the rules of procedure and thus, proceed to resolve these
substantive issues.
b. Remedy against denial and fresh-period rule

2. Appeals
a. Judgments and final orders subject to appeal
b. Matters not appealable; available remedies
ARTURO DELA CRUZ, SR., Petitioner, -versus- MARTIN and FLORA FANKHAUSER,
Respondents.
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.
However, there are exceptions to the general rule that an order of execution is not appealable, one of
which is when the writ of execution varies the judgment. Hence, petitioner’s appeal from the RTC’s order
of execution on the ground that it varied the judgment is permissible.
FACTS:
Arturo dela Cruz and his wife, while then still living, entered into a contract of lease with option to
buy with respondents Martin and Flora Fankhauser, over a parcel of residential land in Puerto
Princesa City. The contract stated that the lessee will occupy the leased premises beginning April 1,
1988, one of the stipulation is that in consideration further of the lessee's option to buy, the lessee
will advance to the lessor commencing from January 1989 up to April 1990 a monthly amount of
P18,000.00 and during this period the rentals shall be considered paid by applying therefor the
interests on the above-mentioned advances; that after the lessee shall have completely paid all the
advances mentioned, a contract of sale over the leased house and lot shall be deemed to have been
perfected and consummated and the lessor binds himself to execute in favor of the lessee a deed of
absolute sale.
The respondents did not advance the monthly amount of P18,000.00. Hence, petitioner sought the
rescission of the contract, which was granted by the RTC. On appeal, the CA that petitioner's claim
for rescission was premature. It ruled that the RTC should have fixed a grace period of 60 days to
comply with the notice required in RA No. 6552. The ruling of the CA became final and executory.
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Respondents communicated to petitioner that 2 checks covering the balance of the price and the
rental arrears were already ready for petitioner to claim. Petitioner did not claim the checks but
instead moved, for the execution of the CA Decision, particularly the second part of the dispositive
portion ordering the respondents to vacate the subject property and to pay rental arrears. The RTC
granter the motion for execution. Petitioner elevated the RTC Order of execution to the CA by notice
of appeal. The CA dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on a procedural technicality and not on the merits.
(YES)
RULING:
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court indeed states that no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution. However, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that there are certain
instances when an appeal from an order of execution should be allowed. There are, however,
exceptions to the general rule that an order of execution is not appealable, one of which is when the
writ of execution varies the judgment.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the appeal made by petitioner from the RTC order of execution,
on the ground that it varied the judgment, is permissible and the CA should not have perfunctorily
dismissed it.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, -versus- ROSA REYES,

CENANDO, REYES AND CARLOS REYES, Respondents.
Should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken under Rule 41, Section 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed. Here, the issues to be
resolved on appeal only involve questions of law. Hence, the proper recourse should have been to file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
On February 13, 2007, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. DH-
1136-07, seeking to expropriate 308 square meters of a parcel of land located in Barangay San
Ramon, Dinalupihan, Bataan, registered in the name of respondent Rosa Reyes (Rosa) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA-10265, in view of the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac
Expressway (SCTEx). It claimed that the said property is an irrigated riceland with a zonal value of
P20.00 per square meter, based on the relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). Consequently, pursuant to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 89747 (RA 8974), petitioner
deposited the amount of P6,120.00, representing 100% of the zonal value of the same.
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Similar complaints for expropriation, docketed as Civil Case Nos. DH-1137-07 and DH-1138-07, were
also filed over the 156 and 384 square meter portions of certain parcels of land owned by
respondents Cenando Reyes (Cenando) and Carlos Reyes (Carlos), respectively, for which petitioner
deposited the sums of P3,120.00 and P7,680.00 also in accordance with Section 4(a) of RA 8974.
In their separate Answers, respondents uniformly alleged that while they had no objection to
petitioner’s right to expropriate, they claimed that the amount of just compensation which petitioner
offered was ridiculously low considering that the subject properties were already re-classified into
residential lots as early as October 6, 2003 and as such, their zonal value ranged from P3,000.00 to
P6,000.00 per square meter, as determined by the BIR. Nevertheless, to expedite the proceedings,
respondents expressed that they were amenable to be paid the rate of P3,000.00 per square meter,
at the lowest, translating to P924,000.00 for Rosa, P468,000.00 for Cenando and P1,152,000.00 for
Carlos.
The three (3) cases were subsequently consolidated as per the RTC’s Order dated May 23, 2007 and
a writ of possession was granted in petitioner’s favor on December 12, 2007. Meanwhile, on April 27,
2007, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (motion for summary judgment),
contending that there were no genuine issues left for resolution, except for the amount of damages
to be paid as just compensation.
In opposition, petitioner argued that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment applies only
to ordinary civil actions for recovery of money claims and not to expropriation cases. Moreover, it
claimed that the mandatory constitution of a panel of commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining
the amount of just compensation due under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court precludes a
summary judgment.
In turn, respondents filed a Reply, asserting that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court applies to both ordinary
and special civil actions. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, hence, the petitioner appealed
via rule 41 to the CA from the RTC’s judgment but the CA dismissed it on the ground of improper
appeal, and said that since questions of law were raised, the proper appeal mode should have been
under Rule 45 of the rules of court.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. (NO)
RULING:
The CA did not err in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction:
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(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper
recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules
of Court; and
(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary thereto, should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken under
Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed.
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a “question of fact”
when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for
determining whether the supposed error was one of “law” or “fact” is not the appellation given by
the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised
without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.35 In
other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions
drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law.36 However, if the question posed requires a
re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Records show that petitioner raised four (4) issues in its appeal before the CA:
First, whether or not summary judgment was properly rendered by the RTC;
Second, whether or not there is any evidence on record to support the conclusion that the subject lots
had already been re-classified from agricultural to residential; and if in the affirmative, whether or
not the same may be considered as “interior lots” which would necessarily affect its zonal valuation;
Third, whether or not the appointment of commissioners is indispensable in an expropriation case;

and
Fourth, whether or not the properties of Cenando and Rosa Reyes overlap that of the Philippine
National Bank.
At the outset, it bears to note that the second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its
opposition to respondents’ motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for reconsideration
from the RTC’s Order dated November 27, 2007. It has been consistently held that appellate courts
are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below but
ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these issues
may be classified as questions of fact since their resolution would require an evaluation of the
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evidence on record, the CA was precluded from considering the same. Consequently, only the first
and third issues were left for its determination.
Unlike the second and fourth issues, the first and third issues can be properly classified as questions
of law since their resolution would not involve an examination of the evidence but only an application
of the law on a particular set of facts.
To elucidate, the first issue regarding the propriety of the RTC’s summary judgment involves only a
question of law since one need not evaluate the evidence on record to assess if the unresolved issues
in this case, i.e., the classification of the properties expropriated, its location and valuation, constitute
genuine issues. This is in line with the rule that a summary judgment is not warranted when there
are genuine issues which call for a full-blown trial. Similarly, the third issue concerning the propriety
of the appointment of a panel of commissioners only requires an application of Section 5, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, without the need of examining the evidence on record. Thus, given that the issues
to be resolved on appeal only involve questions of law, no reversible error was committed by the CA
in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The proper recourse should have been to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
BANK OF THE PHILIPINES ISLANDS, Petitioner, -versus- SARABIA MANOR HOTEL

CORPORATION, Respondents.
A petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.
A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of
facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless one of the
recognized exceptions exists in the case. Here, the determination of whether or not due regard was given
to the interests of BPI as a secured creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question
of fact. Since the issues raised in BPI’s petition are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review, the
petition is improper and dismissible.
FACTS:
In 1997, Sarabia obtained a P150,000,000.00 special loan package from Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) in order to finance the construction of a five-storey hotel building) for the purpose
of expanding its hotel business. An additional P20,000,000.00 stand-by credit line was approved by
FEBTC in the same year. The foregoing debts were secured by real estate mortgages over several
parcels of land owned by Sarabia and a comprehensive surety agreement dated September 1, 1997
signed by its stockholders. By virtue of a merger, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) assumed all of
FEBTC's rights against Sarabia.
Sarabia started to pay interests on its loans as soon as the funds were released in October 1997.
However, largely because of the delayed completion of the New Building, Sarabia incurred various
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cash flow problems. Thus, despite the fact that it had more assets than liabilities at that time, it,
nevertheless, filed, on July 26, 2002, a Petition for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for the
issuance of a stay order before the RTC as it foresaw the impossibility to meet its maturing obligations
to its creditors when they fall due. Finding Sarabia's rehabilitation petition sufficient in form and
substance, the RTC issued a Stay Order. CA affirmed saying that the RTC's conclusions as to the
feasibility with the modification of reinstating the surety obligations of Sarabia's stockholders to BPI
as an additional safeguard for for the effective implementation of the approved rehabilitation plan.
BPI elevated the case to SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
BPI mainly argues that the approved rehabilitation plan did not give due regard to its interests as a
secured creditor in view of the imposition of a fixed interest rate of 6.75% p.a. and the extended loan
repayment period. It likewise avers that Sarabia's misrepresentations in its rehabilitation petition
remain unresolved.
ISSUE:
Whether petition for review on certiorari was the proper remedy resorted to by BPI. (NO)
RULING:
It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the
Court unless, the following exceptions are found to exist: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based
on misappreciation of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its
findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (g) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A question of law
exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question
of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This
being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and the Court will not review them on
appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPI's petition to be improper and hence, dismissible as the
issues raised therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.
To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the interests of BPI as a
secured creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require
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a review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the parties among others, the various
financial documents and data showing Sarabia's capacity to pay and BPI's perceived cost of money
and not merely an application of law. Therefore, given the complexion of the issues which BPI
presents, and finding none of the above-mentioned exceptions to exist, the Court is constrained to
dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the factual findings of the courts a quo which are entitled
to great weight and respect, and even accorded with finality. This especially obtains in corporate
rehabilitation proceedings wherein certain commercial courts have been designated on account of
their expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter, as in this case.
SPOUSES EDMOND LEE and HELEN HUANG, petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 218867, FIRST DIVISION, February 17, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. As a result of respondent’s failure to perfect
an appeal within the period fixed by law, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the RTC
decision.
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang (petitioners) are the registered owners of parcels
of land with an aggregate area of 5.4928 hectares (has.) situated in Mambog, Hermosa, Bataan and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
The subject property was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). DAR
offered the sum of P109,429.98 as just compensation for the 1.5073-ha. portion of the subject
property. Rejecting the valuation, petitioners instead filed the present petition for determination of
just compensation against Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
The respondent claimed that its valuation was based on DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 11,
Series of 1994, as amended by DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998.8 It also contended that petitioners’
appraisal was biased.
The RTC rejected the valuation given by respondent and setting the just compensation for
petitioners’ 1.5073 has. at P250.00 per square meter, or a total amount of P3,768,250.00.
Several years later, petitioners filed a motion for execution of the RTC’s Decision, alleging that while
they received a copy of respondent’s Notice of Appeal dated June 19, 2002, upon verification, no such
appeal was actually filed before the RTC. Respondent denied petitioners’ claim and asserted that it
filed a Notice of Appeal in accordance with the rules and has, therefore, perfected its appeal. As such,
the RTC’s January 17, 2002 Decision was not yet final and executory. The RTC clarified that
respondent was able to file its Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period and that a postal money
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order in the amount of P520.00 had been issued by respondent in favor of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Balanga City, Bataan, representing the payment of the appeal fee.
The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing respondent’s appeal for
failure to prosecute, holding that the validity of the latter’s appeal had already been passed upon in
the RTC’s earlier Orders that gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records
to the CA. It also ruled that upon the perfection of respondent’s appeal, the RTC had already lost
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, any orders subsequently issued by the RTC after the filing of
respondent’s Notice of Appeal on June 19, 2002 were of no force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
dismissed respondent’s appeal for failure to prosecute.
RULING:
YES. the Court clarified the requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful fees. The
requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period
is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1(c), Rule 50, an
appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the
nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under
Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
In relation thereto, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection
of appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon
the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
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execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.
As a result of respondent’s failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law, no court could
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the RTC decision.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and HELEN Y.
DEE, Private Complainants-petitioners, -versus- PHILIP PICCIO, et.al., Respondents.
Jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing
the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of
the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.
In this case, the petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest in the civil aspect
of the case. Rather, by seeking the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the information and thereby seeking
that the said court be directed to set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, it is sufficiently
clear that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for libel. Hence, the
present appeal must fail.
FACTS:
Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of Companies, to
which Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is a corporate member – filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel
against a group called the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for posting on a website
an article alleged to be highly defamatory and libelous against the Yuchengco Group of Companies,
particularly petitioners Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. and Helen Y. Dee (petitioners).
The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the officers and/or members of PEPCI
(defendants). However, the RTC later on dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the
criminal information failed to allege where the article was printed and first published or where the
offended parties reside.
People of the Philippines, through the private prosecutors and with the conformity of public
prosecutor filed a Notice of Appeal. The defendants thereafter moved for the dismissal of the appeal
citing as grounds the fact that the Brief for the Private Complainants-Appellants filed by petitioners
did not carry the conforme of the OSG and that ordinary appeal was not the appropriate remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners, being mere private complainants, may appeal an order of the trial court
dismissing a criminal case even without the OSG’s conformity. (NO)
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RULING:
It is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court
and the CA is vested solely in the OSG which is the law office of the Government whose specific
powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the people before any court
in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by
the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the
criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the
CA or in this Court. In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case
not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or
the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar
as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari
even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil
aspect of the case.
Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest in the civil
aspect of the case. Rather, by seeking the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the information and thereby
seeking that the said court be directed to set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, it is
sufficiently clear that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for
libel.
It must, however, be clarified that the aforesaid dismissal is without prejudice to their filing of the
appropriate action to preserve their interests but only with respect to the civil aspect of the libel case
following the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC., Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES DENNIS and CHERYLIN GARCIA,
doing business under the name and style "Ecolamp Multi Resources,", Respondents.
G.R. No. 203240, FIRST DIVISION March 18, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
FACTS:
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A Complaint with application for a writ of preliminary attachment was filed by petitioner Northern
Islands Co., Inc. against respondent-spouses Dennis and Cherylyn Garcia before the RTC. On October
25, 2005, the Complaint was subsequently amended, alleging that: a) from March to July 2004,
petitioner caused the delivery to respondents of various appliances in the aggregate amount of
P8,040,825.l 7; (b) the goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio Lines, Inc., and
were accepted in good order and condition by respondents' representatives; (c) the parties agreed
that the goods delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the unpaid amounts would earn
interest at a rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum; (d) however, the value of the goods were not
paid by respondents despite repeated demands; and (e) respondents fraudulently asserted that
petitioner had no proof that they had indeed received the quantity of the subject goods.
In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner posted a bond,
through Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation, in the amount of P8,040,825.l 7. On November 7,
2005, the RTC issued the writ sought for.
Instead of filing an answer, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Proper
Pleading and Motion for Discovery (Production and Inspection), asking the RTC to allow them to
photocopy and personally examine the documents attached to the Amended Complaint, claiming that
they could not “come up with an intelligent answer” without being presented with the originals of
the attached documents.
Thereafter, respondents filed Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, alleging that the attachment
previously ordered by the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value of the
attached properties, as assessed by their appraiser, Gaudioso W. Lapaz, amounted to Pl 7,273,409.73,
while the attachment bond is only in the amount of P8,040,825.17.
The RTC denied the Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Proper Pleading and directed the
respondents to file an answer, which was complied with through the filing of their Answer Ad
Cautelam Ex Abudante with Compulsory Counterclaim. Despite this, respondents again filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File Motion for Discovery (Production and Inspection). The RTC also denied the
Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, finding that the appraisal made by Lapaz was not reflective
of the true valuation of the properties, adding too that the bond posted by petitioner stands as
sufficient security for whatever damages respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment. The
RTC granted the Motion for Discovery in accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, despite
petitioner's claim that it did not have the originals of the documents being sought.
The respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration specifically assailing the denial of their
Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment. In this relation, they prayed that the RTC refer to a
commissioner, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, the factual determination of the total
aggregate amount of respondents' attached properties so as to ascertain if the attachment was
excessive. Also, they prayed that the order for production and inspection be modified and that
petitioner be ordered to produce the original documents anew for their inspection and copying.
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However, this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Thus, respondents elevated the matter to the
CA via petition for certiorari and mandamus.
In the interim, the RTC dismissed petitioner's Amended Complaint due to the absence of any evidence
to prove that respondents had agreed to the pricing of the subject goods. Hence, the petitioner
appealed before the CA which partly granted the certiorari. Finding that the Notice of Appeal was
seasonably filed, with the payment of the appropriate docket fees, the RTC ordered the elevation of
the entire records of the Main Case to the CA. However, records do not show that respondents filed
any appeal.
The CA held that: (a) on the issue of attachment, trial by commissioners under Rule 32 of the Rules
of Court was proper so that the parties may finally settle their conflicting valuations; and (b) on the
matter of discovery, petitioner could not be compelled to produce the originals sought by
respondents for inspection since they were not in the former's possession.
The petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner
appealed the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the
CA. (YES)
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC's September 21, 2011 Decision
resolving the Main Case through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011,
together with the payment of the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, in an Order dated January 25,
2012, had confirmed this fact, and thereby ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA.
Meanwhile, records do not show that respondents filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of its own
period to appeal therefrom. Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted that the
RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the Main Case.
With the RTC's loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction all
over matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners to
determine the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter to
the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
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MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, Respondents
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the
right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective
of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court - not even the Supreme Court - has the power
to revise, review, change or alter the same.
FACTS:
The instant case arose from a collection suit for unpaid taxes and customs duties in the aggregate
amount of ₱46,844,385.00 filed by respondent against petitioner Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17.
Respondent alleged that from 1997 to1998, petitioner was able to secure tax credit certificates
(TCCs) from various transportation companies; after which, it made several importations and
utilized said TCCs for the payment of various customs duties and taxes in the aggregate amount of
₱46,844,385.00. Believing the authenticity of the TCCs, respondent allowed petitioner to use the
same for the settlement of such customs duties and taxes. However, a post-audit investigation of the
Department of Finance revealed that the TCCs were fraudulently secured with the use of fake
commercial and bank documents, and thus, respondent deemed that petitioner never settled its taxes
and customs duties pertaining to the aforesaid importations. Thereafter, respondent demanded that
petitioner pay its unsettled tax and customs duties, but to no avail. Hence, it was constrained to file
the instant complaint.
In its defense, petitioner maintained, that it acquired the TCCs from their original holders in good
faith and that they were authentic, and thus, their remittance to respondent should be considered as
proper settlement of the taxes and customs duties it incurred.
Initially, the RTC dismissed the collection case due to the continuous absences of respondent’s
counsel during trial. On appeal to the CA, and eventually the Court, the said case was reinstated and
trial on the merits continued before the RTC.
After respondent’s presentation of evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence,

essentially contending that respondent failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the TCCs
were fraudulently procured, and thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In turn, respondent
filed an Opposition refuting petitioner’s contentions.
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The RTC granted petitioner’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence, and accordingly, dismissed
respondent’s collection case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It found that respondent had
not shown any proof or substantial evidence of fraud or conspiracy on the part of petitioner in the
procurement of the TCCs. In this connection, the RTC opined that fraud is never presumed and must
be established by clear and convincing evidence, which petitioner failed to do, thus, necessitating the
dismissal of the complaint.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Dissatisfied, it appealed to the
CA which referred the records of the collection case to the CTA for proper disposition of the appeal
taken by respondent. While the CA admitted that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
respondent’s appeal, as jurisdiction is properly lodged with the CTA, it nevertheless opted to relax
procedural rules in not dismissing the appeal outright. Instead, the CA deemed it appropriate to
simply refer the matter to the CTA, considering that the government stands to lose the amount of
₱46,844,385.00 in taxes and customs duties which can then be used for various public works and
projects.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that since the CA does not have
jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal, it cannot perform any action on it except to order its dismissal.
The said motion was, however, denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly referred the records of the collection case to the CTA for proper disposition
of the appeal taken by respondent. (NO)
RULING:
The Court finds that the CA erred in referring the records of the collection case to the CTA for proper
disposition of the appeal taken by respondent.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order
for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
In the instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any
action on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the
guise of furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be
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corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, the Court held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic
wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules.
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the
right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus,
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will
render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the
case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court - not even the Supreme
Court - has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same.
CHERITH A. BUCAL, Petitioner, -versus- MANNY P. BUCAL, Respondent.

G.R. No. 206957, FIRT DIVISION, June 17, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its
purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however, exceptions,
such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex-
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.
FACTS:
Cherith and Manny were married and have a daughter named Francheska. Cherith filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Protection Order based on RA 9262. She alleged that Manny had never shown her
the love and care of a husband, nor supported her and Francheska financially. Furthermore, due to
Manny’s alcoholism, he was always mad and would even shout hurtful words at her. Manny’s
demeanor even affected her health detrimentally, leading her to suffer dizziness and difficulty in
breathing on one occasion.
The RTC issued an order granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) and directing Cherith to bring
Francheska to McDonald’s in Tanza at exactly 9:00a.m. on Saturdays where she will be picked up by
Manny and where she will be returned the following day at 5:00 p.m.
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Dissatisfied, Cherith filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the same. At the
outset, it pointed out that Cherith’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, without
any justification therefor, rendered her resort to certiorari premature. Nonetheless, it held that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting visitation rights to Manny because the same
was only based on Cherith’s own prayer.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition of Cherith should be dismissed for failure to file a motion for reconsideration
before the RTC. (NO)
RULING:
A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its
purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however,
exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceeding were ex-parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
The second and third exceptions obtain in this case.
During the course of the RTC proceedings, Cherith filed 3 pleadings all seeking for the clarification of
or the withdrawal of the visitation rights granted to Manny. Each was resolved by the RTC reiterating
the award of visitation rights to the latter. Thus, there was no need for the prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
The urgency for resolution also rendered such filing unnecessary. It should be emphasized that
Cherith had already been issued a PPO. As defined in Section 8 of RA9262, a protection order is an
order issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child. It
serves the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain
control over her life. With a standing PPO issued for the purpose of protecting not only the woman
but also her child against acts of violence committed by the person against whom the order is issued,
the resolution of the issue of whether or not Manny should be given visitation rights, despite any
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discernible basis therefor, is urgent, else Cherith and Francheska would be unduly exposed to the
very danger which they are seeking protection from. Any further delay would substantially prejudice
their interests, thus, allowing a direct recourse to certiorari.
c. Doctrine of finality/immutability of judgment
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, -versus- ALEXANDER P. BICHARA, Respondent.

A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-
established rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment
which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity. A companion to this rule is the principle of
immutability of final judgments. But like any other rule, this principle has exceptions, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In this case, the final judgment sought to be executed is LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision, which was
confined to the directive that PAL reinstate Bichara as a flight purser in view of his illegal demotion to
the position of flight attendant. LA Macam went beyond the terms of the decision when he directed the
issuance of a writ of execution ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
FACTS:
PAL hired Bichara as a flight attendant. In August 1993, Bichara was included in PAL's Purser
Upgrading Program in which he graduated on December 13, 1993. As flight purser, he was required
to take five (5) check rides for his performance evaluation and earn at least an 85% rating for each
ride. However, Bichara failed in the two (2) check rides with ratings of 83.46% and 80.63%.
Consequently, on March 21, 1994, Bichara was demoted to the position of flight steward. Bichara
filed a complaint for illegal demotion against PAL.
Labor Arbiter Nora declared the demotion as illegal, thus ordering his reinstatement as flight
purchaser. This became final and executor. However, during the pendency of the illegal demotion
case, PAL implemented another retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's
employment. This prompted him, along with more than 1,400 other retrenched flight attendants,
represented by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), to file in
1998 an illegal retrenchment case, which remains pending at this time.
On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old compulsory retirement age under the PAL-
FASAP Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Bichara filed a motion for execution of LA Nora's
Decision, which PAL opposed.
LA Macam granted Bichara's motion for execution, thus, directing the issuance of a writ of
execution against PAL and/or a certain Jose Garcia to jointly and severally pay Bichara separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement because despite pendency of the illegal retrenchment case his
termination is invalid. Reinstatement cannot be made because of his retirement.
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NLRC reversed and set aside LA Macam's Order and denied the motion for execution for being
moot and academic. It noted that LA Macam exceeded its authority in granting separation pay instead
of reinstatement despite pendency of the case.
CA when reinstatement is not possible due to over age, payment of separation pay is in place.
In addition, since a decision, rendered in the illegal demotion case, had already become final and
executory, he is entitled to salary differentials of a flight purser from a flight attendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not separation pay should be made instead of reinstatement.
HELD:
It will still depend on the decision of the illegal retrenchment case. For now, salary differential
is the most equitable award.
A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and
well-established rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the
judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity. A companion to this rule is the
principle of immutability of final judgments. But like any other rule, this principle has exceptions,
namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In this case, the final judgment sought to be executed is LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision, which was
confined to the directive that PAL reinstate Bichara as a flight purser in view of his illegal demotion
to the position of flight attendant. LA Macam went beyond the terms of the decision when he directed
the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
In view of the supervening events- PAL’s retrenchment program and its subsequent complaint- the
Court deems the award of salary differential to be the just and equitable award under the
circumstances herein prevailing.
ROLANDO D. LAYUG, Petitioner, -versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIANO VELARDE

(alias "BROTHER MIKE") and BUHAY PARTY-LIST, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192984, EN BANC, February 28, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The finality of a decision or resolution is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the
convenience of a party. Here, a copy of the Resolution was mailed to Layug. It was, however, returned to
sender (COMELEC) after three attempts due to insufficiency of said address. Consequently, the COMELEC
deemed Layug to have received a copy of the Resolution on the date the postmaster made his first
attempt to serve it. From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was
incorrect, his pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of the Resolution
for being in violation of his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. His refusal to rectify
the error despite knowledge thereof impels the SC to conclude that he deliberately stated an inexistent
address with the end in view of delaying the proceedings upon the plea of lack of due process.
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FACTS:
Petitioner Layug, in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to
Disqualify Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from
being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere "extension of the El Shaddai," which is
a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 6, Paragraph 1 of the "Party-List System Act." Neither does
Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as "one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector . . .", as
required of party-list nominees under COMELEC Resolution; the "Rules on Disqualification Cases
Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections”. In their Answer, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay
Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the qualifications of a party-list
and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group.
Record shows that Layug received a copy of the aforesaid Answer only at the hearing conducted on
April 20, 2010 after his lawyer, Atty. Gagate, manifested that his client has not received the same.
Counsel for private respondents explained that their liaison officer found Layug's given address —
#70 Dr. Pilapil St., Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City — to be inexistent. To this, Atty. Gagate was said
to have retorted as follows: "The good counsel for the respondent could send any Answer or
processes or pleadings to may (sic) address at Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya Your Honor, they could come
over all the way to Nueva Vizcaya, we will entertain him."
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying the petition for lack of
substantial evidence. A copy thereof was sent to Layug via registered mail at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street,
Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City. However, the mail was returned unserved with the following
notation of the postmaster: "1st 6/23/10 unknown; 2nd 6/25/10 unknown; and 3rd attempt
6/28/10 RTS INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS." Subsequently, in its Order, the COMELEC Second Division
found Layug to be a "phantom petitioner" by "seeing to it that pleadings, orders and judicial notices
addressed to him are not received by him because the address he gave and maintains is fictitious".
Accordingly, Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the Resolution dated
June 15, 2010 and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period,
said Resolution was declared final and executory. It was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
The COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers for Party-List, promulgated on
July 30, 2010 NBC Resolution proclaiming Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to 2 seats in the
House of Representatives. However, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay
Party-List, with him being the 5th nominee.
Meanwhile, on July 28, 2010, Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010
before the COMELEC En Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him
a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in the
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newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC. Such motion
was denied by the COMELEC Second Division for being filed out of time.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a denial of due process in this case for the failure of the COMELEC to serve him a
copy of the resolution. (NO)
RULING:
A party may sue or defend an action pro se. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, "every
pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address
which should not be a post office box.” A judicious perusal of the records shows that Layug filed pro
se both the Petition to Disqualify and his Position Paper before the COMELEC Second Division. In the
Petition to Disqualify, he stated his address as #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City.
While Atty. Rustico B. Gagate appeared as counsel for Layug during the hearing conducted on April
20, 2010, he nonetheless failed to provide either his or his client's complete and correct address
despite the manifestation that counsel for private respondents could not personally serve the Answer
on Layug due to the inexistence of the given address. Neither did the Position Paper that was
subsequently filed pro se on April 23, 2010 indicate any forwarding address.
It should be stressed that a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 was mailed to Layug at his
stated address at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City, which however was returned
to sender (COMELEC) after three attempts due to insufficiency of said address. Consequently, the
COMELEC deemed Layug to have received a copy of the Resolution on June 23, 2010, the date the
postmaster made his first attempt to serve it. There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the
COMELEC issued an Order on July 26, 2010 declaring the Resolution final and executory, which
thereafter became the basis for the issuance of the assailed COMELEC En Banc's NBC Resolution.
From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was incorrect, his
pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of the Resolution dated June
15, 2010 for being in violation of his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. His refusal
to rectify the error despite knowledge thereof impels the SC to conclude that he deliberately stated
an inexistent address with the end in view of delaying the proceedings upon the plea of lack of due
process. As the COMELEC aptly pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a mockery of election laws
and procedure by appearing before the Commission by himself or by different counsels when he
wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure that he does not receive mails addressed to him.
He cannot thus be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. To rule otherwise, considering the
circumstances in the instant case, would place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and
processes within Layug's power to determine at his pleasure. This cannot be countenanced. It bears
stressing that the finality of a decision or resolution is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made
to depend on the convenience of a party. Decisions or resolutions must attain finality at some point
and its attainment of finality should not be made dependent on the will of a party.
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NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, BERNABE NOBLE,
WILLIAM GAN, JULIO RODRIGUEZ, JR., SAMUEL LIM, SANDRA YAP NG, ALFONSO UY, and
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173802, SECOND DIVISION, April 7, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is well-settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
This principle is commonly known as doctrine of immutability of judgment.
In this case, as the motion was filed way beyond the 15-day reglementary period prescribed therefor,
the court a quo‘s judgment had already lapsed into finality. As evidenced by the registry return receipt
on record, the NHA received a copy of the Assailed Order on November 10, 1998. However, it moved for
reconsideration therefrom only on March 11, 1999, or more than four (4) months from notice.
Consequently, the Assailed Order cannot be made subject to further appellate review and now
constitutes res judicata as to every matter offered and received in the proceedings below as well as to
any other matter admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose.
FACTS:
NHA filed a case against Bernabe Noble, et al. for the expropriation of their properties pursuant to
Letter of Instruction No. (LOI) 555, mandating a nationwide Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program, and LOI 557, otherwise known as “Adopting Slum Improvement.” The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 7847 and originally raffled to Branch V of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental, but was
transferred to Branch 20 of the Misamis RTC (Branch 20), upon the effectivity of B.P.
129. Consequently, Branch 20 issued a writ of possession placing Noble, et al.’s properties under the
NHA’s control.
Thereafter, the case was transferred to Branch 23 of the Misamis RTC (Branch 23), which appointed
commissioners who appraised the fair market value (FMV) of the subject properties at ₱470.00 per
square meter, as of 1984. Later on, the case was once more transferred to the court a quo, which then
approved the aforementioned amount as just compensation, and ordering the NHA to pay Noble, et
al. the same.
Dissatisfied, the NHA appealed the commissioners’ valuation of the subject properties before the CA.
It remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings on the issue of just compensation.
Thereafter, CA issued an Entry of Judgment which closed and terminated the said appeal proceeding.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings, during which a
new set of commissioners was appointed to re-appraise the FMV of the subject properties.
Eventually, the commissioners pegged the just compensation at ₱705.00 per square meter, taking
into consideration the value of the subject properties in 1984 and the accumulated improvements
thereon since then.
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Claiming that it only received a copy of the Assailed Order on March 3, 1999, the NHA filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration (motion) on March 11, 1999. For its part, Noble, et al.
opposed the NHA’s motion on the ground that it was belatedly filed and thus, the said order already
became final and executory. In particular, Noble, et al. contended that contrary to the NHA’s claim,
the registry return receipt on record shows that it received a copy of the questioned Order on
November 10, 1998.
CA dismissed the appeal and held that the Assailed Order had already become final and executory.
Accordingly, it ordered that the entire records of the case be remanded to the court a quo for
execution proceedings. At odds with the CA’s ruling, the NHA filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Assailed Order had already become final and executory. (YES)
RULING:
It is well-settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. This principle, commonly known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has
a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at
the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious
perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather,
a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied.
In this case, the Court concurs with the CA’s view that the Assailed Order had already become final
and executory at the time when the NHA sought to have it reconsidered before the court a quo. As
evidenced by the registry return receipt on record, the NHA received a copy of the Assailed Order on
November 10, 1998. However, it moved for reconsideration therefrom only on March 11, 1999, or
more than four (4) months from notice. As the motion was filed way beyond the 15-day reglementary
period prescribed therefor, the court a quo‘s judgment had already lapsed into finality. Consequently,
the Assailed Order cannot be made subject to further appellate review and now constitutes res
judicata as to every matter offered and received in the proceedings below as well as to any other
matter admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- HOMER and MA. SUSANA DAGONDON,
Respondents.
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Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
It bears reiterating that the CA did not assess the substantive merits of the RTC Decision — which
ordered the reconstitution of the OCT of Lot 84 — on the pretense that it had already attained finality
which rendered it beyond the scope of judicial review.
In Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation, the Court had the occasion to name certain circumstances
which necessitate a relaxation of the rule on the immutability of final judgments, to wit:
“Consequently[,] final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of
substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called
for such actions. In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, we declared as follows:
“x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any

of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor[,] or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.”
Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its prerogative to suspend
procedural rules and to resolve the present controversy according to its merits.
FACTS:
The instant case arose from a Petition filed before the RTC on March 10, 2009 by respondents Homer
and Ma. Susana Dagondon (respondents), as attorneys-in-fact of Jover P. Dagondon (Jover), praying
for the reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) of a 5,185-square-meter parcel of land
located at Bonbon, Catarman, Camiguin, denominated as Lot No. 84 of the Catarman Cadastre (Lot
84). In the petition, respondents alleged that: (a) Jover is the registered owner of Lot 84, having
purchased the same from a certain Lourdes Borromeo Cordero,6 and consequently, registered it nder
his name for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 013775; (b) on October 23, 2008, they
obtained two (2) separate certifications from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), one stating that
Decree No. 466085 was issued in relation to Lot 84, and the other stating that it did not have a copy
of Decree No. 466085 on file, and that the same was presumed lost or destroyed as a consequence of
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the last world war; (c) on February 13, 2009, they secured another certification, this time from the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Mambajao, Camiguin, declaring that the subject property had no existing
OCT and that it was probably destroyed or dilapidated during the eruption of Hiboc-Hiboc Volcano10
or World War II; and (d) they were filing the petition for reconstitution on the basis of Decree No.
466085.
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(petitioner), prayed for the dismissal of the petition for insufficiency in form and substance,
considering that respondents, among others, failed to establish the existence of the very Torrens Title
which they sought to reconstitute.
The RTC granted the petition for reconstitution and, accordingly, ordered the RD of Mambajao,
Camiguin to reconstitute the OCT of Lot 84. In ruling for respondents, the RTC ratiocinated that
neither the government nor any interested party would be prejudiced if it resolved to grant the
petition.
The CA held that the RTC Decision had already attained finality due to petitioner’s failure to move for
its reconsideration within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period provided by law. As such, the RTC
Decision could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and immutability of
judgments. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to proffer compelling reasons to justify the
belated filing of its motion, and worse, even concealed the date it received the RTC Decision which
was consequently belied by the date indicated in the registry return card.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC Decision could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments. (YES)
RULING:
At the outset, it bears reiterating that the CA did not assess the substantive merits of the RTC Decision
— which ordered the reconstitution of the OCT of Lot 84 — on the pretense that it had already
attained finality which rendered it beyond the scope of judicial review.
Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
In Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation, the Court had the occasion to name certain circumstances
which necessitate a relaxation of the rule on the immutability of final judgments, to wit:
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“Consequently[,] final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of
substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such
actions. In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, we declared as follows:
“x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any

of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor[,] or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.”
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as
to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its prerogative to
suspend procedural rules and to resolve the present controversy according to its merits.
d. Modes of appeal from judgments or final orders of various courts

(Rules 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45)
FELY Y. YALONG, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LUCILA C. YLAGAN,
Respondents.
Appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. A notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that
rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA.
A notice of appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment, or final order in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.
Here, Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. The latter court rendered a Resolution
dismissing the same. A petition for certiorari is an original action and, as such, the RTC took cognizance
of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, Yalong should
have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA. As a consequence
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of Yalong's failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC
Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
FACTS:
Stemming from a complaint filed by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan, an Information was filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas City, Branch 1 charging Yalong for the crime of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The information stated that on April 2, 2002 , Yalong, well-knowing
that she does not have funds in or credit with the Export and Industry Bank, Juan Luna Branch, draw,
make and issue to Major Lucila Ylagan, Export and Industry Bank Check No. 0002578833 dated May
3, 2002 in the amount of P450,000.00 to apply on account or for value, but when said check was
presented for full payment with the drawee bank, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on
the ground of "Account Closed," which in effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency of
funds. Ylagan was constrained to file the instant criminal case. In her defense, Yalong averred that
she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same.
Likewise, she claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew that
the said check was not covered by sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she
handed it to Ylagan.
MTCC rendered its Judgment finding Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation
of BP 22. Yalong filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Recall the Warrant of Arrest
dated October 15, 2006 which the MTCC treated as an original motion for reconsideration. The said
motion was denied. Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 2, 2007 which was denied due
course considering that the judgment against her was promulgated in absentia on account of her
unjustified absence.
Yalong filed a Petition for Relief from Order and Denial of Appeal which was dismissed in an Order
dated July 25, 2007 on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies available under the law when
she: (a) failed to appear without justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of the MTCC
Decision; (b) did not surrender within 15 days from the date of such promulgation; (c) did not file a
motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law; and (d) remained at large. Yalong
moved for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated October 25, 2007. Aggrieved, Yalong
filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail before the RTC of Batangas City, Branch 7. The RTC
denied Yalong's certiorari petition, finding the promulgation of the MTCC Decision in absentia to be
valid as Yalong was duly notified of the scheduled date of promulgation on October 6, 2006 and yet
failed to appear thereat. The RTC observed that Yalong did not make any effort to surrender within
the time allowed by the rules and thus, lost the remedies available to her under the law. Yalong filed
a petition for review before the CA which was dismissed on the ground that the "Order of the RTC
was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where appeal (by filing a notice of appeal with
the RTC) and not a petition for review is the proper remedy.
ISSUE:
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Whether the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of improper appeal.
(YES)
RULING:
While the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review
instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike its converse, i.e., the filing of a notice of
appeal when what is required is the filing of a petition for review), Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court.
In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC and that the
latter court rendered a Resolution dismissing the same. It is fundamental that a petition for certiorari
is an original action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved
the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, based on the above-cited rule,
Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA.
As a consequence of Yalong's failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper
reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further
contesting the same.
In this relation, it must be pointed out that Yalong's contention that a petition for review may be
treated as a notice of appeal since the contents of the former already include the required contents
of the latter cannot be given credence since these modes of appeal clearly remain distinct procedures
which cannot, absent any compelling reason therefore, be loosely interchanged with one another. For
one, a notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision,
judgment or final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is
required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalong's filing of the subject petition for
review cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is considered fatal
and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must
be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in
the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to
controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions
with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and
are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not
present in the instant case. As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and
perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
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LEONCIO ALANGDEO, ARTHUR VERCELES, and DANNY VERGARA, Petitioners, -versus- The
City Mayor of Baguio, HON. BRAULIO D. YARANON (to be substituted by incumbent City
Mayor, HON. MAURICIO DO MOGAN), JEOFREY MORTELA, Head Demolition Team, CITY
ENGINEER'S OFFICE, and ERNESTO LARDIZABAL, Respondents.
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides for 3 ways by which an appeal from the RTC's decision may be
undertaken, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (a) an
ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (b) a
petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(c) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the SC where only questions of law are raised.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 is filed with the Court only
on questions of law.
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto Lardizabal (Ermesto) filed ·a complaint for demolition before the City Engineer's
Office of Baguio City, questioning the ongoing construction of a residential structure and garage
extension by petitioners on a parcel of land allegedly owned by Mariano Pangloy and Ernesto's father,
Juanito Lardizabal. Upon investigation, it was found out that the construction had no building permit,
thus, the City Mayor issued a demolition order directing the summary demolition of the said
structures. Aggrieved, petitioners moved for a reconsideration the demolition order but was denied.
As such, they were prompted to file a complaint for injunction and prohibition with the RTC seeking
to enjoin the implementation of said order. The RTC then issued a writ of preliminary injunction
pending the final determination of the merits of the case.
During trial, Verceles testified, among others, that Barangay Atok Trail, the place where the property
is situated. is covered by a proclamation which declared the same as mineral reservation for Baguio
City. As such, all the structures therein has no building permit.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners enjoining the implementation of the demolition order until
and after the resolution of all the issues involving the subject property and/or area. A proclamation
declared the entire area of Barangay Atok Trail as a buffer zone for the mining industry. As such, all
structures constructed thereon were not covered by building permits. Considering the foregoing, it
would violate the equal protection clause if it would allow the demolition of petitioners' structures
while leaving untouched the other structures in the area. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the
CA. The CA reversed RTC’s decision and ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE:
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Whether the CA should have dismissed respondents' appeal as it involves pure questions of law.
(YES)
RULING:
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides for 3 ways by which an appeal from the RTC's decision may be
undertaken, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (a) an
ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (b) a
petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the SC where only questions of law are
raised.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 is filed with
the Court only on questions of law.
There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties or litigants. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn there from is correct, is a question of law. On the other hand, there is a
"question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
In the case at bar, the CA was called upon, not to examine the probative value of the evidence
presented, but to determine whether the legal conclusions made based on the recorded evidence is
correct. Essentially, the issue raised before the CA was whether the order for the summary demolition
of petitioners' structures was authorized under the law, and in that relation, whether the RTC's grant
of the complaint for injunction based on the equal protection clause was proper. Clearly, with none
of the factual circumstances contested, the appeal involved pure questions of law that should have
been brought directly to the SC. On a technical note, the CA should have dismissed respondents'
appeal for having been filed with the wrong tribunal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50.
SPOUSES AMADOR C. CAYAGO, JR. and ERMALINDA B. CAYAGO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
EVELITO CANTARA and SOLEDAD CANTARA, Respondents
G.R. NO. 203918, FIRST DIVISION, December 2, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The original 15-day period to appeal is extendible for an additional 15 days upon the filing of a proper
motion and the payment of docket fees within the reglementary period of appeal. Failure to successfully
comply with the aforementioned procedure, especially in filing the appeal within the prescribed period,
renders the petition for review dismissible. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the CA committed
reversible error when it dismissed Spouses Cayago's petition on the ground that it was belatedly filed. It
bears stressing that Spouses Cayago's motion for extension of time, as well as their petition for review,
was physically in the CA's possession long before the issuance of its Decision on April 14, 2011, but for
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reasons completely beyond their control, the motion for extension of time to file their petition belatedly
reached the ponente's office and was therefore not timely acted upon.
FACTS:
Spouses Evelito Cantara and Soledad Cantara (Spouses Cantara) filed a complaint before the
Municipal Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar (MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. (2008-02) 764,
for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against Spouses Amador
Cayago, Jr. and Ermalinda Cayago (Spouses Cayago). Spouses Cantara alleged that they are the rightful
and legitimate owners and actual possessors of a 1,722-square meter parcel of agricultural land
(riceland) located at So. Can-awak, Brgy. Surok, Borongan, Eastern Samar (subject land) covered by
Tax Declaration (TD) No. 10520 in the name of one Asteria Rubico (Asteria). That they purchased the
subject land from Asteria as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
On the other hand, Spouses Cayago claimed that they are the real owners of the subject land and
possessors thereof since 1948, as evidenced by TD No. 68161 in the name of one Sabina Cayago
(Sabina), as well as Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. (OCT No.) P- 7694 issued on December 28,
2006 in the name of the Heirs of Amador P. Cayago, Sr., represented by Sabina. Furthermore, they
averred that the deed of sale presented by Spouses Cantara to prove their ownership over the subject
land was not registered, hence, not binding or valid against them.
The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding Spouses Cayago to have sufficiently
proven, by a preponderance of evidence, their ownership and prior physical possession of the subject
land. Dissatisfied, Spouses Cantara appealed the matter before the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 1 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 4134.
The RTC reversed the MTC's Decision declaring Spouses Cantara to have the better right to possess
the subject land over Spouses Cayago. Aggrieved, Spouses Cayago filed a motion for reconsideration
on September 14, 2009, which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 6, 2010. Spouses Cayago,
through counsel, received such order of denial on July 15, 2010. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, Spouses Cayago had fifteen (15) days, or until July 30, 2010 within which to file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). On July 29, 2010, 29 or a day before the
expiration of the period within which to file said petition, Spouses Cayago filed a motion for extension
of time praying for an additional period of fifteen (15) days, or until August 14, 2010, within which
to file their petition for review. Since August 14, 2010 fell on a Saturday, Spouses Cayago filed their
petition for review with the CA on August 16, 2010.
Before the CA, the appellate court dismissed the petition outright for having been filed out of time,
Spouses Cayago filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review for failure of Spouses Cayago to file
the same within the reglementary period.
RULING
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YES. As a general rule, appeals are perfected when it is filed within the period prescribed under the
Rules of Court. Specifically, Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals to the CA
taken from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction should be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days, counted from notice of the judgment appealed from or from the
denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The original 15-day period to appeal is extendible
for an additional 15 days upon the filing of a proper motion and the payment of docket fees within
the reglementary period of appeal. Failure to successfully comply with the aforementioned
procedure, especially in filing the appeal within the prescribed period, renders the petition for review
dismissible.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the CA committed reversible error when it dismissed
Spouses Cayago's petition on the ground that it was belatedly filed. It bears stressing that Spouses
Cayago's motion for extension of time, as well as their petition for review, was physically in the CA's
possession long before the issuance of its Decision on April 14, 2011, but for reasons completely
beyond their control, the motion for extension of time to file their petition belatedly reached the
ponente's office and was therefore not timely acted upon. As a result, the same was unceremoniously
dismissed on procedural grounds - such as delay on the part of the personnel of the CA in transmitting
case records to their respective ponentes.
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, Petitioner , vs. COURT OF

APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents
G.R. NO. 217126-27, EN BANC, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction on remedies is
inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure
promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, and
not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. In this case, with the unconstitutionality of the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the
CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso
VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Jejomar S. Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al.), accusing them of Plunder and violation
of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building (Makati Parking Building).
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the
complaint files before its office. Thereafter, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the
office of the respondent.
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On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to
enjoin its implementation. He argued that, pertinent to the five phases of the Makati Parking Building
project, the Phases III to V thereto transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City
Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.
Thereafter, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel
A. Roxas II, caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Subsequently, the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City
Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor. At noon of
the same day, the CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Peña,
Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing
Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Peña, Jr. of
deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice.
In a Resolution, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No.
139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the
Ombudsman to file her comment thereto. Thus, the cases were set for hearing of oral arguments.
Noted herein is the fact that Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman
filed this present petition before the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's Resolution, which granted
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March Resolution directing her to file a
comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
Noted also the fact that before the oral arguments commenced, the CA issued a Resolution granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension
order.
In the conduct of the oral arguments, the Supreme Court required the parties to file their memoranda
and then comment on each other’s memorandum. Hence, this case was submitted for resolution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453.
RULING
YES. As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of
the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the
same. On this note, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable
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remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it
is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law”.
The Supreme Court explained that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited
restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against final decisions or orders
of lower courts, and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. More significantly, by confining
the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on
errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this
light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same.
In this case, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
i. Period of appeal
ROGELIO B. ANTONE, Petitioner -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 225146, SECOND DIVISION, November 20, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In Uy v. Del Castillo, the Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. The rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not
regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which
must be faithfully complied.”
In this case, Antone's failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter court's
Decision dated July 31, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 22, 2016 lapsing into finality. While the
Court notes that there are exceptions to the application of this principle, none of which properly obtains
in this case. In fine, Antone's conviction remains.
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed before the RTC, charging Antone of raping his 11 year old
niece-in-law, AAA. AAA lived in the house of her Aunt Aniceta and the latter’s husband, Antone. AAA
was preparing dinner when she saw Antone staring strangely at her and then he approached her and
carried her into the master’s bedroom. There, he succeeded his carnal knowledge of her and
threatened to kill AAA should she tell what just happened.
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According to AAA, the incident happened several more times and she eventually started to like what
Antone was doing to her. When she returned to her parents’ house, she started missing her sexual
activities, which caused her to seduce her own brother. Word came out of their incestuous
relationship, and it was only then that AAA admitted to her mother about her sexual encounters with
Antone. Accordingly, AAA' s parents had her medically examined and filed the instant criminal cases
against Antone.
The RTC and CA ruled that Antone was guilty of two (2) counts of simple statutory rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each account of rape. Antone filed the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari is proper
RULING:
YES. Firstly, Antone made a procedural lapse in elevating the case before the Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 3(e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides that, “Except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule
124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. In this regard, Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Rules states:
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpertua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
In this case, the CA affirmed the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpertua to Antone for each
count of Statutory Rape. As such, he should have filed a notice of appeal before the CA instead of filing
a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
Antone’s failure to file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter’s Decision lapsing into
finality. The Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it
or by the Highest Court of the land. This is the principle of immutability of judgment and its purpose
is to avoid delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to judicial controversies, the risk
of occasional errors. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but
rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied.
ii. Perfection of appeal

iii. Issues to be raised
CORAZON S. CRUZ under the name and style, VILLA CORAZON CONDO DORMITORY,
Petitioner, -versus- MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Respondents.
132 of 306
An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief
other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. All that said appellee can do is to make a
counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining
the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo nor raised in
the appellant's assignment of errors or arguments.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of
the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who
was the appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA's position that the venue was
improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA's participation was confined to the refutation of the
appellant's assignment of errors. As MIAA's interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig City's
judgment, it cannot, without pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made therein.
FACTS:
On December 7, 2005, Cruz filed before the RTC of Pasig City, a complaint for breach of contract,
consignation, and damages against respondent MIAA. Cruz alleged that on August 12, 2003, she
executed a Contract of Lease with MIAA over a 1,411.98 square meter-property, situated at BAC 1-
11, Airport Road, Pasay City, in order to establish a commercial arcade for sublease to other
businesses. She averred that MIAA failed to inform her that part of the leased premises is subject to
an easement of public use since the same was adjacent to the Parañaque River. As a result, she was
not able to obtain a building permit as well as a certificate of electrical inspection from the Manila
Electric Company, leading to her consequent failure to secure an electrical connection for the entire
leased premises. Due to the lack of electricity,Cruz's tenants did not pay rent; hence, she was unable
to pay her own rental obligations to MIAA from December 2004 onwards. Further, since some of
Cruz's stalls were located in the easement area, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
demolished them, causing her to suffer actual damages in the amount of P633,408.64. In view of the
foregoing, Cruz sent MIAA her rental computation, pegged at the amount of P629,880.02,wherein the
aforesaid damages have been deducted. However, instead of accepting Cruz's payment, MIAA sent a
letter terminating the lease contract.
MIAA filed a Motion to Dismiss hinged on the following grounds: (a) violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, given that the lease
contract subject of the Pasig case is the same actionable document subject of Civil Case No. 1129918
(Manila case) which is a complaint for partial annulment of contract also filed by Cruz before the RTC
of Manila, Branch 1; and (b) improper venue, since in the complaint for annulment of contract, as well
as the verification/certification and the annexes attached thereto,it is indicated that Cruz is a resident
of 506, 2nd Street, San Beda Subdivision, San Miguel, Manila.
The RTC-Pasig City dismissed Cruz's complaint due to forum shopping since both the Pasig and
Manila cases are founded on the same actionable document between the same parties. In addition, it
observed that the Pasig case was not being prosecuted by the real party-in-interest since the lessee
named in the lease contract is one Frederick Cruz and not Cruz. It did not, however, sustain MIAA's
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argument on improper venue since Cruz alleged to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila;
therefore,unless proven otherwise, the complaint shall be taken on its face value. Cruz elevated the
case to CA that (a)the RTC-Pasig City erred in holding that there was forum shopping, considering
that the causes of action in the complaints for breach of contract and annulment of contract are
separate and distinct; (b) that the RTC-Pasig City erred in ruling that Cruz is not the real party-in-
interest considering that Frederick Cruz merely signed the lease contract as her attorney-in-fact.
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification. It held that while Cruz did not commit forum
shopping (since the Pasig and Manila cases involve distinct causes of action and issues) and that Cruz
should be considered as a real party-in-interest in the Pasig case (since Frederick Cruz was merely
her appointed attorney-in-fact in connection with the execution of the lease contract), the Pasig case
remains dismissible on the ground of improper venue as Cruz was bound by her judicial admission
that her residence was actually in Manila and not in San Juan.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Cruz's appeal on the basis of improper venue. (YES)
RULING:
Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee's role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of
refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who
instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he
merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the judgment
appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is
highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or
modification of the lower court's judgment without interposing its own appeal.
An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. He cannot impugn the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. He cannot assign such errors as are designed to
have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors
or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor,
even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo nor raised in the appellant's
assignment of errors or arguments.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal
of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz
who was the appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA's position that the venue
was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA's participation was confined to the refutation of
the appellant's assignment of errors. As MIAA's interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig City's
judgment, it cannot, without pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made
therein. In particular, records bear out that the RTC-Pasig City, while granting MIAA's motion to
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dismiss, found the latter's argument on improper venue to be erroneous. Hence, given that the said
conclusion was not properly contested by MIAA on appeal, the RTC-Pasig City's ruling on the matter
should now be deemed as conclusive. Corollary, the CA should not have taken this ground into
consideration when it appreciated the case before it. By acting otherwise, it therefore committed a
reversible error, which thereby warrants the reversal of its Decision.
e. Review of judgments or final orders of the COA, COMELEC, CSC, and the
Ombudsman
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, -versus- ALEX M. VALENCERINA, Respondent.

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that the office’s
decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a matter of course and
shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto.
Considering that an appeal shall not stop the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being
executory, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for injunctive relief.
FACTS:
An administrative case was filed against Valencerina for Gross Neglect of Duty, and Inefficiency and
Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties before the Office of the Ombudsman.
In an Order dated June 8, 2005, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo found Valencerina guilty of grave
misconduct and ordered her dismissal from service. Subsequently, he filed before the CA a petition
for review under Rule 43 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction against the execution of the June 8, 2005 Order.
TRO was issued but expired after 60 days. Valencerina was then informed that he is "deemed
dismissed from the service as of the close of office hours" that day. Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was then granted and
ordered for her return to work.
Unperturbed, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition for certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
(YES)
RULING:
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Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that the office’s
decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a matter of course and
shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. It is thus clear that the June 8, 2005 Order imposing the penalty of removal on Valencerina
was immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of his appeal. The general rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial bodies stated under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules – which provides that "[t]he
appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just" – would not apply in
this case for the following reasons:
1. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman categorically provides
that an appeal shall not stop the office’s decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others,
from being executory.
2. It is a fundamental legal principle that when two rules apply to a particular case, that which was
specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. Evidently, the aforesaid Section
7, Rule III is a special rule applicable to administrative complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman
while Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules applies to appeals from quasi-judicial bodies in general.
Thus, as between the two rules, Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the application of Section
12, Rule 43 of the Rules in appeals from a decision of the OMB in an administrative case.
3. The Ombudsman is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure. As such,
the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions rendered by the said office when the rules the latter
so promulgates categorically and specifically warrant their enforcement, else the Ombudsman’s
rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and statutory provisions
providing the same be disregarded.
However, Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, thus:
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one-
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.
136 of 306
Considering that an appeal under Administrative Order No. 17, the amendatory rule, shall not stop
the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being executory, we hold that the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for injunctive relief.
Lastly, it must be emphasized that the OMB Rules of Procedure are only procedural. Hence,
Valencerina had no vested right that would be violated with the execution of the OMB’s removal order
pending appeal. In fact, the rules themselves obviate any substantial prejudice to the employee as he
would merely be considered under preventive suspension and entitled to the salary and emoluments
he did not receive in the event he wins his appeal. As aptly pronounced in In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, in the latter’s capacity as Sec. of DPWH.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the CA’s Resolutions granting Valencerina’s prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction staying the execution of the Ombudsman’s June 8,2005 Order are therefore
patently erroneous and, thus, tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As jurisprudence dictates, grave
abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence, as in this case.
f. Review of judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies
DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA, Petitioner, -versus- EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO and GINALYN C.

ACOSTA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 223844, FIRST DIVISION, June 28 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As provided under Sy-Vargas v. The Estate of Ogsos, Sr, when there is already enough basis on which a
proper evaluation of the merits may be had, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure
of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends
of justice.
In this case, there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had. The
CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False Certification
and Slander by Deed may already be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved
Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed are
concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for
resolution on the merits.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint Affidavit filed by Cariaga before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) - Urdaneta City, Pangasinan accusing respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao
(Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta (Acosta; collectively, respondents) of the crimes of Falsification of
Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles
171, 174, and 359 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
137 of 306
In the said complaint, Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their respective capacities as Barangay
Chairman and Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries
in the barangay blotter, i.e., (a)stating that an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a
gun inside Cariaga's compound, and that when Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that the
gunfire came from inside the compound and was directed towards the adjacent ricefields; and
(b)stating that a concerned but unnamed resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his
companions attended the funeral march of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. (Calivo, Sr.) with
firearms visibly tucked in their waists (blotter entries). Claiming that the statements in the blotter
entries were completely false and were made to dishonor and discredit him, Cariaga filed the said
complaint.
In his defense, Sapigao denied the accusations against him, maintaining that the blotter entries were
true, as he personally witnessed their details. For her part, Acosta averred that she was merely
performing her duties as Barangay Secretary when she certified as true copies the photocopies of the
aforesaid blotter entries requested by the police authorities.
In a Resolution dated April 10, 2014, the OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. It
found that the questioned blotter entries were all made in good faith and merely for recording
purposes; done in the performance of respondents' official duties; and based on personal knowledge
of what actually transpired. In this relation, the OPP pointed out that Cariaga's complaint and
supporting affidavits, which mainly consist of a general and blanket denial of the incidents described
in the blotter entries, could not prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of Sapigao and
his witnesses.
In a Resolution dated January 5, 2015, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's ruling. The ORSP found that
absent any showing of ill-motive on respondents' part in making the blotter entries, there can be no
basis to charge them of Falsification of Private Documents.
In a Resolution dated June 17, 2015, the CA dismissed Cariaga's petition before it. It held that the
ORSP is not the final authority in the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service, as one could still
appeal an unfavorable ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). As such, Cariaga's direct and
immediate recourse to the CA to assail the ORSP ruling without first filing a petition for review before
the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, the dismissal of
Cariaga's petition for review is warranted.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before it on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. Whether or not the courts may overturn the findings of the public prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation proceedings on the ground of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
his/her functions.
RULING:
138 of 306
1. NO, CA erred in dismissing Cariaga's petition for review on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000
NPS Rule on Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS),
provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ.
However, this procedure was immediately amended by the DOJ's Department Circular No. 70-A dated
July 10, 2000, entitled "Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in
Certain Cases".
As may be gleaned above, Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule
with finality cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided
that: (a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed
to the courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs) - which includes not only violations of city or
municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years, irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties attached thereto. This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the
ORSP ruling should the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing
amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance, i.e., Department Circular No. 018-14 dated
June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases”.
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the NPS with
regard to complaints subject of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely:
where the complaint was filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has
original jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs.
Thus, the rule shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling
of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be
with finality;
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the
ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be
with finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling
of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose
ruling shall be with finality;
(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the
ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall
be with finality;
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(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c ), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of control
and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling
of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.
In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside the NCR)
accusing respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False
Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the
RPC. Of the crimes charged, only False Certification and Slander by Deed are cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, while Falsification of Public Documents is cognizable by the Regional Trial
Courts. Applying the prevailing rule on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling of the ORSP as
regards Falsification of Public Documents may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to the courts
may be availed of. On the other hand, the ruling of the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and
Slander by Deed should already be deemed final - at least insofar as the NPS is concerned - and thus,
may already be elevated to the courts.
Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False
Certification and Slander by Deed may already be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should
have resolved Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of False Certification and Slander
by Deed are concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be
remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits. However, as provided under Sy-Vargas v. The Estate
of Ogsos, Sr, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be
had - as in this case - the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order
to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice."
2. YES, courts may overturn the findings of the public prosecutor in a preliminary investigation
proceedings on the ground of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his/her functions.
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause- that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
information in court - is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It
is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it
properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. To note, the underlying principle behind the courts' power to review a public
prosecutor's determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the permissible
bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a
constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our system
of government.
140 of 306
In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the ORSP correctly ruled that there
is no probable cause to indict respondents of the crimes of Slander by Deed and False Certification.
As aptly found by the ORSP, there was no improper motive on the part of respondents in making the
blotter entries as they were made in good faith; in the performance of their official duties as barangay
officials; and without any intention to malign, dishonor, or defame Cariaga. Moreover, the statements
contained in the blotter entries were confirmed by disinterested parties who likewise witnessed the
incidents recorded therein. On the other hand, Cariaga's insistence that the blotter entries were
completely false essentially rests on mere self-serving assertions that deserve no weight in law. Thus,
respondents cannot be said to have committed the crime of Slander by Deed.
Furthermore, suffice it to say that the mere act of authenticating photocopies of the blotter entries
cannot be equated to committing the crime of False Certification under the law. In sum, the ORSP
correctly found no probable cause to indict respondents of the said crimes.
g. Dismissal, reinstatement, and withdrawal of appeal
ROLANDO S. ABADILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BONIFACIO P. OBRERO and BERNABELA
N. OBRERO, and JUDITH OBRERO-TIMBRESA, respondents.
G.R. NO. 210855, FIRST DIVISION, December 9, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. A final order is
appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) declaring that “[a]n appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.”
FACTS:
The subject matter of the present controversy is a beachfront property with an area of 7,899 square
meters, more or less, located in Barangay 37, Calayab, Laoag City (subject property). The subject
property was titled in respondents’ names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38422
where the latter constructed cottages and other structures.
Spouses Obrero initiated a case for forcible entry against Abadilla Jr. The spouses claimed that they
are the registered owners of the land in question based on a TCT registered under their name. They
claimed they were in possession thereof based on improvements erected therein utilized for
residential and business purposes prior to the alleged acts of petitioner who forcibly fenced the
perimeter of the land with barbed wire.
By way of defense, Abadilla claimed that the land was sold by the spouses to his late father as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Being one of the heirs, he is one of the owners thereof. In fact,
they left a caretaker to oversee the land. Despite the sale, the spouses supposedly attempted to
remove the fence and even built concrete structures on the land using it for dwelling purposes.
141 of 306
The RTC concluded that since the MTCC in the ejectment case had deemed respondents to have
abandoned their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the filing of the injunction
case, which basically prayed for the same relief constituted forum shopping. Respondents moved for
reconsideration, but was denied in an Order dated August 11, 2010. Aggrieved, respondents elevated
the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari instead of filing a notice of appeal.
The CA took cognizance of the certiorari petition, notwithstanding that the appropriate remedy to
challenge the dismissal of the complaint for injunction and damages with prejudice is an appeal,
citing the need to relax the rules to prevent irreparable damage and injury to the respondents, as
held in Francisco Motors Corporation v. CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari, notwithstanding the
wrong mode of appeal taken to assail the order of dismissal of the complaint for injunction and
damages filed by respondents.
RULING
YES. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. A final order is
appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, 31 Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court (Rules) declaring that “[a]n appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.”
Respondents’ remedy from the RTC Orders, which dismissed with prejudice the injunction case, was
therefore an ordinary appeal. However, instead of doing so, respondents erroneously filed a petition
for certiorari before the way beyond the reglementary period within which to perfect an ordinary
appeal. Given the improper remedy taken, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC has, thus,
become final and immutable and, therefore, can no longer be altered or modified in any respect.
It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party.
MARLON CURAMMENG y PABLO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be
strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client's
liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
142 of 306
In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of Curammeng's appeal is based solely on his
counsel's negligence in failing to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material
portions of the record. Notwithstanding the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance
dated November 6, 2014, the CA upheld its earlier dismissal, ratiocinating that the reasons presented by
Curammeng's counsel were not compelling enough to relax the technical rules on appeal.
While the Court understands and applauds the CA' s zealousness in upholding procedural rules, it
cannot simply allow a man to be incarcerated without his conviction being reviewed due to the
negligence of his counsel. In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of
procedure in order to afford Curammeng the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal,
rather than to deprive him of such and make him lose his liberty on procedural blunders which he had
no direct hand in.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that on the night of September 25, 2006, a Maria De Leon bus going to Laoag,
Ilocos Norte being driven by Francisco Franco y Andres (Franco) was traversing the northbound lane
of the national highway along Santiago, Bauang, La Union, when its rear left tire blew out and caught
fire. This prompted Franco to immediately park the bus on the northbound side of the national
highway, and thereafter, unloaded the cargoes from the said bus. At a little past midnight of the next
day, an RCJ bus bound for Manila being driven by Curammeng traversed the southbound lane of the
road where the stalled bus was parked and hit Franco, resulting in the latter's death.
In his defense, Curammeng averred that he was driving the RCJ bus bound for Manila and traversing
the southbound side of the national highway at less than 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he saw
from afar the stalled Maria De Leon bus at the road's northbound side which was not equipped with
any early warning device, thus, prompting him to decelerate. When the RCJ bus was only a few meters
away from the stalled Maria De Leon bus, a closed van suddenly appeared from the opposite
direction, causing petitioner to steer his bus to the west shoulder, unfortunately hitting Franco and
causing the latter's death. Out of fear of reprisal, petitioner surrendered to the Caba Police Station in
the next town. Eventually, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
In a Decision dated November 26, 2013, the MTC found Curammeng guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.
On appeal, The CA dismissed outright Curammeng's petition based on procedural grounds.

Specifically, the CA found that Curammeng violated Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court as he
failed to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material portions of the
record (e.g., affidavits referred to in the MTC Decision, transcript of stenographic notes of the MTC,
documentary evidence of the parties).
Undaunted, Curammeng filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance dated November 6,
2014, praying for the relaxation of procedural rules so that his petition will be reinstated and given
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due course. He explained that the failure to comply with the rules was only due to a plain oversight
on the part of his counsel's secretary. To show that such failure was unintentional, he attached his
certification of non-forum shopping as well as copies of the pertinent records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Curammeng' s petition for review based on procedural grounds.
(NO)
RULING:
It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of appeal, non-compliance with the
foregoing rule may render the same dismissible. This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule that
"the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who
seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which
the right to appeal is invariably lost." Verily, compliance with procedural rules is a must, "since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice."
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than serve
the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where
strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of
counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of Curammeng's appeal is based solely on his
counsel's negligence in failing to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material
portions of the record. Notwithstanding the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance
dated November 6, 2014, the CA upheld its earlier dismissal, ratiocinating that the reasons presented
by Curammeng's counsel were not compelling enough to relax the technical rules on appeal.
While the Court understands and applauds the CA' s zealousness in upholding procedural rules, it
cannot simply allow a man to be incarcerated without his conviction being reviewed due to the
negligence of his counsel. In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of
procedure in order to afford Curammeng the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal,
rather than to deprive him of such and make him lose his liberty on procedural blunders which he
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had no direct hand in. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the CA for resolution of the appeal
on its merits.
TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner, -versus- KENNY WONG, Respondent.

G.R. No. 180364, FIRST DIVISION, December 3, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
From the denial of the BOI Board of Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party has
three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that
any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions, he may exhaust
the available administrative remedies within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the SOJ and
then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OP’s decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly resort to
certiorari before the CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the
aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy."
FACTS:
A Complaint Affidavit was filed by Kenny Wong, owner and proprietor of San Andres Construction
Supply, against petitioner, who is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in 1975 and
subsequently acquired permanent resident status in 1982, before the Bureau of Immigration (BOI).
The respondent alleged that the latter had misrepresented, in his driver’s license, that he was a
Filipino citizen and prayed that petitioner be investigated by the BOI for violation of immigration
laws.
In his Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied respondent’s claim of misrepresentation, stating that

when he applied for a driver’s license, it was another person who filled up the application form for
him. However, said person entered the wrong information, particularly, on his name, birth year, and
nationality.
Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the BOI the applicable deportation charges
against petitioner. Thereafter, the BOI Board of Commissioners ordered the deportation of the
petitioner on the grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias; and (b) misrepresenting himself as a Filipino
citizen in his driver’s license application. The BOI also took judicial notice of the fact that driver’s
license applications require the personal appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud. Thus,
by allowing someone to apply for him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance
of a fraudulent driver’s license.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was eventually denied by the BOI. As such,
petitioner filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). The SOJ affirmed the ruling of the BOI,
holding that he cannot raise the defense that it was not his doing but that of a stranger who merely
helped him with his driver’s license application. Also, petitioner’s use of an alias was illegal since said
name is not registered in the BOI and does not fall under the recognized exceptions where use of alias
may be allowed.
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The petitioner moved for reconsideration and raised the argument that the Judgment of the BOI was
null and void since only two commissioners participated in the decision-making process. The SOJ
rejected the petitioner’s argument following Sec. 8 of the Immigration Act which requires that "[i]n
any case coming before the [BOI] Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall
prevail[,]" as in this case. It was added that when petitioner sought to reconsider said Judgment, all
four (4) commissioners decided in favor of his deportation.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, which was later denied, before the CA. The CA
found that petitioner chose the wrong remedy considering that the decisions of the BOI Board of
Commissioners are directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA also
observed that even on the assumption that the SOJ was given the authority to countermand the BOI
Judgment under the Administrative Code, no countermand was made, and hence, the same should
have already attained finality. On the substantive aspects, the CA affirmed the ruling of the SOJ that
petitioner should be deported for violating the abovementioned rules.
The petitioner sought for reconsideration but was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari. (YES)
RULING:
The Court, in the case of Dwikarna vs. Hon. Domingo, held that the decisions rendered by the BOI
Board of Commissioners may be appealable to the CA via Rule 43 if a motion for reconsideration
therefrom is denied. The availability of a Rule 43 appeal to the CA from the BOI Board of
Commissioners presupposes the presence of any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, considering that the SOJ may still review the decisions of the aforesaid
body.
From the denial of the BOI Board of Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party
has three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows
that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions, he may
exhaust the available administrative remedies within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to
the SOJ and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OP’s decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly
resort to certiorari before the CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why
any of the aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy."
In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal before the SOJ and thereafter sought direct
recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available remedies, the first being a
subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of the OP decision to the CA
via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available to him, the Court deems that they would not
afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of the plain imminence of his deportation, by virtue of
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the issuance of a warrant of deportation. The urgency of such circumstance therefore justified his
direct resort to certiorari. This notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless denies the petition on
substantive grounds.
Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of
misrepresentation imputed against him, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation.
However, the commission of said acts involves factual matters that have already been established
during the proceedings before the BOI Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point
out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner violated certain
provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies...” As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate from the BOI
Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to its judgment.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner , vs. NIPPONEXPRESS (PHILS.)

CORPORATION, Respondent
G.R. NO. 212920, FIRST DIVISION, September 16, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
In matters of taxation, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or omissions of its
agents for upon it depends the ability of the government to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are
collected. In this case, the massive discrepancy alone between the administrative and judicial
determinations of the amount to be refunded to Nippon should have already raised a red flag to the CTA
Division. Clearly, the interest of the government, and, more significantly, the public, will be greatly
prejudiced by the erroneous grant of refund — at a substantial amount at that — in favor of Nippon.
Hence, under these circumstances, the CTA Division should not have granted the motion to withdraw.
FACTS:
Nippon Express (Phils.) Corporation (Nippon) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws which is primarily engaged in the business of freight forwarding. It maintained
that during the said period it incurred input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales in the amount of
P28,405,167.60, from which only P3,760,660.74 was applied as tax credit, thus, reflecting refundable
excess input VAT in the amount of P24,644,506.86.
Thereafter, Nippon filed an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT in the amount
of P24,644,506.86 for the year 2002 before the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). A day later, or on
April 23, 2004, it filed a judicial claim for tax refund, by way of petition for review, before the CTA,
docketed as CTA Case No. 6967.
For its part, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) asserted that the amounts being claimed by
Nippon as unutilized input VAT were not properly documented, hence, should be denied.
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In a Decision by the CTA Division, it partially granted Nippon's claim for tax refund, and thereby
ordered the CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in the reduced amount of P2,614,296.84, representing
its unutilized input VAT which was attributable to its zero-rated sales. It found that Nippon failed to
show that the recipients of its services — which, in this case, were mostly Philippine Economic Zone
Authority registered enterprises — were non-residents"doing business outside the Philippines."
Accordingly, it concluded that Nippon's purported sales therefrom could not qualify as zero-rated
sales, hence, the reduction in the amount of tax credit certificate claimed
Before its receipt of the aforementioned decision of the CTA Division, Nippon filed a motion to
withdraw, considering that the BIR, acting on its administrative claim, already issued a tax credit
certificate in the amount of P21,675,128.91 on July 27, 2011 (July 27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate).
The CTA issued a Resolution granting the motion to withdraw and, thus, considered the case closed
and terminated.
On appeal before the CTA En Banc, the Court affirmed the Decision and the Resolution of the CTA
Division. The CIR moved for partial reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CTA properly granted Nippon's motion to withdraw.
RULING
YES. The primary reason that militates against the granting of the motion to withdraw is the fact that
the CTA Division, in its August 10, 2011 Decision, had already determined that Nippon was only
entitled to refund the reduced amount of P2,614,296.84 since it failed to prove that the recipients of
its services were non-residents "doing business outside the Philippines"; hence, Nippon's purported
sales therefrom could not qualify as zero-rated sales, necessitating the reduction in the amount of
refund claimed. Markedly different from this is the BIR's determination that Nippon should receive
P21,675,128.91 as per the July 27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate, which is, in all, P19,060,832.07 larger
than the amount found due by the CTA Division. Therefore, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro during the deliberations on this case, the massive discrepancy alone
between the administrative and judicial determinations of the amount to be refunded to Nippon
should have already raised a red flag to the CTA Division. Clearly, the interest of the government, and,
more significantly, the public, will be greatly prejudiced by the erroneous grant of refund — at a
substantial amount at that — in favor of Nippon. Hence, under these circumstances, the CTA Division
should not have granted the motion to withdraw.
In this relation, it deserves mentioning that the CIR is not estopped from assailing the validity of the
July 27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate which was issued by its subordinates in the BIR. In matters of
taxation, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or omissions of its agents for
upon it depends the ability of the government to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are
collected.
SPOUSES RAMON and LIGAYA GONZALES, petitioners, vs. MARMAINE REALTY CORPORATION,
represented by MARIANO MANALO, respondent.
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G.R. No. 214241, FIRST DIVISION, January 13, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust
of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. jurisprudence instructs
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail
himself of all administrative processes afforded him. In the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed
out that the issue they raised before the CA, i.e., the propriety of the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the same is a purely legal question, considering that the
resolution of the same would not involve an examination of the probative value presented by the
litigants and must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
FACTS:
The petitioner spouses filed a Tenancy Case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB). Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) later dismissed the case for lack
of merit. The spouses appealed to the DARAB but the latter affirmed PARAD’s decision. The spouses
moved to reconsider the same but denied. The DARAB Decision then became final and executory and
an Entry of Judgment was issued.
In view of this, Marmaine Realty moved for the Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. Spouses moved
for reconsideration, which was denied and so compelling the spouses to file a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 before the CA. The CA dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
pointing out that the proper remedy from the PARAD's denial of the MR is an appeal to the DARAB
and not a Petition for Review under Rule 43.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review before it due to petitioners’ failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING:
YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.
The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought.
The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action.
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Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to
certain exceptions; one of which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice.
Said question at best could be resolved tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final
decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The
issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law.
In the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before the CA, i.e., the
propriety of the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the
same is a purely legal question, considering that the resolution of the same would not involve an
examination of the probative value presented by the litigants and must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.
3. Petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38)
TERESA R. IGNACIO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROBERTO R. IGNACIO,

Petitioner, -versus- OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, VICTOR B. ENDRIGA,
OFFICE OF THE CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
ATTY. FELIXBERTO F. ABAD, and ALEJANDRO RAMON and RACQUEL DIMALANTA, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 221620, SECOND DIVISION, September 11, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In Home Guaranty Corporation v. La Savoie Development Corporation, it held that to determine whether
a party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is crucial to ask whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or
already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another.
As compared to the doctrine of res judicata, which had been explained above, litis pendentia, as a ground
for the dismissal of a civil action, pertains to a situation wherein another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. Its requisites are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
In this case, the Court finds that no litis pendentia exists between the Annulment Case and the Petition
for Relief, as the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, even though based on similar set of facts,
essentially differ. Moreover, any judgment rendered in one will not necessarily amount to res judicata
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in the action under consideration: on one hand, a ruling in the Annulment Case may result in the
recovery of the property's ownership and possession; on the other hand, a favorable ruling in the Petition
for Relief will result only in the setting aside of the LRC Decision in the Cancellation Case.f65
FACTS:
Teresa Ignacio filed an Annulment Case before the RTC against the Respondents. She alleged that
she is the registered co-owner of a real property which Public Respondents, with malice and bad
faith, sold at a public auction to Spouses Dimalanta without notice of the levy and auction sale
proceedings, thereby depriving her of said property without due process of law. Public Respondents
argued that they had strictly complied with the legal and procedural requirements for the conduct of
the public auction sale, pointing out that they sent the auction sale notice to the address she provided
the Office of the City Assessor, which the City Assessor used in the Tax Declaration and which Teresa
has not changed to date.
For their part, Spouses Dimalanta moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Teresa’s cause of
action is barred by final judgment (Cancellation Case) rendered by the RTC, acting as a land a land
registration court (LRC), which upheld and confirmed the validity of the auction sale, including their
ownership, and ordered the issuance of a new title in their name. Public Respondents also filed a
Manifestation, similarly moving for the dismissal of the Annulment case on the same ground of res
judicata. Meanwhile, Teresa filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition for Relief from Judgment and the
corresponding Petition for Relief before the LRC in the Cancellation Case.
The RTC dismissed with prejudice the Annulment case on the ground of res judicata. The CA upheld
the dismissal, declaring that the issue involving the subject property in the Annulment case had
already been decided with finality, hence, barred by res judicata.
The Public Respondents argue that the dismissal with prejudice of the Annulment Case on the ground
of res judicata has already become final, and maintained that Teresa should have elevated the case to
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), and not to the CA, pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of RA No. 9282.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over Teresa’s appeal

2. Assuming the CA has jurisdiction, whether or not it erred in upholding the dismissal of the
Annulment case on the ground of res judicata
3. Whether or not Teresa committed forum shopping when she filed the Petition for Relief in the
Cancellation Case
RULING
1. YES. The CA properly assumed jurisdiction over Teresa’s appeal. Case law holds that jurisdiction
is conferred by law and determined from the nature of action pleaded as appearing from the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Once the nature of the action is
determined, it remains the same even on appeal until a decision rendered thereon becomes final and
executory.
Based on Section 7(a)(3) of RA No. 9282, the CTA's appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the RTCs becomes operative only when the RTC has ruled on a local tax case. Thus,
before the case can be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action before the RTC must be in nature of a
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tax case, or one which primarily involves a tax issue. In this case, a reading of the Annulment
Complaint shows that Teresa's action is one for recovery of ownership and possession of the
property, with damages, which is not anchored on a tax issue, but on due process considerations. The
Annulment Complaint's allegations do not contest the tax assessment on the property, as Teresa only
bewails the alleged lack of due process which deprived her of the opportunity to participate in the
delinquency sale proceedings.
2. NO. The Annulment Case is not barred by res judicata. Res Judicata literally means a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. For res
judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must
be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.
In this case, the Court ruled that there is no identity of causes of action between the two (2) cases. In
the Cancellation Case, the cause is the expiration of the one-year redemption period without the
landowners having redeemed the property; whereas in the Annulment case, the cause is the alleged
nullity of the auction sale for denial of the property owners' right to due process. The validity of the
auction sale raised as an issue in the Annulment Case was never an issue, nor was it determined with
finality, in the Cancellation Case. As such, the subsequent filing of the complaint in the Annulment
Case was not barred by res judicata.
3. NO. The Petition for Relief did not amount to forum shopping. To determine whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping, it is crucial to ask whether the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
As compared to the doctrine of res judicata, litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action, pertains to a situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Its requisites
are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c)
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
In this case, the Court finds that no litis pendencia exists between the Annulment Case and the Petition
for Relief, as the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, even though based on similar set of facts,
essentially differ.
4. Annulments of judgment (Rule 47)

5. Collateral attack on judgments
T. Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule 39)
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, -versus- PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE

AND ASSURANCE, INC., DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 165585 & 176982, SECOND DIVISION, November 20, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed. In order to grant the same pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, the
following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason
must be stated in a special order. The requirement of "good reason" does not necessarily entail
unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, an invocation thereof must be premised on solid
footing.
In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, granted PGAI’s motion for execution pending appeal
on the ground that the impending sanctions against it by foreign underwriters/reinsurers constitute
good reasons therefor. Hence, without any sufficient basis to support the existence of its alleged "good
reasons," it cannot be said that the second requisite to allow an execution pending appeal exists.
FACTS:
The National Electrification Administration entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with GSIS
insuring all real and personal properties mortgaged to it by electrical cooperatives under an
Industrial All Risks Policy (IAR policy). 95% of the total sum was reinsured by GSIS with PGAI for a
period of one year. As reflected in a reinsurance cover and reinsurance binder, GSIS agreed to pay
PGAI reinsurance premiums per quarter. While GSIS remitted to PGAI the reinsurance premiums for
the first three quarters, it, however, failed to pay the fourth and last reinsurance premium due despite
demands. This prompted PGAI to file a Complaint for sum of money against GSIS before the RTC.
In its complaint, PGAI alleged, among others, that after it had issued the IAR policy, it further
reinsured the risks covered with reputable reinsurers worldwide and thus, PGAI is under continuous
pressure from its reinsurers in the international market to settle the matter. In its Answer, GSIS
proffered affirmative defenses that the complaint states no cause of action against GSIS because the
non-payment of the last reinsurance premium only renders the reinsurance contract ineffective, and
foes not five PGAI a right of action to collect, and that PGAI’s cause of action lies against NEA since
GSIS merely acted as a conduit.
PGAI filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings averring that GSIS essentially admitted the
material allegations of the complaint. The RTC granted PGAI’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
It observed that the admissions of GSIS that it paid the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums to
PGAI affirmed the validity of the contract of reinsurance between them. As such, GSIS cannot now
renege on its obligation to remit the last and remaining quarterly reinsurance premium. This was
appealed by the GSIS.
Meanwhile, PGAI filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal based on the following reasons: (a)
GSIS’ appeal was patently dilatory since it already acknowledged the validity of PGAI’s claim; (b) GSIS
posted no valid defense as its Answer raised no genuine issues; and (c) PGAI would suffer serious
and irreparable injury as it may be blacklisted as a consequence of the non-payment of premiums
due. PGAI also manifested its willingness to post a sufficient surety bond to answer for any resulting
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damage to GSIS. The latter opposed the motion asserting that there lies no sufficient ground or
urgency to justify execution pending appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the execution pending appeal was properly granted. (NO)
2. Whether the judgment on the pleadings was properly granted. (YES)
RULINGS:
1. The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed. In order to grant the same pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules,
the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
Good reasons call for the attendance of compelling circumstances warranting immediate
execution for fear that favorable judgment may yield to an empty victory. The requirement of
"good reason" does not necessarily entail unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, an
invocation thereof must be premised on solid footing.
In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, granted PGAI’s motion for execution pending
appeal on the ground that the impending sanctions against it by foreign underwriters/reinsurers
constitute good reasons therefor. It must, however, be observed that PGAI has not proffered any
evidence to substantiate its claim, as it merely presented bare allegations thereon. It is hornbook
doctrine that mere allegations do not constitute proof. Hence, without any sufficient basis to
support the existence of its alleged "good reasons," it cannot be said that the second requisite to
allow an execution pending appeal exists.
2. Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. In this relation, jurisprudence
dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a
specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the admission of
the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings. As such, it is a form of judgment that is
exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual
issues remain uncontroverted.
In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of PGAI’s
complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted that: (a) it
made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance binder effective for
one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed
to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it received demand
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letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims
during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did not
err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings.
CENTENNIAL GUARANTEE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- UNIVERSAL

MOTORS CORPORATION, et. al., Respondents
That the surety’s financial standing differs from that of the debtor does not negate the order of execution
pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, it is considered by law as being the same party as the debtor in
relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are
interwoven as to be inseparable. Verily, in a contract of suretyship, one lends his credit by joining in the
principal debtor’s obligation so as to render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and
without reference to the solvency of the principal. Thus, execution pending appeal against the debtor
means that the same course of action is warranted against its surety.
FACTS:
Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation and its President and General Manager Reynaldo A. Orimaco filed
a complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages and Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraning Order against Universal Motors Corporation.
The temporary restraining order (TRO) prayed for was eventually issued by the RTC upon the
posting by NSSC and Orimaco of a P1,000,000.00 injunction bond issued by their surety, Centennial
Guarantee Assurance Corporation. The TRO enjoined UMC from selling, dealing, and marketing all
models of motor vehicles and spare parts of Nissan, and from terminating the dealer agreement
between UMC and NSSC. It likewise restrained UMC from supplying and doing trading transactions
with Nissan Cagayan de Oro Distributors, Inc. which, in turn, was enjoined from entering and doing
business on Nissan Products within the dealership territory of NSSC. The TRO was converted to a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the issuance of the
aforesaid injunctive writ. The CA rendered a Decision holding that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the writ absent a clear legal right thereto on the part of NSSC.
Consequently, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC was ordered dissolved.
155 of 306
On October 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for breach of contract
with damages for lack of merit. Accordingly, the RTC ordered NSSC and CGAC to jointly and severally
pay respondents actual damages and lost opportunities suffered by UMC.
Upon respondents’ motion, the RTC granted Execution Pending Appeal. It ruled that there exist good
reasons to justify the immediate execution of the Decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not good reasons exist to justify execution pending appeal against CGAC which is a mere
surety. (YES)
RULING:
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the existence of
“good reasons” for the immediate execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this is
what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution, lest judgment
becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing party’s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment
debtor are altogether nullified. The “good reason” yardstick imports a superior circumstance
demanding urgency that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party and one such “good
reason” that has been held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of
the defeated party.
The factual findings that NSSC is under a state of rehabilitation and had ceased business operations,
taken together with the information that NSSC President and General Manager Orimaco had
permanently left the country with his family, constitute such superior circumstances that demand
urgency in the execution of Decision because respondents now run the risk of its non-satisfaction by
the time the appeal is decided with finality. Notably, the rehabilitation receiver had manifested before
the rehabilitation court the futility of rehabilitating NSSC because of the latter’s insincerity in the
implementation of the rehabilitation process. Clearly, respondents’ diminishing chances of recovery
from the favorable Decision is a good reason to justify immediate execution; hence, it would be
improper to set aside the order granting execution pending appeal.
156 of 306
That CGAC’s financial standing differs from that of NSSC does not negate the order of execution
pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, CGAC is considered by law as being the same party as the
debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities
are interwoven as to be inseparable. Verily,in a contract of suretyship, one lends his credit by joining
in the principal debtor’s obligation so as to render himself directly and primarily responsible with
him, and without reference to the solvency of the principal. Thus, execution pending appeal against
NSSC means that the same course of action is warranted against its surety, CGAC. The same reason
stands for CGAC’s other principal, Orimaco, who was determined to have permanently left the
country with his family to evade execution of any judgment against him.
ROBERTO STA. ANA DY, JOSE ALAINEO DY, and ALTEZA A. DY for themselves and as
heirs/substitutes of deceased-petitioner CHLOE ALINDOGAN DY, Petitioners , -versus-
BONIFACIO A. YU, SUSANA A. TAN, and SOLEDAD ARQUILLA substituting deceased-
respondent ROSARIO ARQUILLA, Respondents.
Res judicata comprehends two concepts: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties;
and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. Accordingly, the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause
of action is prohibited. On the other hand, when there is no identity of causes of action, but only an
identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment wherein the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action is prohibited.
The rule on forum shopping may not strictly applied when it can be shown that: (1) the original case
has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only pending
matter is a motion for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal
of substantial justice for the fresh new case to proceed.
FACTS:
Adriano Dy Chiao (Dy Chiao), the original owner of Lot 1519, gave said lot to his wife Manuela Sta.
Ana (Manuela) and their children Carlos, Lilia, and herein petitioner Roberto (Dy children). After the
death of their parents, the Dy children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale to partition
their parents' estate. In the said document, both Carlos and Lilia sold their respective shares over Lot
1519 and another lot, Lot 1531, to Roberto.
Roberto then filed an application for registration of Lot 1519. The RTC ruled in favor of Roberto and
was issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT). Lot 1519-A became a subject of 3 cases.
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1st case (Recovery case): Roberto filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against
Susana Tan (Susana) and her husband, Sixto. He alleged that during the lifetime of Manuela, the latter,
by mere accommodation, permitted Rosario Arquilla (Rosario) to temporarily occupy Lot 1519-A
with the understanding that she would vacate the premises upon demand. However, despite
repeated demands, the respondents refused to do so. Susana, for her part, claimed that said portion
was ceded to Rosario by Dy Chiao, by way of donation.
The RTC dismissed Roberto's complaint and declared Rosario as the lawful owner of Lot 1519-A.
The CA then reversed the RTC’s decision while the SC affirmed CA’s decision. The foregoing attained
finality.
However, pending resolution of the appeal, Roberto and his wife, Chloe Dy (Chloe), executed a Deed
of Donation of Real Property in favor of their children petitioners Jose and Alteza over Lot 1519.
2nd case (Reconveyance case): Prior to the resolution of Rosario's motion for reconsideration in the
Recovery case, Rosario filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages where Rosario alleged the
same matters as in the Recovery Case. In his Answer, Roberto raised forum shopping.
The RTC dismissed the Reconveyance Case due to litis pendentia and forum shopping since the
Recovery Case, which was pending before the CA, involved the same parties, subject matter, and relief
sought. On appeal, the CA dismissed the same for failure to file the appellant's brief.
3rd case (Annulment case): When Rosario discovered that Lot 1519 had been transferred by Roberto
to his children by way of donation, Rosario filed a complaint for annulment and/or rescission of
corresponding Deed of Donation with damages against petitioners. Petitioners then moved to dismiss
the complaint raising the pendency of the Recovery Case which involved the same parties for the
same cause.
The RTC ordered the annulment and/or rescission of the Deed of Donation, as well as the
reconveyance of Lot 1519-A, in respondents' favor. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, holding that
there was no res judicata since the dismissal of the Reconveyance Case was not based on the merits,
but upon the mere say-so of the court a quo that forum shopping existed. Neither would the case be
barred by the judgment in the Recovery Case since it was ruled there that the recourse of respondents
to attack the OCT was to file an action for reconveyance, which precisely what Rosario in the
Reconveyance Case did.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC decision in the Annulment Case, despite petitioners'
claims of:
1. res judicata (NO); and
2. forum shopping (NO).
158 of 306
RULING:
1. The concept of res judicata is not applicable in this case.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided. Paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is instructive on the matter.
Res judicata comprehends two concepts: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment.
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. Accordingly, the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand, or cause of action is prohibited.
When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata
in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment wherein the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action is prohibited.
Material to this discourse is the doctrine's second element. The term "merits" has been defined as a
matter of substance in law as distinguished from matter of form. It refers to the real or substantial
grounds of action or defense as contrasted with some technical or collateral matter raised in the
course of the suit. It presupposes that trial has been conducted, evidence presented, and issues
sufficiently heard and passed upon. When the judgment amounts to a legal declaration of the
respective rights and duties of the parties, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory contentions, it
is based on the merits.
In the case at bar, the dismissal of the Reconveyance Case did not constitute a bar to the filing of the
Annulment Case because the dismissal of the former was merely based on the finding of forum
shopping and the pendency of a similar action before the CA. In fact, no trial has been held in the
Reconveyance case. Neither would res judicata apply with respect to the final judgment in the
Recovery Case as the CA set aside the RTC Decision in the Recovery Case based on the impropriety of
Rosario's recourse of assailing Roberto's title.
2. The rule on forum shopping is not applicable in this case.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts all substantially founded on the same facts and circumstances and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court,
to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision. The test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
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reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party's
commencement of a judicial remedy then a forum shopping infraction is committed.
Litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy
against multiplicity of suits. The requirements of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; ( b) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
In the case at bar, Rosario indeed violated the rule on forum shopping when she filed the Annulment
Case during the pendency of the Reconveyance Case before the same RTC Branch. In the first place,
there exists an identity of parties in both cases despite the fact that Chloe and the Dy children were
not impleaded in the former case. It is well-settled that only substantial, and not absolute, identity of
parties is required for litis pendentia to lie. Moreover, there is identity of parties when the parties in
both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.
There exists also an identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the two cases since the reliefs
sought for are founded on the same facts and that their resolutions both hinge on the question of
ownership. It bears emphasizing that the true test to determine the identity of causes of action is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions even if the forms or the nature of the
2 actions are different from each other, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions.
Considering the foregoing, however, while the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
provides that a forum shopping infraction shall be ground for summary dismissal of the case with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case nevertheless distinctly call for a deviation from the
general rule in order to further the ends of substantial justice. The rule on forum shopping may not
strictly applied when it can be shown that: (1) the original case has been dismissed upon request of
the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only pending matter is a motion for
reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of substantial justice
for the fresh new case to proceed.
A resort to the third exception is warranted for it cannot be denied that the resolution of the
controversy involving the ownership of Lot 1519-A has long been mired in numerous technical
quandaries, despite the clarity of Rosario's ownership over said lot which she had already acquired
through acquisitive prescription, and now transferred to her heirs, i.e., respondents.
WARLITO C. VICENTE, Petitioner, -versus- ACIL CORPORATION, Respondent.
160 of 306
Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment or order. Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit.
It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity.
FACTS:
Acil Corporation (Acil) acquired Lot 297 situated in Barrio Talomo, Davao City. Transfer Certificate
of Title was eventually issued in Acil’s name. Adjacent to Lot 297 along Talomo River is Lot 10375 for
which Warlito C. Vicente (Vicente) acquired a Free Patent. Consequently, an Original Certificate of
Title was issued in Vicente’s name.
Acil filed a complaint for cancellation of title and recovery of possession with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the RTC against Vicente,
among others. Acil alleged that it owned Lot 10375 as it was formed by accretion. With Lot 10375
assuming the character of private property, the DENR had no authority to issue Free Patent. Acil
further claimed that Vicente clandestinely encroached upon a portion of Lot 297 by constructing a
fence thereon.
Vicente, on the other hand, maintained the validity of his title over Lot 10375. He pointed out that
Lot 297, having been covered by the natural action of the sea and left dry, assumed the character of
foreshore land, hence, no longer existent as private property of Acil.
The RTC dismissed Acil’s complaint. On September 12, 2003, rhe CA upheld Vicente’s ownership but
ruled that Vicente was liable for encroaching upon a portion of Lot 297 as shown in the sketch plan
and was, thus, ordered to vacate the encroached portion. Said judgment became final and executory.
Upon Acil’s motion, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Thereafter, Vicente filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and Enjoin Implementation of Void Writ of Execution asserting that the said writ did not
conform to the decision to be executed. While the said decision ordered him "to vacate and deliver
possession of ta portion of land in so far as it encroaches on Lot 297", the writ of execution directed
the sheriff "to levy the goods, chattels, and real properties". Vicente also posited that the September
12, 2003 CA Decision could not yet be executed since no prior survey has been conducted to
determine the encroached portion of Lot 297.
Acil agreed that the writ of execution was in variance with the dispositive portion of the Decision,
thus, praying that the said writ of execution be amended to conform thereto. Vicente, however,
opposed to an amended writ of execution, insisting that the area of encroachment must be
determined first.
Acil then filed a motion for the appointment of a geodetic engineer to determine the encroached
portion and in a supplemental motion, seeked that a geodetic engineer from the DENR be appointed
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to lead a surveying team. Vicente opposed since the DENR, in connection with a separate
administrative case for cancellation of Acil’s title to Lot 297 filed by him, was poised to survey the
area. Without waiting for the RTC’s action on its motion, Acil conducted the verification survey of Lot
297 through Engr. Vedua the rsult of which showed that Vicente had encroached 6,269 square
meters, and not merely 4,237 square meters as earlier determined.
RTC denied Acil’s motion since there was no need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to
execute the judgment. The CA had already determined in its September 12, 2003 decision that
Vicente encroached an area of approximately 4,237 square meters corresponding to the shaded
portion of a sketch plan prepared by Engineer Vedua. The CA affirmed RTC’s order, upholding its
directive to issue a new writ of execution to implement the dispositive portion of the said CA Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of execution was validly assailed by Vicente. (NO)
RULING:
Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment or order. Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the
suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. It must be
noted that it is fundamental that every litigation must come to an end. While a litigant’s right to
initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court
in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a
favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.
After all, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his
case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law”.
No valid reason exist in the instant petition. There are no circumstances that would make the
execution impossible or unjust, justifying the modification or alteration thereof. The increase in the
land area encroached upon by Vicente even warrants the immediacy of the execution of the CA’s
September 12, 2003 decision. The execution conformed to the judgment to be executed and adhered
strictly to the very essential particulars. Moreover, there is really no need for the appointment of a
surveyor for the sheriff to execute the judgment. The CA decision sought to be implemented had
already determined Vicente’s encroachment on Acil’s property and had equally identified such
illegally occupied area to be that shaded portion in the sketch plan prepared by Engineer Vedua.
HEIRS OF JOSE PEÑAFLOR, namely: JOSE PEÑAFLOR, JR. and VIRGINIA P. AGATEP,
represented by JESSICA P. AGATEP, Petitioners, -versus- HEIRS OF ARTEMIO and LYDIA DELA
CRUZ, namely: MARILOU, JULIET, ROMEO, RYAN, and ARIEL, ALL SURNAMED DELA CRUZ,
Respondents.
G.R. NO. 197797, FIRST DIVISION, August 09, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
162 of 306
In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc. (BPI Family), the Court
remarked that not even a pending action to annul the mortgage or the foreclosure sale will by itself stay
the issuance of the writ of possession:
Furthermore, it is settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale
does not stay the issuance of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application for a
writ of possession is filed, does not need to look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner
of its foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending annulment case.
However, Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court - which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages per Section 6 of Act No. 3135 - provides that upon the expiration of the redemption period,
the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party
is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. Thus, in BPI Family, the Court ruled
that it was an error to issue an ex parte writ of possession to the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure, or to refuse to abate one already granted, where a third party has raised in an opposition
to the writ or in a motion to quash the same, his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or
a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor. The procedure, according to Unchuan v. CA, is for the
trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the
time-honored principle of due process."
In this case, respondents, in their Comment and/or Opposition submitted before this Court, claim that
"Artemio Dela Cruz validated his ownership of the subject property, including the [two-storey] house
erected thereon and other improvements, through a deed of waiver and transfer of possessory rights
executed by his mother, Nicolasa Dela Cruz in May 3, 1989 which is attached and made [an] integral
part hereof." However, it is apparent from the face of this document that the same was not an effective
mode of transferring Nicolasa's ownership to Artemio, which could have thus given the latter an
independent right over the subject property prior to its mortgage to Peñaflor.
FACTS:
Respondents are the successors-in-interest of the late Artemio dela Cruz, son of Nicolasa, the original
owner of the subject property. Nicolasa authorized her daughter, Carmelita, to mortgage the subject
property to Jose Peñaflor, the predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, in order to secure a loan.
Nicolasa failed to settle her loan, so Peñaflor filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure before
the RTC. The subject property was sold at a public auction wherein Peñaflor emerged as the highest
bidder. Period of redemption expired without the property being redeemed, hence, a final bill of sale
was issued and registered in Peñaflor’s name. Despite the affidavit of consolidation of ownership
executed by Peñaflor, Nicolasa refused to deliver possession to Jose Peñaflor.
Peñaflor filed a petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession, which the RTC granted. Writ
of Possession was not enforced because Artemio filed a complaint for annulment of judgment
claiming to be the lawful owner of the subject property even prior to the mortgage. The complaint
was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
After mortgage of the property, Artemio filed a separate complaint for ejection against Carmelita
before the MTC. After submitting documents providing his ownership over the subject property, the
MTC granted his complaint.
163 of 306
In the meantime, the RTC granted Jose’s application for Writ of Possession. The RTC issued a notice
to vacate, ordering Artemio to vacate the subject property. Artemio filed a Motion to Quash the Writ
of Possession and Notice to Vacate, which was denied by the RTC. Herein respondents, in substitution
of their parents filed another motion praying that the implementation of the writ of possession be
held in abeyance as they are third persons in actual possession of the subject property who are
asserting rights adverse to the judgement obligor. The RTC denied, prompting them to elevate this
case to the CA.
The CA annulled and set aside the writ of possession and notice to vacate issued by the RTC. It held
that respondents are holding the subject property adverse to Nicolasa, the judgement obligor.
According to the CA, the remedy is not the implementation of the writ of possession but for the
purchaser or the redemptioner to institute ejectment proceedings or a reinvindicatory action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred when it set aside the writ of possession and notice to vacate issued by
the RTC
RULING:
YES. It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the
absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the
certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem. Hence, the purchaser may demand possession as a
matter of right. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, it imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue
a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. There is no law whereby the
purchaser is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the lapse of the
period for redemption. The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under
Act No. 3135 has been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As an ex parte
proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or consent by any
person adversely interested.
Further, in BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc. the Court remarked
that not even a pending action to annul the mortgage or the foreclosure sale will by itself stay the
issuance of the writ of possession. However, Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
upon the expiration of the redemption period, the possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgement obligor.
When the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. For
the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also
held by the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor. The third party possessor must have done
so in his own right and not merely as a successor or transferee of the debtor or mortgagor.
In this situation, the procedure is for the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the
adverse possession, conformably with the time-honored principle of due process. In this case, the CA
improperly considered the evidence submitted in a totally different proceeding (i.e., the ejectment
case) taken against an entirely different party (Carmelita) in reversing the RTC's issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of Jose. In fact, even if we were to feign ignorance of this clear due process
164 of 306
violation, such evidence were, nonetheless, ostensibly insufficient to prove that Artemio has an
independent right over the subject property adverse to Nicolasa, the judgment obligor/mortgagor.
It is only upon a credible showing by a third party claimant of his independent right over the
foreclosed property that the law's prima facie deference to the mortgagee's consolidated title should
not prevail. Verily, a mere claim of ownership would not suffice.
IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

A. Nature, purpose, and jurisdiction over provisional remedies
B. Preliminary attachment (Rule 57)
LIGON VS. RTC MAKATI

G.R. No. 190028 | February 26, 2014

Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires
a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very
dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property
attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner's debt. The lien
continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus,
a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been
duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property
subject to the said attachment.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Ligon filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia Marasigan
(Marasigan), Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc. (Polished Arrow), and its incorporators. The complaint
alleges among others that the spouses Baladjay enticed her to extend a short-term loan secured by a
PDC which bounced upon presentment, and that the subject property was transferred to respondent
Polished Arrow allegedly defendants’ dummy corporation to defraud creditors. The application for
the writ was granted so the subject property was levied upon by annotating the writ on the dorsal
portion of TCT No. 9273.
While the case was pending, a similar complaint for the sum of money damages, and
cancellation of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before
the RTC Makati by the Sps Vicente against the same respondents. During the proceedings therein, a
writ of preliminary attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated on the
dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.
While the case is still pending in QC, the Makati RTC rendered a decision rescinding the
transfer of the subject property to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of
creditors. Consequently, the Makati City RTC directed the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a)
cancel TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous
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condition” in the name of Rosario Baladjay. In the subsequent execution proceedings, the property
was sold at a public auction to respondent Ting.
The RTC Makati then ordered the RD under pain of contempt to issue a new certificate in
favor of Ting free from any liens and encumbrances.
Meanwhile, the QC RTC ruled in favor of Ligon who sought its execution and discovered the
earlier attachment annotation in her favor has been deleted.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing
the Assailed Orders.
RULING
YES. Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party
is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
party.
Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor
acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the
very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property
attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner's debt.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when
an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the
attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said
registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons. Applying these principles to this
case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon's prior
attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to the nature of attachment
proceedings which is well-established in law and jurisprudence. In this case, Ligon, in order to secure
the satisfaction of a favorable judgment in the Quezon City Case, applied for and was eventually able
to secure a writ of preliminary attachment over the subject property on November 25, 2002, which
was later annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow on
December 3, 2002. Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati
City RTC's December 9, 2004 Decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps.
Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors, Ligon's
attachment lien over the subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she had earlier
secured binds the property itself, and, hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to
Ligon as adjudged in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in
some manner provided by law. The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its
directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting (i.e., TCT No. 19756), free from any
liens and encumbrances.
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This course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon's attachment lien and, also, defies
the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears noting that Ligon's claim, secured by
the aforesaid attachment, is against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had
been effectively restored in view of the RTC's rescission of the property's previous sale to Polished
Arrow. Thus, Sps. Ligon's attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successorsin-interest
should have been preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to any subsequent certificate of
title, the most recent of which as it appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico,
without prejudice to the latter's right to protect his own ownership interest over the subject
property.
ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T. LAZARO,
Respondents.
While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment lien shall
continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien
continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Here, while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved
by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully
complied with. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro's
properties should have continued to subsist.
FACTS:
On August 22, 2005, Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from respondents-spouses Tito S.
Lazaro and Carmen T. Lazaro (Sps. Lazaro) the sum of P2,160,000.00, which represented the
amounts stated in several dishonored checks issued by the latter to the former, as well as interests,
attorney's fees, and costs. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon
the posting of the required P2,160,000.00 bond, issued the corresponding writ on October 14, 2005.
In this accord, three (3) parcels of land situated in Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-64940, T-64939, and T-86369 (subject TCTs), registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro,
were levied upon.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, Sps. Lazaro averred, among others, that Lim, Jr. had no cause of
action against them since: (a) Colim Merchandise (Colim), and not Lim, Jr., was the payee of the fifteen
(15) Metrobank checks; and (b) the PNB and Real Bank checks were not drawn by them, but by
Virgilio Arcinas and Elizabeth Ramos, respectively. While they admit their indebtedness to Colim,
Sps. Lazaro alleged that the same had already been substantially reduced on account of previous
payments which were apparently misapplied. They sought for an accounting and reconciliation of
records to determine the actual amount due. They likewise argued that no fraud should be imputed
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against them as the aforesaid checks issued to Colim were merely intended as a form of collateral.
Sps. Lazaro equally opposed the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Nonetheless, on September 22, 2006, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby
Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a
schedule of payments covering the period from September 2006 until October 2013, under the
following terms, among others: (a) that should the financial condition of Sps. Lazaro improve, the
monthly installments shall be increased in order to hasten the full payment of the entire obligation;
and (b) that Sps. Lazaro's failure to pay any installment due or the dishonor of any of the postdated
checks delivered in payment thereof shall make the whole obligation immediately due and
demandable. The compromise agreement was approved by the RTC.
Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
annotated on the subject TCTs, which the RTC granted on March 29, 2007. It ruled that a writ of
preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect
and preserve certain rights and interests pending final judgment. Considering that the case had
already been considered closed and terminated by the rendition of the January 5, 2007 Amended
Decision on the basis of the September 22, 2006 compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary
attachment should be lifted and quashed. Consequently, it ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
to cancel the writ's annotation on the subject TCTs.
Lim, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on July 26, 2007,prompting
him to file a petition for certiorari before the CA which found no grave abuse o discretion on the part
of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of preliminary attachment is properly lifted. (NO)
RULING:
The discharge of the writ was improper. The Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment
subject of this case should be restored and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto
Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation
of the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment even before
judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security for the satisfaction of
the debt put in suit. Verily, the lifting of the attachment lien would be tantamount to an abdication of
Lim, Jr.'s rights over Sps. Lazaro's properties which the Court, absent any justifiable ground therefor,
cannot allow.
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary
remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or
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incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by
a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate
effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where
personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued
on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the
same manner provided by law.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already
been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder have
yet to be fully complied with particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of
P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro's
properties should have continued to subsist.
LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner, -versus- THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 56 at Makati City
and its Presiding Judge, JUDGE REYNALDO M. LAIGO, SHERIFF IV LUCITO V. ALEJO, ATTY.
SILVERIO GARING, MR. LEONARDO J. TING, and MR. BENITO G. TECHICO, Respondents.
Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular
property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific
lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment or levy itself.
In this case, the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over
the subject property patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-
established in law and jurisprudence.
FACTS:
Leticia Ligon filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC-QC, against the Spouses Baladjay, a certain Olivia
Marasigan, Polished Arrow Holdings, and its incorporators. The Complaint alleges that Spouses
Baladjay enticed her to extend a short-term loan secured by a post-dated check which bounced upon
presentment, and that the subject property was transferred to Polished Arrow, allegedly Spouses
Baladjay’s dummy corporation to defraud its creditors. The application for the writ was granted and
the subject property was levied upon by annotating the writ on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.
169 of 306
While the case was pending, a similar complaint for the sum of money, damages, and cancellation of
title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the RTC-Makati
by Spouses Vicente against the same respondents. During the proceedings, a writ of preliminary
attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT
No. 9273.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case in RTC-QC, the RTC-Makati rendered a decision
rescrinding the transfer of the subject property to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was
made in fraud of creditors. Consequently, the RTC-Makari directed the Register of Deeds to: (a) cancel
TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous condition”
in the name of Rosario Baladjay. In the subsequent execution proceedings, the property was sold at
a public auction to Leonardo Ting.
RTC-Makati then ordered the Register of Deeds under pain of contempt to issue a new certificae of
title in favor of Ting free from any liens and encumbrances. On the other hand, RTC-QC ruled in favor
of Ligon who sought its execution and discovered that the earlier attachment annotation in her favor
has been deleted. Thus, she filed a certiorari petition against the respondents, alleging that the RTC-
Makati committed grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed Ligon’s certiorari petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC-Makati gravely abused its discretion in ordering the deletion of the attachment
annotation. (YES)
RULING:
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken
into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Case
law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property,
enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on
the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted
thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is
paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an
attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a
property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said
attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice
to all persons.
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially
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disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to
the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and jurisprudence.
EDMUND SIA, Petitioner, -versus- WILFREDO ARCENAS, FERNANDO LOPEZ, and PABLO
RAFANAN, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 209672-74, FIRST DIVISION, January 14, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is well-settled that orders pertaining to execution of judgments must substantially conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment
which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.
FACTS:
Due to the real property tax delinquencies of Panay Railways, Incorporated (PRI) over the subject
lots covering the years 1992 to 1996, the City Treasurer of Roxas City auctioned the subject lots. A
Certificate of Sale was issued to the petitioner as the highest bidder. However, the petitioner was not
able to take possession thereof in view of the refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale
despite the lapse of the 1 year redemption period. Worse, then-Mayor Juliano Alba issued EO No. 08-
97 nullifying the auction sale. Hence, the petitioner was constrained to file a Petition for the
annulment of EO 08-97, mandamus, and damages against the City Treasurer, Mayor Alba, the
members of the City Council of Roxas City, the Roxas City Government, and the PRI before the RTC of
Roxas City, Branch 17, docketed as SCA No. V-7075, ultimately seeking that a Final Bill of Sale over
the subject lots be issued to him.
RTC Br. 17 ruled in favor of the petitioner and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue the
Final Bill of Sale as prayed for. PRI appealed to the CA, which affirmed in toto the ruling of RTC Br.
17. Dissatisfied, PRI appealed to the Court, which was denied outright for having been filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period and for failure to pay the docket and other fees on time. On October
23, 2007, the Court’s ruling became final and executory.
Petitioner moved for execution before the RTC Br. 15 and which was granted. However, the City
Treasurer refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale positing that the petitioner still had to settle the
delinquent real property taxes over the subject lots in the amount of ₱2,394,526.44 which accrued
during the pendency of the case. Instead of paying said delinquent taxes, petitioner filed a Motion for
Order Divesting Panay Railway, [Inc. of] Title and Vesting Title to Plaintiff Edmund Sia. The motion
was subsequently granted by the said court and likewise ruled that petitioner cannot be held liable
for any real property tax prior to the issuance of a Final Bill of Sale.
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the delivery of the possession of the subject lots as they were
already being occupied by third parties, including herein respondents. Thus, a Writ of Possession and
eventually, a Writ of Demolition were issued in petitioner’s favor.
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Respondents, who, at that time, were occupying the subject lots as lessees of PRI, moved for the
quashal of the above-mentioned writs, essentially contending that the March 21, 2001 Decision in
SCA No. V-7075 sought to be executed arose from a mandamus petition where a writ of possession is
proscribed. They posited that the execution of a final judgment in a mandamus case is similar to the
execution of special judgments as provided in Section 11, Rule 39 in relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the petitioner argued that the ruling in SCA No. V-7075 and the
orders directing the issuance of the Final Bill of Sale and the divesting of PRI’s title over the subject
lots entitles him to their possession.
RTC Br. 15 denied respondent’s motion to quash and held that the proceedings for tax delinquency
sale at a public auction takes the nature of, or is akin to, an extrajudicial foreclosure, thus
necessitating the issuance of the corresponding writs of possession and demolition. Respondents
moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter
to the CA through 3 separate petitions for certiorari.
The CA set aside the Writs of Possession and Demolition issued by RTC Br. 15 and directed the said
court to enforce the Writ of Execution in accordance with Section 11, Rule 39 in relation to Section 9,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this regard, the CA ruled that since SCA No. V-7075 is one for
mandamus, the RTC Br. 15’s power in executing the judgment therein is limited to directing
compliance with the judgment and, in case of refusal, punish with contempt the person required by
law to obey the same. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was,
eventually, denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly declared the Writs of Possession and Demolition null and void, and
accordingly directed the RTC Br. 15 to enforce the Writ of Execution in accordance with Section 11,
Rule 39 in relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (YES)
RULING:
The CA correctly ruled that the Writs of Possession and Demolition issued in this case are null and
void for having been rendered beyond the authority of RTC Br. 15.
In this case, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 primarily compels the City Treasurer to issue the Final
Bill of Sale covering the subject lots in favor of petitioner pursuant to Section 262 of the LGC, a
ministerial duty, which said officer unduly refused to perform. As such, execution of the said
judgment should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in consonance with the
rule on service and enforcement of orders or judgments concerning the special civil action of
mandamus under Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The rule therefore is that the service and
execution of a special judgment, such as a favorable judgment in mandamus– as in this case – should
be deemed to be limited to directing compliance with the judgment, and in case of disobedience, to
have the disobedient person required by law to obey such judgment punished with contempt.
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The judgment in SCA No. V-7075 sought to be enforced in the case at bar only declared valid the
auction sale where petitioner bought the subject lots, and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to
issue a Final Bill of Sale to petitioner. Since the said judgment did not order that the possession of the
subject lots be vested unto petitioner, the RTC Br. 15 substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid
judgment – and thus, exceeded its authority in enforcing the same – when it issued the corresponding
writs of possession and demolition to vest unto petitioner the possession of the subject lots. It is well-
settled that orders pertaining to execution of judgments must substantially conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment
which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.
C. Preliminary injunction (Rule 58)
PROVINCNE OF CAGAYAN, REPRSENTED by HON. ALVVARO T. ANTONIO, Governor, and

ROBERT ADAP, Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, Petitioner, -versus- JOSEPH
LASAM LARA, Respondent.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Here, a governor's permit is a pre-requisite before one can engage in a quarrying business in
Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right
to conduct his quarrying operations within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any
injunction.
FACTS:
On September 14, 2007, Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit (ISAG Permit) from the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR, authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations
in a twenty-hectare area situated in Brgy. Centro, Muncipality of Peñablanca (Peñablanca), Cagayan
(Permit Area) and extract and dispose of sand, gravel, and other unconsolidated materials from the
Permit Area. Furthermore, Lara obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
On January 3, 2008, Jovy Balisi (Balisi), Lara's representative, went to the Cagayan Provincial
Treasurer's Office to pay the extraction fee and other fees for Lara's quarrying operations but she
was directed to first secure an Order of Payment from the Environmental and Natural Resources
Officer, petitioner Robert Adap (ENRO Adap). However, when Balisi went to ENRO Adap, the latter
refused to issue an Order of Payment. Despite various pleas from Balisi and Atty. Casauay, Lara's
counsel, ENRO Adap remained adamant with his refusal. This prompted Atty. Casauay to tender and
deposit the amount of P51,500.00 with the Treasurer's Office corresponding to the said extraction
fee and other related fees.
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On January 11, 2008, Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day, however, a total of
four trucks loaded with sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were stopped and
impounded by several local officials. Consequently, Lara filed an action for injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the said officials which was issued.
Nonetheless, on March 17, 2008, Lara received a Stoppage Order dated March 13, 2008 this time from
Cagayan Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying operations
for the following reasons: (a) the ISAG Permit was not in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 7942,
otherwise known as the "Philippine Mining Act of 1995," and its implementing rules and regulations;
(b) Lara's failure to pay sand and gravel fee under Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-07; and (c) failure
to secure all necessary permits or clearances from the local government unit concerned as required
by the ECC. Hence, Lara filed the present action for injunction and damages with an urgent and ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before
the RTC.
In their Answer petitioners raised the following defenses: (a) the mere issuance of the ISAG Permit
does not give Lara the right to commence his quarrying operations as he still had to comply with the
terms and conditions stated therein; (b) Lara has neither secured all the necessary permits nor paid
the local fees and taxes; and (c) Gov. Antonio was merely performing his duty to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the Province of Cagayan pursuant to the provisions of RA
7160 (Local Government Code)
RTC granted Lara's application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on a prima facie finding that
he is authorized to extract gravel and sand from the Permit Area. During the pre-trial, the parties
stipulated on the following facts: (a) that Lara was able to secure an ISAG Permit from the MGB and
an ECC from the DENR-EMB; (b) that Lara deposited the amount of P51,500.00 with the Treasurer's
Office for the extraction and other related fees; and (c) that Gov. Antonio issued a Stoppage Order
directing Lara to stop the quarrying operations in the Permit Area.
The RTC made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction and thus, enjoined petitioners from
stopping or disturbing Lara's quarrying operations. Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to
the Court via a petition for review on certiorari raiasing pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly issued a writ of preliminary injunction. (YES)
RULING:
It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites,
namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of
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discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's
right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the
requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit
where his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA 7160 requires that such entity must
first secure a governor's permit prior to the start of his quarrying operations, viz:
SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. The permit to extract
sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial
governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan. x x x x
In connection thereto, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan promulgated Provincial Ordinance

No. 2005-07, Article H, Section 2H.04 of which provides:
SECTION 2H.04. Permit for Gravel and Sand Extraction and Quarrying. No person shall
extract ordinary stones, gravel, earth, boulders and quarry resources from public lands
or from the beds of seas, rivers, streams, creeks or other public waters unless a permit
has been issued by the Governor (or his deputy as provided herein) x x x.
A plain reading of the afore-cited provisions clearly shows that a governor's permit is a pre-requisite
before one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara
admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations
within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any injunction.
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not delve into the issue respecting the necessity of securing
a mayor's permit, especially since it is the main issue in another case, Civil Case No. 7049, which
remains pending before the court a quo. The petition is granted. The RTC decision was reversded and
set aside.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS and

BERMELA A. GABUYA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189801, SECOND DIVISION, October 23, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is a standing rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is merely provisional in nature and is integrally
linked to the subsistence of the proceedings in the main case. Stated differently, the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding.
In this case, since the CA already remanded the case to the Ombudsman for the purpose of resolving
Gabuya's pending motion for reconsideration, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it, absent any
countervailing justification therefor, must be dissolved.
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FACTS:
Bermela Gabuya was arrested in an entrapment operation hatched by the NBI on allegations of
defrauding a certain Vicente Teo. At that time, Gabuya was a government employee in the Cebu
Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center. Hence, following her arrest, the NBI filed an
administrative complaint against Gabuya for grave misconduct before the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found Gabuya guilty of grave misconduct and ordered her dismissal from service
with the accessory penalties cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service. Gabuya filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Ombudsman. Pending its resolution, she filed a petition for review with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the CA.
CA found that Gabuya has a pending motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman which was not
disclosed in the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the CA Petition. As such, the CA
remanded the case to the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, the CA granted Gabuya’s application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, temporarily enjoining the implementation of her
dismissal from service. It held that the the mere filing of an appeal is suffiient to stay the execution of
the Ombudsman’s adverse decision involving disciplinary cases.
The Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the reconsideration of said Decision and the lifting
of the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in remanding the case to the Ombudsman. (NO)
2. Whether the CA erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction notwithstanding such remand.
(NO)
RULINGS:
1. It must be borne in mind that a remand and a dismissal are distinct procedural concepts and
hence should not be confused with one another, else the Rules be subverted. On the one hand, a
remand means an order "to send back"; or the "sending of the case back to the same court out
where it came for the purpose of having some action on it there"; and, on the other hand, a
dismissal refers to an order or judgment finally disposing of an action, suit, motion, etc. which
may either be with prejudice or without. The dismissal is deemed "with prejudice" when the
adjudication is based on the merits and bars the right to bring an action on the same claim or
cause and "without prejudice" when the case can be refiled despite its having been previously
dismissed.
176 of 306
Be that as it may, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in remanding
the case to the Ombudsman for resolution of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, absent any
showing that it exercised its discretion in a whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary manner. In this
respect, the instant petition for certiorari lacks merit and the remand of the case must stand. This
is in addition to the fact that the nullification of the remand would only serve to unduly delay the
proceedings in this case.
2. Verily, it is a standing rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is merely provisional in nature
and is integrally linked to the subsistence of the proceedings in the main case. Stated differently,
the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as part or an incident of
an independent action or proceeding. Thus, since the CA already remanded the case to the
Ombudsman for the purpose of resolving Gabuya's pending motion for reconsideration, the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by it, absent any countervailing justification therefor, must be
dissolved.
SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS and MONINA P. LAUS, and SPOUSES ANTONIO O. KOH and ELISA
T. KOH, petitioners, vs. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC., respondent.
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. While it is a general rule that a trial court’s
discretion in issuing injunctive writs should not be interfered with, the Court finds the CA’s lifting of the
WPI issued by the RTC in this case to be proper, considering that the foregoing parameters were not
observed, thus, tainting the trial court’s issuance with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a complaint against the respondent, several security guards employed by it. The
petitioners alleged that on three (3) separate occasions in August 2005, they were prevented by
armed security guards working for respondent and TIPCO from entering the eight (8) parcels of land
in Mabalacat, Pampanga belonging to them, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title.
The petitioners prayed that: (a) moral, exemplary, and liquidated damages be awarded to them; (b)
a TRO and WPI be issued directing the respondent and the other defendants to refrain from
interfering with the exercise of their rights as owners of the subject properties; and (c) after trial, the
injunction be made permanent.
The respondent and Marivalles countered that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and WPI prayed
for because they do not own the subject properties. They maintained that Margarita dela Rosa,
Manuel dela Peña, Michael Pineda, Fermin Dizon, William Lee, and Odon Sibug are the real owners
thereof, who authorized Mr. Ranilo M. Arceo (Mr. Arceo) to enter into the Security Service Contract17
with respondent to secure the subject properties.
177 of 306
The RTC granted the application for WPI based on its finding that petitioners had presented sufficient
evidence to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject properties and thereby, have
the right to possess the same. Consequently, respondent elevated the case to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling and thereby, lifted the WPI and ordered the dismissal of petitioners’
complaint. It ruled that the WPI was intended to oust respondent and the other defendants from the
subject properties, which, under prevailing jurisprudence, is not allowed where the claimant’s title
has not been clearly established by law, as in this case where petitioners’ titles are under contest and
they have failed to establish their prior possession of the subject properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in lifting the WPI issued by the RTC and in dismissing petitioners’
complaint.
RULING:
NO. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right
must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be pro tected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s
right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance
of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take
property out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party
where such right is being disputed.38 After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve
the status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
While it is a general rule that a trial court’s discretion in issuing injunctive writs should not be
interfered with, the Court finds the CA’s lifting of the WPI issued by the RTC in this case to be proper,
considering that the foregoing parameters were not observed, thus, tainting the trial court’s issuance
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SPOUSES ROMULO H. ESPIRITU and EVELYN ESPIRITU, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES NICANOR
SAZON and ANNA-LIZA G. SAZON, respondents.
G.R. No. 204965, FIRST DIVISION, March 2, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
it bears to stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete
evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for in his complaint. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be
disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, which does not obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
the instant case must be upheld, and the status quo - or the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status
that precedes the actual controversy, which is existing at the time of the filing of the case - must be
preserved until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
FACTS:
178 of 306
Sps. Espiritu are the registered owners of an 8,268-square meter parcel of land situated in the
Barangays of Bundagul and Paralayunan, Mabalacat, Pampanga (subject land) covered by TCT No.
535706-R.
On October 5, 2006, respondents-spouses Nicanor and Annaliza Sazon (Sps. Sazon) filed before the
RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Sales, Cancellation of Titles, Recovery of Possession and Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) against Sps. Espiritu. Sps. Sazon claimed to be the lawful owners of the subject land, having
purchased the same from Sps. Diaz, which was then covered by TCT No. 19948/Emancipation Patent
(EP) No. 413511 in Modesto Diaz's name.
Sps. Sazon alleged that the titles of Peco and Sps. Espiritu are invalid, ineffective, null, void, and
unenforceable, considering that: (a) the owner's duplicate copy of Modesto Diaz' TCT No. 19948 was
never surrendered nor turned over to the RD of Pampanga for cancellation and/or transfer, and is
still in Sps. Sazon's possession as the legitimate purchasers for value and in good faith; (b) the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 19948 was not reconstituted, re-issued, reported nor declared lost
before any court or tribunal as certified by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pampanga and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga; (c) Sps. Diaz could not
have possibly disposed or sold the subject land in favor of Peco on October 4, 2002 since Leticia Diaz
had already passed away on March 17, 2001; and (d) the transfers to Peco and Sps. Espiritu were not
supported by the required Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) clearance. Thus, they prayed that
judgment be rendered cancelling the titles of Peco and Sps. Espiritu for having been fraudulently
obtained, and directing Sps. Espiritu to surrender possession of the subject land to them. They
likewise prayed that pending final judgment, a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory
Injunction be issued by the RTC restraining Sps. Espiritu or any persons acting in their behalf "from
doing acts of possession and construction of building/s on the subject land.
Sps. Espiritu filed their answer, praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that: (a)
the complaint states no cause of action against them since the claim was merely based on an
unregistered deed of sale, which is binding only between the parties thereto and cannot bind the land
or third persons; (b) the complaint does not contain specific averments how they violated the rights
of Sps. Sazon; and (c) Sps. Diaz are the real parties-in-interest who may institute the action. They
further claimed to be innocent purchasers for value.
The RTC granted the application, thereby enjoining Sps. Espiritu from committing acts of possession
and constructing a factory, warehouse or other building over the subject land, conditioned upon the
posting of a P1,000,000 indemnity bond by Sps. Sazon.
The CA denied the petition for certiorari, finding that the RTC did not abuse its discretion when it
granted the writ of preliminary injunction. It explained that the issuance of an injunctive writ is the
prerogative of the trial court whose appreciation of the evidence in support of and in opposition
thereto should not be interfered with by the appellate courts, save in instances where the court a quo
gravely abused its discretion.
ISSUE:
179 of 306
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it granted the writ of preliminary injunction in Sps. Sazon's favor.
RULING:
NO. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in order to protect the ability
of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances
that will hamper or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits. In a sense,
it is a regulatory process meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is that
the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.
At this point, it bears to stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial
or incomplete evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for in his complaint. As such, the evidence need only be a sampling intended merely
to give the trial court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision
on the merits of the case. Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a writ
of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation
of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be
disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, which does not obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in the instant case must be upheld, and the status quo - or the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested
status that precedes the actual controversy, which is existing at the time of the filing of the case -
must be preserved until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, in her capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, and
ANGELITO L. DAVID, in his capacity as the Barangay Chairman of Prado Siongco, Lubao,
Pampanga, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, EMMANUEL SANTOS, Petitioners, -versus-
JAIME C. DIMSON, represented by his Attorneys-in-Fact, CARMELA R. DIMSON and IRENE R.
DIMSON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 223862, FIRST DIVISION, July 10 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As provided under Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, A writ
of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection
of substantive rights and interests. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show
that: (a) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) this right is directly threatened
by an act sought to be enjoined; (c) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (d) there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. The grant
or denial of an injunctive relief in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left for the conclusive
determination of the said court. "Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion." The burden is, thus,
180 of 306
on the applicant to show that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor, since an
application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against him.
Here, Dimson failed to sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the issuance of a TRO
against the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab. In the present case, there is no showing that
Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate the subject poultry farm in
2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was not issued
based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Records show that complaints from
neighboring barangays were received by the office of Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming
from the said farm, which was confirmed upon ocular inspection conducted by the Health and Sanitation
Office of the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga. Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are
presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently shown to be otherwise. In this case, Dimson was
unable to refute the finding that foul odor is being emitted by his farm, having failed to present the
inspection report of the sanitary officer who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in the fann.
Not having passed the necessary sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason
for the withholding of the required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of
Dimson's business permit to operate.
FACTS:
Jaime C. Dimson (Dimson) is the owner of a poultry farm located in Barangay Prado Siongco, Lubao,
Pampanga (subject poultry farm) which had been operating for more than 30 years. In January 2014,
he applied for a barangay clearance with the office of petitioner Prado Siongco Barangay Chairman
Angelito L. David (Chairman David), preparatory to his application for a business permit, and was
informed that the issuance thereof is conditioned on a prior ocular inspection of the subject poultry
farm by the Office of the Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, Mayor Cayabyab. However, despite the conduct
of an ocular inspection, Chairman David refused to issue the clearance; hence, no business permit
was issued in favor of Dimson.
On April 29, 2014, Dimson received a CDO from the Office of Mayor Cayabyab, directing him to desist
from further conducting any poultry farming on the grounds of: (a) lack of a Barangay Business
Permit and a Mayor's Permit; (b) lack of a pollution control officer; (c) foul odor being emitted by the
subject poultry farm that offended passing motorists, and for which complaints were filed by those
affected; and (d) the said poultry farm being situated only five (5) meters away from the national
road, in violation of the 500-meter minimum distance requirement under the Code of Sanitation of
the Philippines (Sanitation Code).
In his motion for reconsideration, Dimson denied that there was foul odor coming from his poultry
farm, at the same time, manifesting that he had already employed a pollution control officer. Said
motion was denied by Lubao Acting Mayor Robertito V. Diaz. Dissatisfied, Dimson filed another
motion for reconsideration, contending that the subject poultry farm is not a nuisance per se that can
be abated by the local government without the intervention of the courts. The motion was denied by
Mayor Cayabyab, clarified that the CDO was primarily issued on the lack of the requisite Barangay
Business Permit and Mayor's Permit. Thereafter, a Closure Order dated June 20, 2014 was issued by
Mayor Cayabyab effectively shutting down the subject poultry farm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case warrant issuance of TRO against the CDO and the Closure Order.
181 of 306
RULING:
NO. There is sufficient justification for the issuance of the CDO and the Closure Order.
"A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights and interests." To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant
must show that: (a) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) this right is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (c) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (d) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage. The grant or denial of an injunctive relief in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve
findings of fact left for the conclusive determination of the said court. "Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave
abuse of discretion." The burden is, thus, on the applicant to show that there is meritorious ground
for the issuance of a TRO in his favor, since an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly
against him. Here, Dimson failed to sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the
issuance of a TRO against the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.
A business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order
for the business to legally operate in the locality. While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate
business, it cannot operate without a business permit, which expires on the 31st of December of
every year and must be renewed before the end of January of the following year.
In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business
permit to operate the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the
necessary barangay clearance which was not issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted
by the said farm. Records show that complaints from neighboring barangays were received by the
office of Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming from the said farm, which was confirmed
upon ocular inspection conducted by the Health and Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao,
Pampanga. Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless
sufficiently shown to be otherwise. In this case, Dimson was unable to refute the finding that foul
odor is being emitted by his farm, having failed to present the inspection report of the sanitary officer
who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in the farm. Not having passed the necessary
sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason for the withholding of the
required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of Dimson's business permit to
operate.
Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary business pennit to operate in 2014 on account of
his inability to obtain the required barangay clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement
standard, Dimson may not legally operate in the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby,
warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure Order.
In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear legal right to resume his operations pending
final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law, which is not extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive
relief.
182 of 306
D. Receivership (Rule 59)
E. Replevin (Rule 60)
V. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A. Jurisdiction and venue
B. Interpleader (Rule 62)
C. Declaratory relief and similar remedies (Rule 63)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners -versus- HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO

CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE SORIANO, STEPHANIE ABIERA,
MARIA LOURDES ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ, CZARINA MAYALTEZ, SHERYL BALOT,
RENIZZA BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, LEANA CARAMOAN, ALDWIN CAMANCE, RENE
DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA ARMINDA
JIMENEZ, MARY ANN LEE,LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO,
NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU REYES,
MELISSA ANN SICAT, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA TORNO, and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO
L. BATHAN, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 92, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204603, EN BANC, September 24, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in
question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, second, and third
requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain
wanting. As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for being void for vagueness; (b)
Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged
nature of priest-penitent relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition
against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26, for violating the right to travel; and (e) Section
27, for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
183 of 306
The Republic moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising
the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court. Thereafter, the Court
promulgated its Decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
Thus, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss, contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had
already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases. Private respondents countered
that: (a) the Court did not resolve the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as
the SC petitions were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for
declaratory relief were met.
ISSUE:
Whether the requirements for declaratory relief have been satisfied. (NO)
RULING:
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, second, and third
requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain
wanting. As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto,
by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a
dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity,
passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by
tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as
a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual
milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as
citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the
184 of 306
enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which
were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended
towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372
against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
in Southern Hemisphere: Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake
and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review
for lack of ripeness.
D. Review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and COA (Rule
64 in relation to ;)
E. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
1. Definitions and distinctions
IRENE VILLAMAR-SANDOVAL, Petitioner, -versus- JOSE CAILIPAN, MARIA OFELIA M.

GONZALES, LAURA J. CAYABYAB, ROGELIO COSTALES, and FERNANDO V. AUSTRIA,
Respondents.
Remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Here, the
grant of the petition for certiorari on mere incidental matters of the proceedings would not accord any
practical relief to respondents because a decision had already been rendered on the main case and
therefore, may be elevated on appeal. Consequently, the CA Division where the appeal of the main case
is pending may appropriately pass upon the merits of the RTC's January 11, 2011 Decision including all
assailed irregularities in the proceedings such as the validity of the default orders.
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case instituted a complaint for damages before the RTC and claimed that she
was prejudiced by the false, baseless and malicious libel case filed against Cailipan which was
supported by affidavits of other respondents. The said libel case circled around certain declarations
purportedly made by petitioner during a homeowner's association meeting about Cailipan's criminal
records for murder, slight physical injuries and estafa. These allegations were supposedly made by
petitioner in order to tarnish Cailipan's reputation and facilitate his ouster as President of the said
homeowner's association.
In the proceedings in the RTC, the respondent’s belatedly filed their answer late for a day but the RTC
did not declare them in default. However, during the pre-trial the respondent’s counsel failed to
appear. The petitioners then prayed that respondent be declared in default which was granted by the
RTC in its October 20, 2010 Order. The respondents then questioned the order of default and the
lawyer of respondent’s said that he had to attend an urgent hearing in Cotabato City involving an
185 of 306
election protest but that he immediately went back to Koronadal City to attend the mediation
proceeding for the main case scheduled at 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Petitioner opposed
the motion.
RULING of the RTC: Sustained the declaration of default due to their counsel's failure to: (1) attend
the scheduled pre-trial conference on October 20, 2010 and; (2) file a pre-trial brief despite due
notice.
On January 11, 2011, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the October 20, 2010
and November 10, 2010 Orders and in not dismissing the case for improper venue. On even date, the
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, a copy of which was received by respondents on
January 24, 2011. On January 22, 2011, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, while its
initially filed certiorari petition was still pending resolution before the same appellate court. In this
relation, they subsequently filed on February 2, 2011 an Amended Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam and
a Joint Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam (Amended Notices of Appeal), clarifying therein that they were
not abandoning their petition for certiorari.
Ruling of the CA: In its Decision dated September 30, 2011, the CA, through its Twenty-First Division,
denied respondents' contention that the venue was improperly laid but nevertheless, granted their
petition grounded on the impropriety of the order of default. It applied the principle of substantial
justice and deemed that "it would be most unfair" to declare respondents in default for their lawyer's
failure to attend the pre-trial conference. With respect to the failure of respondents' counsel to file a
pre-trial brief on time, the CA held that the RTC's Order "barring respondents from presenting
evidence had been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by
[respondents'] counsel with the said order." Thus, for these reasons, the CA set aside the RTC's
October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010 Orders and directed the remand of the case to the RTC to
allow the respondents to present their evidence.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that: (1) since the main
case had already been decided by the RTC through its January 11, 2011 Decision and respondents
have availed of the remedy of appeal, the latter's petition for certiorari filed with the CA on January
11, 2011 was already moot and academic; and (2) the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it declared respondents in default.
The foregoing motion was denied by the CA in its February 1, 2012 Resolution, holding that petitioner
"failed to raise substantial issues that would warrant reconsideration." In sustaining the invalidity of
the RTC's October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010 Orders, it ratiocinated that "it is a far better and
more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse" and afford the respondents
the right to be heard.
Separately, the CA noted that, per the January 27, 2012 Verification issued by its Judicial Records
Division, the case records have yet to be forwarded to it, despite petitioner's allegations that the RTC
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had already promulgated a decision and that the respondents filed a Notice of Appeal. In this regard,
it modified its initial September 30, 2011 Decision and thus deleted the portion which directed that
the records of the case be remanded to the court a quo.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents' petition for certiorari was an improper remedy and/or had been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the RTC's January 11, 2011 Decision. (YES)
RULING:
It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy
would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there
should be no appeal.
The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through a special
action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The exception to this
rule is conceded only "where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, and the
broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders complained of were found to be
completely null and void, or that appeal was not considered the appropriate remedy, such as in
appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver." However, none of the
exceptional circumstances are present in this case, hence, the general rule applies.
It should be noted that respondents' petition for certiorari had long become moot by the RTC's
January 11, 2011 Decision. In particular, the grant of the petition for certiorari on mere incidental
matters of the proceedings would not accord any practical relief to respondents because a decision
had already been rendered on the main case and therefore, may be elevated on appeal. Lest it be
misunderstood, a case becomes moot when no useful purpose can be served in passing upon its
merits. As a rule, courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can
be granted.
In view of the above-discussed considerations and considering the fact that respondents' petition
for certiorari cannot anymore be dismissed, the Court is constrained to set aside the September 30,
2011 Decision and February 1, 2012 Resolution of the CA. Consequently, this course of action will
allow the CA Division where the appeal of the main case is pending to appropriately pass upon the
merits of the RTC's January 11, 2011 Decision including all assailed irregularities in the proceedings
such as the validity of the default orders. To rule otherwise would only serve to perpetuate the
procedural errors already committed in this case.
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CITY OF DAVAO represented by RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, in his capacity as City Mayor,
RIZALINA JUSTOL, in her capacity as the City Accountant, and ATTY. WINDEL E. A VISADO, in
his capacity as City Administrator, Petitioners, -versus- ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, Respondent.
Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, Olanolan has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. As it
appears, he anchors his legal interest to claim such relief on his ostensible authority as Punong
Barangay. In this regard, Section 332 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991," provides that:
“Section 332. Effectivity of Barangay Budgets. - The ordinance enacting the annual
budget shall take effect at the beginning of the ensuing calendar year. An ordinance
enacting a supplemental budget, however, shall take effect upon its approval or on the
date fixed therein. The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental
budgets and the accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the punong
barangay concerned.”
However, records clearly show that Olanolan's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by
the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected
Punong Barangay. While the Court en banc indeed issued an SQAO which temporarily reinstated him to
the disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005 when a Decision was rendered dismissing
Olanolan 's petition.
In addition, City of Davao could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for
by Olanolan in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "[m]andamus only lies to
enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a
discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by
the courts.
FACTS:
Robert Olanolan (Olanolan) was elected and proclaimed Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. An election
protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso A. Tizon (Tizon). It was initially dismissed by the
MTCC, but was later granted by the COMELEC on appeal. Hence, Tizon was declared the duly-elected
Punong Barangay. Olanolan filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC, but to no avail.
Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, with prayer for Issuance of a TRO.
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The Court en banc gave due course to the petition and issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which
was immediately implemented by the DILG. Thus, Olanolan was reinstated to the disputed office.
Upon his reinstatement, Olanolan presided over which, in the regular course of business, passed the
"General Fund Annual Budget of Barangay Bucana for Calendar Year 2005". However, on March 31
2005, the Court en banc rendered an adverse Decision dismissing Olanolan's petition. Consequently,
it also recalled its SQAO (Recall Order).
The City Legal Officer of City of Davao opined that the Recall Order was in effect, an order of
dissolution which is immediately executory and effective. On the basis of this opinion, the City of
Davao thus refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into by Olanolan
as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order as it signified his immediate ouster from the
disputed office. This notwithstanding, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay requested the Regional
Director of the DILG issue a directive for the officials of City of Davao to recognize the legitimacy of
Olanolan as Punong Barangay.
On July 26, 2005, before any action could be taken by the DILG, Olanolan filed a Petition
for Mandamus etc. (mandamus petition) before the RTC, seeking to compel City of Davao to allow the
release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his administration.
ISSUE:
Whether the mandamus petition filed by Olanolan will prosper. (NO)
RULING:
Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, Olanolan has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. As
it appears, he anchors his legal interest to claim such relief on his ostensible authority as Punong
Barangay. In this regard, Section 332 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991," provides that:
“Section 332. Effectivity of Barangay Budgets. – The ordinance enacting the annual
budget shall take effect at the beginning of the ensuing calendar year. An ordinance
enacting a supplemental budget, however, shall take effect upon its approval or on the
date fixed therein. The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental
budgets and the accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the punong
barangay concerned.”
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However, records clearly show that Olanolan's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by
the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected
Punong Barangay. While the Court en banc indeed issued an SQAO which temporarily reinstated him
to the disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005 when a Decision was rendered
dismissing Olanolan's petition.
In fact, as City of Davao correctly argue, the Court's SQAO is akin to preliminary injunctions and/or
TROs. Therefore, as they carry the same import and effect, the recall of the SQAO subject of this case
should be accorded the same treatment as that of the recall of said provisional reliefs. Thus,
considering that Olanolan had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed his
mandamus petition on July 26, 2005, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no
valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for.
In addition, City of Davao could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed
for by Olanolan in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "[m]andamus only lies
to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a
discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with
by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by
law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.
In this case, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to Olanolan
considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay. Surely, it was
part of City of Davao's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay funds would not be released
to a person without proper authority. Hence, given the COMELEC's ruling revoking Olanolan's
election and proclamation as Punong Barangay, which in fact, was later on validated by no less than
the Court, City of Davao could not have been faulted for not automatically releasing the funds sought
for in his mandamus petition.
2. Requisites; when and where to file (Rule 65)
MARIA LOURDDES D. CASTELLS AND SHALIMAR CENTI-MANDANAS, Petitioner, -versus-

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, Respondents.
The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and
subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended. Here, the CA had already
exercised its sound discretion in granting the extension to file the subject petition thru a Resolution
dated January 29, 2008. Consequently, it could not renege on such grant by rendering another issuance
almost seven months later, i.e., Resolution dated August 28, 2008, which resulted in the refusal to admit
the same petition. Such course of action is clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention
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the undue prejudice to petitioners' rights. Verily, the more appropriate course of action would have been
to admit the subject petition and resolve the case on the merits. Thus, in order to rectify this lapse, the
SC deems it prudent to have the case remanded to the CA for its proper resolution.
FACTS:
On August 24, 2004, Saudi Arabian Airlines issued a memo regarding the transfer of 10 flight
attendants, including Castells and Centi-Mandanas (petitioners), from Manila to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
due to "operational requirements". Centi-Mandanas complied with the transfer order while Castells
did not. Centi-Mandanas alleged that upon her arrival in Jeddah, she was told that her contract would
no longer be renewed and that she was asked to sign a pre-typed resignation letter. She averred that
while she never wished to resign, SAUDIA left her with no other viable choice as it would terminate
her services anyway. Thus, she filled out the resignation form handed to her.
For her part, Castells alleged that upon her non-compliance with the transfer order, she prepared a
resignation letter stating that she felt she was being forced to resign. She then alleged that the SAUDIA
Manila Office Manager told her to amend the same to state that she was voluntarily resigning; this
she reluctantly followed.
Petitioners, along with a co-flight attendant, Maria Joy Teresa O. Bilbao filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against SAUDIA, with prayer for reinstatement, full backwages, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. They alleged that they have been hearing stories that Jeddah-based
flight attendants aged 39 to 40 years old, (the same age as them) were already processing their
respective resignations and that the transfer order was made so that they would be terminated upon
their arrival in Jeddah.
For their defense, SAUDIA maintained that the resignations were intelligently and voluntarily made.
It asserted, inter alia, that petitioners and Bilbao's resignation letters were penned and duly signed
by them and that they have voluntarily executed an undertaking acknowledging receipt of various
sums of money and irrevocably and unconditionally releasing SAUDIA, its directors, stockholders,
officers, and employees from any claim or demand whatsoever in law or equity which they may have
in connection with their employment with SAUDIA.
The Labor Arbiter held SAUDIA guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay each of petitioners
and Bilbao full backwages. NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's ruling saying that the presence of
words of gratitude in the subject letters negates the claim that they were products of any form of
coercion or threat on SAUDIA's part.
On January 16, 2008, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion for Extension to File a Petition for
Certiorari, praying that they be given a period of 15 days from January 18, 2008, or until February 2,
2008, within which to file the subject petition. The said motion was granted in a Resolution dated
January 29, 2008. Since February 2, 2008 was a Saturday, petitioners filed the subject petition on the
next working day, or on February 4, 2008, and the CA admitted the same.
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On even date, SAUDIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, primarily contending that A.M. No. 07-7-
12-SC, which took effect on December 27, 2007, no longer allowed the filing of an extension of time
to file a petition for certiorari; thus, the CA should not have admitted the subject petition. In a
Resolution dated August 28, 2008, the CA reconsidered its earlier resolution and granted SAUDIA's
motion. It deemed the subject petition not admitted due to petitioners' non-compliance with the
reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC. Hence, it considered the case closed and terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or the CA correctly refused the admission of the subject petition. (NO)
RULING:
It is well-settled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since
they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in
the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, the
Court has recognized exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends
of justice. These exceptions are as follows: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits
of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the
issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.
In view of the foregoing, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which now disallows an extension of the 60-day reglementary period to file a
petition for certiorari courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound discretion.
To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC) , the
general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and
subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended. In this case, the CA had
already exercised its sound discretion in granting the extension to file the subject petition thru a
Resolution dated January 29, 2008. Consequently, it could not renege on such grant by rendering
another issuance almost seven months later, i.e., Resolution dated August 28, 2008, which resulted
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in the refusal to admit the same petition. Such course of action is clearly antithetical to the tenets of
fair play, not to mention the undue prejudice to petitioners' rights. Verily, the more appropriate
course of action would have been to admit the subject petition and resolve the case on the merits.
Thus, in order to rectify this lapse, the Court deems it prudent to have the case remanded to the CA
for its proper resolution.
RICHARD K. TOM, Petitioner, -versus- SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility". Accordingly, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void".
The issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court
that took cognizance of the case and as such, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
Fidel Cu (Cu) sold via Deed of Conditional Sale his 17,237 shares of stock in Golden Dragon
International Terminals, Inc. (GDITI) to Virgilio Ramos and Cirilo Basalo, Jr. When the latter failed to
pay the purchase price, Cu sold 15,233 of the same shares through a Deed of Sale in favor of Edgar
Lim, Eddie Ong, and Arnold Gunnacao who also did not pay the consideration therefor.
Subsequently, Lim, Basalo, Ong and Gunnacao were selected as officers of GDITI. However, a group
led by Ramos and composed of individuals who were not elected as officers of GDITI, including Tom,
forcibly took over the GDITI offices. This prompted GDITI, through Lim, to file an action for injunction
and damages against Ramos and the others.
Pending the injunction case, Cu resold his shares of stock in GDITI to Basalo. Under their agreement,
Cu sold his remaining 1,997 shares as well as the shares subject of the previously-executed Deed of
Conditional Sale and Deed of Sale. As such, Cu intervened in the injunction case claiming that, as an
unpaid seller, he was still the legal owner of the shares.
The RTC granted Cu’s application for Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunctions and
thereafter issued corresponding writs which directed the original parties to cease and desist from
performing or causing the performance of any and all acts of management and control over GDITI,
and to give Cu, as intervenor, the authority to put in order GDITI’s business operations.
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In view of his successful intervention, Cu executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Cezar
O. Mancao II constituting the latter as his duly authorized representative to perform all acts of
management and control over GDITI. However, in a subsequent letter, Cu expressly revoked the same
authority, effectively reinstating the power to control and manage GDITI unto himself.
Consequently, Mancao and Basalo filed the present Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
Cu and Tom, among others. It was alleged that it was Tom who was authorized to exercise control
and management over GDITI and, on the strength thereof, had made representations that enabled
him to enter some ports to the exclusion of the other agents of GDITI.
Thereafter, Samuel N. Rodriguez filed a Complaint-in-Intervention alleging that in a Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA), Basalo authorized him to manage and control the operations of GDITI in the Luzon
area, and, in such regard, effectively revoked whatever powers Basalo had previously given to
Mancao. However, as Basalo purportedly refused to honor the terms of the MOA despite demand,
Rodriguez sought to intervene. He prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing Basalo and all other persons acting for and on his behalf to honor his obligations under the
MOA.
The RTC granted Rodriguez’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction as it found credence in the MOA which remained uncontroverted. Via a petition for
certiorari before the CA, the CA denied Tom’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction finding no extreme urgency on the matter raised by Tom, and that no clear
and irreparable injury would be suffered if the injunctive writ was not granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Tom’s prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. (YES)
RULING:
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility". Accordingly, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly
extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void".
In relation thereto, it must be noted that a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction are, by nature,
injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests of
a person. The requisites for its issuance are: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the
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right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage. Such issuance rests upon the sound discretion of the court
that took cognizance of the case and as such, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the SC finds that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. By denying Tom's prayer, the CA effectively affirmed the RTC's Order placing
the management and control of GDITI to Rodriguez, a mere intervenor, on the basis of a MOA between
the latter and Basalo, in violation of the Corporation Code which provides that a corporation shall
exercise its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents,
except in certain instances. In so doing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is correctible by certiorari.
PROVINCE OF LEYTE, herein represented by MR. RODOLFO BADIABLE, in his capacity as the
ICO-Provincial Treasurer, Province of Leyte, Petitioner, -versus- ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
Essentially, the purpose of the requirements is to apprise the other party of the pendency of an action in
the CA. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. However, if the other party party had already been notified of
the same and had even participated in the proceedings, such purpose would have already been served
and the petition should not be dismissed. Courts should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural
lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from the constraints of technicalities.
FACTS:
The Province of Leyte issued 4 separate franchise tax assessments against EDC which the latter, in
turn, protested separately. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied all protests, EDC appealed
such denials before the RTC which was, thereafter, consolidated.
Notwithstanding the pendency of the cases before the RTC, the Province of Leyte issued another tax
assessment against EDC with the Assistant Provincial Treasurer verbally intimating to EDC that he
was under strict instruction from the Governor to enforce the collection of tax through the available
administrative remedies upon the lapse of the 60-day period mentioned in the assessment.
This prompted EDC to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying that the
RTC enjoin the Province of Leyte from assessing, or attempting to assess, collecting or attempting to
collect franchise taxes from, and availing of enforcement remedies or actions against EDC until the
pending cases before the RTC shall have been resolved with finality.
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The RTC directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of EDC. Aggrieved, the
Province of Leyte elevated the matter before the CA by way of a petition for certiorari. The CA,
however, dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no proper proof of service of the
petition to the adverse party based on Section 13, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court. Registry receipts can
hardly be considered sufficient proper proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail
considering that Province of Leyte failed to include the registry return card.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition due to its failure to provide
proof of service of the same on EDC. (NO)
RULING:
The case was elevated to the CA via a petition for certiorari which is, by nature, an original and
independent action, and therefore, not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Being an original action, there is a need for the CA
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case before it can resolve the same on the
merits. Naturally, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner upon the filing of the certiorari
petition. As for respondent , the CA acquires jurisdiction upon: (a) the service of the order or
resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction as provided for in Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court.
In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating
its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to
the petition, among others. EDC even complied with such directive by filing its comment to such
petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties.
As to the CA’s ruling that there was no proper proof of service of the petition to the adverse party
since registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient proof of service considering that the
Province of Leyte failed to include the registry return card, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court
which provides for the procedural requirements in filing original actions before the CA is instructive.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received. It
is further required that it be be filed in 7 clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner,
and shall be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. Essentially, the purpose of these
requirements is to apprise the other party of the pendency of an action in the CA. The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
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dismissal of the petition. However, if the other party party had already been notified of the same and
had even participated in the proceedings, such purpose would have already been served and the
petition should not be dismissed.
In the case at bar, considering that the CA had already issued a Resolution dated November 4, 2009
directing EDC to file a comment which the latter had complied with, it cannot be denied that EDC was
already aware of the certiorari proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired
over its person. The CA, therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural
mishap and resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice. Courts should not be
unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration
of justice. Since litigation is not a game of technicalities, every litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and CASMERO MAHILUM,

Petitioners v. VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (VECO), Respondent
The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention
of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The
timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. It must be
noted that the fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one day is not a legal
justification for non-compliance with the rule. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends of
justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one day late. In the case
at bar, the Union received on August 18, 2011 the NLRC's July 29, 2011 Resolution, which denied their
motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30, 2011 Decision. Therefore, the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari ended on October 17, 2011. However, the certiorari petition was
filed one day after, or on October 18, 2011. Thus, petitioners' failure to file said petition within the
required 60-day period rendered the NLRC's Decision and Resolution impervious to any attack through
a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the same.
FACTS:
Respondent Visayan Electric Company, Inc. (VECO) is a corporation engaged in the supply and
distribution of electricity in Cebu City and its neighboring cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Petitioner Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU TUCP (the Union) is the exclusive
bargaining agent of VECO's rank and-file employees while Mahilum was the Union's President.
It was claimed that at the time of Mahilum’s election as union president, VECO terminated active
union members without going through the grievance machinery procedure prescribed under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), among others. Thus, union members marched on the streets
to protest VECO's refusal to comply with the CBA. Following said incident, Mahilum was allegedly
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demoted as warehouse staff to isolate him and restrict his movements. Other union officers
experienced the same.
The union officers were then notified of an administrative investigation to be conducted. On the basis
of the findings thereof, VECO issued a notice terminating Mahilum from employment.
Union filed Notice of Strike on the grounds of unfair labor practice. To avert any work stoppage that
will prejudice VECO's power distribution activity, the Secretary of Labor intervened and issued an
Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
On June 30, 2011, the NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice against
VECO for lack of merit and declared Mahilum's dismissal from employment as legal. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration from the foregoing NLRC Decision, which was denied
in a Resolution dated July 29, 2011.They received said Resolution on August 18, 2011.
On October 18, 2011, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on certiorari petition imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.
The CA issued a Resolution directing petitioners to show cause why the certiorari petition should
not be dismissed for having been filed "one day behind the reglementary period". Atty. Jonas V. Asis
(Atty. Asis) from the Seno Mendoza & Associates Law Offices filed in behalf of petitioners a
Manifestation/Explanation claiming that there was unintended error/mistake in the computation of
the period and that there was no prejudice caused to VECO by the unintended one-day late filing of
the petition. Atty. Asis allegedly thought in good faith that the month of August has 30 days, and that
60 days from August 18, 2011 is October 18, 2011.
The CA, on its resolution, pointed out that petitioners previously filed a Manifestation that they had
terminated the services of Seno Mendoza & Associates as their counsel and have contracted the
services of Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. (Atty. Saladero) as their new counsel. Consequently, the CA
deemed as not filed the Manifestation/Explanation filed by Atty. Asis and dismissed the certiorari
petition for failure of Atty. Saladero to comply with the previous resolution.
Petitioners insisted that the delay should have been overlooked by the CA in favor of substantial
justice.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the certiorari petition on account of the one-day delay in the
Union’s filing
RULING
NO. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed not later
than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The provisions
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on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless
delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of
filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.
It must be noted that the fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one day
is not a legal justification for non-compliance with the rule. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory
that the ends of justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one
day late. When the law fixes 60 days, it cannot be taken to mean also 61 days. If that deadline could
be stretched by one day in one case, what would prevent it being further stretched further to two
days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the
growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the
solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on reason, whim and fancy should
play no part in its application.
In the case at bar, the Union received on August 18, 2011 the NLRC's July 29, 2011 Resolution, which
denied their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30, 2011 Decision. Therefore, the 60-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari ended on October 17, 2011. However, the
certiorari petition was filed one day after, or on October 18, 2011. Thus, petitioners' failure to file
said petition within the required 60-day period rendered the NLRC's Decision and Resolution
impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and no court can exercise
jurisdiction to review the same.
While it is always in the power of the Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case
from its operation, the liberality with which equity jurisdiction is exercised must always be anchored
on the basic consideration that the same must be warranted by the circumstances obtaining in the
case. There is, however, no showing in the present case of any exceptional circumstance that may
rationalize a digression from the rule on timeliness of petitions.
CENTRAL BICOL STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, represented by its President, ATTY.

MARIO T. BERNALES, Petitioner v. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR
LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. and GAWAD KALINGA FOUNDATION, INC. represented
by its Executive Director, JOSE LUIS OQUINENA,* and its Camarines Sur Chapter Head, HARRY
AZANA, Respondent
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration since A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC contains no provision
for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari unlike in the previous Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reasons
and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, the Court has held that the 60-day
period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion. There should be an effort though on the
part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
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failure to comply with the rules. In the case at bar, were it not for CBSUA’s failure to have effected the
registration of the certificate of title under its name, then there appears to be no standing objection
against the enforcement of those laws. Records also show that CBSUA has been in possession of the
subject land. Thus, it would serve the interest of substantial justice for the CA to rule upon the merits of
this case rather than dismiss the petition before it on a mere procedural technicality, it being shown, to
the satisfaction of the Court, that the above-highlighted grounds to relax the rules obtain.
FACTS:
Petitioner Central Bicol State University of Agriculture (CBSUA) is a government educational

institution. Under BP 198, then Camarines Sur Agricultural College was converted into a state college,
known as Camarines Sur State Agricultural College. (CSSAC) Thereafter, it was converted into what
is now known as CBSUA under RA 9717.
RA 9717 granted several real properties to CBSUA such that all assets of CSSAC were transferred to
it. All parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the CSSAC are declared to be property
of CBSUA and shall be titled under its name.
Sometime in 1998, respondent Province of Camarines Sur (Province) sought the reconstitution of
Origina Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1029 registered in its name, which covered one of the parcels of
land granted to CBSUA. By virtue thereof, OCT No. 1029 was reconstituted as OCT RO-917.
Subsequently, armed personnel deployed by the Province allegedly forcibly entered a portion of a lot
being occupied by CBSUA (subject land). They destroyed the fences and other structures erected
thereon. CBSUA learned later on that the Province allocated the subject land for the housing project
of respondent Gawad Kalinga Foundation, Inc. (GKFI) for rebel returnees. Hence, CBSUA filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership, possession and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The RTC denied CBSUA’s application for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, finding that CBSUA failed to show that it had superior right over the subject land as against
that of the Province. CBSUA’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 10,
2011, a copy of which was received by CBSUA on October 17, 2011 which gave CBSUA 60 days or
until December 16, 2011 within which to assail the RTC’s Orders via petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Unfortunately, due to time constraints in securing certified
true copies of the RTC’s Orders, as well as other pertinent documents, the Office of the Solicitor
General, prosecuting this case on behalf of CBSUA, deemed it necessary and prudent to seek an
additional period of 10 days from December 16, 2011 or until December 26, 2011 within which to
file its petition for certiorari before the CA.
In a Resolution, the CA denied CBSUA’s motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari,
citing Section 4, paragraph 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which
provides that the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of the
denial of the motion. As presently worded, the above rule no longer allows extensions to file petitions
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for certiorari. Consequently, since CBSUA filed its petition only on December 26, 2011, the CA ruled
the same to have been filed out of time and dismissed the same outright.
ISSUE
Whether the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court completely disallowed extensions for the filing of petitions for certiorari
RULING
NO. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration since A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC contains
no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari unlike in the
previous Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only
for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, the Court
has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion.
The Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day
reglementary period: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith
of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of
sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
Furthermore, the Court has held that although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by
courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, the Court has, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid
application of the rules of procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits.
In the case at bar, certainly, there are laws which mandated the transfer of ownership over the subject
land, among others, to CBSUA. As observed by the RTC, were it not for CBSUA’s failure to have effected
the registration of the certificate of title under its name, then there appears to be no standing
objection against the enforcement of those laws. Records also show that CBSUA has been in
possession of the subject land. Thus, it would serve the interest of substantial justice for the CA to
rule upon the merits of this case rather than dismiss the petition before it on a mere procedural
technicality, it being shown, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the above-highlighted grounds to
relax the rules obtain.
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FELICITO M. MEJORADO, petitioner, vs. HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondent.
G.R. No. 214430, FIRST DIVISION, March 9, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It bears reiteration that the writ
of mandamus may only issue if the party claiming it has a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to
the thing demanded, and that it was the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required to
accord the same upon him. Petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of the NCA to cover the amount of his
second claim falls short of this standard, there being no clear and specific duty on the part of the
respondent to issue the same.
FACTS:
Sometime in December 1996 and the early part of 1997, petitioner documented 62 smuggled oil
importations from 1991 to 1997 of Union Refinery Corporation (URC), OILINK Industrial
Corporation (OILINK), Union Global Trading (UGT), and Philippine Airlines (PAL). He provided
confidential information detailing the illegal importations of the said companies to the now-defunct
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau of the Bureau of Customs (BOC). Based on the
information petitioner furnished, the BOC investigated 23 out of the 62 smuggled oil importations he
reported. The investigation resulted in the payment by the four (4) companies of millions in unpaid
Value-Added Tax (VAT), excise, and ad valorem taxes from 1997 to 1998. Thus, petitioner filed his
first claim for informer’s reward with the BOC and the Department of Finance (DOF). Subsequently,
the BOC investigated 30 additional smuggled oil importations out of the 62 that petitioner reported.
From this investigation, it was able to collect deficiency taxes from URC, OILINK, and PAL, prompting
petitioner to file his second claim for informer’s fee on May 12, 2000. Records show that petitioner
was able to receive the amount of P63,185,959.73 as informer’s fee for the first claim on April 19,
2006.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is the
proper remedy for petitioner’s second claim on the informer’s reward.
RULING:
NO. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue
to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. In Star Special
Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa City, a case cited at length by petitioner
himself, the Court elucidated on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this wise:
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
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official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted
to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ
is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of
a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the
quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his
duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the
absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom
the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required. x x x x
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being
invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure
and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus
is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the
grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
It bears reiteration that the writ of mandamus may only issue if the party claiming it has a well-
defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded, and that it was the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required to accord the same upon him. Petitioner’s prayer for the
issuance of the NCA to cover the amount of his second claim falls short of this standard, there being
no clear and specific duty on the part of the respondent to issue the same.
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN,

REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE
GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners, -versus- SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY
LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 227757, EN BANC, July 25, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
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from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus
is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure
is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act to be compelled.
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs
sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor
Leader Rep. Fariñas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Fariñas then articulated that: (a) all those who
vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other candidates shall
belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the
Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. Thereafter, the
election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without any objection from any member of Congress,
including herein petitioners. Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House is the essential and
formative step conducted at the first regular session of the 17th Congress to determine the constituency
of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their respective leaders), considering that the Majority would
be comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not. The
unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1 dated July 25, 2016,
which, based on case law, is conclusive as to what transpired in Congress.
FACTS:
The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news
articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative
minority" in the House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself
in Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the
majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority
Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to
feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader.
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before
the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the
winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall
belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of
the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority.
Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker]
Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one
[(l)] registering a no vote," thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who
garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the
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Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However,
despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such.
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon),
manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez
(including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.
Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the recognition of
Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that
various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep.
Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the
Minority was irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of
Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent members of
the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the Minority. However, Rep. Lagman's opposition
was overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be
recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where
the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to said
Minority Leader position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the
House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of the
government. In the same vein, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez
and Majority Leader Farinas contends, inter alia, that the election of Minority Leader is within the
exclusive realm of the House of Representatives, which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant to the
principle of separation of powers, as well as the political question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues
that the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House Minority Leader was not tainted with any violation
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep.
Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only
legitimate members of the House Minority.
RULING:
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the
reliefs sought.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
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Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the House of Representatives had
effectively adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the membership of the
Minority, as well as the process of determining who the Minority Leader would be. More significantly,
this demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement
to the reliefs sought before this Court, namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of automatically
awarding the Minority Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep.
Baguilat; and (b) the rule that those who abstained in the Speakership Elections should be deemed as
independent Members of the House of Representatives, and thus, they could not have voted for a
Minority Leader in the person of Rep. Suarez. As will be explained hereunder, the deviation by the
Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by
a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote
of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to
have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives
the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules,
unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts,
for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of
a majority [of the House of Representatives]. " Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority
to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
[C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the
internal workings of the [House of Representatives]."
However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-
pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this
case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government
which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule
otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach
of the separation of powers doctrine. Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only]
because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself."
GENPACT SERVICES, Petitioner, -versus- MARIA KATRINA SANTOSFALCESO, JANICE ANN

MENDOZA, and JEFFREY MARIANO, Respondents.
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G.R. NO. 227695, FIRST DIVISION, July 31, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for
the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
This notwithstanding, in Carpio Morales v. CA, the foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such
as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are attendant in this
case. In the NLRC decision, it stated that, “No further motion of similar import shall be entertained.”
Otherwise worded, it explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain any
further motions for reconsideration. Hence, this circumstance gave petitioners the impression that
moving for reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal's
aforesaid warning. The tenor of such warming effectively deprived petitioners of their opportunity to
file such motion in this case, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process.
FACTS:
Genpact is engaged in business process outsourcing and is servicing Allstate Insurance Company
(Allstate). Genpact hired respondents to various positions to service its Allstate account. However,
Allstate ended its account with Genpact, resulting in respondents being eventually terminated.
Hence, the respondents filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
for illegal dismissal against Genpact. It alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with
Genpact, they were initially placed on “benching” status with pay, and after five (5) months, Genpact
gave them the option to either "voluntarily resign" or to "be involuntarily terminated on the ground
of redundancy" with severance pay of one-half month basic salary for every year of service.
Respondents chose the latter and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any
monetary benefit. The respondents contended that the termination of Genpact and Allstate’s
agreement neither amounted to a closure of business nor justified their retrenchment.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The termination was due to the
untimely cessation of the operations of Allstate. Genpact tried to remedy the situation by assigning
the respondents to other accounts, but such efforts proved futile as the respondents were hired to
specifically match the needs of Allstate. This was affirmed by the NLRC. The NLRC resolution
explicitly stated that, “No further motion of similar import shall be entertained.”
207 of 306
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), which was dismissed due
to the petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating the
case to the CA. This is a fatal infirmity which rendered their petition dismissible.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by petitioners based on
procedural grounds
RULING:
NO. Petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion for reconsideration may still be
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, this rule
admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
In this case, (d) and (e) are attendant. In the NLRC decision, it stated that, “No further motion of
similar import shall be entertained.” Otherwise worded, it explicitly warns the litigating parties that
the NLRC shall no longer entertain any further motions for reconsideration. Hence, this circumstance
gave petitioners the impression that moving for reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an
exercise in futility in light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning. The tenor of such warming effectively
deprived petitioners of their opportunity to file such motion in this case, thus, constituting a violation
of their right to due process.
UNITED INTERIOR MANGGAHAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, represented by its President,

DANIEL CALILUNG, Petitioner, -versus- HON. AMBROSIO B. DE LUNA, Presiding Judge,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY - BRANCH 51, SPOUSES
EDILBERTO VILLON and HELEN PEVILLON, represented by their heirs namely: EMEE
PEVILLON, EMMANUEL PEVILLON, ELSIE VILLONCABRERA, ELMA VILLONAUSTRIA, and
ELLEN FERRERO, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 216788, SECOND DIVISION, November 20, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
208 of 306
It should be observed that while strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been the long
standing policy of the courts, it is not without exception as the Court possesses full discretionary power
to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it. In Valmores v. Achacoso,
a direct resort to the Court is allowed when the questions involved are dictated by public welfare and
the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice.
In this case, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, once an appeal
is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction all over the judgment and the action in which it is
rendered so far as the rights of the parties under the judgment are concerned. Thus, it has no power to
do anything which affects the substantial rights of the parties therein. The Court disagrees. Under
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, "[i]n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties. In fact, under Section 13 of the same Rules, the trial court, prior to the transmittal of
the original record or record on appeal, may, motu propio or on motion, order the dismissal of the appeal
on the grounds specified therein. In other words, the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not
automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, since the appeal is deemed perfected as to the
appellant only; it is not "deemed perfected," for purposes of divesting the court of its jurisdiction, "before
the expiration of the period to appeal of the other parties."
Thus, contrary to petitioner's position, the RTC has yet to lose its jurisdiction over the case when it filed
its Notice of Appeal as respondents' period to appeal had not yet expired by then.
FACTS:
Petitioner, as represented by its President, Daniel Calilung, filed before the RTC a complaint for
Specific Performance against respondents. After petitioner rested its case, the respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence which the RTC granted, thereby dismissing the
petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration but was denied. Hence, petitioner
filed a notice of appeal. The respondents filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Appeal and Issue
Certificate of Finality, claiming that petitioner failed to attach a board resolution authorizing Calilung
to file the Notice of Appeal on its behalf, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9904, and
did not show proof of payment of the required appeal fees.
The RTC ordered the Notice of Appeal, expunged from the records “for lack of authority from its
Board of Directors to initiate the appeal.” Petitioner sought reconsideration, attaching therewith a
copy of a Board Resolution, confirming Calilung’s authority to represent the petitioner. The motion
for reconsideration was denied on the same ground, adding that petitioner failed to present proof
that the required docket and other court fees were paid. Hence, petitioner filed the present certiorari
petition against the respondents.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in expunging petitioner’s Notice of Appeal from
the records of the case
RULING
YES. First, the petitioner’s resort to a certiorari petition is proper. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from, among others, an order disallowing or dismissing
an appeal; the aggrieved party may, however, file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
209 of 306
Here, the assailed order - expunging petitioner's Notice of Appeal from the records of the case- is an
order disallowing an appeal that precludes resort to an appeal. Hence, the only recourse is via the
certiorari action.
Second, while strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been the long standing policy of
the courts, it is not without exception as the Court possesses full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it. A direct resort to the Court is
allowed when the questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, as in this case.
Proceeding to the main issue, under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in appeals by notice of
appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. The mere filing of a notice of appeal does
not automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, since the appeal is deemed perfected as to
the appellant only; it is not "deemed perfected," for purposes of divesting the court of its jurisdiction,
"before the expiration of the period to appeal of the other parties.” Thus, the RTC has yet to lose its
jurisdiction over the case when it filed its Notice of Appeal as respondents' period to appeal had not
yet expired by then.
Notwithstanding such, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
expunged from the records petitioner's Notice of Appeal. Under the Rules, an appeal from cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be made to the Court of Appeals by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment, and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. The appeal shall be taken, with the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees paid, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Based on such, a board resolution authorizing the representative to initiate the appeal is not
required for the purpose of filing a notice of appeal. This is because a notice of appeal is not a pleading,
initiatory or otherwise, that, when required by the law of the rules, must contain, a verification and
certification against forum shopping to be signed by the party or his/her representative, and, in the
case of a representative, proof os his/her identity to file the action, i.e., a secretary’s certificate with
copy of the Board Resolution. Besides, if only to put to rest any doubts anent respondents' objection
against Calilung's authority to represent petitioner in the case, the latter in fact submitted a copy of
a Board Resolution, with its Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, when the RTC in this case expunged petitioner's Notice of Appeal for lack of authority from
petitioner's Board of Directors to initiate the appeal, it not only effectively expanded the procedural
requirements for initiating an appeal; more than anything, it effectively deprived petitioner of further
recourse to the higher courts by asking for the submission of documents which neither the law nor
the Rules and jurisprudence require.
3. Exceptions to filing of motion for reconsideration before filing petition

F. Quo warranto (Rule 66)
G. Expropriation
1. Rule 67
2. Guidelines for expropriation proceedings of National Government
Infrastructure Projects (Sec. 4, RA 8974)
H. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage
1. Judicial foreclosure (Rule 68)
210 of 306
2. Extrajudicial foreclosure (Act 3135, as amended)
SPOUSES RODOLFO AND MARCELINA GUEVARRA v. THE COMMONER LENDING

CORPORATION, INC.
G.R. No. 204672 | February 18, 2015
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
In an extra-judicial foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent, the mortgagor may
redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure if the land is mortgaged to a rural
bank under Republic Act No. (RA) 720, as amended, otherwise known as the Rural Banks Act, or within
one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale if the land is mortgaged to parties other than
rural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may
still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the aforementioned redemption
period.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Sps. Guevarra obtained a loan from TCLC, which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel
of land emanating from a free patent granted to Sps. Guevarra. Sps. Guevarra, however, defaulted in
the payment of their loan, prompting TCLC to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage on the subject
property in accordance with Act No. 3135 as amended. In the process, TCLC emerged as the highest
bidder at the public auction sale. the certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Iloilo. Eventually, Sps. Guevarra failed to redeem the subject property within the one-year
reglementary period, which led to the cancellation of Title of the spouses in favor of TCLC. Thereafter,
TCLC demanded that Sps. Guevarra vacate the property, but to no avail.
TCLC applied for a writ of possession before the RTC. It recognized Sps. Guevarra’s right to
repurchase the subject property, pointing out that they were able to file their petition within the five-
year period provided under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The CA affirmed the RTC. It
ruled that after the expiration of the redemption period, the present owner, i.e., TCLC, has the
discretion to set a higher price. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Sps. Guevarra has a right to repurchase the lot
2. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the repurchase price for the
subject property should be fixed by TCLC.
RULING:
1. Yes. In an extra-judicial foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent, the mortgagor
may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure if the land is mortgaged
to a rural bank under Republic Act No. (RA) 720, as amended, otherwise known as the Rural Banks
Act, or within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale if the land is mortgaged to
parties other than rural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right,
211 of 306
he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the
aforementioned redemption period.
In this case, the subject property was mortgaged to and foreclosed by TCLC, which is a lending or
credit institution, and not a rural bank; hence, the redemption period is one (1) year from the
registration of the certificate of sale on August 25, 2000, or until August 25, 2001. Given that Sps.
Guevarra failed to redeem the subject property within the aforestated redemption period, TCLC was
entitled, as a matter of right, to consolidate its ownership and to possess the same. Nonetheless, such
right should not negate Sps. Guevarra’s right to repurchase said property within five (5) years from
the expiration of the redemption period on August 25, 2001, or until August 25, 2006, in view of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
2. Sps. Guevarrainsist that the repurchase price should be the purchase price at the auction sale plus
interest of one percent (1%) per month and other assessment fees. On the other hand, TCLC
maintains that it is entitled to its total claims under the promissory note and the mortgage contract
in accordance with Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000.
TCLC’s argument is partly correct. Redemptions from lending or credit institutions, like TCLC, are
governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act. An action to foreclose must be limited to the
amount mentioned in the mortgage. Hence, amounts not stated therein must be excluded, like the
penalty charges of three percent (3%) per month included in TCLC’s claim.
VASHDEO GAGOOMAL, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES RAMON AND NATIVIDAD VILLACORTA,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 192813, THIRD DIVISION, January 18, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any third person is
mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man's indebtedness, such person has all the right to
challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Here, the writ of
possession was granted and enforced against the subject property, over which the respondents — third
parties to Civil Case No. 67381 — claim an adverse interest.
FACTS:
Albert Zeñ arosa was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Ayala Alabang Village covered
by TCT No. 170213. He mortgaged the same in favor of BPI Family Savings Bank which was duly
annotated on the title on June 1990. Subsequently, Zeñ arosa obtained another loan in the amount of
$300,000.00 from RAM Holdings Corporation, secured by a second mortgage over the same property
and a Promissory Note. The parties also executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated March 2, 1995
whereby Zeñ arosa, through an Irrevocable SPA, authorized RAM, to sell the subject property in case
of his failure to pay.
212 of 306
Zeñ arosa failed to settle his obligations prompting RAM to file a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with damages against him and BPI before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 67381). RAM also
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 170213 on June 1999. Pending Civil Case,
Zeñ arosa failed to pay his obligation to BPI resulting in the foreclosure of the subject property. The
certificate of sale was annotated on TCT No. 170213 on March 2000. Meanwhile, RAM sold its rights
and interests over the subject property to New Summit International, Inc., represented by its
President, Vashdeo Gagoomal. The assignment was annotated on TCT No. 170213 on October 2000.
On August 2002, one Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with
application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Zeñ arosa before the RTC of Makati City(Civil
Case No. 02-1038). The writ was issued on September 20, 2002, pursuant to which the Sheriff
attached the subject property and such lien was annotated on the TCT on September 2002. Zeñ arosa
redeemed the foreclosed property from BPI on March 23, 2003. Thereafter, he sold the property to a
certain Patricia Tan in whose favor TCT No. 10206 was issued on April 4, 2003. The annotations of
the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case, as well as the notice of levy on attachment, were carried over
to her title.
In the meantime, Lorenzo obtained a favorable decision which had become final and executory. A
notice of levy and execution on the subject attached property was issued and annotated on the title.
On January 15, 2004, the property was sold at public auction to Lorenzo for P9M and the Certificate
of Sale was annotated on TCT No. 10206 on January 30, 2004, giving Zeñ arosa until January 29, 2005
within which to redeem the property. Subsequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of RAM for
the collection of the sum of money suit. RAM filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which was
granted. On December 14, 2004, the property subject of notice of lis pendens was sold at public
auction to petitioner, the successor-in-interest of RAM, for P19.8M. The certificate of sale was
annotated on Tan's TCT No. 10206 on December 17, 2004.
On January 29, 2005, in view of Zeñ arosa's failure to redeem the property from Lorenzo, the title over
the subject property was consolidated in the latter's name. A writ of possession was issued in favor
of Lorenzo, who subsequently sold the property to Natividad Villacorta for P6M. Immediately after
purchasing the property, respondents took possession thereof.
Meanwhile, Zeñ arosa's appeal was dismissed, and the decision in favor of RAM became final and
executory on October 7, 2005. With a sale annotated in its favor, and without Zeñ arosa exercising his
right of redemption, a final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner, the successor-in-interest of
RAM, on December 14, 2005. By virtue of a writ of possession issued by the RTC on February 1, 2007
in Civil Case No. 67381, petitioner divested the respondents of possession of the disputed property.
The foregoing developments prompted the respondents to file a Motion to Quash Writ of Possession
in Civil Case No. 67381 before the RTC of Pasig City on March 20, 2007. The RTC of Pasig City, issued
an Order denying respondents' Motion to Quash Writ of Possession. It also directed the Registry of
Deeds of Muntinlupa City to issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner
Gagoomal.
213 of 306
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief before the CA,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in directing the "transfer of title over the
subject property" to petitioner; in denying their motion to quash the writ of possession; and in
refusing to restore to them the possession of the subject property. CA granted respondents' petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in granting the respondent’s petition. (NO)
RULING:
A writ of possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession
of a real or personal property. A writ of possession may be issued under any of the following
instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (b) judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118. In this case, the writ of possession was issued
and executed in favor of petitioner under the foregoing provision. However, a punctilious review of
the records will show that its grant and enforcement against the subject property, over which the
respondents — third parties to Civil Case No. 67381 — claim an adverse interest, are devoid of legal
basis.
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any third person is
mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man's indebtedness, such person has all the right to
challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16,
Rule 39 thereof specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either
terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not
belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to vindicate their
claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, "a person other than
the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim."
In the present case, respondents filed a motion to quash the writ of possession substantiating their
preferential rights over the subject property which they had purchased from Lorenzo. As earlier
stated, Lorenzo, in Civil Case No. 02-1038, caused the annotation of a writ of preliminary attachment
on September 30, 2002 and thereafter, a notice of levy and execution, finally acquiring the property
in a public auction sale on January 30, 2004. Similarly, respondents have instituted a separate civil
action for quieting of title and recovery of property before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276,
docketed as Civil Case No. 08-011. Petitioner's argument that he acquired a superior right over the
subject property by virtue of the earlier annotation of a notice of lis pendens on June 11, 1999 by his
predecessor-in-interest RAM on the same title cannot be given credence.
214 of 306
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the
defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or
otherwise, of the property subject of the litigation to the judgment that the court will subsequently
promulgate. Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and effective when it affects title over or right
of possession of a real property.
In this case, it cannot be denied that Civil Case No. 67381, which RAM, predecessor-in-interest of
petitioner, instituted against Zeñ arosa was for collection of sum of money with damages — a purely
personal action. Hence, the notice of lis pendens in favor of RAM annotated on the cancelled TCT No.
170213 and carried over to Tan's TCT No. 10206 conferred upon it no rights over the subject
property and, as a necessary consequence, upon petitioner, its successor-in-interest.
Accordingly, petitioner has not created a superior right over the subject property as against
respondents by reason of the prior annotation in 1999 of the notice of lis pendens by his predecessor
RAM. Hence, the subsequent levy on execution on October 14, 2004 arising from the final money
judgment in favor of petitioner cannot prevail over the earlier annotated attachment made by
Lorenzo on September 30, 2002 and its subsequent notice of levy on execution and sale of the
property to respondents on January 30, 2004, who then took possession. On October 14, 2004, what
petitioner merely levied upon on execution was the remaining redemption rights of Zeñ arosa until
January 29, 2005 which period expired without any redemption having been made. Consequently,
the writ of possession issued as a result of a wrongful execution was not proper and cannot be
enforced against the respondents who are third parties in possession of and claiming an adverse
interest on the property in controversy.
It bears to stress that the court issuing the writ of execution may enforce its authority only over
properties or rights of the judgment debtor, and the sheriff acts properly only when he subjects to
execution property undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor. Should the sheriff levy upon the
assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has not even the remotest interest, then he is
acting beyond the limits of his authority. A judgment can only be executed or issued against a party
to the action, not against one who has not yet had his day in court. Neither can We affirm petitioner's
contention that in seeking the quashal of the writ of possession, the respondents were, in effect,
asking the RTC to abrogate its decision, which had already attained finality. As correctly observed by
the CA, the quashal of a writ of possession does not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the
judgment of the RTC. "The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to
correct clerical errors or mistakes — all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and
laid to rest." To reiterate, however, the court's power with regard to execution of judgments extends
only to properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor, which does not obtain in this case.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the writ of possession had already been enforced and can no
longer be quashed deserves scant consideration. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory
215 of 306
control over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it the right to determine
every question which may be invariably involved in the execution. Respondents invoked this
supervisory power when they sought the quashal of the writ of possession.
RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., Petitioner, -versus- GERRY CENTENO,
Respondent.
After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property,
the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point,
the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property
is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor. Here, the RTC had
already passed upon petitioner's title over the subject lots during the course of the proceedings.
Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been established for the purpose of issuing a writ
of possession.
FACTS:
Spouses Gregorio and Rosario Centeno (Sps. Centeno) were the previous owners of the subject lots.
During that time, they mortgaged the foregoing properties in favor of petitioner Rural Bank of Sta.
Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. as security for a P1,753.65 loan. Sps. Centeno, however, defaulted on the loan,
prompting petitioner to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said mortgage. Consequently, the
subject lots were sold to petitioner being the highest bidder at the auction sale. On October 10, 1969,
it obtained a Certificate of Sale at Public Auction which was later registered with the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo City on December 13, 1971.
Sps. Centeno failed to redeem the subject lots within the one (1) year redemption period pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 3135. Nonetheless, they still continued with the possession and cultivation of the
aforesaid properties. Sometime in 1983, respondent Gerry Centeno, son of Sps. Centeno, took over
the cultivation of the same. On March 14, 1988, he purchased the said lots from his parents.
Accordingly, Rosario Centeno paid the capital gains taxes on the sale transaction and tax declarations
were eventually issued in the name of respondent. While the latter was in possession of the subject
lots, petitioner secured on November 25, 1997 a Final Deed of Sale thereof and in 1998, was able to
obtain the corresponding tax declarations in its name.
On March 19, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC,
claiming entitlement to the said writ by virtue of the Final Deed of Sale covering the subject lots.
Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he purchased and has, in fact, been in actual, open
and exclusive possession of the same properties for at least fifteen (15) years. He further averred that
the foreclosure sale was null and void owing to the forged signatures in the real estate mortgage.
Moreover, he claims that petitioner's rights over the subject lots had already prescribed. The RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioner, the CA reversed the RTC decision.
216 of 306
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession over the subject lots. (YES)
RULING:
It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right
of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and
proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial
function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse
to that of the mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which partly provides:
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted
to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the
time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner
by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor. On the other hand, the phrase "a third party who is actually holding the property adversely
to the judgment obligor" contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural
tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the
successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.
On the issue regarding the identity of the lots as raised by respondent in his Comment, records show
that the RTC had already passed upon petitioner's title over the subject lots during the course of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been established for the purpose
of issuing a writ of possession. It is hornbook principle that absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are binding and
conclusive upon the Court, as in this case.
Finally, anent the issue of laches, it must be maintained that the instant case only revolves around
the issuance of a writ of possession which is merely ministerial on the RTC's part as above-explained.
As such, all defenses which respondent may raise including that of laches should be ventilated
through a proper proceeding. Hence, the petitioner is the lawful owner in this case.
217 of 306
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ and ANITA J. MARQUEZ, Petitioners, -versus- SPOUSES
CARLITO ALINDOG and CARMEN ALINDOG, Respondents.
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. After the
consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ
of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
is merely a ministerial function.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already
consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. The
general rule as herein stated – and not the exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules –
should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the subject property on their purported purchase
of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor).
Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez)
successors-in-interest who do not have a right superior to them. Therefore, the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property.
FACTS:
Anita Marquez extended a loan to a certain Benjamin Gutierrez. As security therefor, Gutierrez
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in Tagaytay City. The mortgage was
duly annotated on the dorsal portion, which Spouses Marquez had verified as clean prior to the
mortgage. Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the subject property. Anita emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction
sale. Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property within the prescribed period therefor, the
title was consolidated in the same of Spouses Marquez which, however, bore an annotation of adverse
claim in the names of Spouses Alindog. Said adverse annotation was copied from an earlier
annotation made only after the subject property’s mortgage to Spouses Marquez.
Spouses Alindog filed a civil case for annulment of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale on the
groud that they purchased the subject property from Gutierrez way back 1989 but was unable to
secure a certificate of title in their names due to deception of a certain Agripina Gonzales. They
eventually found out that the property had already been mortgaged to Spouses Marquez. Meanwhile,
Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession claiming that the same is
ministerial on the part of the court following the consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the
subject property. This was granted by the RTC and Spouses Alindog was served with a notice to
vacate.
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After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Spouses Marquez from taking possession of the subject property. RTC’s appreciated the
initial evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog, concluding that they appear to have a right to be protected.
Thus, notwithstanding the consolidation of Sps. Marquez’s title over the subject property, the RTC
granted Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief, holding that any further dispossession on their
part would cause them irreparable injury.
CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part when it
issued the injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property.
It observed that Sps. Alindog had indeed "adduced prima facie proof of their right to possess the
subject property" while the annulment case was pending, adding that the latter’s "right to remain in
possession" proceeds from the fact of the subject property’s earlier sale to them.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued
the injunctive writ. (YES)
RULING:
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. The issuance
of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation
of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a
ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in
connection with such issuance is misplaced.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had
already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in
nature. The general rule as herein stated – and not the exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the subject property on their
purported purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being
the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the
latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do not have a right superior to them.
That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its discretion when it issued the injunctive writ which
enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property. To be sure, grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez,
it defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting
Sps. Alindog's prayer for injunctive relief. The RTC's finding anent the initial evidence adduced by
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Sps. Alindog constitutes improper basis to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
in their favor since, in the first place, it had no authority to exercise any discretion in this respect.
AQA GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner , v s . PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK,

Respondent
G.R. NO. 211649, FIRST DIVISION, August 12, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
JE-AN SUPREME BUILDERS AND SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner , vs.PLANTERS

DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent
G.R. NO. 211742, FIRST DIVISION, August 12, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial court to issue a writ of possession. The exception,
however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, 37 which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial
foreclosures of real estate mortgages. In this case, the Supreme Court said that Je-An's claimed
ownership over the subject properties is mere inchoate right, and corollarily, the enforcement of the writ
of possession cannot also be stayed in favor of AQA which merely derived its possession from Je-An
through an unregistered contract of lease.
FACTS:
Kwong-on Trading Corporation (KTC) obtained a loan from the Planters Development Bank
(Plantersbank) secured with a mortgage over 19 parcels of land situated in San Juan, Manila. When
KTC defaulted in its payment, Plantersbank extrajudicially forclosed the mortgaged properties. As
the highest bidder during the public auction, the subject properties were then issued in the name of
Plantersbank. Thereafter, a writ of possession was issued together with a Notice to Vacate to AQA
Global Construction, Inc. (AQA), which occupied the subject properties at the time.
AQA filed a Manifestation and Motion before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking leave of court to
intervene in the case and to be excluded from the implementation of the writ of possession, claiming
that its possession: (a) was adverse to that of KTC; and (b) stemmed from a ten (10) year contract of
lease commencing on March 10, 2009, with Je-an Supreme Builders and Sales Corporation (Je-An),
which had bought the subject property from Little Giant Realty Corporation (Little Giant), the
registered owner of the subject properties.
On the other hand, Je-An filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim to stay the implementation of the writ
of possession, alleging that its right to possess the subject properties was: (a) separate and distinct
from that of KTC; 17 and (b) derived from a Contract to Sell dated January 15, 2003 (January 15, 2003
Contract to Sell) executed by Little Giant.
The RTC issued an order excluding AQA and Je-An from the implementation of the writ of possession
in favor of Plantersbank, ruling that they are third parties which did not derive title from KTC. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by Plantersbank but the same was denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in staying the
implementation of the writ of possession against AQA and Je-An. It held that when a writ of
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possession had already been issued, the adverse third party seeking to vindicate its claim of
ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed properties may avail of the cumulative remedies
of: (a) terceria to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not
belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor; and (b) an independent separate action. The CA further
held that third parties cannot intervene in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
AQA and Je-An separately moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in staying the
implementation of the writ of possession against AQA and Je-An.
RULING
NO. In the issuance of a writ of possession, the general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption
period, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
who is entitled to the possession of the said property. Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon
the trial court to issue the writ of possession in his favor. The exception, however, is provided under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, 37 which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real
estate mortgages. Under the said provision of law, the possession of the mortgaged property may be
awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor.
In this case, the Supreme Court said that Je-An's claimed ownership over the subject properties is
mere inchoate right, and corollarily, the enforcement of the writ of possession cannot also be stayed
in favor of AQA which merely derived its possession from Je-An through an unregistered contract of
lease.
Ultimately, Je-An and AQA cannot be considered third parties holding the subject properties
adversely to KTC, the defaulting debtor-mortgagor. Resultantly, the general rule, and not the
exception, applies to the instant petitions, rendering it the mandatory and ministerial duty of the RTC
to issue the writ of possession in favor of Plantersbank as the confirmed owner, and of the Sheriff to
implement the said writ.
3. The General Banking Law of 2000 (Sec. 47, RA 8791)

I. Partition (Rule 69)
J. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
1. Differentiated from accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria
2. Rule 70
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now Known As TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND

ENTERPRISE ZONE AUTHORITY), Petitioner, -versus- MARCOSA A. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL,
PEDRO TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, AND ROMEO TAPALES, Respondents.
221 of 306
Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily
imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. Here, petitioner's supposed failure to describe in
detail the manner of respondents' entry into the subject property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence
states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor as petitioner had
sufficiently demonstrated would necessarily imply the use of force.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (petitioner) is the owner of the subject property and other
parcels of land located in Brgy. Basdiot, Moalboal, Cebu since February 12, 1981 when it bought the
same from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings, Inc. (Tri-Island). It had then been in actual, physical,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property and had declared the same for
taxation purposes. Sometime in 1997, however, respondents Pedro Tapales, Luis Tapales, Romeo
Tapales (Tapaleses), and Sabandal-Herzenstiel (respondents) by force, strategy and stealth entered
into the 2,940 square meter portion of the subject property, on which they proceeded to cut down
some coconut trees, introduced improvements and fenced the area. Petitioner made demands to
vacate, the last of which was through a letter dated January 5, 1998, which respondents ignored,
prompting the filing of a forcible entry complaint against them before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Moalboal-Alcantara-Badian-Alegria, Cebu (MCTC), on March 18, 1998.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Tapaleses acknowledged that the subject property had
already been sold by its administrator, Josefina Abrenica, to Tri-Island. They, however, claimed that
the sale was tainted with force and intimidation and hence void, including the subsequent
transactions covering the same property. Notwithstanding the sale, they remained in actual and
physical possession of the subject property and even introduced improvements thereon.
Consequently, absent any proof of prior possession on the part of petitioner, they claimed that the
forcible entry complaint must necessarily be dismissed.
MCTC declared that petitioner is the lawful owner of the subject property and had been in prior
possession and ordered respondents to vacate the same. RTC dismissed the respondent’s appeal for
their failure to file a memorandum on appeal as required under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court.
CA nullified and set aside both the ruling of MCTC and RTC. It declared that while the RTC correctly
dismissed respondents' appeal for failure to submit their memorandum on appeal within the
prescribed period, it should have relaxed the rules on procedure in the interest of substantial justice
and for a full determination of the rights of the parties taking into account the subsequent compliance
of the respondents. On the merits, the CA found petitioner to have failed to establish prior possession
of the subject property and rebut respondents' claim of continued physical possession in spite of the
sale of the subject property to Tri-Island during which, Sabandal-Herzenstiel leased and converted
the property into a resort.
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ISSUE:
Whether respondents may be lawfully ejected from the subject property. (YES)
RULING:
In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the disputed
property and that the defendant deprived him of his possession by any of the means provided for in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. In this case,
respondents failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject property after its
sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their answer to the
complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting caretakers and leasing
portions thereof to third persons. Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession. Thus, finding petitioner's assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC properly adjudged
petitioner to have prior possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who
never claimed ownership or possession thereof.
Petitioner's supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of respondents' entry into the subject
property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the
exclusion of the lawful possessor as petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated would necessarily
imply the use of force. Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior
possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to
constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary.
The foundation of a possessory action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a
person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth"
include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property
and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. It has been held that the acts of
unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the
prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. The Court upholds the findings and
conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging petitioner to be the lawful possessor of the subject property,
square as they are with existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, the CA's ruling on the merits
must perforce be reversed and set aside.
REMEDIOS M. MAULEON, Petitioner, -versus- LOLINA MORAN PORTER, Respondent.

GR No. 203288, SECOND DIVISION, July 18, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the immediate execution of judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a
supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation for the use
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and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal. These requirements are
mandatory and concurrent, without which execution will issue as a matter of right.
In this case, it is evident that petitioner failed to interpose an appeal from the MeTC Decision rendering
the same final and executory. Hence, the Order granting its execution was properly issued.
FACTS:
Lolina Moran Porter filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. During the preliminary
conference, petitioner failed to appear, despite notice. Thus, Moran moved for the rendition of
judgment pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, which
the MeTC granted. Thereafter, the MeTC rendered a Decision against petitioner.
Instead of appealing the aforesaid MeTC Decision, petitioner filed a "Most Very Urgent Manifestation
with Omnibus Motion to Reconsider the Order, to Suspend the Proceedings and/or to Dismiss the
Case". On the other hand, respondent filed a motion for execution of the MeTC Decision, which she
claimed to have attained finality. Petitioner's motions were denied, while respondent's motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution was granted.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
RTC, seeking the nullification of the MeTC Decision as well as the August 18, 2009 Order granting its
execution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, hinged on the following arguments: (a) the MeTC Decision and the Order were issued
with undue haste in violation of petitioner's right to due process; (b) her motion for postponement
of the March 27, 2009 hearing deserved consideration; (c) she is not bound by the reckless or gross
negligence of her counsel;[ and (d) the pending annulment of documents and reconveyance case was
determinative of the ejectment case.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s finding that no grave abuse of discretion attended the
issuance of the MeTC Decision and the August 18, 2009 Order directing its execution. (NO)
RULING:
Records show that during the scheduled preliminary conference, petitioner and her counsel failed to
appear despite notice. Hence, the MeTC was justified in granting respondent's motion to render
judgment in the ejectment case pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
The use of the word "shall" in the said provisions makes the attendance of the parties in the
preliminary conference mandatory, and non-appearance thereat is excusable only when the party
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offers a justifiable cause for his failure to attend. The petitioner in this case, however, failed in this
respect.
It is undisputed that petitioner's counsel filed an urgent motion to postpone the hearing on the same
date and only after the MeTC judge had already granted respondent's motion for rendition of
judgment. As such, the MeTC properly declared that the aforesaid motion deserves scant
consideration and, in fact, should not even be received considering the three (3)-day notice rule on
motions stated in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Similarly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against the MeTC in issuing the Order
directing the execution of its Decision. Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the
immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed
if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or
other reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the
pendency of the appeal. These requirements are mandatory and concurrent, without which execution
will issue as a matter of right.
In this case, it is evident that petitioner failed to interpose an appeal from the MeTC Decision
rendering the same final and executory. Hence, the Order granting its execution was properly issued.
It is settled that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable and unalterable.
By this principle of immutability of judgments, the Court is now precluded from further examining
the MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner’s perceived errors therein, i.e., that her
possession of the subject property was not by virtue of respondent’s tolerance, hence, the ejectment
complaint should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; and that the pending annulment of
documents and reconveyance case was prejudicial to the ejectment suit.
TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA, Petitioner, -versus- ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS, INC., Respondent.

In Zacarias v. Anacay, the Court discussed that inforder for an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the
plaintiff-lessor must show that: first, initially, the defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises
by virtue of a subsisting lease contract; second, such possession eventually became illegal, either due to
the latter's violation of the provisions of the said lease contract or the termination thereof; third, the
defendant-lessee remained in possession of the leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-
lessor enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and
that the suit is brought within one (1) year from the last demand.
In this case, the first, third, and fourth requisites have been indubitably complied with, considering that
at the time the suit was instituted on June 21, 2011: (a) there was a subsisting lease contract between
petitioner and respondent; (b) respondent was still in possession of the subject land; and (c) the case
was filed within one (1) year from petitioner's letter dated May 24, 2011 demanding that respondent
pay monthly rentals and at the same time, vacate the subject land. Thus, the crux of the controversy is
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whether or not the second requisite has been satisfied, that is, whether or not respondent violated the
terms and conditions of the lease contract, specifically with regard to the payment of monthly rentals.
FACTS:
On June 26, 2003, Teodorico A. Zaragoza (petitioner) bought a parcel of land located at Cabatuan,
Iloilo, from his parents, Florentino and Erlinda Zaragoza, and eventually, had the same registered
under his name. Petitioner claimed that unknown to him, his father leased a portion of subject land
to Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. (respondent), for a period of eight (8) years commencing on December
5, 2003 and renewable for another eight (8) years at the sole option of respondent. This
notwithstanding, petitioner allowed the lease to subsist and respondent had been diligent in paying
its monthly rent pursuant to the lease contract.
Petitioner claimed that when Florentino died, respondent stopped paying rent. On the other hand,
respondent maintained that it was willing to pay rent, but was uncertain as to whom payment should
be made as it received separate demands from Florentino's heirs, including petitioner. Thus,
respondent filed an interpleader case before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24 (RTC-
Br. 24). After due proceedings, RTC-Br. 24 issued: (a) dismissing the action for interpleader, but at
the same time, stating that respondent may avail of the remedy of consignation; and (b) reiterated
that respondent may consign the rental amounts with it in order to do away with unnecessary
expenses and delay. Pursuant thereto, respondent submitted a Consolidated Report and a
Manifestation and Notice informing petitioner that it had consigned the aggregate amount of
₱521,396.89 before RTC-Br. 24.
This notwithstanding, petitioner sent respondent a letter, stating that granting without conceding
the propriety of consignation, the same did not extinguish the latter's obligation to pay rent because
the amount consigned was insufficient to cover the unpaid rentals plus interests from February 2007
to May 2011 in the amount of ₱752,878. 72. As his demands went unheeded, petitioner filed a suit
for unlawful detainer against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, Branch
10 (MTCC) on June 21, 2011.
In its defense, respondent maintained, inter alia, that its consignation of rental amounts with RTC-
Br. 24 constituted compliance with the provisions of the lease contract concerning the monthly rental
payments. As such, petitioner has no cause of action against it, and accordingly, it cannot be ejected
from the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner could eject respondent from the subject land as the latter complied with
its obligation to pay monthly rent thru consignation?
RULING:
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YES. For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there
must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand
both to pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action
for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order
that said cause of action may be pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to establish
the cause of action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of
lease entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease
conditions alleged to have been violated.
In other words, for an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first,
initially, the defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease
contract; second, such possession eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation of the
provisions of the said lease contract or the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained
in possession of the leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment
thereof; and fourth, there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the suit is
brought within one (1) year from the last demand.
In this case, the first, third, and fourth requisites have been indubitably complied with, considering
that at the time the suit was instituted on June 21, 2011: (a) there was a subsisting lease contract
between petitioner and respondent; (b) respondent was still in possession of the subject land; and
(c) the case was filed within one (1) year from petitioner's letter dated May 24, 2011 demanding that
respondent pay monthly rentals and at the same time, vacate the subject land. Thus, the crux of the
controversy is whether or not the second requisite has been satisfied, that is, whether or not
respondent violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract, specifically with regard to the
payment of monthly rentals.
It appears that even assuming arguendo that respondent's consignation of its monthly rentals with
RTC-Br. 24 was made in accordance with law, it still failed to comply with its obligation under the
lease contract to pay monthly rentals. It is apparent that at the time petitioner filed the unlawful
detainer suit on June 21, 2011, respondent was not updated in its monthly rental payments, as there
is no evidence of such payment for the months of April, May, and even June 2011. Irrefragably, said
omission constitutes a violation of the lease contract on the part of respondent.
Considering that all the requisites of a suit for unlawful detainer have been complied with, petitioner
is justified in ejecting respondent from the subject land.
K. Contempt (Rule 71)
VI. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Settlement of estate of deceased persons
1. Venue and process (Rule 73)
2. Summary settlement of estates (Rule 74)
3. Allowance or disallowance of wills (Rule 76)
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4. Claims against the estate (Rule 86)
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLAVIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG,

namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A. MAGLASANG,
GLENDA A. MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA A. · MAGLASANG, FE DORIS
A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A. MAGLASANG,MA. MILALIE A.
MAGLASANG, SALUD A. MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE A. MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE
ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE-NAMEDDECEASED PARENTS, Petitioners, -versus- MANILA
BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT SPV-
AMC, INC. FSAMI, Respondent.
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. In this
case, Manila Banking sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously
belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it
be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as the
heirs assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the
estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted
to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now
precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
FACTS:
Spouses Maglasang obtained a credit line from Manila Banking Corporation which was secured by a
real estate mortgage executed over seven of their properties. After Flaviano died intestate, his widow
Salud and their surviving children, appointed their brother Edgar Maglasang as their attorney-in-fact
and was subsequently granted and appointed by the CFI (probate court) as the administrator of
Flaviano’s estate. In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court issued a Notice
to Creditors for the filing of money claims against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, Manila Banking
notified the probate court of its claim.
The probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs executing an extra-judicial
partition of the properties of Flaviano’s estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate to Manila
Banking, however, remained unsatisfied. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the
rights of Manila Banking under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang,
specifically, its “right to foreclose the same within the statutory period.” In this light, Manila Banking
proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and
emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps.
Maglasang’s obligation prompting Manila Banking to file a suit to recover the deficiency amount
against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and the suriviving heirs.
The heirs assert that it is not Act No. 3135 but Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules which applies in this
case. The latter provision provides alternative and exclusive remedies for the satisfaction of Manila
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Banking’s claim against the estate of Flaviano. Corollarily, having filed its claim against the estate
during the intestate proceedings, the heirs argue that Manila Banking had effectively waived the
remedy of foreclosure and, even assuming that it still had the right to do so, it was precluded from
filing a suit for the recovery of the deficiency obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether the suit to recover the deficiency amount will prosper. (NO)
RULING:
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate.
Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules,
although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these
special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with
secured claims against the estate:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general
distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon
his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant,
and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or
the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security,
he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section;
or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any
time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets
of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator
from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is
held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for
the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.
In this case, Manila Banking sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third
option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against
the estate, as the heirs assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of
its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus,
having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7,
Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier
discussed.
5. Payment of the debts of the estate (Rule 88)
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6. Sales, mortgages, and other encumbrances of property of decedent (Rule 89)
7. Distribution and partition (Rule 90)
B. Escheat (Rule 91)
C. Guardianship
1. Venue (Rule 92)
2. Appointment of guardians (Rule 93)
3. General powers and duties of guardians (Rule 96)
4. Termination of guardianship (Rule 97)
D. Writ of habeas corpus
1. Rule 102
RUBEN E. TIU, Petitioner, -versus- HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ACTING CHAIRPERSON OF THE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, HON. FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention
is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the writ will not
issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
In this case, petitioner is serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the
offense of selling and delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15, Article III of
RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659. He failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer
lawful and that he is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS:
Petitioner and two others were found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of selling, delivering, and
giving away to a poseur-buyer methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu" a
regulated drug. Consequently, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the fine. Their conviction became final and executory.
The Board of Pardons and Parole recommended the grant of executive clemency to petitioner.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted him "conditional pardon without parole conditions," but
was, nonetheless, still "subject to the conditions indicated in the individual pardon papers. It turned
out, however, that no such papers were issued in petitioner's favor. Thus, petitioner repeatedly
requested for a certificate of conditional pardon without parole conditions from the Office of the
President, but said requests were denied.
In the meantime, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III signed into law Republic Act No., which,
subject to its provisions, would substantially increase the Good Conduct Time Allowance of qualified
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inmates. Petitioner's carpeta was returned to the Bureau of Corrections for the re-computation of his
time served.
Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus, insisting on the efficacy and
enforceability of his conditional pardon without parole conditions, which allegedly necessitates his
release from prison. He argues that, since he was granted a "colonist status" by then Director of
Corrections, his sentence was automatically reduced to thirty (30) years. Petitioner invokes Section
5 of RA 10592, which provides that the time allowances for good conduct once granted shall not be
revoked. He further proposes that RA 10592 be given retroactive effect in light of the liberal
construction provided for in the rules to favor detained or convicted prisoners like him.
ISSUE:
Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of petitioner. (NO)
RULING:
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the
writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record. The writ is denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex
merito justicias.
In this case, petitioner is serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the offense
of selling and delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15, Article III of RA
6425, as amended by RA 7659. He failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer
lawful and that he is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
It must be emphasized that pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated
officially to the court. The executive clemency extended by PGMA on June 3, 2010 to a number of
prisoners including petitioner was made "subject to the conditions indicated in the corresponding
documents." It is undisputed, however, that no individual pardon papers were issued in petitioner's
favour, thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and ineffective, as
clarified by Deputy Executive Secretary Aguinaldo.
2. Writ of habeas corpus in relation to custody of minors (A.M. No. 03-0404-SC)

E. Change of name (Rule 103)
F. Cancellation or Correction of entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108)
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME
IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner, -versus- REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211724, FIRST DIVISION, August 24, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the
petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an
entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other
persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
Petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he claims
that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate
compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations
renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.
FACTS:
For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However, when he
requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office, he was surprised to
discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a
Petition for Correction of Entry in his NSO birth certificate before the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan, Catanduanes and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela, former governor of the said province, and
Francisca B. Condeno, both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he
has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname
in all of his official and legal documents, including his school records from elementary to college,
certificate of Government Service Insurance System membership, government service records,
appointment as Provincial General Services Officer, report of rating in the First Grade Entrance
Examination of the Civil Service Commission, Philippine Passport, Marriage Contract, and Certificate
of Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his
birth certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes
showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.
The RTC granted the petition and accordingly, directed the Municipal Civil Registrar .of Pandan,
Catanduanes to cause the correction of entry of the facts of petitioner's birth by changing his surname
from "Condeno" to "Almojuela".However, considering that the Book of Births of the Municipal Civil
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Registrar of Pandan, Catanduanes reflects the name "Felipe Condeno" as petitioner's registered
name, the R TC ordered that the same be first corrected before the correction of entry in the records
of the NSO could be had.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and Order and held that although petitioner correctly
invoked Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in filing his petition, he, however, failed to strictly comply with
the requirements thereunder when he omitted to implead the Local Civil Registrar and his half-
siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for, as parties. Moreover, the CA also
found that the correction of entry sought by petitioner was not merely clerical in nature, but
necessarily involved a determination of his filiation.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth certificate on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. (NO)
RULING:
The Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the
petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may
be considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction
of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other
persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
Petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he claims
that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless
mandate compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due process and to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial
alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.
G. Clerical error law (RA 9048)
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. General matters
1. Criminal jurisdiction; concept and requisites for exercise
2. When injunction may be issued
B. Prosecution of offenses (Rule 110)
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, -versus- REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA.
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ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondent.
If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured
by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. Here, the accused petitioner has not yet been
arraigned. Hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying
the motion.
FACTS:
Karlo was charged under the Anti-VAWC law in RTC Pampanga. In 2009, he physically injured his
girlfriend and the RTC found probable cause and issued a warrant for his arrest. He posted bail and
filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and a motion to quash the information
averring that he is no longer in a relationship with the complainant, and that such information is
contrary to what the accused has admitted during the course of the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the information should be quashed because it is contrary to what has been admitted. (NO)
RULING:
The information should not be quashed.
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. Here,
the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned. Hence, the RTC was correct in directing the
amendment of the Information and in denying the motion.
CHRISTOPHER FIANZA A.K.A. "TOPEL", Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. NO. 218592, FIRST DIVISION, August 2, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In People v. Lomaque, the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any
of the following circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12)
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years of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex. On the other hand, in People
v. Baraga, Sexual abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 has three (3) elements:
(a) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child
is below eighteen (18) years old.
In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC, as well as the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that on two (2) occasions in July 2010 and on November
30, 2010, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and masturbate him. The only
point of dispute is with regard to the existence of the second element of sexual abuse, i.e., whether or
not the lascivious conduct was performed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
FACTS:
Fianza was charged with two (2) counts of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7160 under two (2) informations filed before the RTC. The RTC found Fianza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 2 counts of violation of RA 7160. It held that for an accused to be convicted of
child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years old, the requisites for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) must be met in addition to the
requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA 7160, which the prosecution was able to establish.
On appeal to the CA, it upheld Fianza’s conviction. The CA observed that while Fianza was charged
with violations of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 (sexual abuse), the proper appellation of the
crimes should be violations of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section
5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, and found that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for
both Acts of Lasciviousness and sexual abuse.
Fianza assails his conviction for the prosecution's failure: (a) to specify in the Information in the
Criminal Case the date of commission of the offense; and (b) to indicate in the information in both
cases that the complained acts were performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse in violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against him.
ISSUES
Whether the CA correctly upheld Fianza’s conviction?
RULING
YES. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which lays down the guidelines in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides that: “A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.” As to the
sufficiency of the allegation on the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Rules adds that, “It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.”
In People v. Lomaque, the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any
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of the following circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex. On the other hand, in People
v. Baraga, Sexual abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 has three (3) elements:
(a) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child
is below eighteen (18) years old.
In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC, as well as the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that on two (2) occasions in July 2010 and on November
30, 2010, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and masturbate him. The only
point of dispute is with regard to the existence of the second element of sexual abuse, i.e., whether or
not the lascivious conduct was performed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
By virtue of these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense,
it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action. In this case, Fianza had been fully apprised of the charges against him
since the Informations stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense to be "sometime
during the month of July 2010." Indeed, the precise date and time of the incidents are not among the
elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
Further, it is sufficient that the acts or omissions constituting the offense be stated in the information
in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, albeit in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged
and for the court to pronounce judgment. Here, the Informations not only referred to the specific
section of RA 7610 that was violated, but also stated that AAA was an 11 year old minor at the time
of the offense and Fianza committed lascivious conduct by forcing AAA to masturbate his penis. This
allegation was sufficient to apprise him of the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged
to enable him to prepare his defense.
C. Prosecution of civil action (Rule 111)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- ARIELLAYAG ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS, Respondent.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, death of the accused prior to his final conviction by the
Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his acts
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against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a
separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
FACTS:
In a Resolution, the Court adopted in toto the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding accused-
appellant Ariel Layag (Layag) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Qualified Rape by
Sexual Intercourse, two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness. Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the Resolution
had already become final and executory. However, the Court received a Letter from the Bureau of
Corrections informing us of the death of accused appellant on July 30, 2015, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Death.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court is constrained to reopen the case despite the finality
of the August 3, 2015 Resolution. In this case, Layag's death which occurred prior to the promulgation
of the Resolution dated August 3, 2015 - a matter which the Court was belatedly informed of - clearly
shows that there indeed exists a special or compelling circumstance warranting the re-examination
of the case despite its finality.
ISSUE:
Whether Layag’s death pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability ex delicto.
(YES).
RULING:
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Layag's death prior to his final conviction by the Court
renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
In People v. Egagamao, the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending
appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as
the civil liability, based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
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a)Law
b)Contracts
c)Quasi-contracts
d)xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a
separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct,
and independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both
as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling
in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing
whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Rimando of the crime of estafa through the use of
false manifestations and fraudulent representations. In her defense, Rimando denied the allegations.
Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 before the MTC. On July 7, 2010, Rimando was acquitted in the BP 22 cases on the ground
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of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or omission from which liability may arise does
not exist.
Subsequently, the RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps.
Aldaba. Aggrieved, Rimando appealed to the CA. In her Appellant’s Brief, she contended that her
acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba
from claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rimando may be held civilly liable in the estafa despite her acquittal and
exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases. (YES)
RULING:
Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to
private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict
may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him."
Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in the estafa case,
even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances. Jurisprudence even instructs that
the simultaneous filing of BP 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts
committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a
single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar there
will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of
elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of
information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
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adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double
recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused
cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as
in this instance.
D. Preliminary Investigation
1. Executive vs. judicial determination of probable cause
VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and

WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., Petitioner, -versus- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE
RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court,
Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND, Respondents.
A judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether
probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. Here, the RTC’s immediate dismissal,
as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed.
Certain essential facts – namely, (a) whether Desmond committed false representations that induced
Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether Desmond utilized the fund sinvested by Dio solely for
the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon – remain controverted. It
cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article315(2)(a) and
315(1)(b) of the RPC had already been established.
FACTS:
Petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio) was the majority stockholder of H.S.Equities, Ltd. (HS
Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to
respondent Desmond, the Chairman and CEO of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI),
and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc., the majority
shareholder of SBMEI. After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS
Equities, decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.00 in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine Park, a
theme park to be constructed at the Subic BayFreeport Zone. Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale,
invested another $1M in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach Hotel Project. Dio
claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s representations, SBMEI actually had no
capacity to deliver on its guarantees. Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent,
Desmond made certain disbursements from Westdale’s special account, meant only for Miracle
Beach expenditures. Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, she then filed two criminal
complaints for estafa (a) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or
conversion under Article 315(1)(b) of RPC; and (b) through false pretenses under Article 315(2)(a),
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both against Desmond. 6) City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
Desmond.
The elements of the crimes charged were thus established in these cases, namely Dio parted with her
money upon the prodding and enticement of respondent on the false pretense that he had the
capacity and resources for the proposed project. In the end, Dio was not able to get her money back,
thus causing her damage and prejudice. Moreover, such defraudation or misappropriation having
been committed by Desmond through his company SBMEI involving funds solicited from Dio as a member
of the general public in contravention of the public interest, the probable cause clearly exists to indict
Desmond for the crime of Estafa.
Two criminal information were filed with RTC where it ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that
no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all
present. City prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. CA upheld the RTC’s authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process
of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record
insufficient to establish probable cause. MRs filed by City prosecutor and Dio were denied. Hence,
the instant petitions
ISSUE:
Whether the informations should be dismissed for lack of probable cause. (YES)
RULING:
The informations should be dismissed. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or
judicial.
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal
information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence
submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the
information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere
superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the
evidence without a full-blown trial.
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A judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting
documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. While a
judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing
arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly
states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. The RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the
standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. Certain essential facts – namely, (a)
whether Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure;
and (b) whether Desmond utilized the fund sinvested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach Project
for purposes different from what was agreed upon – remain controverted. It cannot be said that
the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article315(2)(a) and 315(1)(b) of the RPC
had already been established.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Petitioner , vs. HON. ORLANDO C.

CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Overall Deputy Ombudsman, FIDEL C. CU, CARMELITA B. ZATE,
and MARY LOU S. APELO, Respondents
G.R. NO. 206866, FIRST DIVISION, September 2, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. Guided by the foregoing
considerations, the Supreme Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint against private respondents for lack of probable cause.
FACTS:
In a Joint-Affidavit filed by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), through its duly-
authorized officers, it alleged that private respondents herein Fidel C. Cu and Carmelita B. Zate as
officials of the Bicol Developent Bank, Inc. (BDBI) and Mary Lou S. Apelo as a former employee of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as the Bank Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI's
books and records, are guilty of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials,
defined and penalized under Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, as
well as violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In the course of the receivership, PDIC took over the affairs of BDBI after the BSP Monetary Board
ordered its closure in its capacity as the statutory receiver. That a certain Arsenia T. Gomez (Gomez)
— a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI until its closure — went to the PDIC and
submitted an Affidavit outlining the alleged irregularities committed by private respondents when
BDBI was still in operation.
According to Gomez, during the course of her employment with BDB, she was instructed by Cu to
take money from the vault in the amount of P30,000.00 and to deposit the same to Apelo's bank
account with Philippine National Bank. When Gomez asked for the reason, Cu replied "Professional
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Fee natin sa kanya yan." Two more deposits were subsequently deposited to Apelo’s bank account on
separate dates. After the deposits were made, she was initially instructed to cover the unofficial and
unbooked cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other
Cash Items;" and thereafter, to regularize and remove from BDBI's books such disbursements by
including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they were completely covered. In this regard,
Gomez averred that in the course of her employment with BDBI, she does not know of any official or
legitimate transactions that would warrant BDBI to disburse the aforesaid amounts in favor of Apelo.
In their defense, private respondents Cu and Zate denied the allegations against them while Apelo
did not file any counter-affidavit.
The Ombudsman issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
PDIC filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
private respondents of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Supreme Court has consistently refrained from
interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and
to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded
from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.
Following the testimony of Gomez as provided in her Affidavit, probable cause was established to
believe that private respondents may have indeed committed such acts constituting the crimes
charged against them. As such, they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits. It was
error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez's affidavit as inadmissible in evidence
for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.
In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Supreme Court declared that hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation
is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Supreme Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents for lack of
probable cause.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL M. REINOSO, GENEROSO TANSECO, MANUEL
MORALES, RUBEN B. ANCHETA, GERONIMO Z. VELASCO, TROADIO T. QUIAZON, JR.,
FERNANDO MARAMAG, EDGARDO TORDESILLAS, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., GERARDO SICAT,
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PANFILO O. DOMINGO, POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MANUEL B. SYQUIO, RAFAEL M. ATAYDE,
HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., GEORGE T. SCHOLEY,1 TIRSO ANTIPORDA, JR., CARLOS L.
INDUCTIVO, and TEODORO VALENCIA, respondents.
It bears stressing that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to
establish whether there exists probable cause to file an information in court against the accused. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused
committed the crime. The fact that PNB appeared to be unduly exposing its finances by extending
iniquitous loans to HMOI, despite the latter being undercapitalized and, notwithstanding the
inadequacy of the collaterals being offered to secure the loans, should have been sufficient basis for the
Ombudsman to find probable cause.
FACTS:
Former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to investigate alleged
behest loans granted by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), among others, during the Marcos years.
Subsequently, through the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 61, the Committee's functions were
broadened in scope. To aid in its investigation of behest loans, the following criteria were established
as a frame of reference:
a. It is undercollateralized.
b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized.
c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes.
d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies.
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended.
f. Use of corporate layering.
g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought.
h. Extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Assisted by a Technical Working Group (TWG), the Committee investigated the loans granted by PNB
to Hercules Minerals and Oils, Inc. (HMOI), a domestic corporation engaged in mining copper ores to
produce copper concentrates.
The Committee's investigation revealed that on June 27, 1978, the HMOI, through its Chairman of the
Board, respondent Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), filed with the PNB an application for a guarantee
loan in the amount of US$17,000,000.00 (US$17M), which the latter approved via PNB Resolution
No. 548 dated July 16, 1979 where it stated that the proceeds of the loan will finance HMOI in
developing, extracting, and milling its copper reserves in Ilocos Norte, dubbed as "The Bully Bueno
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Copper Project." Thus, HMOI and PNB executed a Loan Agreement on February 1, 1980 for the
US$17M loan, then equivalent to P125,290,000.00.
With the foregoing findings, petitioner PCGG, through its Legal Consultant, Atty. Liezel G. Chico (Atty.
Chico), filed on December 15, 2004 an affidavit-complaint before the Ombudsman accusing
respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 for their participation in the alleged behest
loans extended by PNB to HMOI.
PCGG contended that the loans extended by PNB to HMOI were in the nature of behest loans, being
characterized by the following: (a) the loans were undercollateralized; (b) the borrower corporation
was undercapitalized; (c) the stockholders, officers, or agents of the borrower corporation are
identified as cronies; and (d) the extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release was made. It
asseverated that because PNB unduly accommodated HMOI, as evidenced by said loans which were
grossly disadvantageous to the government, as well as the public, respondents must be prosecuted
under Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Only respondent Domingo submitted his counter-affidavit, raising as defenses lack of personality of
Atty. Chico, prescription, and insufficiency of evidence. He claimed that Atty. Chico had no personal
knowledge of the questioned loan transactions between PNB and HMOI and was without any legal
authority to prosecute or initiate the cases falling under RA 3019, as amended.
With respect, to the existence of probable cause to hold respondents liable as charged, the
Ombudsman ruled in the negative. It held that the PCGG's argument that the loans were
undercollateralized was specious, as the Committee did not make any independent valuation of the
said collaterals. Neither did it secure any documentation which could show that HMOI exaggerated
the value thereof. It also had no inventory of the properties acquired for the copper project and from
the loan proceeds to show that HMOI merely used the same assets for the subsequent loans and
exaggerated its value. Moreover, it held that future assets or after-acquired properties are acceptable
securities and thus, not inimical to sound banking practice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it found no probable
cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 and consequently,
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
RULING:
YES. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's determination as to the existence or non-existence of probable cause. The rule,
however, does not apply if there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify
judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
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of passion or hostility. After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds that such judicial
intervention is justified and proper in this case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing elements, the Court finds that there may be liability arising
from violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
The fact that PNB appeared to be unduly exposing its finances by extending iniquitous loans to HMOI,
despite the latter being undercapitalized and, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the collaterals
being offered to secure the loans, should have been sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to find
probable cause.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds probable cause to hold respondents for trial on the
offenses charged, except for Domingo, whose criminal liability is extinguished in accordance with
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code on account of his death on June 26, 2008. With respect to
respondents Tanseco, Morales, and Syquio, the facts of their deaths must be confirmed with sufficient
evidence before the same provision may apply to them.
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.

G.R. Nos. 212593-94, FIRST DIVISION, March 15, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case
to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order
to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. Hence, overall,
the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially determining the existence of
probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes's Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings.
FACTS:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers
Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging
of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years
2004 to 2010, in the total amount of P172,834,500.00. The charges are contained in two (2)
complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
on September 16, 2013, (NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013,
(FIO Complaint).
On March 28, 2014, OMB issued a 144-joint resolution finding probable cause against petitioners 1
count of Plunder and 15 counts of violation of RA 3019.
On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying, among others, the MR filed by
petitioners. This led to the filing of the 4 petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212593-
94, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, and G.R. Nos. 213475-76, commonly assailing the
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March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-13-
0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396.
Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan, charging, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder; and Reyes,
Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third Division.
On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case, "along with several other related cases," the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the
accused," stating that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the
Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of probable cause against them,
and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment. The Napoles siblings urgently
moved for the MR of the judicial finding of probable cause against them and requested that their
arraignment be held in abeyance pending the resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles
siblings alleged that the Sandiganbayan acted on their MR through the latter's Resolution dated
November 14, 2014, declaring that the presence of probable cause against them had already been
settled in its previous resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the petition,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the September 29, 2014 and November 14, 2014
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion in judicially determining the existence of probable
cause.
RULING:
NO. There is no grave of discretion in judicially determining the existence of probable cause. Once
the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case to
the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to
determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. As discussed
in the case of People vs Castillo:
There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined
by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
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ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence
to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The Court in Mendoza v. People (Mendoza) clarified that the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan) is
given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it, namely to: (a)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause
Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon
motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to determine
whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in
the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line with the
fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court."
The conclusion that the requirement to personally evaluate the report of the Ombudsman, and its
supporting documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it explicitly declared in its
Resolution dated July 3, 2014 that it had "personally read and evaluated the Information, the Joint
Resolution dated March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the [Ombudsman], together
with the above-enumerated documents, including their annexes and attachments, which are all part
of the records of the preliminary investigation x x x." A similar pronouncement was made by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated September 29, 2014, wherein it was said that "[a]fter further
considering the records of these cases and due deliberations, the Court finds the existence of
probable cause against the said accused x x x." Later on, in a Resolution dated November 14, 2014,
the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier findings when it held that the presence of probable cause
against all the accused "was already unequivocally settled x x x in its [Resolution] dated July 3, 2014
x x x." Besides, the Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of its official duties. This presumption was not convincingly overcome by either Reyes
or the Napoles siblings through clear and convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail. As such,
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings was judicially
confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued
warrants of arrest against them.
Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially determining the
existence of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes's Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R. Nos. 215880-
94 is in order.
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VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and
WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo
City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND,
and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
G.R. No. 178947 and G.R. No. 179079, June 26, 2013
In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted,
there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing
of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a
deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without
a full-blown trial.
FACTS: Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities)
and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to Desmond, the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and
the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority
shareholder of SBMEI.5 After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS
Equities, decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.006 in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine Park
(Ocean Adventure)
Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive
of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure,7 and also guaranteed substantial
returns on investment. Accordingly, Dio was elected as a member of SBMEI’s Board of Directors and
further appointed as its Treasurer.
In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another US$1,000,000.0016 in a separate
business venture, called the Miracle Beach Hotel Project (Miracle Beach), which involved the
development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said
investment would be used to settle SBMEI’s ₱40,000,000.00 loan obligation to First Metro
Investment Corporation and for the construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas.
Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s representations, SBMEI actually
had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses
amounting to ₱62,595,216.00. She likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the company’s
books and financial statements – specifically, its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-
disclosure of the true amount of JV China’s investment – which prompted her to call for an audit
investigation.
Dio then filed two criminal complaint for estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315(1)(b)
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, both against Desmond.
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In defense, Desmond maintained that his representation of himself as Chairman and CEO of SBMEI
was not a sham and that Dio has not even proven that he did not have the expertise and qualifications
to double her investment.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated August 26, 2004,
finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes. Desmond then motioned
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause at RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged
against him since the elements of estafa were not all present: First, the element of misrepresentation
or deceit found in par. 2 (a) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is absent. Verily, this is SBMEI’s
representation or "come on" to would-be investors and not a personal assurance of the accused. The
fact that accused was the company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors
is of no moment in the absence of any evidence to show that accused personally prepared the
business plan thereby making the alleged "rosy picture" his own personal enticements to the
complainant.
Furthermore, the court cannot find any sufficient evidence that the accused personally assured the
complainant about his so-called power, influence and credit with the SBMA and other financial
institutions that would supposedly insure the viability and profitability of the project.
Second, the element of personal misappropriation by the accused under par. 1(b) Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code is likewise not present. While it may be conceded that there was money utilized
to pay salaries of expatriates and staff as well as the cost of utilities amounting to US$72,272.00
complainant failed to show that said money was taken from her companies’ investments in SBMEI. It
must be pointed out that other than complainant’s bare allegation, there was no document presented
categorically stating that the investment of complainant’s companies were earmark for a particular
payment or project. Hence, when the investment entered SBMEI’s financial coffers, the same
presumably were co-mingled with other monies of the corporation.
CA upheld the RTC’s authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable
cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish
probable cause. It explained that such dismissal is an exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this score, the CA evaluated the
evidence presented and agreed with the RTC’s conclusions that there was no sufficient basis showing
that Desmond committed estafa by means of false pretenses. Neither was it established that the
money sourced from petitioner Dio was converted by respondent Desmond for some other purpose
other than that for which it was intended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
dismissed the subject informations for lack of probable cause.
RULING: CA erred in their decision. RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the informations charged against Desmond for lack of probable cause
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal
information in court.
250 of 306
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence
submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the
information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere
superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the
evidence without a full-blown trial.
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor
who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings
and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA,
was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. In this case, records
show that certain essential facts – namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false
representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond
utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from
what was agreed upon – remain controverted. As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the
elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) and 315(1) (b) of the RPC had already been
established, thereby rendering the RTC’s immediate dismissal of the case highly improper.
Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a perceived gap in the
evidence leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is
preferable over a doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case
immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to
establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its
existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in
court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction
of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to
determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
2. Rule 112
GIRLIE M. QUISAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 216920, FIRST DIVISION, January 13, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy. In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict
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petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review
prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein. Unfortunately, the
same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as there was no
showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP- Makati’s division
chiefs or review prosecutors.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause
against the petitioner for the violation of RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Later on, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the
RTC charging the petitioner of the said crime.
Pasiya/Resolution was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor De La Cruz and approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor Hirang;
Pabatid Sakdal/Information was penned by ACP De La Cruz, but without approval from any higher
authority. However, there was a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information.
The petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority
of the person who filed the same before the RTC. She claims that it is a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured. OCP-Makati countered that SACP-Hirang was authorized to approve the Pasiya
pursuant OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 and the prior approval from the City Prosecutor with
regards to the information was shown in the Certification.
The RTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. It found that the Certification attached in the
Information sufficiently complies with Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the ROC which requires prior written
authority or approval by the CP.
The CA affirmed the denial of the motion to quash holding that OCP-Makati complied with Sec. 9 of
RA 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32. It also opined that
the said Certification should enjoy the presumption of regularity in absence of a contrary proof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC and CA gravely abused their discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion to
quash.
RULING:
YES. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein
before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. xxx Thus, as a general rule,
complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of
the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal
pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules. xxx In this relation, People v. Garfin, firmly
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instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same
constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even
by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged,
was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati,
SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC,
as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the
OCP- Makati’s division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De
La Cruz which stated, among others, that “DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng
sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig”–
which translates to “and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of
the City Prosecutor. xxx despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown
that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that
they obtained prior WRITTEN authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section
4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. xxx Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be
quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING
PARTNER, FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, -versus- ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA, Respondents.
A trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. It must, however, be observed that the judge's power to immediately dismiss a
criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear.
The second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of
a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. Here,
it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void
due to Branch 203's lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, the dismissal was proper.
FACTS:
On July 31, 2006, an Information was filed against respondent Atty. Josejina C. Fria Branch Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, charging her for the crime of Open
Disobedience under Article 231[5] of the Revised Penal Code. Issue arose from his failure to obey the
order of the said court which is of superior authority, for the issuance of a writ of execution which is
her ministerial duty to do so in Civil Case No. 03-110 entitled Charles Bernard Reyes, doing business
under the name and style CBH Reyes Architects vs. Spouses Cesar and Mely Esquig and Rosemarie
Papas, which has become final and executory since February 2, 2006, despite requests therefor, if
only to execute/enforce said decision dated July 29, 2005 rendered within the scope of its jurisdiction
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and issued with all the legal formalities, to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff thereof. The
records show that the Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110
instituted before Branch 203. On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
prompting the defendant in the same case to appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and
consequently ordered that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to
the denial of the defendant's motion for reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment became final
and executory.
In its Complaint-Affidavit dated February 12, 2006, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4,
2006, it had been following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005
judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said
writ.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria posited a draft writ of execution not
addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen who was then on leave. Neither did she know
who the presiding judge would appoint as special sheriff on Felicen's behalf. Nevertheless, she
maintained that she need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued
an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same.
On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a Memorandum recommending, inter alia, that Atty. Fria be
indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. The corresponding Information was thereafter filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80 (MTC). the MTC ordered the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. It found that aside from the fact that
Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law Firm failed to prove the existence of the other elements of the
crime of Open Disobedience. The RTC affirmed the MTC's ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the case for Open Disobedience on the ground of lack of probable cause was
proper. (YES)
RULING:
Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately
dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. It must,
however, be observed that the judge's power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be
warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. The Court held that a clear-cut case of lack of
probable cause exists when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts
which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the
evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order
the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be
to order the presentation of additional evidence.
254 of 306
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his
primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if
he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he
doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the
conclusion that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal case for lack
of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the
unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. While the first
element, i.e., (Art. 231 of RPC) that the offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in view of
Atty. Fria's position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently
remain wanting.
To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment,
decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all
legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have
been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203's lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, the
dismissal was proper.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her

capacity as Tanodbayan, and HON. GERARD A. MOSQUERA, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, Petitioners, vs. ROGER F. BORJA, Respondent
G.R. NO. 201830, FIRST DIVISION, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
LERMA S. PRUDENTE and DAMASO T. AMBRAY , Petitioners, vs. ROGER F. BORJA, Respondent
G.R. NO. 201882, FIRST DIVISION, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The dismissal of the criminal case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in
consonance with the rule that a criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. In this case, the Supreme Court
held that the fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 had
been dismissed upon the Ombudsman's manifestation that it lacked basis to prosecute him is of no
moment.
FACTS:
Predicated from a Decision ruled by the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the decision of the the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the separate
resolutions of the the Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water District (SPCWD) in dismissing its
division chiefs, Evelyn Eje (Eje) and Racquel Tolentino (Tolentino) on the basis of the administrative
complaint filed by its General Manager, Roger F. Borja (Borja), the appellate court awarded them
backwages and other employment benefits.
255 of 306
The CA, however, ruled that the backwages could not be charged against SPCWD, in view of the
doctrine that where a public officer removes or dismisses another officer wrongfully, he acts outside
the scope of his authority and hence, shall be held personally liable. The CA decision attained finality,
and Eje and Tolentino were subsequently reinstated and paid their backwages which were, however,
taken from SPCWD's funds upon Borja's approval.
Thereafter, members of the San Pablo City Bar Association instituted a civil action on behalf of the
water concessionaires seeking to compel the members of the Board of Directors of SPCWD and Borja
to reimburse SPCWD for the amount paid to Eje and Tolentino. In a Decision by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 32, the RTC ordered Borja to refund to SPCWD the amount of
P1,942,031.82 paid to Eje and Tolentino within 60 days from receipt of the decision. The RTC noted
that Borja knew that the same was his personal liability based on the information given by the
Commission on Audit (COA) through Director Felicitas Ona (COA Director Ona). The COA was,
however, ordered to audit the payments made to Eje and Tolentino to ascertain if they were to be
considered misuse of public funds.
Also, Borja was charged criminally in Criminal Case Nos. 13758-SP, 13759-SP, and 13760-SP for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," for causing undue injury to SPCWD when he paid Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other
benefits from the water district's funds. The RTC however dismissed the criminal complaint on the
basis of the Ombudsman's recommendation when the case was referred back to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for reinvestigation, where it noted that the COA En Banc had ruled that the payment by
SPCWD was made in good faith, and that the subsequent issuances of the
COA and CSC negated the initial findings of bad faith, manifest partiality, and negligence on his part.
Later on, Borja and the other officers of SPCWD were charged administratively, docketed as OMB-L-
A-03-1156-L. The complaint alleged that Borja and the other respondents therein used public funds
to settle a private obligation, considering that Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other benefits were
Borja's personal liabilities.
The Ombudsman held Borja guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service and accordingly, suspended
him from service for one (1) year without pay. Borja filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied.
On appeal, the CA found that Borja should not be held administratively liable on the ground that he
made the payment in good faith, as found by the COA En Banc. In fact, it was this finding of good faith
that moved the Ombudsman to dismiss the criminal cases against Borja. It ratiocinated that if Borja
could not be held criminally liable because the payments made to Eje and Tolentino were made in
good faith by the management of the water district, there is even less reason to hold him
administratively liable for the same act done in good faith. The motion for reconsideration filed by
the Ombudsman was denied by the CA
Hence, the Ombudsman filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court,
where it maintained that the dismissal of the criminal charges against Borja is not a ground to dismiss
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the administrative case against him, given that only substantial evidence is necessary to sustain a
finding of administrative liability.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal charge against Borja is not a ground to dismiss the
administrative case against him.
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 had been dismissed upon the Ombudsman's manifestation that it lacked basis
to prosecute him is of no moment. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, the dismissal of the
criminal case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance with the rule
that a criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according
to the facts and the law applicable to each case. Moreover, in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction could be had, while
liability in administrative cases is only hinged on the lesser threshold of substantial evidence, defined
as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that Borja acted in a manner prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. By causing SPCWD to pay the backwages and other benefits due Eje and Tolentino, Borja
clearly placed said office in a financial disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability which did not
belong to it, especially considering that the amount involved and taken from SPCWD's funds, i.e.,
P1,942,031.82, is by no means negligible. In doing so, the integrity of Borja's office was put in to
question, and SPCWD was placed in a deleterious financial position.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 220685, SECOND DIVISION, November 29, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In De Los Santos-Dio v. CA, the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a case [under the authority
of the aforesaid provision] must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails
to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus,
established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the
contrary, if the evidence on record [show] that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and
thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of
action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence."
In this case, the Court concurs with the CA Fourth Division's finding that there was no probable cause
against herein respondent for the crime of qualified theft, considering the glaring absence of certain key
elements thereof. Notably, "for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of
the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that
every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense."
257 of 306
FACTS:
In May 2007, respondent undertook the construction of the CTTL Building in Baguio City, adjacent to
the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn (BPTI) which is a business establishment owned and operated by the
University of Manila (UM). At that time, respondent's father, Virgilio Delos Santos (Virgilio), who was
the President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees (BOT) of UM, allegedly ordered the employees
of BPTI to assist respondent in all his needs in the construction. Specifically, respondent was
permitted to tap into BPTI's electricity and water supply.
When the respondent's father died, he was succeeded by Emily Dodson De Leon (De Leon) as
President of UM. In 2011, UM, represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint against respondent
for the qualified theft of the electricity and water supply of BPTI for the period 2007 to 2011, with a
total value of ₱3,000,000.00 more or less, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In
his defense, respondent argued that his family aggregately owns 98.79% of UM; that he was explicitly
allowed by his father to use the electricity and water supply of BPTI for the construction of the CTTL
Building for which no opposition was aired by anyone; and that the complaint was filed as a result of
his own opposition to the probate of his father's alleged holographic will, which was initiated by his
sister, Maria Corazon Ramona Llamas De Los Santos, whom respondent claims is the live-in partner
of De Leon.
In a resolution, the investigating prosecutor dismissed the complaint in view of the absence of the
element of "lack of consent or knowledge of the owner," considering that Virgilio, while being the
President and Chairman of the BOT of UM, explicitly allowed respondent to use the electricity and
water supply of BPTI. It was likewise noted that Virgilio was a very generous father to his children;
and that, while Virgilio was still alive, no complaint was filed against the respondent for his use of the
electricity and water supply of BPTI.
However, the aforestated Resolution was subsequently reversed upon the UM's motion for
reconsideration. In a Resolution on Review, Assistant City Prosecutor Rolando T. Vergara (ACP
Vergara) found sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for qualified theft (attended by the
qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence), pointing out that respondent's defense of
being expressly allowed by his father is barred under the Dead Man's Statute. Nonetheless, ACP
Vergara held that the express consent of Virgilio, if there was any, was only limited to the period of
the construction of the CTTL Building. However, even after the completion thereof, respondent did
not disconnect the electrical and water connections to the damage and prejudice of UM. Moreover,
considering that respondent was, at the time in question, not only the manager and operator of BPTI,
but a stockholder and trustee of UM which owns BPTI, he was said to have had access to the BPTI
premises and, thus, gravely abused the confidence reposed upon him by UM.
The Resolution on Review was affirmed in the Second Resolution on Review, which denied
respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Meanwhile, an Information charging
respondent with qualified theft was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (RTC).
Consequently, respondent was arrested.
Respondent challenged via a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) the (a)
Resolution on Review, and (b) Second Resolution on Review. Said petition was, however, dismissed
in a Resolution.
Eventually, respondent filed before the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) To Lift/Quash Warrant of Arrest; and (3) To Suspend/Defer
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Arraignment and/or any Proceeding, alleging that the Information filed against him and the
documents appended thereto failed to show proof sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause
for the crime of qualified theft.
The RTC denied the Urgent Omnibus Motion upon a finding that probable cause indeed exists for the
indictment of respondent, considering his admission that he caused the tapping of the electricity and
water supply of BPTI. The CA Special Tenth Division affirmed the questioned Orders of the RTC, and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Consequently, respondent moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing Decision. He likewise filed a motion for inhibition attributing
irregularities on the part of the members of the Special Tenth Division, which was granted amidst
strong denial of respondent's accusations. The case was re-raffled to the CA Fourth Division (Division
of Five), which issued an Amended Decision setting aside the Orders of the RTC, and thereby,
dismissing the complaint for qualified theft and quashing the warrant of arrest against respondent.
Undaunted, UM filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision, which was, however,
denied in a Resolution. Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in holding
that probable cause exists against respondent for qualified theft.
RULING:
NO. "A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause - that is, one made for the purpose of
filing an [I]nformation in court - is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies
beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny."
However, Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a
judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause, viz.:
Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested,
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.
In De Los Santos-Dio v. CA, the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a case [under the
authority of the aforesaid provision] must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements
of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record [show] that, more likely than not, the
crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge
should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases,
however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence."
259 of 306
In this case, the Court concurs with the CA Fourth Division's finding that there was no probable cause
against herein respondent for the crime of qualified theft, considering the glaring absence of certain
key elements thereof. Notably, "for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the
elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the
principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no
criminal offense."
As correctly ruled by the CA, the elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently
absent in this case.
To recount, UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution established and owned by
respondent's family.1âwphi1 His father, Virgilio, owned 70. 79% of the entire shares of stock of the
UM, and respondent himself claims 9.85% share thereof. Virgilio was the President and Chainnan of
the BOT of UM at the time material to this case, and respondent himself was a board member and
stockholder. Records disclose that respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI's electricity
and water supply. As such, respondent had no criminal intent - as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his
father's authority, on behalf of UM - to appropriate said personal property.
It has been held that in cases where one, in good faith, "takes another's property under claim of title
in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in
fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner.
The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or
out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where
the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take
possession of it for himself or for another," as in this case.
The Court reiterates that "[w]hile probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there
is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State
from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising
from false, fraudulent or groundless charges." This, the RTC failed to do. Hence, the CA correctly
reversed the finding of probable cause against respondent.
All told, the RTC gravely erred when it denied respondent's motion for judicial determination of
probable cause. Instead, it should have granted the same and, accordingly, dismissed the case
pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 112 as cited above. In this light, the assailed CA rulings are affirmed.
E. Arrest (Rule 113)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, -versus- NAZARENO VILLAREAL y

LUALHATI, Accused-appellant.
For the warrantless arrest under paragraphs (a) or (b) of Section 5 to operate, the officer's personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the
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officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just
been committed.
As to paragraph (a), it is inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would
be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while
simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03
gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. As to paragraph (b), it has not been
established that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime.
FACTS:
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was
driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about
8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a
member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City,
alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had
previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape
but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant's attempts to resist
arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet
of shabu in his possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police
Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon
marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant's initials
and the date of the arrest. Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the
person of appellant to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed
an acknowledgment receipt6and prepared a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of the
seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior Inspector
Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Consequently,
appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs in an Information which reads : That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006
in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.03 gram which, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of
METHYLAMPHETAMIME HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon's allegations and instead claimed that on the
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date and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th Avenue
when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the
person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his
wallet which contained P1,000.00. Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he
was detained and mauled by eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently,
he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he
recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters' firing range. There, "Michelle"
and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his
ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued to deny knowledge
about the cellphone. Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was brought to the
Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment. The following day, he underwent inquest
proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed him that he was being charged with resisting
arrest and "Section 11." The first charge was eventually dismissed. The RTC and the CA convicted the
appellant for the charge.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a lawful warrantless arrest. (NO)
RULING:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for
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its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under
paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In sustaining appellant's conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear
case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with
his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of
about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule
amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That
he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion
that what he purportedly saw in appellant's hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be
properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant)
had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking
along the street and examining something in one's hands cannot in any way be considered criminal
acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least
appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5,
Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. The
factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a
crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have
been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. Without the overt act that would pin liability
against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant
on account of the latter's previous charge for the same offense.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant
is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent
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The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process
cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down
the rules on lawful warrantless arrests. In the case at bar, there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest. Considering that Calag was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
around 30 kilometers per hour at a distance of around 10 meters, it is highly implausible for
him, even assuming that he has perfect vision, to be able to identify with reasonable accuracy
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside 2 very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante.
FACTS:
An information was filed charging Alvin Comerciante (Comerciante) of violation of Section

11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, Agent Eduardo Radan (Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and
P03 Bienvy Calag II (Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling an area while on their way
to visit a friend at Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, 2 men, Comerciante and Erick Dasilla (Dasilla),
standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements" with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached the 2 men. Subsequently, Calag introduced himself, arrested the 2
men, and confiscated 2 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which was
later confirmed as shabu.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", a notorious
drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney, were arrested and taken to a police station. It was then claimed that illegal drugs
were confiscated from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they
failed to accede, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings,
and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE
Whether Carag performed a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante the answer to which
would necessarily affect the admissibility of the sachets of shabu
RULING
NO. As a general rule, search and seizure must be carried out on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause. In the absence of such warrant,
the search and seizure becomes "unreasonable", thus, makes the evidence obtained on the
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occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure be deemed inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding under the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In
this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
- the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests.
The aforementioned provision provides 3 instances when a warrantless arrest may be

lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed and (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
For a warrantless arrest under (a) above to operate, 2 elements must concur, namely: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, (b) above requires
for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it. It must be noted that in both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the
fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under (a), the officer himself
witnesses the crime while in (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In the case at bar, there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest. Considering that Calag
was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour at a distance
of around 10 meters, it is highly implausible for him, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, to be able to identify with reasonable accuracy miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside 2 very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that
no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit
a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something
to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal act even if Comerciante and his
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by Calag. That his
reasonable suspicion was bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest
persons in possession of shabu and (b) he underwent trainings and seminars on illegal drugs
when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what
he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.
Based on the foregoing, the shabu purportedly seized from Comerciante is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
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JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In Sindac v. People, the Court held that under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact
that a crime has just been committed.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure identifies three (3) instances when
warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer's
personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential.
In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a
purported report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's arrest.
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace when the
Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and questioned him, and thereafter, frisked and arrested
him. BB Bahoyo's testimony on direct and cross-examinations is enlightening on this matter.
FACTS
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay
Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo)
was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private parts
at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez (BB
Velasquez) then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they later
identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a
gate enclosing an empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner and asked him
where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the
same street but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card, but
petitioner failed to produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card,
but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of
cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This
prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the police
station, and turn him, as well as the seized items, over to SP03 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo). After
examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that
petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both
dangerous drugs.
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Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the facts.
According to him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay
Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived. Upon
responding that he lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then frisked him, took away
his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the barangay hall.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs should be upheld.
RULING
NO, because the pieces of evidence against the accused were iadmissible.
One of the arguments presented in the instant petition is that the search and arrest made on
petitioner were illegal and, thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in
evidence. In this relation, it is worth noting that his arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB
Velasquez, are mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are not
government agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation
in charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as "force multipliers" to
assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security within their
designated areas.
In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or other
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and
order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be
deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III
of the 1987 Constitution to them.
"Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure identifies three (3) instances when
warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a
purported report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's
arrest. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace
when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and questioned him, and thereafter, frisked
and arrested him.
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Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering
that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot
pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal
knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
JOSELITO PERALTA y ZARENO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

In Sindac v. People, one of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 5 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure identifies three (3) instances where warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are:
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, records show that upon the police officers' arrival at Pantal District, Dagupan City, they saw
Peralta carrying a pistol, in plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to confront Peralta
regarding the pistol, and when the latter was unable to produce a license for such pistol and/or a permit
to carry the same, the former proceeded to arrest him and seize the pistol from him. Clearly, the police
officer conducted a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Peralta, thus, making the consequent
search incidental thereto valid as well. At this point, it is well to emphasize that the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is malum prohibitum punished by special law and, in order that one may be found
guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess
a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent. Given these, Peralta can no longer question the validity of his arrest and the
admissibility of the items seized from him on account of the search incidental to such arrest.
FACTS:
An information was filed charging Peralta of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The
prosecution alleged that at around 11 o’clock in the evening, a team consisting of Police Officers
responded to a telephone call that there was a man firing a gun at the back of a PLDT building. Upon
their arrival thereat, the police officers saw two men walking, Peralta and Calimlim, holding a gun
and a knife respectively. Upon seeing the officers, the men became uneasy, which prompted the
former to swoop in. Upon apprehension, they recovered a .45 pistol containing a magazine with five
(5) live ammunitions from Peralta.
In his defense, Peralta denied the accusation against him and presented different narration of facts.
According to him, he was riding a motorcycle with Calimlim when they were flagged down by the
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police officers. While admitting that the latter recovered a knife from Calimlim, Peralta vigorously
denied having a firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the same. Further, Peralta averred
that upon arrival at the police station, he was forced to admit possession of the gun allegedly
recovered from him, and that they were subjected to a paraffin test but were not furnished with
copies of the results thereof. The RTC and the CA found Peralta guilty of the crime charged.
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Peralta questioned the legality of the
warrantless arrest and subsequent search made on him. According to him, there was no reason for
the police officers to arrest him without a warrant and consequently, conduct a search incidental
thereto. As such, the firearm and ammunitions purportedly recovered from him are rendered
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE
Whether or not Peralta is correct?
RULING
NO. Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure, becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section
3(2) of the same article, provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
However, one of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be effected
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 5 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
identifies three (3) instances where warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge
of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which
had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In the first scenario, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. On the other hand, the second scenario requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential.
In this case, records show that upon the police officers' arrival, they saw Peralta carrying a pistol, in
plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to confront Peralta regarding the pistol, and
when the latter was unable to produce a license for such pistol and/or a permit to carry the same,
the former proceeded to arrest him and seize the pistol from him. Clearly, the police officer conducted
a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Peralta, thus, making the consequent search
incidental thereto valid as well. Case law has established that the carrying of firearms and
ammunition without the requisite authorization is enough basis for the conduct of a valid in flagrante
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delicto warrantless arrest. Given these, Peralta can no longer question the validity of his arrest and
the admissibility of the items seized from him on account of the search incidental to such arrest.
F. Bail (Rule 114)

G. Arraignment and plea (Rule 116)
H. Motion to quash (Rule 117)
I. Pre-trial (Rule 118)
PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, Petitioner, -versus- CATALINA L. SANTOS, Respondent

GR No. 194638, SECOND DIVISION, July 02, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The trial court has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule
the pre-trial conference in accordance with the circumstances obtaining in the case. This must be so as
it is the trial court which is able to witness firsthand the events as they unfold during the trial of a case.
Postponements, while permissible, must not be countenanced except for clearly meritorious grounds
and in light of the attendant circumstances.
In this case, the RTC was able to explain to the satisfaction of the Court that the postponement of the
pre-trial scheduled on July 7, 1998 was not warranted under the circumstances. It should be recalled
that the Complaint was filed by petitioner on March 19, 1991. Seven years later, no pre-trial had been
conducted as yet. Hence, the cancellation of the pre-trial on the ground of the impending filing of a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, as there was no proof at the time of the hearing that said
petition was in fact filed, was obviously a dilatory tactic designed for petitioner to control the
proceedings of the court.
FACTS:
Catalina L. Santos entered into a Contract of Lease with Frederick O. Chua over 8 parcels of land
located in Parañaque City, specifically giving the latter the "first option or priority to buy" the same
in case of sale. However, Chua assigned his rights to petitioner PKE.
Later on, petitioner filed a Complaint before the RTC against Santos and respondent David A.
Raymundo to whom Santos allegedly sold the leased premises without giving petitioner the
opportunity to exercise its priority to buy the same.
Subsequently, the case was set for pre- trial but petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, claiming
that it was preparing a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was to be filed with the CA before
the scheduled pre-trial. It was denied and the RTC directed the parties to proceed to pre-trial as
scheduled.
The trial court then required petitioner to start the pre-trial with the statement of its cause. However,
counsel for petitioner, Atty. Nelson Santos, refused to do so saying he would just furnish the court the
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following day with a copy of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA.
Consequently, upon motion of the opposing counsel, the RTC declared petitioner non-suited, and
dismissed the Complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC's denial of petitioner's Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, and the dismissal of the
Complaint for failure of petitioner to proceed to pre-trial was proper. (YES)
RULING:
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the trial court has the discretion on whether to grant or
deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial conference in accordance with the
circumstances obtaining in the case. This must be so as it is the trial court which is able to witness
firsthand the events as they unfold during the trial of a case. Postponements, while permissible, must
not be countenanced except for clearly meritorious grounds and in light of the attendant
circumstances.
In this case, the RTC was able to explain to the satisfaction of the Court that the postponement of the
pre-trial scheduled on July 7, 1998 was not warranted under the circumstances.
Far from showing bias or prejudice, the RTC judge was merely complying with his sworn duty to
administer justice without delay. It should be recalled that the Complaint was filed by petitioner on
March 19, 1991. Seven years later, no pre-trial had been conducted as yet. Hence, the cancellation of
the pre-trial on the ground of the impending filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, as
there was no proof at the time of the hearing that said petition was in fact filed, was obviously
a dilatory tactic designed for petitioner to control the proceedings of the court. The Court finds
nothing improper, irregular or jaundiced with the trial court's course of action. As the latter aptly
pointed out, since petitioner presented no copy of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
duly received by the appellate court, there was nothing with which it could evaluate the
"merits and demerits of the proposed postponement." More importantly, even with the actual
filing of the petition for certiorari in the afternoon of July 7, 1998, no restraining order was issued
by the CA enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the pre-trial. The appellate court
correctly emphasized that the mere elevation of an interlocutory matter through a petition
for certiorari does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the trial court,
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued. This
pronouncement is squarely consistent with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
By openly defying the order of the trial court to proceed to pre-trial, petitioner only has itself to blame
for the dismissal of its Complaint. The dismissal is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion,
which, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court must stand absent any justifiable
reason to the contrary, as in this case.
271 of 306
J. Trial (Rule 119)
CECILIA RIVAC, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 224673, SECOND DIVISION, January 22, 2018 , PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In Cabarles v. Maceda, the Court expounded on the novelty, nature, and parameters of this rule, to wit:
x x x Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for
reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2)
the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only
after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5)
the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days
from the issuance of the order.
A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally
offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation
but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline covering a motion to reopen
is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
In this light, the CA clearly erred in holding that: (a) it was improper for the RTC to reopen its
proceedings because the latter court had already promulgated its judgment; and (b) assuming
arguendo that what it did was a new trial, there were no grounds for its allowance. To reiterate, a
motion to reopen may be filed even after the promulgation of a judgment and before the same lapses
into finality, and the only guiding parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC
correctly allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Farifias's subsequent testimony in order to
shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially, determine whether or not
the latter is indeed criminally liable.
FACTS:
In 2007, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, the accused Cecilia Rivac (Rivac) received for sale on
consignment from Asuncion C. Farinas (Farinas) pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱439,500.00 under
the express obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale or if not sold, to return the pieces of jewelry
to Farinas not later than August 11, 2007, but far from complying with her obligation and despite
repeated demands, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the pieces of jewelry, to the damage
and prejudice of Rivac.
The prosecution alleged that on August 4, 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private
complainant Farinas where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate
amount of ₱439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis, as evidenced by a
document called jewelry consignment agreement (consignment document). Fariñas and Rivac
agreed that after seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry
or return the unsold jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of
the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon her, causing Farinas to send
her a demand letter. This prompted Rivac to go to Fariñas's store and offer her a parcel of land as
partial payment for the jewelry. However, Farinas refused the offer as she discovered that the
property was involved in a land dispute, and instead, reiterated her demand that Rivac return the
pieces of jewelry or pay their value in cash.
272 of 306
During arraignment, Rivac pleaded "not guilty" and maintained that her liability is only civil, and not
criminal, in nature. She narrated that she asked Farinas for a loan as she badly needed money for her
husband's dialysis, to which the latter agreed. As such, she went to Fariñas's store and handed over
the certificate of title and other supporting documents to the latter as collateral. In turn, Farinas gave
her the amount of ₱150,000.00 and asked her to sign a blank consignment document. She further
averred that she was able to pay interest for several months but was unable to pay the entire loan.
According to Rivac, Farinas told her that she would foreclose the collateral. Thereafter, she sent her
a letter demanding payment of the principal amount of ₱280,000.00 plus interest.
The RTC found Rivac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, found
that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime charged.
After the promulgation of the judgment and before it lapsed into finality, Rivac moved to reopen
proceedings on the ground that she intends to present the testimonies of Fariñas and a certain Atty.
Ma. Valenie Blando (Atty. Blando) to prove the true nature of her transaction with Fariñas. The RTC
partly granted the motion insofar as Fariñas's testimony was concerned, as the apparent revision of
her recollection of events could not have been anticipated during the course of the trial. It, however,
denied the same as to Atty. Blando's testimony, opining that there was no showing that Rivac could
not present her during the trial proper. Consequently, the Court retook Fariñas's testimony, where
she "clarified" that she now remembered that the consignment document never became effective or
enforceable as she did not allow Rivac to take the jewelry because she has yet to pay her outstanding
loan obligation plus interest.
The RTC affirmed its assailed Judgment. It held that Farifias's testimony was in the nature of a
recantation, which is looked upon with disfavor by the courts. the RTC pointed out that there have
been various circumstances prior to the promulgation of the assailed Judgment where she could have
"correctly recollected" and revised her testimony, such as when she: (a) sent a demand letter to Rivac;
(b) reiterated her demand during barangay conciliation; (c) executed her complaint-affidavit for the
instant case; (d) paid the filing fee for the case; and (e) testified before the court. Further considering
that the retraction does not jibe with Rivac's testimony, the RTC found the same to be unworthy of
credence.
On appeal to CA, the CA upheld Rivac’s conviction, it held that the RTC erred in allowing the reopening
of the case, since it had already promulgated a ruling therein. The CA opined that the RTC proceedings
after the promulgation of its ruling can be likened to a new trial, which is likewise improper as the
grounds for its allowance are not extant. Rivac’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that it was improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings
RULING:
NO. Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the reopening of
criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At any time before finality of the judgment of
conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the
proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30)
days from the order granting it." In Cabarles v. Maceda, the Court expounded on the novelty, nature,
and parameters of this rule, to wit:
273 of 306
A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a
recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage. This
lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000.
x x x Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening
a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is
issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing
is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the
order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, and in the furtherance of justice, may
allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court
where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after
either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is
rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling
guideline covering a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening
a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
In this light, the CA clearly erred in holding that: (a) it was improper for the RTC to reopen its
proceedings because the latter court had already promulgated its judgment; and (b) assuming
arguendo that what it did was a new trial, there were no grounds for its allowance. To reiterate, a
motion to reopen may be filed even after the promulgation of a judgment and before the same lapses
into finality, and the only guiding parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC
correctly allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Farifias's subsequent testimony in order
to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially, determine whether or
not the latter is indeed criminally liable.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, petitioners, - versus - THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., respondents.
The conditional examination of a prosecution witness cannot defeat the rights of the accused to
public trial and confrontation of witnesses. The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to
apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of witnesses.
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the
accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating
the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC.
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
274 of 306
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing of said criminal
case. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen
Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by
reason of ill health.
The MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical
Certificate of Li Luen Ping. The RTC declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The CA ruled that no
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the
complaining witness Li Luen Ping.
ISSUE:
Whether the deposition taking of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia is an infringement of
the constitutional right of the petitioners to confront the said witness face to face. (YES)
RULING:
The RTC properly nullified the MeTC's order granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen
Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia, since the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending. The
condition of the private complainant, being sick and of advanced age, falls within the provision of
Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should
be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Nowhere in the said rule
permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's
ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that –
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order
to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection
of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule.
The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such,
calls for a strict construction of the rules.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules
of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true
that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case,
we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
275 of 306
The conditional examination of a prosecution witness cannot defeat the rights of the accused
to public trial and confrontation of witnesses. The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is
held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the
judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against
the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without
violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial
trial proceedings before the MeTC. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should
have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in
having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to
take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating
the right of the accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking
sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses
against him face to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of
prosecution witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and
depositions.
K. Judgment (Rule 120)
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner, -versus- MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 210148, FIRST DIVISION, December 8, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."
FACTS:
Sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan
Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in
Quezon City, ran her over. She died while she was being rushed to the hospital to receive medical
attention. Following the day of the incident, the daughter of the deceased, herein respondent, Marla
Oliva (Marla) filed a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Antonio
Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.
Shem Serrana, who was presented as the eye-witness for the prosecution, testified that on said date,
he saw a woman who was crossing EDA heading towards the island near the flyover and that the
latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing the aforementioned plate number. The prosecution
276 of 306
also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family
as a result of her mother’s death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz, who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez, who
conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the
vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
(demurrer) asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution
witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent
evidence of how the incident transpired.
On May 24, 2010, the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 granted Daluraya’s demurrer and dismissed
the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages
sustained by her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit her
mother; (b) Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz
merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident,
likewise declared thathe did not witness the same.
Marla moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the MeTC, clarifying that the grant of
Daluraya’s demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that reconsideration of its Order granting
Daluraya’s demurrer would violate the latter’s right against double jeopardy. With respect to the civil
aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded
absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise.
Aggrieved, Marla appealed to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 76, insisting that the MeTC failed to
make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, which finding was not precluded by the dismissal
of the criminal aspect of the case. Marla filed a motion for reconsideration which, although filed
beyond the reglementary period, was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found the same
without merit and thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC. Dissatisfied, Marla
elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly
liable.
On June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and held that the MeTC’s Order showed that since
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, Daluraya was not not exonerated from civil liability.
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
November 22, 2013, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
277 of 306
Whether the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death despite his
acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. (YES)
RULING:
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime
charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Daluraya’s
acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as
affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would
necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence
on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution
to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his
civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
L. New trial or reconsideration (Rule 121)

M. Appeal (Rules 122, 123, 124 and 125)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, -versus- VAL DE LOS REYES and DONEL GO,
Accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 130714, EN BANC, October 16, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country, he loses
his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to
have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. Here, Donel jumped bail. Hence, even if the SC were to
remand the cases to the CA for intermediate review, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss
appellant's appeal, as he is considered a fugitive from justice.
FACTS:
The complainant Imelda B. Brutas (Imelda), filed criminal complaints for rape against Donel and Val,
who were jointly charged in two (2) Informations after she suffered unconsented sexual intercourse
with the two on December 22, 1994. Unfortunately, the authorities were able to arrest only Donel
278 of 306
while Val remained at large. Thus, Donel was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,
but before the prosecution could conclude the presentation of its evidence, he jumped bail.
Consequently, he was tried in absentia.
The RTC convicted Donel of 2 counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty for each
count. In view of the penalty of death imposed upon him, the case was elevated to the Court on
automatic review, while, the cases against Val were sent to the archives pending his arrest. Later, the
RTC revived the criminal cases against Val, who, after trial, was likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the three (3) charges of rape filed against him.
The Court En Banc rendered a Decision vacating the judgment of conviction against Val, upon a
finding that the RTC violated Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised
Rules of Court which required that the testimonies of the witnesses be given orally. It would appear
from the records that during Val's trial, the prosecution merely adopted the transcript of the
stenographic notes during the trial against appellant and asked the prosecution witnesses to affirm
their previous testimonies. Thus, finding that the proceedings against Val were abbreviated and
irregular, the Court remanded to the RTC for rehearing. The RTC, after rehearing convicted him for 3
counts of rape and to suffer death penalty. The CA affirmed the decision but modify the penalty to
reclusion perpetua. With the foregoing factual backdrop, only Donel's appeal is left before the Court
En Banc for resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the proper course of action is to remand this case to the appellate court for the conduct of
an intermediate review because it involved the penalty of the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.
(NO)
RULING:
The Court no longer sees the necessity of transferring these cases to the CA for intermediate review
and instead, deems it more appropriate to dismiss the instant appeal.
Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and was, in fact,
tried and convicted in absentia. There is dearth of evidence showing that he has since surrendered
to the court's jurisdiction. Thus, he has no right to pray for affirmative relief before the courts. Once
an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in Donel's case, or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. Thus, even if the Court were to
remand these cases to the CA for intermediate review, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss
appellant's appeal, as he is considered a fugitive from justice. It bears to stress that the right to appeal
is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost.
279 of 306
N. Search and seizure (Rule 126)
EDMUND BULAUITAN Y MAUAYAN, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
A search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the lawful occupant of the
premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their absence that their
presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.
In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the policemen involved in the search of
Bulauitan's residence — as shown in their own testimonies - did not conduct the search in accordance
with Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The testimonies given in the case at
bar ultimately prove that: (a) Bulauitan was not in his residence when the search was conducted; (b)
his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness SPO2 Baccay's search of Bulauitan's room as PO3
Tagal kept her in the living room and even instructed her to leave the house to contact her parents; and
(c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia neither witnessed the search as they remained outside Bulauitan's
residence.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging Bulauitan of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, under RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that the Philippine National
Police of Gagayan constituted a team to implement a search warrant to search Bulauitan's residence.
Upon arriving at Bulauitan's residence, the search team was met by Bulauitan's two children and
housekeeper, who informed them that Bulauitan was not home. This notwithstanding, the search
team explained to the children and housekeeper the reason for their presence, prompting the latter
to allow them inside the house and conduct the search. SPO2 Baccay then proceeded to Bulauitan's
room and there, discovered three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting that the contents are shabu, the search team showed the sachets to the children
and housekeeper and photographed the same. SPO2 Baccay then gave the sachets to P/Insp.
Bulayungan, who in turn, handed them over to PO3 Tagal who wrapped the confiscated items with a
piece of paper for transport to the Solana PNP Station. When Bulauitan arrived at his residence, the
search team effected his arrest and took him to the police station with the seized sachets. Upon arrival
thereat, PO3 Tagal prepared the police blotter and request for laboratory examination, marked the
sachets with his initials, and delivered the same to forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. A
qualitative examination revealed that the three (3) plastic sachets contained an aggregate of 0.22
gram of shabu.
In his defense, Bulauitan denied owning the sachets allegedly recovered by the search team in his
280 of 306
house. The RTC found Bulauitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
otherwise. The CA affirmed Bulauitan's conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether Bulauitan's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in
implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct of a search.
Under this provision, a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the
lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their
absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the policemen
involved in the search of Bulauitan's residence — as shown in their own testimonies - did not conduct
the search in accordance with Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
testimonies given in the case at bar ultimately prove that: (a) Bulauitan was not in his residence when
the search was conducted; (b) his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness SPO2 Baccay's search of
Bulauitan's room as PO3 Tagal kept her in the living room and even instructed her to leave the house
to contact her parents; and (c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia neither witnessed the search as they
remained outside Bulauitan's residence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appelle, -versus- PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO,

Accused-appellant.
Immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
281 of 306
of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that P03 Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed
over by Macapundag to him) and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to the three sachets recovered from
Macapundag upon his arrest) marked the seized items immediately at the place of arrest. However, the
prosecution's witnesses failed to state whether or not the police officers inventoried and
photographed the seized sachets in the presence of Macapundag or his representative. Likewise,
they were silent as to the presence of the other required witnesses, i.e., a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public official, and a member of the press. In fact, the
prosecution did not even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs thereof as evidence. In
this relation, it is observed that the Evidence Acknowledgement Receipt and the Affidavit of Attestation,
which form part of the evidence of the prosecution, likewise failed to disclose that the seized items were
actually inventoried or photographed in accordance with the parameters provided by Section 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR; thus, their submission cannot constitute compliance with the law.
Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 to 8:30 in the morning of March 14, 2009, an informant
tipped the Caloocan City Police that a certain individual known as alias "Popoy" was selling shabu in
Baltazar Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City. Acting on the tip, Police Chief Inspector (PCI)
Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan) ordered the conduct of a buy-bust operation in coordination with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), with Police Officer 3 (P03) George Ardedon (P03
Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer, and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO 1) Amel Victoriano (SPOl
Victoriano) and Police Officer 2 (P02) Jeffred Pacis (P02 Pacis), as back-up officers. After the team's
final briefing, they proceeded to the target area where they saw Macapundag, who was then
identified by the informant as "Popoy." Consequently, P03 Ardedon approached Macapundag and
retorted "Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod, paiskor naman." Macapundag replied "Magkano?," to
which P03 Ardedon responded "Tatlong piso fang," and simultaneously handed the three (3) marked
₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag then took four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
gave one to P03 Ardedon, and returned the other three (3) back to his pocket. Upon receiving the
sachet, P03 Ardedon gave the pre-arranged signal by holding his nape and then held Macapundag, as
the back-up officers rushed to the scene. P03 Ardedon marked the plastic sachet he purchased from
Macapundag, while SPO 1 Victoriano marked the other three (3) recovered from his pocket.
282 of 306
Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to the police station, where the seized items were turned over
to P02 Randulfo Hipolito (P02 Hipolito), the investigator on duty.Later, P02 Hipolito brought the
items to the crime laboratory for physical examination. Eventually, Forensic Chemical Officer-PC!
Stella Ebuen (PCI Ebuen) examined the specimen, which tested positive for ephedrine, a dangerous
drug. Macapundag was later on tried and convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for
each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Macapundag prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21
of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims that they did
not make any inventory and failed to take pictures of the confiscated drugs along with him at the
scene of his arrest. There was also no justification given as to why they failed to comply with these
requirements of law.
Immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that P03 Ardedon (with respect to the sachet
handed over by Macapundag to him) and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to the three sachets
recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest) marked the seized items immediately at the place of
arrest. However, the prosecution's witnesses failed to state whether or not the police officers
inventoried and photographed the seized sachets in the presence of Macapundag or his
representative. Likewise, they were silent as to the presence of the other required witnesses, i.e., a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public official, and a member of the
press. In fact, the prosecution did not even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs
thereof as evidence. In this relation, it is observed that the Evidence Acknowledgement Receipt and
the Affidavit of Attestation, which form part of the evidence of the prosecution, likewise failed to
disclose that the seized items were actually inventoried or photographed in accordance with the
283 of 306
parameters provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR; thus, their submission cannot constitute
compliance with the law.
In People v. Sanchez, the Court recognized that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of 9165 may not always be possible, and ruled that under the
implementing guidelines of the said Section, "non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items." However, the Court added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving
justifiable cause.
Thus, in People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value
of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the inventory and photograph
of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the police station,
as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not
made at the place of seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a
representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public official to witness the inventory and
receive copies of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs of the
seized items. Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
O. Provisional remedies in criminal cases (Rule 127)

P. Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC)
Q. The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC)
VIII. EVIDENCE
A. General concepts
1. Proof vs. evidence
2. Burden of proof vs. burden of evidence
3. Equipoise rule
B. Admissibility
1. Requisites (Rule 128)
2. Exclusionary rules
284 of 306
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, -versus- MARCELINO VITERBO y REALUBIT
and RONALD VITERBO y REALUBIT, Accused-appellants.
As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is
therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof
of the corpus delicti.
In this case, there exists reasonable doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items,
necessitating therefor strict compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As it has
been established that there was non-compliance with its provisions, i.e., that there was no physical
inventory or photographs of the seized evidence, nor was there any representative from the media, or
the Department of Justice, or any elected public official present during the subject seizure and
confiscation, it is therefore clear that the identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, hence, rendering improper accused-appellants’ conviction.
FACTS:
Marcelino Viterbo and Ronald Viterbo were charged in an Information for violation of Section 5, in
relation to paragraph (b) of Section 26, Article II of RA 9165. In a Judgment rendered by the RTC, they
were convicted as charged. Aggrieved, they elevated the case to the CA, arguing among others that
the identity of the illegal drugs allegedly confiscated from them was not established with moral
certainty, in the absence of a physical inventory or photographs thereof. They insisted that the drugs
were not marked at the place where they were supposedly seized; hence, the chain of custody thereof
was not clearly established. They therefore concluded that these circumstances cast serious doubt
that a sale of illegal drugs transpired.
ISSUE:
Whether accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165. (NO)
RULING:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized
from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
285 of 306
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where
it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the
evidence are minimized if not altogether removed."
In relation thereto, Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of custody
of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz.:
“1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.”
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render
the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when (a) there is a justifiable
ground for such noncompliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and
should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
A punctilious examination of the records in this case shows that the prosecution failed to establish
the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellants, militating against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SPO4 Cardona, the poseur-buyer who transacted with accused- appellants, testified that he kept in
his possession and custody the two (2) plastic sachets containing the illegal substance from the time
they were confiscated up to the time that he marked them in the PDEA Office. Together with a
companion, he brought the confiscated items as well as the laboratory request to the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office. However, he was unable to deliver the confiscated items and the laboratory
request because he was informed that here was no chemist to conduct the examination at the time.
As such, he decided to return to the PDEA Office, bringing with him the items and the laboratory
request. The following day, someone else delivered the confiscated items and the laboratory request
to the crime laboratory.
286 of 306
The confiscated items changed hands before they were delivered to the crime laboratory, i.e., from
SPO4 Cardona to "Captain Vargas" who, unfortunately, did not testify in this case in order to shed
light on what happened to the seized items when they were turned over to his possession, or at the
very least, to clarify if he was the person who successfully delivered the plastic sachets together with
the laboratory request to the crime laboratory. Clearly, there were substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the seized items, particularly the events that transpired from the time the items left the
hands of SPO4 Cardona on the night of March 4, 2003 and turned over to the possession of "Captain
Vargas.”
The prosecution’s case is further weakened by the fact that the seized items were delivered not on
the same day of the buy-bust operation, but only the following day. To the Court’s mind, the
considerable amount of time that had transpired from the conduct of the buy-bust operation until
the same were brought for laboratory examination, especially when viewed together with the above-
mentioned considerations, figures into a gaping hiatus in the chain of custody of the said items, which
is extremely fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Thus, in the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there exists reasonable doubt on the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items, necessitating therefor strict compliance with
the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As it has been established that there was non-
compliance with its provisions, i.e., that there was no physical inventory or photographs of the seized
evidence, nor was there any representative from the media, or the Department of Justice, or any
elected public official present during the subject seizure and confiscation, it is therefore clear that the
identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, hence,
rendering improper accused-appellants’ conviction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- MARICEL PATACSIL Y

MORENO, Accused-Appellant.
G. R. No. 234052, SECOND DIVISION, August 6, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
(CRIM)
In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.
Here, a plain examination of PO3 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated September 28,
2012 – which stood as the inventory receipt – shows that while PO3 Meniano claims that representatives
from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory, no such representatives signed the document.
Further, it also appears that no public elected official was present when such inventory was made.
287 of 306
FACTS:
Two (2) Informations were filed before the RTC charging Patacsil with the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Patacsil was apprehended during a buy-bust operation with
PO3 Francisco S. Meniano, Jr. (PO3 Meniano) acting as the poseur-buyer.
In her defense, Patacsil pleaded not guilty to the charges against her and offered her version of the
events. She narrated that on the day she was arrested, she just arrived home after visiting her live-in
partner in jail, when suddenly, six (6) men in civilian clothes appeared in front of her house. After the
men briefly searched her abode, she was then taken to the police station and subsequently charged
with the aforesaid crimes.
The RTC found Patacsil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and held that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes charged. It found that Patacsil's bare
denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of the police officers who conducted the buy bust
operation. Aggrieved, Patacsil appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Patacsil's conviction should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.
Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. In the
case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the (DOJ), or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."
288 of 306
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law
with the passage of RA 10640 – provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted
at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure,
and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under
justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer or team.
In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out
in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over
the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above saving clause
to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Patacsil.
Here, a plain examination of PO3 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated September 28,
2012 – which stood as the inventory receipt – shows that while PO3 Meniano claims that
representatives from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory, no such representatives signed
the document. Further, it also appears that no public elected official was present when such inventory
was made.
At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any
genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 must be adduced. Mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact
the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning
from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time
of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set
procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- BENJAMIN FERIOL Y

PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
G. R. No. 23215, SECOND DIVISION, August 20, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
289 of 306
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow
when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. The
apprehending officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule,
thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug allegedly seized
from Feriol.
In this case, while the, inventory and the photography of the seized items were made in the presence of
Feriol and an elected public official, the records do not show that the said inventory and photography
were done before any representative from the DOJ and the media. The apprehending officers did not
bother to acknowledge or explain such lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that there was an
attempt to contact or secure these witnesses' presence.
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Feriol with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs. Feriol was apprehended during a buy-bust operation with Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council
Operative Delno A. Encarnacion (MADAC Encarnacion) as the designated poseur-buyer and PO1
Mark Angulo as the immediate back-up. Due to security reasons, the buy-bust team brought Feriol
and the seized items to the barangay hall, where the required inventory and photography were
conducted in the presence of Feriol and Barangay Kagawad Roderick P. Bien (Kagawad Bien)
In her defense, Feriol denied the accusations against him, claiming that he was taking a bath inside
his house when he heard a number of individuals shouting his name and averred that upon opening
the door, someone poked a gun at him and asked for his ID. He was handcuffed and brought to the
barangay hall where the pieces of evidence was shown to him.
The RTC found Feriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and observed that the
apprehending officers' failure to secure the representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the media during the conduct of inventory was not fatal – and thus did not render Feriol's arrest void
and the evidence obtained from him inadmissible Aggrieved, Feriol appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Feriol’s conviction should be upheld. (NO)
RULING:
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow
when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the
said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. In the case
of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure
290 of 306
and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the [said drugs) that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."
The apprehending officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug
allegedly seized from Feriol.
In this case, while the, inventory and the photography of the seized items were made in the presence
of Feriol and an elected public official, the records do not show that the said inventory and
photography were done before any representative from the DOJ and the media. The apprehending
officers did not bother to acknowledge or explain such lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that
there was an attempt to contact or secure these witnesses' presence.
The absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.
However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to
secure the required witnesses must be adduced. In view of the prosecution's failure to provide
justifiable grounds which would excuse their transgression in this case, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from Feriol have
been compromised, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such,
Feriol's acquittal is in order.
3. Judicial notice and judicial admissions (Rule 129)

C. Object (Real) Evidence (Rule 130, A)
D. Documentary Evidence (Rule 130, B)
1. Definition
2. Best Evidence rule
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, -versus- AMADO M. MENDOZA and MARIA
MARCOS VDA. DE MENDOZA, Respondents.
While the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that generally, the
original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry,
the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as "[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror." In order to fall under the
aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original;
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.
291 of 306
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities. First, the existence or due
execution of the subject check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for the non-presentation
of the original copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US government for
being an altered check. The subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is not an ordinary check, and
practically speaking, the same could not be easily obtained. Lastly, absent any proof to the contrary and
for the reasons already stated, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original
of the subject check. Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of
the photocopy of the subject check as secondary evidence was permissible.
FACTS:
A Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment was filed by BPI against
respondents before the RTC. BPI alleged that on April 8, 1997, respondents: (a) opened a foreign
currency savings account with Account No. 0584-0007-08 (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan Branch
and deposited therein the total amount of US$l6,264.00, broken down as follows: US$100.00 in cash
and US$16,164.00 in US Treasury Check with No. 3149-09693369 payable to "Ma. Marcos Vda. de
Mendoza" (subject check); and (b) placed the amount of US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account. After
the lapse of the thirty (30) day clearing period on May 9 and 13, 1997, respondents withdrew the
amount of US$16,244.00 from the US savings account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank charges.
However, on June 26, 1997, BPI received a notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust
Company New York (Bankers Trust), that the subject check was dishonored due to "amount
altered", as evidenced by (1) an electronic mail (e-mail) advice from Bankers Trust, and (2) a
photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by Bankers Trust as the
original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the government of the United States
of America (US government). This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and to
demand reimbursement. BPI then claimed that: (a) on July 18, 1997, respondents allowed BPI to
apply the proceeds of their time deposit account in the amount ofUS$2,015.00 to their outstanding
obligation; (b) upon the exhaustion of the said time deposit account, Amado gave BPI a promissory
note dated September 8, 1997 containing his promise to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of
₱l,000.00 monthly; and (c) when respondents failed to fulfill their obligation despite repeated
demands, BPI was constrained to give a final demand letter to respondents on November 27, 1997.
For their part, while respondents admitted the withdrawals and exchanged the same with BPI at the
rate of ₱26.l59 per dollar, they did not receive the amount of ₱582,140.00 from the proceeds.
Respondents then maintained that Amado only affixed his signature in the letter dated July 18, 1997
in order to acknowledge its receipt, but not to give his consent to the application of the proceeds of
their time deposit account to their purported obligations to BPI. According to Amado, he would have
been willing to pay BPI, if only the latter presented proper and authenticated proof of the dishonor
of the subject check. However, since the bank failed to do so, Amado argued that BPI had no cause of
action against him and his mother, Maria.
ISSUE:
292 of 306
Whether the CA correctly dismissed BPI's complaint for sum of money against respondents. (NO)
RULING:
The RTC declared that BPI was able to sufficiently establish by preponderance of evidence that
respondents were duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check, rendering them liable to refund
what they had withdrawn from BPI. Pertinently, it hinged its ruling on the pieces of evidence
presented during the trial, namely: the e-mail printout advice from Bankers Trust informing BPI that
the subject check was dishonored, the BPI letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 addressed
to respondents, and the subject promissory note voluntarily executed by Amado. On the contrary, the
CA held that respondents were not liable to BPI for its failure to competently prove the fact of the
subject check's dishonor and its subsequent confiscation by the US government. In this relation, the
CA deemed that the printout of the e-mail advice is inadmissible in evidence for lack of proper
authentication pursuant to the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states that generally, the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of
the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as "[w]hen the original has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror." In
order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or
due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed.
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities. First, the existence or due
execution of the subject check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for the non-
presentation of the original copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US
government for being an altered check. The subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is not an
ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same could not be easily obtained. Lastly, absent any
proof to the contrary and for the reasons already stated, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its
failure to present the original of the subject check. Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence
Rule, the presentation of the photocopy of the subject check as secondary evidence was permissible.
As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence, and thus, its admissibility
or inadmissibility should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence proving
respondents' obligation towards BPI, namely: (a) Amado's voluntary acts of conforming to BPI's
letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 and executing the promissory note to answer for such
obligation; and (b) the photocopy of the subject check, which presentation was justified as falling
under the afore-discussed exception to the Best Evidence Rule. As such, their probative value
remains.
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Besides, it should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the evidence
presented by BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter's formal
offer of evidence. It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly
be considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC did in this case, since it was
in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during the trial.
3. Secondary evidence
4. Parol Evidence rule
5. Interpretation of documents
E. Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C)
1. Qualification of witnesses
2. Testimonial privilege
3. Admissions and confessions
4. Previous conduct as evidence
5. Testimonial knowledge
6. Hearsay and exceptions to the hearsay rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, -Appellee, -versus- BERNABE P. PALANAS alias "ABE",
Accused-Appellant.
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, 4 conditions must
concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) the declarant is conscious of his impending death at the time the declaration was made; (c)
the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On the other hand, a statement to be
deemed as part of the res gestae, thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence,
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c)
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense and may only be considered if the following circumstances are shown:
(a) the accused was somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime
FACTS:
Bernabe Palanas (Palanas) is accused of murder for the killing of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio (Borre).
At around 6:40 a.m. of March 26, 2006, Borre took his grandson outside his residence in Pasig City.
PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (Zapanta), who slept at Borre’s residence, was watching television when he
heard 4 successive gunshots. When Zapanta looked through the open door, he saw 2 men armed with
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.38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot but
he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, they fled on a motorcycle.
Zapanta, together with Borre’s stepson Ramil Ranola (Ranola), brought Borre to the Pasig City
General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, Borre told Ramil and Zapanta that it was "Abe", "Aspog"
or "Abe Palanas", his neighbor, who shot him. This statement was repeated to Borre’s wife,
Resurreccion, who followed him at the hospital. Borre then died due to gunshot wounds on his head
and trunk.
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on March 25, 2006,
he was in Parañaque City attending to the needs of his sick father. On the next day, he went to Tondo,
Manila for a baptism and stayed there from morning until 9:00 p.m., after which he returned to his
father in Parañaque City. He maintained that he was not aware of the death of Borre until he was
informed by a neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him of killing her husband. He also denied
any knowledge why Resurreccion would blame him for Borre’s death.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Borre’s statements on his way to the hospital can be considered a dying declaration
and part of the res gestae. (YES)
2. Whether Palanas’ alibi can be given credence. (NO)
RULING:
1. Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, 4 conditions must
concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) the declarant is conscious of his impending death at the time the declaration was made;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. Such declaration is considered
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was
made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is
silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law
deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by an oath administered in court.
On the other hand, a statement to be deemed as part of the res gestae, thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts,
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
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spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence is whether the act or declaration is so intimately
interwoven with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
In the case at bar, Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration. His statements pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death. Moreover, taking into consideration the number and severity
of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his
own death was already imminent.
In the same vein, Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. His
statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot. While on his way to the hospital, Borre
had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants, thus, his utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
2. Palanas’ defense of alibi must fall.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense and may only be considered if the following circumstances are
shown: (a) the accused was somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.
In this case, aside from the admission that travel from Parañaque City to Pasig City only takes about
1 hour, the incident occurred on a Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had
access to a motorcycle that allowed him to travel faster. Under the circumstances, there is the
possibility that Palanas could have been present at the locus criminis at the time of the shooting.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. OSCAR PARBA y SOLON, Accused-

appellant
G.R. NO. 214506, FIRST DIVISION, October 19, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
It is well settled that alibi as a defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy
to fabricate and difficult to disprove. In this case, the Supreme Court finds the alibi of Parba unavailing.
FACTS:
In an Information dated March 14, 1997, Oscar Parba (Parba) and John Doe were charged with the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and
attended with treachery and evident premeditation, which led to the death of a certain Mark P. Navaja
(Navaja).
The prosecution alleged that at around 6:55 in the morning of January 6, 1997, Jesus Catapan
(Catapan), a security guard of the Salazar Institute of Technology (SIT) in Natalio Bacalso Avenue,
Labangon, Cebu City, was buying cigarettes from a vendor stationed near the main gate of SIT
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Elementary Department. Suddenly, Parba, who was then seated beside the vendor, stood up, pulled
a gun from his belt bag, and shot a man at the back of the head while the latter was helping his
daughter disembark from a motorcycle. At that instance, the victim, later on identified as Mark P.
Navaja (Navaja), fell to the ground, while Parba and a companion exited towards the highway, chased
by Nestor Buenavista (Buenavista) and Fernando Cuizon (Cuizon), fellow security guards of Catapan.
8 As they were running, Parba pointed a gun at Buenavista and Cuizon, prompting the two to seek
cover. Parba then boarded a jeepney while Buenavista and Cuizon followed via a separate jeepney
and continued their pursuit. Eventually, Parba disembarked at Tabada Street and the two security
guards lost sight of him.
The following day, the policemen, who were only able to arrest Parba, subjected him to a paraffin
test, where the casts taken off his hands tested positive for the presence of gunpowder residue.
Likewise, Dr. Jesus Cerna, the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of Navaja, reported that
the latter died due to a gunshot wound at the back of the head.
In his defense, Parba denied committing the crime and interposed alibi, denial, and set-up as
defenses. He averred that on the date of the incident, he was sleeping in his house until 10 o'clock in
the morning as he came from a drinking spree with his brother the night before. Later in the
afternoon, Jose Leeway Rivera (Rivera), a police officer, arrived and allowed Parba to test a gun which
the former promised to give him. After firing the gun, Rivera invited Parba to the police headquarters
where he learned for the first time that he was suspected of killing Navaja. Parba admitted that he
knew Navaja since they were neighbors and had been friends since childhood, claiming that the latter
was known as a tough guy who had many enemies because of his attitude. However, Parba
maintained that he held no personal grudge against Navaja.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Parba of murder. It refused to give credence to Parba's alibi
finding the same to be weak and unsubstantiated, noting that Parba failed to present his wife or his
brother to corroborate his testimony and to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the place of the incident. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Parba's conviction for murder.
RULING
NO. Anent Parba's alibi, the Supreme Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well settled that alibi
as a defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and difficult
to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.
In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the fact that Catapan personally witnessed Parba pull out a
gun and shoot Navaja in the head, which led to his untimely demise, while Buenavista and Cuizon
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immediately chased Parba after the shooting and further encountered him face-to-face when he
turned around and pointed a gun at them. Thus, there was no break in the chain of events that would
cause any doubt as to the truth and veracity of the facts which point to the guilt of Parba. Moreover,
the prosecution witnesses, who were merely bystanders at the time the crime occurred, were not
impelled by any improper motive to falsely testify against Parba. Ultimately, there was no proof and
no other witness showing the physical impossibility of his presence at SIT, which was only 100
meters away. Thus, Parba's alibi fails to convince the Court.
7. Opinion rule
8. Character evidence
F. Burden of proof and presumptions (Rule 131)
ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., represented by RAFAEL A. POBLADOR, Petitioner, -

versus- ROSARIO L. MANZANO, Respondent.
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be
assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. In Delgado
vda. de Da la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian, the Court states that it is an inference of
the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
However, a presumption is not evidence, but merely affects the burden of offering evidence.
Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case. Apart from Rafael's admission, petitioner
further admitted that: (a) Moreland directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did
not actually see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check; (b) it did not ask Moreland to
issue the check for the payment of the taxes directly in the name of the BIR; (c) it would not have dealt
with Manzano had she not been Metroland' s employee; and (d) it has several lawyers and an accountant
at its disposal, and its representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real estate business and is familiar with
brokerage transactions.
FACTS:
During the settlement proceedings, the Probate Court authorized petitioner's administratrix, Elsa A.
Poblador to negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner, including the Wack-Wack Golf and
Country Club, Inc Share. Upon Elsa's instruction, Rafael (one of the heirs of the deceased Honorio
Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the services of Manzano, a
broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated (Metroland) who, faxed a computation for the sale of the
Wack-Wack Share to petitioner.
However, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. Thus, Elsa returned to
Moreland the amount of ₱l8,000,000 which the latter paid for the Wack-Wack Share, plus interest,
and applied with the BIR for the refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise
asked Manzano to return the broker's service fee.
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Meanwhile, Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres, allegedly requested Manzano
for an accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of petitioner. In response, Manzano
faxed documents addressed to Torres.
Examining these documents, Rafael and Torres allegedly noticed a discrepancy in the faxed Capital
Gains Tax Return: while the typewritten portion of the Return indicated Pl,480,000 as the capital
gains tax paid, the machine validation imprint reflected only P80,000 as the amount paid. To clarify
the discrepancy, petitioner secured a certified true copy of the Capital Gains Tax Return from the BIR
that reflected only P80,000 as the capital gains tax paid for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. As a
result, petitioner demanded Manzano to properly account for the P2,800,000 allegedly given to her
for the payment of taxes and broker's fees, but to no avail.
This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code against Manzano before the RTC. In the course of
the proceedings, Manzano filed a Demurrer to Evidence praying for the dismissal of the case for
failure of the prosecution to establish the essential elements of Estafa with which she was charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto of Manzano should be
dismissed?
RULING:
YES, the petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto of Manzano should be dismissed.
Article 315, RPC paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or
conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa.
In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil
liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when
an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or
conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove
fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the act
of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof
justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists.
In this case, the Court agrees that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa through
misappropriation as defined in, and penalized under, paragraph 1 (b ), [Article 315] of the [RPC]. As
the RTC aptly noted, Rafael, as the representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and
concurred with the entire arrangement, including those which had to be made with the BIR. In fact,
petitioner itself admitted that it received the full amount of ₱15,200,000.00 - the full amount to which
it was entitled to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner
could not claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be no
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misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would justify the charge of Estafa and, with it, the
alleged civil liability ex delicto.
In fact, Rafael categorically admitted that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the
BIR, and that Manzano's name did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the
capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax. This admission clearly contradicts the disputable
presumption under Section 3 (q) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the ordinary course of
business has been followed, which petitioner adamantly relies on to support its claim.
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be
assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. It is an
inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof
of other facts. However, a presumption is not evidence, but merely affects the burden of offering
evidence. Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case. Apart from Rafael's admission,
petitioner further admitted that: (a) Moreland directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check
although it did not actually see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check; (b) it did not
ask Moreland to issue the check for the payment of the taxes directly in the name of the BIR; (c) it
would not have dealt with Manzano had she not been Metroland' s employee; and (d) it has several
lawyers and an accountant at its disposal, and its representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real estate
business and is familiar with brokerage transactions.
G. Presentation of evidence (Rule 132)

1. Examination of witnesses
2. Authentication and proof of documents
THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, THROUGH THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, FELIPE G.

CAPULONG, Petitioners, -versus- DUANE STIER and EMILY MAGGAY, Respondents.
In Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, the Court explained the factors involved in the examination and
comparison of handwritings in this wise:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc.,
that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on
the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting,
even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There
are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition
of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state
of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on
the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute
absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of
a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.
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To prove forgery, petitioners offered in evidence the findings and testimony given by expert witness
Perez, who declared that she found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality,
stroke structure and other individual handwriting characteristics" between the signature that appears
on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the standard signatures of Donton, thereby concluding that they were
not written by one and the same person. On cross-examination, however, Perez admitted that she had
no actual knowledge of the source of the specimen signatures given to her for examination, as it was the
CIDG personnel who provided her with the same.
In this case, thus, as the CA correctly observed, Perez's findings deserve little or no probative weight at
all, considering that the signatures which she used for comparison came from an unverified source.
Perforce, petitioners are left with no conclusive evidence to prove their allegation that Donton's
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
FACTS:
While Donton was in the United States, he discovered that Respondents took possession and control
of the property and the management of his business. He made demands to vacate the property and
to cease and desist from operating his business, but to no avail. Upon returning to the Philippines,
Donton learned that the Respondents were able to transfer the ownership of the property to their
names, through fraudulent means. He filed a complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of
property with damages against Respondent. Donton denied signing or executing the document in
favor of respondents, especially considering that on the date of its purported execution, he was
allegedly still in the United States. Respondents claimed that Donton executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA), in favor of Stier, giving him full authority to sell, mortgage, or lease the property.
During the trial, Donton presented the findings of a Document Examiner of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, who, after comparing the alleged signature of Donton on the Deed of Absolute Sale to his
standard ones, found significant divergencies in the manner of execution, line, quality, stroke
structure, and other individual handwriting characteristics between them, and concluded that they
were not written by one and the same person.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, finding that the Deed of
Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial document, enjoys the presumption of regularity, and thus
cannot simply be defeated by Donton’s bare allegation of forgery of his signature. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred when it upheld the RTC’s ruling?
RULING:
NO. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing
evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery, in this case, the petitioners.
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the fact of forgery can only be
established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
It bears stressing that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court,
the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own
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opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the
questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
In Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, the Court explained the factors involved in the examination
and comparison of handwritings in this wise:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs
of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine
one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations
of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments,
is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned
signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen
and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless,
therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much
weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that
questioned handwriting and an authentic one.
To prove forgery, petitioners offered in evidence the findings and testimony given by expert witness
Perez. In cross-examination, however, Perez admitted that she had no actual knowledge of the source
of the specimen signatures given to her for examination, as it was the CIDG personnel who provided
her with the same. Perez's findings deserve little or no probative weight at all, considering that the
signatures which she used for comparison came from an unverified source. Perforce, petitioners are
left with no conclusive evidence to prove their allegation that Donton's signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was forged. The Court, therefore, upholds the findings of the courts a quo in this respect.
Be that as it may, the Court, however, differs from the findings of the courts with respect to Stier’s
citizenship. Stier admitted that he was an American citizen. Such statement made by Stier are
admissions against interest and are therefore binding upon him. An admission against interest is the
best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute since no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds
the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made through palpable
mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.
In light of the foregoing, even if petitioners failed to prove that Donton's signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was a forgery, the sale of the subject property to Stier is in violation of the Constitution;
hence, null and void. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void and vests
no rights and creates no obligations.
3. Offer and objection
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DAMASO T. AMBRAY & CEFERINO T. AMBRAY, JR., Petitioners, -versus- SYLVIA A. TSOUROUS,
CARMENCITA AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY AMBRAY-AZORES, VIVIEN AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY
AMBRAY-ESCUDERO, MARISTELA AMBRAY-ILAGAN, ELIZABETH AMBRAY-SORIANO, MA.
LUISA FE AMBRAY-ARCILLA, and CRISTINA AMBRAY-LABIT, Respondents.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence,
and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established
by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature
of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove their allegation of forgery is
Questioned Documents Report issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner II
Antonio R. Magbojos stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when
compared to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the same person.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and the testimony given by Estela
in the falsification case in support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary weight in
favor of the latter.
FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. With the exception of Sylvia, they are the children of the
late Ceferino Ambray and Estela Trias who passed away on February 5, 1987 and August 15, 2002,
respectively. During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, one of which
was a parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna denominated as Lot 2 of subdivision plan
covered by TCT No. T-11259 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City. Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2
with Manila Bank for the amount of P180,000.00.
Prior to the discharge of the mortgage, Lot 2 was subdivided into three lots: Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and the
subject property, Lot 2-C, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-11259. Lot 2-C was registered in
Ceferino, Sr.'s name in accordance with his letter requesting the Register of Deeds to register Lot 2-
C in his name. Thus, TCT No. T-22749 was issued covering the said parcel under the name of Ceferino,
Sr., married to Estela.
Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C had been cancelled and, in its stead, TCT
No. T-41382 was issued in the name of petitioners. It appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela, allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the
consolidation subd. plan Pcs-12441"to petitioners for a consideration of P150,000.00. The Deed of
Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City.
303 of 306
Respondents filed the instant complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against
petitioners and Estela alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and void because
the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela were forgeries.
In a motion to dismiss, defendants claimed that the issue on the authenticity of the signatures of
Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale had already been passed upon in the falsification case
where petitioners were eventually acquitted; hence, the matter was res judicata. The RTC granted
the motion and dismissed the case on said ground. The RTC nullified the Deed of Sale as well as TCT
No. T-41382 in the name of petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's nullification of the Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382
covering Lot 2-C in the name of petitioners. (YES)
RULING:
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence,
and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established
by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of
the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
Jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of
forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was
physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove their allegation of forgery is
Questioned Documents Report issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner
II Antonio R. Magbojos stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when
compared to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the same person.
In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia, the testimony of their mother, Estela, in the
falsification case where petitioners were previously acquitted. In the course thereof, she identified
the signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.'s, which was fully corroborated by Atty.
Zosimo Tanalega, the notary public who notarized the subject Deed of Sale and was present at the
time the Ambray spouses affixed their signatures thereon.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and the testimony given by
304 of 306
Estela in the falsification case in support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary
weight in favor of the latter. Hence, respondent's complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and
damages should be dismissed.
H. Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)

I. Weight and sufficiency of evidence (Rule 133)
J. Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
IX. WRIT OF AMPARO (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN and CLAUDINE MARGARET SANTIAGO, Petitioners, vs.
RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, and ERWIN TULFO, Respondents
G.R. NO. 205039, FIRST DIVISION, October 21, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy
as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege
any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported
violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of
direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside
the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.
FACTS:
At around 11:40 in the morning of May 6, 2012, Spouses Raymart Santiago and Claudine Santiago
(Spouses Santiago) arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 (NAIA 3) aboard a
Cebu Pacific Airline flight from a vacation with their family and friends. They waited for the arrival
of their baggage but were eventually informed that it was offloaded and transferred to a different
flight. Aggrieved, Spouses Santiago lodged a complaint before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk. As
they were complaining, they noticed a man taking photos of Claudine with his cellular phone.
Raymart approached the man and asked what he was doing. Suddenly, the man, later identified as
Ramon "Mon" Tulfo (Mon), allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight back.
When Claudine saw the commotion, she approached Mon and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and
pushed her back against the counter. At that instance, Raymart rushed to defend his wife, while one
Edoardo Benjamin Atilano (Atilano) joined in the brawl. Immediately thereafter, several airport
security personnel came to stop the altercation and brought them to the Airport Police Department
for investigation.
Days after the incident Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo (respondents), brothers of Mon, aired on their TV
program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate.
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo against respondents on May 11, 2012 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
305 of 306
On May 23, 2012, Erwin Tulfo filed a Manifestation and Motion to Deny Issuance of Protection Order
and/or Dismissal of the Petition Motu Proprio 8 (May 23, 2012 Motion) which was opposed by
petitioners for being a prohibited pleading.
The RTC, through Judge Maria Filomena Singh (Judge Singh), resolved to dismiss the petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo. In this relation, the trial court explained that while it is true that the
May 23, 2012 Motion was a motion to dismiss and as such, a prohibited pleading under the rules, it
still had the discretion to dismiss the case when in its own determination the case is not covered by
the same rule.
Spouses Santiago filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC's dismissal of petition for a writ of amparo was correct.
RULING
YES. According to Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the first paragraph, does state that the writ is a
remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same
section's second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically pertain to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases
that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs should indeed
be read together in order to construe the meaning of the provision. In our jurisdiction, the contextual
genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the
RTC does not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats
thereof, in the senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of
respondents' purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals
without any showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their
amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the
RTC, through Judge Singh, properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under
this principal determination, regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court, indeed,
has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the relief in the first place.
And when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty
to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.
X. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)

XI. RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
A. Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
B. Writ of continuing mandamus
C. Writ of kalikasan
306 of 306

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CASES OF JUSTICE PERLAS-

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the

BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO,

3. Jurisdiction over the issues

III. CIVIL PROCEDURE

JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, Petitioner, -versus- ERINEO S. MALIKSI, in his capacity as

C. Parties to civil actions (Rule 3)

JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, Petitioner, -versus- ERINEO S. MALIKSI, in his capacity as

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an

MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent.

Westmont filed an Amended Complaint impleading as additional defendants, Panamax Corporation

1. The additional defendants are not necessary parties to the case.

2. Sheriff Cachero is guilty of indirect contempt in implementing the writ of execution

ANDY ANG, Petitioner, -versus- SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P. TORRALBA, SUSANA

PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOVEN L. NGO, as represented by OSCAR J.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES RAMON and ANNABELLE

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by its President,

WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION AND/OR WILLIAM GO QUE, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF

The CA required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum

1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike

3. Manner of making allegations (Rule 8)

ROSEÑA FONTELAR OGAWA, Petitioner, -versus- ELIZABETH GACHE MENIGISHI, Respondent.

Accordingly, with petitioners' admission, the competence of the respondent's witness to

2. Go Tong Electrical's Finance Officer’s testimony that Go Tong Electrical was

4. Effect of failure to plead (Rule 9)

JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND

In particular, they point out that:

ISIDRO QUEBRAL, ALBERTO ESQUILLO, RENANTE SALINSAN, JEROME MACANDOG, EDGARDO

REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY

GRACE PARK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND WOODLINK REALTY CORPORATION,

NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent

ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS, Petitioners, -versus- MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN and

ALDERSGATE COLLEGE INC., et al v. JUNIFEN F. GAUUAN et al

GR No. 192951 | Nov 14, 2012

3. Motion for bill of particulars (Rule 12)

DIANA YAP-CO, Petitioner, -versus-SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY and ESTER GO-UY, Respondents.

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner, -versus- CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent.

J. Pre-trial (Rule 18)

Complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, -versus- THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN,

L. Subpoena (Rule 21)

2. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25)

From the above-stated incidents stemmed the consolidated cases.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073

Q. Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33)

Enrico Encarnacion Consolacion Maximiano Mariano

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is

R. Judgments and final orders

JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Finding petitioners to be indebted to ZACI as its incorporators in the aggregate amount of

It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,

1. Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

3. Rendition and entry of judgments and final orders (Rule 36)

HENRY L. SY, Petitioner, -versus- LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, Respondent.

The assertion is untenable.

b. Remedy against denial and fresh-period rule

BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, -versus- ROSA REYES,

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. (NO)

Third, whether or not the appointment of commissioners is indispensable in an expropriation case;