PEOPLE v. POMAR November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008 protect the health and safety of women.
protect the health and safety of women. The Court reasoned that the state had a valid
FACTS:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory
pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized
to transact business in the City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he
granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the
wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery
and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.
The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act
No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of
its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of
pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of labor of any description,” and of
insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one
month after their delivery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the
police power of the state.
RULING:
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops
and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has
been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental
law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people’s law – the
constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to
conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of
contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally
applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation
owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or
by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no
services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that
the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are
unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby
dismissed.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish - 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937)
RULE:
The United States Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that
deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.
Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded
is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils
which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process.
FACTS:
The Act, entitled "Minimum Wages for Women," authorizes the fixing of minimum wages
for women and minors. Further provisions required the Industrial Welfare Commission to
ascertain the wages and conditions of labor of women and minors within the State. Public
hearings were to be held. If after investigation the Commission found that in any
occupation, trade or industry the wages paid to women were "inadequate to supply them
necessary cost of living and to maintain the workers in health," the Commission was
empowered to call a conference of representatives of employers and employees together
with disinterested persons representing the public. It became the duty of the Commission
to issue an obligatory order fixing minimum wages. A chambermaid filed suit against her
employer, a hotel, to recover the difference between the wages paid her and the
minimum wage fixed pursuant to the state law. The minimum wage was $ 14.50 per week
of 48 hours. The employer challenged the act as repugnant to due process. The Supreme
Court of the State, reversing the trial court, sustained the statute and directed judgment
for the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Was the Act unconstitutional for violating due process?
ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it was a valid exercise of the state's police power to
interest in the wages paid to women because their support would fall on the state if
women were not paid adequate wages. The Court specifically overruled a case relied on
by the employer which held that minimum wages laws for women were an
unconstitutional burden on the right to contract. The Court reasoned that the case could
not stand because employers and employees did not stand on equal footing in the
contract process, and the state's interest in the protection of women was valid. The Court
held that equal protection was not violated because there was no doctrinal requirement
that the legislation to be couched in all-embracing terms. The Act was directed at a social
position unique to women, so the Act did not constitute arbitrary discrimination.
ACCFA v CUGCO Digest G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
Facts:
1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as
amended was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While ACCFA
Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA),
are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of the supervisors and the
rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and
ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to
non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5 days later,
the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint against
ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices;
violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal
to bargain.
3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was
pending, RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then,
ASA and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights with ACA.
While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed which
placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding
the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in
favor of ASA and AWA.
ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity
YES.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can
be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code
is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely
governmental function, no less than, the establishment and maintenance of public
schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the
ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State,
the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of
policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of
the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality;
and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with
respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character
of its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution
itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by
virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is
a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step
down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA.
However, the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the classification of
the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental
functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within the
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of
economic forces.
BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos
issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was
eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the
pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was
not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome
her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its
publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297
was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly.
The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.
HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary
ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to
constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on
the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment”
to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that
these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA
are declared valid and subsisting.
Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July
17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to
11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption
of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions
of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from
the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU
FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did
not report for work for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him
and nobody was there to look after his children. He was required to explain. Finding his
reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company
rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?
HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair,
just and reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on the
workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy
but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on
a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capital
are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts
must, perforce, yield to the common good.
RODOLFO FUENTES vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
GR No. 110017, January 2, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners were regular employees of Agusan Plantations, Inc. Claiming that it
was suffering business losses, head office in Singapore undertake retrenchment measures
and sent notices of termination to petitioners and the DOLE. Petitioners then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Was there a valid retrenchment?
HELD: NO.
Under Art. 283 therefore retrenchment may be valid only when the following requisites
are met: (a) it is to prevent losses; (b) written notices were served on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month before the effective
date of retrenchment; and, (c) separation pay is paid to the affected workers.
There is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent losses.
However, these losses must be serious, actual and real.[3] Otherwise, this ground for
termination of employment would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who
might be merely feigning losses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees.
Indeed, private respondents failed to prove their claim of business losses. What they
submitted to the Labor Arbiter were mere self-serving documents and allegations. Private
respondents never adduced evidence which would show clearly the extent of losses they
suffered as a result of lack of capital funding, which failure is fatal to their cause.
CORAZON JAMER vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts:
This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants Corazon Jamer and Cristina
Amortizido both were cashier of Isetann. They were both dismissed on the alleged ground
of dishonesty for incurring a shortage ofP15,353.78. Complainants were asked to explain
and they submitted their respective written explanations for the shortage. Respondents
placed both complainants under preventivesuspension for the alleged shortages.
Thereafter, respondents conducted an administrative investigation. Finding the
explanation of the complainants to be unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the
complainants from the service. Aggrieved, complainant instituted this present action. The
Labor Arbiter directed the respondents to reinstate complainants to service with full
backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Isetann and John Go appealed the
aforesaid decision to the NLRC. The NLRC found that the complainants were validy
dismissed for lack of confidence.
Issue:
Whether NLRC is correct?
Held:
Yes. The failure of petitioners to report to management the aforementioned irregularities
constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative one of the just causes in terminating employment as provided
for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE,the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in is
hereby AFFIRMED.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. NLRC, GR No. 103525, 1996-03-29
Facts:
On 23 August 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation, a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of mineral prospecting,
exploration and extraction, and private respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a labor federation
duly organized and... registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-
file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) effective from 1 May 1984 until 30 April 1987. Prior to the expiration of the
aforestated Agreement, on 25 July 1986, petitioner and private respondent executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein the terms of the CBA, specifically on matters
of wage increase and facilities allowance, were modified in compliance with the amended
CBA, petitioner implemented the initial 5% wage increase due on 1 May 1986.
On 1 June 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the
integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into
the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to 1 May 1987.[5] Consequently,...
effective on 1 May 1987, the basic wage rate of petitioner's laborers categorized as non-
agricultural workers was increased by P9.00 per day. Petitioner implemented the second
five percent (5%) wage increase due on 1 May 1987 and thereafter added the integrated
COLA. Private respondent, however, assailed the manner in which the second wage
increase was effected. It argued that the COLA should first be integrated into the basic
wage before the 5% wage increase is computed. Consequently, on 15 December 1988,
the union filed a complaint for underpayment of wages before the Regional Arbitration
Branch IV, Quezon City.
On 24 July 1989, the Labor Arbiter promulgated a decision in favor of the union. Petitioner
appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision and on 18 November 1991 the NLRC rendered its
decision sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling. It is petitioner's contention that the basic
wage referred to in the CBA pertains to the "unintegrated" basic wage. Petitioner
maintains that the rules on interpretation of contracts, particularly Art. 1371 of the New
Civil Code which states that:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
should govern.
Siding with the petitioner, the Solicitor General opines that for the purpose of complying
with the obligations imposed by the CBA, the integrated COLA should not be considered
due to the exclusivity of the benefits under the said CBA and E.O. No. 178. Private
respondent counters by asserting that the purpose, nature and essence of CBA
negotiation is to obtain wage increases and benefits over and above what the law
provides and that the principle of non-diminution of benefits should prevail.
Issues:
What should be the basis for the computation of the CBA increase, the basic wage without
the COLA or the so-called "integrated" basic wage which, by mandate of E.O. No. 178,
includes the COLA.
Ruling:
We rule for the respondents.
The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and
true.[17] However, the present controversy involves not merely an interpretation of CBA
provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of... an executive
order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA.
It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they
allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA and MOA were executed
because there is no question that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the
basic wage of workers, or... the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the
integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the COLA.
This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of the
parties must conform.
Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in the light of the fact that compliance with
the law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulation by and between the parties;
consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include the COLA
becomes... immaterial. There is evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the
law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for petitioner, said law, by some uncanny
coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase became
effective.
Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA increase on the
basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the CBA.
What E.O. No. 178 did was exactly to integrate the COLA under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3,
5 and 6 into the basic pay so as to increase the statutory daily minimum wage.
Integration of monetary benefits into the basic pay of workers is not a new method of
increasing the minimum wage.
The purpose of E.O. No. 178 is to improve the lot of the workers covered by the said
statute. We are bound to ensure its fruition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Principles:
While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is
not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing
ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article
1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and
capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it
must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than
narrowly and... technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction
upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose
which it is intended to serve.
PLDT vs. NLRC G.R. No. 80609 August 23, 1988
Facts:
Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, was accused by two complainants of having
demanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her
promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated
and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service.
She went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally
removed. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the company
was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Nevertheless, the
dispositive portion of labor arbiter’s decision declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.
Considering that Dr. Bangayan and Mrs. Martinez are not totally blameless in the light of
the fact that the deal happened outhide the premises of respondent company and that
their act of giving P3,800.00 without any receipt is tantamount to corruption of public
officers, complainant must be given one month pay for every year of service as financial
assistance.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations
Board, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. The private
respondent took no further action, thereby impliedly accepting the validity of her
dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us to question the affirmance of the
above- quoted award as having been made with grave abuse of discretion.
The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an employee illegally
dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws.
However, an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor
backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with
law. In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded financial assistance
equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10 year service in the company
despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded rather than punished
for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification. The award is made
on the ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover,
such award puts a premium on dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring
corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with
her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense
but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after working faithfully with the
company for ten years. In support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases of
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile
Corporation of Davao, where the employees were dismissed for cause but were
nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social and compassionate justice.
Issue: WON Separation pay is proper.
Held:
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice
only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the
valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the
wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that
he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect
a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to
do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who
do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it
is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly
will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane
society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an
impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so
only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection
of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted
the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.
PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The
Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf
of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power
of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban
in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.

Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case
at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found
by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted.
The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be
considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty
that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of
service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social
justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.
Petition granted.
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity)
filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which
establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under
a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other
related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional
right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual
artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance
of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the
constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies
only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does
not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment
ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police
power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit
in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc.
(Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the
trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an
order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the
compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also
however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted
a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State.
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld
as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when
their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to
the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as
to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action
to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as
not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that
licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of
various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid
written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not
claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right
under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet
reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.