From Maidan To A Revolution of Dignity

From Maidan to a Revolution of Dignity:
Understanding the EuroMaidan and Ukraine’s

subsequent political developments
Mara Olteanu (15009718)
Dissertation Supervisor: A. Grebner
March 26th, 2019
The Hague University of App lied Sciences
Faculty of Management and Organisation
European Studies
Word count: 18,890 words
1
Executive Summary
The purpose of this dissertation is to contextually analyse the 2013/14 Ukrainian Revolution of
Dignity – also known as the EuroMaidan – and to consequently examine the political impact it had
on the country. Thus, the central research question of the dissertation is the following: How did the
EuroMaidan Revolution of Dignity change the political situation in Ukraine? For a more
comprehensive structure, a series of sub-questions were formulated, which are more elaborately
outlined in the methodology. The sub-questions represented the basis for drafting the chapters
which constitute the results section.
The five chapters of the results section were drafted according to the sub-questions. The first
chapter was designed to put forward a historical overview of Ukraine and the narrative of
EuroMaidan, including the involvement of the Berkut– the Ukrainian Special Police Forces– in the
events. Moreover, the second chapter provides a comparison between the EuroMaidan and the
Orange Revolution, hence offering a better understanding of why the Revolution of Dignity
occurred. Next, the third chapter focuses on how the Russian media interpreted and covered the
events in the light of EuroMaidan. The following chapter constitutes a representation of the way
social media was used in the organisation of the protests and to which extent it was or was not
mobilizing. Lastly, the final chapter highlights the political prospects and developments post-
EuroMaidan, it describes Ukraine’s post-revolutionary relations with the EU and Russia, and it
presents different experts’ views on the direction in which the state is currently moving.
The findings are followed by an analysis in which the data from the results are interpreted and
analysed. Furthermore, a conclusion and recommendations are drawn. What one can conclude
from this dissertation is that EuroMaidan was a revolution which Ukraine needed to witness, as it
created a stronger collective identity, a more active civil society and paved the way for new reforms
in different sectors. EuroMaidan also succeeded in distancing the country from Russia and bringing
it closer to Europe. Nevertheless, because of the Revolution, two tragic events occurred: the
annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in the Donbass. The lack of action and support from the
European Community in this matter has made part of the population sceptical regarding the real
intentions of the EU. On the other hand, the youth and NGOs, on a more optimistic note, are
working towards fighting corruption and injustice in order to pave the way for European integration.
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 2
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 5
Methodology.................................................................................................................. 7
1. Research questions and sub-questions ................................................................................ 7
2. Qualitative desk research .................................................................................................... 8
3. Interviews ......................................................................................................................... 10
4. Limitations ........................................................................................................................ 11
Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 12
1. Social movements ............................................................................................................. 12
2. Political activism ............................................................................................................... 12
3. Collective identity .............................................................................................................. 14
4. Social media and contemporary citizen activism ................................................................ 15
5. Far-right involvement in the protests................................................................................. 16
1. The EuroMaidan: Past and Present ........................................................................... 21
1.1. Historical Overview ........................................................................................................ 21
1.2. EuroMaidan: a social movement ..................................................................................... 22
1.3. Berkut involvement in the protests ................................................................................. 25

1.3.1. 30 November-1 December 2013 ....................................................................................................26
1.3.2. 19-23 January 2014 ........................................................................................................................27
1.3.3. 18-20 February 2014 .....................................................................................................................29
2. Comparing the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution ........................................... 31
2.1. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution .......................................................................................... 31
2.2. The Orange Revolution vs EuroMaidan ........................................................................... 32

2.2.1. Duration .........................................................................................................................................33
2.2.2. Location..........................................................................................................................................33
2.2.3. Size .................................................................................................................................................33
2.2.4. Actors involved...............................................................................................................................34
2.2.5. Protest claims .................................................................................................................................36
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From Maidan to a Revolution of Dignity: Mara Olteanu
Understanding the EuroMaidan and Ukraine’s subsequent political developments
2.2.6. Rise in violence...............................................................................................................................37
3. Kremlin’s interpretation and coverage of the EuroMaidan ........................................ 38
4. EuroMaidan and social media................................................................................... 42
4.1. Activism and social media ............................................................................................... 42
4.2. Social media and self-organization .................................................................................. 43
5. Political prospects and developments post Euro-Maidan .......................................... 45
5.1. Ukraine between EU and Russia post-EuroMaidan.......................................................... 45
5.2. Five years after the EuroMaidan – Experts’ view ............................................................. 48
Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 50
1. EuroMaidan and its course of action .................................................................................. 50
2. Developments ................................................................................................................... 52
3. Retrogressions ................................................................................................................... 53
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 54
Recommendations........................................................................................................ 56
References.................................................................................................................... 57
Appendices ................................................................................................................... 64
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................ 64
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................ 72
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................ 75
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Introduction
As William Jay Risch wrote, “It has been over four years since late February 2014, when the sky over
downtown Kyiv turned black, one of its main streets became awash with blood, and over 100 people
were killed in Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution. The blood shed on Kyiv’s Instytutska Street and
Hrushevsky Street over 18-20 February 2014 brought about the sudden end to the pro-Russian
regime of Viktor Yanukovych. It provoked counter-protests in Crimea and the Donbas region, and
Russian military intervention, leading to Crimea’s illegal annexation by Russia and a war in the
Donbas that continues to the present day” (Risch, 2018).
As a former Soviet country, Ukraine’s political, economic and socio-cultural ties with Russia are
heavily rooted in its history. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s desire for European integration is consistently
rising (Stepanenko & Pylynskyi, 2015). A remarkable event demonstrating Ukraine’s will for
complete “de-sovietisation” was the EuroMaidan’s Revolution of Dignity. EuroMaidan – the protest
movement – occurred in Ukraine, on November 21, 2013, when President Yanukovych unilaterally
delayed the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU (Shveda & Park, 2016). This 180-
degree flop was caused by Yanukovych’s alignment with Russia – which shifted back and forth from
2008 until 2013. During this series of events, thousands of demonstrators, most of which were
students, rushed into the streets of Kyiv. After Berkut–the Ukraine Special Police Forces– had
brutally beaten the activists protesting on Maidan –the Independence Square– the student protest
quickly evolved into a mass popular uprising with a common national scope, to overthrow the
existing executive power (Shveda & Park, 2016). In addition, according to Averre and Wolczuk, the
turmoil which erupted in the streets of Kyiv, further known as the EuroMaidan, rapidly led to what
has been regarded as “the collapse of the post-Cold War regional order in the wider Europe” (Averre
& Wolczuk, 2016).
It is a particularly interesting topic to analyse, as a country which is strongly connected, historically

speaking, to one of the world’s most controversial states could be motivated and ambitious enough
to redirect itself towards a completely new way of governing, with different reforms and integrated
European values (Szeptycki, 2014). Moreover, according to Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna
Klympush-Tsynadze, the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement which entered into force
on September 1st, 2017 would slowly enable it to adjust to the European level, by creating political
and economic systems resembling other EU countries (Kosova, 2017).
Nevertheless, even though the international media has portrayed the EuroMaidan series of protests
as a step forward for the country’s appropriation to the EU, various academic experts believe the
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Euromaidan Revolution was a failure. To exemplify, William Jay Risch – Assistant Professor of the
History and Geography Department at the Georgia College and State University– claims that the
series of events have brought the country on an even more unfortunate path than it had formerly
been the case (Risch, 2018). As such, according to him, “while Ukraine has signed an Association
Agreement with the European Union, a goal of the EuroMaidan protests, at least 10,000 people
have been killed in the war in the Donbass” (Risch, 2018). Besides this, Risch stresses that more than
1.4 million people have become seriously injured as a consequence of the Revolution, corruption is
at its peak under the new regime of Petro Poroshenko and NGOs, a consistent part of the press and
various activists are continuously prosecuted by the government (Risch, 2018). On top of
everything, as the author mentions, almost no one was held accountable for the deaths of over 100
people in late February 2014, when the protesters were massively abused by the Special Forces in
their ceaseless try to regain territory (Risch, 2018).
Furthermore, in order to obtain a more thorough understanding of the events and its consequent
political developments, as well as comprehending the multiple different views of the academia, the
central research question of this dissertation is as follows How did the EuroMaidan Revolution of
Dignity change the political situation in Ukraine?
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Methodology
This section aims to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the methods used during the
research and writing phases. The process of obtaining and selecting relevant information and
evidence for the dissertation is vital in due consideration of the research question. This will be
supported by formulating sub-questions, which will serve to guide the analysis and conclusion of
the dissertation. As such, the main research question and the derived sub-questions will be
presented in this chapter. Next, the research methods used will be explained. Thus, qualitative desk
research is highlighted as a principal approach and qualitative interviews are briefly discussed as a
further research method. Lastly, the research limitations are outlined to provide the reader with
an explanation concerning the gaps that can be found throughout the dissertation.
1. Research questions and sub-questions
Research question: How did the EuroMaidan Revolution of Dignity change the political situation in
Ukraine?
Sub-questions:
1. How was the political situation in Ukraine shaped before the EuroMaidan protests and what
were the main events which led to the start of the Revolution?
2. What was Berkut’s– the Ukrainian Special Police Forces– involvement in the protests?
3. EuroMaidan past and present: What were the main differences between the Orange Revolution
and EuroMaidan?
4. Kremlin: How did the Russian media portray the EuroMaidan crisis?
5. How did social media contribute to the organisation of the events?
6. What were Ukraine’s political prospects & developments post-EuroMaidan and in which
manner where its external relations with Russia and the EU affected?
The above-mentioned sub-questions represent the basis for the research and the results section.
To answer the first two sub-questions, the first chapter of the results – The EuroMaidan: Past and
Present – is drafted. The third sub-question is answered in the second chapter – Comparing the
EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution. The fourth sub-question is incorporated into the third
chapter – Kremlin’s interpretation and coverage of the EuroMaidan. The fourth chapter –
EuroMaidan and social media–includes the results of the fifth sub-question. Finally, the sixth
subquestion represents the base for the last chapter of the results section – Political prospects and
developments post-EuroMaidan.
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2. Qualitative desk research
During the research process, qualitative, rather than quantitative desk research was used to collect
secondary data, or sources which derive from previous research, studies or the academic world.
Qualitative desk research is defined by Earl Babbie as a scientific method of research to gather
nonnumerical data, which refers to the concepts definitions, characteristics, meanings or
metaphors (Babbie, 2007).
The primary research method used was desk research for the gathering of secondary data, by
thoroughly investigating scholarly work regarding the timeline of the EuroMaidan, its leading
factors, how the conflict was mediatised, what role was played by social media during the events
and what were the country’s consequent political developments. The main types of sources used
for the dissertation were books, journals, academic articles and reports and internet articles.
In order to comprehend the timeline and the main factors and events leading to the conflict, the
content of EuroMaidan Press–an independent online journal covering events in Ukraine– was
investigated (EuroMaidan Press, n.d.). In addition, the research was as well based on a journal
article by Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse entitled The Maidan in Movement. Diversity and the
Cycles of Protest. Based on interviews with protesters, politicians, activists, journalists and focus
groups with ordinary citizens, this paper maps “the actors, claims and frames of each phase in the
protest cycle. It highlights the diversity of actors and the inability of activists and party leaders to
coordinate as the central features of the protests.” (Onuch & Sasse, 2016). Besides this, a paper
published by Yuriy Shveda and Joung Ho Park in the Journal of Eurasian Studies will as well be used
to investigate the dynamics of EuroMaidan (Shveda & Park, 2016).
Moreover, Berkut’s police violent approach during the Euromaidan protests was significant for the
research. In order to understand if the Berkut’s intervention was only a political strategy in order
to defeat the protesters, several sources were looked into, such as an article published by Taras
Fedirko entitled Police violence and ideas of the state in Ukrainian Euromaidan, which focuses on
how the pro-Kremlin ex Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych used Berkut as a tool to cease the
protests and to comply with Russian orders (Fedirko, 2014).
Additionally, Olga Onuch’s work entitled Maidan’s Past and Present: Comparing the Orange
Revolution and the EuroMaidan was thoroughly used for drafting the chapter focusing on the
comparison between EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution, which served to comprehend the
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two events in terms of motives, organisation and mobilization, actors involved and political
aftermaths.
Furthermore, in other to be able to examine the political changes and the country’s external
relations with the EU and Russia post-EuroMaidan, the ideas and judgements projected by Viktor
Stepanenko and Yaroslav Pylynskyi in their work entitled Ukraine after the EuroMaidan. Challenges
and Hopes was prominently consulted. The book examines the multiple aspects of Ukraine’s
current crisis and its political upheaval. Among others, the authors focus their work on the factors
behind the country’s transformation, exploring the relevant political, economic and social reasons.
Moreover, they analyse the impact of the 2013/14 Ukrainian Revolution on European and global
politics as well as the new challenges of severe reforms the country is currently facing (Stepanenko
& Pylynskyi, 2015).
Equally, William Jay Risch’s article, published earlier this year in March, entitled Turning a protest
into (someone else’s) metaphysics, was of high relevance to the research, particularly since it
displays a unique analysis of the events. To this regard, the author contradicts, using factual data,
objective arguments and legitimate examples, Euromaidan’s coverage of historian Marci Shore of
Yale University. In his article, Risch extensively criticises Shore’s book, stressing that “it rectifies the
excessive attention observers paid to the geopolitics of Euromaidan” (Risch, 2018). He further
expresses that “it does not address Ukraine’s current political situation and does not predict any
political outcomes” (Risch, 2018).
The work of Ph.D. Ivan Katchanovski from the School of Political Studies of the University of Ottawa,
entitled The Far Right in Ukraine During the “Euromaidan” and the War in Donbas was investigated
and used in the theoretical framework of the dissertation. The paper draws an analysis of the far
right’s role in the national politics of Ukraine during EuroMaidan and the war in the Donbas.
On the same note, Luke Harding’s article entitled Kiev's protesters: Ukraine uprising was no neoNazi
power-grab” was also relevant for the theoretical framework. However, contrary to Katchanovski’s
and Risch’s thought processes, Harding’s empirical research and further judgement led to the
statement that Kremlin wrongfully interpreted the Ukrainian nationalist groups’ participation in the
protests as a fascist coup d’état.
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3. Interviews
Furthermore, while desk research is of particular importance to understanding what triggered the
EuroMaidan Revolution, how it was internally and externally shaped and to what extent it affected
Ukraine’s domestic politics and its consequent relations with the EU and Russia, further field
research was conducted through the means of interviews. As such, in order to gather more in-
depth information with an authentic touch and to compare the different thoughts and perspectives
on the issue, two interviews were conducted with Laura Starink, author, journalist and reporter
specialised in Eastern European politics and with Olena Vlasenko, First Secretary at the Embassy of
Ukraine in The Hague.
The interview conducted with Laura Starink was vital for gathering objective and unbiased evidence
and data about EuroMaidan, the different actors involved in the protest, the impact it had on the
country, what changes and developments brought upon Ukraine’s politics and how it influenced
the future of the country. Moreover, the information gathered during the interview revealed how
Russia and the EU influenced the course of events and what was their involvement before
EuroMaidan, during the protests and after. Finally, the interview was concluded with Starink’s view
regarding the future prospects for Ukraine and in which direction the country will be going.
Furthermore, the interview conducted with Olena Vlasenko was not particularly extensive due to
lack of time, nevertheless, it significantly contributed to the research process of the dissertation.
One of the most interesting aspects of the interview was that Mrs Vlasenko responded to the
questions from a Ukrainian citizen’s perspective, leaving aside her professional position within the
embassy. On the contrary to Starink’s slightly pessimistic view regarding EuroMaidan and the
impact it left on the country, Vlasenko seemed to portray EuroMaidan as a heroic social movement
that Ukraine had needed for a long time. Overall, her most notable claim was that EuroMaidan
united the Ukrainian citizens and formed a more enhanced civil society that, with some effort, could
be able to fight corruption. Moreover, according to her, even though EU’s support during
EuroMaidan was not necessarily present, cooperation came afterwards with the signing of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement, which represented a significant milestone for the country. Lastly,
in her views, political progress exists, nevertheless, at a slow speed.
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The two interviews were highly useful for the gathering of primary data, as they provided two
reliable, but different views on the subject, which consequently facilitated the drafting of a more
thorough analysis.
4. Limitations
As far as limitations are concerned, one of them consists in the lack of interviews conducted with
Ukrainian NGOs, that could have provided more insightful data regarding the development of
EuroMaidan and how it further impacted the political situation of the country. Apart from that,
another issue lied in the difficulty of finding unbiased sources. As the topic of the dissertation has
been thoroughly debated not only in Ukraine and Russia, but also in the Western society, there was
a predisposition for using western publications, due to the incapacity of reading Russian and
Ukrainian material. As such, some parts of the paper do not present completely unbiased content.
Nevertheless, when dealing with controversial topics, the aim has been to seek out multiple
scholarly views, in order to minimise the influence of propaganda or bias in the research and
writing.
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Theoretical Framework
1. Social movements
According to Mario Diani, “social movements are defined as networks of informal interactions
between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural
conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities. It is argued that the concept is sharp enough
to differentiate social movements from related concepts such as interest groups, political parties,
protest events and coalitions, to identify a specific area of investigation and theorising for social
movement research” (Diani, 1992). In essence, as Ph.D. Adrian Hatos claims, almost all definitions
of social movements emphasize their collective, protesting or claiming nature and the fact that they
are aimed at changing not only the political/economic/social status-quo, in different forms and
instances, but also the conventional way of action (Hatos, 2007, p. 373). They should not be
associated with collective explosive phenomena such as spontaneous protests or revolts, which are
of short duration and are often very poorly organized, being, unlike these, lasting operations and
often very sophisticated as an organization (Hatos, 2007, p. 373).
Their actions aim at redistributing certain social rights - material, political or symbolic - into a more
or less open conflict with the political power or the social elite, in which they usually use tactics
outside conventional politics. One of the theorists of the field, Charles Tilly, has also defined social
movements as "a form of politics but by other means" (Tilly, 2004). The vague formulations in the
definitions point to the difficulties of the operationalization of social movements. For example, the
relationship between conventional politics and social movement tactics highlights connections far
more complicated than the simple confrontation suggested here: ecological movements in
countries such as Germany or Sweden promote their programs through political parties enshrined
in the institutionalized political competition (Hatos, 2007, p. 374). Likewise, the mobilization of US
public opinion, by social movements, around some themes, produces increased rates of
participation in ordinary elections (Hatos, 2007, p. 374).
2. Political activism
Political activism is an attitude, a rule of conduct or a political commitment that favours short-term
direct action over theoretical principles and long-term actions. To achieve the desired economic,
political, environmental or social change, activism can go as far as defying the law, sometimes in a
violent way, by questioning legality with regard to legitimacy (Norris, 2007, p.633). Political activism
is often used as a last resort when legal policy means are or seem impossible. Some activists
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voluntarily reject the legal means of political action in principle, such as refusal to participate in
alliances, or for the sake of efficiency, for instance, due to the weight of the media and the role of
public opinion (Norris, 2007, p.633).
What counts as activism depends on what is conventional. According to Brian Martin, Social
Sciences Professor at the University of Wollongong in Australia, “in societies in which free speech
is respected and protected, making a posting on an e-mail list complaining about the government
is a routine occurrence” (Martin, 2007, p. 19). Nonetheless, in authoritarian regimes, the
probability that this type of action may be perceived as subversive is notably high and will, most
certainly, be punished accordingly. Equivalently, in a society where strikes are prohibited, going on
strike is a more audacious form of activism than when they are legal and represent a common
practice (Martin, 2007, p.19).
As Martin suggests, “activism is typically undertaken by those with less power, because those with
positions of power and influence can usually accomplish their aims using conventional means”
(Martin, 2007, p.20). Sometimes, however, those in positions of power who go beyond average
expectations can also be labelled as activists, i.e. an activist president or an activist court (Martin,
2007, p.20).
Activism is most commonly embodied in the form of public protests, i.e. rallies, marches or public
meetings. According to Martin, this represents a useful starting place for determining the different
methods of activism. Political activism can take the form of non-violent action, violent action and
violence against physical objects (Martin, 2007, p.21). Firstly, the methods of non-violent action
can be divided into three main types, namely, methods of protest and persuasion (speeches,
slogans, banners, picketing, vigils, singing, marches and teach-ins), non-cooperation (religious
excommunication, disobeying social customs, protest emigration, rent strike, producers' boycott,
withdrawal of bank deposits, international trade embargo, and a wide variety of strikes) and
intervention (sit-ins, nonviolent occupations, guerrilla theatre, fasting, and setting up alternative
economic and political institutions) (Martin, 2007, p.21). Secondly, there is violent action, such as
beatings, imprisonment, torture, killing, and bombing, which is usually carried out by freedom
fighters and terrorist groups (Martin, 2007, p. 22). Lastly, violence against physical objects can take
the form of sabotage, which include damaging a pipeline, destroying genetically engineered crops,
or defacing a website (Martin, 2007, p.22).
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The various methods of activism are in continuous expansion, alongside with political opportunity
and development. A relatively new practice called culture jamming, which involves a
transformation of conventional symbols is arising to challenge consumer culture. Moreover, what
can be noticed nowadays is an increase in online activism, which relies on Internet and social media
platforms for communication and further organisation of collective actions such as protests, revolts
and even social movements (Martin, 2007, p.22).
Furthermore, Martin (2007) concluded that insufficient focus is attributed to activism in scholarly
works:
Activism, despite its importance historically and in struggles every day, has received
relatively little attention from scholars. Most history is written about powerful and
prominent people and about official systems and activities, such as governments,
elections, militaries, and wars. Even when the focus is on a social problem, such as
slavery, there is consideration attention to official actions, such as President
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. The vast amount of individual and small-
group activism may be given only a brief discussion or be entirely ignored (p.24).
3. Collective identity
As Jacquelien van Stekelenburg wrote, during the past four centuries, movement scholars have
significantly emphasized the importance of collective identity as a stimulating factor for protest
participation and civic uprisings. Collective identity is perceived as an “emergent group
phenomenon” (Stekelenburg, 2013, pp. 310-311). According to Alberto Melucci, “Collective
identity is an interactive, shared definition of the field of opportunities and constraints offered to
collective action produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is
constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to
groups” (Melucci, 1989, p.793).
Throughout time, several theories of collective identity have been identified. Among those, the two
most important rely on the essentialist and constructivist perspective.
3.1. Essentialist perspective
References to essentialism are very common in current literature. As suggested by Sayer (1997),
there are many variations and also criticism to essentialism, each changing with the context and
issue under debate (Sayer, 1997, p. 456). According to the essentialist perspective, collective
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identity is something natural, essential, and permanent, that resonates in all people. Moreover, it
is pre-existing to social actors, being a biological, psychological, cultural or regional emerging.
Finally, the essentialist perception of collective identity implies that members of a community
internalize the same essential features in a unitary way, which suggests a determined and a unique
social experience (Sayer, 1997, p.460).
3.2. Constructivist perspective
Contemporary constructivist conceptions appear in response to previous theories that derive their
explanations from the assumption of the existence of some final states and the limitations imposed
on the social actors. The emphasis is shifted from the superstructure, also known as essence, to the
social actor and on his / her skills or capabilities (Jasper & Polleta, 2001, p. 293). According to Jasper
and Polleta, as people do not have one essence, they have no single constructivism. On the
contrary, the range of theories that can be included under this umbrella term is much wider and
more varied. What ultimately unites them are the basic assumptions about knowledge and social
reality that are being built, changed or even multiplied (Jasper & Polletta, 2001, p. 295). Moreover,
things do not exist in themselves, they are just categories or constructs generated by people’s
perceptions. Transposed in terms of assumptions about identity, this idea can take any of the
following forms: Collective identity is a social construction; Collective identity is instrumental;
Collective identity is a contextual representation, without substance, thus multiply and fluid (Jasper
& Polletta, 2001, p. 300).
4. Social media and contemporary citizen activism
As Ph. D Panayiota Tsatsou implies, in the last decade, scholars, researchers and practitioners have
extensively debated on whether the internet and its affiliated technologies have exhilarated,
developed or empowered contemporary citizen activism and popular uprisings or if they have
plainly placed them in diverse “technological, communicative and institutional contexts” (Tsatsou,
2018, p. 1). Moreover, discussions focusing on the role of online media in citizen activism have
provided erratic and splintered insights (Tsatsou, 2018, p. 1). As Tsatsou claims, there are various
forms of citizen activism that have been shaped throughout time and within different contexts.
Also, the links between citizen activism and online mediated forms of communication are still not
well-defined (Tsatsou, 2018, p. 1). In addition, according to Tsatsou (2018), ‘’the distinction
between online and offline activism, the associated role of online technologies, and which
15
affordances of those technologies (i.e. networking, communication, collaboration) play the most
important role and why are issues that cannot be tackled with ease” (Tsatsou, 2018, p. 1).
Determining whether online or offline is the most efficient method of approaching activism is quite
impossible. Nonetheless, as Tsatsou concludes, scholars who can extensively debate on the issue
of online communication in citizen activism and the different perimeters between online and offline
activism as productive areas of analysis must also direct their attention towards inspecting “the
difficult issues of size, quality, level, forms/means, organisational structures, and effects” (Tsatsou,
2018, p. 1).
5. Far-right involvement in the protests
A common practice in protests and social movements is the implication of far-right groups and
organisations. During EuroMaidan, besides the main actors involved in the mass mobilization
process, namely, activists and SMOs, foreign actors, the political elite and the ordinary citizens,
farright factions also made their presence intensely felt.
As a contrast to Berkut’s implication in the EuroMaidan protests, it is of significant relevance to

understand the participation of the far-right groups in the series of events. According to Ivan
Katchanovski, Ph.D. at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, the problem
regarding the involvement of the Ukrainian far-right groups in the EuroMaidan and the war in the
Donbas region has been ‘’politicized and polarized’’ (Katchanovski, 2015). In the author’s view,
Russian and separatist politicians together with the Kremlin media had a common tendency of
presenting the EuroMaidan events as a fascist coup d’état (Katchanovski, 2015). On the other hand,
Katchanovski claims that Western governments and mainstream media were inclined to display the
role of the far right in the EuroMaidan Revolution and in post-Maidan Ukraine as minimal
(Katchanovski, 2015).
As such, important to acknowledge when analysing the organisation of the EuroMaidan protests is
the involvement of the Ukrainian right-wing party Pravy Sektor, translated as the Right Sector Party,
formerly led by deputy Andriy Tarasenko (Harding, 2014). According to Ivan Katchanovski, various
evidence was revealed concerning the Right Sector’s involvement in a violent attack on the Berkut
police on November 30, 2013, when a significant number of protesters appeared in Kyiv’s
Independence Square (Katchanovski, 2016). Besides this, as Katchanovski asserts, “the organization
had a crucial role in the violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government, in particular, in
16
the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police, on February 18-20, 2014” (Katchanovski,
2016).
Moreover, according to journalist Luke Harding, members of the organisation took part in the
protests and the young volunteers of the group have subsequently hijacked a store and a city
council office. Most of the allegations coming from Russian supporters and Kremlin itself pointed
to the Right Sector as being fascist, strongly relying on their hypothesis that the events in Kiev were
an ultranationalist takeover led by the Right Sector (Harding, 2014).
After becoming aware of the variety of negative comments coming from Kremlin and its advocates,
Right Sector’s deputy leader Andriy Tarasenko stated, in an interview with The Guardian, that his
party was not willing to implicate itself in any post-revolutionary party politics. (Harding, 2014).
According to Harding (2014), Tarasenko further declared that his organisation rather “sought to
transform the relationship between people and power”, statement which remained open to
interpretation (Harding, 2014). In addition, he expressed his desire for the Ukrainian government
to implement a law permitting the members of his party to carry weapons, offering as an example
Switzerland’s situation. Moreover, as a reaction to President Putin’s comments regarding the
ultranationalist takeover, Tarasenko argued that “Putin is the fascist. He’s the occupier” (Harding,
2014). What is more, as Harding expresses, when faced with accusations, Tarasenko denied the
fact that his party was anti-Semitic, stating that “I met with the Israeli ambassador. We had
absolutely normal relations. We want to trade with Israel” (Harding, 2014).
Contrary to Kremlin’s beliefs, various experts strongly believe that Russian propaganda regarding
the far-right Ukrainian organisation is what confused the Western society (Harding, 2014). To
exemplify, Olexiy Haran, a politics professor and a member of the Maidan's organising committee,
articulated his resentment regarding the Russian accusations of fascist behaviour targeting the
Right Sector’s activities and organisation (Harding, 2014). Because of the allegations, the Western
society showed its concern and presented its support for Ukraine. To exemplify, Haran declared
that “I’ve had liberal Harvard professors asking me about this. We are talking traditional Russian
propaganda” (Harding, 2014).
According to Harding, as a means to counter-attack Kremlin’s statements regarding the far-right as

being ultranationalist and fascist, Haran together with experts focusing on post-Soviet Ukrainian
radicalism described the nature of EuroMaidan as a “confusing mosaic” (Harding, 2014). Moreover,
they stated that the protesters, coming from different backgrounds and being driven by different
17
sets of motivation, only turned “violent in response to increasing police ferocity and the
radicalisation of Yanukovych's regime” (Harding, 2014).
In addition, another right-wing party involved in the EuroMaidan Revolution was Svoboda,
translated into English as “Freedom”. As it was the case with the Right Sector, Svoboda was as well
involved in the attempts to assault the presidential administration on the 1st of December 2013 and
subsequently, in the overthrow of the Ukrainian Parliament in January and on February 18, 2014
(Katchanovski, 2016).
Svoboda was created in 1991 as an anti-communist movement and previously known by the name
of the Socio-National Party of Ukraine (Harding, 2014). As Harding suggests, the party was born
from neo-fascists roots, having had as a symbol a swastika-like Wolfsangel. In 2004, Oleh
Tyahnybok took office as the new leader of the former Socio-National Party of Ukraine and further
intended to erase the party’s neo-fascists background, by changing its name into Svoboda,
translated into English as Freedom (Harding, 2014). Moreover, the party is highly supported by the
country’s Western citizens, with particular focus on the Galicians, having polled over 10% in the
2012 elections (Harding, 2014). Consequently, it won thirty-eight seats in the parliament composed
of 450 seats. Besides this, as Harding affirms, “Svoboda is now part of Ukraine's government,
holding four cabinet positions, including deputy prime minister” (Harding, 2014).
Furthermore, as various academic observers claimed, the party appeared to have avoided
displaying xenophobic behaviour over the past decade. To support this statement, Geoffrey Pyatt,
former US ambassador in Kiev, expressed his content with Svoboda’s constant evolution, especially
regarding its political activities within Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. According to Harding, the former
ambassador subsequently asserted that “they have demonstrated their democratic bona fides”
(Harding, 2014). Additionally, as Harding suggests, the party’s involvement and leading initiative in
the EuroMaidan Revolution was of significant relevance. As a result, eighteen of Svoboda’s
members were shot during the protests (Harding, 2014).
Similar to the situation in which the Right Sector was implicated, Svoboda was as well accused by
the Russian government of conducting anti-Semitic activities (Harding, 2014). Nevertheless, as
Harding asserts, Ukraine's chief rabbi, Moshe Reuven Azman stated, in an interview with The
Guardian, that there had been no signs of anti-Semitic repercussions from Svoboda’s or the Right
Sector’s part, neither before or after the EuroMaidan protests (Harding, 2014). In addition,
according to Harding, when rabbi Azman was asked about his opinion regarding the activities of the
18
country’s far-right organizations, he responded simply “I haven't read their programme. I've been
in touch with Jewish communities across Ukraine. Nobody told us of anti-Semitic statements"
(Harding, 2014).
Subsequently, as Harding declared (2014), “Nayem, Haran and others in Kiev argue that the
Kremlin's description of a neo-Nazi power-grab is unfounded. A better critique, they say, is that the
politicians now in charge are from the same political class that has failed Ukraine in the past, and
that the Russian-speaking east of the country – Yanukovych's heartland, bordering Russia – is
under-represented” (Harding, 2014).
On the other hand, William Jay Risch strongly believes that the far-right organisations advocated
for and instigated violence during the EuroMaidan protests. As Risch puts it, their vision of defeating
the Yanukovych regime served as a purpose to fulfil their “long-expected national revolution”
(Risch, 2018). Besides this, as various evidence shows, Risch asserts that the far-right activists,
during most of their attacks, were synchronised with the riot police and the Berkut forces. For
instance, the far-right instigators seized control over Kyiv’s City Hall building on the 1st of December
2013, while consequently attempting to overthrow the Presidential Administration Building, that
same day (Risch, 2018). According to the author, “Video cameras from the time show one radical
nationalist crossing riot police lines unhindered, as rioters assaulted police with chains and rocks
and drove a bulldozer at their ranks” (Risch, 2018). In addition to this, the radical groups destroyed
the Lenin monument in Kyiv, on the 8th of December 2013. The suspicions arose subsequent to the
fact that, during the night of the incident, the riot police were not there to prevent the attack, as it
had formerly been during the previous two attempts (Risch, 2018).
Further, Risch reinforced his arguments targeting the far-right activists as instigators, while
contradicting Shore’s representation of the 18-20 February 2014 violent attacks. According to
Shore, the assaults were initiated by the Berkut forces on the protesters, who were marching
towards the Parliament to request a change of constitution, as the one implemented in 2004 (Risch,
2018). The reality is, as Risch suggests, that a member of one of the radical groups, who was leading
the crowd towards the Parliament, wrecked the fence that was separating the protesters from the
police and started to fight it (Risch, 2018). As a result, the Berkut forces responded to the attacks
by striking the people and throwing at them with grenades, tear gas and rubber bullets (Risch,
2018).
Consequently, as Risch claims, someone not particularly up to date with the events would believe,
after hearing Shore’s portrayal of the circumstances, that the Berkut police started shooting at the
19
demonstrators, to break up the protests, a second time after their failed attempt during the night
of 18-19 February (Risch, 2018). The first try of the armed forces to clear the Independence Square
was unsuccessful, as a consequence of the truce created between Yanukovych and the opposition
leaders. Nevertheless, the armistice was broken the following morning, by instigators from the
Maidan (Risch, 2018). According to Risch “Men with shotguns appeared at the conservatory, where
protesters were staying after the Trade Unions Building had burned down. They started firing at
police forces above the Maidan, killing Berkut officers and breaking the truce. Then protesters
rushed forward, up Instytutska Street, as if to retake those positions the Maidan had occupied prior
to 18 February” (Risch, 2018).
20
1. The EuroMaidan: Past and Present
1.1. Historical Overview
As Ukrainian journalist Taras Voznyak explains, for a better understanding of the current situation
in Ukraine, it is important to comprehend its modern history. As the dust settled after World War
I, Ukraine was defeated and divided, and the Soviets controlled much of the country. In 1922,
Ukraine, along with Russia, became the founding members of the Soviet Union (Voznyak, 2015).
Then, in 1932, the great famine began and up to 10 million Ukrainians starved to death. According
to Voznyak, one of the factors than worsened the situation were the policies created by the new
head of the communist party, Joseph Stalin (Voznyak, 2015). Soon after came the Great Terror
embodied by two waves of Stalinist political repression and persecution in the Soviet Union, which
resulted in the killing of approximately 682 thousand people, including 80 percent of the Ukrainian
cultural elite and three-quarters of all the Ukrainian Red Army’s higher-ranking officers (Voznyak,
2015).
A while after came the outbreak of the Second World War. As described by The Daily Conversation,
german armies invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, beginning four straight years of ceaseless
war. In the battle of Kyiv, Axis troops encircled and laid siege to the capital city, act leading to the
death or captivity of more than 600 thousand Soviet soldiers (The Daily Conversation, 2014.
According to The Daily Conversation, the total losses inflicted upon the Ukrainian population during
the war were estimated between five and eight million, including over half a million Jews killed by
Nazi death squads (The Daily Conversation, 2014). While more than seven hundred cities and towns
and 28 thousand villages were destroyed, material losses comprised an estimated 40 percent of
Ukraine’s national wealth (The Daily Conversation, 2014).
Nevertheless, Ukraine bounced back, its economy boomed, and its industrial output doubled from
1940 to 1955 (The Daily Conversation, 2014). According to The Daily Conversation, before long,
Soviet Ukraine soon became a European leader in industrial production and an important centre of
the Soviet arms and high-tech research industries (The Daily Conversation, 2014). Moreover, over
this period, Ukraine was producing many prominent Soviet sports players, scientists and artists, as
well as much of the Soviet leadership, including Leonid Brezhev, who ousted Khrushchev and
became the Soviet leader from 1964 to 1982 (The Daily Conversation, 2014). Further, as The Daily
Conversation illustrates, on 26 April 1986, a reactor in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded,
resulting in the most fatal nuclear reactor accident in history (The Daily Conversation, 2014).
21
Later on, the Soviet Union began to break apart under the weight of the “War of Laws”, a series of
conflicts between the central government of USSR and the governments of the Russian Federation
and other constituent republics, who were each seeking greater autonomy (The Daily Conversation,
2014). As The Daily Conversation describes, on August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian parliament officially
declared independence, which subsequently led to the decline of the economy into depression and
to the loss of 60 percent of the country’s GDP from 1991 to 1999 (The Daily Conversation, 2014).
In 1996, a new currency, the hryvnia, was introduced and by the end on the 1990’s, the economy
began to stabilize (The Daily Conversation, 2014).
Nonetheless, as Voznyak (2014) claims, corruption under Ukraine’s second president set the stage
for the 2004 ascendance of then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych to the Presidency, in elections
that the Ukrainian Supreme Court ruled as falsified (Voznyak, 2015). Yanukovych was then thrown
out of power in the peaceful Orange Revolution in favour of opposition leaders Viktor Yushchenko
and Yulia Tymoshenko, who became president and prime-minister (Voznyak, 2015). According to
Voznyak, the pro-Russian leader then regained the Prime Ministership in 2006, however, he lost a
snap election just a year later, which resulted in Tymoshenko being elected as prime minister again
(Voznyak, 2015).
The Daily Conversation asserts that, further on, in January 2009 came the natural gas crisis in which
Russia stopped supplying gas to Ukraine, in the middle of winter and since Ukraine is itself the main
supply route to much of Europe, the situation was troubling (The Daily Conversation, 2014).
Tymoshenko eventually signed an agreement to reopen the pipes, but not before Ukraine incurred
major economic losses. As a result of the political fallout, Yanukovych was elected president again,
in 2010. Then, in October 2011, Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of
office, due to the signing of the natural gas deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin (The Daily
Conversation, 2014).
1.2. EuroMaidan: a social movement
As The Daily Conversation claims, in 2012, the European Union and Ukraine began negotiations for
it to join the 28-nation group and therefore, President Yanukovych urged the parliament to adopt
laws so that Ukraine would meet the EU criteria (The Daily Conversation, 2014). Nevertheless,
Russia was completely opposed to Ukraine’s association with the EU and, as a consequence,
responded by starting a trade war that resulted in a 10% decline in Ukrainian export revenue from
22
the previous year, or 1.5 billion dollars in losses (The Daily Conversation, 2014). Consequently, the
circumstances brought the 3-month old EuroMaidan protests, which began at the end of 2013,
when Yanukovych, who was feeling the economic pressure, abruptly suspended efforts to join the
EU (The Daily Conversation, 2014). As reported by the Australian media outlet, he then turned
around and signed an agreement with Putin, who offered 15 billion dollars in financial aid and a
33% discount on Russian natural gas (The Daily Conversation, 2014). As a result, the protests have
escalated and have become more violent, with many people having called for the ouster of
Yanukovych and a rejection of the Russian deal, in favour of a complete embrace of Europe (The
Daily Conversation, 2014).
Additionally, following the ideas of Nadia Diuk, Senior Advisor at the National Endowment for
Democracy, the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU would have represented, for
Ukraine, a major step away from the long-lasting attachment with Russia and Eastern Europe (Diuk,
2014). The century-long orientation towards Russia began in the 17th century, when the leaders of
the Ukrainian Cossack signed a treaty with the czar of Muscovy. Moreover, the eastern part of
Ukraine was under Russian occupation until its independence, while the Western part was
governed, for many years, from Vienna or Warsaw, as part of Austria or Poland (Diuk, 2014).
Further on, the disparate parts of Ukraine were ultimately united under the Soviet Union,
nevertheless, the tensions between the east and the west did not disappear (Diuk, 2014).
As Nadia Diuk suggested, “these tensions were reflected in the policies of the past two presidents”
(Diuk, 2014). Coming from the Donbass region, President Yanukovych opted for a more
authoritarian approach, unlike his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, a more Western-oriented
president with pro-European attitudes. However, when Vladimir Putin was re-elected president of
Russia in 2012, he saw Ukraine as a valuable asset for his grandiose plan to create a powerful
Eurasian Union (Diuk, 2014).
Furthermore, Nadia Diuk (2014) asserts that Putin used Ukraine as a tool to minimize the EU’s
sphere of influence:
Putin sought to block the West by reeling in a country that had been negotiating a
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union for
more than two years as part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership not only with Ukraine,
but also with Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ukraine was
ahead of the other in having already initiated an agreement (pp. 3-4).
23
For several months, the EU officials were making plans in the view of a signing ceremony for
Ukraine, believing that the country was indeed intending to sign the Association Agreement.
Following Diuk’s ideas, the most emphasised demand for Ukraine was to renounce to its electoral
laws and, most importantly, to end the so-called “selective justice”, a coded phrase used by the
media to refer to the former imprisonment of ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and other
opposition members, based on politically motivated accusations (Diuk, 2014). Taking everything
into account, especially the will of the EU to compromise on certain points, it seemed that Ukraine
was ready to sign the Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit in November 2013.
Nevertheless, as Diuk illustrates, the shocking turbulence came when President Yanukovych made
a sudden U-turn regarding the signing, claiming that the country was facing austere financial
difficulties that only further negotiations with Russia could ameliorate (Diuk, 2014). Having
declared that, the peaceful marches led by the assembly of students in support of their country’s
future collaboration with the EU suddenly transformed into a “full-fledged movement not only of
protests, but of opposition” (Diuk, 2014).
Interestingly enough, the EuroMaidan was not the first mass protest led by students on Kyiv’s
Independence Square. As Diuk claims, back when Maidan Nezalezhnosti was called Lenin Square, a
large group of students organised a hunger strike, setting up tents under the statue of Lenin (Diuk,
2014). According to her, this manifestation “brought thousands of people into the streets in an
unprecedented show of support for Ukrainian sovereignty that led to a mass vote for independence
from the Soviet Union in a referendum a year later” (Diuk, 2014). Moreover, the protests against
the fraudulent presidential election of 2004 which further turned into the Orange Revolution was
as well led by students and youth groups (Diuk, 2014).
Nonetheless, the EuroMaidan Revolution began as something new, for both its protesters and the
government. According to Diuk, “the student organizers’ rejection of political party symbols was
the first sign that this was not a second coming of the Orange Revolution. This generation of young
Ukrainians was more hard-headed and clear-sighted about the future than their predecessors”
(Diuk, 2014). In addition, even though the members of the opposition put themselves at the lead
of the protest movement, it was without doubt that they had not expected such an uprising and
were catching up with the people already manifesting on the streets of Kyiv (Diuk, 2014).
24
1.3. Berkut involvement in the protests
Since EuroMaidan started in November 2013 in Kyiv, a highly consistent number of Ukrainian
citizens have gathered to protest against the increasingly authoritarian ruling decisions of, at that
time, President Viktor Yanukovych. The base of the protesters’ aggravated discontent was the
violent approach of a special police force known as the Berkut or the “Golden Eagle” (Jacobs, 2014).
As Harrison Jacobs suggests, during the EuroMaidan Protests, the Yanukovych government has
employed up to 5,000 members of the Berkut armed forces, specialized in protest management
and fighting strategies, among which the use of water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets (Jacobs,
2014).
As Jacobs wrote, since their creation, the Berkut police has had a thorough past of abuse, brutality,
dominance, torture and various other measures serving to Ukraine’s political regime (Jacobs, 2014).
Jacobs (2014) presents the circumstances that allowed for the creation of the Berkut forces and
what their mission originally represented:
The force was first formed in 1988 as part of the Soviet OMON (Special Purpose
Police Unit), an elite riot police and paramilitary force. In 1992, after the fall of the
Soviet Union, the force reformed as the Berkut under the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and was stationed in every province. Originally established to fight
organized crime, the force has been increasingly utilized to maintain law and order
and break up mass events, such as riots and protests (Jacobs, 2014).
Additionally, the Berkut has been involved in various scandals. To exemplify, throughout time, they
have violently dispersed peacefully protesting coal miners in 1998, brutally attacked demonstrators
during the Ukraine Without Kuchma protests in 2001 and, as it is well-known by now, they have
aggressively abused the protesters during the EuroMaidan protests (Jacobs, 2014). Prior to being
admitted within the organization, Berkut candidates are prudently nominated and extensively
trained (Jacobs, 2014). As a main requirement to join the armed forces, the members must have
acquired army service during their lives, as well as up to three years of law enforcement expertise
(Jacobs, 2014). Moreover, as Jacobs mentions, they receive an exponentially remuneration
comparing to regular police officers (Jacobs, 2014).
In the article he wrote on the Berkut police, Jacobs (2014) makes the following statement regarding
the authorities:
25
The semi-autonomous Berkut police often act with impunity for their actions,
leading some to call them a mafia-style organization. Some efforts have been made
over the years to rein in Berkut power, most notably by Yuriy Lutsenko (now an
opposition leader) under President Viktor Yushchenko. Lutsenko set up human
rights experts and oversight groups to monitor the activities of the Berkut and
other members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Jacobs, 2014).
Nevertheless, when President Yanukovych took office, these measures were curtailed, as the
former president appointed a close associate to run the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and, since
then, Berkut’s brutality has significantly risen (Jacobs, 2014).
1.3.1. 30 November-1 December 2013
The first substantial attack of the Berkut Special Forces on the protesters was on the night of 30
November 2013, more precisely, at approximately four in the morning (Russia Today, 2013). The
members of the police, armed with batons, grenades, tear gas and munition, used brutal force on
the demonstrators with the purpose of dispersing them from the city’s Maidan, while also impeding
communication through mobile devices (Russia Today, 2013). According to observers, the victims
of the raid led by the Berkut police were not only protesters, but also multiple civilians who were
in the proximity of the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Interfax-Ukraine, 2013). As a consequence of the
police beating defenceless people with truncheons, batons and even their own feet, 35 individuals
were heavily injured, amongst which a Reuters cameraman and a photographer (Interfax-Ukraine,
2013). Further that day, the armed forces continued their mission and surrounded the St. Michael’s
Golden-Domed Monastery, where circa 50 of the EuroMaidan activists found shelter, away from
the brutality of the police (Grytsenko & Shevchenko, 2013).
As a justification, police spokesperson Olha Bilyk, asserted that the raid was put in place as a result
of the protesters’ interference with the arrangements to decorate the Independence Square for
the Christmas Holidays (Kyiv Post, 2013). However, according to Susanna Capelouto and Victoria
Butenko, Minister of Internal Affairs, at that time, Vitaliy Zakharchencko, publicly apologized to the
nation and assured that a consequent investigation will be thoroughly conducted (Capelouto &
Butenko, 2013). Moreover, he declared, via national television, that “if there are calls for mass
disturbances, then we will react to this harshly" (Capelouto & Butenko, 2013). In addition, according
to Interfax-Ukraine, Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Anatoliy Pryshko declared, in an official
statement, that 79 people were injured during the attack, including six students, four reporters,
26
two foreigners and seven policemen. Moreover, ten people were hospitalized (Interfax-Ukraine,
2013).
Further on that day, as the Maidan Square was continuously guarded by the special forces, another
gathering took place at St. Michael’s Monastery (Shevchenko, 2013). As Ukrayinska Pravda
mentions, the ambassadors of ten EU member-states, including Jan Tombinski, former EU
Ambassador in Ukraine, visited the protesters at the meeting in St Michael’s Square (Ukrayinska
Pravda, 2013). According to Daryna Shevchenko, in the afternoon of 30 November, 5,000 more
people joined the meeting shouting “Won’t forgive” and “Revolution” and subsequently started to
form units of self-resistance (Shevchenko, 2013). Moreover, according to Ukrayinska Pravda, up to
10,000 protesters remained at St Michael’s Square that same evening, while 10,000 more travelled
from Lviv to Kiev to join them (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2013).
1.3.2. 19-23 January 2014
Secondly, the following major involvement of the Berkut special forces in the events occurred
between the 19th and 23rd of January 2014, when peaceful protests turned violent (Euromaidan
Press, n.d.). According to Kyiv Post, on January 19th, the ninth protest in a row took place in central
Kiev, where more than 200,000 people gathered to protest against the freshly established
dictatorial law, meant to ban outdoor assembly and demonstration (Kyiv Post, 2014). During the
rally, not only the opposition leaders made their appearances, but also Tetiana Chornovol, the
investigative journalist who was beaten by a group of men, allegedly sent by President Viktor
Yanukovych, the night of December 25, 2013 (Kyiv Post, 2014). Next, the protests escalated into
riots and clashes with the authorities, as thousands of people were marching on the Hrusehvskoho
Street, on their way to the Parliament building (Kyiv Post, 2014). From the 19th until the 21st,
Hrusehvskoho Street was constantly filled with riots and violent protests involving both the
EuroMaidan activists and the opposition (Kyiv Post, 2014).
Further, between 21st and 22nd January, three people were killed during the riots on Hrushevskoho
Street (Kyiv Post, 2014). The first victim was a 22-year old man who fell from a 13metre high portico
in front of the Dynamo Stadium, while being attacked by the Berkut forces. According to various
sources, the debate stands between whether the man jumped from the colonnade in order to
escape the beating or if he was pushed by the police (Kyiv Post, 2014). The second death occurred
on January 22nd, where the victim was shot four times and consequently killed by the Berkut, while
trying to climb the barricades in the protest area (Kyiv Post, 2014). Similar to the previous situation,
the third victim was a Belarusian man, deadly shot by the Special Forces. Following these incidents,
27
the clashes continued on to Lutheran Street, close to the Presidential Administration, where
protesters were throwing Molotov cocktails at the authorities (Kyiv Post, 2014).
As the course of events continued, according to the live updates published by Kyiv Post, in the
morning of January 23rd, the authorities raided and destroyed a Red Cross EuroMaidan medical
centre (Kyiv Post, 2014). Moreover, as it has been the case the previous night, several public
television channels covering EuroMaidan events were temporarily suspended by the government,
soon followed by internet and social media platforms (Kyiv Post, 2014). As the EuroMaidan PR had
declared, further that morning, Vinnytsya riot-control police refused to fight the demonstrators, as
news from the entire country indicated that riot police and military groups were being mobilized
to go to Kyiv to suppress the EuroMaidan protests (Kyiv Post, 2014).
Next, according to Christopher J. Miller, “Several hundred pro-government titushki, or hired thugs,
encircled the U.S. embassy in Kyiv late on Jan. 22 and into the early morning hours of Jan. 23. The
group hurled eggs at the embassy’s welcome sign and chanted held signs that warned the U.S. not
to meddle in Ukraine’s affairs” (Kyiv Post, 2014).
According to the statements of AutoMaidan co-leader Oleksandr Hrytsenko and activists Kateryna
Butko and Yuriy Tebenko, the Berkut forces had attacked and brutally beaten 15 men in Mariinsky
Park, while two of the victims where Oleksandr Hrytsenko and Volodymyr Zelentsov (Kyiv Post,
2014). Also, the authorities had gravely damaged the tires and windows of 9-10 vehicles (Kyiv Post,
2014).
Furthermore, according to Anna Nemtsova, EuroMaidan demonstrators documented police

brutality carried out various times by the Berkut and members of the Internal Troops of Ukraine
(Nemtsova, 2014). The Berkut police and officers of the Internal Troops assaulted not only
protesters, but also random civilians. What is more, they would shame them using excessive foul
language and consequently order them to completely undress (Nemtsova, 2014). Moreover, in a
video uploaded to YouTube by one police officer, Interior Ministry troops tortured and humiliated
a EuroMaidan activist in Kiev's Pechersk region, where he was stripped naked in the cold after being
harshly beaten and further photographed by officers (Nemtsova, 2014). An interview was as well
conducted by BBC News with another protester who was beaten and stabbed by authorities
subsequent to being caught photographing the Hrushevskoho Street riots (BBC, 2014).
28
In addition, also on January 23rd, reports of the events revealed that the Berkut forces were
engaging in the use of improvised grenades, taping nails and other ammunition to conventional
stun-grenades (Afineevsky, 2015). Besides this, Berkut was involved in the kidnapping of a 22-
yearold volunteer of the EuroMaidan medical service, originally from Donetsk (Afineevsky, 2015).
They had confiscated all her identification documents, took her by force outside of the capital and
left her out in a wood line near Vyshhorod, a small city located in the surroundings of Kyiv
(Afineevsky, 2015).
1.3.3. 18-20 February 2014
On February 18, 2014, a crowd of unarmed protesters gathered and marched together, in a
peaceful rally, towards the Parliament building. By the time the crowd arrived at the Mariyinsky
Park, situated nearby the Verkhovna Rada (The Ukrainian Parliament), the Berkut forces and the
“Titushky” –mercenary agents acting as street hooligans with the purpose of committing illegal
acts– intersected the protesters (Afineevsky, 2015). Organized in blockades, they started to attack
and further beat the protesters. According to one of the activists who participated in the
documentary “Winter on Fire”, the “Titushky that were in Mariyinsky Park on February 18th were
different than they were before. They were well trained and organised. It was a well-planned
action” (Afineevsky, 2015).
Further on, at the intersection of Instytutska and Shelkovichna Street, the Berkut forces were
shooting at people from rooftops, throwing bricks at them (Afineevsky, 2015). Besides that, they
were all thoroughly equipped with grenades, tear gas and rubber bullets. Then, as Berkut was
gaining power and various people were severely wounded, the demonstrators retreated back to
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Afineevsky, 2015). As one of the activists remembered, the Berkut occupied
top positions such as the October Palace and the footbridge, in order to be able to fire ideally. Soon
after, the authorities began throwing Molotov cocktails from above (Afineevsky, 2015). According
to Anthropoliteia editor Taras Fedirko, as a response, the crowd counter-attacked by throwing tires
into the fire with the purpose of creating smoke which would harm the Berkut members. The
following action taken by the police was a fire attack over the Trade Union House, which was also
used as an hospital to treat the wounded during the protests (Fedirko, 2014).
By February 20, 2014, one of the bloodies days of “European conflict since the end of the ColdWar”
the shootings were ceaselessly extended, with more people severely injured or dying (Schwartz,
29
2018). While protesters were attacking the Berkut with Molotov cocktails, the authorities
responded with tear gas and rubber bullets (Afineevsky, 2015). One of the victims was Vitya
Chmilenko, a EuroMaidan activist shot by the Berkut while trying to help his wounded peer. By the
time the shootings had stopped, dozens of bodies were laying in the streets (Afineevsky, 2015).
According to Yuriy Shveda and Joung Ho Park, 88 Euromaidan participants were killed between the
18th and the 21st of February 2014. Moreover, as subsequent deaths were counted, including those
who passed due to injuries sustained during the protests, a total of 113 deaths subsequently
resulted (Shveda & Park, 2016).
On the same note, historian Mattathias Schwartz (2018) gives the following explanation:
Almost immediately, a disinformation campaign began on social media to try to

reframe the violence. Reporting by The Washington Post has attributed the effort
to the G.R.U., Russia’s military-intelligence agency. On Facebook and the Russian
social media site VKontakte, G.R.U. operatives created fake accounts, which
characterized the Maidan uprising as a coup by armed nationalists. The G.R.U. also
set up online groups that promoted Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. The effort,
which also used paid Facebook ads, presaged Russian interference with the 2016
presidential election in the United States. As a consequence, two days after the
events, Yanukovych fled to Russia and over the next few weeks, Ukraine’s
Parliament was holding new elections (Schwartz, 2018).
30
2. Comparing the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution
In order to be able to unbiasedly analyse the development, causes and further consequences of the
EuroMaidan’s Revolution of Dignity, special focus needs to be directed to one of Ukraine’s past
national conflicts, namely, the Orange Revolution. Moreover, a comparison between the
EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution will as well be drawn.
2.1. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution
Andrew Wilson, author and expert in Ukrainian studies, wrote that the Orange Revolution was
represented by a series of protests and political events that took place in Ukraine, more specifically
in its capital, Kyiv, that lasted from late November 2004 until January 2005 (Wilson, 2005, p.20). On
November 22nd, 2004, presidential election results were announced in Ukraine and were greeted
with accusations of vote rigging on a massive scale. The defeated opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko called for a national strike and the People’s Army occupied Kyiv’s Independence
Square. The mass protests were further dubbed the Orange Revolution; however, as Wilson
described, it symbolised the turning point in a bruising election marathon (Wilson, 2005, p.24).
According to the author, earlier that year, in September, Ukraine was gearing up for a political
battle, as millions of citizens were disillusioned with the corruption that had passed for politics
since the country’s independence (Wilson, 2005, p.27). As such, as Wilson explained in his book,
the people were in support of candidate Viktor Yushchenko, a former banker, who was leading a
coalition of groups that sought to weaken ties with Kremlin and strengthen relationships with
Europe (Wilson, 2005, p.29). On the other hand, his opponent was Pro Russian Viktor Yanukovych,
whose support was concentrated in the mining and industrial areas of the East (Wilson, 2005, p.45).
Consequently, tensions between the two groups reached dangerous levels. As Yushchenko was
actively involved in promoting his political campaign, while receiving support from the Ukrainians,
his security crew was constantly on the lookout for potential assassins (Encyclopaedia Britannica,
n.d.). According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, on September 5th, 2004, Yushchenko’s security system
apparently broke down and it was claimed that conspirators tried to poison him in a plot worthy of
a Cold War thriller (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). As Yushchenko’s health began to fail, medical
tests were carried out and subsequently revealed that he had suffered dioxin poisoning, allegedly
performed by the Ukrainian State Security Service. As a consequence of the poisoning, his face was
left disfigured (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.).
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In the first round of the election which was held on October 31st, Yanukovych won 39.32% of the
vote casts, while his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko won 39.87%. Nonetheless, in the runoff which
was held on November 22nd, Yanukovych was declared the winner of the elections. As a
consequence, mass protests began in Kyiv’s Independence Square, as the official count differed
noticeably from exit poll results which gave Yushchenko up to an 11% lead, while official results
gave the election win to Yanukovych by 3% (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). Moreover, while
Yanukovych’s supporters argued that the votes’ disparity was caused by Yushchenko’s connections
to the Ukrainian media, the Yushchenko team publicised evidence of many incidents of electoral
fraud in favour of the government-backed Yanukovych, witnessed by many local and foreign
observers (Karatnycky, 2005).
After the election results had been announced, protesters dressed-up in orange, the colour of
Yushchenko’s political campaign, took to the streets of Kyiv and a two-week period of protests and
demonstrations began, which further became known as the Orange Revolution. According to
Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Yanukovych’s supporters in the east threatened to secede from Ukraine
if the results were annulled. Nevertheless, on December 3, the Supreme Court ruled the election
invalid and ordered a new runoff for December 26. Yushchenko subsequently defeated Yanukovych
by garnering some 52 percent of the vote. Although Yanukovych challenged the validity of the
results, Yushchenko was inaugurated as president of Ukraine on January 23, 2005” (Encyclopaedia
Britannica, n.d.).
2.2. The Orange Revolution vs EuroMaidan
According to Olga Onuch, in order to properly conduct a comparison between the Orange
Revolution of 2004 and the EuroMaidan of 2013/2014, it is crucial to investigate several factors of
convergence and divergence (Onuch, 2015, p.2). The first series of factors that needs to be taken
into account for the comparison is the duration, location and size of the protests. Secondly, a
specification of the different actors involved in the mobilization process and their respective roles
needs to be included. (Onuch, 2015, p. 2). Besides this, a description of the main demands and
repertoires employed by the protesters in both the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution will be
added and finally, the “the dramatic and unprecedented rise in violent repertoires” needs to be
covered (Onuch, 2015, p. 2).
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2.2.1. Duration
First, when talking about duration, the EuroMaidan became a mass mobilisation during the
weekend of November 30 and 1 December, when, according to Onuch, “we see a cross-class cross
cleavage coalition beginning to form in the streets and squares of the largest cities in Ukraine”
(Onuch, 2015, p.6). Moreover, the date officially considered as the end of the EuroMaidan was 21
February 2014, when Yanukovych fled the country. As far as the Orange Revolution is concerned,
experts agree that activists and opposition mobilisation began around the time of the first round
of the elections, on 21 October 2004 (Onuch, 2015, p.6). After it was officially announced, on
November 21st, that the elections’ results were fraudulent, on November 23rd, the demonstrations
turned into a moment of mass mobilization. The protests were consequently brought to an end on
27 December 2004, following the remaking of the second round of the presidential elections and
the subsequent election of Viktor Yushchenko as president of Ukraine on 26 December (Onuch,
2015, p.6).
2.2.2. Location
As far as location is concerned, during EuroMaidan, the protests mainly took place in Kyiv and some
West Ukrainian cities, while during the Orange Revolution of 2004, the protests were rapidly spread
throughout the country and, even from the beginning, protest events were organized in the eastern
and southern towns (Onuch, 2015, p.9). Moreover, as far as EuroMaidan is concerned, the student
groups on the one side and the opposition activists on the other had their distinct protest areas.
Thus, according to Onuch, “from the very beginning even the physical space of the protest zones
showed divisions and lack of coordination between different groups of actors. It was argued that
the spatiality of the difference in the protest zones was important as it allowed for diverse groups,
with different approaches to and aims of protest, carve out their own version of the EuroMaidan”
(Onuch, 2015, p.10).
2.2.3. Size
Next, according to Onuch, the size and scale of protests in 2004 and 2013/2014 is comparable. At
their peak, approximately 800, 000 people took part in the protests in Kyiv and close to 1.5 million
across all of Ukraine (Onuch, 2015, p.11). As the Centre for the Study of Society claims, it is not the
size of the largest protests that distinguishes the EuroMaidan from the Orange Revolution, but it is
33
the number of demonstrations and events that took place over the three-month period, which is
estimated at just under 4000 individual protests, events and actions (Onuch, 2015, p.11).
2.2.4. Actors involved
While identifying the dates, duration, location and size of the two series of protests, it is as well
necessary to examine which actors where involved and what their roles where. The author
researched four types of actors integral to the mass mobilization process, namely, activists and
SMOs, foreign actors, the political elite and the ordinary citizens (Onuch, 2015, p.11).
2.2.4.1 Activists and SMOs
To begin with, during the EuroMaidan of 2013/2014, a consisting part of the protest groups were
formed by the activists and the SMOs. As Onuch suggested, while during the 2004 Revolution, at
least two SMOs - the black and yellow Poras - were of significant activist importance, during the
EuroMaidan, no such SMOs took centre stage (Onuch, 2015, p.12). Nevertheless, the activists of
EuroMaidan claimed that several networks of activists and SMOs known as tusovsky, which were
leading the coordination of the demonstrations during EuroMaidan, were extensions or
restorations of SMOs present during the past two revolutions, of 2004 and respectively 2001
(Onuch, 2015, p.12). According to Onuch, these SMOs were brought together under umbrella
groups such as Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector), Hromadskyi Sektor (Civic Sector), Avto Maidan (Car
Maidan), Opora (Resistance), Chesno (Honest), Coordinating Committee of the Maidan, Zhinocha
Sotniya (Women’s 100, Squadron), Samooborona (Self Defence) and Molodyi Opir (Young
Resistance) (Onuch, 2015, p.12).
In addition, as far as activists are concerned, Onuch believes that “self-organization was not only a
phenomenon among ordinary citizens, it was also a phenomenon among activists who broke off
from organized groups and launched their own activities” (Onuch, 2015, p.12). As the author
exemplifies, the difference between 2004 and 2013/2014 was that, during the Orange Revolution,
in order to be an activist, one had to be part of a network, while, during EuroMaidan, activists were
organizing themselves in new networks interconnected with their objectives, tactics and
revolutionary strategies (Onuch, 2015, p.13). Moreover, similar to the 2004 events, there was
almost no existing differentiation between journalist and activist networks, as well as tusovsky. For
instance, Journalist Mustafa Nayem was the one who urged Ukrainians into the streets of Kyiv, via
Facebook, to protest the Yanukovych’s failure to sign the Association Agreement. Also, the
34
abundance of internet television and journalism strongly displayed activist rhetoric and former
activists took the roles of camera operators at the Maidan (Onuch, 2015, p.13).
2.2.4.2. Foreign actors
Furthermore, foreign actors were actively involved in the mobilization process during both the
Orange Revolution and EuroMaidan. Throughout the two-year period leading up to 2004, Ukrainian
activists were benefiting from funds and training from multiple IGOs and NGOs, hence making
foreign actors of this kind significant, but still not essential in the mobilization process (Onuch,
2015, p.14). In her study, Onuch (2015) found that:
In 2013, the protests were triggered by a foreign policy issue, thus making the EU,
its institutions and member states key actors in the mobilization process,
specifically in its trajectory and outcome. Foreign NGOs and IGOs did indeed
provide some small levels of support to several independent news groups and
SMOs in 2013, but this was clearly ad hoc, and recipient actioned (p.14).
2.2.4.3. Political elite
Subsequently, the political elites of the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan were highly distinct.
By 2013, it was already common knowledge that Yanukovych’s regime was noticeably different
than Kuchma’s, the former being based on consistent patronage and nepotism, while the latter
took the form of a semi-authoritarian rule (Onuch, 2015, p.15). Also, as Olga Onuch (2015) asserts,
the immediate party in power, the Party of Regions, which endorsed Yanukovych as their candidate
for the 2010 presidential elections, began to show signs of defections when, two of the members
and men of the Donbas clan, Tihipko and Lyovochnik, left and respectively resigned (Onuch, 2015,
p.15). Consequently, this instant buffer also allowed Yanukovych to resist most of the foreign
pressure to step down from office (Onuch, 2015, p.15). In part due to this insulation, and in part
due to opposing worldviews, it has been suggested by insiders, that Yanukovych was abler and
willing to use repressive force, something Kuchma was reluctant to do in 2004. Thus, according to
Onuch, “the regime was stronger and qualitatively different from Kuchma’s semi-authoritarian
rule” (Onuch, 2015, p.15).
2.2.4.4. Ordinary citizens
As Onuch stated, the ordinary citizens are the most appealing category of the protests. “While in
2004, a clear partisan cleavage dominated the Maidan, the story of the EuroMaidan is much more
complex” (Onuch, 2015, p.16). The protesters’ claims changed from seeking greater collaboration
35
with the EU, to the protection of basic civic and human rights. Therefore, according to Onuch,
during EuroMaidan, the average age of interviewed protesters was 36, the slight majority (59%)
being men (Onuch, 2015, p.16). Moreover, while 82% of them chose Ukrainian as their mother
tongue and 12% chose Russian, 69% recognised Ukrainian as their main language for
communicating with their families and friends and 22% identified Russian (Onuch, 2015, p.16).
Thus, one can conclude that approximately one quarter of the respondents were predominantly
russophones. As Onuch wrote, “according to the 2001 Census, this is representative of the general
population in central Ukraine” (Onuch, 2015, p.16). Besides this, most of the participants were
employed and possessed at least secondary education and several had higher education (Onuch,
2015, p.16).
According to the data gathered from the Ukrainian Protest Protect, the EuroMaidan protesters
could be subdivided into three broad groups, namely, the students and youth under 29 years old,
the working middle class between the ages of 30-49, the retirees and the people over 50 years of
age (Onuch, 2015, p.17). The youth and students were portrayed as initiators of the protest,
demonstrating for more abstract goals such as freedom and a fair democracy. Moreover, the
middle-aged group considered themselves the most essential group of protesters, as they were
workers and voters, hence maintaining the economy and politics of the country. According to the
research, their claims were more concrete and oriented more towards economic security, travel to
the EU and the illegitimacy of the regime’s use of repression (Onuch. 2015, p.17). Lastly, the final
group, namely the elderly, associated themselves with “the guardians of the Maidan”, their claim
being that they did not have much to lose and therefore believed it was their responsibility to
protest and fight for the country (Onuch, 2015, p.17).
2.2.5. Protest claims
As far as the protest claims are concerned, the objectives of the EuroMaidan and the Orange
Revolution were different, nevertheless, their motive was similar, fighting corruption and injustice
(Onuch, 2015, p.18). While the Orange Revolution was started due to falsified election results, the
EuroMaidan was driven by Yanukovych’s decision to withdraw the country from signing the
Association Agreement with the EU. Moreover, according to the media, the most important claim
of the protesters during EuroMaidan was focused on the mobilization on foreign policy issues, as it
was the case with the Association Agreement (Onuch. 2015, p.18). Nonetheless, from interviews
conducted by the Onuch’s research team with the protesters, it was concluded that “they did not
36
actually discuss their demand in foreign policy or geopolitical terms, but rather in terms of socio-
economic rights that would be protected by signing the agreements and the illegitimacy and lack
of accountability of the Yanukovych government by going back on a promise of closer ties with the
EU” (Onuch, 2015, p.18).
2.2.6. Rise in violence
Lastly, when referring to the violent nature of the protests, unlike in 2004, the Ukrainian authorities
constantly employed the use of violence and massive repressions against Ukrainian protesters and
civils. In her work entitled Maidan's Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the
EuroMaidan (2015), Onuch makes the following statement about the use of violence:
These were blatant violations of human rights, and undoubtedly stoked a more
aggressive or desperate response from the protesters. Kuchma, unlike Yanukovych,
was unwilling to use the state apparatus to repress protesters in 2004 – a deep
analysis into the inner-workings of the two presidential administration will allow
us to better understand this process. But the use of violent repertoires was a
significant shift among Ukrainian activists, who have long employed a variety of
non-violent tactics (p.19).
As such, in the author’s opinion, this represented one of the most important differences between
EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution (Onuch, 2015, p.19). During the latter, the non-use of
violence was crucial for the protesters and the SMO leaders, while during EuroMaidan, it was
common practice from the part of the authorities and radical activists to resort to violence (Onuch,
2015, p.19).
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3. Kremlin’s interpretation and coverage of the EuroMaidan
Media portrayals of the EuroMaidan and the subsequent 2014 unrest – where pro-Russian and anti-
government groups started a series of demonstrations in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine,
notably varied between Ukrainian, Western and Russian media. It is important to mention that,
during the EuroMaidan protests, the different types of media were accused of propagandizing and
of instigating an information war during their coverage of the events (Ermochenko, 2014). As
Agence France-Presse reported, Russian media was heavily condemned by the West for the
misleading use of images, misjudgement, false narratives, abolition and invented news stories, for
instance, a child’s crucifixion and the death of a 10-year-old in a gunfire (Agence France-Presse,
2014). Moreover, according to BBC news, the Russian state television seemed to “employ
techniques of psychological conditioning designed to excite extreme emotions of aggression and
hatred in the viewer” (Ennis, 2015). As The Guardian suggested, this was part of a coordinated
“informational-psychological war operation” (Pomerantsev, 2015).
Throughout time, a common theme among Russian news and publications was the Ukrainian army,
which was composed of a consistent number of Russian-speakers. It was speculated that the army
had committed genocide against russophones and that, allegedly, it had declared seeking
protection from Russia against Kiev (Snyder, 2014). This affirmation was completely against a poll
showing that less than 20% of the eastern inhabitants of Ukraine were asking for Russian custody
(Leivat, 2015). In addition, Vladimir Putin’s official declaration in which he denied having sent
troops to conquer the Crimean Peninsula was heavily supported by the Russian supporters in
eastern Ukraine, even though there was evidence that Russian soldiers frequently bombarded
across the border (Shuster, 2015).
Since the beginning of EuroMaidan, the Russian media has interpreted and displayed the series of
events as being organized by fascist, ultranationalist, neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic groups and as
having been prompted by the Poroshenko government (Lucas & Pomeranzev, 2016). As Laura
Starink concluded, there are two things one needs to take into account when talking about
Euromaidan. On the one hand, there is the Kremlin narrative claiming that the EuroMaidan was a
Neo-Nazi, fascist coup d’état, led by the Western part of Ukraine. In Western Ukraine, in Lviv, the
population is considerably anti-Russian, as this portion of the country was never part of the Russian
Empire, it became Ukraine after the Second World War. As such, they do not possess Russian
backgrounds or connections at all, they are very nationalistic and, besides that, they follow the
values and ideas of their hero, Stepan Bandera, a fascist who tried to organize an independent
38
Ukrainian state and intended to collaborate with Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the Germans had no
interest in working with him and, consequently, they put him in a concentration camp. He was
killed, later on, by the KGB. Bandera never took part in WWII, nonetheless, he was well-known for
his fascist behaviour (Starink, 2018).
Moreover, according to Laura Starink, he became a heroic figure in Ukraine, due to his anti-Russian
active background (Starink, 2018). Thus, the problem during that period, especially in Central and
Eastern Europe, was the existence of two enemies: the fascists and the communists. As such, there
was no actual escape, as whichever side one was on, one would end up being killed by the enemy
(Starink, 2018). Hence, for those people, it was difficult to choose which was the lesser evil. To this
extent, the Russians, in their historiography, had always misused the situation and had portrayed
the Ukrainians as fascists, because of the previous collaborations (Starink, 2018).
As far as EuroMaidan is concerned, it was initiated by students. However, in any kind of revolution,
there are always extremists and radicalists involved. Subsequently, as Starink describes, when the
events started to escalate, there were extreme-right, nationalistic factions such as Svoboda and
The Right Sector, who were there to instigate and to provoke (Starink, 2018). These groups did not
constitute the majority of the protesters, nonetheless, their violent participation was a worrisome
development for EuroMaidan. Nonetheless, the Russians were significantly convinced that the
Ukrainians were all collaborators during the Second World War and that they took part in the
annihilation of the Jews (Starink, 2018). Therefore, according to Starink, ‘’the Russian media had
this very simplistic narrative that Euromaidan was a fascist junta, an illegitimate and nationalistic
coup d’état’’ (Starink, 2018). Consequently, due to the Russian coverage of events, many Russian
soldiers were manipulated into joining the war in Donbass (Starink, 2018).
Kremlin’s allegations regarding EuroMaidan were highlighting the fact that, allegedly, western
countries, especially the US, were manoeuvring the events in Ukraine, in the disfavour of Russia
(Nimmo, 2015). Also, as Darczewska and Żochowski imply, Kremlin’s main argument in response to
its actions was based on accusations of Russophobia from the part of the West (Darczewska &
Żochowski, 2015). Besides this, according to Moscow correspondent Max Seddon, Russia
considered that the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement was created in order to
sabotage its influence and power on the international stage, that demonstrators were getting paid
by the United States and that the Vilnius summit resembled the Munich Agreement, signed
between France and Nazi Germany in 1938 (Seddon, 2013). Nonetheless, subsequent to Kremlin’s
39
declarations, the European Commission displayed its concern regarding these accusations, claiming
that “The Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA)
are not directed towards or against Russia’’ (European Commission, 2014). Moreover, the
Commission stated that, even though the DCFTA is not necessarily congruent with Ukraine
becoming a member of the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the EU
certainly does not perceive Russia as an opponent. In addition to that, the EU asserted that a closer
relation between Ukraine and Russia would even be applauded (European Commission, 2014).
In addition to the criticism brought to Ukraine and the West, Russia was also highly discontent with
regards to different uprisings in Eastern Europe which, according to Kremlin, were controlled and
manipulated by fascists and foreign powers (Adamkus, et al., 2009). In a letter written to Barack
Obama by several Central and Eastern European leaders, several concerns regarding the status-quo
of various events were bluntly and officially addressed. As such, Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa and the
other authors of the letter heavily criticised Russia for its political behaviours, blaming it for
"challenging our claims to our own historical experiences" and "asserting a privileged position in
determining our security choices’’ (Adamkus, et al., 2009). Moreover, another comment made by
the Russian television was directed towards the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague
Spring of 1968, which, in Russian views, were orchestrated by Western collaborations and the US
(Deutsche Welle, n.d.). According to BBC News, Kremlin suggested that the Russian invasion of 1968
in Prague was fairly justified, aiming to prevent a possible NATO and fascist attack (BBC News,
2015).
Additionally, according to Laura Starink, in order to understand Russia’s interpretations of various

circumstances, it is important to take a look at other events, for instance, the Armenian Revolution
which occurred in early 2018, taking the form of a people’s revolution (Starink, 2018). It was led by
Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who wanted to fight corruption. Nevertheless, Russia’s
opportunistic approach regarding the Armenian Revolution was completely different than the one
they used during EuroMaidan (Starink, 2018). This time, they did not react against it, but more than
that, they embraced it. And all of this happened because Armenia still is under Russia’s sphere of
influence (Starink, 2018).
Furthermore, as Max Seddon suggests, media outlets such as Channel One Russia, after having
reported from one of the EuroMaidan protests, where more than a hundred thousand people were
present, announced that the protests were slowly “dying out” with only a few hundred people
40
attending (Seddon, 2013). Moreover, as TV producer Peter Pomerantsev wrote, Dmitry Kiselyov,
head of Rossiya Segodnya declared that „information war in now the main type of war, preparing
the way for military action” (Pomerantsev, 2015). Besides this, Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei
Shoigu, claimed that media is a necessary support for the Russian military (Portnikov, 2015). As
such, one can safely conclude that Russian media was using propaganda and manipulation, creating
a false narrative, unproportionate with and opposed to with Ukrainian and Western statements.
As far as western sources are concerned, Timothy Garton Ash published an article in The Guardian,
in which he stated that Putin “used television to impose his own narrative of a socially conservative,
proud Russia threatened by fascists in Kiev, an expansionist NATO and a decadent EU” (Ash, 2015).
Similarly, Joshua Yaffa wrote in The New Republic, reporting a “propaganda onslaught
unprecedented in the post-Soviet era, implying or inventing dark suspicions about Western motives
in Ukraine while painting Russia's own meddling as a heroic answer to the call of justice” (Yaffa,
2014). Various other western journalists were sharing a similar opinion, believing that Kremlin was
reinventing the EuroMaidan in their favour, portraying it as a genocide against Russians (Peled,
n.d.). Besides this, western leaders, political figures and the media were firmly convinced that
Russia was portraying false scenarios and accusations directed to Ukraine, in order to compensate
for its acknowledged gradual loss of influence and the shrinking of the Eurasian Economic Union
(Deutsche Welle, n.d.).
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4. EuroMaidan and social media
4.1. Activism and social media
Turning to a distinct set of ideas, important to take into account is the fact that the planning of the
EuroMaidan protests was particularly influenced by social media. As such, as more than a billion
people had done previously, on November 21, 2013, Ukrainian journalist and activist Mustafa
Nayem wrote a Facebook post (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015). As mentioned by the authors Andrei
Soldatov and Irina Borogan (2015), this post, however, was proven to have a much larger impact
on subsequent political developments than most that had preceded it (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015).
Frustrated with President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign a long-promised association
agreement with the European Union, Nayem asked others who shared the same aggravated
discontent, to comment on his post. Even more importantly, Nayem wrote that if the post would
have received at least 1000 comments from people willing to join him, they should all reunite to
protest in the Independence Square (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015). And indeed, starting with just a
few thousand people, the protests had swollen to be the largest since Ukraine’s independence,
particularly after police used force against protesters at the end of November 2013. Eventually,
these protests led to the resignation of the government, the exile of the former president, and
indirectly to the secession of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the eastern part of the country
(Soldatov & Borogan, 2015).
In addition, social media’s impact on the organization of the movement cannot go unnoticed. Of
relevant importance to measuring the way the events started and evolved, significant focus needs
to be paid to the #Euromaidan hashtag. According to Olga Onuch (2014), the hashtag, firstly used
by a group of Ukrainian activists on Twitter, and further on Facebook, had successfully managed to
raise interest towards organizing the first phase of the Maidan student protests (Onuch, 2014). The
hashtag was created on the 22nd of November 2013 and soon became the most popular on
Ukrainian Twitter (Onuch, 2014). For instance, as author Alexis Scott explains, from 1,500 up to
3,000 tweets containing #Euromaidan were tweeted every hour in the first week of the protests.
This allowed for centralized information about what was happening on the ground, which further
became valuable internal communication for the military police already involved in the protests
(Scott, 2018).
On the other hand, from Nataliya Gumenyuk’s perspective, the #euromaidan takes a different form,
away from its common meaning on social media platforms. For Gumenyuk, the hashtag
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#euromaidan does not invoke any emotions, in the same way the IMF, UN, OSCE or the EBRD do
not speak to her directly (Gumenyuk, 2013). As she further claims, the #euromaidan does not
represent the need or desire for affiliation with the European Union, but it rather focuses on sharing
the same European values, including material ones. Moreover, the author stresses that
#euromaidan is not a question of “making a geopolitical choice in a strictly literal sense, but rather
the universal right of citizens to take to the streets when their opinions are brazenly disregarded,
even though, supposedly, the people are the source of power” (Gumenyuk, 2013).
Nonetheless, Gumenyuk asserts that, without European support, the country is most likely to fail,
due to the multitude of immoral factors that continuously fill the country. She believes that the
‘euro-choice’ is the best possible option for the Ukrainian population, in order for the country to
distance itself from corruption and injustice (Gumenyuk, 2013). According to her “Abandoning the
‘Euro-choice’ in Ukraine means remaining in the territory of lawlessness and tyranny, ignorance
and kleptocracy” (Gumenyuk, 2013). Overall, the #euromaidan, in the author’s vision, takes the
form of a metaphor expressing unity, solidarity, civil integration, the fight for a correct democracy
where the rule of law, human rights, tolerance and acceptance can be truly embraces. The
#EuroMaidan means the voice of the Ukrainian people in an ideal scenario where they would obtain
the power to provide a better future for their country (Gumenyuk, 2013).
4.2. Social media and self-organization
Besides Facebook, Vkontakte - the Russian version of Facebook – also represented an important
tool for communication during the protests. Nevertheless, as Onuch believes, the main debate
revolved around the uncertainty regarding whether the self-organisation of the protests succeeded
due to social media or if social media networks were used in a larger proportion because of a high
tendency for self-organisation (Onuch, 2014). On the other hand, she further states that, in the
case of EuroMaidan, “the two went hand in hand” (Onuch, 2014).
In terms of information dissemination and coordination, social media was a vital tool for the
participants in the protests. Nevertheless, even though social networks succeeded in uniting
ordinary citizens with a common political objective to protest at the Maidan, various surveys and
interviews showed that social media was not particularly mobilizing in itself (Onuch, 2014).
According to Onuch, “while twitter was predominantly used by activists, organizers, politicians and
practitioners, it was Facebook and Vkontakte which were used by ‘ordinary’ citizens, who would
create their own pages, groups and events related to the EuroMaidan protests” (Onuch, 2014). This
43
had a positive impact for people living in various regions across Ukraine were information
accessibility represented an impediment. Therefore, social media made it possible for Ukrainian
citizens to be up-to-date with what was happening in Kiev (Onuch, 2014).
Moreover, a comparison pointed out by Onuch was that social media functions differently than
internet media (Onuch, 2014). According to her, on social media platforms such as Facebook and
Vkontakte, one does not need to search for specific information, as the news feed provides the
user with suggestions matching their interests, i.e. friends sharing certain
articles/news/videos/events that allow one to be connected to what is happening in real time
(Onuch, 2014). As far as EuroMaidan is concerned, the problem laid within people virtually
participating to the EuroMaidan via Facebook and Vkontakte and sharing their opinions online and
the real participants, who physically participated in the demonstrations (Onuch, 2014). According
to a EuroMaidan activist interviewed by the author, “it was also far too easy to simply like and share
an item and feel like one has already participated, made a difference, whereas physical bodies in
the square were the real protest, and not only changing one’s profile picture” (Onuch, 2014).
The author Olga Onuch further claims that, even though, for the most part, activity on social media
networks did not necessarily pose a threat on participants, it did make activists easily identifiable
and therefore subject to regime oppression (Onuch, 2014). In addition, the spread of
photoshopped and aggressive propaganda also created opportunities for the spread of violence
(Onuch, 2014). Hence, as Onuch wrote, while social media may have had an overall democratizing
effect, one of the interviewed activists claimed that “there is a dark side to social media... you can
safely voice radical views... you can spread misinformation... and just like it was a space to battle
regime propaganda, it also allowed opponents of the EuroMaidan to demonize us” (Onuch, 2014).
Another claim presented by Onuch revolved around the issue of self-organisation through social
media as negatively impacting coordination and the peaceful state of events (Onuch, 2014). As
various participants and activists reported in the interviews and surveys conducted by Onuch’s
team, the rise in Facebook activism during EuroMaidan generated a surge in far-right groups
involvement and caused a consequent escalation of violence (Onuch, 2014). According to Onuch,
“while further analysis is necessary, and the causal directionality of the relationship is still unknown,
it is certain that we can see a pattern developing. One that could be tested in Ukraine, but also in
other mass mobilization contexts internationally” (Onuch, 2014).
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5. Political prospects and developments post Euro-Maidan
As Laura Starink implies, one cannot expect a total change after five years from the EuroMaidan,
unlike the West wishes to believe. There are very frightening signs as well. For example, the NGOs
are under constant pressure, and that’s partly due to politicians, who do not want to abide to the
law, and partly due to criminals, who want to make use of the situation (Starink, 2018). For instance,
in October 2018, in Ukraine, activist Kateryna Handzyuk, from Kherson, died due to an acid attack,
supposedly managed by criminal groups who were in close relations with political members
(Starink, 2018). Moreover, this is only one case that the media decided to make public, out of many
more. Besides this, during the last 18 months, more than 55 people were attacked/abused by
unknown criminal organizations. Hence, that already says a lot. As such, NGOs fight for
transparency, which brings upon them a high number of enemies. Also, the aggression they
encounter, such as the example mentioned previously, is worrying. And what is even more
disturbing is that they must deal with similar types of situations every day (Starink, 2018).
As Olena Vlasenko–First Secretary of the Ukrainian Embassy in The Hague–described, the

EuroMaidan represented the passage towards more reinforced European Integration (Vlasenko,
2019). According to Vlasenko, Ukraine needed EuroMaidan in order to distance itself from the long-
lasting Russian ties and redirect itself towards new democratic reforms and the adaptation of
European values (Vlasenko, 2019). However, she claims, the process is slow and there is still a long
way until complete European integration will occur for Ukraine. More support, both financial and
political, is needed (Vlasenko, 2019). Similarly, Starink believes that, subsequent to the
EuroMaidan, the Ukrainian population was particularly keen with regards to strengthening EU
relations, especially with the new change of government. Nevertheless, as Starink suggested, the
enthusiasm faded soon after the signing of the economic part of the Association Agreement in
2014, as no significant developments were visible in the country (Starink, 2018).
5.1. Ukraine between EU and Russia post-EuroMaidan
In December 2013, Glavred, a Ukrainian media group covering political and economic events,
hosted an interview with political scientist Sergei Taran, in which the EuroMaidan events where
debated. When asked by the reporters about the “post-shifts” relations between Ukraine and
Russia and Ukraine and the EU, Taran replied that, in any case, it would be problematic for the
Ukrainian authorities to declare Ukraine's membership in the Customs Union (Glavred, 2013).
However, he argued that, if the current government refrains, it will obviously put some of the
45
Customs Union's mechanisms in the Strategic Agreement between Ukraine and Russia. For
example, there may be restrictions on the conduct of foreign policy for Ukraine. He also added that,
strategically, Ukraine will not be able to remain in the Customs Union for long, because Russia's
economy is vulnerable and even dependent on world energy prices (Glavred, 2013). According to
him, “The EU will undoubtedly be ready to conclude an agreement with Ukraine, if there is a
corresponding desire of the Ukrainian authorities” (Glavred, 2013).
According to a factsheet published in December 2018 by the European External Action Service, the
EU has helped Ukraine attain its democratic objectives post-EuroMaidan (European External Action
Service, 2018):
The European Union supports Ukraine in ensuring a stable, prosperous and

democratic future for all its citizens. The EU is unwavering in its support for the
country's territorial integrity and sovereignty and sees the full implementation of
the Minsk agreements as the basis for a sustainable, political solution to the conflict
in the east of the country. Since spring 2014, the EU has stepped up its support for
economic and political reforms in Ukraine (European External Action Service,
2018).
As the EEAS reported, the Association Agreement comprising the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area which entered into force on the 1st of September 2017, serves to promote “deeper
political ties, strong economic links and the respect for common values” (European External Action
Service, 2018). The parts of the Association Agreement, which were applied since its creation, have
improved cooperation between Ukraine and the EU on various levels such as human rights, the rule
of law, fundamental freedoms, reforms, political dialogue and the movement of persons (European
External Action Service, 2018). Additionally, the application of the Agreement has helped
strengthening cooperation in sectors such as energy, the environment, transport, public finances,
financial services, agriculture, fisheries and maritime policies, consumer protection and civil society
(European External Action Service, 2018).
On the contrary, when referring to Ukraine’s relations with Russia post-EuroMaidan, some experts
believe that Putin ordered the annexation of Crimea out of revenge for how the EuroMaidan ended
and the consequent establishment of a new anti-Russian government in Ukraine. On the other
hand, others are more inclined to believe that Kremlin was planning the annexation of Crimea since
early 2013, even before the EuroMaidan had started, as they had always considered Crimea as
being Russian territory (Szeptycki, 2014). Subsequently, Putin started the ongoing war in the
46
Donbass, sending separatist forces to fight Ukrainians, manipulating the soldiers into believing they
were fighting the fascists, with the purpose of destabilizing the country and sabotage the early
presidential election of May 2014 (Szeptycki, 2014).
Taking both sides into account, as Ph.D. Andrzej Szeptycki wrote, Russia was in total disagreement
with the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and the organisation of the EuroMaidan, due to its
fear of losing power and influence, especially with regards to the Eurasian Union (Szeptycki, 2014).
Putin claimed that the Association Agreement was highly incompatible with Ukraine’s national
interests and he further suggested that the West was being “co-responsible” for the destabilization
of the country during EuroMaidan (Szeptycki, 2014). Journalist Robin Emmot reported that, in the
aftermath of the EuroMaidan, when Ukraine was prepared to sign the economic part of the
Agreement, Kremlin publicly announced that, once the Association Agreement is signed, Russia will
curtail Ukraine’s access to important Russian markets and therefore causing a significant loss in the
country’s export revenue (Emmott, 2014).
In addition, Szeptycki stressed that, even though the EU offered support to Ukraine in the form of
the Association Agreement, it was never willing to engage into an “open confrontation with the
Russian Federation over the common neighbourhood”, which is partly due to the fact that Russia
is a strong EU political and economic partner and partly due to the “specificity of the EU power in
international relations” (Szeptycki, 2014). As such, Szeptycki concluded that the unwillingness of
the EU to confront Russia was notably visible on the international stage. Moreover, after the
invasion of Crimea, the EU still considered appropriate to maintain dialogue with Russia (Szeptycki,
2014).
Overall, following the judgement of journalist Laura Starink, Ukraine will always be a buffer state
between the EU and Russia, geopolitically speaking. Moreover, what can be observed now is that
both the EU and Russia are in decline (Starink, 2018). According to a Russian sociologist, Putin is
passé for populists. Also, one can agree that Russia is a destructive country and it does not provide
anything, no new alliances, no participation nor involvement (Starink, 2018). As an example, in
November 2018, the OPCW held their yearly conference, and Russia refused to condone extra
budget to pursue the perpetrators of chemical attacks. Russia was trying to lobby, but, according
to Starink, ‘’they failed miserably’’ (Starink, 2018). Overall, 80 countries were in favour of the
budget and only 28 were on Russia’s side. Additionally, Laura Starink believes that Putin is not only
losing face externally, but also internally (Starink, 2018). In the past year, due to the pension
47
reform, a lot of Russians were infuriated as he refused to raised pensions. In her opinion, one can
conclude that, for Ukraine, the situation is very unpredictable (Starink, 2018). Being surrounded by
unstable neighbours can also pose a risk. As the journalist claims, they would have prospered if
there would have existed more help and support from the EU, but unfortunately, it is not the case
(Starink, 2018). However, the fact that Russia is becoming weaker might be an advantage for
Ukraine as the probability of an attack would be less likely to occur (Starink, 2018).
5.2. Five years after the EuroMaidan – Experts’ view
Nowadays, Ukrainian people share the same believe that the state is moving in the wrong direction.
According to the data of the September Social Survey "Social Monitoring", 65% of Ukrainian citizens
adhere to this opinion (Glukhovsky, 2018). Glavkom, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of
Ukraine asked several experts to share their insights regarding the political future of the country,
five years post-EuroMaidan (Glukhovsky, 2018).
Irina Bekeshkina, sociologist and director of the Ilko Kucheriv "Democratic Initiatives’’ Foundation
stated that ‘’ I hope the revolution has forever ended the double-vector. What happened after the
Maidan is Russia's rejection of our choice of European integration. Previously, we all broke up
between East and West’’ (Glukhovsky, 2018). In an optimistic note, Bekeshkina believes that now,
given the fact that the eastern vector has collapsed, changes are slowly occurring and that the
country’s slowly moving towards European integration (Glukhovsky, 2018). According to a poll
conducted by her team, most of the interviewed participants consider that pro-European reforms
should be continued, as this is what Ukraine needs now (Glukhovsky, 2018).
Similarly, Joseph Zisels, dissident and chairman of the Vaade of Ukraine also believes that Ukraine
is moving in the right direction when talking about the country’s prospects of joining a civilised
European community (Glukhovsky, 2018). According to him ‘’ The only thing that does not satisfy
us is the efficiency of the movement in this direction. But this is another issue that is caused by
many factors that are related to the history of Ukraine, its identity, and so on’’ (Glukhovsky, 2018).
On the same note, Volodymyr Fesenko, political scientist and chairman of the Penta Centre for
Applied Political Studies asserts that the key changes that can be attributed to the Revolution of
Dignity are a clear, systematic and long-term choice in favour of the “European civilization path”
(Glukhovsky, 2018). Despite the disappointment in the political elites that is currently observed,
48
most people remain committed to this political choice and supports it, the same way they did four
years ago. Over the past 4-5 years, the weight and influence of civil society have increased
significantly (Glukhovsky, 2018). The authorities must reckon with the mood of society and with its
pressure, however, this is not always the case. There is not always a direct cause-and-effect
relationship, but the dependence of power on society has become more orderly than it was before.
Various institutional reforms have taken place, some of which are successful. The scope, scale and
number of reforms are larger than in the other period of Ukraine's development (Glukhovsky,
2018).
According to Fesenko, when people are asked by sociologists whether they believe the state is
moving in the right direction, the answer is almost always negative, regardless of who is power.
The reason for this is that, as he claims, ‘’they do not feel it on their wallet’’ (Glukhovsky, 2018).
Nevertheless, according to Fesenko, ‘’this choice in favour of the European civilization path is the
right direction. Unlike people who answer ‘no’ to questionnaires, I understand what we have an
alternative to. If not this way, which one? This is the most feasible option’’ (Glukhovsky, 2018).
Moreover, in Fesenko’s view, an additional issue lies within the effectiveness of the
implementation of the state policy and the problem of poor quality of public administration
(Glukhovsky, 2018).
Moreover, Laura Starink is also inclined to believe that people support European integration and
more than that, many of them aim at redirecting Ukraine according to the European values, as this
is the right approach for the country in order to success politically, socially and economically. More
than that, she claims that in Ukraine, ‘’nobody I have met told me they want to belong to Russia’’
(Starink, 2018).
After the EuroMaidan, the war in the Donbas began, which significantly affected the country both
economically and politically. It is a very worrisome situation that has little prospects of
improvement. As Joseph Zisels believes, in order to stop the war, the force that started it is needed
(Glukhovsky, 2018). Nevertheless, he stresses that, even though Russia started the war, people
doubt that even Putin can stop it now. Ukraine never wanted this war and fought since the
beginning to resist against the aggressive invasion of the East (Glukhovsky, 2018). Moreover, he
claims that only the tight efforts of the international community against Russia, including real
sanctions and not as cosmetic as now, will slowly push Russia into a corner and will not give it
49
another way out as to stop the war, to induce the de-occupation of the Crimea and the Donbas
(Glukhovsky, 2018).
Analysis
1. EuroMaidan and its course of action
The research conducted so far has shown that EuroMaidan represented a Revolution of Dignity in
its true sense, while also bringing upon the country a social mass movement. Nevertheless,
EuroMaidan has been controversially debated by experts with regards to whether the protests
realistically represented a social movement or only a failed series of riots. Some of the scholars, on
an optimistic note, believe that EuroMaidan was a necessary revolution to change the erosive
status-quo of the country and others, more pessimistically claim that EuroMaidan was a brave, yet,
failed attempt aimed at political improvement through European integration and away from the
eastern vector.
The EuroMaidan also displayed a strong sense of political activism from the part of the citizens and
a real impression of collective identity. This affirmation can be backed up by the participants’
demonstration of unity after the Berkut and the titushky have repeatedly used force and violence
on the protesters and even civilians. Thus, contrary to the government’s forecast, the Ukrainian
people did not abandon the protests and even more, they transformed Maidan into a Revolution
of Dignity, requesting a change of regime with a democracy in which human rights are promoted
and the rule of law is enforced. In the end, after an unfortunate series of violent riots and police
brutality used on protesters, the EuroMaidan came to an end with the acknowledged victory of the
participants.
The formal reason for Ukrainians gathering in Maidan Nezalezhnosti at the end of November 2013
was the government’s failure to proceed with the signing of the Association Agreement with the
EU. Nevertheless, even if the main requirement established by the protesters during the Revolution
was the continuation of paving the way for European integration, it came to people’s attention
three years later, that the Association Agreement had not been completely fulfilled. During a
consultative referendum in the Netherlands that took place in December 2015, it was reported that
a majority of voters had voted against the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement,
which delayed its entrance into force until September 2017 (Makarenko, 2016). According to
Oleksandra Matviychuk, human rights activist and coordinator of the Euromaidan SOS organization
50
“from the point of view of ordinary Ukrainians, this is a betrayal behaviour of the European Union.
Ukrainians are probably the only people who died under EU flags for EU values. As a country, we
fulfilled all the requirements for a free visa regime with the EU, but this question is still on the
agenda” (Makarenko, 2016). This is one of the reasons for which many Ukrainians had consequently
developed a scepticism regarding the extent to which the EU can really show support for Ukraine.
Furthermore, another controversial issue during EuroMaidan was the rise of right-wing groups such
as Svoboda and Pravy Sektor. While some believe that right-wing activists were normally
demonstrating as all the other participants during EuroMaidan, others tend to believe that violence
was mainly instigated by far-right groups which consequently triggered the Berkut forces who
started to use violence on the protesters, mainly during the clashes between 18 and 20 February
2014. For instance, as William Jay Risch concluded, their vision of defeating the Yanukovych regime
served as a purpose to fulfil their “long-expected national revolution” (Risch, 2018). In the author’s
view, their motivation for joining the Maidan was highly unrelated to the collective goal of the
Ukrainian protesters (Risch, 2018). What they have been really preparing for was a national
revolution. As a consequence, Russia used this incident to portray the EuroMaidan, on the
international stage, as a fascist coup d’état which, according to Kremlin, had no real correlation
with pursuing European values and integrity (Risch, 2018).
The violent meddling of the far-right supporters in the events had received serious criticism from
the part of the liberal wing of the Maidan movement, yet, the matter was not dealt with
subsequently. There was no actual attempt to break their interference in the protests. An
explanation for this would be that, such an action could have compromised the actual purpose of
EuroMaidan, namely the overthrow of Yanukovych. On the other hand, according to Volodymyr
Ishchenko, “it could also have given the movement more time to build a truly nationwide
movement against the regime, incorporating majorities in Eastern and Southern Ukraine”
(Ishchenko, 2017). Nevertheless, he continues, “this possibility was unlikely because of the
oligarchic nature of the opposition parties, the neoliberal-nationalist orientation of civil society,
and the weakness of the Ukrainian left and labour movement, while the major left-wing force was
a de facto part of the governing coalition under Yanukovych” (Ishchenko, 2017).
What also needs to be pointed out was the use of social media during the events, which facilitated
the organisation of the protests. After Mustafa Nayem published the Facebook post in which he
urged people to gather in the Maidan Square to protest the government’s 180 flop of not signing
51
the Association Agreement, everything changed. It was the call for revolution that people needed
to hear. After Nayem’s post, people started to use social media as a form of self-organisation.
Moreover, the hashtag #euromaidan appeared to have been highly influential on Tweeter during
that period. The hashtag was the virtual embodiment of the Revolution of Dignity, representing the
struggle that Ukrainian people were facing for a more prosperous country with a proper
democracy, rule of law, human rights and European values.
2. Developments
When referring to political developments post-EuroMaidan, one can safely conclude that one of
them was represented by the Association Agreement with the EU which was signed in June 2014
by the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko. The procedure for ratification of the agreement
was completed on July 11, 2017, when it was signed by all the countries of the European Union.
The positive consequence of the signing of the Association Agreement was the visa-free regime of
Ukraine with the EU.
Besides this, reforms were launched, such as the judicial reform implemented in the summer of
2016, where certain amendments to the Constitution were adopted. This paved the way for
enhanced transparency. For example, starting with 2016, Ukrainian officials were constrained to
electronically declare their assets and properties. According to Makarenko, this “resulted in a
shocking display of wealth for one of the poorest countries in Europe” (Makarenko, 2016).
Moreover, the field of media was also reformed with new legislation being launched on the
transparency of media ownership. Apart from the judiciary system and the media, steps were also
taken to reform the tax system (Makarenko, 2016).
A consequent advancement after EuroMaidan was Ukraine’s distancing from Russia. As Ukraine is
a relatively new state, in the last two decades after its independence, the country was still
significantly dependable on Russia for gas resources. As a strategy to hold as much control as
possible over Ukraine, Russia was manipulating Ukraine through gas prices and supply conditions
(Makarenko, 2016). Actually, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea was created on the grounds of
Russian gas supplies. According to Makarenko, “Back in 2010, then Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev signed the Kharkiv agreements providing
Ukraine a discount for the Russian gas in exchange for prolonging the duration of stay of the Russian
naval fleet in Crimea. The same fleet was instrumental in the military takeover of Crimea in
52
February-March 2014” (Makarenko, 2016). Nowadays, however, five years after the EuroMaidan,
as Ukraine is working extensively towards fostering relations with the EU, it is slowly leaving Russia
behind.
Finally, EuroMaidan was successful in making people more active and united and thus, in creating
a real, purposeful and persistent civil society. This can represent an opportunity to eliminate the
current political class with its built-in oligarchic interests and to become a more open country.
According to Ihor Rozkladai, the Reanimation Package of Reform expert on media declared that
“we have seen the start of a new era of NGOs. And some of them are financed by local businesses”
(Makarenko, 2016).
3. Retrogressions
On the other hand, there are still many factors which impede Ukraine’s political development and
one of them is the constant rise in corruption and injustice. While the youth together with NGOs
strive to diminish corruption and to install human rights and adherence to the rule of law, the
actions and activities conducted by criminal organisations and the political elite are crushing every
opportunity for justice and a proper democracy in Ukraine. Also, the ongoing war in the Donbass
becomes more and more concerning and problematic. As Olena Makarenko claims “Saying
goodbye to Russia became a complicated and painful task “(Makarenko, 2016). The annexation of
Crimea and the ongoing war in the eastern part of the country represent a cruel price for Ukraine’s
choice of independence. Moreover, as the journalist implies, even though the Minsk agreements
were implemented to settle the situation in the Donbass, people are killed and wounded on a daily
basis. What can also be observed is that, a consistent number of people who fought against
Yanukovych’s regime at EuroMaidan have decided to continue their fight for Ukraine’s future at
the frontline (Makarenko, 2016).
Moreover, when referring to Ukraine’s relations with the EU, even if the signing of the Association
Agreement finally took place, one cannot assert that the EU is willing to protect Ukraine completely.
For instance, as Szeptycki concluded, the EU was never intending to confront Russia concerning its
malicious actions of annexing Crimea and of starting the ongoing war in the Donbas. Thus, this can
be explained by the fact that Russia is a strong EU political and economic partner and that the EU
has limited power or voice in this regard. In addition, as far as Russia is concerned, Kremlin
repeatedly stated that, if Ukraine were to sign the economic part of the Association Agreement, its
53
access to various Russian markets would be blocked, which would consequently cause a high loss
in export revenue for Ukraine.
Conclusion
On November 21, 2013, the government of Mykola Azarov stated that they would suspend
preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. This decision led to the first
protests that further became known as EuroMaidan (Euromaidan Press, n.d.). Subsequently,
according to Euromaidan Press, November 21 remained known as the date of the beginning of the
Revolution of Dignity, the largest number of actions against the ruling regime during the time of
independent Ukraine (Euromaidan Press, n.d.). Approximately three months of street
confrontation on Maidan ended with civilian shootings and with President Viktor Yanukovych
fleeing the country. Then came the annexation of the Crimea, the Russian attack on the Donbas
and the change of political elites and the course of the state, which Ukrainians were highly
dissatisfied with (Euromaidan Press, n.d.).
Equally important to consider is the fact that Ukraine’s future is unstable and unpredictable in
terms of mass organisations and protests, given the fact that the country has witnessed two
highscaled revolutions in a time frame of less than three years. When referring to the Orange
Revolution and EuroMaidan, the two shared different objectives, but the same motive of fighting
corruption. As Sergiy Taran implies, the two revolutions were different in terms of dynamics. Unlike
the Orange Revolution, which began due to fraud in elections and where people were more radical
than politicians, the Maidan represented a Revolution of Dignity, where politicians took a more
radical approach (Ramani, 2016). Moreover, the time of occurrence of the two events was
different. The Orange Revolution was more peaceful as it happened during the elections and most
of the times, peaceful manifestations occur during election cycles. On the other hand, the
EuroMaidan took place outside of election cycles, which gives a more accurate explanation for the
escalation of violence and for the incapacity of a peaceful transition. Thirdly, according to Taran,
‘’the Maidan revolution was about something much deeper. It was about civilizational choice,
identity politics and whether Ukraine should support European integration” (Ramani, 2016).
What is more, social media platforms such as Facebook and Vkontakte were extensively used during
the protests. In terms of information dissemination and coordination, social media was a vital tool
for the participants in the protests. Nevertheless, even though social networks succeeded in uniting
54
ordinary citizens with a common political objective, various surveys and interviews showed that
social media was not particularly mobilizing (Onuch, 2014).
As far as the way in which the political situation changed after EuroMaidan, what can be noticed is
that reforms were adopted not only in the media sector, but also in the judicial and tax systems,
and that transparency slightly began to be felt due to the fact Ukrainian officials were obliged to
declare their assets and properties. Moreover, Ukraine was finally able to somewhat shift away
from the Russian vector and gaining more independence. Besides this, collective identity and
political activism grew stronger in Ukraine, the youth together with NGOs became more active and
involved, working towards achieving a more prosperous future for the country, including paving
the way for European integration. Additionally, as various social and political experts argue, even
though change is slow and there are many factors interfering with the country’s opportunities for
political advancements, there are still prospects for development. For this to occur, corruption and
injustice need to be fought and transparency in the judicial and political system needs to be
increased. Hence, if these requirements are met, the EU will become more involved in showing
support to Ukraine.
On the contrary, as Starink suggests, the main problem is that the international status quo is
eroding very rapidly, as well as the attachment to human rights and the rule of law. Thus, Ukraine
is in backlash. Populists are gaining influence everywhere, which represents a very frightening
development, one would say, especially for young failed states such as Ukraine. These kinds of
states are the ones who need the most support and motivation to comply with and abide to the
law, for their own chance to a prosperous development. Besides this, the problem with the West
still stands. At first, the EU was keen on helping Ukraine escape the corruption bubble after
EuroMaidan, nevertheless, it was never willing to confront Russia for its intentional breach of
international law (annexation of Crimea, the ongoing war in the Donbass). As a consequence,
people are disappointed and, apart from the youth, who have a more optimistic view, Ukrainians
are particularly sceptical with regards to EU’s effectiveness in supporting Ukraine’s path towards
European integration.
What one observes now is that Western Europe is not as involved as it had been previously, due to
its own problems with refugees, the rise of populists etc., which notably represents a negative
development. Subsequently, as Starink implies, one can even argue that, in the end, a regime like
Putin’s, which is likely to exist until 2024 or even longer, has the longer “breath” (Starink, 2018). As
55
such, in the alleged case of EU’s collapse, Kremlin will wait, meanwhile, and take back Ukraine
afterwards (Starink, 2018). Overall, one can agree that political developments are slow in Ukraine,
corruption is flourishing, external tensions are persisting and even with the signing of the
Association Agreement, which represented the formal objective of the Revolution of Dignity,
changes do not seem to take place in real time. Only with increased support from the EU,
developments will begin to take place in Ukraine. Consequently, the country’s opportunity for
European integration will only arrive, once more extensive reforms will be adopted, once the level
of transparency will increase in all areas, once human rights will be promoted and once the rule of
law will be obeyed.
Recommendations
In terms of recommendations for future research on this topic, one idea would be to approach the
subject from a different angle, for example, by creating surveys to be addressed to Ukrainian
experts, activists, labour unionists, SMOs and protesters of the EuroMaidan. This could help obtain
a unique perspective and a clearer understanding of how the Revolution of Dignity changed the
political situation of the country. Thus, through well-formulated surveys and interviews and in the
case of a sufficient response rate, a more quantitative research could be conducted, which would
ease the writing process and the subsequent drafting of the analysis and the conclusion. What is
more, the language barrier represented an issue for the collection of objective and nonbiased data
on the topic. Even though various academic sources were consulted during the research process,
the majority of them were in English and some sources were inclined to be slightly biased. Even
though this kind of literature tried to be avoided as much as possible, the difficulty of providing
completely unbiased content still existed. However, if Ukrainian sources would have been
consulted, the dissertation would have provided more extensive results, analysis and conclusion.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Interview with Laura Starink
Date: 28/11/2018
Duration: 70 minutes
1. To begin with, could you tell me about your professional background? How did you begin and
further continued your career?
Laura Starink: By profession, I am a slavicist, I studied Russian Language and Literature at the
University of Amsterdam in the 1970’s and in 1979 I lived in Leningrad for one year, due to the
opportunity of receiving a scholarship, which was quite exceptional in those times, as it was the
Brezhnev era, so communism, a totally different period and country than now. As such, during the
time I’ve spent studying in Leningrad, we were all sleeping in dormitories, with Russian students.
Some of them had to take care of us as we were foreigners and did not speak the language that
well. Then, after my undergraduate years, I decided to pursue a master’s degree at the Leningrad
Institute of Theatre, Music and Cinema, for one year, and thus I have completed my master
dissertation on the topic of satire in Russian theatre in the 1930’s. After having finished my studies,
I obtained a job position at NRC Handelsblad, a Dutch newspaper and after five years or so, they
have decided to send me to Moscow, as I spoke Russian, in order to be a correspondent for the
newspaper during the Gorbachev era, from 1987 until 1991. Later on, after returning to Holland, I
continued my work as a journalist and reporter for NRC Handelsblad until approximately 9 years
ago. Now, besides being an author, I also collaborate with two of my colleagues, former
correspondents in Moscow as well. Three years ago, we have decided to create a website, more
like a digital think-tank called Raam op Rusland. After the Maidan crisis and the commencement of
the war in the Donbass, we reflected upon the fact that there is not enough knowledge and
information in Holland regarding these delicate events and that, through this initiative, people
would form a better understanding of what is happening in Russia and why there is always
something conflicting going on. As such, in three-year’s time, our team managed to create a
fullfledged website, with the work of many Russian authors being published, in order to keep the
dialogue going, to get their point of view. Moreover, since September 2018, we started to
collaborate with the University of Leiden, involving students and professors, as our objective is to
create a bridge between academia, journalism, public opinion, politicians, opinion leaders and
Russia.
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2. As an author, which piece of work would you categorize as your most valuable?
Laura Starink: Certainly, that would be the book about my mother, entitled “German roots”. My
mother was German, from Silesia, nowadays a region Poland. During her youth, it represented the
furthest part of the German empire. After the war, the Germans were kicked out because Stalin
wanted to grab the eastern part of Poland and give it to Ukraine. For that to be accomplished, he
had to shift the border to the West. Consequently, the Germans were kicked out from Silesia by
the time my mother had already left and moved to Switzerland where she met my father. Further
on, after some time, I investigated my mother’s history and decided to write a book about it, which
was proven to be the most successful among all the other books that I have written.
3. Shifting more towards the topic, how would you define political progress/political change in
a problematic society, such as Ukraine?
Laura Starink: This is quite a complicated thematic, I believe. What is political progress? In terms of
revolutionary events, the EuroMaidan was not the first revolution Ukraine had witnessed. In 2004,
there was the Orange Revolution followed, later on, by several upheavals. We also need to bear in
mind the fact that Ukraine is a new state, created only 25 years ago, and that formerly, it had always
been a part of the Russian Empire, only the Western part being under Polish occupation. Therefore,
as it is a relatively new country and a relatively new nation, Ukraine’s continuous conflicts with
Russia are evolving, as the latter does not recognize Ukraine as an independent state. Russia still
perceives Ukraine, especially Crimea and its Eastern regions (where there is ongoing war with the
separatists), as its own territory, and always has had. Therefore, referring to Maidan, it was initiated
mainly by students and young people who wanted to fight corruption and transform Ukraine into
a decent, transparent democracy, employing the rule of law and democratic liberties.
Moreover, the Ukrainians were aware that this would not be possible if the country would remain
under Russian influence, as the country is corrupt in its entirety. As such, they wanted to get rid of
the Russian heritage and the link with the EU was a favourable opportunity for them. As we know
by now, the EuroMaidan was triggered by Yanukovych’s failure to sign the Association Agreement
with the European Union. Yanukovych was a very strange figure, he had a criminal background, was
highly implicated in the Ukrainian corrupt clientelism and was often referred to as a “Gopnik”,
which is translated as “street thief”. So, to put it briefly, he was also playing its cards with the West.
As we know, at first, he was in favour of signing the Association Agreement, but then Putin put
pressure on him, he backed down and that was the main reason why the people took to the streets
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and persevered, to the astonishment of both Russia and the EU. Nobody had expected the
EuroMaidan to last that long, due to the deception that was previously provoked by the Orange
Revolution in 2004. Nevertheless, the EuroMaidan ended very bloody and I believe that neither
Putin nor the West had forecasted a regime change in Ukraine and neither one of the parties was
pleased with it, especially Putin, as he lost his sphere of influence. Moreover, the West was scared,
as they did not want a war in Central Europe, they did not know how to respond to the annexation
of Crimea, they did not know how to respond to the War in Donbass, they wanted to avoid a war
with Russia, so, as a conclusion, everyone was upset by the course of events.
The situation in Ukraine was atrocious, the Ukrainians were in the middle of this so-called clash of
civilisations as they were a failed state, very corrupt, very poor, with no institution of its own. I,
personally, was not present in Kyiv during the protests, but immediately after the regime changed,
I visited Ukraine quite often and spoke to a lot of young people from NGOs, who were full of hope
that something would finally change now that the government was overthrown. They used to tell
me that, as a nation, they can’t do it on their own, needing the EU support in order to progress as
a democratic, transparent and lawful society. They told me that “our corrupt clicks are so powerful
that we are not able to resist them, therefore we need EU support”. By consequence, if the IMF
were to give loans to Ukraine, they would expect some reforms in return. However, EU membership
was never an actual prospect for Ukraine. Back in the days, people were not so keen regarding EU
membership, as it would have meant that all kinds of enterprises and establishments would have
been closed, as they could not have reached European standards, resulting in high unemployment.
On the other hand, there was and still is an impressive and active civil society in support of EU
integration, especially from the part of the younger generation, as they are more aware of the
benefits that such a collaboration could bring upon the country.
So, coming back to the previous question, when talking about Ukraine’s status, it is still a failed
state, even after EuroMaidan. Moreover, amongst NGOs and young people, there still is a lot of
disappointment, as everyone expected things to change rapidly after the revolution. Nevertheless,
this is hard to accomplish as there is a high level of corruption dominating the society, which is
considerably difficult to combat. Besides this, the pressure from the West is not helpful. As such,
due to the circumstances, many young people are leaving the country to find a better future for
themselves, as now there is a visa-free regime and it is more accessible for people to leave.
Nonetheless, a colleague of mine, Max Barren, is currently conducting a research on corruption in
Ukraine with six Ukrainian scientists and I must say that his vision is not so pessimistic. He says that
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things are changing, slowing, but the change exists, however, it is very dependent on the local
circumstances. There are towns where criminality is in charge, but there are also other cities where
NGOs cooperate with the government with the purpose of enhancing the situation.
4. Moving on, comparing the Orange Revolution with the EuroMaidan, which one was proven to
be more successful?
Laura Starink: The Orange Revolution, in its core, had the same purpose as EuroMaidan. It was also
initiated in order to fight corruption and to have a regime change. The difference was that there
was no invasion at that time, so there was not an outside enemy. And that is one of the reasons for
which it failed so quickly. The situation inside the country remained the same. In a way one can
conclude, even though it may sound harsh, that the Orange Revolution was a blessing in disguise
for what was yet to come. What Putin did was that he united the Ukrainians to fight and protect
their country. Therefore, now, most of the population does not want to be associated with Russia,
moreover, they would prefer giving up on speaking Russian and using only Ukrainian as their official
language.
Consequently, I personally believe that in forming statehood, EuroMaidan was more effective than
the Orange Revolution. The latter was more of a change from one corrupt click to another. This
conflict with Russia has helped Ukraine a lot, as the population was forced to unite and stick
together, which means that they did not have another option other that EU. As such, this means
that if they want to collaborate with the EU, they need to find a way to fight the corruption. And of
course, this goes very slowly and there is no prospect for EU integration in the near future, because
they just can’t compete with the West. After EuroMaidan, however, a consistent amount of people
was in favour of EU and even NATO membership. Even in the Donbass region, a few months ago, I
have spoken with Alexander Hug- former representative of the monitoring mission of the OSCEwho
said that “nobody I have met told me that they wanted to belong to Russia”.
5. Would you say that the media coverage of the events is not completely accurate, due to lack
of information?
Laura Starink: Yes. For a journalist working, for example, in the Donbass, it is very difficult. If you
work in the Donbass, as a journalist, then the Ukrainians are most likely to boycott you, because
they consider it occupied territory, so you are not supposed to go there, which is unreasonable, of
67
course, because a journalist must go everywhere, as that is his/her job. Consequently, because
there are not so many journalists reporting from the Donbass, there is not enough plausible
information for the public. I, personally, believe that media coverage should not be trustworthy,
especially regarding what is happening in the Eastern part of Ukraine.
6. In what sense did the intervention of Berkut– the Ukrainian Special Police Forces– influence
the course of events and the political game?
Laura Starink: Yanukovych sent in the troops and because of that, there were so many victims and
numerous casualties. However, there are many speculations regarding whether Kremlin
manipulated Yanukovych into bringing in the Berkut. During EuroMaidan, there were a lot of
Russians in Kyiv, as well as Russian Secret Services involved in the Revolution. Nevertheless, the
Berkut belonged to Ukraine, not to Russia, as many tended to believe. However, I believe that
Yanukovych was quite reluctant to using force in the beginning. He was not strong enough to face
the situation, to face the Ukrainian people who revolted, so that is why he ultimately chose to flee
the country. The Russians wanted him to crush this uprising, as such, the easiest way for
Yanukovych to implement the plan was by involving the Berkut. In the end, everything turned
chaotic, bloody, a lot of victims, so, because he was desperate, afraid, and out of control, he chose
to leave. And that is how his regime ended. The Berkut’s approach was fatal and, to be honest,
partially useless. Nevertheless, again, it brought people closer together, fighting the corruption and
injustice.
7. During the EuroMaidan events, a clear sympathy for the protesters was developed, due to
media coverage. Nevertheless, it appears that many of the activists seemed to have quite
dubious backgrounds and to have instigated the violent riots. What is your opinion on that?
Laura Starink: There are two things one needs to consider: on the one hand, there is the Kremlin
narrative claiming that the EuroMaidan was a Neo-Nazi, fascist coup d’état, led by the Western part
of Ukraine. In Western Ukraine, in Lviv, the population is considerably anti-Russian, as this portion
of the country was never part of the Russian Empire, it became Ukraine after the
Second World War. As such, they do not have these Russian backgrounds or connections at all, they
are very nationalistic and, besides that, they follow the values and ideas of their hero, Stepan
Bandera, a fascist who tried to organize an independent Ukrainian state and intended to
collaborate with Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the Germans had no interest in working with him
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and, consequently, they put him in a concentration camp. He was killed, later, by the KGB. Bandera
never took part in WWII, nonetheless, he was certainly a fascist. Moreover, he became a heroic
figure in Ukraine, due to his anti-Russian active background. So, the problem during that period,
especially in Central and Eastern Europe was the existence of two enemies: the fascists and the
communists. As such, there was no actual escape: whichever side you were on, you would end up
being killed by the enemy. Hence, for those people, it was difficult to choose which was the lesser
evil. To this extent, the Russians, in their historiography, had always misused the situation and had
portrayed the Ukrainians as fascists, because of the previous collaborations.
Thus, as far as EuroMaidan is concerned, it was initiated by students. However, in any kind of
revolution, there are always extremists and radicalists involved. Subsequently, when the events
started to escalate, there were extreme-right, nationalistic factions such as Svoboda and The Right
Sector, who were there to instigate and to provoke. These groups did not constitute most of the
protesters; however, their violent involvement was a worrisome development for EuroMaidan.
However, the Russian put a lot of stress on the issue that, the Ukrainians were all collaborators
during the Second World War and that they took part in the annihilation of the Jews and so one.
Therefore, they have this very simplistic narrative. Also, the fact that most of the Ukrainian
population sees Stepan Bandera as a freedom fighter and not as a fascist, does not help to
ameliorate Kremlin’s vision of the events. Besides this, Russia only emphasized the negative side of
the revolution, of the regime change and that is also why they managed to convince so many
Russians to go to war in the Donbass, because they would tell them they are going to fight the
fascists, which is false. What I also want to add is Russia’s approach to different events. Let’s take
the example of the Armenian Revolution which occurred earlier this year and which took the form
of a people’s revolution. It was led by Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who wanted to fight
corruption. Nevertheless, Russia’s opportunistic approach regarding the Armenian Revolution was
completely different than the one they used during EuroMaidan. This time, they did not react
against it, but more than that, they embraced it. And all of this happened because Armenia still is
under Russia’s sphere of influence.
8. Overall, in which direction is the political situation of the country going? Will it direct itself
towards the European model or will it remain under the “dominance” of Kremlin?
Laura Starink: One cannot expect a total change after five years from the EuroMaidan, unlike the
West wants to believe. There are very bad signs as well. For example, the NGOs are under constant
69
pressure, and that’s partly due to politicians, who do not want to abide to the law and partly due
to criminals, who want to make use of the situation. For instance, last month, in Ukraine, there
were subsequent to a tragedy that happened to an activist, Kateryna Handzyuk, from Kherson. She
died due to an acid attack. And this is only one case, out of many more. Moreover, during the last
18 months, more than 55 people were attacked/abused by unknown criminal organization. So that
already says a lot. As such, NGOs fight for transparency, which brings upon them a lot of enemies.
Also, the aggression they encounter, such as the example I have mentioned previously, is horrific.
And what is even more disturbing is that they must deal with similar types of situations every day.
The main problem is that the international status quo is eroding very rapidly and the attachment
to human rights, rule of law etc. So, we are in backlash. Populists are gaining everywhere and that
is a very frightening development, I would say, especially for young failed states such as Ukraine,
because they need support, they need somebody to force them to comply and to abide to the law,
only for their own good and more prosperous development. Besides this, there is still the problem
with the West. At first, the EU was keen on helping Ukraine escape the corruption bubble after
EuroMaidan, but now, people are disappointed, thinking they should not meddle or interfere,
because it takes more than effort to change the situation. Hence, what we see is that Western
Europe is slowly withdrawing itself, as it has its own problems with refugees, populists etc., which
is, certainly, a negative development. Subsequently, one can even argue that, in the end, a regime
like Putin’s, which is likely to exist until 2024 or even more, has the longer “breath”. As such, in the
alleged case of EU’s collapse, Kremlin will wait, meanwhile, and take back Ukraine afterwards.
Furthermore, the political system in Ukraine is more than unacceptable, lousy. It is an oligarchic
system, they have these industrial groups who own newspapers and television channels. Therefore,
it is not a democracy in its true sense. There is, of course, more diversity and pluralism than in
Russia, where everything is stopped down. And as far as elections are concerned, I believe that
Poroshenko will be elected again, as there is no other alternative. It is true, he is a little bit above
the rest, however, the problem lays within these continuous political scandals which are not even
political anymore. The situation has reached the level where interest groups fight for money,
power, ownership, influence. Besides this, the population is aware of what is going on, and,
consequently, they are becoming sceptic regarding the elections and who to vote for. Besides
Poroshenko, people also see Yulia Tymoshenko as an option. Her popularity has risen since
EuroMaidan; however, she is quite an ambiguous figure, due to her past contacts with Vladimir
Putin.
70
Overall, Ukraine will always be a buffer state between the EU and Russia, geopolitically speaking.
Moreover, what we see now, both the EU and Russia are in decline. According to a Russian
sociologist, Putin is passé for populists. Now, everyone is more concerned with Trump, he is the
new figure. Russia is a destructive country, they do not build anything, no new alliances, no
participation nor involvement. As an example, last week, the OPCW held their yearly conference,
and Russia refused to condone extra budget to pursue the perpetrators of chemical attacks. Russia
was trying to lobby, but they failed miserably. Overall, 80 countries were in favour of the budget
and only 28 were on Russia’s side. Additionally, Putin is not only losing face externally, but also
internally. Last year, due to the pension reform, a lot of Russians were infuriated as he refused to
raised pensions. In conclusion, for Ukraine, the situation is very unpredictable. Being surrounded
by unstable neighbours is harmful. They would have prospered if there would have existed more
help and support from the EU, but unfortunately, it is not the case. However, the fact that Russia
is becoming weaker might be an advantage for Ukraine as the probability of an attack would be
less likely to occur.
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Appendix 2
Interview with Olena Vlasenko – First Secretary at the Ukrainian Embassy in The Hague
Date of the interview: 22/01/2019
Duration: 30 minutes
1. How would you define political progress/political change in a problematic society, such as
Ukraine?
Olena Vlasenko: This is an interesting and at the same time, a sensitive question given the current
situation of Ukraine with the war in the Donbas. I personally believe that progress, in all areas of
the society is possible. However, there are many factors we need to bear in mind. First, we know
that Ukraine is a new state, it was formed in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet bloc. Secondly, Ukraine
has witnessed three major popular uprisings, from 2001 until 2013, meaning a bit over a decennium
and that is something to keep in mind. Next, after the EuroMaidan came the annexation of Crimea
and the consequent war in the Donbas. Russia does not want to stop its oppression. People are
fighting and resisting, continuing to stress the importance for European integration. Thus, to
answer your question, one would believe that, after everything Ukraine has gone through in such
a short period of time, the country would just rest its case, sort to say. On the one hand, it is true
that many Ukrainians have already lost their hopes when talking about the future of the country
and that is also why many of them are leaving the country. On the other hand, we see the youth,
hand in hand with NGOs, trying to fight corruption and injustice and to spread their thoughts
concerning the importance for European integration and adoption of European values. I believe
that things are not ideal right now in Ukraine, but that political progress can happen, even if it’s
quite slow and sometime unnoticeable.
2. When referring to EuroMaidan, do you believe that media’s coverage of the events was
accurate?
Olena Vlasenko: If we refer to how national media was documenting the events, then yes, I believe
it was accurate. What was seen, however, was that, a high number of journalists and reporters
were either kidnapped, abused and even killed for voicing their opinions and for taking a stance
during the protests. And of course, all these tragic events happened because of the high levels of
corruption in the country. Political figures have close ties with criminal organisations who conduct
this kind of activities. So, what I’m trying to say is that, even though media actors where addressing
72
the real concerns during EuroMaidan and its course of action, a high price had to be paid. Apart
from the Ukrainian media, there was also Russia reporting that EuroMaidan was, in fact, a fascist
coup d’état led by radicalists and extremists and on the other hand, there were the United States,
putting all the blame for EuroMaidan on Russia. So, in the end, everyone became confused and did
not understand the real meaning of EuroMaidan. I believe that, in order to understand the
EuroMaidan and its consequences correctly, one should conduct thorough research based on
content written by experts, because, frankly, international news are less and less trustworthy.
3. In what sense did the intervention of Berkut– the Ukrainian Special Police Forces– influence
the course of events and the political game?
Olena Vlasenko: From the beginning of EuroMaidan, Berkut was used by the government as a tool
to scare the protesters, in the hope that they would abandon the protest. Nevertheless, to their
surprise, people became angrier and transformed the protests into a real Revolution of Dignity.
After November 30, Ukrainians were not only protesting the government’s decision to withdraw
the country from signing the Association Agreements, but also corruption, the use of violence and
injustice. More than that, people drafted a whole set of political demands and they did not stop
protesting until these demands were fulfilled. What I can say is that Berkut, with its violent
approach, created a more powerful civic society and a way more pronounced sense of collective
identity. Ukrainians literally fought for the future of their country.
4. During the EuroMaidan events, a clear sympathy for the protesters was developed, due to
media coverage. Nevertheless, it appears that many of the activists seemed to have quite
dubious backgrounds and to have instigated the violent riots. What is your opinion on that?
Olena Vlasenko: As it is the case for every protest/revolution/riot/popular uprising, there are many
different actors involved. There are activists, labour unions, normal citizens, SMOs and of course
there are far-right groups as well. I cannot tell you precisely what happened, but I do not believe
that right-wing activists from Svoboda or Pravy Sektor started the violence during the protests. Or
if they used violence, it was as a response to Berkut’s behaviour. However, I am not very well
informed on the subject so I cannot give you a clear answer to this question.
5. Overall, in which direction is the political situation of the country going? Will it direct itself
towards the European model or will it remain under the “dominance” of Kremlin?
73
Olena Vlasenko: Right now, I am not really sure in which direction is the state moving. But what I
can tell you is that EuroMaidan was needed and, even if it ended bloody, with many victims, it
achieved its objectives. We now have an Association Agreement with the EU and a new
government. Of course, people will still complain, and it is certain that progress is slow, but at least,
Ukrainians start to realize that, in other to distance Ukraine from Russia, we need a new orientation
and set of values and our only possible solution now is the EU. Many Ukrainians are still sceptical
regarding whether Ukraine could ever be part of the EU. And they are right. But I believe that, with
more support from Brussels, developments in Ukraine are possible. Russia is slowly losing face on
the international stage.
Also, Ukrainians never wanted to be associated with Russia. People in the eastern part of Ukraine
do not want to be associated with Russia. The whole war in the Donbass is manipulated and
controlled by Russia, but it seems that even Kremlin does not know what to do anymore. It has
been over four years since the war started and nobody know when it is going to end. As far as the
war in concerned, I do not have any prospects. I believe that the EU needs a military force in order
to deal with conflicts of this type.
Overall, however, political change is happening, but indeed, very slowly. One first step would be
more attachment to European values, one thing that Ukrainian people seem to already start
understanding. Also, extensive EU support is needed, not only financially, but also politically and
socially. The signing of the Association Agreement represented one milestone, yet, more effort
needs to be provided. If EU initiatives for Ukraine would be drafted more frequently, people would
become more motivated and engaged in collective action. Moreover, one can see that Ukrainians
are more united than they were before, and I think that was due to the EuroMaidan. I personally
believe that with unity, obstacles of each type can be overcome.
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Appendix 3
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From Maidan To A Revolution of Dignity

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From Maidan to a Revolution of Dignity:

Understanding the EuroMaidan and Ukraine’s

Mara Olteanu (15009718)

Dissertation Supervisor: A. Grebner

March 26th, 2019

The Hague University of App lied Sciences

Faculty of Management and Organisation

Word count: 18,890 words

1. Research questions and sub-questions ................................................................................ 7

2. Qualitative desk research .................................................................................................... 8

Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 12

1. Social movements ............................................................................................................. 12

2. Political activism ............................................................................................................... 12

3. Collective identity .............................................................................................................. 14

4. Social media and contemporary citizen activism ................................................................ 15

5. Far-right involvement in the protests................................................................................. 16

1. The EuroMaidan: Past and Present ........................................................................... 21

1.1. Historical Overview ........................................................................................................ 21

1.2. EuroMaidan: a social movement ..................................................................................... 22

1.3. Berkut involvement in the protests ................................................................................. 25

2. Comparing the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution ........................................... 31

2.1. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution .......................................................................................... 31

2.2. The Orange Revolution vs EuroMaidan ........................................................................... 32

2.2.6. Rise in violence...............................................................................................................................37

3. Kremlin’s interpretation and coverage of the EuroMaidan ........................................ 38

4. EuroMaidan and social media................................................................................... 42

4.1. Activism and social media ............................................................................................... 42

4.2. Social media and self-organization .................................................................................. 43

5. Political prospects and developments post Euro-Maidan .......................................... 45

5.1. Ukraine between EU and Russia post-EuroMaidan.......................................................... 45

5.2. Five years after the EuroMaidan – Experts’ view ............................................................. 48

1. EuroMaidan and its course of action .................................................................................. 50

It is a particularly interesting topic to analyse, as a country which is strongly connected, historically

1. Research questions and sub-questions

2. Qualitative desk research

3.1. Essentialist perspective

3.2. Constructivist perspective

4. Social media and contemporary citizen activism

5. Far-right involvement in the protests

As a contrast to Berkut’s implication in the EuroMaidan protests, it is of significant relevance to

According to Harding, as a means to counter-attack Kremlin’s statements regarding the far-right as

1. The EuroMaidan: Past and Present

1.1. Historical Overview

1.2. EuroMaidan: a social movement

1.3. Berkut involvement in the protests

1.3.1. 30 November-1 December 2013

1.3.2. 19-23 January 2014

Furthermore, according to Anna Nemtsova, EuroMaidan demonstrators documented police

1.3.3. 18-20 February 2014

Almost immediately, a disinformation campaign began on social media to try to

2. Comparing the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution

2.1. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution

2.2. The Orange Revolution vs EuroMaidan

2.2.4. Actors involved

2.2.4.1 Activists and SMOs

2.2.4.2. Foreign actors

2.2.4.3. Political elite

2.2.4.4. Ordinary citizens

2.2.5. Protest claims

2.2.6. Rise in violence

3. Kremlin’s interpretation and coverage of the EuroMaidan

Additionally, according to Laura Starink, in order to understand Russia’s interpretations of various

4. EuroMaidan and social media