Andrew Sadek Expert Witness Part 1 of 3 of Document Michael Levine

MICHAEL LEVINE - SECURITY
TRIAL·
CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY- CONFIDENTIAL
Tim O'Keeffe, ESQ.

O'Keeffe, O'Brien Lyson and Foss Ltd.
Fargo, North Dakota
Expert witness report.
Mutter - substandard recruitment, management and protection of Andrew

SADEK as an undercover, criminal police informant.1
I. INTRODUCTION
I, MICHAEL LEVINE, of the City of High Falls and State of New York, do say as
follows:
That l have been a court-qualified expert and legal consultant in
civil and criminal matters involving all facets of Narcotic law enforcement;
Undercover Tactics, Investigative Procedures; Investigative File Review;
Police Corruption and Misconduct Investigations; Law Enforcement Hiring
Procedures including paneling, background investigations and selection;
Selection of Law Enforcement Officers for Undercover Work; financial>
income tax and money laundering investigations, and other matters related
to law enforcement activities since 1966. My detailed resume is attached
hereto as Attachment A. Specifics as to expert qualifications and other
materials heavily relied upon in all opinions rendered herein, are included
in Section rv of this report, below.
That, I have been retained by John SADEK and Tammy SADEK,
as surviving parents of Andrew SAD.EK, through their attorneys, Tim
O'Keeffe & Tatum O'Brien, to review the case file, deposition transcripts and
1 Crl.mlnal informant, is the training designation traditionally given to those informants who
come from the criminal element, and/ or are given "license" while under the Control and
guidance of law enforcement, to violate Federal and state felony laws in order to assist law
enforcement in enforcing the law,
EXHIBIT
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discovery documents through the lens of my fifty yearn of training and

experience and conduct whatever other research and consultations I deem
necessary to then render comments and opinions as to the existence of
items of proof (elements of probable cause) indicative of DEFENDANTS'
reckless, unreasonable and craven disregard of national and professional
standards and public safety in general, and in particular, the health and
safety of Young ANDREW SAD EK (the victim), specifically as relates to the
tactics, methods and use of police authority and force employed by
DEFENDANTS in the targeting, investigation, and recruitment ("flipping") of
the victim into a role as a criminal informant, including but not limited to
DEFENDANTS' subsequent attempted deployment of this young college
student into the active role of an undercover police informant. All of my
opinions are given to a "more likely than not" standard and I reserve my
right to amend this report based on reciept of new or additional information.
It it my understanding that I have reviewed all information
available with regard to this matter. I will be providing an Exhibit listing the
documents/items which have been provided to me for review.
That I have incorporated said opinions and comments in a Expert
Witness Report Format, which is herewith set forth in the following format:
I. INTRODUCTION;
II. SPECIFIC EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER DATA HEAVILY
RELIED UPON IN REACHING OPINIONS;
III. RELIABLE METHODS OF INVESTIGATIVE FILE and Action REVIEW &
RELATED EXPERTISE QUALIFICATIONS FURTHER EXPLAINED
IV. OPINIONS AND FINDINGS - A BRIEF SUMMARY;
V. OPINIONS AND FINDINGS - WITH ADDITIONAL DETAIL SUMMARIZING
"REASONS TO BELIEVE";
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VI DETAILS [RTLASONS FOR MY BELIEF] - ANALYSIS OF ALL MATERJALS

REVIEWED IN SUPPORT OF FINDINGS;
II. SPECIFIC EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER DATA HEAVILY

RELIED UPON IN REACHING OPINIONS
The following training and experience combine to formulate the basis of, or
"lens" through which I formulate my opinions as to what professional standards
are as they relate to Undercover Tactics, Informant Handling, Entrapment and
related Investigative and Management Procedures and Responsibilities. (direct
and qualifying testimony).
(a) Police Involved Shootings (as a result of substandard informant

handling).
Since 1990, I have been retained by both Plaintiff and
Defense in the expert review of more than 2 00 police-involved
shootings and other related use-of-force matters. From 2003 to
the present time, I have been retained by theDistrict Attorneys
offices of Fulton County (Atlanta) and DeKalb Counties, Georgia
and have testified as a prosecution expert on numerous occasions.
A significant number of use-of-force matters evolve from, and/ or,
are directly caused by substandard informant recruitment and
handling. On occasion my reviews have resulted in the
identification of elements of probable cause indicative of false
officiaJ reporting, and/ or, other criminal offenses, to a degree that
resulted in criminal investigation of said officers and officials,
and/or, my recommendation of same, as in the case of the instant
matter.
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CONFIDENTIAL- ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY- CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Police Instructor, US Department of State

In November, 2010, I began instructing the Brazilian Federal
Police in Undercover Tactics and Informant Handling for the US
Department of State. At that time I had already authored a
student manual ( Undercover Tactics and Informant Handling) on
those subjects that was translated into Brazilian Portuguese and
distributed to the BFP by the Department of State. The training is
extremely comprehensive and covers the use of informants,
entrapment and undercover tactics throughout South and Central
America and Mexico, as well as the use of technical devices such
as wiretaps GPS and other surreptitious monitoring devices, and,
use-of-force tactics related thereto, These assignments continued
from 2010 to 2014.
(c) Police Instructor New York State Department of Criminal

Justice Services.
Until March, 2009, I served as a New York State certified law
enforcement instructor and have lectured in New York State on the
topic "Undercover Tactics & Informant Handling" boLh on
Department of Justice Assignment and continuing after my
retirement on contractual basis. My lectures were attended by
officers from federal agencies and other state agencies as well. In
January of 2008 I authored the law enforcement student manual
"Undercover Tactics and Informant Handling," for the New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services. The training
encompassed the use of "flipped" criminals as undercover
informants (criminals who agreed to work undercover as a result of
cooperation agreements) and all related areas and enforcement
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procedures, including but not limited to, procedures and

standards employed in the corroboration of criminal informant
claims. As part of my duties as a police instructor I continually
research cases to use as examples of the tragedies that resulted
from this substandard recruitment and handling of criminal
informants.
(d) Instructor of Suggested National Standards in Investigative

Procedures-- DEA Local Enforcement Training Programs
The Drug Enforcement Administration, designated our
nation's "lead agency in the war on drugs" in 1973, in an effort to
stem a rising tide of drug-related corruption, including but not
limited to false arrests and prosecutions emanating from the
substandard, and/ or criminal use of criminal informants, was
mandated by Congress, to embark upon an intensive effort to set
national standards for all investigative procedures related to the
management, handling, corroboration of Informants (all those
providing information as to criminal activity) via training schools
for local, county and state police agencies across the nation. This
included training and exercises in the use, safety, control and
management of informants in an undercover capacity.
It was recognized by way of tragic and well-documented
experience, that the substandard employment and/ or selection
and/or management of Criminal Informants, arid/or the due
diligence corroboration of informant-supplied information,
represented a clear and present danger to officer safety, the safety
and security of the community these police agencies had sworn to
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protect and serve, as well as the safety of the informants

themselves.
For seventeen yearn of my career with the Drug Enforcement
Administration, I served periodic co-duties as an
Instructor /Lecturer in this program, specializing in Undercover
Tactics, Entrapment and Informant Handling and other areas
related thereto, including but not limited to the use of electronic
monitoring devices, wiretaps and use of force issues. During this
period of time, among many other training assignments I fulfilled
as part of this program, I became a licensed New York State Police
Instructor and a regular instructor of Narcotics Investigations,
Undercover Tactics & Informant Handling at the New York State
Police Academy. Also, during tb is period of time, I authored a
teaching manual entitled, "Undercover Tactics and Informant
Handling," This manual was subsequently adopted by the New
York State criminal justice division, for the training of local law
enforcement throughout the state. The manual was then
subsequently adopted by the US State Department for use in the
training of Brazilian federal police, It is currently in print via
academia.edu and, during the past five years, has been rated as
between the top .01 %-.05% of Global downloads by police
agencies, researchers and academicians.
(e) Lecturer at FBI Academy

It was during this period of time that I was invited by the FBI
through DEA headquarters to lecture at their advanced undercover
and informant handling training seminar in Quantico, Virginia.
The standards and guidelines taught during this time are precisely
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the same standards and guidelines referred to throughout this

report.
(£1 19 Years Service as a Supervisory Officer:

Nineteen years of training and experience as a Drug
Enforcement Administration and US Customs supervisory officer
with intensive training and experience in supervising and/ or
reviewing and/ or conducting thousands of criminal investigations
including the direct supervision of the handling, control and record
keeping associated with Investigative Procedures and Informant
Handling practices and all investigative procedures related thereto,
including but not limited to the use of electronic recording devices,
wiretaps, interrogation procedures and use of force issues. The
cases numbering in excess of 10,000 involved every aspect: of law
enforcement investigative activities, including but not limited to:
Organized Crime, drug trafficking, homicide, extortion, money
laundering, continuing criminal enterprise, RICO, armed robbery,
kidnapping, etc. It is important to note the techniques and
procedures of the justice-department-mandated-review duties
imposed on DEA supervisory officers, are identical to those
employed in reviewing the instant matter.
(g) Training Received in Investigative File and Operations

Review Procedures:
During my seventeen years as a DEA supervisory officer, I
was specifically trained in the reliable methods and principals of
investigative file review, as well as the close review and supervision
of agents and local police officers under my command; supervisory
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duties that entailed the close supervision and full review of

thousands of criminal investigations most of which entailed the
use of criminal informants, Undercover Tactics, Interrogations, the
"flipping" of informants and Interviews, wiretaps (Title IIIs), the use
of electronic monitoring devices as well as use-of-force issues .2
Herc again, it is important to note that the procedures tactics and
standards of this training were adhered to during the instant
review,
(h) Responsible for Approval of Prosecution Packages:

It is significant to note here, that part of my training,
experience and supervisory duties was the supervision and review
of investigations and,' or investigative files and that affixing my
signature of approval of same prior to said investigations andj' or
files being forwarded to federal and/ or slale prosecutors for
prosecution; and in excess of 90 percent of these cases involved
the use of undercover tactics and/or Informants.3 As a
s upervisory officer a significant problem was the continuous
monitoring of all Informant-handling tactics of the men and women
under my command, in particular as those tactics applied to
public, officer and informant safety.
(i) Undercover and Informant-Handling Experience--

Individual Responsibility
2 DEA Management School at the University of Maryl.and; Operations Inspector Training,
Wash.D.C. and mandatory attendance at numerous management training sessions and

conferences throughout this period of time.
3 Commonly referred to as "prosecution packages."
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Twenty-five years of law enforcement training and experience

serving as an undercover operative and case agent with intensive
personal experience working criminal investigations that ran the
full gamut of known criminal. activity. During this period of time I
personalJ.y fulfilled in excess of 3,000 undercover and deep cover
assignments and was considered one of the most decorated officers
in DEA's history. I have worked assignments for four federal
agencies, the New York State Police, the New York City Police
Department, and the Broward County, Florida. Sheriff's
Department. During this same time, I was personally responsible
for the management, handling, corroboration and security of more
than ~-3,000 informants used in an undercover capacity.
It is important to note that this experience included my
personal participation as a deep cover agent in excess of 200 major
and complicated international conspiracy investigations, wherein I
successfully posed as an international drug trafficker. Nonfiction
books written about these experiences are currently being used as
references by researchers, international law enforcement agencies
and u niverai tiea.
U) Expert Testimony for Prosecution:

Approximately 19 of my 25 years as a federal agent, during
which time I was called on by the prosecution, on in excess of 200
occasions, to testify as an expert in all areas of criminal
investigations including but not limited to all facets of undercover
operations, entrapment, informant handling, interrogations, use of
force, raids, the execution of search warrants, Title III (wiretap)
investigations and matters related thereto.
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(k) Co-duty as Inspector of Operations - Department of

Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility:
Three years of co-duty as a DEA Inspector of Operations,
attached to the Department of Justice, Office of Professional
Responsibility, during which time I was pulled from my normal
supervisory duties and sent to DEA Divisional offices throughout
the world on unannounced operational inspections. These
inspection duties always included a full file review and evaluation
of investigative procedures related to all law enforcement
investigative procedures including but not limited to all aspects of
Informant-handling and undercover tactics, and related areas
including but not limited to Wiretap (Title III), electronic
surveillance, interrogation and use-of-force issues, with a special
emphasis on management oversight responsibility.
It is important to note that, in essence, these reviews were
almost identical in technique, purpose and standards, to the
reviews conducted as a trial consultant in the instant matter.
(1) Responsible for Performance Ratings of Federal Agents

and Local Police Under my Command:
17 years of experience as a DEA supervisory officer during
which time I was responsible for the performance, review and
training of all investigators under my command." This entailed the
completion of biannual performance ratings that mandated my
personal observation and rating as it related to officer performance
4 These duties required that I prepare written performance reviews for every enforcement officer
under my command, including local law enforcement officers, on a biannual basis.
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iJ1 ALL facets of their law enforcement duties and training,

including but not limited to:
- Appropriate and reasonable Use-of-Force and Authority in
all situations.
- Interrogations and interviews-all standards related
thereto.
Compilation of Probable Cause for arid Execution of
Search Warrants.
Electronic surveillance including, but not limited to,
wiretaps and electronic monitoring devices
- Investigative report writing and adherence to professional
and national standards in investigative reporting.
Standards of Conduct (including honesty, judgment,
integrity, etc.). I was required to specifically observe,
investigate and report indications of deception and/ or
corruption in all areas of performance.
- Adherence to National Drug Policy (i.e. the exhausting of
all investigative means to fully exploit each and every
investigation in the direction of sources of supply and/ or
kingpins and/ or to the resolution of all drug related
crimes encountered, including but not limited to
homicide, extortion, larceny, witness tampering, etc.).
Adherence to the search-for-truth principals of
investigative work, all phases of investigation.
Courtroom Testimony.
Presentation of Investigations and Investigative Files for
Prosecution.
Undercover Work (all phases).
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- Productivity.
- Informant Handling, including Informant Debriefings &
Interrogations, security, Adherence to Investigative
Corroboration of Informant Claims, Record Keeping and
Reporting Standards, including but not limited to
adherence to the Attorney General's Guidelines on
Informants,
Monitoring, the adherence to departrnen t of justice
prohibitions against "Down Trading" cooperation
agreements; that is, cooperation agreements between
arrested and "flipped" criminals during which said
criminals seek to make cooperation agreements by
trading clearly "Lesser" violators in return for cooperation
credit for their own sentencing.
(m) Police Instructor/Lecturer Since Retirement from Law

Enforcement.
Since my retirement from DEA, twenty-one years of
professional consulting (continuing to this date) during which
time I have continued to lecture for police agencies and
professional security associations in the US, Canada and
Australia on enforcement tactics and procedures related to
Undercover Operations and Informant Management. I served as a
police instructor for the United States State Department,
American Embassy in Brazil, 2011-2014.
Many of these lectures also entailed my attendance at other
lectures presented by top experts covering the full gamut of
narcotics and other law enforcement activities, in order to
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maintain my expertise as current as possible. lt is during these

courses and lectures and the sharing of ongoing investigative data
that I have been kept aware of the continuing occurrence of cases
involving substandard informant management and handling (and
all management matters related thereto) that have resulted in,
and continue to result in, tragic consequences paid for by the
public that law enforcement has vowed to serve and protect.
In December 2008, I was an invited lecturer by the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs, Southern Command. My topic
was the handling of human intelligence (informants) and the flaws
in procedures that have led to catastrophic failures in both law
enforcement and military.
(.n) Internal Affairs Investigative Experience

More than ten years of my career as a street enforcement
supervisor during which I was assigned co-duties as an Internal
Affairs Investigator, which routinely covered investigations of the
full gamut of police misconduct and/ or corruption, a significant
percentage of which involved use-of-force issues, the abuse of police
powers, and the substandard handling of informants."
(o) Homicide Investigations

Supervised and/ or reviewed and/ or served as primmy case
agent in numerous Organized Crime, RICO, Conspiracy, Drug and
Weapons Trafficking cases that resulted in clearing in excess of 100
homicides during my career.
5 This was a mandatory co-duty of all DEA Group Supervisors.
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(p) DEA Headquarters Desk Officer

Service as a DEA Headquarters Desk Officer overseeing
major national and international investigations of all types.
(q) Current Database of Experts and Research Materials

My current journalist/ expert witness/Trial consultant
database with includes more than 200 serving law enforcement
officers worldwide, journalists and other experts and practitioners,
with whom I consult and collaborate on all matters that are under
my review as a trial consultant and/ or expert witness and/ or
journalist and/ or law enforcement instructor, including but not
limited to Use-of-force issues, Informant Hand.ling and matters
relating to Interrogations and Interviewing tactics of criminal
informants.
{r) 27 Years of Trial Consulting Experience:

Since my retirement from the Department of Justice, 27
years of professional consulting during which time I have reviewed
in excess of 500 full case files, as an expert witness and trial
consultant, relating to civil and criminal matters involving police
investigative and informant handling {including "jailhouse
snitches"), undercover procedures and tactics and Use-of-Force
issues and related areas such as wiretaps, complicated
conspiracies, interrogation and interview standards and adherence
to the search for truth doctrine.
The discovery materials reviewed as a result of my trial-
consulting activities, include up-to-date Police and federal law
14
enforcement agency operations, procedural and training manuals

for in excess of 50 state, city and county law enforcement entities
as well as all law enforcement agencies within the Department of
Justice, U.S. Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security.
That, during these 27 years I have on occasion identified, as
a result of these reviews, elements of probable cause indicative of
major crime and corruption that resulted in my testifying before
criminal grand juries, and/ or, recommending that the cases under
review be forwarded to the appropriate federal investigative body
for criminal investigation as is the case with the instant review.
III RELIABLE METHODS OF INVESTIGATIVE FILE AND ACTION

REVIEW & RELATED EXPERTISE QUALIFICATIONS FURTHER
EXPLAINED
The route to being deemed to qualify as an expert within the Department of
Justice and the training involved in the reliable methods of investigative file
review employed in this matter are set forth as follows. The officers selected
for supervisory promotion to front-line supervisory status must consistently
demonstrate an expert's level of performance in the following areas; areas in
which, as a supervisory officer, they will be called upon to observe and
evaluate the performance of those under their command in biannual written
ratings:"
a. Adherence to the Code of Conduct.
b. Dealing with the Public in all situations.
c. Appropriate use of force in all situations
6 In accordance with the standard of "reason ability under the totality of circumst.ances," as per
the opinion of supervisory officers, considered the "in-house experts."
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d. Informant recruitment and handling, all areas, including but not

limited to the adherence to national and professional standards
and law.
e. Undercover Tactics
f. Raid planning and execution.
g. Courtroom testimony and trial preparation.
h. Preparation of official reports and affidavits and adherence to
standards related thereto.
1. Investigative effectiveness in all areas including conducting
background investigations for pre-employment of law enforcement
personnel and the conducting of accident investigations and
Internal Affairs investigations at the order of supervisory
personnel.
j. Adherence to agency guidelines and directives.
k. Adherence to state and local law.
1. Character and Reasonability of Judgment in all situations.
m. Maintaining mental and physical condition.
After having been designated as a frontline supervisory officer, I became one of

the administration's procedural experts in the field. I was called upon to
conduct the frontline review and investigation of all incidents occurring under
my command.
After said selection and promotion at the beginning of my 1 7 years
as a DOJ supervisory officer, I was sent to the University of Maryland for
management training during which I began specific training in the reliable
methods of investigative file and action review; that is, the methodology of
utilizing your areas of expertise as a "lens" in the methodical, step-by-step
investigation and review of all incidents that merit said review.
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TRIAi.. - MICHAEL LEVINE - SECURITY
After approximately 6 years of receiving "outstanding" annual

ratings for my performance in a supervisory capacity, the Department of
Justice selected me for a co-duty assignment as an Inspector-in-Place in OPR,
The Office of Professional Responsibility. This assignment entailed additional
training in Washington DC, with a strong focus on assessing Management
Responsibility in all incidents and situations meriting "special attention"
occurring world-wide in DEA Divisional Offices, often involving local police and
other federal agencies involved with DEA in Task Force ur similar operations.
As an inspector-in-place, I was subject to leave my normal supervisory duties
on short notice and join with a team of OPR inspectors to conduct a no-notice
inspection of any DEA Divisional office worldwide. After performing these
duties for 42 months I received an overall "Outstanding performance" rating.
The methodology of Reliable Methods of Investigative File review employed
during these OPR Inspection assignments involved the breakdown of
investigative and other files into a timeline of events and the examination of
procedures involved as viewed through the lens of my already proven areas of
expertise followed by my recommendations which included but were not limited
to Management Responsibility and Actionable Criminal Offenses.
It is precisely this methodology that is relied upon in my review of
the instant matter as well as most other matters I have encountered as a trial
consultant,
IV OPINIONS AND FINDINGS - A BRIEF SUMMARY

In the body of this report, I have documented elements of probable
cause, and/ or, reasons to believe that DEFENDANTS bad faith
manipulation of the North Dakota narcotic laws, for the sole purpose of
"gaming" the federal grant systems for significant amounts a federal
grant money, as the primary moving force resulting in the violent
death of Andrew SADEK, specifically:
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a. That, defendant Jason WEDER (aided and abetted by named and as yet:
unnamed DEFENDANTS) targeted the victim, Andrew SADEK, a casual,
college student/ marijuana user with neither history of, nor
predisposition to engage in the commerce of drug trafficking, for an
arrest or a "convenience sale"? of a miniscule (user) amount of
marijuana, to two uncontrolled and un-vetted criminal informants, at
least one of whom was an accused drug dealer, via what DEFENDANTS
described as a "controlled buy," that in reality was an "out of control" (of
defendant law enforcement officers) perversion of a specific undercover
investigative tactic intended for investigative probes of narcotic
trafficking organizations; that I have been using, teaching, and reviewing
this tactic, along with all the related procedures, for the past five
decades; that the deceptive and fraudulent misuse of this tactic resulted
in, ANDREW SADEK, an inexperienced young college student, being
coerced by exaggerated threats of arrest, prosecution and lengthy prison
terms, into allowing a "consent" search of his dorm room arid then
accepting his ultimately life-ending role as an undercover criminal
informant;
b. That, the totality of evidence revealed in the instant report- As viewed

through the lens of my now five-decade career in law enforcement-
inclicates that defendants use of the tactic of a "consent search," in lieu
of search and arrest warrants was knowingly deceptive if not false
reporting, in that be so-called "consent" was only given as a result of
7 The term "convenience sales" is a common one used in the field of narcotic enforcement to
describe the sale of illegal narcotics by one user to another as a convenience and not
necessarily for-profit, unless the evidence developed during an investigation indicates
otherwise. Defendant WEBER, failed to conduct, and/or, document anything more then the
victim providing a small user amount marijuana to what he believed was a fellow student.
The amount of money charged, on its own, indicated that the sale was not for profit.
18
threats of immediate arrest and prosecution should the victim refuse,

and that the primary reason for this deceptive, if not criminal action, was
to conceal the fact that there was no legal justification to target the
victim in the first place.
c, That, the very inception of the so-called investigation targeting Andrew

SAD EK, was initiated and under the control of two essentially
undocumented and un-vetted criminal informants, despite the well-
known and publicized half-century history of dangerous and life
threatening scams for which uncontrolled criminal informants have
become notorious, not the least of which is entrapment, and/or other
forms of the illegal "creation" of crime commonly lmown as a "frame up"
or "frame job," as opposed to its deterrence;
d. That, the body of this report will reveal elements of probable cause
indicative of defendants' attempts to conceal-by deceptive and false
reporting (by material omission)-the fact that the victim was in fact
arrested, with the prosecution deferred pending the victim's agreement to
function as a criminal informant.
e. That, subsequent to the victim's arrest, defendant WEBER, continuously

threatened SADEK with being charged with the felony violations and
severe penalties for possession imposed under North Dakota State law,
unless the victim agreed to engage in the extremely high risk commerce
of narcotics trafficking of every manner of illegal narcotics, as a police
informant, an undercover police role for which t:he victim, Andrew
SADEK, (as DEFENDANTS were well aware) was dangerously
unqualified; and that the threats emanating from defendant WEBER
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himself continued mercilessly up until the day that the victim went
missing, later to be found the victim of a violent death;
f. That, the sole purpose of the targeting, arresting and recruiting ANDREW
SAD EK as an undercover criminal informant was to generate, and/ or,
increase the numbers of arrests and informants recruited, quarterly
statistical counts that are mandatory requirements needed for the
justification, and/ or, the continuance of a flow of Federal and other grant
monies into the coffers of the DEFENDANTS and away from the many
communities across this nation facing real drug epidemics such as the
current opioid crises;8
g. That, the specific tactics utilized by defendant WEBER, aided and

abetted by named and as yet unnamed DEFENDANTS, such as the
recruitment, management and handling of the undercover informants
used specifically to target Andrew SADEK, were employed in a reckless,
deceptive and unprofessional manner that evinced elements of probable
cause indicative of felony violations of law as well as a complete and
craven disregard for those professional and national standards now in
existence for more than five decades, intended for the protection of the
constitutional rights and physical safety of Andrew SADEK and the
general public, as well as police safety;
h. That, the totality of the evidence reviewed indicates> beyond a reasonable

certainty, that defendant Jason WEBER, conducted the Andrew SADEK
investigation in a criminally negligent manner, and that he did so
without a modicum of supervision, and/or, oversight, and/or, that his
8As per my training and experience, Andrew Sadek was in fact arrested with the deferred
prosecution (see details section of this report for full explanation).
20
entire handling of the SAD EK matter, was with the connivance of

defend ant management;
i. That, my review of this matter has resulted in my documenting

numerous elements of probable cause indicative of defendant Jason
WEBER, aided and abetted by named and as yet unnamed
DEFENDANTS, committing violations of federal and state felony statutes
relating lo financial fraud and for false official reporting (by both
omission and commission} sufficient for this matter to be forwarded to
the appropriate independent federal authority.
j. That, the totality of evidence reviewed through the lens of my now five
decades of training and experience, indicate, beyond a reasonable
certainty, that the violent death of Andrew SADEK, came as a. direct
result of the illegal (not legally justified) forceful and life-altering
intrusion into the 20 year-old college student's life by DEFENDANTS;
k. That, the intentional failure of the DEFENDANTS to document any

investigative efforts toward identifying any criminal contacts that the
young man was coerced into making, as a result of his being put to work
as an undercover criminal informant, would have crippled any
investigative effort whatsoever, trying to ascertain whether or not the
victim was murdered as a direct result of him being identified as an
informant.
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V OPINIONS AND FINDINGS WITH ADDITIONAL DETAIL SUMMARIZING

"REASONS TO BELIEVE'' (specifics showing full support of each of
these findings will be found in the details section of this report).
a. DEFENDANTS abuse and/ or misuse of police authority and
force as a primary and directly causative factor in the
victimization and subsequent death of Andrew SADEK:
That, my review of materials disclosed in this case, has resulted
in the documentation of significant elements of probable cause,
and/ or elements of proof strongly supportive of my findings that
defendant Jason WEBER, aided and abetted by other
DEFENDANTS both named and as yet unnamed, engaged in the
grievous abuse and/ or misuse of police authority and force in
the targeting, detaining by means of threats, arresting? and
"flipping" (coercing) of Victim Andrew SAD EK, a College student
and casual marijuana user with no predisposition whatsoever to
engage in drug trafficking, into adopting the role of an
undercover police informant, was a primary causative factor in
the resultant homicide or suicide of this young college student;
b. Targeting of Andrew's SADEK an unlawful violation of
National and Professional standards. That, the very targeting
of Andrew SADEK, by deputy Jason WEBER, (aided and abetted
by other DEFENDANTS both named and yet to be named), for a
full court press criminal investigation utilizing the most
intrusive and life altering investigative tactics and procedures,
in law enforcement's lexicon of weaponry, (including but not
limited to the use of two uncontrolled, undercover criminal
informants), was done with no reasonably-vetted probable
9 Ibid
22
TRIAL - MJCHAEL LEVJNE - SECURITY
cause indicating that the young college student was involved in

any criminal activity whatsoever other than the casual personal
use of marijuana; and that in taking drastic and invasive
actions such as DEFENDANTS' use of uncontrolled and 'un-
vetted criminal informants to intrude, and/or, invade the life of
Mr. SADEK as agent provocateurs for no other discernible law
enforcement goal other than to convert the young ma.n's very
existence into a statistic necesaary to maintain DEFENDANTS'
eligibility for Federal and public funding grants, acted in direct
and reckless violation of National and professional standards as
well as the Richland Sheriffs Department's own specific
mandates and guidelines, most of which are now in existence
for more than four decades for the purpose of public safely and
security, in particular against the unjustified, and/ or, corrupt
use, and/ or, abuse of pol.ice powers, force and authority;
c. Utilization of threats and promises as tools of coercion in
direct violation of National and professional standards as
well as Richland Sheriffs Department mandates: That,
defendant .Jason WEBER, aided and abetted by named and as
yet unnamed DEFENDANTS, in direct violation of national and
professional standards, (including those of the Richland County
Sheriff's Department), utilized threats of major felony
prosecutions and lengthy prison sentences should Andrew
SAD EK refuse to allow a "consent" search of his dorm room,
and then to adopt the highly dangerous, life altering and
psychologically damaging role of undercover police informant,
and promises of leniency if he acquiesced;
23
TRIAL -
d. Violation of the Supreme Court's citation of the "Glick

test" in its decision in Graham v. Connor: That, the form
and nature of the "flipping,' (coercion) itself, in particular as
applied to the victim, Andrew SADEK, was a sadistic and
torturous application of police force that had no legitimate,
and/ or, reasonable law-enforcement purpose, evincing elements
of probable cause of corruption, criminality and sadistic cruelty,
that bring with it a reasonable expectation of serious physical,
and/or, psychological damage, and/or, violent death, and that
the brutal treatment of Andrew SADEK at the hands of
DEFENDANTS ( in the words of the Supreme Court) "shock the
conscience." Numerous elements ofprobable cau.se, and/ or,
reasons to believe come together in support; of this Opinion and
will be highlighted throughout the details section of this report.
e. A pattern of Corrupt and fraudulent misuse and abuse of

official police powers and authority: That, my review of
materials listed below has already resulted in the
documentation of significant elements of probable cause
indicative of corruption and felony violations of law, as well as
elements of proof strongly supportive of findings and opinions
that defendant Jason WEBER, aided and abetted by both
named and unnamed DEFENDANTS, engaged in a pattern of
substandard and deceptive misuse of specialized law
enforcement tactics, including but not limited to Undercover
tactics and Informant handling procedures to target casual
College student/ marijuana smokers such as the victim Andrew
SADEK and others, for the purpose of (in the words of WEBER
24
TRIAL -
himself) "lining up" numbers of casual marijuana smokers for

arrest and conversion to undercover police informant status in
order to perpetuate DEFENDANTS' receipt of public funding, as
has already been stated, by "gaming" the federal grant system,
at a time when communities across the United States caught in
the opioid crisis are in dire need of this aid; and that the
detailed Analysis of the totality of materials under review (see
Details below) will demonstrate full evidentiary support of this
opinion;
f. The use of "sentencing entrapment" for the sole purpose of
increasing the potential threat of draconian sentences
unless investigative targets such as Andrew SADEK agreed
to perform the function of undercover criminal informant
when lack of experience or suitability was not even a
consideration. That, in accordance with all my training and
experience of five decades, the use of multiple undercover
purchases of drugs has always been, and always will be, for the
purpose of expanding investigation into criminal narcotic
organizations, with each buy aiding the undercover officer to
penetrate further into the operations of the organization. There
is no other legitimate purpose for this tactic. Yet, the totality of
evidence reviewed herein, indicates beyond a reasonable
certainty, that defendant WEBER used multiple criminal
informants-with neither control nor oversight-to make multiple
undercover purchases of user quantities of marijuana, while
having no investigative purpose other than to increase the
potential sentencing of the victim Andrew SADEK, in order to
forcefully induce him into accepting the role of an undercover
25
I
)
TRIAL -
police informant with no regard whatsoever as to the inordinate

dangers this 20 year old college student would be facing. The
totality of evidence reviewed and analyzed throughout the
details section of this report, indicates strongly that WEBER,
aided and abetted by named and as yet unnamed
DEFENDANTS, utilized the tactic of sentencing entrapment
combined with the strict North Dakota drug laws as a modus
operandi of coercion, WEBER, in his sworn deposition, openly
admitted to this.
g. Defendant WEBER personally charged with providing the

arrest and informant statistics to the funding institutions
on a quarterly basis. That, the continued authorization of
federal fonding grants to DEFENDANTS, is based upon yearly
numbers of arrests and numbers of "Flipped" (coerced)
informants; and that defendant Jason WEBER is personally
charged with the compiling of these statistics, with which he
personally completes the quarterly reports, mandatory to
maintaining the flow of funding to DEFENDANTS, and that the
totality of the evidence reviewed indicates beyond a reasonable
certainty that this (likely, along with personal aggrandizement
and career enhancement) were the primary goals of the
DEFENDANTS' intrusion in the life Andrew SADEK, in lieu of
any semblance of the traditional law enforcement goals
associated with narcotic enforcement that extraordinarily
intrusive investigative tactics such as the undercover use of
criminal informants were intended for; and that the detailed
elements of probable course in support of this opinion and
26
finding also support my opinion that this entire matter merits

consideration of criminal investigation and prosecution of
DEFENDANTS by the appropriate independent federal
investigative authority;
h. Evidence of criminality sufficient to merit referral to the

appropriate independent Federal Authority for criminal
investigation: that, I have documented elements of probable
cause strongly indicative of DEFENDANTS, in furtherance of
their goals of obtaining and sustaining federally sourced
funding by the "creation" of drug crimes as opposed to its
interdiction, by targeting casual marijuana users, such as the
victim Andrew SADKK (and others) by the deceptive,
uncontrolled use of criminals as agent provocateurs, whose only
instruction and/ or mission-as was later imposed on Andrew--
was to "make cases"; that is, to produce numbers of arrests,
and numbers of people who could be counted in statistical
reporting as yet even more "informants recruited," as
justification for the continued granting of federal funding to
DEFENDANTS, which in itself presents probable cause of
criminality sufficient to merit investigation by the appropriate
independent federal agency.
1. Craven and reckless disregard, specifically, for the safety

and well-being of the victim, Andrew SADEK: That,
specifically, Deputy Jason WEBER, aided and abetted by both
named and unnamed DEFENDANTS, recruited/
"flipped'{coerced] victim Andrew SADEK, a college
27
student/ casual marijuana user with no predisposition to

engage in the commerce of drug trafficking, into assuming one
of the most dangerous roles in narcotic enforcement, that of an
undercover police informant with the mandate to "lineup" more
cases if he wanted to a.void a severe prison sentence; and that
in doing so, all DEFENDANTS demonstrated a craven and
reckless disregard to all standards of duty and reasonability for
the protection and security of the young man who would pay
the ultimate price for this action. That, a full explanation of
why and how this type of substandard/ deceptive
informant/handling procedure-forcing an individual's
performance as a police informant with threats- has
historically, not only resulted directly in the tragic and violent
deaths of informants (consistent with the death of Andrew
SADEK), but also those of innocent citizens and police officers,
as well as causing numerous cases of false arrest and
incarcerations, will be provided in the details section of this
report along with documented examples including several taken
from my own files;
j. Concealment of DEFENDANTS use of entrapment, and/or,

the creation of crime (a "frame-up") in the case of Andrew
SADEK, by the intentional failure to adhere to professional
and national reporting standards as well as those of the
Richland County Sheriff's department, as they relate to the
recruitment, documentation and management of criminal
informants: That, I have documented elements of probable
cause as well as elements of proof {as will be demonstrated fully
28
in the details section of this report) indicating that deputy

Jason WEBER, aided and abetted by other DEFENDANTS both
named and unnamed, utilized two uncontrolled criminal
informants, to entrap, and/ or "frame" the victim Andrew
SAD EK, a college student/ casual marijuana smoker, into
engaging as an unwitting conduit in a "staged" sale of a
miniscule quantity of marijuana between two criminal
informants, and that in order to conceal this illegal activity, the
details of any probable cause sufficient to even justify targeting
Andrew SADEK for this level of intrusive investigative effort,
were again, in violation of all National and professional
standards, omitted from all reporting; and when considered
along with the totality of evidence covered in this report, present
elements of probable cause indicative of false official reporting
and cover-up by intentional, material omissions.
k. WEBER, aided and abetted by named and as yet unnamed

DEFENDANTS in furtherance of defendant goal to beef up
arrest and informant statistics to qualify for federal
funding, resorts to the long-prohibited tactic of "Down
Trading" - making cooperation deals with "big fish" to
catch "little fish," in return for "credit" against sentencing
That, in January 1984, Stephen Trott, then an Assistant
Attorney General, now a federal judge, mandated for all Justice
Department Jaw-enforcement officers to "Make [cooperation]
agreements only with 'little fish' to get 'big fish.' ... The
integrity of government-indeed our very way of life-
29
TRIAL -
demands it."- (Stephen Trott, Assistant Attorney General,

United States Department of Justice).1°
That, defendant WEBER, in violation of the Justice
Department prohibition against down trading, which became
part of DEA and FBI training programs for local and state
police throughout the United States beginning in 1984, utilized
criminal informant M-WIIII (arrested for possession of
dealer quantities of marijuana) to target Andrew SADEK, a 20-
year-old college student and casual marijuana user, in return
for which WIii would receive "credit" against sentencing.
1. My review has resulted in the documentation of the below

listed elements of probable cause indicative of Andrew SAD EK
having been the target of a classic "Frame Up," the moving force
of which were two uncontrolled, WEBER-recruited criminal
informants, and the subsequent concealment of this illegal act
by defendant WEBER (aided and abetted by named and as yet
unnamed DEFENDANTS) refusing to adhere to national and
professional standards of undercover tactics, informant
handling and investigative reporting:
l) WEBER down-trades with informant M- WIii,

(marijuana dealer) 11 allowing him to target: Andrew SAD EK
(casual user and likely customer of W-'s) for arrest;
10 Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.Department of Justice.

"The Successful Use of Snitches, Informants, Co-conspirators and Accomplices as Witnesses
for the Prosecution in a Criminal Case; .January 1984 Revision FOIA Request. #CRM-960224F.
The Hon. Stephen S. Trott is currently serving as a Federal Judge in the 9th District. Excerpted
from Informant Law Desk: Book.
30
TRIAL -
2) WEBER, in violation of National and professional standards,

including the attorney general guidelines on informants, as
well as the Richland sheriff's department SOP's, refuses to
document any history-criminal or otherwise -- between
M_ W .. and the victim, Andrew SADEK, that would
justify any criminal investigation at all, no less one utilizing
these radically invasive tactics;
3) WEBER, again in reckless disregard of long-standing and

very specific "controlled buy" tactics and procedures, places
the entire control of the undercover purchase of a miniscule,
user quantity of marijuana entirely in the hands of criminal
informant and drug dealer WIii, recklessly disregarding the
fact that "controlled buy" standards, emphatically place the
"control" in the hands of law-enforcement and that the well-
documented, historical price paid for any failure to adhere
strictly to these guidelines, [uihich. will he explored in detail in
the details section of this report), are decades of documented
tragedy including but not limited to false arrests and
incarcerations, and the violent deaths of subjects,
informants and police, a good number of which come from
my own personal and professional experience;
4) WEBER, next permits informant W.. to enlist the aid of an
individual named TIii H_, who WEBER describes as
"a friend of W..'s, to help out" with the controlled buy from
11 No record of the precise quantity of drugs informant WIIIIII was charged with was received in
Discovery. WEBER, in sworn testimony in his deposition, recalled that it was 2 to 3 ounces of
marijuana, which would be sufficient to charge him with possession with intent to sell
(dealing); however, W-'s true record should be ascertained prior to trial in this matter.
31
TRIAL - MICHAEL LEVINE - SECURIW
Andrew SADEK. Incredibly, WEBER never even asks his

drug dealer/ informant why he needs "help" in malting a buy
of a user amount of marijuana from a college boy/ casual
user. What WEBER, has revealed in his deposition, is his
refusal, and/or, intentional avoidance to question the illegal
and sinister motivations this marijuana dealer/informant
almost certainly had in the sudden need for an assistant, not
W- H-
the least of which was that the victim, SAD EK, would have
recognized
about to deliver to
as the source of the marijuana he was
(WEBER himself later calls this
"delivery" and not a purchase;
5) That, in the recorded debriefing of Andrew SAD EK, (only 5 l
seconds of untranscribed audio) WEBER showed absolutely
no interest in ascertaining the source of the marijuana that
he was about to charge the young man with in his allegedly
malting a felony sale to H_ , when in accordance with
five decades of training and experience, the source of seized
drugs should have been WEBER's very first concern, and in
accordance with my training and experience in internal
affairs and OPR investigations, the avoidance of questioning
and/or seeking information about the source of drugs, is a
classic element of probable cause indicative of deception,
corruption and the protection of the drug dealer, in this case
WIIIIII. The impression of WEBER avoiding the subject is
heightened significantly by the briefness of his interrogation
of SADEK (51 seconds) can only be explained by the desire to
conceal, as opposed to the seeking of truth. Further
32
indicative of concealment is the refusal to transcribe and

document an interview with a defendant as evidence.
6) That, of particular note is a fact that Weber never asks any
questions that would reveal whether or not Mr. SADEK had
any experience whatsoever in actually selling marijuana,
prior to the two alleged transactions with the CRIMINAL
INFORMANTS, nor does he ask any questions about the
victim's relationship with the two criminal informants. The
importance of these questions, for an honest, truth seeking
narcotic investigator, is clearly to preclude the idea that the
young man had been entrapped into what the totality of
evidence indicates, were acts that he had neither
predisposition nor any past history of engaging in. Also of
note, is the fact that the so-called "consent" search yielded
not a single iota of evidence indicative of ANDREW SADEK
being engaged. in the "economy" of selling drugs, and/ or of
having a predisposition for same.
7) That, the impression of WEBER concealing the truth
concerning the relationship between his criminal informant,
~, and the victim, prior to WEBER authorizing the
allegedly controlled buy, is again captured in WEDER's case
report, wherein he describes the total probable cause he is
citing as the total justification for targeting Andrew SADF~K,
as follows: that his two criminal inforrnants(W- and
H- ) "contacted me, agent Jason WEBJ~:R, regarding
them being able to purchase some marijuana from Andrew
SADEK." Here again, WEBER avoids putting any details
whatsoever concerning the history of these informants with
33
SADEK nor what should have been incriminating events that

led to them contacting WEBER in an official report; the
omission of this information is an additional element of
probable cause indicative of concealment and corruption; it
also implies that WEBER was well aware that his informants
could buy marijuana from the victim, because one of them-
Michael WIii - had sold it to him,
8) Ofo. WHITNEY LINK of the campus police noted in her report
that deputy WEBER had told her that Andrew SADEK was in
trouble for "buying drugs" from one of his confidential
informants.
9) WEBER, in his text message communications and threats to
SADEK, referred lo the drugs that WEBER described as
"sales to a confidential informant," as "deliveries," which is
consistent with items one through eight listed above; that is
that W_, put the marijuana into SADEK's hands to be
"delivered" to TIii ~' criminal informant number
two-the perfect frame up. (see item m. below).
m. 'I'Irat, the text message traffic emanating from defendant

WEBER, and other recorded conversations reveals that he
relentlessly pursued the victim, Andrew SADEK, with
threats of felony prosecution unless the young man "lined
up" more arrests including a final threat that WEBER kept
no record of, and was only discovered on the victim's
phone. That, the many threats included that SADEK would be
charged with two felonies totaling 40 years in prison and a
$40,000 fine, unless SADEK agreed to be a police informant,
34
ending with a final threatening text message, coming on the day

of SADEK's disappearance, stating "you have 1111til May 1 to get
the next deal done. Otherwise I will cut warrants for your arrest
on your deliveries."
n. That, a review and analysis of the arrest and informant

statistics, submitted for continuation of D1':::FENDANTS' receipt
of Federal and other funding, indicates that the vast majority of
these statistics emanate from small, user amounts of
marijuana, from which no significant seizure was ever made,
nor any significant source of marijuana ever arrested.
o. The avoidance of "bad evidence" is a classic indicator of

deceptive and/ or false official reporting, as well as other forms
of corruption. What this means is the avoidance of standard
investigative procedures, and/ or, official reporting standards,
that might result in the revelation of evidence of official
corruption, and/ or, official malfeasance of any kind. A review
of the totality of materials received as discovery in this matter,
indicates beyond a reasonable certainty that defendant WEBER,
in order to conceal numerous acts of malfeasance continuously
resorted to the avoidance of bad evidence as follows:
1) Refusal to document the probable cause justifying the

initiation of an undercover investigation targeting the
victim;12
1 2 In Department of Justice training, including for local police, referred to us "case initiation
report."
35
2) Refusal to properly document the two criminal

informants WEBER utilized in targeting the victim;
3) Refusal to adhere to four decades old standards of

management and control of the activities of undercover
criminal informants, designed to protect both public and
officer safety; in essence allowing these "converted
criminals" to operate as though they were law
enforcement officers, the only requirement being that
they continually produced a statistical flow of arrests
and informants, all for the purpose of DEFENDANTS'
continued qualification for the receipt of federal and
other fonding. is
p. That, while no investigative effort whatsoever was noted in an

attempt to link the violent death to SADEK'S, attempts at
fulfilling his coerced role as an undercover police informant, the
glaringly, unprofessional absence of documentation of any
investigative data whatsoever relating to SADEK'S contacts
made during his amateurish efforts at fulfilling this extremely
dangerous role would have made any effort at a homicide
investigation impossible. This includes, but is not limited to, an
individual only known as THE TIRE SLASHER, who, should
have been a "Person of Interest" in a homicide investigation;
··-············-·········-··------
l3 ln my long experience with the corrupt, and/ or, criminal misuse of undercover informants,
the motivation is often personal and professional aggrandizement in the form of awards and
promotions; however, at this writing the defense has objected to the production of copies of the
award submission, and awards themselves, received by Defendant WEDER that in any way
relate to his "Performance" as a narcotic enforcement officer. To date, all awards produced pre••
date this incident.
36
TRIAL. -
however, thanks to DEFENDANTS overall avoidance of

professional and national standards of the investigation and
documentation, remains unknown at this writing.
q. The "Arrest" of SADEK: That, the events dncurnented
surrounding WEBER'S so-called "consent search" of SADEK'S
dorm room and his subsequent "flipping" of the victim into
accepting the role of an undercover criminal informant with
WEBER'S orders to "line up" more cases and arrests, as viewed
through the lens of my now five decades of training and
experience, indicate beyond a reasonable certainty that Mr.
SADJLK had been arrested with deferred processing and
prosecution. Throughout my career as a federal narcotic agent
working both federal and state cases throughout the United
States, this was a common practice that was always both legally
and statistically reported as an arrest. No law-enforcement
officer was ever authorized to do this without the approval of a
Federal or state prosecutor. ln accordance with national arid
professional standards this act and the prosecutor's approval
had to be documented specifically and meticulously. Due to
WEBER'S failure to adhere to minimum standards of
investigative report writing, it is unlikely at this point that he
received any prosecutorial authorization for this act. The
purpose of deferring processing was always to enable a "flipped"
defendant to seamlessly return to his real life criminal role in a
much larger criminal enterprise, only now functioning as an
informant. The totality of evidence reviewed thus far, indicates
beyond a reasonable certainty, that SADEK was reported,
and/or, destined to be reported as an arrest and informant
37
TRIAL· MICHAEL LEVINE· SECURITY
statistic, again, for the purpose of continuing defendants'

receipt of significant amounts of federal funding dollars as well
as the likely return of professional awards and advancement for
WEBER himself.
VI. DETAILS IN SUPPORT OF FINDINGS AND OPINIONS
1. A review of the totality of investigative files and other data submitted as
discovery in this matter, reveals no documentation whatsoever of any
probable cause to justify the initiation of any criminal investigation
whatsoever targeting the victim, not to mention the use of two
undercover criminal informants.
2. The review further reveals that defendant WEBER recklessly ignored,

and/ or, was completely untrained in the professional and National
standards related to the recruitment, management and corroboration of
criminal informants, specifically in his use of the two undercover
criminal informants utilized in the targeting of the victim;
3. During his deposition, defendant WEBER gives background information

on the arrest of M ■ WIIIIII, for possession of three or more ounces of
marijuana an amount of the drug sufficient to indicate that he was
engaged in the business of selling marijuana. -WEBER, in violation of
just about every professionally mandated arrest and law enforcement
related report writing standard that I have been exposed to in my now
five decade career, including, but not limited to the US Attorney
General's Guidelines and some of those of the Richland County Sheriff's
department-WEBER's employer- refused to document any of the
details involved in the arrest and recruitment of W-;
38
4. Criminal informant W- will next (011 his own] recruit an individual

named TIIII H- as what can only be described as an "assistant
criminal informant" to "assist>' WIii in targeting the victim, ANDREW
SAD EK, in direct and reckless violation of professional and national
standards long in place for the protection of the constitutional rights and
physical safety of the innocent public, as well as officer safety emanating
from the violence often associated with law enforcement action based on
false informant allegations;
5. The totality of evidence next reveals that} WEBER nexl permitted his two
undocumented criminal informants to conduct, what WEBER falsely
describes as a "controlled buy" of a miniscule, user quantity of marijuana
from SAD EK, in gross and reckless disregard of professional and national
standards in place for the protection of the constitutional rights and
physical safely of the innocent public, as well as officer safety emanating
from the violence often associated with false informant allegations;
6. DEP JASON WEBER Deposition dated 10/ 17 /17~

Q Okay. And do we have those names already?
W-
T-H-.
A If you don't, I mean, I can give them to you, M-
Q So explain the situation to me again, just so I --

A Sure.
and
Q MIIIIIII or Andrew --
Q So explain the situation to me again, just so I --
A Sure:
Q M- or Andrew --
39
M-
A So M- WIii was pulled over by NDSCS Campus Police on a
traffic stop. Him and another guy were in the car. There was, like, three
ounces of marijuana in the car. was given the opportunity to
come in, help himself out, which he agreed to do. During the course, he
had did some buys on another gentleman prior to Andrew, and then at
some point enlisted Mr. H- to come in and help with the deliveries
with Andrew. You know, I assume that H- was getting stuff from
Andrew, so that's how he knew, he enlisted his help. So Mr. HIIIIIIIII
helped out to help out his buddy get out of charges, reduced charges.
Q And did you know they were going to do that together?
A At some course of the point he came in and asked if he could have a
buddy come in and sign up as a confidential informant and help him out.
(Lines 14-25 p. 40 and Lines 1 . . 13 p. 41, Item 10)
Analysis/Comments Items 1-6:

a. One of the red flags indicative ofpolice corruption in narcotic enforcement,
as per my training and experience in internal affairs investigations and the
office ofprofessional responsibility, has been the initiation of an
investigation targeting an individual, while having no probable cause,
and/ 01~ initiating an investigation based upon uncorroborated informant
allegations. The motivation of these corrupt officers was always money
and/ or self- promotion. Probably the worst case ofpolice corruption in
American history) the New York City police department scandals of the
1960s and 70s, was replete with examples of this. I was professionally
and personally involved in these investigations. In all of these cases a
common ploy used by corrupt police, in order to hide this criminal activity
was to simply avoid documenting this "bad evidence" in writing. Precisely
as defendant WEBER has done in the instant matter.
40
b. To combat this kind of corruption, beginning in the 1970s, National and

profeesional standards were established including, but not limited to the
Allomey General's Guidelines on Informants, which sets specific mandates
as to the documentation and corroboration of criminal informants for the
Department of Justice. The Druq Enforcement Administration, in about
1974, was tasked by Congress to create and teach suggested national
standards to law-enforcement throughout the country, and eventually
throughout the world. This course of study continues to this day. For 17
years of my career with the Druq Enforcement Administration, I served co-
duties as a course planner and instructor with a focus on undercover
tactics and informani handling. A manual that I authored at that time-
"Undercover Tactics and Informant Handlinq't-=runo accounting for from
01 %-05% of downloads via Academia. edu, by police agencies and
researchers globally.
c. Stressed in this training, as particularly affects the instant matter, are the
grave dangers that substandard informant handling poses [or both public
and officer safety. Criminals, coerced into the role of undercover informant,
have great motivation to provide false information, lie, plant evidence and
entrap, in order to "disappear" pending charges against them, and
perhaps, as is often the case, earn money. Ouer the past almost 5
decades, I have been professionally involved in numeroun cases resulting
in false arrests and convictions, wrong door raids, the killing of innocent
citizens and police, all coming as a result of undercover investigations
originating with criminal informants handled in a reckleeelu substandard
manner.
d. WEBER, under oath during his deposition, in trying to explain how he
justified the investigation targeting the victim Andrew SADEK, stated that
he "assumed" his criminal informant }--gets marijuana from
41
SADE!(, displaying a reckless disregard for just abou.t every investigative

standard and constitutional safeguard that I have ever been exposed to, by
replacing "investigation" with "assumption." Didn't anyone ever train this
man that criminal investigators assume nothing? Wasn't there're even a
single management level officer exercising any oversight over this man?
WEBER did not even bother getting a detailed debriefing from his two
informants, as to what history they actually had with the victim. This is,
sadly, the first time in my noui flue decade career, that I have ever heard a
more facetioue explanuiiori by a law enforcement officer, for his initiation. of
a significantly invasive investigation that would, beyond a reasonable
certainty, cost the life of this victim. In my long experience this combination
offactors, as stressed in my Justice Department training, can only occur
when there is no oversight and/ or supervision whatsoever.
e. WEBER's statement under oath, that he "assumed" that his unvetted and
undocumented informant(s} had probable cause to initiate an undercover
operation targeting the victim, and that he had not bothered to even make
inquiru, as to a single fact that supported that assumption must be
examined further as to its implications concerning this officer's fitness to be
performinq any law enforcement assignments that depend on his training
and understanding of the laws and constitutional protections, put in place
for both public and officer safety. It is my opinion that had these guidelines
been followed and these informants properly vetted and controlled)
ANDREW SADEK would be alive today.
f As per ,ny training and experience in operational reviews, those

responsible for the placement of an officer as glaringly unfit as WEBER in
such a public safety sensitive position, as well as the supervision, training
42
and oversight related thereto} are as responsible for the death of ANDREW
SADEK as is WEBER himself.
7. WEBER stated during his Deposition that he lets Cls work in pairs,
which was the case for CI wlllllll and CI H- when they targeted
SADEK:
DEP JASON WEBER Deposition dated 10/ 17 / l 7:
Q Do you ever have the confidential informants working together?
A There are some cases where confidential informants will work together.
Typically you'll see that, like, in maybe, like, a boyfriend/ girlfriend
situation or a married couple or a couple buddies that, you know, one
buddy might want to help another buddy, or whatever. But it doesn't
happen very often at all. It has happened though.
Q Did it happen at all in Andrew's case?
A It did happen in Andrew's case.
(Lines 20-25 p. 39 and Lines l-5 p. 40, Item J 0)
8. The Attorney General's Guidelines on informants and its updates, relating

to the critical importance of the federal vetting ofpotential undercover
criminal informanis, sets forth the recommended procedures that should be
adhered to by any informant handler. These procedures had been
developed by the Druq Enforcement Administration and its predecessor
agencies and then taught via the DEA training academy for local and state
police, since 1974, at which time I served as a police instructor, course
developer, some but not all of the procedures and information are listed as
.follows:14
11 United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman, committee on the
Judiciary, US Senate- "Confidential informants." The vetting of confidential informants is
covered beginning on page 39 of this publication,
43
TRIAL -
Table 3 provides a listing of the provisions front the Attorney

General's Guidelines Regarding the Use and vetting of Confidential
Informants, that rnust occur prior to entrusting them with, public
safety sensitive, undercover activities. Those particularly applicable
to the instant case are highlighted. in bold:
a. Prior to utilizing a person as a CI, a case agent of a

Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency (JLEA)
shall complete and sign a written initial suitability report
and recommendation, which shall be forwarded to a field
manager for his or her written approval.
b. In completing the initial suitability report and

recommendation, the case agent must address the
following factors ( or indicate that a particular factor is not
applicable):
( 1) whether the person has a criminal history, is
reasonably believed to be the subject or target of a
pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has
been charged in a pending prosecution;
(2) the person's motivation in providing information or
assistance, including any consideration sought from the
government for this assistance;
(3) the person's age;
(4) the person's alien status;
(5) whether the person is a public official, law enforcement
officer, union official employee of a financial institution or
school, member of the military services, a representative or
affiliate of the media, or a party, or in a position to be a party
to, privileged communications (e.g., a member of the clergy, a
physician, or a lawyer);
(6) the extent to which the person would make use of his or
her affiliations with legitimate organizations in order to
provide information or assistance to the JLEA, and the ability
of the JLEA to ensure that the person's information or
assistance is limited to criminal matters;
44
TRIAL - MICHAEL LEVINE - SECUHITY
(7) the extent to which the person's information or

assistance would be relevant to a present or potential
investigation or prosecution and the importance of such
investigation or prosecution;
(8) the nature of any relationship between the Cl and the
subject or target of an existing or potential investigation
or prosecution, including but not limited to a current or
former spousal relationship or other family tie, and any
current or former employment or financial relationship;
(9) the risk that the person might adversely affect a
present or potential investigation or prosecution;
(10) the extent to which the person's information or
assistance can be corroborated;
At a minimum, an FBI agent shall provide the following

information to facilitate the initial validation process:
( 11) basic identifying information that establishes the
person's true identity, or the FBI's efforts to establish the
individual1s true identity;
( 12) a photograph of the person (when possible);
(13) whether the person has a criminal history, is
reasonably believed to be the subject or target of a
pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has
been charged in a pending prosecution;
( 14) the person's motivation for providing information or
assistance, including any consideration sought from the
government for this assistance;
( 15) any promises or benefits, and the terms of such
promises or benefits, that are given a [CI] by the FBI,
federal prosecuting office (FPO), or any other law
enforcement agency (if known, after exercising reasonable
efforts); and
(16) the person's reliability and truthfulness;
(17) the person's prior record as a witness in any
proceeding;
( 18) whether the person is reasonably believed to pose a
45
danger to the public or other criminal threat, or is

reasonably believed to pose a risk of flight;
( 19) whether the person is a substance abuser or has a
history of substance abuse;
(20) whether the person is a relative of an employee of any
law enforcement agency;
21) the risk of physical harm that may occur to the person
or his or her immediate family or close associates as a
result of providing information or assistance to the JLEA;
(particularly important as affects the initial documentation of
the victim. by WEBER)
(22) the record of the JLEA and the record of any other law
enforcement agency (if available to the JLEA) regarding the
person's prior or current service as a CI, cooperating
defendant/witness, or source of information, including, but
not limited to, any information regarding whether the
person was at any time terminated for cause
Analysis/Comments Item 7 & 8:

All training and standards in the handling of criminal informants are in
place essentially because the sad history of using these "converted" criminals has
iauqhi law enforcement that they cannot be simply trusted to adhere to the law,
their activities must be monitored and their allegations corroborated by the law
enforcement officers charged with their handling. The price, almost always paid
for lax handling, are false allegations, arrests and convictions, wrong door
raids.and extreme violence inuoluinq the lcilliing of both innocent citizens and
police alike.15
15 I assisted in the production of a "60 Minutes" news program, "Informants," that featured
"Carlson v. US," one of my cases as an expert witness, illustrating how precisely the kind of lax
and substandard informant handling that is the hallmark of the instant case, resulted in the
shooting of an innocent citizen in his own home. The video was used for "Informant-handling"
training al the federal law enforcement training center, Glencoe, Georgia.
https://v,rww.youtube.com/watch?v=VJrNX9C8WuU
46
The history of the use of undercover criminal informants has shown us,
that putting two or more criminal informants together for no specific tactical
purpose, can result in rampant criminality, with one CI lying and the otheris}
swearing to it, and unethical and/ or corrupt handlers, not wanting to interrupt the
flow of arrest statistics, accepting the coordinated lies as "corroboration."
Unfortunately it is not uncommon that this so called "corroboration" has been.
accepted by judges and prosecuiers, with the result being, false arrests and
convictions, wrong door raids and even the violent deaths of innocent citizens,
and those of law enforcement offices who are led into violent confrontations
based upon false, and/ or, uncorroborated criminal informant allegations. During
my now five decade career I have numerous: specific cases that I can cite as
examples.16
During my career, I've handled thou.sande of undercover criminal
informant cases. My experience and training had made me so wary ofplacing
any control whatsoeuer in the hands of an undercover criminal informant, that the
idea of usinq two Cls working in tandem, for no specific practical reason, was
deemed by my superiors, as foolishly reckless- and unless there was a specific
tactical reason, a classic element ofprobable cause indicative of corruption.
I will estimate that of the in excess of 2,000 cases in which I have been
inuolued doing my now five decade career, I have never heard of a case, up to the
instant matter, wherein two unuetied and improperly registered criminal
informants were given the freedom to target whomever they wanted to target, with
the case agent or officer failing to write even a single investigative report detailing
the justification for his actions, without the officer himself being prosecuted.
16 One recent case of mine is Bums v Concord Police Department. A search warrant based
upon the uncorroborated words of three criminal informants, resulted in the killing of an
innocent 22 year old man. My report, submitted it to United States District Court, Northern
District of California, documented elements of probable cause indicative of the reckless
dii•m~gard of informant handling standards sufficient to merit consideration of criminal
prosecution. The case settled out of court for $1.5 million. The issue of criminal prosecution is
still on the table.
47
TRIAL MICHAEL LEVINE - SECURITY
M
and/ or at least becominq the target of a criminal investigation, as should happen

as a result of this action.
WEBER, in his deposition, claims that his criminal informant, utll,
recruited, on his own, a second criminal informant) ~ to "help out." There
are so many possibilities of criminal informant criminality, such as:
--utllll, who had been arrested with dealer quantities of marijuana, might have
been the source of user quantities of murijuana tu the victim, but to satisjj1 his
informant agreement with WEBER, there was no way he could approach the
victim (SADER) to buy marijuana, when he has previously been the victim's
dealer. So why not arrange for the victim to" deliver" a small quantity of
marijuana to ~' "selling" the hapless victim as a dealer? WEBER had
taken. no oversight, and/ or, corroborative precautions to stop them from executing
this or any other possible "frame)' plot. In fact, as has already been listed
(above), there are significant elements ofprobable cause indicative of precisely
this having been the case, and that defendant WEBER) very much aware of this
scam, simply loolced the other way. What he was interested in was whether or
not, drug dealer turned CJ ¾Ill and his "assistant, 1' HIIIIIII, could produce
another an-est and informant statistic needed to qualify for Federal funds, and
perhaps an award or two for WEBER himself.
What is important to point out at this point is that not only did WEBER use
Uilll, a drug dealer, to target a college hoy, casual marijuana smoker, (a direct
uiolatioti of the down iradinq standard), he also intentionally refused to document
any probable cause whatsoever to justify opening an investigation that employed
aggressive and inuasiue tactics normally used to target well-documented
criminals and drug irajfickinq organizations (DTOs); the equivalent of attacking
children in a piauqround with an anti-tank: gun Finally, he sought to conceal the
down- trading violation) by not reporting the fads surrounding t11III )s arrest.
48
TRIAL - M!CHAEL LEVINE - SECURITY
hi fact, my review of the totality of the evidence received in this file) not the
least of which was the sworn deposition of WEBER himself, reveals beyond a
reasonable certainty, that he, aided and abetted by named and as yet unnamed
DEFENDANTS charged with his oversight and supervision, completely and
recklessly ignored all the professional and national standards listed in item 8.
The following items cover my review of what WEBER describes in

official reporting as "Controlled Buys," of marijuana from the victim,
ANDREW SADEK. As the detailed review and analysis will reveal, beyond
a reasonable certainty, that WEBER radically and recklessly violated the
letter and spirit of professional standards governing undercover tactics
and procedures, including but not limited to the specific misuse of the
controlled buy tactic, to a degree that evinced significant elements of
probable cause indicative of narcotics and informant related corruption.
9. 04/04/ 13: First Controlled Buy targeting SADEK:

On 04/04/ 13, two Confidential Informants purchased a small amount of
marijuana from Andrew SADEK. This would begin the case against
SAD EK, headed by DEP. Jason WEBER; the following captures the total of
WEBER'S entire investigative effort as found in his Official reporting:
Case Report 13-030 by DEP WEBER dated 04/11 / 13
Summary: On Thursday, April 4, 2013, at approximately 3:58pm,

Confidential Informant #13-0350 and Confidential Informant -#13--0345
purchased approximately 1/8 ounce of marijuana for $60 from Andrew
John SADEK DOB: --93 in Lot #4 on the NDSCS Campus. This is
located in the City of Wahpeton which is in the County of Richland. This
deal also took place in a. school zone.
49
TRIAL -
Details: On Thursday, April 4, 2013, Confidential Informants ftl3-0350 and

# 13--0345 contacted me, Agent Jason WEBER, regarding them being able to
purchase some marijuana from Andrew SADEK. (p. 1, Item 29)
C;Q1J11B?t1t/g.ngly§f§,_[t§1JL2:
Aside from Case Report 13-030, there are no narratives documenting debriefing
of the Cls or any other narration or summaries of investigative work conducted. by
DEP. WEBER. WEBER'S continued lack of reporting uiould constitute multiple
violations of the Richland County Sheriffs Office Policy Manual. Professional
standards, as taught lo local law-enforcement by the Drug Enforcement
Administration beginning in 1974--a course that WEBER. claims to have attended,
stresses that, not only do undercover criminal informants have to be meticulously
vetted, documented and approved, before they are released on the unsuspecting
public, but that every one of their actions while working under the imprimatur of
any law enforcement agency, must be controlled and meticulously documented,
by said agency, as well. WEBER did none of this (see beloio for more specific
details on the requirements referred to here).
T, quite frankly, have never seen this level of "In. your face" reckless
disregard ofprofessional standards, as well as the standards of his own
employing agency, without, at minimum, the officer being fired for cause. The
fact, as I have stated above, that a 20 year old college student died violently as a
direct result of WEBER'S actions, as described throughout this report, in my
opinion continues to merit consideration of criminal prosecution.
On 04/04/ 13, DEP WEBER printed out driver's license information for
SADEK:
10. Motor Vehicle Report SADEK 13-030 by DEP WEBER dated
04/04/13
Driver's License Details for Andrew SADEK
50
TRIAL· MICHAEL LEVINE· SECURITY
Violations: No Child Restraint 7 / 13/ 10

6-10 Over 70/75 Speed: 09/12/12
(l page, Item 26)
On [UNK date], DEP WEBER printed out a photograph of SADEK. WEBER

will use this photograph to have CI 13~0350 ID SADEK after the buy:
11. Photograph of SADEK 13-030 by DEP WEBER
Photograph of SADEK, from driver's license
{1 page, Item 33)
On 04/09/ 13, DEP WEBER took photographs of the $60 buy money
12. Buy money serial numbers 13-030 by DEP WEBER elated
04/04/13
Photograph of $60 with serial numbers
(1 page, Item 27)
Comment/analysis, Item 10-12:
These are the only investigative steps that WEBER has documented in this case,
in corroboration. of informant information. One must also keep in mind that the
very purpose of undercover procedures to corroborate informant allegations is to
pursue leads into the drug trafficking activities of the target. To determine, first,
whether or not the target has been accurately described by the criminal
informant, in an attempt to eliminate the possibility of the informant supplying
false information in order to satisfy his own cooperation agreement. Second, to
determine the targets position in the hierarchy of the drug trafficking
environment. ls he a dealer or a user? Jf he is a dealer what is his capacity?
How much of a drug can he supply? Who are his connections and sources? And
much much more. However> Mr. WEBER> as uie will see throughout this report,
has no curiosity whatsoever about the victim. Not even about the most basic of
51
TRIAL· MICHAEL LEVINE - SECURITY
information. any narcotic investigator would want to know: where is Mr. SADEK
getting his drugs?
On 04/04/ 13, DEP WEBER described initially meeting with the two Cis
before the controlled buy. There are no details about which CI set up the
controlled by against SADEK in WEBER'S report, yet based on analysis of
the recorded conversations, it is apparent CI 13-0350 [wlllllllJ set up the
meeting on 04/04/13:
13. Case Report 13-030 by DEP WEBER dated 04/ 11 /13
DETAILS: At approximately 3:48pm, I met with both Cl's at a
predetermined location. l searched both Cl's and neither one had money
or contraband. Agent John Boelke searched CI # 13-0345's vehicle and
found no money or contraband. I issued CI# 13-0350 $60 from the buy
fund money.
At approximately 3: 52pm, 1 started the transmitter recorder and placed it
on CI #13-0350. Then both C!s left the predetermined located [sic] and
went to Lot #4 on NDSCS Campus where the deal was set up. This
location is located in the City of Wahpeton in the County of Richland.
Agent JOHN BOELKE and I monitored the Cis to this location. Agent
BLAINE O'HARA and Agent JOHN SMYKOWSKI monitored the parking lot
where the deal took place. (p. 1-2, Item 29)
On 04/04/ 13 at 3:52PM, DEP WEBER started the transmitter to record

the controlled buy between the two Cls and SADEK. Transmitter recorded
for 10 minutes. There is no indication as to who turned off the recorder
and when; information that should have been highlighted in a written
report. There is no transcript for the audio recording and WEBER did not
even summarize the audio recording in his report:
52
TRIAL" MICHAEL LEVINE" SECURITY
14. Audio Recording of Transmitter Case 13-030 by DEP WEBER 17:

WEBER: Today's date is Thursday April 4th, 2013, time is 3:52PM, turning
on the transmitter recorded placed on the CI.
static, silence
WEBER: Help me out. Lift that.
static, silence
WEBER: Okay
CI 13-0350 H-: Zip this up too?
WEBER: Zip it right up to there so that way they don't see it but it will
record. Two things. You got the cash on you?
CI 13-0350 I--: Yep.
WEBER: Two things: Get it done. Uh, wherever the money goes, don't front
our money, okay? If he doesn't have it in hand, he needs to go get it. Don't
front our money.
CI 13-0350 H-: Okay.
WEBER: Okay. Number two is, wherever the elope goes or the money goes,
you need to be there because you're the one with the wire.
Cl 13-0350 H-: Okay.
WEBER: So, okay?
CI 13--0350 ~ Okay.
WEBER: Sounds good. I'll meet you back here.
car door closing, engine turning on
CI 13-0350 H- : I feel like a stuffed turkey in this thing. Okay, so, I'.11
get ahold of SADEK right now. Say uh ... what should I tell him? Be like ...
"me and my buddy are on our way?"
radio on, breathing
17 Transcribed by Michael Levine.
53
CI 13-0345 W-: background road noise, quietly speaking) but ut11

seems to say: I'm always like, "can I get you 60?" You said 60 right?
CI 13-0350 ~ : Well, that's what I'll do.
CI 13-0345 W-: That's what I always do. [indiscernible! that don't look
sketchy at all.
CI 13-0350 ~ : I'm going to say, "here's your f>0" and he gives me
the pot I'll just be like, uhhh ...
CI 13-0345 W-: Just roll the baggie - that looks good.
CI 13--0350 H- : Looks good.
CI 13-0345 WIii: That's what I do.
CI 1:3-0350 H.1111111111: Alright. Quick and easy.
CI 13-0345 W-: Yeah.
CI 13-0350 ~ : .I texted him to say "we're on our way" but he hasn't
answered back yet.
ringing
Cl 13-0350 ~ : Ohl There he is. He said "alright."
silence, driving
CI 13-0350 ~ : I think I should go to the back corner there.
CI 13-0345 WIii: Okay.
CI 13-0350 I-I-: Car's got some nice rims.
CI 13-0345 WIIIII Yeah. Is his car here?
CI 13-0350 ~ : Yeah, there he is.
CI 13-0345 WIii: [indiscernible}
CI 13-0350 I-- : Yeah his car is right here. I'll just get out
I car door closes] (5:30 minutes)
SADEK: Whats up man
CI 13-0350 H- : Whats up you said sixty right?
SADEK: Mrn-hm
54
silence, car enqine running

CI 13-0350 ~: Looks good. Be safe. [car door closes]
breathing, engine running
CI 13-0350 I-I-: Holy. That was ... yep. One deal done. Now we should
go back and meet him.
CI 13-0345 W-: [indiscernible]
CI 13-0350 H-: What did you say?
CI 13-0345 W-: [indiscernible] in the mirror, you see that silver
Lincoln? pulled up behind us?
CI 13-0350 H-: Yeah'? That's them?
CI 13-0345 W-: [indiscernible] other parking lot
CI 13-0350 H-: Oh yeah? They're not going to bust him right now,
are they?
CI 13-0345 W-: No.
silence, car engine running, radio on
Cl 13-0350 H-: Okay. That was pretty easy. Oh god. I'm getting a
headache dude. This is fucking smells dude, this is like good weed. And it
smells bad. Its like that, you know what I mean. Yuck. Pot. Stupid pot
users. M •. rMIII = wlllllJ
CI 13-0345 W-: Yeah, yeah. You damn near fail out of school.
CI 13--0350 H- : You almost failed out?
CI 13-o;-345 WIii: Yeah, because of that semester that I was doing that
shit.
CI 13-0350 H-: You're a fucking ...
CI 13-0345 W-: Yeah, it's an eye opener.
CI 13-0350 ~: Ha. Yeal-1.
55
CI 13-0345 W-: I don't even know, I have to pull ... good thing I'm good
at, fucking mechanic work cause that's the only thing that's saving my ass
right now.
CI 13-0350 ~ : Really?
Cl 13-0345 W-: Because in all my mechanic classes I have As.
car engine running, radio on, singing with radio
CI 13-0350 ~ : Is that what they normally charge for an eighth? Is
Sixty?
CI 13-0345 W-: Yeah.
CI 13-0350 H-: That's a lot of money. For pot.
CI 13--0345 WIIIIII: Not cheap.
car engine runninq, radio on
CI 13-0350 H-: What, they're not here yet? I thought they would
just chill out out here.
CI 13-0345 W-: They took pictures and shit.
CI 13-0350 1--: Of us doing the deal? Really?
car door closing, static, silence) zipper
WEBER: 302 Turning off the transmitter recorder.
(audio file 13-030) Item 34)
Comment/analysis, Item 13-14:

The term "Controlled buy," as per professional and national suggested standards
is supposed to indicate that the investigating law enforcement officer is in control.
The purpose of the standards is both to prevent the informani frotri setting up a
"dupe" (a drug user) from whom the informant (a dealer) has no fear, and at the
same time, to obtain evidence and leads into the full scope of ihe targets position
in the drug world. That is, to explore by recorded conversation evidence that at
minimum corroborates the informant's allegations. For example, during the
56
TRIAL -
controlled buy the informant is told to ask questions such as: can you get me a
bigger quantity of marijuana? How much can you get me? How much do you
charge? And many, many, more that would both corroborate the informant
information and progress the investigation. Mr. WEBER also veered sharply
away from the mandatory specifics governing the conduct and procedures for the
control of the «controlled buy" as will be demonstrated more fully in the
continuation of this report. It is important, however; to note the following
concerning the actual recording as captured above:
(a) Recording itself, reveals that the conduct of the entire so-called "controlled
buy" operation, was in the hands of criminal informant vvlll-
(b} The recording, was never transcribed by the prosecution, and/ or, Mr.
WEBER himself, for use in prosecution; presenting yet another element of
probable cause indicative of the avoidance of documenting "bad evidence,"
(c} The recording itself, presents evidence, of WEBER consciously permitting
and enabling his criminal informant vvllllll, to violate the national and
professional prohibition against permitting a criminal informant to "Down
trade," which as the totality of this report will demonstrate, he will attempt
to conceal by simply refusing to document investigative procedures.
(d) The recording itself, also demonstrates that the criminal informant
~, who had inexplicably been recruited by ¼Ill, did all the talkinq
with. the victim making barely intelligible comments. This is consistent with
the likelihood that the drugs them.selves had been supplied by ~' (see
Opinions section of this report).
A review of the recorded conversation, in particular the absence of any

attempt whatsoever to quantifu the alleged marijuana dealing of the victim,
continues to provide a significant element of probable cause, indicative of my
opinion that the whole purpose of targeting the victim, had nothing to do with law
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MICHAEL LEVINE - SECURITY

Tim O'Keeffe, ESQ.

Expert witness report.

Mutter - substandard recruitment, management and protection of Andrew

discovery documents through the lens of my fifty yearn of training and

VI DETAILS [RTLASONS FOR MY BELIEF] - ANALYSIS OF ALL MATERJALS

II. SPECIFIC EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER DATA HEAVILY

(a) Police Involved Shootings (as a result of substandard informant

(b) Police Instructor, US Department of State

(c) Police Instructor New York State Department of Criminal

procedures, including but not limited to, procedures and

(d) Instructor of Suggested National Standards in Investigative

protect and serve, as well as the safety of the informants

(e) Lecturer at FBI Academy

the same standards and guidelines referred to throughout this

(£1 19 Years Service as a Supervisory Officer:

(g) Training Received in Investigative File and Operations

duties that entailed the close supervision and full review of

(h) Responsible for Approval of Prosecution Packages:

(i) Undercover and Informant-Handling Experience--

2 DEA Management School at the University of Maryl.and; Operations Inspector Training,

Wash.D.C. and mandatory attendance at numerous management training sessions and

Twenty-five years of law enforcement training and experience

U) Expert Testimony for Prosecution:

(k) Co-duty as Inspector of Operations - Department of

(1) Responsible for Performance Ratings of Federal Agents

iJ1 ALL facets of their law enforcement duties and training,

(m) Police Instructor/Lecturer Since Retirement from Law

maintain my expertise as current as possible. lt is during these

(.n) Internal Affairs Investigative Experience

(o) Homicide Investigations

5 This was a mandatory co-duty of all DEA Group Supervisors.

(p) DEA Headquarters Desk Officer

(q) Current Database of Experts and Research Materials

{r) 27 Years of Trial Consulting Experience:

enforcement agency operations, procedural and training manuals

III RELIABLE METHODS OF INVESTIGATIVE FILE AND ACTION

d. Informant recruitment and handling, all areas, including but not

After having been designated as a frontline supervisory officer, I became one of

After approximately 6 years of receiving "outstanding" annual

IV OPINIONS AND FINDINGS - A BRIEF SUMMARY

b. That, the totality of evidence revealed in the instant report- As viewed

threats of immediate arrest and prosecution should the victim refuse,

c, That, the very inception of the so-called investigation targeting Andrew

e. That, subsequent to the victim's arrest, defendant WEBER, continuously

g. That, the specific tactics utilized by defendant WEBER, aided and

h. That, the totality of the evidence reviewed indicates> beyond a reasonable

entire handling of the SAD EK matter, was with the connivance of

i. That, my review of this matter has resulted in my documenting

k. That, the intentional failure of the DEFENDANTS to document any

V OPINIONS AND FINDINGS WITH ADDITIONAL DETAIL SUMMARIZING

cause indicating that the young college student was involved in

d. Violation of the Supreme Court's citation of the "Glick

e. A pattern of Corrupt and fraudulent misuse and abuse of

himself) "lining up" numbers of casual marijuana smokers for

police informant with no regard whatsoever as to the inordinate

g. Defendant WEBER personally charged with providing the

finding also support my opinion that this entire matter merits

h. Evidence of criminality sufficient to merit referral to the

1. Craven and reckless disregard, specifically, for the safety

student/ casual marijuana user with no predisposition to

j. Concealment of DEFENDANTS use of entrapment, and/or,

in the details section of this report) indicating that deputy