CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – I

(CASE DIGESTS)

1) G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, et al.,
respondents.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, through a writ of certiorari and prohibition,
challenged the validity of the order issued by Judge Villasor for the grounds of excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Judge Villasor granted the issuance of an
alias writ of execution which led the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to serve Notices of Garnishment
with several banks against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These funds were
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of
military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
RULING:
NO. The writ of execution issued by Judge Villasor against the property of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines is against the constitution as the state and its government, which the AFP is part
of, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. Government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs or execution or garnishment as well. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law since the functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects.

2) G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO,
respondentsappellees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO,
respondents-appellees, RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and
ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors.

FACTS:
Sometime in 1961, the Bureau of Forestry advertised for public bidding a certain tract of public
forest land consisting of 6,420 hectares. Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, petitioner-appellant, won the
bidding of such from nine other applicants. Benjamin Gozon, during the time as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, issued a memo granting authority to the Director of Forestry
to grant new ordinary timber licenses for areas not more than 3,000 hectares each and the
extension of ordinary timber licenses not exceeding 5,000 hectares each. However, Jose
Feliciano who was appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon
assumption promulgated a memo revoking such authority. On the same day the memo took
effect, the ordinary timber license was granted to Tan by then Acting Director of Forestry,
Estanislao Bernal.
Having been issued without authority from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
the ordinary timber license of Tan was declared as void ab initio. Petitioner-appellant moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner-appellant then filed a case before the Court of First
Instance, Manila claiming that the respondents-appellees unlawfully, whimsically and
capriciously acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion by
revoking a valid timber license without just cause thereby denying him of his right to property
and impairing the obligation of contracts. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the respondentsappellees. On the other hand, the Director of Forestry filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that the petition does not have a cause of action, the court has no jurisdiction
and that the respondents may not be sued without their consent. The court a quo dismissed the
petition for insufficient cause of action. With his motion for reconsideration denied, petitioner-
appellant Tan appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the timber license of petitioner-appellee was valid.
(2) Whether the State can be sued without its consent .

RULINGS:
(1) NO. The Supreme Court concurred with the lower court’s decision of declaring the timber
license as void ab initio since it was released without the consent and authority of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the authority granted to the Director of Forestry at the
times was already revoked.
(2) NO. Petitioner-appellant’s action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of
State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued. The
respondents/appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting as
representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers and not as private
individuals since the latter cannot issue timber licenses.

3) G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. PABLO FELICIANO and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.
FACTS:
Feliciano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic
of the Philippines which was represented by the Land Authority for the recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Salvacion, Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property from Victor Gardiola who then acquired such from
the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title was evidenced by an informacion posesoria. In
1954, President Magsaysay issued a proclamation to reserve a tract of land for resettlement
purposes under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), presently the Land Authority, which subdivided and distributed the
land to settlers. Part of such is the land in question claimed to be owned by Feliciano.
The Land Authority raised Feliciano’s lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription. In the
trial court, the judge ruled in favor of Feliciano and declared the lot to be excluded from the
NARRA settlement reservation. However, a motion to intervene and set aside the decision was
filed by settlers and the barrio council on the grounds that they had been in possession of the
said land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership. After several motions, the trial court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in which respondent moved for reconsideration. The
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, filed its opposition and maintained the dismissal as
proper on the ground of non-suability of the state and questioned the authenticity and validity of
the title possessed by petitioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the doctrine of non-suability is applicable in said case.
(2) Whether evidence possessed by petitioner to claim land is valid.
RULINGS:
(1) YES. The doctrine of non-suability is applicable in the case at bar. By its caption and its
allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. In such case, there is no such showing of consent by the State.
(2) NO. The informacion posesoria owned by the petitioner was a mere prima facie evidence of
possession therefore lacking merit. Feliciano also failed to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act.

4) G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of
the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO TOBACCO PLANTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO
P. JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La Union, respondents.
FACTS:
Hon. Judge Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed by a notice of garnishment on the funds
of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration which was deposited with the
petitioner, Philippine National Bank. The petitioner contended that such act was unconstitutional
because the funds were of public character thereby invoking the doctrine of non-suability of the
state.
ISSUE: Whether the notice of garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration was constitutional?
RULING: YES, funds of public corporations such as the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration could properly be made the object of a Notice of Garnishment as held in the
previous case of Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company. By engaging
in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests
itself of its sovereign character, making the corporation subject to the rules of law governing
private corporations.

5) G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
The Department of Agriculture, petitioner, and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract
for the latter to provide security services to the government agency. Several guards of said
agency then filed a complaint against the Department of Agriculture and the agency for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages. The Executive Labor
Arbiter found petitioner jointly liable with Sultan Security Agency to the complainant security
guards and ordered for the payment of P266,483.91.
The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal this decision thus it became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to
enforce and execute the judgment against the two respondents’ property. Hence, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, such as one unit Toyota Hi-Ace,
one unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one unit Toyota Crown. These units were put under the
custody of the petitioner’s property custodian pending their sale at public auction or the final
settlement of the case.
The Department of Agriculture then filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), respondent. The petitioner contended that the writ issued was granted without the
Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner thus making his decision null
and void and all actions in pursuance thereto equally invalid and of no legal effect. The
petitioner also added that the seizure of the property would hamper and jeopardize the
performance of their governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Because of this, NLRC suspended their judgments to give petitioner time to source funds to
satisfy the judgment awards against it. Since the NLRC refused to overturn the writ of execution,
the petitioner filed for certiorari due to the former disregarding the rule of non-suability of the
state. On the other hand, the private respondents argued that the petitioner had impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE: Whether the Department of Agriculture waived its immunity from suit through implied
consent when it entered into contract with the Sultan Services Agency.
RULING:
NO. The petition is granted. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a
waiver of its non-suability as distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the
instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract nor that it
could have performed any act proprietary in character. The claims of private respondents for
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the
Contract for Service clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the
State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied. However, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

6) G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II,
as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City,
ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
FACTS:
Sanders and Moreau, petitioners, were officers of the U.S. Naval Base in Subic while Rossi and
Wyer, were gameroom attendants of the U.S. Naval Station. On October 3, 1975, the
respondents’ employment was converted to part time instead of full time status. The
respondents protested against it and the hearing officer recommended to reinstate their status
to full time with backwages. However Sanders, in a letter to Moreau, disagreed with the decision
and asked for rejection of the recommendation alleging that the respondents were difficult
employees to supervise, while Rossi was also alienating co-workers and supervisors and both
discussing the case in public places even though they were under oath to do the contrary.
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a letter was purportedly sent by Moreau requesting
the change of the respondents’ employment status. Because of this, the respondents filed a suit
for damages against the petitioners in their personal or private capacity at the Court of First
Instance in Olongapo City claiming that the letters contained libelous imputations that had
exposed them to ridicule and caused mental anguish and the prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. However, in a motion to
dismiss, the petitioners argued that they committed the acts in the discharge of their official
duties which the court had no jurisdiction under the doctrine of state immunity. This motion was
denied by the court on the ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their
acts were official in nature and not personal. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary
injunction is then filed in the Supreme Court by the petitioners contending that the Court of First
Instance acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.
RULING:
YES. The petition is granted and the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
petitioners acted in the discharge of their official duties hence it is the US government and not
them personally that is liable for their acts.

7) G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE
SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., plaintiff, filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service
under the Bureau of Customs in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the value of a
case of rotary drill parts shipped from abroad that was undelivered by the defendants. The
defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that not being persons
under the law, they cannot be sued. However, appellant contends that since the defendant is
discharging proprietary and not governmental functions, it can be sued by private individuals.
Nonetheless, the said court dismissed the complaint judging in favor of the defendants.
Because of this, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether defendants are suable under the law.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the dismissal. The fact that a non-corporate government
entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit. The Bureau of Customs’ primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties while arrastre service is just a necessary incident thus engaging in the same
does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. Otherwise, it could not perform its
governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted
as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

8) G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR., as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
respondents.
FACTS:
The National Airports Corporation, petitioner, was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and
succeeded by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Prior to the abolition, the Philippine Airlines,
Inc. paid petitioner the sum of P65,245 which was instead said to be due and payable to the
Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used as an airport. The owner of Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. filed a suit against Philippine Airlines, Inc. to recover the above amount.
However, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the
petitioner, National Airports Corporation, alleging that it had paid to the latter the fees claimed
by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. believing that the petitioner were the operators and maintainers
of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 and that they would pay to the landowners the rentals for the use
of the land. The Solicitor General then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third-party complaint since the National Airports Corporation
has lost its juridical personality and as an agency of the Republic of the Philippines and
unincorporated, is incapable of suing and being sued.
ISSUE: Whether the National Airports Commission and Civil Aeronautics Administration can be
sued.
RULING:
YES. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which the entity was
organized. If it partakes more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, they are not regarded as suits against the state. The Civil
Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity since it was created,
like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but
to run what is essentially a business. Hence, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may not, and
should not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.

9) G.R. No. L-32667, January 31, 1978

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as
authorized Deputy sheriff, respondents.
FACTS:
The now defunct Court of Industrial Relations denied the motion of the petitioner, Philippine
National Bank, to invalidate a notice of garnishment on the money of the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation for lack of merit. The petitioner contended that the appointment of
respondent Gilbert Lorenzo to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and the subject
funds of the garnishment may be public in character. Because of the aforementioned court’s
judgment that was against their favor, petitioner filed a suit against the court for grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUES:
Whether the subject funds of the garnishment can be considered as public in character and
therefore cannot be garnished?
RULINGS:
NO. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Although the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity, it does not follow though that they were exempt
from garnishment. Since the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation is an entity that is
possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence, it can sue and be sued. Thus, its
funds may also be levied upon or garnished.

10) G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N.
FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA,
MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
FACTS:
A collision occurred between a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by
Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck driven by Alfredo Bislig and
owned by petitioner, Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which led to the death of several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. due to injuries sustained. The private
respondents filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney.
However, said defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the driver of the dump truck and
its owner which the private respondents also impleaded in an amendment of its complaint.
Petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the complaint lacked a cause of action. He also contended
that the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney was the proximate cause
of the collision and lastly, he asserted the doctrine of non-suability of the state. In the decision of
the trial court, respondent judge dismissed the complaint against the owner and driver of the
jeepney but ordered the petitioner and the driver to compensate the private respondents on
funeral expenses, moral damages and lost expected earnings of the deceased. Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration and was advised by respondent judge to bring his case to a
higher court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
RULING:
YES. Petition is granted. The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the
State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
when he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
The State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of
express or implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special
law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability
arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the government enters
into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also
when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Hence, the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Furthermore, it
also has no duty to pay monetary compensation.

11) G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA
RIVERA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed
and that the Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber firearms issued to him by the
Assistant Commissioner even though he is not an agent of EIIB. The letter, purporting to have
been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the
Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the separation of personnel, the EIIB had made
some savings. He averred that the only funds released to his agency by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were
filled. He also denied that there were ghost agents in the EIIB and claimed that disbursements
for "open" or "overt" personnel and "closed" or "covert" personnel plantillas of the agency had
been cleared by the Commission on Audit (COA). He prayed that the complaint be dismissed
and the case considered closed. Petitioner Perez, the budget chief of the EIIB, also denied that
savings had been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM provided
allocations for only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that the disbursement of funds for the
plantilla positions for "overt" and "covert" personnel had been cleared by the COA and that the
high-powered firearms had been issued for the protection of EIIB personnel attending court
hearings and the Finance Officer in withdrawing funds from the banks.
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments
unsatisfactory and therefore, asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. He then
issued a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their
counteraffidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the
Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal
Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988."
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum.
The respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that
there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. However, he denied their motion to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence
against themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant,
petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman also ordered the Chief of the Records,
petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel
Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of
the EIIB for 1988, as well.
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera
were EIIB employees under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly
what he could not do directly which is compelling them to produce evidence against themselves.
Petitioners' motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman's order hence, a petition was filed
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not a case brought about by an unsigned and unverified letter complaint is an
"appropriate case" within the concept of the constitution in which public respondent can oblige
petitioners by virtue of his subpoena duces tecum to produce to him "all documents relating to
personal services funds for the year 1988 and all evidences, such as vouchers (salary) for the
whole plantilla of eiib for 1988."
(2) Whether or not "all documents relating to personal services funds for the year 1988 and all
evidences, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" are classified and,
therefore, beyond the reach of public respondent's subpoena duces tecum.
RULINGS:
(1) YES. The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in
any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions as stated in Art. XI, Sec. 12 thereof.
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that testimony given at a factfinding
investigation and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for
the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not
necessary.
(2) NO. If there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which is in the interest of national security, the privilege is appropriate, and the court
should not jeopardize the security. On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does
not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a
general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in
the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential
to the enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
Furthermore, the Office of the Ombudsman can still carry out its constitutional duty to protect
public interests while insuring the confidentiality of classified documents. To be sure no
information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case
should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the
extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency.

12) G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, the President of the Philippines designated petitioner Mary Concepcion
Bautista as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. She was then eventually
extended a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on December 17, 1988.
She then took her oath of office and discharged the functions and duties of the Office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. On 9 January 1989, she then received a letter
from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the
Commission certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with her
confirmation as well as requesting her presence at a meeting of the Commission on
Appointments. However, Bautista wrote in a letter to the Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments that the latter does not have jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights since her position is not amongst those expressly
mentioned in Article VII, Section 16 which stated the government officials whose appointments
are subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of Congress.
Because of this, the Commission on Appointments sent a letter to the Executive Secretary that
the "ad interim appointment extended to Bautista as Chairperson of the Commission on Human
Rights" is disapproved by the Commission in view of her refusal to submit to their jurisdiction.
The motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointment was also
denied by the Commission on Appointments.
It was then reported in the newspaper that the President had designated PCHR Commissioner
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission" pending the resolution of
Bautista's case which had been elevated to the Supreme Court. Salonga declared Bautista can
no longer hold on to her position after her appointment was not confirmed for the second time
and that Bautista can be accused of usurpation of authority if she insists to stay on her office.
Before the respondent Commission on Appointments had acted on her ad interim appointment,
Bautista filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate
issuance of a restraining order, to declare as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal
force and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee on
Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on her lawfully extended appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and
constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment. She further prayed "to enjoin
the respondent Commission on Appointments not to proceed further with their deliberation
and/or proceedings on the appointment of the petitioner or to enforce, implement or act on any
order issued in the course of their deliberations. Petitioner then filed an amended petition, with
urgent motion for restraining order, impleading Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin the
designated Acting Chairman as party respondent and praying for the nullification of his
appointment and seeking to restrain respondent Mallillin from continuing to exercise the
functions of chairman and to refrain from demanding courtesy resignations from officers or
separating or dismissing employees of the Commission.
Respondent Mallillin however argued that the petition is moot and academic since Bautista, as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, can be removed from said office at anytime, at
the pleasure of the President according to Executive Order No. 163-A. And that with the
disapproval of Bautista's appointment by the Commission on Appointments, there was greater
reason for her removal by the President and her replacement.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
(2) Whether the President could extend a so-called “ad interim appointment” to the petitioner
subsequent to her permanent appointment of the petitioner as Chairman on December 17,
1988, and after petitioner had qualified for the office to which she had been appointed.
(3) Whether or not petitioner’s appointment on January 14, 1989 which the President submitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation was an “ad interim” appointment.
(4) Whether Executive Order No. 163-A is constitutional.
(5) Whether petitioner can be removed from office.
RULINGS:
(1) NO. Bautista's appointment on December 17, 1988 is an appointment that was for the
President solely to make and not an appointment to be submitted for review and confirmation or
rejection by the Commission on Appointments. This is in accordance with the ruling of the Court
in the case of Mison and Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) NO. When the President converted petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on December 17,
1988 and after Bautista’s acceptance of the appointment through her taking her oath of office
and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights, Bautista's appointment was already a completed act on the part
of the President.
(3). NO. No new or further appointment could be made to a position already filled by a
previously completed appointment which had been accepted by the appointee, through a valid
qualification and assumption of its duties. The Commission on Appointments, by the actual
exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments, cannot
create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
The respondents also cannot contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on January
14, 1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim
appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make, or those without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why they are to remain valid until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
(4) YES. It is to be noted that, while the earlier Executive Order No. 163 speaks of a term of
office of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights — which is seven (7)
years without reappointment — the later Executive Order No. 163-A speaks of the tenure in
office of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights, which is "at the
pleasure of the President."
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. When Executive Order No. 163 was
issued, the evident purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that "the term of the
Members of the Commission shall be provided by law". As the term of office of the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years, without reappointment,
as provided by Executive Order No. 163, and consistent with the constitution, the tenure in
office of said Chairman and Members cannot be later made dependent on the pleasure of the
President. The Commission on Human Rights vested with the delicate and vital functions of
investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions
as well as remedial measures cannot truly function with independence and effectiveness, when
the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the
President. The Commission should be free from executive influence especially because many of
the irregularities on human rights violations are committed by members of the armed forces and
members of the executive branch of the government.
(5) YES. Petitioner may be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due
process properly safeguarded. If there are charges against Bautista for misfeasance or
malfeasance in office, charges may be filed against her with the Ombudsman. If he finds a
prima facie case against her, the corresponding information or informations can be filed with the
Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her suspension from office while the case or cases
against her are pending before said court.

13) G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Under Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council was created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. From the moment the JBC was
created, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-
officio members. Each House sent a representative alternately or by rotation pursuant to the
constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative. In 1994, the
composition of the JBC was altered and an eighth member was added while the 2
representatives from Congress who would sit alternately have onehalf of a vote each.
Eventually in 2001, the representatives from the Senate and House of Representatives were
allowed one full vote each.
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner Chavez asked the Court to determine whether the first
paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC; and if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each
House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. The Court granted
the petition of Chavez, declaring the current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council as unconstitutional. It also enjoined the Judicial and Bar Council to reconstitute itself
which was immediately executory, so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
However, on July 31, 2012, following the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Escudero and Congressman
Tupas, Jr. (respondents), the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012
in which the order for immediate execution was suspended and the parties were directed to
submit their respective memoranda within ten (10) days from notice. Pursuant to the same
resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. Respondents prayed
that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the grounds: that allowing only
one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral
nature; that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift
from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; that two representatives from
Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political
partisanship; and that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would
provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
The Court found some sense in the reasoning of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, however, it found itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal
issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to
absurdity considering its bicameral nature.
(2) Whether or not the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a
shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight.
RULINGS:
(1) NO. The Supreme Court ruled that allowing one representative from Congress in the JBC
does not lead to absurdity considering the Bicameral nature of Congress. The argument that a
senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and viceversa
is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. The
SC said that it may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
The Congress in exercising their legislative and constituent powers requires both Houses to
interact such as in the passing of a law and during voting. However, in its participation in the
JBC, no interaction is essentially required between the two Houses of Congress since their
participation in the JBC only entails the screening and nomination of judicial officers. The
Framers also simply gave recognition to the Legislature to be part of the JBC, not because it
was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government. Hence, the Court ruled that no parallelism can be drawn between the
representation of Congress in the JBC with the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers
and constituent powers.
(2) NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the Framers did not fail to make the proper adjustment in
the shift from unilateralism to bicameralism. And the choice of not changing the no. of
representatives of Congress to the JBC in the 1987 Constitution was not an oversight. In the
1987 Constitution, several provisions were already adjusted to be in tune with the shift to
bicameralism such as Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election
shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately." and under Section 18 in which, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." Hence in said provisions, the
Framers did make the corresponding adjustments in recognition of the bicameral nature of
Congress.
The Court also reiterated its July 17, 2012 Decision, that the use of the singular letter "a" to
describe the phrase "representative of Congress," means that the Filipino people through the
Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one seat in the JBC. If the intention had
been otherwise, the Constitution could have provided it. It is very clear that the Framers were
not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was
not in the exercise of its primary function which was to legislate. JBC was created to support the
executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.
The SC added that to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote
each, would negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is
enshrined in the Constitution. Increasing the number of JBC members to eight could also lead to
voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership. The SC also ruled that the scheme
of splitting the said vote into half between the representatives of Congress is a constitutional
circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court and also causes disorder in the voting
process. When the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is
sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
The Court also added that it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its
mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the
same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court
action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement. To broaden
the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject
matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. Pursuant to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all
of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound.

14) G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioner sought to declare the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino wherein Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries or other appointive officials of the Executive Department are allowed, in addition to
his primary position, to hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Petitioner argues that this
runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
8 (1), Article VIII.
The respondents invoked Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) which allowed the holding of multiple
positions by the appointive official if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position”.
However, petitioners argued that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-
B of the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in
general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII
which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in so far as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.
RULING:
(1) NO. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in
the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits them from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure which is provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
A strict application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of
the Government, would not strip the Members of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, since
the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of the concerned official's office. Such ex-officio posts do not fall under the
definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition because
they do not compromise ‘any other office’ but are properly an imposition of ‘additional duties and
functions on said officials.”
With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences are more apparent than
real. Holding too many positions of responsibility may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
Hence, a concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our
national and economic development, far outweighs the benefits, if any, that may be gained from
a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.

15) G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Due to the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election, the Judicial Bar Council unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice pursuant to Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court such as Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Renato C. Corona and Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales. Others either applied or were nominated.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing
the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio,
Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De
Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval.
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying that
the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees
for the position of the next Chief Justice.
Other filed a petition for prohibition, preventing the JBC from conducting its search, selection
and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice. Others also sought a ruling from
the Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments
to the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the incumbent President has the power and authority to appoint during the
election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice
on his retirement on May 17, 2010.
RULING:
(1) YES. The incumbent President has the power and authority to appoint the position of Chief
Justice since the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission ruled that had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. One of
the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight
appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments
dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo in which former President Macapagal issued
an administrative order which sought to cancel or withdraw the issuance of former President
Garcia of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours
before the inauguration of the President being an abuse of Presidential prerogatives.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, the Supreme
Court held that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in
the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments
in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be
made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan
considerations. The creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by
doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.

16) G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SATURNINO
DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila by Justice Pastor
M. Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo to declare section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
unconstitutional, and order the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-
fund the income taxes that were deducted from their salaries; (P1,744.45 for Justice Pastor M.
Endencia and P2,345.46 for Justice Fernando Jugo).
The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the 1935 Constitution, particularly section 9,
Article VIII has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited
by the Constitution. It held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the
payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was
a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is
expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
However, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, it
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, to counteract the ruling in that decision and to authorize and
legalize the collection of income tax
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly Section 13, can justify and legalize
the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
RULING:
NO. The SC reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution.
We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a
law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of
later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said
statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of
the land.
Under our system of constitutional government, the interpretation and application of laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends
to the Constitution. In this case, the declaration of Congress in Section 13, Republic Act No. 590
that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office," found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which refers
to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by
the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
The Court believes that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident
diminution thereof. Under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, said
official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom
every payday. As in the case of Justice Endencia, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685
every payday and every year is decreased by P1,744.45.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low
as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law,
such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national
revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the
constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it
should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the
establishment of the constitutional exemption.

17) G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-
SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police
Internal Affairs Service and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police
District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave
threat, robbery extortion and physical injury. A few days after, Police Senior Superintendent
Atty. Clarence Guinto also filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct with the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza on the same allegations. On
July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his office
which was duly complied with. Mendoza then filed their position papers with Gonzales. Pending
Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to
substantiate his allegations. Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure
to prosecute.
On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales
forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her
review wherein in his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct
and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Ombudsman approved
Gonzales’ recommendation thus Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration on November
5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.
On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case records
to the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December
14, 2009, the case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis
Garcia for review and recommendation. He then released a draft order to his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed
and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales’ office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft
and endorsed the order, together with the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by
the Ombudsman.
However, on August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s
case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour
assistants on board as hostages. This incident ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of
Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus. Thereafter, President Benigno C.
Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local
Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident through the creation of an
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
In its First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their "gross
negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza." The Committee
stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking." The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP
for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings. And on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before
the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for
Misconduct in Office. On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and
dismissed him from the service. The OP reasoned that "the inordinate and unjustified delay in
the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion for Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9) long
months’] xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s own Rules of Procedure." In his petition, Gonzales contended that
the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and that under
Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman. He added that Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration
had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve
the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9)
calendars days from his receipt of the order.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the issue raised by the petitioners is justiciable.
(2) Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which vests disciplinary authority in the
President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the Constitution.
(3) Whether or not there is a lack of an external check in the Ombudsman if it were an
independent office.
RULINGS:
(1) YES. The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a
justiciable – not a political – question. In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the
wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the President but it
is limited to whether such statutory grant violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.
(2) YES. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should be invalidated for violating the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court ruled that subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in
the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. The law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably
with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize.
Therefore, what is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who
are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls
external to her Office. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the
President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman
also fully support this position. Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional
Commission expressed his apprehension that any form of presidential control over the Office of
the Ombudsman would diminish its independence. The exchange between Commissioners Blas
Ople and Christian Monsod further revealed the constitutional intent of the framers to keep the
Office of the Ombudsman independent from the President.
(3) NO. It ignores the existing checks and balances already in place. On the one hand, the
Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject to the
impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up the
misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same
attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.
There is judicial recourse available in the Supreme Court as a non-political independent body
mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial disputes, whose judges and
employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman and whose neutrality
would be less questionable. In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument
becomes distinctly implausible. At the same time, the Court remains consistent with its
established rulings - that the independence granted to the Constitutional Commissions bars any
undue interference from either the Executive or Congress – and is in full accord with
constitutional intent.

18) G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES,
respondents.
FACTS:
Due to the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of
National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief
of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order. In compliance, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner
by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted and was
placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
On January 24, 2000, the President Joseph Estrada confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum which was addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the
peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program
including increased police patrols. And to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the
AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. However, he declared that the services
of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. On 17 January 2000, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare
President Estrada’s order to deploy the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional.
The IBP contended that the Deployment of the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila is violative of
the Constitution and in militarizing law enforcement in metro manila, the administration is
unwittingly making the military more powerful than what it should really be under the
constitution.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution, dated January 25, 2000,
required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. The Solicitor General
vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines,
contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment
of the Marines involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility
patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does
not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the factual basis of the calling out power of the President is subject to judicial
review.
RULING:
NO. The Court cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom such as in calling out
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In Section 18 of
Article VII, the Supreme Court may only review the factual basis or sufficiency of the factual
basis in the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or its extension. However, the Constitution does not grant a clear right for the judiciary to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the calling out power.

19) G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, et al., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
RAUL MANGLAPUS, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. Corazon C. Aquino then took over and was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. However, the Marcoses were still
able to stir trouble from afar through their loyalists who staged the failed Manila Hotel coup in
1986 and the takeover of television station Channel 7. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution
enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings
of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop the bloody challenges to the
government. On August 28, 1987, another failed coup was led by Col. Gregorio Honasan,
leaving scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. Communist insurgencies and the
seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, also
have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the
separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. The economy was also left
devastated by the accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation made by Ferdinand
Marcos. In his deathbed, however, Ferdinand Marcos signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. Considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, President Corazon Aquino stood firmly on the decision to
bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles
that the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people and that the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as
protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. Therefore, preventing the return of the Marcoses in order to
maintain peace is part of the President’s residual powers.

20) G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL
OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
The Petitioners who are duly appointed and qualified Judges of the Regional Trial Court all with
stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.They contend that "any tax withheld from their emoluments
or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court
en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive.
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges
are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional
protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.Under the 1973
Constitution, it provided that “the salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be
decreased during their continuance in office.” However, it also had another provision which
specifically stipulated that “No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.”
Since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the
1973 Constitution, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers was to revert to the concept of
"nondiminution" of salaries of judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

RULING:
NO. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the
final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission
negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-
diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose
income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax.
Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII,
negate such contention. The Commissioners decided that granting the judiciary the exception
from income tax which is a kind of economic immunity would lead to a fortress of privileges,
because this right accorded to the Judiciary is denied to the entire executive department and the
legislative. The argument that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice should not be sustained because
such is also true of Cabinet members and all other employees. There are many people who
have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are still
subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting
service in government.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable.
With the foregoing interpretation, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of
judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed
in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the
alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted. The Court
declared that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government
and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

21) G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C.
ENRIQUEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVIST AND
RETIREE AFFAIRS, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Elections, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani. On August 7, 2016 following Duterte’s proclamation as
President, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Ricardo R. Visaya, ordering the
implementation of the President’s verbal order to have the remains of the late former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani and to undertake all the
necessary planning and preparations thereof. Dissatisfied with such issuance, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed by Saturnino Ocampo and others in their capacities as human
rights advocates or human rights violations victims to prevent the burial of former President
Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Petitioners argued that the Libingan ng mga Bayani is
reserved for heroes. Since there had already been judicial declarations of the atrocities of
Marcos such as the procurement of ill-gotten wealth, then he cannot be considered a hero and
therefore not eligible to be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
ISSUE: Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violate the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. The Supreme Court held that it was lawful for the
President to make such an order because the disqualification for being buried in the Libingan ng
mga Bayani is criminal conviction. However, Marcos was not yet convicted for the charges
against him. Furthermore, the law also allows former presidents to be buried in the Libingan ng
mga Bayani. Since Marcos qualified for such, he was entitled to be buried in the aforesaid
place. There is also no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose
its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch.

22) G. R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P.
CELESTINO, Petitioners, vs. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and
RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
A petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction action was filed which sought to declare as null and void the
concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for
being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution and to enjoin respondent Elma from holding and discharging the duties of both
positions and from receiving any salaries, compensation or benefits from such positions during
the pendency of this petition. Respondent Ronaldo Zamora was also sued in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary. On October 30, 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his
oath of office as Chairman of the PCGG and during such tenure was then appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He took his oath of office for the latter position but waived
any remuneration that he may receive as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).
Petitioners cited Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary to support their position that
respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes
Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners
also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices. Citing also the
aforesaid case, respondents allege that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions
provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of
executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and does not cover
other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
Respondents claim that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should
be applied in the case. This provision, according to the respondents, would allow a public officer
to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and
(2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. They also
alleged that since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no
incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow respondent
Elma’s concurrent appointments to both positions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government Chairman can
concurrently hold the position of Chief Presidential Legal Counsel.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the present Constitution
does not apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a
Cabinet Secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary. Even if Section 13, Article VII were
applicable to the case, respondent Elma still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices
because neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions
of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if appointments in
question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments
are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B which covers all appointive and elective officials,
due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman
and the CPLC.
The PCGG being an agency under the Executive Department would render the actions of the
PCGG Chairman subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will then be
required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any
investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself.
Due to such incompatibility, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised which is the
situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible
offices.

23) G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II,
as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City,
ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
FACTS:
Sanders and Moreau, petitioners, were officers of the U.S. Naval Base in Subic while Rossi and
Wyer, were gameroom attendants of the U.S. Naval Station. On October 3, 1975, the
respondents’ employment was converted to part time instead of full time status. The
respondents protested against it and the hearing officer recommended to reinstate their status
to full time with backwages. However Sanders, in a letter to Moreau, disagreed with the decision
and asked for rejection of the recommendation alleging that the respondents were difficult
employees to supervise, Rossi alienating co-workers and supervisors and both discussing the
case in public places even though they were under oath to do the contrary. Before the start of
the grievance hearings, a letter purportedly sent by Moreau requesting the change of the
respondents’ employment status.
Because of this, the respondents filed a suit for damages against the petitioners in their
personal or private capacity at the Court of First Instance in Olongapo City claiming that the
letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused mental
anguish and the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal
and proprietary rights. However, in a motion to dismiss, the petitioners argued that they
committed the acts in the discharge of their official duties which the court had no jurisdiction
under the doctrine of state immunity. This motion was denied by the court on the ground that the
petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not
personal. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction is then filed in the
Supreme Court by the petitioners contending that the Court of First Instance acted in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.
RULING:
NO. The petition is granted and the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Sanders, as director of the special services department, had supervision over its personnel,
including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The letter he wrote was also just a reply to a
request from his superior for more information regarding the case of the private respondents.
Furthermore, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the
hearing officer's criticism as "an autocratic form of supervision”. As for Moreau, his act of writing
the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents'
type of employment is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior
of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval
Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. Given the official
character of the above-described letters, the Court held that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf
of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the
petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.

24) G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR
MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition that sought to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional since it was not
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain
the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. The Court also allowed the Commission on Appointments to file
a petition in intervention.
According to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second,
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower
in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. However, the Constitution is silent on whether the second, third and fourth
groups of officers should be appointed with the consent/confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Mison is unconstitutional?
RULING:
NO. Following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent/confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. The records of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and the country’s experience under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions wherein there
were malpractices and lack of the principle of checks and balances, the Supreme Court held
that it was the intention of the framers that “only those appointments expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the Commission on Appointments,
namely, "the heads of the executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All other appointments by
the President which are mentioned in the succeeding sentences of the provision are to be made
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. It thereby follows that the
appointment of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) not one of those
within the first group of appointments, no longer needs the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment
of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint is already
vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in
the second sentence of the same section.
The SC stated that the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to
the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs through Presidential Decree No. 34 which amended Sec. 601 of Republic
Act No. 1937. Even though such decrees were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, however under the 1987 Constitution, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to
be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and
to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

25) G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987

WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner, vs. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime before 1979, Wilfredo S. Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance in
Manila of two counts of estafa and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of eleven (11)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and
one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. Upon appeal, these convictions were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.1
On 18 April 1979, the petitioner was granted a conditional pardon by the President of the
Philippines on condition that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law." This condition pardon was accepted by the petitioner and he was consequently released
from confinement. However, on May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
recommend to the President to cancel the conditional pardon which was granted to the
petitioner. The Board showed evidence that on March 22, 1982 and June 24, 1982, petitioner
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa which were then pending trial before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). Another record also showed that on June 26, 1985,
petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of
sedition in which such conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate
Court. In a letter from the National Bureau of Investigation, the records showed that petitioner
had already been charged numerous times during the last twenty years for different crimes
(estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions).
On June 4, 1986, the Minister of Justice then wrote to the President informing her of the
Resolution of the Board which recommended to cancel the conditional pardon previously
granted to petitioner. Such recommendation to cancel the conditional pardon was then granted
by the President on September 8, 1986. The Minister of Justice then issued an Order of Arrest
and Recommitment against petitioner which led to his arrest and confinement to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
In the instant case, petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He contended that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not
been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged against him. He
added that he was not given a chance to be heard before being arrested and recommitted to
prison thus depriving him of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense but rather ascertainment of whether the convict has breached
his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines”. In
Tesoro vs. Director of Prison, the Court held that the determination of whether the conditions of
Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-
General and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. Hence, the
President, who granted the pardon, is also given the power to determine if the person had
violated conditions of his pardon. The Court then cannot interfere with the Executive in its
determination on whether a person had violated the terms of the pardon. However for the
subsequent crime, a conviction by final judgment of a court is required to impose criminal
penalties to the offender.

26) G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner, vs. CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the Commissioner of Land Registration which was a position
created by Republic Act No. 1151. Under section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is
"entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item set
forth the salary of said officer, with the rank and privileges of district judge to P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice through a letter, required the petitioner to
explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against the latter for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans
covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered
and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and
compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the
papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon
conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", that he was suspended pending the investigation of
the charges against him on gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest.
Petitioner then filed on March 18, 1968 a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction in the
Supreme Court to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of
the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the
Executive Secretary pending investigation, claiming for lack of jurisdiction and abuse of
discretion.
In their answer, respondents admitted the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration
Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of
First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; and that
the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in
nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation
of the principle of the separation of powers.
ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by Rep. Act 1151 and the Appropriation
Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 67 of the Judiciary Act does not claim or show that
the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary
at all.
The petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or
removed upon its recommendation, would result in the same right being possessed by a variety
of executive officials whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges
such as the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice, the Assistant Solicitors
General and the Securities and Exchange Commissioner.
Adopting petitioner's theory, would also mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of
investigating and disciplining officials whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent
curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant of the President's power to discipline
and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution
expressly placed under the President's supervision and control under Art. VII, Sec. 10.
It is the opinion of the Supreme Court that the Legislature could not have intended such unusual
corollaries when it granted said executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First
Instance. It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision
to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
The Supreme Court also held that if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general
grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to
be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it
would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, because it would result to
conferring upon the Supreme Court the administrative function of supervisory control over
executive officials, and simultaneously reducing the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.
Adhering to the principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever
possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, the Supreme Court
ruled that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the
"same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not
intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of
privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the
investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34
of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of
jurisdiction.

27) G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A.
ABIERA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the RTC of Antique,
filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order seeking the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.
In an affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office, he alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, the petitioner knew that no
decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted
for decision. The respondent further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of
service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, of 1989; and the months
beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of
ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. He also argued that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the
control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the petitioner said that the
Ombudsman’s investigation constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court.
(2) And assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
RULINGS:
(1) YES. As to the petitioner's argument that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction of the case
according to the ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from his
performance of official duties and is thereby under the Supreme Court’s control and supervision,
the Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. The Supreme Court cited that a
judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
(2) YES. The Supreme Court however, agreed with petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel which violates the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Supreme Court ruled that according to Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, it
exclusively vests on the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges'
and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, because such justification runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution
which grants supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel and
also undermines the independence of the judiciary.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination. The Ombudsman also cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this
matter.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same
to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties.

28) G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION,
GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. However, from the beginning
of his term, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that eroded his popularity and led
to his sharp descent from power. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The next day, Senator Teofisto
Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege
speech which accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson and P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. Due to
such speech, joint investigation was conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the
Committee on Justice while the House Committee on Public Order and Security also decided to
investigate. A move to impeach the petitioner was also spearheaded by some representatives.
In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House
of Representatives to the Senate. Days after, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
The impeachment trial then began in which Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of
Equitable-PCI Bank testified that petitioner Estrada had affixed the signature Jose Velarde on
documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.
Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance also alleged that the
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges
of insider trading. Then on January 16, with a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against
the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde.
The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger and on January 18, a 10-kilometer line
of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on
Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people’s solidarity in
demanding petitioners resignation. The day after, in the presence of former Presidents Aquino
and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared on
behalf of the Armed Forces, that they were withdrawing their support to the government. This
was followed by a similar announcement by PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson,
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned
from their posts. Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the
country.
On January 20, the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
started and about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacanang
Palace and issued a press statement that he has vacated the seat of presidency for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. On the same day, petitioner also
signed a letter declaring by virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution,
that he is unable to exercise the powers and duties as a President and by operation of law and
the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of such was then sent
to former Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel.
The Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. She appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and
special envoys and her government was recognized by foreign governments and the House of
Representatives and a majority of all Filipinos. After his fall from power, several cases
previously filed against the petitioner for bribery and graft and corruption, plunder serious
misconduct in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. A special panel of investigators
was also created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the
petitioner.
On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction that sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in the criminal complaints filed in their office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. He also filed a petition for
Quo Warranto and prayed for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President
of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. The parties filed their
replies and the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
(3) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
(4) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the
extent of the immunity.
(5) Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. Respondents cannot rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs.
Aquino since the cases involve the legitimacy of the government of Arroyo thereby presenting a
political question. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review since Arroyo still swore under the
1987 Constitution. The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions since the principal
issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution.
(2) NO. Using the totality test, the SC deemed that petitioner had resigned. For resignation to be
considered, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. According to the SC, his resignation was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang.
In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oathtaking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation and did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) when he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in
the past tense.
(3) NO. Following Tanada vs. Cuenco, the Supreme Court held that it cannot exercise its judicial
power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislative. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court
without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. In fine, even if the petitioner can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on
the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
(4) NO. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and
civil cases may already be filed against him. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
(5) NO. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case.
In the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court ruled that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an
accused’s right to a fair trial as well as by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality.
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts
does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

29) G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner, vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V.
VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondents.
FACTS:
After the elections, the twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments was proportionally
apportioned to the several political parties. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those that was
chosen to represent the Liberal Party. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino was reorganized which led to the resignation of Twenty four members of the Liberal
Party who then joined the LDP, thereby increasing the LDP membership in the House of
Representatives to 159 and correspondingly reducing the Liberal Party members to only 17.
Because of this, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP.
On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction in the
Supreme Court on January 13, 1989, challenging the decision to remove him from the
Commission on Appointments as well as the assumption of his seat by Singson. A temporary
restraining order was then issued by the Court on the same day to prevent both the petitioner
and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.
The petitioner contended that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments
because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
He claims that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment since the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not
yet attained political stability.
However, the respondent argued that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature
and beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. He also maintained that he was improperly impleaded since
it was the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stressed that it is not stated in the
Constitution that the political party registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the question raised by Daza is political in nature and therefore beyond the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
(2) Whether or not the respondent has been improperly impleaded in the case.
(3) Whether or not the reorganization of the House representation is not based on a permanent
political realignment since the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. The Supreme Court held that contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar since what is involved in the case is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. In the case, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional objection has become
even less tenable and decisive since even if it were to assume that the issue was political in
nature, the Supreme Court would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon them which now covers even political questions.
(2) NO. The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less
persuasive. Although it was not him who caused the petitioner's removal, the Supreme Court
felt that the objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. As
earlier held by the Supreme Court in the Emergency Powers Cases, “where serious
constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure."

(3) NO. On November 23, 1989, the Commission on Elections granted the petition of the LDP
for registration as a political party. The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party
must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Since the LDP has
been in existence for more than a year and has 157 members in the House of Representatives
and 6 members in the Senate with the President as its titular head, it surely cannot be
considered still temporary because although there are some internal disagreements among its
members, these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in
structure.

If the petitioner's argument were also to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House
of Representatives would be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and
also the Electoral Tribunal. Since the independents cannot be represented because they belong
to no political party, if the members of the LDP cannot be appointed, it would virtually leave the
Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all of the twelve seats of the House
of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the
House Electoral Tribunal. When with 41 members the Liberal Party were also allotted two of the
seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection.
30) G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner, vs. THE
BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LUZON
PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), which was formed by Taiwanese investors in a
petrochemical project, applied with the BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. In its application, it specified Bataan as the plant site and one of the conditions
for registration of the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or
fuel for its petrochemical plant. The said petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with
PNOC. The BPC’s application was granted and a certificate of registration was then issued on
February 24, 1988 by the BOI. BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other
incentives by BOI such as exemption from taxes on raw materials and repatriation of the entire
proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate
obtaining at the time of repatriation.
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, the chairman of USI Far East Corporation and the
major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter
advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by
changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason behind was the insurgency
and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
The petitioner, who is the 2nd district representative of Bataan, vigorously opposed the
proposal. President Aquino also expressed her preference that the plant be established in
Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. However, despite speeches in the Senate and House
opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC filed on April 11, 1989 its request for
approval of the amendments.
Its application is as follows: "(1) increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US
$320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and
polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. BOI then
approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical project.
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of
the Senate asserted that although the BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over
Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, the BOI or the government for that matter
could only recommend as to where the project should be located and it recognizes and respect
the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis
provide the funding or risk capital for the project.

ISSUE: Whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the
wishes of the investor contending that the latter has the final choice of the site and the decision
on the feedstock, national interest notwithstanding.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in approving
the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in
the investor, all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding.
First, the BPC agreed to the original choice of the BOI to establish the plant site in Bataan which
is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is also already no
need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas since
there is already an available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the
petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. Said site is also ideal and the result
of careful study and is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents also
have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable
labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of
the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan which can
provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, if the plant were in Batangas,
there is a need to import LPG for use of the plant when the country is short of LPG. The local
production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes.
Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the
furnaces of the transferred petrochemical plant.
Third, Republic Act No. 6767 which exempted naphtha as feedstock from the ad valorem tax
was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. However, it excluded LPG from
exemption from ad valorem tax. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or
contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to
"regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19,
Article II of the Constitution.
Fifth, the capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land
for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical,
more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the
great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the
management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically
nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by
BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for
reasons which remain murky to say the least.

31) G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his
capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Lance Corporal Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He
was charged with the crime of rape committed against Suzette S. Nicolas, a Filipina, sometime
on November 1, 2005, together with Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith
Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano. Petitioner Nicolas narrated that on the first day of November
2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City, respondent Smith conspired by
means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of
her intoxication, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abused and had sexual intercourse
with or carnal knowledge with her inside a Starex Van driven by Soriano, Jr., against her will
and consent. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States, the United States was granted custody of defendant Smith
pending the proceedings and faithfully complied with its undertaking of bringing Smith to the trial
court every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement, accused Smith was
to serve his sentence in the facilities agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities. However, pending such agreement, he was temporarily committed to the Makati City
Jail and was further sentenced to indemnify the petitioner in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a
contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the DILG,
and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government,
provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to
as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which stated that the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America agree that in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J.
Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first
floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12
square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police
and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States
is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.”
Petitioner contends that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because
the VFA is void and unconstitutional. As this issue had been raised before and resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of the VFA, the petitioners sought the reversal of the previous ruling on
the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic,
as well as a specific mandate of the Constitution in Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. This section was
designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops
or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign
sovereign State involved to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and
conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us
but not upon the foreign State.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the
VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.

RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that the presence of US Armed Forces in the Philippines is allowed. As
held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for
advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State as it is a matter of internal United
States law and internationally known practice by the United States under the provisions of the
so-called Case Zablocki Act.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic
courts varies from country to country. It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment
and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and
the enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under
international law. Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi, an
executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in international law and
constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-vis the United States.
The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate. Under Article V, joint
RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack
fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the
instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an
implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. Recognizing the
desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of the
Philippines, the parties agreed under the VFA that in cases of offenses committed by the
members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the custody of any United States
personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with
United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings. However, United States military authorities shall, upon
formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel
available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been charged.

32) G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000

MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO
ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President,
CIIF Oil Mills, respondents.

FACTS:
The International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC) which was a domestic shipping
business, entered into a one year contract with the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
companies which was comprised of Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport
Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED
COCONUT), for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia on 7 February 1996.
Majority of the shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by UCPB as administrator of
the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a
three month advance notice was given to the other party. However, prior to the expiration of the
contract, Oscar A. Torralba, the new president of the CIIF companies, terminated the contract
without the advance notice required and engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag
which was operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.
Petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., the Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman, public respondent, a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba.
The case narrated a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by
Torralba such as breach of contract in the unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract;
bad faith through the falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT
Transasia; manipulation to influence their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia; unreasonable
denial of requirement imposed; double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag;
engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner of
MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only P250,000.00; and,
lastly, overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to Cocochem. Petitioner
also charged respondents Oscar A. Torralba and Tirso Antiporda, the Chairman of UCPB and
CIIF Oil Mills before the Ombudsman for violating “The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act”.
However, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint based on its finding that it was a simple
case of breach of contract with damages that should have been filed in the regular court.
According to the Ombudsman, it had no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the
termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. They added that the entities involved
are also private corporations which their office has no jurisdiction. The Ombudsman also
dismissed the motion of reconsideration filed by petitioner as it was unswayed in its finding that
the present controversy involved breach of contract taking into account that petitioner had
already filed a collection case before the Regional Trial Court and that the filing of the motion for
reconsideration was already beyond the period of five (5) days from notice of the assailed
resolution.
Petitioner then imputed that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing his complaint. He contended that in the cases of COCOFED v. PCGG and
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, it had been declared that coconut levy funds are public funds while
in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, corporations formed and organized from those funds or whose
controlling stocks are from those funds should be regarded as government owned and/or
controlled corporations. According to petitioner, since the funding or controlling interest of the
companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund, it follows that they are government owned and/or controlled corporations.
Being such, that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are also public officers which are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
He also alleged that the Ombudsman’s conclusion that his complaint refers to a breach of
contract is whimsical, capricious and irresponsible amounting to a total disregard of its main
point on whether private respondents violated The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when
they entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corporation which was grossly
disadvantageous to the government in general and to the CIIF in particular. Although he
admitted that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, he argued that public
respondent should have relaxed its rules for the paramount interest of justice as the delay was
just a matter of days. However, the respondents countered that the CIIF companies were duly
organized and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code and that their stockholders are
private individuals and entities. Hence, according to them, they are not public officers as defined
under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but are private executives appointed by the
Boards of Directors of the CIIF companies. As petitioner filed a similar case for the collection of
money plus damages before the trail court, they also charged him with forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the respondents.

RULING:
NO. According to par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, a
government owned and/or controlled corporation is any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. This definition requires three conditions: it must be
organized as a stock or nonstock corporation; its functions must be related to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and that it is owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of
at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
In this case, all three corporations that comprise the CIIF companies were organized as stock
corporations with UCPB-CIIF owning 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the
shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. Since the shares
of stock of UCPB in Legaspi Oil is below 51%, it removes the firm from the definition of a
government owned or controlled corporation. As for GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT, it
failed to comply with the second requisite as there is no showing that they are vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. Hence, the
Court concluded that the CIIF companies are private corporations and not within the scope of its
jurisdiction.
33) G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the
Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of
their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their direction and control,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. The following day, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent
and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Because Arroyo believed that she
needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of
persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, she further
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front.
Two days later on December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her action. In her report,
President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms
in Maguindanao and risen against the government. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint
session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the
validity of the President’s action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could
act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting the martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao.
But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and before any
serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao’s inhabitants could arise, the
Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court
should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the
Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution
of such issue is unavoidable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may rule on the constitutionality of Proclamation
1959 which declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Province of Maguindanao.

RULINGS:
NO. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty
to review and validate or invalidate the same.
Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review
should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of
the Court.
Since President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress could
act on the same, the petitions have become moot. The lifting of martial law and restoration of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that
obliterated any justiciable controversy. Hence, the present cases do not present sufficient basis
for the exercise of the power of judicial review.

34) G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE,
Petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their
units operating in ARMM, Respondents.

FACTS:
Following the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters on
November 24, 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and
by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
Three days later, President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273), transferring
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the
President to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to issues
raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A
(AO 273-A) amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM
to the DILG.
Petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all
ARMM officials, filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 claiming that the President’s
issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy. They alleged that the proclamation and the
orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional
governments powers which is in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act
9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the
DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over
the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them. They further
claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents
occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well
as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the
AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
In its comment for the respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the
President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore
peace and order in subject places which is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-
Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom. She
must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available
to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and
whenever needed.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the orders did not authorize a takeover of the
ARMM as the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers
over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego and that they did not give him
blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials. The delegation was necessary to
facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. Further, the assailed proclamation and
administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the
Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
(2) Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out
the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and (3) Whether or not the President had factual bases for
her actions.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate
the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President
authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
governmental powers over the region. However, the Court ruled that the DILG Secretary did not
take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the
ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December
10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12 of RA 9054. In turn,
petitioner Sahali-Generale also became Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. Because of this, the
DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
(2) NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
(3) YES. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that “the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” While it is true that the Court may inquire
into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to
her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora, it is clearly the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the Presidents judgment.
In the case at hand, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s
exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all
areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of
the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
Apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly
explained that the President’s decision to call out the armed forces had factual bases. Not only
did the Ampatuans and Mangudadatus have thousands of personnel and firearms, there were
also intelligence reports of the involvement of rebel armed groups who would participate in the
conflict. Hence, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take
preventive action by calling out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms
and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threaten the peace and security in the
affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.

35) G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO
L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of
the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

FACTS:
Maximo V. Soliven is the publisher of Philippine Star while Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar is the
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 35. During the 1989 coup d’ etat when
Malacanang was almost taken over by Marcos supporters, the Philippine Star wrote in a column
that the President hid under her bed during the height of the coup, seemingly questioning her
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the country. Because of this, former President Cory Aquino
became furious and sued the newspaper and the writer for the article.
Petitioner Beltran argued that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues
Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

RULING:
YES. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention. The Supreme Court ruled that
the privilege of immunity from suit given to the President by virtue of the office may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.

36) G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
FACTS:
Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which provided in Section 1 that “a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.”
The petitioners, however, challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284. They
contended that the Executive Order which allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions, subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which states that “The President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 which allows Cabinet members to hold another
office is constitutional.

RULING:
NO. Since Section 13, Article VII prohibits Cabinet members from holding any other
office/position, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution sought to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding, during their tenure, multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those
cases specified in the Constitution itself and those posts held without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office.
The citation of Cabinet members as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which
cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.
The rationale provided by the Supreme Court for such prohibition is for the aforestated officials
to have focus on their respective offices as being head of an executive department is no mean
job. It requires full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. The officials should be
allowed to attend to their duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. They should be precluded from dissipating their efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency. The advantages to be derived from this concentration of
attention, knowledge and expertise far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from
department heads spreading themselves too thin and taking in more than what they can handle.

37) G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010, Respondent.
FACTS:
Former President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 which provided for the
creation of the Philippine Truth Commission. The Commission was an ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Petitioner Louis Biraogo, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailed the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1. He contended that it was violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. Biraogo questioned the
President’s capacity to create public offices which he argued was a function of Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions.
RULING:
NO. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution
as he is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This power flows from the need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Department
of Health vs. Camposano, the Chief Executive’s power to create an ad hoc Investigating
Committee is part of his constitutionally granted power of control over Executive Department.
The President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow
an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the
investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano
Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in
the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-
existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the contention that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, the Supreme Court ruled that there will be
no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is also no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would
be allocated to the Commission shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there
is no impropriety in the funding.

38) G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, et al., Petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ
(IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVIST AND RETIREE
AFFAIRS, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), et al., Respondents.

FACTS:
During the campaign of President Duterte, he announced that if elected, he would allow former
president Ferdinand Marcos to be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. When he eventually
won and assumed the presidency, public respondent Secretary of National Defense issued a
memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines regarding Ferdinand
Marcos’ internment in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear
Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding
General to provide services, honors and other courtesies for the late Former President Marcos.
A petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was then filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,
in their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined
under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013). They argued that the Libingan ng mga Bayani is reserved for heroes.
Petitioners claimed that Marcos' acts and deeds - the gross human rights violations, the
massive corruption and plunder of government coffers, and his military record that is fraught
with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies - are neither worthy of perpetuation nor serve as a
source of inspiration and emulation of the present and future generations. Hence, not being
worthy of being buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Furthermore, petitioners argued that the
burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just
rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also
condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution."
For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos' alleged
"heroism."

ISSUE: Whether the issuance memorandum and directive international laws, particularly and
implementation of the assailed violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws.

RULING:
NO. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. The Supreme Court ruled that while the Constitution is a
product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing
guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB. Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 1
7, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No.
289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.
Applying the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero"
would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and
every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President
under existing laws and regulations. The Supreme Court also contended that the proposed
interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act itself does not
confer upon him the status of a "hero” as the purpose of the LNMB has neither been to confer to
the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be
treated as a "hero."
Petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as
to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative
until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents. The enforcement
of Human rights violations’ victims under R.A. No 10368 will also not be impaired by the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As argued by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal
connection and legal relation to the law. Furthermore, the law also permits former presidents to
be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Hence, as a former president, Marcos then qualifies to
be buried in the said place. Lastly, there is no law exclusively prohibiting Marcos from being
buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, the President can exercise his residual powers in
doing so.

39) G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, represented herein by
its Secretary, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES,
represented by BAGUIDALI KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region 12
Chapter), respondents.
FACTS:
On November 15, 1999, Israel C. Gaddi, the Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, issued a Memorandum directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly
Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative
Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, which provided for the
redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative units in the regional and field offices.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim administrative
arrangement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in delivering its services pending approval of the government-wide
reorganization by Congress, the DENR adopted a policy to establish at least one Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional
District except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital
Region (NCR). Further, the Regional Executive Directors (REDs) were also authorized to
realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with the attached
distribution list per region. In compliance with such, the supervision of the Provinces of South
Cotabato and Sarangani were transferred from Region XI to XII.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees
association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary
injunction. Hence, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from
implementing the assailed Memorandum and ordering to stop the transfer of DENR Region 12
offices from Cotabato City to Korandal (Marbel), South Cotabato. Petitioner then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, with the arguments that the power to transfer the
Regional Office is executive in nature and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and that the decision to transfer is also based on Executive Order No. 429 which has
been validly affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region
12 Office.

RULING:
YES. The qualified political agency doctrine “recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Said doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President over all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices provided under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, as held by the Supreme Court in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, the
President has the continuing authority to carry out the reorganization in any branch or agency of
the executive department which includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public offices.
Such authority is part of his residual powers as enunciated in Book III, Section 20 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. Thus, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to
be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, the Supreme Court stressed that the power of the President to
reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional centers.
In identifying said centers, the President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field
services of government agencies. In this case, the same intention can be ascertained from the
preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 in which the DENR sought to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services.

40) G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002

HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (Executive Judge, Branch 28), ULRIC R.
CAETE (Presiding Judge, Branch 25), AGUSTINE R. VESTIL (Presiding Judge, Branch
56), HON. MTC JUDGES TEMISTOCLES M. BOHOLST (Presiding Judge, Branch 1),
VICENTE C. FANILAG (Judge Designate, Branch 2), and WILFREDO A. DAGATAN
(Presiding Judge, Branch 3), all of Mandaue City, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondent.
FACTS:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of
P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased said amount to P1,500 for each
judge. However on March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that additional allowances in the form of
honorarium should not exceed P1,000.00 in provinces and cities, and P700.00 in municipalities.
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to
Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC
Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the
amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges
were reduced to P1,000 each and they were also asked to reimburse the amount they received
in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of
disallowance. They argued that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue
City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein. They also maintained that said circular is not supported
by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Furthermore,
the said circular is also void for lack of publication. Lastly, they contended that the yearly
appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458,
par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. However,
the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the
COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President and for not having been published.
(2) Whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for
additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by
Congress.
RULINGS:
(1) YES. The Supreme Court declared LBC 55 as null and void as the exercise of local
autonomy of local government units is only subject to the power of supervision by the President.
Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “the President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.”
Under his supervisory powers over local government units, the President can only interfere in its
affairs and activities if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. Hence, the
President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any
directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of
a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because
it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

(2) YES. LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local
government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities.
However, Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, which serves as the legal basis of LBC 55,
allows the grant of additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government
allow. The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional
allowances granted to judges. Thus, the finances of a city government may allow the grant of
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its
annual expenditures. In this case, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of
P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional allowances of more
than P1,000 each to ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of
enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. Hence, the DBM over-
stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did
not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the
circular had no legal basis.

41) G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and
MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, petitioner Llamas who was the incumbent Vice Governor of Tarlac, together
with Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a
verified complaint dated June 7, 1989 against respondent governor Mariano Ocampo III before
the then Department of Local Government charging him with alleged violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337 and other laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Before that, petitioner also filed with the Office of the Omdusman a verified complaint against
respondent governor for the latter's alleged violation of Section 3-G of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After trial, Governor Mariano Ocampo III was found guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or
abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract — with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc.
that was grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province. A penalty of suspension from
office for a period of 90 days was then imposed on him. However, without ruling on respondent
governor's Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent issued a Resolution granting the
former executive clemency for the reduction of his ninety-day suspension. Thus, respondent
governor reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to
the petitioner.
The petitioner contended that the issuance by public respondent of the Resolution constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction. He argued that executive clemency
could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books
or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
Petitioner also contends that since respondent governor refused to recognize his suspension,
having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of the suspension order, executive
clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of
executive clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a
finding by public respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent
governor, the former failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter.
Petitioner further alleges that the executive clemency granted was the product of a hocus-pocus
strategy because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed by
respondent governor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President through his Executive Secretary can grant executive
clemency to the suspended governor even though it is not one of those enumerated in Sec. 19.

RULING:
YES. It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission that the President's executive
clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the
Constitution. If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those
adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit. In criminal
cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence
to support a decision. Thus, it will be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of
some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them,
even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public.
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city officials
devolves on the Department of Interior and Local Government and ultimately on the President.
Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the President to
reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or
removal order, even in the granting of executive clemency.

42) G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG
TORRES, (LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and
daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners, vs.
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA,
MM., respondents.

FACTS:
Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time
before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the maximum
sentence expiring on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to
Torres by the President of the Philippines on the condition that the former would not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Petitioner Torres accepted the said conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement. However, on May 21, 1986, the
Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President to cancel the conditional pardon
granted to Torres since he had been charged once again with twenty counts of estafa and
convicted of sedition by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The President therefore
canceled the grant of conditional pardon in September 8, 1986. On October 10, 1986, an Order
of Arrest and Recommitment was executed against the petitioner and was eventually arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
The wife and children of Torres then filed a petition praying for the latter’s immediate release
from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition
of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of
innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the
terms of a conditional pardon. In a proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department can proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
or under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code which is
an exercise of his executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to
the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to
prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. When Torres
consented to the terms stipulated in the contract, he has thereby placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that he
complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration
of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." Said exercise of presidential judgment is
beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented
to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it,
cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered.
Also solely vested in the Chief Executive is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in
his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him,
warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a
pardon to a convicted criminal. There is likewise no basis for the courts to effectuate the
reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers
undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.

43) G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TANADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents.

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. He then
called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence. Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency, President
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust
or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger. Furthermore, respondents also claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers
and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the
issuances, as well as the raid of an army outpost in Benguet which resulted in the death of three
soldiers. Lastly, the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests was another reason for the declaration.
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several
cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. The
President then suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region as well as
cancelled all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I. She also revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor also announced that warrantless arrests and take-
over of facilities, including media, can also already be implemented.
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed,
groups of protesters still marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently
dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. Well-trained policemen also used truncheons, big
fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and
scatter the massed participants in Cubao, Quezon City, along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de
Roxas Street in Makati City. One of those arrested in the rallies was petitioner Randolf S. David
who was a professor at the University of the Philippines and a newspaper columnist. Together
with him who was also arrested was Ronald Llamas, President of the Akbayan partylist.
On February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of
the PNP also raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. During the raid, they confiscated news
stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. A few minutes
after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune, the police also surrounded the premises of
Malaya and the tabloid, Abante.
Seven petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were then filed with
the Supreme Court. Said petitions assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for
the imposition of martial law; and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, speech and assembly. However, respondents argued that PP 1017 has constitutional
and legal basis and does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of
grievances.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President can order a ban on public assemblies and rallies.
(2) Whether or not the President can order the raid of the newspaper establishments.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. It is violative of the freedom of expression and assembly. However, the state can
regulate the conditions of the rallies. The state does not prevent the freedom to rally but it only
regulates it. The Supreme Court ruled that modern jurisprudence promotes maximum tolerance
over rallies. Hence, a rally cannot be simply dispersed in the absence of a permit to rally but
only if said rally had already become a nuisance or becomes violent.
(2) NO. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, such temporary take over as
provided in Section 17 of Article XII refers to Congress, not the President. Hence, the President
may exercise such power with the delegation of power of Congress through a law prescribing
the terms and limits thereof. In this case, President Arroyo still needs the authority of Congress
for such take over.

44) G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., et al., Petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, represented by HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE, Respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance
with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The
provisions of the statute, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory state. Petitioners argued that since it is a function of the Senate to
ratify a treaty, it is then the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed treaty to the
Senate for the latter to exercise its discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

RULING:
NO. The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. He acts as the
country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs and is thus vested with the authority to
deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. He also
has the sole authority to negotiate with other states in treaty-making.
The signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. The signing is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument
and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. On the other hand, the ratification is the formal
act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. This is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the
state or of the government.
The argument of petitioners that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law
to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis since the signature does not signify the
final consent of the state to the treaty. Rather, it is the ratification that binds the state to the
provisions thereof. The Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of
the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. By ratifying a
treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of
such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being
accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the
contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its
people. The President thereafter also has the discretion on deciding whether or not to ratify the
treaty or not.

45) G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al., Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped
the women as part of the destruction of the village. These soldiers forcibly seized the women
and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by
Japanese soldiers. Said actions of the Japanese led the petitioners to spend the remainder of
their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and
emotional suffering.
The petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS which is a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War. They claimed that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort
women stations in the Philippines. However, said officials declined to assist them and argued
that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the two countries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can compel the Executive Department to espouse their
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

RULING:
NO. The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan. The question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter for
which authority is delegated by the Constitution to the political branches and not the courts. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951. Therefore, the wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The petitioners
could also neither assail the said determination by the Executive Department through a petition
for certiorari. The Executive Department has also already determined that filing the claim would
be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
creating serious implications for stability. The Supreme Court ruled that overturning the
Executive Department’s determination is tantamount to an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch in which such authority is only granted to them by the
Constitution.

46) G.R. No. L-23846, September 9, 1977

GO TEK, petitioner-appellee, vs. DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
On March 3, 1964, the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go
Tek a Chinaman who was allegedly a sector commander and intelligence and record officer of
the Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States. It was also alleged that fake
dollar checks were found in his possession thus violating article 168 of the Revised Penal Code
and also rendering himself an undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed for the Board to recommend to the President the immediate deportation
of Go Tek as an undesirable alien. However, Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint was premature. He argued that the board had no jurisdiction to try the case in
view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, that it may deport aliens only
on the grounds specified in the law. However, such motion was denied by the board. They
reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may exercise its rights to
deport an undesirable alien and that they are only a fact finding body whose function is to make
a report and recommendation to the President in whom has the exclusive power to deport an
alien or a deportation proceeding.
Due to such, Go Tek filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the
Board in which it issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the board from hearing Go
Tek's case. Citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, the court held that mere ion
of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law and that under
section 37(3) of the law, before an alien may be deported for having been convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude,
a conviction is needed. Since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article
168, the court ruled that the deportation was premature.
The Board then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court on the ground that the decision is
contrary to law. They contended that the trial court was wrong in assuming that the President
may deport undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law and in holding that mere
possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation, and that a criminal conviction
is necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on
a ground which is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the aliens has
not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal
possession of fake dollar checks as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities in spite of the fact that
he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code
and notwithstanding that act is not the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as
enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek before- the Board
was not premature as the obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case invoked is not of this case. In
said case, the aliens were charged with economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation
under Republic Act No. 503.
Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected by order of the
President, after due investigation and by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners. The Supreme Court also held that the State
has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. Said power may be exercised by the Chief
Executive when he determines it is necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the
nation. Furthermore, it held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation
conducted. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the
evidence on which he acted.

47) G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner colleges filed a petition which sought to declare the unconstitutionality of Act No.
2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. They argued that said act
deprives owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property
without due process of law; deprives parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children
for civic efficiency; and confers on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to
prescribe rules and standards constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative power. On the
other hand, the Government contended that the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy
exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; petitioners are in
estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and that the Acts are constitutionally valid.
Act No. 2706 which was approved in 1917 is "An Act making the inspection and recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." The provisions of
said Act mandate the Department of Education to supervise and regulate all private schools in
the country. Petitioners argued that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit
before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint. This
argument is in reference to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before a
private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of
Education.
However, the Solicitor General pointed out that none of the petitioners has no legal standing on
the case since all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits. The petitioners also have not asserted that the respondent Secretary of Education has
threatened to revoke their permits. Hence, the Solicitor General contended that they have
suffered no wrong under the terms of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions. Petitioners also did
not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation.
Therefore, there is no reason for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the
power by the Secretary of Education. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might
under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. Hence, without an actual controversy, the case is still premature.

48) G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. He
questioned the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides that “Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment
of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.” He argued
that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case filed by petitioners has actual controversy.

RULING:
NO. Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the assailed provision. No
petition seeking his disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is also no ruling
of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari.
His question being hypothetical, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered
without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the
primary jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC as section 2, Art. XII-C of the Constitution
provides that it is the “sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.”

49) G.R. No. 131124, March 29, 1999

OSMUNDO G. UMALI, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA
JR., CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION,
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.

FACTS:
On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue by then President Ramos. However, on August 1, 1994, President Ramos
received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal
revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more
particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. Former President Ramos
authorized then issued an order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately
referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. In its Order, dated August 9, 1994, the
PCAGC directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for
the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994,
at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required Answer.
On August 25, 1994, petitioner appeared with his lawyer, Atty. Bienvenido Santiago before the
PCAGC. Counsel for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue submitted a Progress Report,
dated August 24, 1994, on the audit conducted on the petitioner. As prayed for, petitioner and
his lawyer were granted five (5) days to file a supplemental answer.
On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 152 which ordered for the dismissal of petitioner from the
service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his dismissal but was denied by the Office of the President. Thus, he filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner was suspended and dismissed from the service in violation of
his constitutional right to due process of law.
(2) Whether or not the constitutional right of the petitioner to security of tenure was violated by
the respondents.
(3) Whether or not the PCAGC is a validly constituted government agency and whether
petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s decision.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was not denied the right to due process before
the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect
to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings
before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of nonobservance of
due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis.
(2) NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security
of tenure. The petitioner contended that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue,
he is a CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner’s claim of CESO
eligibility lacks evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter.
(3) NO. With regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, the petitioner raised such in
his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Hence, it was too late
to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.

50) G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset
Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO
MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

FACTS:
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government from the Japanese
government through the Reparations Agreement entered with Japan This property which
consisted of the land and building became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs.
Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has
remained undeveloped since that time.
There was then a proposal presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by the former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese
firm, Kajima Corporation, who will construct two buildings in Roppongi and one building in
Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of
the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one of the buildings to be
constructed in Roppongi and the two buildings in Nampeidai. However, the government has not
acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties.
On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Orders.
The respondents, however, contended that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and
devolution of the title to a property. Further, they argued that even assuming that the Civil Code
is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has
become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic
purposes for over thirteen years now.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

RULING:
NO. The constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the
constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." Thus, the
Supreme Court did not decide on the constitutional issues since it can be decided on another
issue. The Roponggi property, being part of public dominion, cannot be sold alone by the
President. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress, thus requires executive and legislative concurrence.

51) G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

FACTS:
Fernando Poe, Jr. ran for the Presidential Elections. However, a petition was initiated before the
COMELEC to disqualify him and cancel his Certificate of Candidacy on the basis that he made
a material misrepresentation claiming he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Allegedly, Poe was
not a natural born Filipino citizen being a son of foreigners whose father was Spanish while the
mother was an American. Petitioners further alleged that even if his father was a Filipino citizen,
he was illegitimate since he was born a year before his parent’s marriage while his father was
also already been married before. However, COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit
as well as the motion for reconsideration instituted thereafter. Hence, petitioners assailed the
COMELEC’s decision in this case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of the COMELEC and declared Poe as a
naturalborn Filipino citizen. It was ascertained that grandfather Lorenzo Pou, having died at the
age of 84 years old in 1954 would have been born sometime in the year 1870 and the place of
residence upon his death, in the absence of any other evidence, would also have been his place
of residence before he died. With these considerations, he would have been a beneficiary of the
en masse Filipinization effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. Since Pou’s citizenship extends to
his son, Allan Poe, it would also make Fernando Poe, Jr. as a natural born Filipino as well. In
the aspect of legitimacy, the 1935 Constitution which prevailed during Fernando Poe, Jr.’s birth
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipinos regardless of whether they were
legitimate or not.

52) G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND
ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. When she was five years old, spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and
Susan Roces filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan
City. Upon reaching the age of eighteen years old, she registered herself as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office and also applied and was issued a Philippine Passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). She enrolled and pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the Philippines and eventually continued her studies abroad and left
for the United States of America in 1988. In 1991, she graduated from Boston College with a
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
On 27 July 1991, she married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. As she wanted to
be with her husband, she lived in the United States and eventually gave birth to her children
there. On 18 October 2001, she also became a naturalized American citizen. When her father
ran for the presidency, she came back to the country to support him but returned to the U.S.
thereafter. Petitioner once again returned to the country when his father became sick and
eventually died. After such incident, she and her family decided to move and reside permanently
in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. The family then began preparing for
their resettlement. The family purchased a condominium unit and eventually built their family
home in the country while the children of school age also began attending Philippine private
schools.
On 7 July 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Under the Act, she filed with a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children. This was then granted to
the family. She also registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City and secured
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport.
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Poe as Chairperson of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, she
executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City. The following day,
she took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice
Consul also issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States".
Two years after, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she obtained the highest number of votes. On 15
October 2015, she then filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her
COC, she declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up
to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24
May 2005.The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City. Petitions were then
filed challenging her citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Based on statistics offered by the Solicitor
General from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), there was a 99.83% statistical probability
that any child born in the Philippines in that decade when Poe was born is natural-born Filipino.
She also possessed the typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
As a foundling, Poe was likewise a citizen under international law. Through the incorporation
clause wherein the country adopts generally accepted principles of international law, a foundling
is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth according to Art. 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention, or is also presumed to have been born on the place where he or she was
found, pursuant to Article 2 of the 1961 UN Convention of the Reduction of Statelessness. Thus,
having been found in Ilo-Ilo and subscribing to principles of international law, Poe was ruled as
a Filipino citizen by the Supreme Court. The latter also added that since it was just an
administrative proceeding, substantial evidence suffices in considering Poe as a natural-born
citizen of the country.

53) G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
nonimmigrant. She was permitted to come into the country on March 13, 1961 for a period of
one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. However, she continued to stay in the country
beyond said period and after repeated extensions. On January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao who was an alleged Filipino citizen. The respondents contended
that marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer Filipino citizenship.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was also ascertained
that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not also name any Filipino
neighbor with the exception of one named Rosa and did not even know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. Hence, the Commissioner of Immigration still decided for her
arrest and immediate deportation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that since Lau Yuen Yeung married a Filipino, she now
possessed Filipino citizenship through derivative naturalization. Under Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines. Therefore, Lau Yuen Yeung who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, not being disqualified to become such by naturalization, is a Filipino citizen by virtue of
her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao under the Naturalization Laws of the country.
54) G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Eventually, Manzano incurred
the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
Respondent Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration. However, he argued that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother and was only considered an American citizen under US
laws since he was born in the United States. He contended that notwithstanding his registration
as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship thus holding dual citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Manzano is disqualified from the position for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy and is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected.

RULING:
NO. Respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano, having been born in San Francisco, California,
acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the
principle of jus soli. However, he was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the
1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
When he was issued an alien certificate of registration, it did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
Since respondent registered himself as a voter after attaining the age of majority and voted in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, said acts effectively renounced his US citizenship under
American law. Thus, under the Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship. Furthermore,
by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

55) G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008

NESTOR A. JACOT, Petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines but became a naturalized
citizen of the US on December 13, 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 and filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General of Los Angeles, California.
On the same day, he then took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On September 27, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six
months thereafter, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. However, respondent Dal filed a Petition for
Disqualification before the COMELEC against petitioner on the ground that the latter failed to
renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines was already
made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy
operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 12 June 2007, the
COMELEC then issued its resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US
citizenship. Petitioner Jacot then assailed the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his argument. But said motion was thereafter
dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court found that petitioner should indeed be disqualified. Contrary to his
assertions, the oath of allegiance he made to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement
of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire
or retain their Philippine citizenship. However, there is nothing in such oath that renounces his
foreign citizenship. Section 5(2) of the aforesaid act compels natural-born Filipinos, who have
been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired Philippine citizenship and
are seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections. Therefore, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is
substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225.

56) G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE,
respondents.

FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. However, petitioner Raul R.
Lee who is another candidate for the position, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that
his Certificate of Candidacy of Frivaldo be canceled and he also be disqualified from seeking or
holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines. The
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. Frivaldo then filed a motion for
reconsideration which remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. Hence, his
candidacy continued in which he obtained the highest number of votes.
On June 9, 1995, Lee, who procured the next highest number of votes filed a petition praying for
his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. He was thereafter proclaimed by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Frivaldo then filed with the COMELEC a new petition praying for the annulment of the
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. According to him, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted.
Thus, Frivaldo contended that when the said order was released and received by Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as governor.
Furthermore, he argued that as held in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not
Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated a decision that Lee, not having
garnered the highest number of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 is therefore qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal and was able to cure his lack
of citizenship.

RULING:
YES. The repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is valid and deemed to have
retroacted to the date of his application on August 17, 1994. the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of
any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. Being a former Filipino who has
served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.

57) G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier
General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO
BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S.
HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda was a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines from 1943 to 1944. He
is now charged before a military Commission which was convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his
duties as such command and permitting his subordinates to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces,
which is in violation of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, however, filed a petition which
sought to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines, to
enjoin and prohibit respondents Hussey and Port from participating in the prosecution of his
case before the Military Commission, and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding
with his case. According to him, said Executive Order violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws since the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent
to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare. Hence he argued
because of such, the commission had no jurisdiction to try him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
NO. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in Chief of all our armed forces. The President as Commander in Chief is fully
empowered to consummate the trial and punishment of a war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68. The rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. Under the doctrine of incorporation, these rules and principles therefore form
part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

58) G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1180 or "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed to regulate the
retail business in the Philippines. Said Act prohibits against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade. The only exceptions to such prohibition are those aliens actually engaged in said
business before May 15, 1954 and those in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States.
Petitioner brought the action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and
to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions in behalf of other alien resident’s corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. Petitioner contended that said act (1) denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business through
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity
to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
On the contrary, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila argued that (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180 violates international treaties.
(2) Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. The Supreme Court found no merit in the contention of petitioners that the act violated
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. The Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects while the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations. That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the
Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations
Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade,
and in most nations of the world, laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
As to the alleged violation on the Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of China, the Court ruled that all that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment
to the Chinese nationals upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the
nationals of China are not discriminated since all nationals of other countries, except those of
the United States, are prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
(2) YES. Even if the law infringes upon a treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the
police power of the State.

59) G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary,
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General,
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR
MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of
foreign rice to be purchased from a contract with Vietnam and Burma. He also created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other respondents for the implementation of said
proposed importation. Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner, is a rice planter and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the
production of rice and corn. He filed the petition contending that making or attempting to make
said importation of foreign rice constitutes acting with grave abuse of discretion because
Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn. Petitioner prayed,
therefore, that said petition be given due course and that a writ of preliminary injunction be
forthwith issued restraining respondent and their agents or representatives from implementing
the said plan of importing foreign rice.
The respondents argued that the contracts with Vietnam and Burma have already become
binding. Further, they contend that in case of conflict with R.A. 3452 and the aforesaid
contracts, the contracts should prevail as it is the one which was made the latest. As held in
American jurisprudence, when a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the
conflict must be resolved in favor of the one which is latest in point of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract should prevail over Republic Act No. 3452.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements
have not been sufficiently established. Even if they were, they are null and void according to the
Constitution as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 3452. The
President may not by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes because the Constitution provides that the President may not indirectly repeal laws by
the legislature as its main function is to enforce laws only.
The American theory is also not applicable in the case as said contracts are not treaties. The
theory is justified as treaties require consent of the Senate. However, executive agreements are
not authorized by such legislation. Therefore, since what was entered into was an executive
agreement, it does not have an effect of a law.

60) G.R. No. 91332, July 16, 1993

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF
TABAC REUNIES, S.A., petitioners vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized and does business in the United States.
As registered owners of "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration, it
asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK". Petitioners
argued that it is in contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law. On the other hand,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation argued that it has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is
a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated. It also contended that since plaintiffs
are not doing business in the Philippines coupled with the fact that the Director of Patents has
not denied their pending application for registration of its trademark "MARK", the grant of a writ
of preliminary injunction is premature. However, petitioners argued that their trademarks are
entitled to protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which the
Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines. It has
then the force and effect of law under Section 12, Article XVII of the Constitution. On March 28,
1983, the preliminary injunction prayed by petitioners was denied by the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to enforce their trademark rights in the country.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that since Philip Morris does not conduct business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered. Section 2 of the
Trademark Law states that one may appropriate a trademark to his exclusive use if there is an
actual use thereof. Since Philip Morris does not conduct business in the country, they cannot
exclusively use a trademark and has not right to be protected.
Even if the Philippines is a signatory to the Paris Convention, it does not follow that by any
means imply the primacy of international law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation, generally accepted principles of international law are given equal standing yet are
not superior to national legislative enactments.
61) G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States signed an Extradition Treaty which was then ratified by
the Senate. The Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States sent a request for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. Pending evaluation, Jimenez requested for copies of the official
extradition documents but was denied by the Justice Secretary.
The Secretary of Justice contended that the denial of the request of Jimenez is consistent with
Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent
the interests of the United States in any proceeding arising out of a request for extradition. Since
the US Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
subject information, it cannot grant said request.
Failing to procure such documents, Jimenez filed with the RTC a petition against the Secretary
of Justice, Foreign Affairs and the Director of NBI for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition and
from performing any act directed to the extradition of him to the United States. This petition was
granted by respondent Judge Lantion. The Secretary of Justice then initiated proceedings
against the former.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

RULING:
NO. Under the doctrine of incorporation, whenever there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provisions of the Constitution or a local statute, efforts should first be
made to harmonize them. However, if they are irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between the two, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by municipal courts
for the reason that said courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
Since the private respondent’s right to due process is protected by the Constitution which is the
organic law of the land, the Supreme Court ruled that said respondent should be furnished
copies of the extradition request and grant him reasonable period to file his comment with
supporting documents. The right to due process of the prospective extradite must be protected.
The application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will also not go
against the treaty or implementing law.

62) G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a.
MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

FACTS:
After the Supreme Court granted Mark Jimenez the copies of the extradition request in
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, the Secretary of Justice filed a motion for reconsideration which
the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision stating that private respondent Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
The DOJ, representing the US government, filed with the RTC the petition for extradition, which
prayed for the issuance of an order for the immediate arrest of Jimenez. Before the RTC could
act on the petition, Jimenez filed an urgent manifestation which prayed that petitioner’s
application for an arrest be set for hearing; which was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez once
again prayed that in case a warrant should be issued, he be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P100,000 which was granted by the RTC.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can
be issued.
(2) Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. As argued by petitioner, the Supreme Court ruled that sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor
the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been
defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
(2) NO. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution
granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest
warrant. The constitutional provision of bail in Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court stated
that bail is only applicable when a person has been detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws.
The constitutional right to bail comes from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It then follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply in extradition cases where presumption of
innocence is not an issue.
Presidential Decree 1069 which was enacted in compliance to the Extradition Treaty is a guide
for the implementation of such treaty under the doctrine of transformation. Thus, there is no
choice but to apply the treaty.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States
is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

63) G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG, et al., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, et al., Respondents.

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after
such enactment from Congress, people from various sectors of society filed cases to declare its
unconstitutionality.
Petitioners claimed that the RH Law which would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables violate the right to life of the unborn as
stated in Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. The legislation would allow access to abortive
thereby effectively sanctioning abortion, despite the RH Law’s express terms prohibiting it. They
also contended that medical research shows that the contraceptives result to an abortion as
they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. Furthermore, they also argued that
the promotion of contraceptives, through the RH Law, is contrary to their religious beliefs and
violates the right to religious freedom, as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives which are contrary to said beliefs.
Respondents, however, argued that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since it only
allows non-abortifacient reproductive health care services. According to them, Congress has
made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients. The constitutional
right to life is also not violated because various studies of the WHO show that life begins from
the implantation of a fertilized ovum. Since the RH Law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed, it does not
violate the provision.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional.
(2) Whether or not conception begins from implantation.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. As to the right to life, the Supreme Court held that the RH Law does not violate such
right as said law has adequate safeguards to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. The law also requires that the contraceptives be procured from a duly
licensed drugstore or pharmaceutical company and that they be tested, evaluated and approved
by the FDA. For the argument that the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom, the
Supreme Court ruled that it is not within the province of the court to determine whether the use
of contraceptives is moral from a religious standpoint due to the principle of separation of the
church and state. Under the non-establishment clause, the state is prohibited from sponsoring
any religion and mandated strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups. Hence, petitioner’s
contention was not given merit since the state cannot be dictated by the policies of one religion
or dogma. Furthermore, the Supreme Court provided that in case of conflict between the
provisions of the RH law and the exercise of religious freedom, consensus objection is applied
wherein those health workers whose religion prohibits a performance are not compelled to do so
as the courts accord primacy to religious freedom.
(2) NO. The Supreme Court held that Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution shall be
understood to mean that life begins at fertilization. Verba legis was applied to the provision
wherein the traditional meaning of conception was ascertained, that conception is “the formation
of a viable zygote.” From the deliberations of the Constitutional convention, the Supreme Court
found that it was the intent of the framers for conception to mean fertilization since the fertilized
ovum already takes in nutrients and possesses other vital signs of life.

64) G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO EBRALINAG, et al., petitioners, vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CEBU, respondent.

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1265 required the singing of the National Anthem, saluting the flag and reciting
the pledge as compulsory. However, petitioners failed to perform such mandated acts as it is
against the teachings of their religion. Jehovah’s witnesses believe that aforesaid acts are
already considered as acts of worship or religious devotion, which they cannot conscientiously
give to anyone or anything except God. Hence, a number of Jehovah’s witnesses students were
expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for violation of said act.
The students and their parents then filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right
to freedom of speech, religion and worship. They also contended that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They merely quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their respective classes until further orders from this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the expulsion orders issued by the public
respondents. It ruled that religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights for it involves the relationship of man to
his Creator. Since the petitioners also do not engage in external acts or behavior that would
offend their countrymen and show their respect by merely standing in silence during flag
ceremonies, then such act does not warrant expulsion. Furthermore, an expulsion would also
violate their right under the Constitution to education.

65) G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, Respondents.

FACTS:
The ARMM which was created by law provided for the creation of a regional assembly which
had the power to create laws. Through this power, they created the Shariff Kabunsuan province,
composed of the 8 municipalities in the 1st district of Maguindanao through MMA Act 201. Since
Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao, it passed a resolution requesting the COMELEC to
clarify its status in view of the conversion of the 1st District of Maguindanao into a province.
COMELEC then issued Res. No. 7902 renaming the former 1st district of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City to Shariff Kabunsuan province with Cotabato City.
Petitioner Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, filed a petition to nullify aforesaid COMELEC Resolution
and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. She
contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution. Thus, she asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution
No. 7845 which designated Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao’s
reapportioned first legislative district. Lastly, she claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902,
the COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
ISSUE: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly has the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.

RULING:
NO. As to municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts
with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create them, provided Section
10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is only
granted to Congress. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides that “each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives”. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member.
Therefore, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution. A city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot
also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with
a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically
becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution. Thus,
the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district.

66) G.R. No. L-18684, September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO MERCADO
and MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental,
Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan, and the provincial governor of Negros Oriental. They filed a
petition as they alleged that they have been discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, since
they were given less representative districts than the number of their inhabitants required or
justified. They also contended that said act was passed by the House of Representatives
without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the Members at least three calendar
days prior to its passage and was approved more than three years after the return of the last
census of our population. However, the respondents alleged that they were merely complying
with their duties under the statute, which they presumed to be constitutional. Respondent
National Treasurer also averred that petitioners have no personality to bring this action and that
a duly certified copy of the law creates the presumption of its having been passed in accordance
with the requirements of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 3040 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court declared Republic Act 3040 as unconstitutional as it violated Article
VI, Section 5 of the Constitution which states that the legislative districts shall be apportioned in
accordance with the no. of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. This provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave Cebu
seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila
four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less
inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having been
assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224
got three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants
(515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while
Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.

67) G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:
Resolutions from COMELEC disqualified several partylist groups from participating in the
partylist elections by denial of their petitions to register or cancellation of their
registration/accreditation even if they already participated in previous partylist elections. Hence,
52 partylist groups and organizations filed a petition assailing the said resolutions. COMELEC
contended that such issuances were valid since those disqualified groups do not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented. Some nominees for said groups also did not come from the
sector they represent.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said
partylists.

RULING.
NO. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Court
adopted new parameters in the qualifications under the partylist system. The said court ruled
that the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Article VI,
Section 5 provides that partylists include national or regional parties or organizations. Said
provision did not limit the system only to sectoral organizations. The Supreme Court also ruled
that the nominees of the partylists need not belong to the sector they represent as long as they
have the track record of promoting the interest of their sector and that they are a member of the
party or organization.

68) G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, petitioner, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995. However private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the COMELEC. He alleged that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency as Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. He then prayed that "an
order be issued disqualifying and cancelling Marcos’ certificate of candidacy. On March 29,
1995, petitioner Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. She
explained that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation". She sought to rectify the mistake by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy. Further, she contended
that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the COMELEC came up with a Resolution finding
private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; striking off her
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and canceling her original
Certificate of Candidacy. But on May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation if she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. However, COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes. Marcos argued that she was the overwhelming winner of
the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. On account of the resolutions for her
disqualification, Marcos filed a petition to the Supreme Court for relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos has met the requirement of residency to run as representative of
the First District.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court It held that Marcos has complied with the said requirement. It ruled
that the 7 months petitioner wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy was only her actual residence.
As a minor, Imelda Marcos followed the domicile of her parents which was Tacloban, Leyte. And
since there is an absence of clear and positive proof that she had abandoned her domicile of
origin, the court held that her domicile was still Tacloban, Leyte. Even upon marriage, she did
not lose her domicile but only gained an actual residence. Throughout her life, she also kept
close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban and celebrating
birthdays and other milestones in the said place.

69) G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI,
MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

FACTS:
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 20 March 1995, for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, he claimed to be a resident of the said district for 10 months. However,
when faced with a petition for disqualification, he claimed in his certificate of candidacy to have
been a resident of the district for 1 year and 13 days. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for
disqualification and allowed Aquino to run in the election. Aquino then won the election but upon
a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the COMELEC later issued an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the issue is resolved. However, the COMELEC
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified him for the elective office for lack of the qualification of
residence. Thus, Aquino filed a petition assailing the decision of COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino has complied with the residency requirement for the elective
position.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Aquino is disqualified as he was not able to prove
that he had established his new domicile and abandoned his domicile of origin. His intention of
not establishing a permanent home in Makati is evident in him leasing a condo instead of buying
a home. His previous COC also indicated that he was a registered voter of Tarlac for more than
52 years prior to the election. His short length of time which he claimed to be a resident of
Makati also indicates that his purpose for the transfer of residence was to qualify as a candidate
for the said position.

70) G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker,
House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L.
SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected as Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur. He then filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM with the COMELEC. Because of this, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House
of Representatives excluded petitioner from the roll of Members of the House, pursuant to
Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code as well as other proceedings of the House.
When he lost his bid as governor of the aforesaid province, he expressed his intention to
resume performing his duties as a Member of Congress.
According to petitioner, he was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives;
he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his
office suites were occupied by other persons. Therefore, he contended that he was barred and
excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly
elected and qualified congressman from his district. Although he admitted that he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy, he maintained that he did not lose his seat as congressman because
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, and
therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
Furthermore, he asserted that under Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to the
constitutional provisions as it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a
ground not provided for in the Constitution. He contended that if it were the intention of the
framers to include the provisions of the aforesaid section as among the means by which the
term of a Congressman may be shortened, they would have incorporated it in the present
Constitution.
On the other hand, respondents contended that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in
said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2,
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. They also argued that the ground provided in Section 67
is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein
are not exclusive. There are other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of
Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty
of disqualification to hold public office. Finally, respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a
Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he
is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They also further maintained that their questioned act
is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 67, Article IX, of B.P. Blg. 881 is operative under the present
constitution?
(2) Whether or not the respondents could exclude the petitioner from the rolls of the House of
Representatives, thereby preventing him from exercising his functions as congressman, and
depriving him of his rights and privileges as such?

RULINGS:
(1) YES. The petitioner's assumption that the questioned provision is no longer operative does
not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of
office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their
tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their
former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve
the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from
their constituents. Hence, what is cut short is not the term but rather the tenure of office. Under
the questioned provision, when an elective official covered files a certificate of candidacy for
another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term
remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
(2) YES. The Speaker and House Secretary-General, as administrative officers, perform
ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide
by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their
ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.

71) G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL
KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et al., petitioners, vs. THE SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

FACTS:
In October 1987, the petitioners filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
1987 elections. On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Estrada but
including Senator Enrile filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of a case on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case as respondents. The petitioners
contended that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which
they perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a
solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the
respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only
three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules which required the concurrence of five
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than
four members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three including one Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Such situation created by the petition for disqualification would then leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, who are all Justices of
this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Electoral Tribunal can render judgment without the Senator
Members.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a situation wherein the Senator Members cannot sit in
the tribunal due to the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other body can perform. The overriding
consideration must be that the Tribunal is not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone
has the power to perform and the performance of which is in the highest interest of the public as
evidenced by it being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

72) G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR.,
VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY,
FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO,
FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B.
FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, a m respondents.

In his privilege speech, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. disparaged the President’s
administration by making malicious bribery charges against the President. Because of said act,
House Resolution No. 59 was passed which provided for the creation of a Special Committee
tasked to investigate the charges made by the petitioner. if found to be baseless, petitioner may
then be subjected to disciplinary action.
Osmena then filed a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against respondent Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the aforesaid Special Committee. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the grounds that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House; his words constituted no actionable conduct; and after his
allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII,
sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member
had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
The special committee then submitted its report through House Resolution No. 175 which found
petitioner guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him from office for fifteen
months. Respondents argued that it is within the power of Congress to discipline its members
with suspension. They upheld their decision and contended that with Congress having ended
its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee, whose members are the sole respondents, had
thereby ceased to exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary privilege of speech.

RULING:
NO. While Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that Members of Congress are
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress and cannot be
questioned in any other place, aforesaid Members may be questioned by Congress itself. The
Supreme Court ruled that his parliamentary immunity does not protect him from being subjected
to disciplinary action. Furthermore, Congress itself can discipline its members when their words
and conduct are found to be disorderly or unbecoming of a public official.
73) G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation filed a complaint
against Senator Miriam Santiago, who was then a CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. On or about October 17, 1988, petitioner Santiago was alleged to have unlawfully and
criminally approved applications for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens, which
is in violation of Executive Order no. 324. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan imposed
suspension on the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago for ninety days from her position as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position she may be
holding at present or hereafter. Hence, Santiago filed a petition assailing the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension on a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines. Santiago contended that the constitution granted the authority to discipline a
senator to the Senate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the suspension contemplated in the constitutional provision
is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. However, the suspension
imposed on Santiago was a preventive suspension and not a punishment which results from a
criminal complaint.

74) G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREÑAS, et al., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.,
respondents.

FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. In the 12th
Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which increased the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
The rationale for the amendment was to restrain the mad rush of municipalities converting into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they
are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt
from the P100 million income requirement the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
In the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate once again
failed to approve it. Per advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the 16 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. These bills also contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu.
Eventually, the cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 without
the President's signature.
Petitioners filed petition to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violating Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. They also
lamented that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment as more cities will be sharing the same amount
of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
(2) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULINGS:
(1) NO. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood
Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The Supreme Court ruled that turning
the 16 municipalities into cities is constitutional because it is within the plenary power of
Congress to amend/repeal laws passed by those of the previous Congress.
(2) NO. The Cityhood Laws uphold the equal protection clause since at the time when the 16
municipalities’ applications were pending, they were already qualified to be converted into cities.
It was then the fault of Congress that they did not approve of such application. To subject the 16
municipalities to comply with the new requirement of reaching the requisite revenue for a city
would be unfair since they had already complied with said requirements before.

75) G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:
Various petitions challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716 which seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system were filed. The petitioners contended that in enacting R.A. No.
7716 or the Expanded Value Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because
although the Act originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate
but was simply consolidated with the Senate version which is S. No. 1630 in the Conference
Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. According to petitioners, this
violates Article VI, Sec. 24 which provides that all appropriation, revenue, tariff bills or bills
authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application and private bills must originate
exclusively from the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional as it did not exclusively originate from
the House of Representatives.
RULING:
NO. Because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills.
However, after a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, the Senate certainly
can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two
chambers of Congress. While Art. VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must
"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." Thus, in the exercise of this power, the Senate may
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.

76) G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado together with other
groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. The Lambino group wanted to shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The aforesaid group then filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum
Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. It also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals. On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution, as held in Santiago v. Commission on Elections. Thus, the group filed a petition to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution can be amended through a people’s
initiative provided that there is an enabling law giving them the authority to do so according to
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Furthermore, changing the form of government is no
longer an amendment but a revision since it is a major revision. However, a revision cannot be
done by people’s initiative but through a Constitutional convention or by majority vote of
Congress.

77) G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, et al., petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE
GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
There was a law granting the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office he charter to operate
gambling activities. The PCSO then entered into a joint venture agreement with a Malaysian
company for the latter to operate gambling infrastructure in the country using their technology.
Kilosbayan, a civil society group, filed a case to declare the agreement as invalid because it
violates the charter of PCSO which prohibits the latter from entering into agreements with aliens
in so far as gambling is concerned. However, respondents contended that Kilosbayan did not
have the locus standi to file the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the case.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held that petitioners do not have legal standing to sue since they are
not parties to the contract and would not suffer a direct injury as a result of the law’s
implementation. Furthermore, petitioners are also not involved in gambling. However, the
Supreme Court still took cognizance of the case as it is of transcendental importance because
gambling pervades in many parts of the country.

78) G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System, due to privatization, decided to sell by public
bidding 30% to 51% of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation which owns Manila Hotel. In a
close bidding, Manila Prince Hotel lost against Renong Berhad, a Malaysian company, that bid
P2.42/per share more than petitioner. Pending declaration of winning bidder, petitioner in a
letter to GSIS, matched the bid price of P44.00/share and issued a check by Philtrust Bank for
33 million pesos as bid security to match the Malaysian group. However, this offer was not
accepted by GSIS. Hence, Manila Prince Hotel went to court and it issued a TRO enjoining
petitioners from consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
(2) Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite,
it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
(2) Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

RULING:
(1) YES. The Supreme Court ruled that it is a self-executing provision. Since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when or whether they shall be effective.
Section 10, par. 2 of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. Hence, it is judicially enforceable. The said provision of the Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. Hence, it simply means that
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

(2) YES. Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony as it has
become a landmark of Philippine heritage. Although it started as an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

79) G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, et al., petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition seeking to cancel all timber licensing agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licensing agreements. Plaintiffs, representing their generation as well as those in the future,
contended that they are entitled to the enjoyment of the natural resources such as tropical
forests. They further asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance in the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Meanwhile, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause
of action against him and that it is of a political question. The RTC Judge sustained the motion
to dismiss, ruling that relief prayed would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution. Petitioners thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue.

RULING:
YES. Petitioners have locus standi. In so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned, the Supreme Court ruled that petitioners have the personality to sue on behalf of the
future generations due to the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Section 16, Article II
which recognizes above all: the state shall protect and advance the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature is also recognized as a self-
executing provision and may be a source of obligation upon the state without need of further
positive act from Congress.

80) G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. PABLO FELICIANO and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.

FACTS:
This appeal was filed to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic
of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion who is
representing the Republic of the Philippines. Prior to this, the respondent, Pablo Feliciano filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
consisting of four lots. The trial court declared Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano
while the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, be reverted to the public domain. However, the 86
settlers of the Barrio of Salvacion alleged that they had been in possession of the land for more
than 20 years under claim of ownership. The trial court then ordered the settlers to present their
evidence. However, they did not appear on the day of the presentation of evidence which led
the trial court to rule in favor of Feliciano. However, the settlers immediately filed a motion for
reconsideration. The case was reopened which allowed them to present their evidence.
Feliciano then filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court but was denied. The settlers
also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

HELD:
NO. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, which is a governmental agency
created by Republic Act No. 3844. Since the complaint is a suit against the State, it cannot be
given due course without a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or
by implication. Furthermore, the complaint itself also fails to allege the existence of such
consent.

81) G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

FACTS:
The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress on November 28, 2001. A year after, the House of
Representatives then adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on the Judiciary Development Fund. On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was
endorsed by the House Representatives and was thereafter referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 due to its insufficient substance. The
following day, the second impeachment complaint was filed by several House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by the House Resolution. This impeachment complaint was then accompanied
by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” which was signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were then filed with the Supreme
Court which contends that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as
it violates Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution which states that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the offenses alleged in the second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
(2) Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

HELD:
(1) NO. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
intent is also clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The courts will not
touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux
of the controversy.
(2) YES. The second impeachment complaint is barred as it falls within the one year bar
provided in Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. The word “initiate” in said provision
takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Since an
impeachment complaint had already been filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by the House Representatives
against the Chief Justice already violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

82) G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,

vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for its first regular session of the 11th
Congress wherein the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S.
Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President in
which the latter won. With the concurrence of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Senator Tatad
manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader. According to him, those who
voted for him belonged to the minority while those that had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the majority. However, Senator Guingona was recognized as minority leader of the Senate by
the Senate President after receiving a letter from the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as such. The next day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping
and unlawfully holding the position of Senate minority leader, which for both, rightfully belongs
to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
(2) Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
(3) Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?
(4) Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?

HELD:
(1) YES. It is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.

(2). NO. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary. Thus, the method of choosing who will be such other officers
is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself and not by the Court.
Furthermore, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders nor is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or choosing its holders. Hence, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature.

(3) NO. Respondent Senator Guingona did not usurp nor unlawfully hold and exercise the
position of Senate minority leader. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the
person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
However, petitioners in this case present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise
to the office of the Senate minority leader. In the absence of any clear-cut guideline, in no way
can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Further, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

(4) NO. Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader since the latter belongs to one of the minority
parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. Through unanimous resolution of the members
of said party which voted for him to be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Senate President Fernan only formally recognized Guingona as minority
leader after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, in which both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints. Due to such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that
he cannot be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed
to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

83) G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,
MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.

FACTS:
Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province in the September
17, 1935 elections.. The provincial board of canvassers then proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the National Assembly on October 7, 1935 for garnering the highest number of votes. A
month after, he then took his oath of office. On December 3, the National Assembly then passed
Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. However, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara a few days after on
December 8. The Electoral Commission thereafter passed a resolution the next day to be the
last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. On December 20, Angara filed before the Election
Commission a motion to dismiss the aforesaid protest contending that the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period. However, Angara’s petition was denied
Angara then prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the controversy.
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted within its jurisdiction.

HELD:
(1) YES. The SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission. When there are conflicts
between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to
review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review or referred to as Judicial Supremacy.
Judicial supremacy is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(2) YES. The Electoral Commission acted within its jurisdiction since the latter is recognized as
an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal or corporation, board, or
person. It is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. This includes the power of
regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of the National
Assembly of its members is not required and does not limit the Electoral Commission of its
power to fix dates for election protest since the contrary of such would undermine the power and
functions of the Electoral Commission.

84) G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et al., Petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., Respondents.

FACTS:
Republic Act 9522 or the Baselines Law was enacted. This law defined the archipelagic
baselines of the Philippines for the purpose of compliance with the terms of the third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The petitioners questioned the validity
of RA 9522 with the contention that it decreased the national territory of the Philippines, thereby
making the law unconstitutional. They argued that the law abandoned the demarcation set by
the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties resulting to the exclusion of the country’s claim
over Sabah; it undermines Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
country’s nuclear-free policy and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions since it opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts; and the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG),
as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not R.A. 9522 or the Baselines Law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines.
(2) Whether or not RA. 9522 or the Baselines Law undermines Philippine sovereignty and
national security.

HELD:
(1) NO. The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 9522 or the Baselines Law did not decrease but
rather increased the demarcation of the Philippine territory. Under R.A. 3046 which was
amended by RA 9522, we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines resulting
to an area covering 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). However, under R.A. 9522 and
with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime territory increased
to 586,210 sq. na. mi. The classification of the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough
Shoal as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area since we still continue to lay
claim over said islands as enunciated in the definition of territory in the Constitution and through
effective occupation. The Constitution defines the territory of the country as not only limited to
those islands in the archipelago but also “all other islands and territories which the Philippines
exercises jurisdiction over.” Furthermore, the UNCLOS also only defines maritime territories and
said islands do not fall under said category but are rather land territories.

(2) NO. Philippine sovereignty and national security is not undermined since we have already
waived some of our country’s sovereign rights by signing into the UNCLOS through the principle
of auto-limitation. Furthermore, the innocent passage would still be subject to the regulation of
the state therefore not undermining its powers.

85) G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents. However, on November 5, 1985, he
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship as provided under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4) wherein a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of
a foreign country. On March 17, 1994, he then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. Thereafter, in the May 11, 1998 elections, he ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Petitioner
Bengson then subsequently filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen of the
country as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

HELD:
YES, since repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. In this case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States but subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630. Having taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and also being
registered in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan, in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen; a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. Hence, the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship. Since the law did not require Cruz to go through naturalization proceedings in order
to reacquire his Philippine citizenship, the acts he performed already made him a natural-born
Filipino. Hence, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the
House of Representatives.

86) G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., and VALERIANO CABILING MA,
Petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., et al., Respondents.

FACTS:
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma,
Nicolas Ma, and Isidro Ma are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores
Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in the
country for almost sixty years. Their whole lives were spent in the country, not having set foot in
Taiwan nor even traveled abroad, and consequently raised their respective families in the
Philippines. They received both their primary and secondary education in the country and do not
speak nor understand the Chinese language. During their age of minority, they secured from the
Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration. Upon reaching the age of twenty-
one, they then claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution. The aforestated provision provides that those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of
the country. However, despite taking their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners
failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 or “An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen”.
However, it was only more than thirty years after they elected Philippine citizenship that they
registered said documents with the civil registrar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are not considered Filipino citizens but foreign nationals
subject to deportation as undocumented aliens.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners are Filipino citizens. According to Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 or “An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen”, the
statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are a statement of election under oath, an
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines and registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. In this case, although
petitioners failed to register their election of Philippine citizenship in the civil registry, the court
held that it should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a
Filipino mother. They are considered to be Filipino citizens upon their election of such
citizenship as registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. It is just a means of confirming the
fact that citizenship has been claimed. Further, the court held that the lacking requirement may
still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties.

87) G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS
AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Calilung filed a petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, which sought to enjoin the latter from implementing RA No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. The said law provides that “all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act”. Natural-born citizens of the country who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of another
country are deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. Furthermore, the Act provides that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall also
retain their Philippine citizenship. Petitioner Calilung contended that RA No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution which states that,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." He
argued that the act in question cheapens Philippine citizenship and allows dual allegiance and
not dual citizenship. He also maintained that the act also allows all Filipinos, either natural-born
or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing
their foreign citizenship.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional for violating Section 5, Article IV of the
Constitution.

HELD:
NO. RA No. 9225 is constitutional. From the excerpts of the legislative records, it is clear that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries and to allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country. The Supreme Court ruled that the act does not recognize dual allegiance
on its face since the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic. It also ruled that Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and not a self-executing provision. The legislature would still need to
enact the law on dual allegiance. From Section 3 thereof, the act stayed clear out of the problem
of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country.

88) G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and
ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham requested to proceed with his pending Civil Case with the Court of First
Instance of Manila that was initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation. However,
Judge Arsenio Dizon, the respondent judge, refused to continue hearings on the case which
were initiated during the Japanese military occupation due to the proclamation of General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”. According to respondent judge, said
declaration had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of
the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such
authority. He further contended that the government established during the Japanese
occupation was not a de facto government.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines during Japanese military
occupation were de facto governments.
(2) Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Army, has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts
and proceedings of the said courts.

HELD:
(1) YES. The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines established during the Japanese occupation were de facto governments. The
former which was organized by Order No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a
civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto
government since the source of its authority comes from the Japanese military and is a
government imposed by the laws of war. Although apparently established and organized as a
sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, the latter
Republic of the Philippines was also, in truth and reality, a government established by the
Japanese forces of occupation.
There are three (3) kinds of de facto governments: the government that gets possession and
control of the rightful legal government by force or by the voice of the majority; the government
that is established and maintained by the military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war; and, the government that is established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the mother state.

(2) NO. The phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation must be
construed as referring to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
proceedings. According to a rule of statutory construction, "a statute ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." It is therefore
to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States, did not intend to act
against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later
embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, should not only reverse the international policy and practice of his own government,
but also disregard the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation." A contrary construction
would also result to great inconvenience and public hardship, and endanger and sacrifice great
public interests, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued
or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily
become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer
available, especially since almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by
fire as a consequence of the war.
89) G.R. No. L-9959, December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS
DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Sometime in 1863, a devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines. Contributions
amounting to about $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine
Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of the victims of said
earthquake. On October 6 of the same year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of
the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. From the amount,
$80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more
working capital, then petitioned the Governor-General for them to loan the latter amount. In
June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000.
However, the respondent bank declined to comply on the contention that only the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement. On account of this, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General,
brought a suit against the Monte de Piedad to recover the $80,000, together with interest, for
the benefit of the victims of the earthquake or their heirs. After trial, judgment was ruled in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with
legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant then appealed.
It questioned the competence of the plaintiff government to bring the action, on the contention
that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine government can file a suit against Monte de Piedad on behalf of
the intended beneficiaries or their heirs.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as representatives
of the legitimate claimants adhering to the doctrine of parens patriae wherein the government is
considered to be the guardians of the rights of its people. Thus, the legislature or government of
the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its
general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted
with it. This prerogative is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a beneficent function, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their
rights, justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show
that this beneficent function has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a
monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called
into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is clearly capable of
being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases.

90) G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO,
BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO,
Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, who is a television evangelist and host of the Ang Dating Daan
program, made obscene remarks alluding to Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo
and also a regular host of another program, Ang Tamang Daan, during a broadcast. Two days
thereafter, almost identical affidavit-complaints were filed by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
against the petitioner before the MTRCB. The latter then sent the petitioner a notice of the
hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the aforementioned incident.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days. The same order also set the
case for preliminary investigation. The next day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the
preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other
members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. However, two
days later, petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing
with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension
order issued. On September 27, 2004, a decision was rendered finding Soriano liable for his
utterances and imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program.
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the program part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III of the Constitution.

HELD:
NO. Under the circumstances of the case and in consideration of the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of
his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating
Daan for three months. It cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the paramount of viewers’ rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media, a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication.
There is also nothing in petitioner’s statements that is the subject of the complaint that
expresses any particular religious belief or furthers his avowed evangelical mission. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults
directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that it cannot accept
petitioner’s contention that the statements were made in defense of his reputation and religion,
as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. Rather, they simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-
calling and foul-language discourse.